

FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES

1958–1960

VOLUME III

NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY; ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT

Microfiche Supplement



DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960

Volume III

National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

Microfiche Supplement

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351 *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors of this microfiche

supplement are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This microfiche supplement is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series for the years 1958–1960. The subseries presents in 19 volumes and 2 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the final 3 years of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This supplement to volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, is the last part of the subseries published covering the 1958–1960 triennium.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this supplement was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of the statute, although access to some records was restricted, as noted below.

The editors have had complete access to all the retired records and papers in the Department of State. The Department's collections of NSC papers and correspondence were of the highest value. Some of these documents are available in the central (decimal) files and lot (office) files deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Over the last several years, all the Department's indexed central files for these 3 years, as well as several of the lot files, have been permanently transferred to Archives II. The remaining Department lot files covering this triennium are scheduled to be transferred to Archives II in the near future.

Records of the Central Intelligence Agency and certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State became available to the Department historians only after this supplement was compiled. Arrangements have been made for Department historians to have access to these records for future volumes.

The major decisions on national security and arms control questions were made by President Eisenhower, usually after recommendations from and discussion in the National Security Council (NSC) and his Committee of Principals, established in 1958 to advise him on disarmament matters. The most important Presidential records are the

relevant White House files at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, to which the editors had complete access. The Eisenhower Library contains, among other important collections, the memoranda of discussion at the NSC meetings, usually prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, and the memoranda of conference with the President, prepared by the President's Staff Secretary, Andrew J. Goodpaster.

Records of the National Security Council located at NARA include the numbered NSC papers and related documentation. Because White House and Department of State records contain many significant Department of Defense documents, the editors sought only selected access to the Department of Defense files. The editors also perused the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the official papers of General Nathan F. Twining, General Thomas D. White, and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke.

The List of Sources (pp. 1–6) lists the files consulted both in government repositories and in private collections for the print volume and the microfiche supplement.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the *Foreign Relations* series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in a microfiche supplement or in editorial or bibliographical notes.

The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors give priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes).

Selection Criteria (in general order of priority):

1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identity the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States;
2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted;

3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy;

4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members;

5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies;

6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues;

7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State;

8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State;

9. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions;

10. Economic aspects of foreign policy;

11. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance;

12. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies;

13. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies;

14. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes.

*Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for the Microfiche
Supplement to Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume III*

Most of the research for the print volume and this supplement was completed in 1988, prior to a protracted declassification review. The principles of selection followed by the editors for the print volume are described in the preface of the volume. The print volume may be used without this supplement, but the supplement should be used in conjunction with the print volume.

The documents selected for this microfiche publication by the editors of volume III provide additional details on the major issues

covered, as well as some lengthy documents and attachments which could not be printed because of lack of space, such as the full texts of National Security Council reports, National Intelligence Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates.

Editorial Methodology

The documents in this microfiche supplement are arranged in two sections: national security policy and arms control and disarmament. Within each of these sections, the documents are presented chronologically, according to Washington time or in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

The documents are numbered at the top of the first page of the document. The List of Documents is ordered according to these numbers. The documents are not annotated nor is there any other editorial apparatus. Material not declassified has been blacked out; for each document not declassified, a page has been inserted that shows a title, date, classification, number of pages, and source citation.

The List of Documents, which includes for each document the title, date, participants (for memoranda of conversation), from/to information, classification, number of pages, and source citation, as well as a brief summary, is part of this printed guide and appears on the first two microfiche cards. The printed guide also includes Lists of Sources, Abbreviations, and Persons.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention.

The Advisory Committee has not reviewed this microfiche supplement.

Declassification Review

The declassification review process for this volume was particularly lengthy, requiring 8 years to complete. It resulted in the withholding

from publication of about 5 percent of the documentation selected for publication by the editors; 6 documents were denied in full. Documentation withheld from the volume consists largely of certain still classified information pertaining to intelligence and nuclear weapons. The declassified documentation provides an accurate account of the major foreign policy issues and the major policies undertaken by the U.S. Government on national security policy and arms control during this period.

The Information Response Branch of the Office of IRM Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, which was superseded by Executive Order 12958 on April 20, 1995, and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the National Archives and Records Administration and at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in particular David Haight, who provided

invaluable help in the collection of documents for this microfiche supplement.

David W. Mabon and Edward C. Keefer compiled the material presented in this supplement under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennen. Dr. Mabon also provided planning and direction. Former General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the editing process. Douglas R. Keene prepared the List of Documents, and Rita M. Baker performed the technical editing.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

August 1998

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List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Indexed Central Files. See under National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. A list of the lot files of the Department of State (decentralized files created by operating areas) used in or consulted for this volume and which are still in the custody of the Department follows. See also under National Archives and Records Administration below.

G/PM Files: Lot 68 D 358

Records on intelligence, national security actions, nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, et al., as maintained by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs for the years 1950–1967.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates for 1958–1960.

S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171

Restricted data files for 1957–1967, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 1953–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations.

Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957–1961. Herter was Under Secretary of State, 1957–1959, and Secretary of State, 1959–1961.

McCone Papers

Papers of John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1958–1961.

National Security Council Staff Records

Disaster File and Executive Secretary's Subject File.

President's Daily Appointments

Records of the appointments of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961.

Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952–1961.

White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology

XIV List of Sources

White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology

White House Office Files, Project Clean Up

Project Clean Up collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1952–1961.

White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary (Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell), 1952–1961.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, DDE Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, NSC Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, Diary Series, Miscellaneous Series, Presidential Transition Series, International Meetings, Administrative Series, and International File.

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Twining Papers

Papers of General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957–1960.

White Papers

Papers of General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 1957–1961.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Department of State Records, Record Group 59

Indexed Central Files

Among the most useful of these files in the preparation of the volume and supplement were 033.1100, 320.11, 330, 396.1–GE, 396.12–GE, 611.00, 611.0012, 700.5, 700.5611, 711.5, and 711.5611.

Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688

Consolidated collection of documentation on atomic energy policy for 1944–1962, maintained principally by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs but also by other offices in the Department of State.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559

Collection of documentation of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560

Collection of documentation of official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

EUR/RPM Files: Lot 64 D 444

Collection of documentation on NATO and NATO countries for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 341

Miscellaneous Top Secret subject files maintained by the Combined Policy Staff of the Office of Politico-Military Affairs for the years 1958–1961.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1957–1961.

S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject file of NSC documents and correspondence for 1948–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of NSC documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous NSC files, including records of action, for 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, Record Group 218

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NSC Records, Record Group 273

Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File, and Policy Papers File.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.**Burke Papers**

Papers of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**Record Group 59, Conference Files: FRC 83-0068**

See Department of State Records under National Archives and Records Administration above.

Record Group 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170

Country and general files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1960.

Published Sources

Official Documentary Collections and Narrative Studies

- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *Documents on Disarmament, 1960* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961)
- U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency. *Operation Hardtack I, 1958*, December 1, 1982, report number DNA 6038F
- U.S. Department of State. *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office)
- _____. Department of State *Bulletin*, 1958, 1959, 1960 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office)
- _____. *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*. 2 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960)
- _____. *The Need for Further Research in Seismology* (July 1959)
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. *History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP–62*. (Undated)
- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, 1959, 1960–61* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office)

Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries

- Kistiakowsky, George B. *A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976)
- Macmillan, Harold. *Pointing the Way, 1959–1961* (London: Macmillan, 1972)
- Taylor, Maxwell D. *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1960)

List of Abbreviations

ABM, anti-ballistic missile system
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AFOAT, Air Force Assistant for Atomic Energy
AFOAT-1, surface and air burst nuclear test detection system
AFTAC, Air Force Technical Applications Center
AICBM, anti-intercontinental ballistic missile system
ALBM, air-launched ballistic missile
ARPA, Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASW, anti-submarine warfare

BMEWS, ballistic missile early warning system
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BOMARC, surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile
BW, biological warfare

Cahto, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Herter when away from Washington
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEG, Comparative Evaluation Group
CEP, circular error, probable—a measure of missile accuracy
CF, Conference Files
CFEP, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CONUS, Continental United States
CRAF, Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CVA, conventionally powered aircraft carrier
CVAN, nuclear powered aircraft carrier
CW, chemical warfare

Del, delegation
Denuc, series indicator for telegrams from the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DEW line, distant early warning air defense installations in northern Canada
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State
Dynasoar, rocket-launched long-range space glider project

ECM, electronic countermeasures
ELINT, intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic signals
EURATOM, European Atomic Agency

FAA, Federal Aviation Administration
FY, fiscal year

GAO, General Accounting Office

XVIII List of Abbreviations

HE, high explosive

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile

IDO, International Disarmament Organization

IGY, International Geophysical Year

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IOC, initial operating capability

IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSOP, Joint Strategic Operations Plan

JSPS, Joint Strategic Planning Staff

JSTPS, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

KT, kiloton

M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAP, Military Assistance Program

MATS, Military Air Transport Service

MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile

MSP, Mutual Security Program

MT, megaton

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASC, National Aeronautics and Space Council

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Niact, night action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

n.m., nautical mile

NOA, new obligational authority

Noform, no foreign dissemination

NORAD, North American Air Defense Command

NSA, National Security Agency

NSC, National Security Council

NSTL, National Strategic Target List

NSTPS, National Strategic Target Planning Staff

NTL, national target list

Nusup, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

OCB, Operations Coordinating Board

OCDM, Office of Civilian Defense Mobilization

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation

ONR, Office of Naval Research

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

PACOM, Pacific Command
P.L., Public Law

Q-1, a seismic measure of magnitude

R&D, research and development
reftel, reference telegram
RG, Record Group

S, Office of the Secretary of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
S/AE, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
S&L, supply and logistics
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State
SIOP, Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLAM, supersonic low-altitude missile
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOR, Specific Operating Requirement aircraft (long-range jet powered cargo aircraft)
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
STRAC, Strategic Army Corps

Tocah, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Herter when away from Washington
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his delegation

UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNDC, United Nations Disarmament Commission
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDel, United States Delegation
USIA, United States Information Agency
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VELA, project designed to improve detection of nuclear tests
VOA, Voice of America

WSEG, Weapons System Evaluation Group

List of Persons

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Allen, George V., Director of the United States Information Agency
Amory, Robert, CIA member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury

Bacher, Robert F., Member, President's Science Advisory Committee
Bantz, Fred A., Under Secretary of the Navy
Berkner, Lloyd V., Chairman, Panel on Seismic Improvement
Bethe, Hans A., Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation; also Member, Panel of Experts
Bevan, Aneurin, British Member of Parliament and opposition Labor Party spokesman on foreign affairs
Boggs, Marion W., Director of the National Security Council Secretariat until July 1959; thereafter Deputy Executive Secretary
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to the Philippines until October 15, 1959; thereafter Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles
Boster, David E., Staff Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles
Brucker, Wilber M., Secretary of the Army
Brundage, Percival F., Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1956–1958
Bulganin, Nikolai Alekandrovich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until March 1958
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations
Byers, Lieutenant General Clovis E., Military Adviser, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Ambassador to the United States
Calhoun, John A., Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from September 1958
Coolidge, Charles A., Director, Joint Disarmament Study
Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister
Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

De Gaulle, Charles, Prime Minister of France, June 1958–January 1959; thereafter President of France
Dillon, C. Douglas, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until June 1958; Under Secretary for State for Economic Affairs, July 1958–June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State
Douglas, James II, Secretary of the Air Force until December 11, 1959; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick, British Foreign Secretary from July 1960
Dryden, Hugh, Acting Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State until his resignation on April 22, 1959
Dunning, John R., Adviser to the Atomic Energy Commission

XXII List of Persons

- Eaton, Frederick M.**, U.S. Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva from September 1960
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Eisenhower, Major John S.D.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President, promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in May 1960
- Emelyanov, V.S.**, Head of Soviet (non-military) Atomic Energy Authority
- English, Spofford G.**, Chief, Chemical Branch, Research Division, Atomic Energy Commission
- Farley, Philip J.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs
- Federov, Yevgeni**, member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Experts Conference on Nuclear Tests, 1958; thereafter Soviet Adviser to the delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
- Fisk, James B.**, U.S. Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests; also member, President's Science Advisory Committee
- Floberg, John F.**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission
- Foster, Admiral Paul**, Member, Atomic Energy Commission; Member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
- Foster, William C.**, U.S. Representative to the Geneva Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack
- Fox, General Alonzo P.**, Defense Member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy
- Franke, William B.**, Under Secretary of the Navy until June 7, 1959; thereafter Secretary of the Navy
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr.**, Secretary of the Navy until June 7, 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense, June 7–December 1, 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense
- Gleason, S. Everett**, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council
- Glennan, T. Keith**, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Goodby, James E.**, Atomic Energy Commission
- Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Gore, Albert**, Democratic Senator from Tennessee; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- Gray, Gordon**, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, until July 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Green, Howard C.**, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs from June 1959
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Gruenther, General Alfred M.**, disarmament adviser to Secretary of State Dulles; formerly Military Adviser to President Eisenhower
- Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to President Eisenhower
- Hammar skjöld, Dag**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Harriman, W. Averell**, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Herter, Christian A.**, Under Secretary of State until April 21, 1959; thereafter Secretary of State
- Hickey, Lieutenant General Thomas F.**, Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff
- Hoegh, Leo A.**, Director, Office of Civil Defense, until July 1958; thereafter Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
- Holaday, William M.**, Director of Guided Missiles, Department of Defense
- Hood, Viscount Samuel**, British Minister to the United States
- Hoover, J. Edgar**, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Humphrey, Hubert H.**, Democratic Senator from Minnesota; Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Disarmament, Committee on Foreign Relations

Irwin, John N., II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from September 26, 1958

Jackson, Henry M., Democratic Senator from Washington; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Johnson, Lyndon B., Democratic Senator from Texas; Senate Majority Leader

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., Staff Member, White House Office of Science and Technology

Kennedy, John F., Democratic Senator from Massachusetts

Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Vice Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers until March 1958; thereafter Chairman

Killian, James R., Jr., President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology until July 1959

Kistiakowsky, George B., Staff Member, White House Office of Science and Technology, until July 15, 1959; thereafter President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology

Knight, Robert H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, February 1958–June 1959

Krebs, Max V., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until June 1959; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Latter, Albert, physicist with the Rand Corporation

Latter, Richard, Member, Panel of Experts

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Le Boutillier, Philip, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics

LeMay, General Curtis E., Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Lemnitz, General Lyman L., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army until June 30, 1959; Chief of Staff until October 1, 1960; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Libby, Willard F., Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission, until July 1958

Ling, Donald P., Member, Science Advisory Committee

Lloyd, John Selwyn Brooke, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until July 27, 1960; thereafter Chancellor of the Exchequer

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Permanent Representative to the United Nations until September 3, 1960

Long, Franklin A., Professor of Chemistry, Cornell University

Loper, General Herbert B., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy

Lovett, Robert A., disarmament adviser to Secretary of State Dulles

Macauley, John B., Deputy Director of the Office of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister

McCloy, John J., disarmament adviser to Secretary of State Dulles

McCone, John A., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from July 1958

McElroy, Neil H., Secretary of Defense until December 1, 1959

McGuire, E. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics

McRae, James W., Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Requirements

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from October 1958; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August 1959–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Moch, Jules, French Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Norstad, General Lauris, Commander in Chief, European Command

Ormsby Gore, William David, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., Chairman, Panel on High Altitude Detection

Pate, General Randolph M., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps until December 31, 1959

Penney, William, British nuclear physicist

Persons, General Wilton S. (Ret.), Assistant to President Eisenhower

Plowden, Edwin N., Chairman, British Atomic Energy Authority

Polk, Brigadier General James H., Director, Office of Planning, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Power, General Thomas S., Commander, Strategic Air Command

Pugh, George E., Member, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense

Quarles, Donald A., Deputy Secretary of Defense until his death on May 8, 1959

Randall, Clarence S., Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Counselor of the Department of State

Rhea, Colonel Fred, Defense Member, Working Group on Disarmament Policy

Sandys, Duncan, British Minister of Defense until October 1959; thereafter Minister of Aviation

Saulnier, Raymond J., Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

Scoville, Herbert E., Assistant Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence

Scribner, Fred C., Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury

Segni, Antonio, Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense from July 1958; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior from February 1959; Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 1960

Sharp, Dudley C., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force until January 31, 1959; Under Secretary of the Air Force, August 3–December 11, 1959; thereafter Secretary of the Air Force

Shoup, General David M., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps from January 1, 1960

Sides, Vice Admiral John H., Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

Smith, Bromley, Staff Member, National Security Council, until January 1959; thereafter Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board

Smith, Gerard C., Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Smith, General Walter Bedell (Ret.), disarmament adviser

Smith, Brigadier General Willard W., Deputy Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff

Spaak, Paul-Henri, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Spiers, Ronald, Officer in Charge of Disarmament Affairs, Department of State

Sprague, Mansfield D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until September 3, 1958

Sprague, Robert, Director, Security Resources Panel, ODM Science Advisory Committee on Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, from September 1957

Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget

Stassen, Maurice H., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, until March 1958; thereafter Director

Starbird, Brigadier General Alfred D., Director, Division of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission

Stassen, Harold E., Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament until February 15, 1958

Strauss, Admiral Lewis L., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, until June 30, 1958;
Secretary of Commerce from October 24, 1958

Symington, W. Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri

Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chief of Staff of the Army until July 1, 1959

Teller, Edward, Director, Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Weapons Laboratory

Thomas, General Gerald C., Director, Net Evaluation Sub-committee Staff

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Tsarapkin, Semen K., Soviet Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontin-
uance of Nuclear Weapon Tests from 1958

Twining, General Nathan F., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 30,
1960

Wadsworth, James J., U.S. Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontin-
uance of Nuclear Weapon Tests until August 31, 1960; Permanent Representative to
the United Nations from September 8, 1960

Washburn, Abbott, Deputy Director, United States Information Agency

Whisenand, Brigadier General James F., Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff

White, General Thomas D., Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Whitman, Ann C., Personal Secretary to President Eisenhower

Whitney, John Hay, Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Wiesner, Jerome B., Member, President's Science Advisory Committee

Wilcox, Francis O., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Williams, Haydn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NSC Affairs and Plans,
International Security Affairs

Wright, Michael, British Deputy Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discon-
tinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests from 1960

Yeagley, J. Walter, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Department
of Justice

York, Dr. Herbert F., Director of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, from
December 30, 1958

Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Representative to the United Nations and to the Ten-Nation
Disarmament Conference from 1960

Summary of Print Volume III

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text. Volume III, published in 1996, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

National Security Policy

A major focus of the first part of the compilation on national security policy is the Eisenhower administration's response to the Gaither Panel, which in November 1957 had submitted its report, "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age." (See *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, Volume XIX.) The main thrust of the report was that during the next 2–3 years the U.S. strategic position relative to the Soviet Union would be at its strongest, but that within 12–20 years both the United States and the Soviet Union would be capable of annihilating one another and that the very real dangers of miscalculation that would then exist in estimating whether or not an attack was occurring required urgent study. (1) In response to the report, the National Security Council (NSC) in early 1958 held lengthy discussions on the nation's strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. One result was President Eisenhower's directive that the Defense Department should report back on the feasibility and desirability of supplemental "active" military measures to reduce the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to a hypothetical Soviet surprise bomber attack. (2)

In response to the Gaither Panel's concerns about the status of the nation's active defenses, the Eisenhower administration held several meetings on various aspects of the problem. One was devoted to SAC alert forces. Discussions about procedures involving the deployment of these forces under emergency conditions, initially called "Fail Safe" and renamed "Positive Control," centered on the readiness and rapid launching of SAC planes as well as procedures to recall them before attack if the alarm proved to be false. Eisenhower seemed to be generally satisfied with the SAC's preparedness and emergency safeguards. (9, 16, 25)

A related question was the military's coordinated targeting strategy in the event of nuclear war. In August 1959 the President approved the use of an "optimum mix" of military and urban-industrial targets, which in the event of general war was to include all vital strategic elements of the enemy's known nuclear offensive capability and to achieve a 75 percent assurance of delivering one weapon at each target.

(90, 91) He also initially agreed with Defense Secretary McElroy that the Strategic Air Command, under JCS supervision, was the best single authority to plan the targeting of what was a complex, technical problem and required computer programs. (72, 107) But when McElroy's successor, Thomas Gates, attempted to implement a single integrated plan in August 1960, he ran into stiff resistance from the Navy. Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, opposed a detailed plan. He wanted more flexibility of arsenal as well as delivery for the unified commanders during a first retaliatory strike. (18, 113)

President Eisenhower rejected these arguments, however, and stressed the importance of having a single, rigid plan. While plans for a second strike might allow commanders more leeway, he argued, "you can and must have a firm plan for the first strike" to make it simultaneous and avoid duplication of effort. Although the issue was somewhat different from the legislation to further centralize authority in the Secretary of Defense, in order to tame interservice rivalries on budgetary and personnel matters, which Eisenhower had pushed through Congress in 1958 (3), the need for organizational reform of the military services was similar, and the President lectured the Joint Chiefs on their responsibility to subordinate their bureaucratic self-interest to "the nation's interest." (113) Believing that "something must be done before he leaves office, because he did not want to leave his successor with the monstrosity we now see in prospect as Polaris and other new weapons come into operating status," he authorized Gates to set up a Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSPS) under the direction of the SAC Commander in Omaha. By the end of the year the JSPS had developed a methodology for preparing a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), but Eisenhower expressed dismay over the emerging SIOP's potential for "overkill." (125, 127)

Another concern was the status of the various U.S. missile systems. President Eisenhower frequently discussed with his senior defense advisers the progress in the Atlas, Thor-Jupiter, Polaris, Minuteman, and Titan programs, to all of which he gave "the highest priority" for research and development. (56, 72, 123) These conversations allowed him to monitor closely the progress in the entire missile field and to suggest improvements. He argued, for instance, that the NSC "ought to look at the costs, what we are doing, how we are doing it, and leave a legacy of thought, if not organization, on this subject." (72) He was especially concerned that the missile race with the Soviet Union might undermine the U.S. economy. "We must cut the cost of our missile programs or go broke," he warned. (56)

During the triennium the administration received periodic intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's military capabilities, especially its missile systems. (33, 48, 52, 75, 82, 84, 97, 98, 120) But because these

estimates tended to overstate Soviet progress in the missile field, by early 1960 the notion of future “missile gap” developed, which Congress sought to explore. Eisenhower and General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, believed that if such a gap developed by 1961, new U.S. missile systems would be ready by 1962 to close it. (82) (They proved more than correct in this judgment for Soviet ICBM deployments lagged behind those of the United States until the late 1960s.) While Eisenhower was willing to approve modest increases in defense spending and to expedite certain important programs such as the development of reconnaissance satellites, he opposed any programs “on a crash basis until scientific analysis demonstrates real promise of success.” (102, 129) And despite political and demagogic attacks on his administration’s defense programs, he believed there was little public uneasiness about them. (93)

The NSC also discussed the status of U.S. continental defense policy. Following a January 30, 1958, briefing on ballistic missile programs (6), the NSC drafted a new position paper on continental defense policy, NSC 5802, which updated and superseded NSC 5408. While NSC 5802 called for “an anti-ICBM weapons system as a matter of the highest national priority,” it still emphasized the importance of defensive measures against a hypothetical Soviet bomber attack. (8) Because of rapid advances in missile development, however, by 1960 discussion about continental defense focused more on the desirability and extent of an anti-missile missile program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for a firm administration commitment to accelerate the development of an extensive Nike–Zeus anti-missile missile system, but Defense Secretaries McElroy and Gates and the scientific community believed such a program would be too expensive adequately to defend missile sites and useless to defend the population. Eisenhower was also skeptical, noting that it was questionable whether an effective anti-ICBM system could be developed in the 1960s. (82, 83, 132, 133) The divisions pre-saged a similar split during the Kennedy administration, with President Kennedy basically more sympathetic to Secretary of Defense McNamara’s and the scientists’ opposition to deployment of a missile defense system than to the Joint Chiefs’ position. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, Volume VIII.)

In the area of “passive” defense, the NSC considered the initiation of a nationwide fallout shelter plan. Although the Gaither Panel and the Federal Civil Defense Administration supported fallout shelters, others raised objections. Eisenhower, for example, “expressed a certain degree of skepticism as to the wisdom of expending billions of dollars on a shelter program as opposed to spending the money on additional measures of active defense.” He also worried that the U.S. shelter program “would insure neutralism in Europe.” (8) Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles also claimed that a shelter program would have an undesirable impact on "the psychology of the American people. There were practical difficulties in the way of maintaining, at one and the same time, both an offensive and a defensive mood." When it was noted that the new addition to the State Department building did not include shelters, Dulles replied that "the State Department was expendable." (8) Gordon Gray of the Office of Defense Mobilization, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, and General Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), among others, also pointed to difficulties in trying to implement an extensive shelter plan. (4)

Regular military briefings on the horrific effects of nuclear war, however, convinced President Eisenhower that more emphasis had to be given to defensive measures. (38, 97) Following one such briefing in September 1960, the President commented that "he had been making up his mind to go into training as an Indian and live on deer in the Rocky Mountains." While he still believed that "most of our money should be put on deterrence," he also recognized the political and psychological need for the U.S. Government to demonstrate its ability to destroy an incoming missile before the Soviets could do so. He continued that "if greater emphasis is not given to passive defense, there will be no U.S. Without passive defense we could retaliate but the people we are supposed to be defending would be all dead and there would be no State Department to worry about foreign affairs." He concluded by asking several agencies to re-examine the administration's shelter policy "on a down-to-earth basis. He would like to see all the agencies he had mentioned feeling a sense of responsibility for taking a new look at this question." (120)

Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, the National Security Council again considered the question of fallout shelters. Eisenhower was now convinced that "we should be doing a lot more than we are doing for passive defense of the population." He opposed massive new federal outlays for a shelter program, however, and ultimately approved "the objective of obtaining fallout shelter for the population within five years, principally with local and private effort, and with Federal resources to be confined largely to setting an example and stimulating individual efforts to attain the objective but not to guarantee its attainment." (133)

A major preoccupation of the National Security Council throughout the Eisenhower administration was its annual review of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) paper. As the title suggested, these papers covered all phases of the nation's security interests, including chemical and biological weapons, military assistance, policy toward developing nations, and weapons systems. At one point the NSC even considered inclusion of a statement on birth control as a "crucial"

element of its basic policy statement on “undeveloped” countries. Eisenhower strongly objected, however, claiming that if a policy statement on the issue was adopted, “we would be accused of all kinds of terrible things.” (61)

The main debate over BNSP concerned the problem of conventional forces to fight limited wars. While these discussions foreshadowed the Kennedy administration’s subsequent adoption of the strategy of “flexible response” to potential Soviet provocations, they did not get that far under Eisenhower. The discussions initially developed in reaction to the traditional Eisenhower administration doctrine of “massive retaliation,” which could result in either a massive nuclear strike or retreat in the face of Soviet aggression, and the desire for greater flexibility in U.S. military capabilities. In this view, the need for a revised BNSP seemed more urgent as the Soviet Union moved closer to “virtual nuclear parity” with the United States. In 1957 the NSC had adopted a policy statement on “limited war” that called for “the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability” to resist “local aggression” in developing countries where U.S. interests were involved.

General Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff especially continued to advocate great emphasis on conventional forces to resist limited aggression, and even Secretary Dulles, the principal architect earlier of the “massive retaliation” concept, believed by 1958 that the United States had to develop a more coherent policy in dealing with wars not directly involving the United States and the Soviet Union and to allow the United States “to fight defensive wars which do not involve the total defeat of the enemy.” Dulles also stressed that public opinion among the Western allies was beginning to reject the notion of reliance on a U.S. pushbutton to start a global nuclear in their defense and would demand some kind of modernized defensive capabilities of their own to resist possible Soviet aggression. But while trying to keep an open mind on these complicated issues, President Eisenhower remained skeptical, arguing that “each small war makes global war the more likely.” (18, 23)

Despite wide-ranging NSC discussions in 1958, no revision of the 1957 paragraphs on limited war were approved (24, 25), but further extensive discussions occurred in 1959. Largely because of State Department lobbying for a change in policy, the resulting BNSP added language calling for planning for “situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear.” (64, 70) Although this wording suggested less emphasis on nuclear weapons, it was never implemented in force planning levels,

mainly because Eisenhower worried about the budgetary implications of large increases in conventional forces. He also continued to be "never very eager to talk about limited war and disliked the subject." (124) Perhaps because of this disinterest no BNSP was devised for 1960.

Arms Control and Disarmament

This compilation begins with the three disarmament proposals of Harold Stassen, President Eisenhower's Disarmament Adviser. Stassen's initiatives, which were to mark the beginning of serious U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing, consisted of agreement on installation of 8-12 test monitoring inspection sites in both the United States and the Soviet Union followed by a 2-year ban on nuclear testing, creation of an inspection zone in Central and Eastern Europe against surprise attack, and another inspection zone covering Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, the Northwestern United States, and Western Canada. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) agreed that because a test cessation agreement in its simplest form would limit the development of smaller, "clean" weapons, it was a detriment to U.S. national security. They claimed that there were no airtight methods to confirm that the Soviets were not testing and that the cessation of testing would actually result in both nations building more, not fewer, weapons to compensate for the reduction in technical advancement. (136)

Stassen and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the United Nations, both of whom worried that the United States was becoming morally isolated by its slow reactions on the disarmament issue, argued that a new, fresh U.S. proposal was required to regain world support for the U.S. position. (136, 137) The Eisenhower administration, while acknowledging the potential significance of these views, had not developed a new position by March 27, 1958, when the Soviet Union announced a test cessation. The Soviets' test suspension put the United States in the position of having to choose between continued nuclear weapons testing to improve the nation's defense capabilities, which would look warlike and immoral in world opinion, or stopping testing. The Eisenhower administration agreed that the Soviet initiative required a "new and more flexible position." (145)

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that the Soviets' test ban initiative was its latest propaganda move designed to undermine the U.S. reputation in world opinion. Over the coming months, he argued against the rationale of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission that an immediate test cessation would hurt U.S. defense capabilities and would be giving the closed Soviet society an unfair advantage to improve their nuclear arsenal through espionage and secret testing. He commented that "unless we take a radical step

now, our failure to do so will in effect be a step to 'go it alone' as a militaristic nation in world opinion without friends and allies." (148, 150, 166) Both he and President Eisenhower agreed that although nuclear weapons and not tests were the real danger to world security, public opinion demanded a cessation of testing. (155)

In August 1958 the National Security Council finally formulated a comprehensive proposal on test suspension to present to the Soviets. The initiative consisted of a 3-year agreement to suspend testing. To take into account the Defense Department's and Atomic Energy Commission's reservations, this new proposal stipulated that the test suspension not continue beyond 3 years if satisfactory progress was not made on a viable inspection system. (165)

Meanwhile, a National Security Council ad hoc working group under Dr. Hans Bethe began to study the technical feasibility of monitoring a test ban. The recommendation of the group, supporting a suspension, concluded that inspection stations with the immediate mobile access of inspection teams would provide adequate safeguarding for an agreement limiting nuclear testing. (147) In July and August 1958, a meeting in Geneva of experts from Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania made some progress in discussing the several technical details involved in inspection systems. (164, 176)

The first challenge the United States faced at this technical conference was gaining British support for the U.S. position. The United Kingdom did not want even to consider suspending testing until it had developed its own sufficient nuclear capabilities. (150, 155) To get around British fears of vulnerability in the face of disarmament pressures, the 1954 Atomic Energy Act was amended on June 2, 1958, to allow for increased exchange of atomic weapon information to U.S. nuclear allies, particularly the United Kingdom. (166, 175, 176)

Safeguards against surprise attack were another issue relating to disarmament that the United States tried to address during 1958. A study prepared by an inter-agency working group concluded in September 1958 that an effective safeguard to prevent surprise attacks would require an inspection system to monitor any agreed upon limitation of bomber readiness. (180) The United States also agreed to a meeting in Geneva of technical experts to study the practical problems and feasibility of inspecting against surprise attacks. Although this conference made significant progress on technical issues, the Soviet Union resisted inspection of its military sites. (185, 188, 189) Dr. George Kistiakowsky, the President's Science Adviser, wrote President Eisenhower that inspection was not sufficient—there was no way to monitor missile-launching submarines, for example. A better solution to the problem of surprise attack, he argued, was the actual disarmament

of nuclear weapons rather than inspections. (192) When the Geneva surprise attack conference was in fact suspended on January 21, 1959, the Western side was convinced that the Soviet side would not agree to limit discussions to inspection and observation measures and that future talks would have to consider disarmament measures that might affect the surprise attack problem. (193)

Another stalemate in disarmament discussions occurred when the Defense Department discovered that information discussed at the first Geneva technical meeting was inaccurate. (168) The Hardtack II tests revealed that instead of there being an 80–90 percent level of confidence in detecting a 5-kiloton and above underground explosion, this level of confidence could only occur at 20 kilotons and higher. Defense officials argued that the new information made the underground test detection system being developed at the Geneva conference unreliable. (169)

By January 1959 the Eisenhower administration had split on strategies for using the new data in the current nuclear test negotiations in Geneva. AEC Chairman John A. McCone argued that because of the unreliability of the underground test detection system, only atmospheric tests should be banned. Underground tests might be curtailed after more experimentation. Secretary Dulles believed that “there was not one chance in a hundred that the Soviets would agree to the controls that we think are necessary to police the agreement we had in mind.” He felt that the U.S. Government should keep the Hardtack II information to itself and let the Soviets take the blame and bad publicity for the failure of the talks. Because the Soviets were arguing for a veto on any potential inspections, Dulles felt that focusing on the intransigence of the Soviets on this issue seemed to be the best method to disengage the United States from the talks. (195–196, 202) President Eisenhower, however, still wanted a comprehensive test ban. He felt that despite the new information on underground inspection a workable system could still be designed. (205, 206)

The British also hoped for a test ban. With political elections getting closer in Britain and public concern growing over the issue of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, British Prime Minister Macmillan pushed President Eisenhower to conclude some kind of test ban treaty. But while the President urged his senior disarmament advisers to move toward an agreement, he did not overrule or dismiss those who opposed any testing accord that did not include extensive safeguards for U.S. security.

By April 1959 Christian A. Herter, who that month succeeded Dulles as Secretary of State, instructed the U.S. delegation at Geneva to agree to a comprehensive test ban if two provisions were met: if the Soviets backed down on their demands for a veto, and if they accepted the adequate number of on-site inspections necessary to detect

underground explosions. If this initiative failed, Herter authorized the delegation to work for a phased approach that would include an immediate ban on atmospheric testing, and a subsequent ban on underground testing once sufficient controls, based on Hardtack II data, were established. If the Soviet Union rejected these proposals, the delegation was to announce the U.S. decision to end the conference because of the Soviets' disinterest in a treaty and to reveal its plans for a unilateral cessation of atmospheric tests. (213) President Eisenhower believed that worldwide public anger over nuclear testing would force the United States to stop atmospheric testing in the long run, and thus a partial or comprehensive bilateral ban would be better for U.S. interests than unilateral, unreciprocated actions. (216)

Perhaps also aware of the importance of maintaining worldwide public support for its disarmament policy, the Soviets also seemed unwilling to break off the talks. They refused to consider, however, that the conclusions from the meeting of experts in 1958 were anything but viable. Consequently, they would not discuss either an adequately safeguarded comprehensive plan or a phased plan. The negotiations deadlocked when the United States refused to consider any agreement that did not contain a sufficient number of inspections. (223)

As the Geneva disarmament talks dragged on, many in the Eisenhower administration became concerned that the voluntary U.S. testing moratorium first announced in October 1959 was giving the Soviets exactly what they wanted. The moratorium supposedly stopped U.S. and Soviet testing, but it was not controlled. (234) Of further concern was the fear that the British desire to reach any agreement, including an uncontrolled moratorium, would weaken Western positions on disarmament negotiations. The United States spent a large proportion of time at the Geneva test negotiations trying to reconcile the Allied positions on disarmament. (227)

In December 1959 U.S. and Soviet technical experts met for a second time to discuss difficulties relating to testing controls. For the United States it was an opportunity to try once again to revise the data from the 1958 conference. The Soviets, however, saw U.S. concerns over up-to-date safeguards as a U.S. propaganda ploy to disengage from a disarmament accord. Because the Soviets "refused to give serious consideration to anything relating to criteria for inspection" while the U.S. side insisted on talking about elaborate and effective inspection systems, the talks ended without any agreement. (238)

As a possible compromise to the conflicting U.S. and Soviet positions, Kistiakowsky suggested in January 1960 the threshold concept, whereby all tests above a certain measurable seismic magnitude would be banned. Under a threshold agreement, the United States and the Soviets would conduct joint research to improve inspection techniques

and subsequently to lower threshold limits. Adequate safeguards would be provided on banned testing levels while there would be no increase in the agreed upon on-site inspections. (239, 240) Despite skepticism about the Soviets' interest, the U.S. delegation introduced the concept at the Geneva talks.

In spite of the U.S. doubts, the Soviet Union informed the Geneva Conference in March 1960 that it was prepared to discuss a treaty based on the threshold concept. They wanted to begin discussion on suspending tests above a 4.75 seismic magnitude. (247, 248) However, disagreement over testing under the 4.75 magnitude destroyed hopes for a possible agreement on the threshold concept. The Soviets wanted a moratorium for testing under 4.75, while the United States wanted only a set moratorium period with an agreement to conduct joint research on underground test detection technology. (250) The Soviet downing of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, together with disagreement over the moratorium and U.S. frustrations over the Soviet refusal to consider seriously any type of controls, once again prevented any break-through on the nuclear testing issue at the Geneva negotiations. (253)

A fresh start seemed possible at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference on March 15, 1960. President Eisenhower hoped to persuade the Allies to focus on larger disarmament issues—namely, a suspension in the production of fissionable materials. (244) Here too a stalemate resulted. Ambassador Eaton, Chairman of the U.S. delegation, reported that the Western position at the conference was increasingly weakened by Allied interest in obtaining a disarmament accord at any cost. Eaton recommended revising the U.S. plan to appease allies, especially France, which were worried that U.S. intransigence would ruin any hope of an agreement. All such proposals proved futile, however, when the Soviets walked out of the conference on June 27, 1960. (256)

Meanwhile, the United States began to develop a new approach to disarmament negotiations. Preliminary talks began on a cooperative research program with the British and Soviets that was designed to improve the ability to detect underground nuclear explosions. To improve trust and cooperation in the program, all the nuclear devices to be used for the testing research would be inspected by all three countries to confirm that they would only be used for peaceful purposes. In case the Soviets refused the joint research project, the Eisenhower administration also proposed a fallback plan whereby the United States would open up its nuclear devices to the United Nations for inspection before beginning unilateral research testing. This time the administration's plans faced obstacles, not just from the Soviets, but also from an election year Congress that did not like the idea of unilaterally showing U.S. devices to the Soviets for nothing in return. (259)

President Eisenhower soon realized that domestic political problems resulting from the upcoming elections would prevent not only an agreement but the actual research. (260) When Secretary Herter determined by mid-November that the Soviets were holding off on the Geneva negotiations to see if a better deal could be made with the newly elected Kennedy administration, he proceeded to call for a recess. The First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly discussed disarmament issues in the fall of 1960, and the U.N. General Assembly passed three resolutions on disarmament in December, but hopes for substantive progress on arms control talks with the Soviet Union were deferred until President-elect Kennedy took office in late January 1961. (264, 265)

List of Documents

No.	Document Description
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National Security Policy

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| 1 | Minutes of Cabinet meeting, January 3, 1958. State of the Union message; Department of Defense budget. Confidential. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 2 | Briefing note for the 350th NSC meeting, January 4, 1958. Security Resources Panel (Gaither Panel) report. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. |
| 3 | Record of Legislative Leadership meeting, Supplementary Notes, January 7, 1958. Missiles, satellites, and Department of Defense unification. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 4 | Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Killian, Cutler, and Goodpaster, January 21, 1958. Priority for missile program. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 5 | Memorandum of discussion at 352d NSC Meeting, January 22, 1958. Agenda item 3: Priorities for Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Programs (see print Document 5). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. |
| 6 | Memorandum for the record of meeting among Eisenhower, Goodpaster, McElroy, and Harlow, et al., January 25, 1958. JCS organization. Confidential. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 7 | Record of Legislative Leadership meeting, Supplementary Notes, January 28, 1958. Defense reorganization. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 8 | Presentation on the U.S. Ballistic Missile Program at the 353d NSC meeting, given by Holaday, January 30, 1958. Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. |
| 9 | Briefing note for the 353d NSC meeting by Cutler, January 30, 1958. Introduction to Holaday's briefing. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. |

No.	Document Description
10	Letter from McElroy to Eisenhower, January 31, 1958. Transmittal letter for progress report on ballistic missile programs. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
11	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian, Kistiakowsky, York, and Goodpaster, February 6, 1958. Progress in ballistic missile programs. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
12	Memorandum from Kistiakowsky to Killian, February 13, 1958. Progress and recommendations in ballistic missile program. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
13	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, February 14, 1958. Transmits NSC Planning Board report on U.S. overseas military bases. Secret. 15 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
14	Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Gruenther, February 19, 1958. Possibility of establishing disarmament advisory board. Confidential; Personal and Private. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers.
15	NSC Report, NSC 5802/1, February 19, 1958. "Continental Defense." Top Secret. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense.
16	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian, Strauss, and Goodpaster, February 25, 1958. High-altitude nuclear explosions. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
17	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-58, February 26, 1958. "Estimate of the World Situation." Secret. 17 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
18	Briefing note for the 356th NSC meeting, February 27, 1958. Nash Report on overseas military bases. No classification marking. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
19	Briefing note for the 356th NSC meeting, February 27, 1958. Defense Department report on the Gaither Report; continental defense policy. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

No.	Document Description
20	Memorandum of discussion at the 356th NSC meeting, February 27, 1958. Agenda item 4: Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
21	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Coolidge, and Goodpaster, February 27, 1958. Department of Defense reorganization. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
22	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Gray and Goodpaster, March 3, 1958. Emergency planning; Net Evaluation Subcommittee work. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
23	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 7, 1958. Transmits Defense plan on capabilities of forces for limited military operations. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RC 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
24	Memorandum from Chief of Staff, USAF, to the JCS, CSAFM–72–58, March 10, 1958. Launching of the SAC alert force. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 218, CCS 381 U.S. (5-23-46), Sec. 94.
25	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian, Kistiakowsky, and Goodpaster, March 10, 1958. Centralizing direction of missile program. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
26	Letter from Farley (S/AE) to Loper (DOD/AE), March 10, 1958. Not declassified. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/3–1058.
27	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Coolidge, Randall, Persons, Harlow, and Goodpaster, March 12, 1958. Department of Defense reorganization and control of missile programs. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
28	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 14, 1958. Transmits Interdepartmental Report on NSC 5807, “Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter.” Top Secret. 16 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.

No.	Document Description
29	Briefing note for the 359th NSC meeting, March 20, 1958. Civil defense and civilian fallout shelters. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
30	Paper distributed at the 359th NSC meeting, March 20, 1958. Important points in NIE 100–58. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
31	Memorandum of discussion at the 359th NSC meeting, March 20, 1958. Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter; Agenda item 2: Soviet Civil Defense and Air-Raid Shelter Construction. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
32	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian and Goodpaster, March 20, 1958. Defense proposals for budgetary augmentations. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
33	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Quarles, Twining, Stans, Killian, Persons, and Goodpaster, March 20, 1958. Defense budget and missile development. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
34	Letter from Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, March 21, 1958. Transmits draft speech with proposal to invite Soviet students to U.S. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
35	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 24, 1958. Transmits NSC Planning Board comments on NSC 5807. Top Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.
36	Letter from John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, March 25, 1958. Comments on draft speech. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Exchange.
37	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 26, 1958. Transmits JCS views on NSC 5807. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.
38	Letter from Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, March 26, 1958. Thoughts on dealing with Soviet threat. Personal and Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

No.	Document Description
39	Memorandum of discussion at the 360th NSC Meeting, March 27, 1958. Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter; Agenda item 3: Proposed Reorganization of the Department of Defense. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—15 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
40	Record of Legislative Leadership meeting, Supplementary Notes, April 1, 1958. Outer space; Department of Defense reorganization; nuclear test cessation. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
41	NSC Report, NSC 5807/1, April 2, 1958. "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter." Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.
42	Draft paper, April 7, 1958. "Some Elements of a National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension, Distrust and Destructive Capability"; attached to print Document 19. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Nuclear Policy.
43	Memorandum for the record, April 9, 1958. Conversation among Eisenhower, Gates, and Burke on Defense reorganization. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
44	Letter from Quarles to John Foster Dulles, April 22, 1958. Not declassified. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.56300/4-2258.
45	Presentation to the NSC by Holaday, April 24, 1958. Missile development and deployment. Top Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
46	Memorandum from McNeil to McElroy, April 25, 1958. Comments on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.
47	Memorandum from Twining to McElroy, April 25, 1958. JCS views on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
48	Record of telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and Anderson, April 30, 1958. Basic national security policy. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
49	Draft briefing note for 364th NSC meeting by Cutler, April 30, 1958. Basic national security policy, NSC 5810. Top Secret. 14 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

No.	Document Description
50	Letter from Cutler to McElroy, May 5, 1958. President's comments on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 2 pp (plus retyped copy). Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
51	Letter from McElroy to Eisenhower, May 7, 1958. Transmits report on military reconnaissance satellite program. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
52	Memorandum of discussion at the 365th NSC meeting, of the NSC, May 8, 1958. Agenda item 6: US-USSR Ballistic Missile Developments. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
53	Memorandum from Stroh to Robertson, May 8, 1958. Transmits views of Chief of Naval Operations on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5/5-858.
54	Memorandum from Green (FE) to Robertson (FE), May 9, 1958. Comments on CNO's views on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5/5-858.
55	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining and Goodpaster, May 12, 1958. Defense reorganization; nuclear test ban; outer space. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
56	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, May 15, 1958. Transmits revised pages of NSC 5802/1. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense.
57	JCS paper, May 1958. "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1958"; not declassified. Top Secret. 35 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
58	Briefing note for 367th NSC meeting, May 29, 1958. Status of military mobilization base program. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
59	Memorandum of discussion at the 367th NSC meeting, May 29, 1958. Agenda item 3: Status of Military Mobilization Base Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
60	Memoranda from several DOD/ISA offices, May 29, June 10, and June 11, 1958. Comments on "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961." Top Secret. 10 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files.
61	Memorandum of conversation between State and Defense leadership, June 17, 1958. Strategic concept for the defense of Europe. Top Secret. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548.

No.	Document Description
62	Note from Cutler to Goodpaster, June 18, 1958, enclosing notes on Department of State/Department of Defense conference. Strategic concept for the defense of Europe. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Exchange.
63	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, June 18, 1958. Transmits study on capabilities of forces for limited military operations. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
64	Briefing note for 369th NSC meeting, June 19, 1958. Draft basic national security policy paper. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
65	Memorandum of discussion at the 369th NSC meeting, June 19, 1958. Agenda item 1: Basic National Security Policy. Top Secret: Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
66	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining and Goodpaster, June 23, 1958. Defense reorganization, FY 1959 Defense budget. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
67	Briefing note for the 370th NSC meeting, June 26, 1958. U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
68	NSC Report, NSC 5816, July 1, 1958. "Directive on Net Evaluation Subcommittee." Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5816 Series.
69	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles, July 10, 1958. Briefing for July 14 NSC meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
70	Briefing note for the 372d NSC meeting, July 14, 1958. Problem of shelter against fallout. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
71	Memorandum of discussion at 372d NSC meeting, July 14, 1958. Agenda item 1: Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-military Defense; Agenda item 2: The Number of Nuclear Weapons Which Might Be Tolerable to World Populations; Agenda item 3: Survival of Population Following a Massive Nuclear Exchange; Agenda item 4: Status of Shelter Measures as of June 30, 1958; Agenda item 5: National Security Council and NSC Planning Board Meetings, September 1947 Through July 21, 1958. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

No.	Document Description
72	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles July 15, 1958. NSC review of military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1; recommendation for a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
73	Note from Howe (S/S) to John Foster Dulles, July 17, 1958. Approval of recommendation for a new strategic concept; transmits draft letter to McElroy from Dulles. Top Secret Attachments (not included). 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
74	Memorandum of conversation between DOD/ISA and S/P officials, July 18, 1958. New strategic concept. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
75	Letter from McElroy to John Foster Dulles, July 18, 1958. Department of Defense position on retaining current strategic concept. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
76	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles, July 19, 1958. Question of a new strategic concept. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
77	Letter from John Foster Dulles to McElroy, July 19, 1958. Question of a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
78	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, July 21, 1958. Transmits McElroy's memorandum on strategic concept (print Document 30). Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
79	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-7-58, July 22, 1958. "Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to US Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East." Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 12 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
80	Memorandum for the record of conversation between John Foster Dulles and McElroy by Boster, July 22, 1958. Strategic concept. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
81	Letter from John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, July 23, 1958. Question of a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.
82	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, July 30, 1958. Approval of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

No.	Document Description
83	Briefing note for the 374th NSC meeting, July 31, 1958. Operational capability of reconnaissance satellites. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
84	Memorandum of discussion at the 374th NSC meeting, July 31, 1958. Agenda item 3: Operational Capability of Reconnaissance Satellites. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
85	Memorandum of discussion at the 375th NSC meeting, August 7, 1958. Agenda item 6: Technical Surveillance Countermeasures; Agenda item 7: U.S. Policy on Antarctica. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
86	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining and Goodpaster, August 11, 1958. Formosa Straits; SAC dispersal; withdrawal from Lebanon; Department of Defense reorganization. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
87	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McCone, Gray, and Goodpaster, August 19, 1958. Control of large nuclear weapons; cessation of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
88	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11–5–58, August 19, 1958. “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles.” Top Secret. 10 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.
89	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Quarles, Twining, McCone, White, Loper, Harbour, Foster, Gray, and Goodpaster, August 27, 1958. Testing at Eniwetok; SAC exercises. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
90	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Quarles, Twining, and Goodpaster, August 28, 1958. Defense reorganization and discipline on intelligence matters. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
91	Letter from Sen. Symington to Eisenhower, August 29, 1958. Question of a missile gap. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series.
92	Memorandum from Lay to Gray, September 3, 1958. Analysis of draft implementing instructions on use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes.

No.	Document Description
93	Memorandum for record of meeting between Eisenhower and Gray, September 12, 1958. Expenditure of nuclear weapons; NSC structure; Taiwan Straits. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.
94	Memorandum of discussion at the 379th NSC meeting, September 18, 1958. Agenda item 2: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958: The Internal Security Program (NSC 5819). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
95	Paper for presentation to the NSC, September 18, 1958. U.S. internal security program. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
96	Memorandum from Smith to John Foster Dulles, September 22, 1958. State position on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5410 Series.
97	Briefing note for 380th NSC meeting, September 24, 1958. Mobilization and civil defense programs (NSC 5819). Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
98	Memorandum of discussion at 380th NSC meeting, September 25, 1958. Agenda item 2: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958: The Mobilization Program and the Civil Defense Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
99	Memorandum of discussion at the 381st NSC meeting, October 2, 1958. Agenda item 1: Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
100	Memorandum from Lay to all holders of NSC 5819, October 6, 1958. Transmits Part 1 of NSC 5819 and Annex A. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Special Limited Distribution; NoFORN. Extracts—11 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5819.
101	Memorandum from Briber to Killian, October 9, 1958. Kistiakowsky's views on NIE entitled "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles." Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

No.	Document Description
102	Memorandum of discussion at the 382d NSC meeting, October 13, 1958. Agenda item 1: Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
103	Record of actions by the NSC, October 16, 1958. NSC Actions No. 1994 and 1995 taken at the 382d (Special) NSC meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council.
104	Memorandum of discussion at the 383d NSC meeting, October 16, 1958. Agenda item 1: Status of the National Security Programs: The Atomic Energy Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
105	Memorandum prepared by the Office of the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, undated. Selected issues in the FY '60 Defense budget (As of November 1, 1958). Top Secret. 21 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Offensive and Defensive Weapons.
106	Memorandum from Gleason to the NSC Planning Board, November 5, 1958. Encloses alternative policy statements on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
107	Memorandum of discussion at the 385th NSC meeting, November 6, 1958. Agenda item 1: Comparative Evaluation Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
108	Memorandum from Murphy (G), Reinhardt (C), and Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles, November 8, 1958. Suggestions for conversation with McElroy on Department of Defense budget. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 611.00/11–858.
109	Memorandum of conversation between the President and Gray, November 19, 1958. Nuclear targeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President.
110	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Department of Defense and NSC leaders, November 28, 1958. Department of Defense budget issues. No classification marking. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.

No.	Document Description
111	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles, November 28, 1958. Defense budget; includes three transmittal notes. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351.
112	Memorandum of conversation among Eisenhower, Milton Eisenhower, Merchant, Greene, and John Foster Dulles, November 30, 1958. Mutual Security Program funding. Secret; Personal and Private. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.
113	Memorandum for the record, December 3, 1958. White House meeting on Department of Defense budget. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
114	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Gray, December 8, 1958. Department of Defense budget; detection of underground testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.
115	Memorandum from Stans to Persons, December 10, 1958. Record of December 3 meeting among President, Treasury Secretary Anderson, Persons, and Stans on Department of Defense budget. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
116	Memorandum of discussion at the 390th NSC meeting, December 11, 1958. Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
117	Memorandum from Gray to Morse (AEC), December 11, 1958. Returns Morse's preview of December 6 NSC meeting on defense budget. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Projects Clean Up.
118	Briefing note for the 391st NSC meeting, December 16, 1958. Military mobilization base, July 1, 1961; fallout shelters. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
119	Memorandum of discussion at the 391st NSC meeting, December 18, 1958. Agenda item 1: Status of Military Mobilization Base; Agenda item 2: Fallout Shelters in Existing Federal Buildings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
120	Presentation by McGuire before the NSC, December 18, 1958. Status of the mobilization base, July 1, 1961. Top Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

No.	Document Description
121	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Department of State, Department of Defense, and NSC officials, December 19, 1958. Discussion of Presidential approval of Defense/AEC proposal for dispersal of atomic weapons. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
122	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Department of Defense, NSC, and White House officials, December 22, 1958. Department of Defense reorganization and organization of military intelligence. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
123	NSC Report, NSC 5807/2, December 24, 1958. "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter." Top Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.
124	Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Gray, December 24, 1958. Military mobilization base, situation in Cuba, intelligence procedures, Geneva conferences on test suspension and surprise attack. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President.
125	Questions and answers drafted in JCS, January 7, 1959. JCS role in Department of Defense budget formulation. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.
126	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, January 7, 1959. Transmits discussion paper on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
127	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian, Kistiakowsky, and Goodpaster, January 12, 1959. Concerns about inspection against surprise attack and nuclear testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
128	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining and Goodpaster, January 14, 1959. Dispersal of nuclear weapons, training Chinese Nationalists in the U-2, Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
129	Memorandum of discussion at the 393d NSC meeting, January 15, 1959. Agenda item 3: U.S. Military Bases Overseas. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

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| 130 | Agenda for special meeting (of the NSC?), January 15, 1959. Report of President's Board of Consultants on Intelligence Activities, annual report on NSC 5412/2 activities. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. |
| 131 | Letter from John Foster Dulles to McElroy, January 24, 1959. Proposes State-Defense study of U.S. strategic concept; encloses S/P paper and covering memorandum. Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351. |
| 132 | Memorandum from John Eisenhower to Goodpaster, January 27, 1959. Comparison of NIE 11-4-58 with NIE 11-4-57. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office File, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, CIA. |
| 133 | National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957. "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962. Top Secret. 74 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files. |
| 134 | National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-4-58, December 23, 1958. "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963. Top Secret. 82 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files. |
| 135 | Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining and John Eisenhower, February 9, 1959. Senior military personnel appointments, publicizing defense efforts; Congressional hearings. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 136 | Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy, Quarles, Twining, Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower, February 12, 1959. Projected nuclear weapons requirements for 1968. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. |
| 137 | National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-59, February 17, 1959. "Estimate of the World Situation." Not declassified. Secret. 17 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files. |
| 138 | Memorandum from Gray to McElroy, February 18, 1959. Proposes series of meetings with Eisenhower to discuss policy related to military missions and weapons systems. Top Secret; Restricted Handling. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. |
| 139 | Briefing note for the February 26 NSC meeting, February 25, 1959. Port security. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. |

No.	Document Description
140	Memorandum of discussion at the 397th NSC meeting, February 26, 1959. Agenda item 2: Port Security. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
141	Record of telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and Herter, March 2, 1959. Proposed Office of Executive Management. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
142	Record of telephone conversation between Anderson and Herter, March 3, 1959. Executive branch reorganization plan. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
143	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 3, 1959. Transmits JCS views on NSC 5904. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
144	Notes by Killian for presentation to the President, March 4, 1959. Anti-missile program and maintaining deterrence. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
145	Presentation by McMillan to Eisenhower, March 4, 1959. “An Analysis of Technical Factors in the Strategic Posture of the United States—1955–64.” Top Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
146	Briefing note for the March 5 NSC meeting, March 2, 1959. NIEs 11–4–58 and 100–59. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
147	Briefing note for the March 5 NSC Meeting, March 4, 1959. NSC 5904. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
148	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining, Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower, March 9, 1959. SAC airborne alert exercise; JCS support for Mutual Security Program; Berlin; JCS–Congressional relationship. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
149	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Department of Defense leaders and John Eisenhower, March 9, 1959. SAC airborne alert exercises. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

No.	Document Description
150	Memorandum from Gray to Quarles, March 12, 1959. Question of defense presentations to the President on military missions and weapon systems. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
151	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, April 21, 1959. Transmits a memorandum from Quarles to the NSC on "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program." Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5810, 5906.
152	Memorandum of discussion of the 403d NSC meeting, April 23, 1959. Agenda item 2: U.S. Overseas Military Bases. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
153	Letter from Herter to McElroy, April 25, 1959. Transmits a paper on foreign policy considerations bearing on military strategy. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
154	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Harr and Goodpaster, May 4, 1959. Relationship of State and OCB. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
155	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Herter and Goodpaster, May 4, 1959. Department of State-OCB relationship, nuclear test ban negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
156	Briefing note for the 405th NSC meeting, May 6, 1959. Port security program. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
157	Memorandum of discussion at the 405th NSC meeting, May 7, 1959. Agenda item 1: Port Security; Agenda item 5: Overseas Internal Security Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
158	Briefing note for May 13 NSC meeting, undated. Priorities for space programs. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
159	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Smith, McElroy, and Irwin, May 23, 1959. Strategic concept of basic national security policy. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

No.	Document Description
160	Presentation by Beale at the 409th NSC meeting, June 4, 1959. Trade policy and national security. No classification marking. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
161	Memorandum of discussion at the 409th NSC meeting, June 4, 1959. Agenda item 1: Effects of U.S. Import Trade Policy on National Security. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
162	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Smith, McElroy, and Irwin, June 5, 1959. Strategic concept and NSC 5810/1. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
163	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian, Gray, and Goodpaster, June 8, 1959. Continental air and missile defense. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Bomarc.
164	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Nixon, Dillon, Department of Defense and JCS officials, Stans, White House, and NSC officials, June 9, 1959. Continental air and missile defense. Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Bomarc.
165	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, June 19, 1959. Transmits views of NASC on NSC 5906. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
166	Memorandum from the JCS to Secretary of Defense, JCSM–239–59, June 20, 1959. Transmits views of JCS on NSC 5906; includes Appendix A and Appendix B. Top Secret. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
167	Briefing note for the June 25 NSC meeting, June 23, 1959. Basic national security policy. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
168	Memorandum for the record, June 30, 1959. State–Defense meeting on military paragraphs of NSC 5906, use of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
169	Letter from Smith (S/P) to Herter, July 1, 1959. Bureau comments on NSC 5906 and use of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

No.	Document Description
170	Note from Lay to the NSC, July 1, 1959. Transmits NSC 5908, a directive on establishing the Comparative Evaluations Group. Top Secret; Special Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
171	Memorandum of conversation among Eisenhower, Gray, McElroy, Gates, Radford, Herter, Smith, and others, July 2, 1959. Inconclusive discussion of role of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 13 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
172	Memorandum from Robert Johnson to the NSC Planning Board, July 6, 1959. Transmits State Department proposed revision of paragraphs 23–b and 24 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series.
173	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, July 6, 1959. Transmits summary of NASC discussion of paragraph 62 of NSC 5906 on military exploitation of space programs. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series.
174	Memorandum of conversation with the President, and Harlow, Gray, and Goodpaster, July 7, 1959. President’s approval of attached guidelines for Harlow’s discussion with Jackson on Congressional hearings on the NSC. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos.
175	Memorandum from Gray to Haydn Williams, July 8, 1959. Transmits discussion paper on uses of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Review of Basic National Security Policy.
176	Memorandum from Whisenand to Gray, July 8, 1959. Transmits Twining’s views on basic national security policy. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.
177	Briefing note for July 9 NSC meeting, July 8, 1959. NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
178	Memorandum of meeting with the President, and Gray and Goodpaster, July 15, 1959. Discussion of proposed changes to paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.

No.	Document Description
179	Briefing note for the July 16 NSC meeting, July 15, 1959. NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
180	Memorandum from Haydn Williams to Twining, July 20, 1959. Possible revisions to paragraph 12-a of NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
181	Telegram Toca 162 to Herter in Geneva, July 20, 1959. Discussion of proposed revisions in NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
182	Telegram Cahto 159 from Herter in Geneva, July 21, 1959. Transmits message to NSC on revisions in NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
183	NASC Paper, July 23, 1959. Proposed revisions in NSC 5906. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
184	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Twining and Goodpaster, July 27, 1959. Basic national security policy; Department of Defense reorganization; Net Evaluation Subcommittee. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
185	Memorandum of meeting between Eisenhower and Gray, July 27, 1959. Study of aftermath of nuclear war; Wheelus Air Force Base; basic national security policy; Senate consideration of NSC structure. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos.
186	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, July 28, 1959. Transmits revised paragraphs of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
187	Letter from Furnas to Smith (S/P), July 30, 1959. Transmits approved revised military paragraphs of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.
188	Minutes of Cabinet meeting, July 31, 1959. Civil defense exercise and planning. Confidential. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Cabinet Secretariat.

No.	Document Description
189	Memorandum of meeting between Eisenhower and Gray, August 3, 1959. Basic national security policy; Space Council/NSC coordination. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos.
190	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Kistiakowsky and John Eisenhower, August 4, 1959. Service involvement in space activities; need for single, global military communications system; ICBM basing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
191	Presentation by Kistiakowsky to the President, August 4, 1959. Global military communications; ICBM basing; Geneva disarmament negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
192	Note from Buford to Martin, August 5, 1959. Eisenhower's preferred revision of paragraph 16 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
193	Memorandum from Boggs to the NSC, August 11, 1959. Transmits Secretary of Defense's paper on ballistic missile and space programs. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles.
194	Memorandum from Twining to the JCS, CM-386-59, August 24, 1959. Target coordination. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files, CJCS 381 (1957-1959).
195	Cabinet paper, C-59-78/2, September 10, 1959. Proposed policy on strategic materials. Privileged. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series.
196	Minutes of Cabinet meeting, September 11, 1959. Approval of policy on stockpiling. Confidential. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series.
197	Memorandum from Allen Dulles to Eisenhower, September 12, 1959. Transmits report on Soviet guided missile estimate. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, CIA.
198	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McElroy and Goodpaster, September 16, 1959. Ballistic missiles; budget problems. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
199	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, September 21, 1959. Transmits draft revision of paragraph 59 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

No.	Document Description
200	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, September 29, 1959. Transmits the views of the JCS on proposed revisions to paragraphs 59 and 64–f of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
201	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to Herter, September 29, 1959. Recommends State Department position on paragraph 59 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
202	Briefing note for October 1 NSC meeting, September 29, 1959. Mobilization base paragraph of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
203	Memorandum of discussion at the 420th NSC meeting, October 1, 1959. Agenda item 1: Basic National Security Policy. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
204	Memorandum of meeting between Eisenhower and Gray, October 14, 1959. Mobilization base, Service roles and missions, international information activities report, long-range planning, VOA broadcasting, organization for space activities, future NSC activities, and Berlin. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President.
205	Memorandum of discussion at the 421st NSC meeting, October 15, 1959. Agenda item 1: Comparative Evaluations Group; Agenda item 2: Outer Space Science and Technology; Agenda item 3: History of the Development of Long-Range Guided Missiles Weapons Systems. Top Secret. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
206	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Glennan, Kistiakowsky, McElroy, Gates, Twining, Staats, Goodpaster, and others, October 21, 1959. Transfer of ABMA to NASA. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
207	Memorandum from Gates and Glennan to Eisenhower, October 21, 1959. Responsibility and organization for certain space activities: transfer of ABMA to NASA. No classification marking. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
208	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to Herter, October 29, 1959. Effect of force cuts on foreign and defense policy. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

No.	Document Description
209	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, October 29, 1959. Transmits for comment OCDM memorandum on paragraph 60 of NSC 5906 on strategic stockpiling. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
210	Memorandum of discussion at the 422d NSC meeting, October 29, 1959. Agenda item 1: Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security; Agenda item 4: U.S. Overseas Military Bases; Agenda item 5: Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1959, The USIA Program (NSC 5912). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
211	Memorandum from Lay to holders of NSC 5912, October 30, 1959. Transmits Part 1 of NSC 5912, Defense Department report on “Status of United States Military Programs as of 30 June 1959.” Top Secret; Restricted Data. Extracts—12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5912.
212	Memorandum of discussion at the 423d NSC meeting, November 5, 1959. Agenda item 4: Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1959: The Atomic Energy Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
213	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Kistia-kowsky and Goodpaster, November 5, 1959. Possibility of suspending nuclear testing; reliance on deterrence; making choices in defense programs; problems with Titan; problems with federally-funded research. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
214	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Glennan and Goodpaster, November 17, 1959. Transfer of ABMA to NASC; defense budget; reorganization of space activities. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
215	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to Herter, November 18, 1959. Long-range security policy; includes two covering memoranda, December 9 and 11. Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548.
216	Memorandum of conference with the President, and the Joint Chiefs and Goodpaster, November 18, 1959. General discussion of the U.S. military program: force levels, B–70, budget. Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

No.	Document Description
217	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Service Secretaries and Goodpaster, November 21, 1959. U.S. military program: B-70; national defense system; budget, space activities; missile programs; Panama. No classification marking. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
218	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, December 3, 1959. Presidential approval of revision of paragraph 60 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
219	Memorandum from JCS to Commander in Chief, SAC, undated. Instructions for use of nuclear weapons in emergencies. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.
220	Memorandum from JCS to Commander in Chief, Atlantic, undated. Instructions for use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.
221	Memorandum from JCS to Commander in Chief, Europe, undated. Instructions for use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.
222	Briefing note for the December 16 NSC meeting, December 16, 1959. Emergency relocation plan, NSC 5521. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
223	Memorandum of discussion at the 429th NSC meeting, December 16, 1959. Agenda item 1: Emergency Relocation Plan—National Security Council; Agenda item 4: Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the National Security Council. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—13 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
224	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-8-59, December 23, 1959. "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964." Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

No.	Document Description
225	NSC Report, NSC 5919, December 28, 1959. "U.S. Policy With Respect to the Development of Cargo Air Lift." Confidential. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
226	Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to Dillon, January 5, 1960. Recommends approval of NSC 5919. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
227	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, January 7, 1959. Transmits views of the JCS on NSC 5919. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.
228	Briefing note for the January 7 NSC meeting, January 7, 1960. Cargo air lift (NSC 5919). Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
229	Memorandum of discussion at the 430th NSC meeting, January 7, 1960. Agenda item 1: U.S. policy with respect to the development of cargo air lift. Top Secret. Extracts—10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
230	Memorandum from Power (SAC) to White (USAF), January 11, 1960. B-70 capabilities. No classification marking. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Thomas D. White Papers.
231	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Kistiakowsky and Goodpaster, January 14, 1960. Discussion of issues: Nike-Zeus, Project Corona, Titan, GAO report on management of the missile program, Polaris; includes Kistiakowsky's briefing memorandum. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
232	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-60, January 19, 1960. "Estimate of the World Situation." Secret; Noform. 20 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
233	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, January 19, 1960. Transmits draft recommendations on the role of MATS. Official Use Only. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
234	Briefing note for the January 21 NSC meeting, January 20, 1960. The role of MATS in peace and war. Official Use Only. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
235	Memorandum of discussion at the 433d NSC meeting, January 21, 1960. Agenda item 2: Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security: Soviet Missile Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

No.	Document Description
236	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Herter, Douglas, Farley, White, Loper, Gray, and Goodpaster, January 21, 1960. Use of nuclear weapons; lend-lease negotiations with the Soviet Union. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
237	Briefing note for February 4 NSC meeting, February 3, 1960. Presentation of NIE "Estimate of the World Situation." Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
238	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Herter, Douglas, Cabell, Twining, York, Charyk, Kistiakowsky, Gray, and Goodpaster, February 5, 1960. Military space reconnaissance. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
239	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-4-59, February 9, 1960. "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964." Top Secret. Extracts-13 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
240	Memorandum from Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower, February 12, 1960. Problems involved in the Minuteman program. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
241	Memorandum of meeting with the President, and Gray and Goodpaster, February 17, 1960. Nuclear stockpile levels, possibility of disciplining Taylor. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President.
242	Memorandum of discussion at the 435th NSC meeting, February 18, 1960. Agenda item 1: Technological Developments in Non-Lethal Weapons and Doctrine for Possible Use. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts-7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
243	Memorandum from Burke to Gates, March 12, 1960. Survivability of soft bases in United States after Soviet missile attack. Top Secret. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.
244	Memorandum for the record of meeting between Gates and JCS, March 14, 1960. Soviet missile capabilities and request for JCS study on U.S. strategic vulnerabilities. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 2 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

No.	Document Description
245	Memorandum for the record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Burke, March 26, 1960. Discussion of augmentation of the Polaris submarine program. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 2 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.
246	Memorandum from Twining to Gates, CM-516-60, April 11, 1960. JCS views on revisions to NSC 5904/1. Top Secret. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers.
247	Memorandum from Twining to Gates, JCSM-149-60, April 11, 1960. Transmits JCS revisions to NSC 5904/1. Top Secret. 4 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers.
248	Paper, undated. "Comparisons in Megatonnage Involved in Previous Net Evaluation Studies." Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.
249	Paper, April 26, 1960. "Planning Board Questions, Net Evaluation Presentation." Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.
250	Memorandum for the record, April 29, 1960. Debrief of the NSC meeting of April 28: Polaris reserves, Soviet intercept capability against aircraft, SAC dispersal, fallout. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originators File, 1 March to 30 April, 1960.
251	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-5-60, May 3, 1960. "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles." Top Secret. 21 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
252	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-6-60, May 3, 1960. "Strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR." Secret. 7 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
253	Memorandum of discussion at the 443d NSC meeting, May 5, 1960. Operation Alert exercise, and Agenda item 1: History of U.S. and USSR Long-Range Missile Development. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
254	Memorandum for the record of meeting between Sprague and Merchant, May 25, 1960. Operations Coordinating Board. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 100.4-OCB/5-2560.
255	Memorandum of discussion at the 448th NSC Meeting, June 22, 1960. Agenda item 1: U.S. Policy on Continental Defense: Port Security. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

No.	Document Description
256	Memorandum from Smith (S/P) to Herter, July 13, 1960. Discussion of paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 on chemical and biological weapons. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
257	Paper, July 19, 1960. U.S. response to Soviet propaganda campaign. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material.
258	Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 100-6-60, August 9, 1960. "Probable Reactions to U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programs." Secret. 5 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
259	Letter from Gates to Goodpaster, August 10, 1960. Transmits draft paper on target coordination and associated problems. Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary.
260	Draft memorandum for the record, August 11, 1960. Record of a meeting among Eisenhower, Department of Defense leaders, Twining, and Burke on turning over responsibility for targeting and SIOP to SAC. No classification marking. 8 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP Briefing.
261	Memorandum for the record, August 15, 1960. Record of a meeting between Burke and Gates on preparation of NSTL and SIOP. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP Briefing.
262	Memorandum of discussion at the 458th NSC meeting, September 7, 1960. Agenda item 4: Civilian Readiness Base. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
263	Briefing note for the September 15 NSC meeting, September 14, 1960. U.S. policy on continental defense. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
264	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, September 28, 1960. Transmits a study by interdepartmental study group on "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962." Top Secret. Extracts—11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs, Limited Military Operations.
265	Letter from Smith to Irwin, September 28, 1960. Questions some of the assumptions about non-use of nuclear weapons by Communist forces made in the limited war study. Secret; Personal. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Limited War.

No.	Document Description
266	Memorandum from Rathgens to Kistiakowsky, October 5, 1960. Comments on limited war study. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
267	Briefing note for the October 6 NSC meeting, October 5, 1960. Limited war study. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
268	Memorandum for the record, October 10, 1960. Record of October 6 NSC meeting on limited war. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: Lot 64 A 2710.
269	Report by IIC-ICIS, October 11, 1960. Status of the internal security programs. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
270	Note from the Secretaries to the JCS, JCS 2056/181, October 12, 1960. Transmits paper on "Integration and Utilization of SIOP Forces." Top Secret; Limited Distribution "C". 10 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files, CCS 5175 (16 Sep 60, Sec. 1).
271	Memorandum of discussion at the 463d NSC meeting, October 13, 1960. Agenda item 1: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1960. Top Secret. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
272	Briefing note for November 7 NSC meeting, November 4, 1960. Outer space programs under the auspices of the Department of Defense. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
273	Memorandum of discussion at the 466th NSC meeting, November 7, 1960. Agenda item 1: Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of the Department of Defense. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
274	Memorandum from Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower, November 25, 1960. Comments on Joint Strategic Planning Staff work on targeting and SIOP. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
275	Record of meeting between Burke and Aurand, November 25, 1960. Eisenhower's reaction to targeting plan, dispersal sites for President. Top Secret. 8 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Transcripts and Phone Calls (NSTL).

No.	Document Description
276	NSC Report, NSC 6019, November 29, 1960. "Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad." Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6019.
277	Memorandum from Burke to Flag and General Officers, December 4, 1960. Burke's comments on the December 1-2 NSTL/SIOP meeting in Omaha with Secretary of Defense, JCS, and CINCs. Secret. 10 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP.
278	Memorandum from Boggs to holders of NSC 6013, December 7, 1960. Transmits Part 1 of NSC 6013, "Status of United States Military Programs as of June 30, 1960." Top Secret; Restricted Data; Special Limited Distribution. Extracts—14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 6013.
279	Annex to JCS comments, JCSM-553-60, December 9, 1960 (print Document 130). "Specific Joint Chiefs of Staff Views on Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations." Top Secret. 25 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs.
280	NSC Report, NSC 6022, December 13, 1960. "U.S. Policy on Continental Defense." Top Secret. 26 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
281	Briefing note for December 20 NSC meeting, December 19, 1960. Continental defense policy. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
282	Briefing note for the December 20 NSC meeting, December 19, 1960. NASA space programs. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
283	Memorandum of discussion at the 470th NSC meeting, December 20, 1960. Agenda item 1: Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of NASA. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
284	Memorandum of discussion at the 472d NSC meeting, December 29, 1960. Agenda item 1: Attack warning channels and procedures for civilians; Agenda item 4: Evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens in danger areas abroad. Top Secret. Extracts—9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

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| 285 | Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Merchant to the NSC Executive Secretary, December 30, 1960. Concurrence with draft NSC action on protection against BW and CW attack; includes a memorandum to Merchant recommending a Department of State position. Confidential. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5802 and 6022 Series. |
| 286 | NSC Report, NSC 6027, December 30, 1960. "Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack." Top Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 273, Policy Papers File. |

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| 287 | Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, December 26, 1957. Transmits memorandum on revision of U.S. policy on disarmament: test suspension, reduction of military personnel, protection against surprise attack. Secret. 19 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meeting Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A. |
| 288 | Memorandum of conversation between Stassen and John Foster Dulles, January 2, 1958. Four-power disarmament proposal. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. |
| 289 | Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, January 3, 1958. Transmits JCS views on Stassen proposals to modify Four-power joint proposals. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meetings Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A. |
| 290 | Letter from Stassen to Eisenhower, February 14, 1958. Letter of resignation. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Stassen, Harold E., 1957. |
| 291 | Record of telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and Sherman Adams, February 19, 1958. Advisory panel on disarmament. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. |
| 292 | Record of telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and Lovett, February 20, 1958. Request to Lovett to join advisory panel on disarmament. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. |
| 293 | Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, February 24, 1958. Disarmament panel; summit meeting; Menshikov meeting; Soviet submarines off U.S. east coast; official visits; Macmillan's visit; youth exchanges with the Soviet Union. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. |

No.	Document Description
294	Press release, February 27, 1958. Wadsworth appointment as disarmament negotiator; advisory panel. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
295	Appendix to memorandum from JCS to McElroy, March 13, 1958 (print Document 141). Estimated spectrum of weapons yields after September 1958. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
296	Tabs A–E to memorandum from Farley to John Foster Dulles, March 18, 1958 (print Document 142). Nuclear test suspension; cut-off of fissionable material production; establishment of surprise attack zones; preliminary measures relating to missile controls and outer space; reduction of manpower and conventional armaments. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3–1858.
297	Memorandum for Eisenhower from Cutler, March 21, 1958. Peaceful uses of “clean” nuclear weapons. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Cutler, General Robert L., 1958 (3).
298	Record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, March 23, 1958. Possible announcement of nuclear testing; summit preparations. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
299	Memorandum of conversation with the President, and Twining, Quarles, Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles, Strauss, Cutler, Goodpaster, and McElroy, March 24, 1958. Proposal to suspend nuclear testing dropped; includes draft Presidential statement. Confidential. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.
300	Draft Presidential statement, March 24, 1958. Announces upcoming nuclear test at Eniwetok. Confidential. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
301	Memorandum from Washburn (USIA) to Cutler, March 25, 1958. Eniwetok test. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Eniwetok Test, 1958.
302	Memorandum from Melbourne (OCB) to Cutler, March 25, 1958. Discussion of draft Presidential statement. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Eniwetok Test, 1958.

No.	Document Description
303	Record of telephone conversation between Lodge and John Foster Dulles, March 25, 1958. Public relations considerations to nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
304	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 28, 1958. Appendices A–E to Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group (Bethe Report) (print Document 147). Technical feasibility of cessation of nuclear testing; Appendices B, D, and E not declassified (25 pp.). Top Secret; Restricted Data. 64 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament—Bethe Report.
305	Memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, March 28, 1958. Records Strauss' comments on his conversation with John Foster Dulles on nuclear testing. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AFC, Vol. II.
306	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 28, 1958. Transmits a report on "Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement." Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meeting Minutes File, 361st Meeting, Tab A.
307	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, April 2, 1958. Transmits the views of the JCS and Department of Defense on the report on "Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Nuclear Testing." Top Secret; Restricted Data. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Technical Feasibility.
308	Record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, April 7, 1958. Message to Khrushchev; cessation of testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
309	Informal memorandum from Hagerty to Eisenhower, c. April 7, 1958. Nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
310	Record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, April 8, 1958. Possible press questions on suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

No.	Document Description
311	Memorandum of conversation, April 9, 1958. Record of the first meeting of the Special Working Group on Disarmament; preparations for summit, suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 611.0012/4-958.
312	Memorandum from Bethe to Killian, April 17, 1958. Development of clean weapons. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Nuclear Weapons.
313	Memorandum from Walmsley (IO) to Herter, April 20, 1958. U.S. position on possible Soviet moves in the Security Council on "fail safe" procedures; includes draft Security Council resolutions. Confidential. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 330/4-2058.
314	Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, April 20, 1958. U.S. position on Soviet complaints about "fail safe" procedures. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 330/4-2158.
315	Record of telephone conversation between Lodge and John Foster Dulles, April 20, 1958. Follow-on to defeat of Soviet resolution. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
316	Record of telephone conversation between Quarles and John Foster Dulles, April 23, 1958. Proposal to declare the Arctic an inspection zone. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
317	Record of telephone conversation between Lodge and John Foster Dulles, April 24, 1958. Arctic inspection zone proposal. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
318	Record of telephone conversation between Lodge and John Foster Dulles, April 24, 1958. Arctic inspection zone proposal. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
319	Record of telephone conversation between Barco (USUN) and John Foster Dulles, April 25, 1958. Arctic inspection zone proposal. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

No.	Document Description
320	Letter from John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, April 30, 1958. Transmits a record of Dulles' meeting with disarmament advisory panel. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series, Disarmament.
321	Memorandum from Twining to McElroy, April 30, 1958. Views of the JCS on suspension of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 3 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers, Chairman's Files.
322	Record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, May 1, 1958. Congressional role in possible suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
323	Record of conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, May 2, 1958. Possible suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
324	Telegram 1259 from USUN, May 2, 1958. U.S. position on fallout. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5–258.
325	Memorandum for the files by Spiegel (S/AE), May 3, 1958. Comments on U.S. position on fallout. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Fallout.
326	Telegram 1283 from USUN, May 8, 1958. U.S. openness contrasted to Soviet secrecy. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 330/5–858.
327	Telegram 1310 from USUN, May 14, 1958. U.N. report on effects of atomic radiation. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5–1458.
328	Memorandum of conversation among John Foster Dulles, Caccia (U.K. Amb), Roper (U.K. Embassy), Kohler, and Farley, May 15, 1958. Possible technical studies of methods of detecting violations of a test cessation agreement. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
329	Memorandum of conversation between John Foster Dulles and Strauss, May 16, 1958. Suspension of testing and reducing fallout from tests; includes report of Strauss' General Advisory Committee. Top Secret; Personal and Private. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.

No.	Document Description
330	Record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, May 17, 1958. Question of including the U.K. and France in U.S.-Soviet discussions on detecting testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
331	Memorandum of conversation among John Foster Dulles, Caccia, Hood (U.K.), Roper (U.K.), Kohler, and Farley, May 18, 1958. Discussion of response to Khrushchev's letter. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
332	Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, May 30, 1958. Reply to Macmillan letter on exchange of nuclear weapons information. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
333	Memorandum of conversation between Strauss and Herter, May 30, 1958. Reply to Macmillan's letter. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
334	Memorandum of conversation between U.S. experts for technical talks on test detection and John Foster Dulles, Farley, and Spiers, June 6, 1958. Agenda for talks with Soviet Union. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6-658.
335	Memorandum of conversation among U.S. experts, Strauss, and Morris, June 6, 1958. Proposed nuclear test detection discussions. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6-658.
336	Telegram 8917 to London, June 13, 1958. Transmits Dulles' reply to Macmillan letter. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6-358.
337	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, June 19, 1958. Transmits Department of State-AEC semiannual report on NSC 5725/1, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Secret. 34 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725.
338	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-2-58, July 1, 1958. "Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences;" not declassified. Secret. 24 pp. DOS, INR Files.

No.	Document Description
339	Annex to NIE 100-2-58, July 1, 1958. "Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences;" not declassified. Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. DOS, INR Files.
340	Letter from John Foster Dulles to Killian, July 3, 1958. Request for exploration of surprise attack issues. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology Files, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.
341	Letter from Killian to John Foster Dulles, July 10, 1958. Problem of surprise attack not limited to technical or scientific issues. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.
342	Telegram Denuc 103 from Geneva for the Secretary and Killian from Fisk, July 25, 1958. Soviet interest in agreement on nuclear test detection. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-2558.
343	Telegram 248 from Moscow, July 26, 1958. Soviet desire for agreement on nuclear test detection. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-2658.
344	Telegram 661 from London, July 30, 1958. Embassy support for Geneva and Moscow recommendation that U.S. prepare for next steps in disarmament talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-3058.
345	Memorandum of conversation between McCone and John Foster Dulles, July 30, 1958. Dulles reacts negatively to a paper by Libby and Teller urging testing limitations. Confidential; Personal and Private. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.
346	Record of telephone conversation between Goodpaster and Herter, August 4, 1958. Statement following Geneva discussions. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
347	Memorandum from Killian to Herter, August 6, 1958. Need for basic policy decision before deciding between test cessation or limitation. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-658.
348	Letters from Farley to McCone, Quarles, and Allen Dulles, August 7, 1958. Transmits a proposed revision of U.S. nuclear testing policy. Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-758.

No.	Document Description
349	Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, August 12, 1958. Need to resolve nuclear testing policy; Quemoy and Matsu; U.N. session on Near East. Top Secret; Personal and Private. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.
350	Record of telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and Herter, August 13, 1958. Cessation of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
351	Memorandum of conversation between Lovett and John Foster Dulles, August 14, 1958. Continuation of the disarmament advisory group. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.
352	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to Gray, August 14, 1958. Record of the Disarmament Working Group meeting. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
353	Telegram Denuc 163 from Geneva, August 14, 1958. Report of meeting with Soviets in Geneva on detection of nuclear explosions. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1458.
354	Letter from Kistiakowsky to Killian, August 15, 1958. Conveys report of Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack (not included). Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.
355	Memorandum from Keeny to Goodpaster, August 15, 1958. Forwards three papers on nuclear test cessation. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.
356	Letter from Kistiakowsky to McElroy, August 15, 1958. Conveys report of Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack (not included). Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel, Surprise Attack.
357	Memorandum from Twining to McElroy, August 15, 1958. Conveys negative JCS views on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Nuclear Testing.

No.	Document Description
358	Letter from the President's Science Advisory Committee Panel on Surprise Attack to Killian, August 15, 1958. Transmits the Panel's report (not included). Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
359	Draft Presidential statement, August 18, 1958. For release after successful conclusion of Geneva talks on detection of nuclear tests. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.
360	Telegram 1913 to London, August 19, 1958. Transmits letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan on public statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Confidential; Presidential Handling; Niact. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1958.
361	Record of telephone conversation between Herter and John Foster Dulles, August 20, 1958. Statement on nuclear testing; offshore islands. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
362	Record of telephone conversation between Herter and John Foster Dulles, August 20, 1958. Statement on cessation of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
363	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Herter, Killian, Persons, Hagerty, and Goodpaster, August 20, 1958. Statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
364	Telegram Secto 8 from John Foster Dulles at USUN, August 20, 1958. Draft Presidential statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2058.
365	Record of telephone conversation between Herter and John Foster Dulles, August 20, 1958. Statement on cessation of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
366	Message from Macmillan to Eisenhower, August 20, 1958. Seeks assurance on release of nuclear testing information. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

No.	Document Description
367	Message from Macmillan to Eisenhower, August 20, 1958. Agrees to statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.
368	Message from Macmillan to Eisenhower, August 20, 1958. Urges postponement of statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.
369	Telegram 1969 to London, August 20, 1958. Conveys message from Eisenhower to Macmillan on providing technical information and political necessity of making statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Presidential Handling. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2058.
370	Memorandum of conversation between Dulles, Reinhardt, and Greene and U.K. officials: Lloyd, Hayter, Moore, and Lasky, August 20, 1958. Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
371	Letter from Strauss to Eisenhower, August 20, 1958. Assures Eisenhower U.S. can provide nuclear information sought by Macmillan. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Strauss, Adm. Lewis.
372	Telegram Dulte 2 from John Foster Dulles at USUN, August 21, 1958. Transmits for Eisenhower text of letter from Dulles to Macmillan on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2158.
373	Record of telephone conversations between Eisenhower and Herter and John Foster Dulles, August 21, 1958. Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
374	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Libby and Goodpaster, August 21, 1958. Eisenhower urges full and generous exchange of information with U.K. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AEC, Vol. II.
375	Telegram Secto 13 from John Foster Dulles at USUN, August 21, 1958. Transmits Dulles' views on draft statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700/5611/8-2158.

No.	Document Description
376	Telegram Dulte 4 from John Foster Dulles at USUN, August 71, 1958. Repeats telegram to London transmitting letter from Macmillan to Dulles. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.6511/8-2158.
377	Message from Macmillan to Eisenhower, August 21, 1958. Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.
378	Message from Macmillan to John Foster Dulles, August 21, 1958. Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles, 1955-59.
379	Memorandum from Cumming (INR) to John Foster Dulles, August 30, 1958. Intelligence Note: Khrushchev Statement on Nuclear Test Suspension. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/8-3058.
380	Letter from Acting AEC Chairman to Eisenhower, September 4, 1958. Initial U.S.-U.K. information exchanges. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Presidential Actions-Atomic.
381	Memorandum from Breithut (S/AE) to John Foster Dulles, September 8, 1958. Briefing for meeting with McCone: IAEA, U.S.-French exchanges. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA-General.
382	Memorandum of conversation among McCone, Vance (AEC). John Foster Dulles, Wilcox (IO), Breithut (S/AE), and Cargo (IO/UNP), September 8, 1958. IAEA. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA-General.
383	Memorandum from Minshull to Killian, September 23, 1958. Outlines JCS view that readiness, disposition, and level of forces not be included in Surprise Attack talks. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.
384	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian and Goodpaster, September 30, 1958. ABMA move to NASA, Geneva Conference on Atoms for Peace, surprise attack study. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

No.	Document Description
385	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McCone and Goodpaster, October 7, 1958. IAEA problems, Plow-share, uranium requirements. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
386	Note from Gray to Goodpaster, October 11, 1958. Conveys memoranda of conversation between the President and Teller and Bradbury, dealing with detecting nuclear tests. Top Secret enclosures. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.
387	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, October 16, 1958. Terms of reference for surprise attack delegation, nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
388	Memorandum from Wilcox (IO) to John Foster Dulles, October 27, 1958. Proposal for 81-Nation Disarmament Conference, nuclear testing resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 320.11/10-2758.
389	Memorandum of conversation between John Foster Dulles and Murray, October 28, 1958. Geneva Conference on Nuclear Testing. Confidential; Personal and Private. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.
390	Telegram Supnu 45 from Geneva, November 11, 1958. Summary of first 10 days of nuclear test conference. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-1158.
391	Memorandum of conversation among Dulles, Macomber, Farley, and Sen. Gore, November 17, 1958. Gore proposal on atmospheric testing. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-1758.
392	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Farley, Spiers, Killian, and Bethe, November 18, 1958. Bethe's views of nuclear test suspension conference. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
393	Telegram Supnu 77 from Geneva, November 21, 1958. Proposes change in negotiating position in nuclear test conference. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-2158.

No.	Document Description
394	Telegram Supnu 78 from Geneva, November 21, 1958. Proposed U.S.-U.K. public statement. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-2158.
395	Record of telephone conversation between McElroy and John Foster Dulles, November 26, 1958. Response to Nixon cable pushing for rapid change in U.S. negotiating position. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
396	Telegram 5175 to London, personal for the Vice President from Secretary, November 26, 1958. Conveys view that there must be full deliberation on proposed change in U.S. position at nuclear test suspension conference. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/11-2658.
397	Memorandum of conversation between John Foster Dulles and Gray, November 26, 1958. Use of interdepartmental machinery to deal with issues arising from nuclear test suspension conference. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.
398	Telegram Supnu 121 from Geneva, December 9, 1958. Basic provisions text tabled by Soviet Delegation. Official Use Only. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-958.
399	Telegram Supnu 136 from Geneva, December 15, 1958. U.S. text for several treaty articles. Official Use Only. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-1558.
400	Telegram Nusup 118 to Geneva, December 15, 1958. Textual changes to delegation's proposal. Confidential; Priority. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-1558.
401	Memorandum from Herter to Gray, December 17, 1958. Response of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament to a request for an evaluation of a test suspension proposal by Sen. Gore. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-2658.
402	Memorandum from Herter to Gray, December 17, 1958. Transmits an interagency evaluation of a test suspension proposal by Sen. Gore. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament.
403	Letter from McCone to Gray, December 19, 1958. Conveys AEC views on issues that have arisen in nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret; Defense Information. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament.

No.	Document Description
404	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, December 30, 1958. U.S. position in nuclear test suspension talks; Hardtack II data. Secret. 13 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-3058.
405	Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, January 7, 1959. Suggests improvements to detection systems. Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament.
406	Record of telephone conversation between Wadsworth and Herter, January 9, 1959. Need for decisions on U.S. position in cessation of nuclear testing talks. No classification marking. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 110.12-HE/1-959.
407	Letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan, January 12, 1959. Agrees to drop linkage of cessation of nuclear testing to progress on disarmament. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan.
408	Memorandum from Gray to Eisenhower, January 13, 1959. Advises against Gore proposal on nuclear testing at this time. Confidential. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
409	Telegram Nusup 157 to Geneva for Wadsworth, January 16, 1959. Account of Dulles' conversation with Mikoyan on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1659.
410	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McCone and Goodpaster, January 16, 1959. U.S.-U.K. nuclear cooperation, Department of Defense plutonium requirements, domestic nuclear power, thermocouples to power satellites, sales of U-235 to IAEA. No classification marking. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
411	Letter from Herter to Killian, January 16, 1959. Urges version of seismic improvement report be prepared to present to the Soviet Union, further testing be conducted. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Nuclear Test Suspension, Seismic Data.
412	Letter from McCone to Herter, January 19, 1959. Urges change in negotiating objectives until more reliable detection system developed. Personal. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Khrushchev Exchange.

No.	Document Description
413	Letter from Herter to Killian, January 23, 1959. Proposes panel of experts to examine detection of high altitude tests. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2359.
414	Note from Smith to Gray, January 26, 1959. Transmits papers for meeting on seismic improvement. Confidential. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
415	Telegram Supnu 230 from Geneva, for Herter from Wadsworth, January 27, 1958. Urges tabling proposed duration clause of draft nuclear testing cessation treaty. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2759.
416	Telegram Nusup 184 to Geneva, January 28, 1959. Approves tabling duration clause. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2759.
417	Memorandum of conversation among John Foster Dulles, Department of State officials, and Nuclear Advisory Panel members, January 30, 1959. Nuclear test suspension negotiations, surprise attack safeguards. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-3059.
418	Record of telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and Farley, February 1, 1959. Soviet veto proposal in nuclear testing suspension talks. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
419	Telegram 1165 to Geneva, personal for Wadsworth from Secretary, February 1, 1959. No further clauses to be tabled in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-159.
420	Letter from McCone to John Foster Dulles, February 2, 1959. U.S. should not agree to cessation of tests that cannot be reliably detected. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-259.
421	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-5-59, February 3, 1959. "Implications for the Free World and the Communist Bloc of Growing Nuclear Capabilities." Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.
422	Telegram Secto 9 from London, February 5, 1959. Account of John Foster Dulles' discussions with Ormsby-Gore and Lloyd on nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Niact. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-559.

No.	Document Description
423	Record of telephone conversation between Dulles and Greene, February 11, 1959. Possibility of breaking off nuclear testing suspension talks. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.
424	Letter from Herter to McCone, February 16, 1959. Rejects AEC position on nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-259.
425	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Kohler, and Spiers and Caccia and Roper (U.K. Embassy), February 17, 1959. U.S. firm position on control issues in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-1759.
426	Letter from Macmillan to Eisenhower, February 20, 1959. Extols virtue of agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.
427	Memorandum from Eisenhower to Herter, February 21, 1959. Comments on Macmillan message on nuclear test suspension negotiations. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.
428	Memorandum from Herter to Eisenhower, February 22, 1959. Transmits proposed reply to Macmillan letter. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2259.
429	Telegram Supnu 294 from Geneva, February 23, 1959. U.S. Delegation ideas on handling a recess in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2359.
430	Letter from Herter to Goodpaster, February 25, 1959. Transmits message from Lloyd to Herter providing a readout of Macmillan's talks in Moscow. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous Memos.
431	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian and Goodpaster, February 25, 1959. Eisenhower request to Killian to talk to Herter about inspection in connection with nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.
432	Telegram Supnu 310 from Geneva, eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth, March 1, 1959. Desirability of tabling article on duration. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-159.

No.	Document Description
433	Memorandum from Twining to McElroy, JCSM-71-59, March 2, 1959. Conveys JCS views on formation of a group to study problems of surprise attack. Secret. 5 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman's File.
434	Telegram Supnu 319 from Geneva, eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth, March 5, 1959. Expresses concern with news reports that U.S. and U.K. have agreed to Soviet veto list. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-559.
435	Telegram Supnu 323 from Geneva, eyes only for Herter, March 8, 1959. Seeks advice on tactics in nuclear test suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-859.
436	Telegram Supnu 325 from Geneva, eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth, March 9, 1959. Suggests a recess in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-959.
437	Telegram Supnu 328 from Geneva, eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth, March 10, 1959. Further indications Soviets would agree to a recess. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1059.
438	Memorandum from Beckler to Killian, March 11, 1959. Mitigating effects of withdrawal from nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.
439	Note from Caccia to Herter, March 13, 1959. Transmits a copy of a letter from Macmillan to Eisenhower agreeing to a recess of nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.
440	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Killian and Goodpaster, March 13, 1959. Technical aspects of detecting nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
441	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Herter and Goodpaster, March 17, 1959. Nuclear testing suspension talks, surprise attack negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

No.	Document Description
442	Memorandum of conversation among Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, Herter, Macmillan, and Lloyd, March 22, 1959. German peace treaty; Egyptian-Iraqi relations; nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Personal and Private. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.
443	Memorandum for the File by McCone, March 23, 1959. Discussion with Lloyd on nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.
444	Memorandum from the Panel on Seismic Improvement to Killian, March 24, 1959. Transmits report on concealment of underground explosions. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.
445	Memorandum for Killian, March 26, 1959. Recommendations by the Panel on High Altitude Detection and the Panel on Seismic Improvement. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear-Hi-Alt. Misc.
446	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, March 26, 1959. Negotiating tactics for nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
447	Letter from Quarles to Herter, March 26, 1959. U.S. position at resumed nuclear test suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.
448	Memorandum from Killian to the Department of State, March 31, 1959. Suggests change to memorandum of conversation of March 26, 1959. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.
449	Memorandum from Killian to Eisenhower, March 31, 1959. Technical factors relating to arms limitation and to the Geneva conference on nuclear test cessation. Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Killian, James R., 1957.

No.	Document Description
450	Memorandum of conversation between Herter and Lloyd and their delegations, USDel/MC/12, April 4, 1959. Nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
451	Memorandum from Herter to Eisenhower, April 4, 1959. Transmits a draft letter to Macmillan suggesting a position to take in nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, April 1959.
452	Telegram 8816 to London, April 4, 1959. Transmits letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan on nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan.
453	Letter from McCone to Herter, April 4, 1959. Believes U.S. should test during interim period; U.S. should not accept a detection system that only deters testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-459.
454	Memorandum from Killian to Gray, April 7, 1959. Recommends systematic study on military and technical aspects of arms control. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
455	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Quarles, Irwin, and Farley, April 7, 1959. Discussion of proposed surprise attack study. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
456	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Quarles, Irwin, and Farley, April 7, 1959. Letter to Macmillan; concept of deterrence. Secret; Limited Distribution. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
457	Letter from Herter to McCone, April 8, 1959. Response to McCone letter: U.S. would retain right to conduct underground tests, detection systems. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.
458	Record of telephone conversations between Goodpaster and Eisenhower and Herter, April 10, 1959. Discussion of Macmillan proposal on nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

No.	Document Description
459	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, April 15, 1959. Macmillan proposal to offer unilateral moratorium on underground and outer space testing while negotiations on those issues are underway. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-1559.
460	Letter from Killian to Herter, April 18, 1959. Transmits President's Science Advisory Committee's recommendation for arms control studies. Confidential. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Surprise Attack, Miscellaneous.
461	Memorandum from Herter to Eisenhower, April 20, 1959. Recommends against Macmillan proposal for moratorium on underground and space nuclear testing. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.
462	Telegram Supnu 382 from Geneva, for Herter from Wadsworth, April 22, 1959. Negotiating tactics at nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2259.
463	Telegram Supnu 383 from Geneva, April 22, 1959. Negotiating tactics at nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2259.
464	Telegram Supnu 401 from Geneva, April 29, 1959. Soviets seem to adopt Macmillan quota proposals. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2959.
465	Memorandum from Panofsky to Killian, May 1, 1959. Preliminary findings of the working group on high altitude detection. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear-Hi-Alt-Misc.
466	Memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, May 5, 1959. Gray's comments on Department of State proposal for disarmament policy review. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.

No.	Document Description
467	Telegram Supnu 433 from Geneva, May 14, 1959. Transmits text of proposed communiqué on nuclear test ban. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1459.
468	Telegram Secto 67 from Herter at Geneva, May 18, 1959. Account of talk with Lloyd on Soviet refusal of technical discussions on seismic detection, criteria for inspections. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1859.
469	Memorandum of conference with the President, and a group of scientists and Goodpaster, May 19, 1959. Technical basis of disarmament; international exchange of scientific information. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
470	Telegram Tosec 144 to Herter at Geneva from the Acting Secretary, May 29, 1959. Negotiating tactics for resumption of nuclear test ban talks. Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-2959.
471	Telegram Tosec 145 to Herter at Geneva, May 29, 1959. Transmits draft tactics paper for nuclear test ban negotiations. Secret; Limited Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-2959.
472	Memorandum from Irwin to Herter, June 8, 1959. Department of Defense reservations on resumption of general disarmament talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Disarmament.
473	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, June 17, 1959. High-altitude technical talks, inspections of nuclear test ban. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
474	Terms of reference for disarmament policy review, June 23, 1959. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.
475	Letter from Herter to Taylor, July 1, 1959. Requests Taylor to head disarmament policy review; includes terms of reference for review. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 611.0012/7-159.
476	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, State staff, McCone, and a Congressional delegation, July 8, 1959. Congressional observer group's views on nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 033.1100/7-859.

No.	Document Description
477	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, July 9, 1959. Public opinion; possibility of concealment of nuclear tests. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.
478	Memorandum of conversation between Caccia and Hood and Herter and Merchant, July 10, 1959. Nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-1059.
479	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, July 16, 1959. Technical aspects of nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy.
480	Memorandum from Killian to Kistiakowsky, July 20, 1959. Proposes discussing Latter Hole in nuclear test suspension talks. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy.
481	Memorandum of conversation between Herter and Gromyko, US/MC/164, July 29, 1959. Resumption of disarmament negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
482	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Dillon, Coolidge, and Goodpaster, July 29, 1959. Disarmament study. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
483	Telegram Cahto 188 from Herter at Geneva, July 31, 1959. Wadsworth's views on recess of nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-3159.
484	Telegram Cahto 201 from Herter at Geneva, August 3, 1959. Discussions with U.K. on nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-359.
485	Letter from McElroy to Eisenhower, August 5, 1959. Plans to resume testing. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, Neil, 1959.

No.	Document Description
486	Report of Joint U.S.–U.K. Technical Group to Review Technical Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Test Detection. London, August 10–11, 1959. “Large Hole;” satellite detection systems. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Nuclear Policy.
487	Letter from McElroy to Eisenhower, August 14, 1959. Conveys JCS concerns about extension of nuclear test moratorium, safety of nuclear weapons. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, Neil, 1959.
488	Letter from McElroy to Eisenhower, August 20, 1959. JCS views on phased approach to agreement for the cessation of nuclear testing, underwater testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, Neil, 1959.
489	Memorandum from Twining to McElroy, JCSM–337–59, August 21, 1959. JCS views on necessity of nuclear testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.
490	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, August 26, 1959. Kistiakowsky report on nuclear test requirements. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
491	Letter from Dillon to McElroy, August 28, 1959. Transmits letter from Kistiakowsky stating Geneva experts concluded that underwater tests could be detected. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2559.
492	Memorandum of conversation between Herter and Lloyd and their delegations, US/MC/15, August 28, 1959. Disarmament machinery, cut-off of production of fissionable material, disarmament policy. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449.
493	Memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower, Macmillan, and U.S. and U.K. officials, US/MC/16, August 30, 1959. Monitoring nuclear testing, U.S. need for safety testing. Secret; Limit Distribution. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449.

No.	Document Description
494	Memorandum of conversation between Herter, Lloyd, and U.S. and U.K. officials, US/MC/22, September 1, 1959. Tactics for nuclear test ban talks, joint research. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D, CF 1449.
495	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, September 2, 1959. Transmits report on the implementation of NSC 5725/1, for the period July, 1958-June 30, 1959. Secret. 46 pp. NARA, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725.
496	Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 11-9A-59, September 8, 1959. "Probable Soviet Position on Nuclear Weapons Testing." Secret; Restricted Data. 11 pp. DOS, INR Files.
497	Letter from McElroy to Eisenhower, September 14, 1959. Transmits JCS views on nuclear testing and makes his own recommendation that underground testing should resume. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel, Disarmament Policy, 1959.
498	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Dillon, Farley, Allen Dulles, Gates, Burke, McCone, Kistiakowky, Gray, Persons, and Goodpaster, September 22, 1959. One-point safety testing; nuclear reactor for Dutch submarine; exchange of reactor information with the Soviet Union. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
499	Memorandum from Coolidge to Herter, September 29, 1959. Elimination of nuclear weapons. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Coolidge, Charles A.
500	Record of telephone conversation between Dillon and Kistiakowsky, October 6, 1959. Control system for suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
501	Memorandum from Keeny to Kistiakowsky, October 15, 1959. Comment on instructions to U.S. delegation to nuclear test ban negotiations. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy 59.

No.	Document Description
502	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Ormsby-Gore, and U.S. and U.K. officials, October 20, 1959. Tabling a limited treaty in nuclear test negotiations. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
503	Memorandum from Starbird to McCone, October 26, 1959. Recommends U.S. resumption of underground testing. Secret; Personal. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 3.
504	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McCone and Goodpaster, October 27, 1959. McCone's visit to the Soviet Union; Yemelyanov visit to U.S.; Dutch request for nuclear submarine; discussion with Macmillan on nuclear testing negotiations; U.K. purchase of U-235. Secret; Restricted Data. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
505	Letter from Gates to Dillon, October 28, 1959. Question of a lack of effective system to detect high-altitude tests; includes summary of engineering studies. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy 59.
506	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Farley, Spiers, Coolidge, Irwin, and Panel of Disarmament Advisers, November 3, 1959. Nuclear test negotiations, stability of deterrence requires greater conventional force. Secret; Limit Distribution. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
507	Memorandum for the record by Haskins, November 30, 1959. Planning Board meeting with Coolidge. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament, General.
508	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, other U.S. officials, and Panel of Disarmament Advisers, December 1, 1959. Developments in nuclear test talks, Coolidge report, troop withdrawals from Europe, Norstad plan. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
509	Record of Cabinet meeting by Starbird, December 11, 1959. Nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

No.	Document Description
510	Memorandum of meeting with Nixon and Principals by Gray, December 11, 1959. Moratorium on nuclear testing. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.
511	Telegram from Harold Brown to McCone, December 26, 1959. Results of technical working group no. 2: foolproof detection impossible, U.S. should resume testing. Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Test File, Dec. 1959.
512	Memorandum of conversation among the Principals of Geneva Test Group, December 28, 1959. No agreement with the Soviet Union on technical detection criteria, position to take in resumed negotiations, decision on testing. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
513	Memorandum from McCone to the AEC General Manager, December 29, 1959. Details decision made by the President on U.S. position in nuclear testing ban talks. Secret; Personal. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Test File, March 1960.
514	Telegram 5162 to London, January 7, 1960. Transmits letter from Dillon to Lloyd outlining U.S. position in resumed nuclear test suspension talks. Confidential; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
515	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, January 8, 1960. Discussion of appropriate threshold for underground testing. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
516	Memorandum for the record by Keeny, January 15, 1960. Comments on Department of Defense staff paper (attached) on the threshold for underground tests. Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, NT, Threshold.
517	Memorandum of conversation among Herter and U.S., Canadian, French, U.K., and Italian officials, January 18, 1960. Preparations for ten-nation disarmament talks. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

No.	Document Description
518	Note from Calhoun to Goodpaster, January 18, 1960. Transmits letter from Lloyd to Herter on position on nuclear test talks. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, State Mepco Cables.
519	Tabs A and B to memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, January 19, 1960 (memorandum of conversation is print Document 240). Agenda of Working Group meeting and draft instruction on threshold to U.S. delegation to nuclear test talks. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
520	Letter from Gates to Herter, January 19, 1960. Transmits joint State Department-Defense Department study on disarmament prepared under Coolidge's direction. Secret. 73 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.
521	Telegram 5562 to London, January 23, 1960. Transmits letter from Herter to Lloyd on threshold proposal at nuclear test talks. Confidential. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
522	Memoranda of conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, January 23, 1960. Ten-nation disarmament conference; letter to Lloyd on nuclear test talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President.
523	Message from Ormsby-Gore to Herter, January 29, 1960. Disagrees with threshold proposal for nuclear test talks. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
524	Telegram 5847 to London, February 2, 1960. Reply from Herter to Lloyd acknowledging differences, proposing interim steps at nuclear test talks. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
525	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Caccia, and U.S. and U.K. officials, February 3, 1960. Attempt to coordinate positions for nuclear test talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

No.	Document Description
526	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Herter and McCone, February 3, 1960. Ormsby-Gore visit. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
527	Working paper, February 8, 1960. U.S. Views on Certain Disarmament Measures. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
528	Memorandum for the file by Herter, February 11, 1960. Record of discussion among Herter, Farley, Gates, Douglas, and Irwin on test detection improvements, cut-off in production of fissionable material. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/12-1160.
529	Memorandum from Twining to Gates, JCSM-51-60, February 12, 1960. JCS views on U.S. disarmament policy. Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, NSC Special Meetings.
530	Record of telephone conversations between Herter and Eaton, Gates and Farley, February 13, 1960. U.S. position for tenation disarmament talks. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
531	Record of telephone conversation between Herter and Gates, February 15, 1960. Cut-off of production of fissionable material. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
532	Memorandum from Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower, February 18, 1960. Government organization for the development of arms limitation and control policies. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-Organization.
533	Memorandum from Farley to Merchant, February 19, 1960. Five-power disarmament talks; cut-off of production of fissionable material; disarmament policy. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/2-1960.
534	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Dillon, Merchant, and other State Department officials, February 21, 1960. French view on cut-off; five-power working paper; negotiating tactics for ten-power talks; military force levels. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

No.	Document Description
535	Letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, March 3, 1960. U.S. plans to share nuclear weapons with NATO. No classification marking; Presidential Handling 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev-Eisenhower.
536	Telegram 6676 to London, March 5, 1960. Transmits letter for Lloyd from Herter on ten-nation disarmament talks. Secret; Niact. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
537	Note from Caccia to Herter, March 7, 1960. Transmits letter from Lloyd to Herter: applauds compromise on nuclear testing talks position. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
538	Memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, March 8, 1960. Record of discussion between Eisenhower and Herter of a letter from Lloyd. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, State Department.
539	Memorandum of conversation among Eisenhower, Menshikov, and Davis, March 8, 1960. Menshikov delivers Khrushchev's letter on nuclear arms for NATO. Secret; Presidential Handling. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/3-860.
540	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Dillon, McCone, and John Eisenhower, March 10, 1960. Operation Plowshare. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
541	Letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, March 12, 1960. No change in U.S. policy against transferring nuclear weapons to other countries. Confidential; Presidential Handling. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower-Khrushchev.
542	Telegram Didel 32 to Geneva, March 16, 1960. Summary of approved position paper on Communist China and U.S. disarmament policy. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.1-GE/3-1660.
543	Record of telephone conversation between Herter and Kistia-kowsky, March 21, 1960. Disarmament organization; military planning; developments in test talks; moratorium on testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

No.	Document Description
544	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, March 21, 1960. Transmits March 14 report by Kistiakowsky on "The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production" and two JCS memoranda (attachments to print Document 249). Top Secret; Restricted Data. 50 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171.
545	Letter from Eaton to Herter, March 22, 1960. Report on first week of ten-nation conference on disarmament. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2260.
546	Note from Caccia to Herter, March 22, 1960. Transmits letter to Herter from Lloyd on nuclear test conference. Secret; Personal. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
547	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, March 22, 1960. Discussion of reply to Soviet proposal on testing moratorium. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
548	Telegram 4663 from London, March 24, 1960. U.K. views on Soviet proposal for test moratorium. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.
549	Draft paper with Eisenhower's revisions, March 24, 1960. Outlines a U.S. position on nuclear test suspension. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.
550	Telegram Deldi 39 from Geneva, eyes only for Herter from Eaton, March 26, 1960. Disarmament and the Macmillan visit. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2660.
551	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Kohler, Farley, Caccia, and Hood, March 26, 1960. U.S. position on Soviet proposal for a test moratorium in advance of Macmillan visit. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
552	Memorandum of conversation between Herter, Macmillan, and other U.S. and U.K. officials, March 28, 1960. Coordinating the U.S.-U.K. position in nuclear test talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

No.	Document Description
553	Paper, March 28, 1960. "The Need for Nuclear Detonations in a Seismic Research Program." Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II.
554	Talking Paper, undated. Coordinated effort in the seismic improvement program. Confidential. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II.
555	Supplementary memorandum of meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan, March 29, 1960. Instructions for test ban negotiations. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II.
556	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Kistiakowsky, Persons, and Goodpaster, March 30, 1960. Research in seismic detection, radioactive strontium in wheat. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.
557	Letter from Herter to Gray, April 11, 1960. Organization for disarmament. No classification marking, but responds to a Personal and Confidential memorandum from Gray (included). 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament-General.
558	Statement agreed to at a meeting of five Western Foreign Ministers, April 13, 1960. Tab C to print Document 252 re disarmament negotiations. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
559	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Green, and other U.S. and Canadian officials, US/MC/50, April 14, 1960. Accession to nuclear test ban agreement, Chinese nuclear capability, commercial nuclear work in Europe. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
560	Memorandum of conversation between Herter and other U.S. officials, April 21, 1960. Coordinating center for U.S. disarmament efforts. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
561	Memorandum of discussion between Eisenhower and McCone, April 22, 1960. McCone's visit to France; nuclear testing. Confidential; Eyes Only. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.

No.	Document Description
562	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Couve de Murville, and other U.S. and French officials, April 24, 1960. Tactics for ten-power disarmament talks. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/4-2460.
563	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, May 5, 1960. ARPA briefing on detection of high-altitude explosions; inspection of underground events above the threshold. Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.
564	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, May 10, 1960. Detection of nuclear tests and missile launches, inspections. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
565	Memorandum for the record by Kistiakowsky, June 6, 1960. Comment on technical aspects of nuclear weapons tests cessation. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
566	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, June 9, 1960. Safeguarding seismic research explosions, high altitude detection. Secret; Restricted Data. 13 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, RD-Test Ban Question.
567	Memorandum from Twining to Gates, JCSM-250-60, June 10, 1960. Conveys JCS views on a June 2 Soviet disarmament proposal. Secret. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman's File.
568	Memorandum from Twining to Gates, JCSM-236-60, June 13, 1960. Conveys JCS views on test ban treaty. Secret. 7 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman's File.
569	Letter from Lloyd to Herter, June 15, 1960. Status of U.S. positions at test ban negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
570	Memorandum of conversation among Sullivan and Spiers and Hood and Wiggin (U.K. Embassy), June 17, 1960. Tactics for ten-nation disarmament conference. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/6-1760.

No.	Document Description
571	Letter from Caccia to Herter, June 22, 1960. Transmits a message from Lloyd to Herter on Western position in disarmament talks. Personal and Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.
572	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Caccia, and other U.S. and U.K. officials, June 23, 1960. Positions in negotiations on disarmament and test ban. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
573	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, June 23, 1960. Disarmament and nuclear test conferences. Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, '60.
574	Memorandum of telephone conversations between Herter and Eaton, June 27, 1960. Breakup of ten-nation disarmament talks. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Calls.
575	Memorandum for the files by McCone, June 28, 1960. Record of McCone's conversation with Eisenhower on considerations for resumed testing. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Eyes Only. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.
576	Record of telephone conversations between Herter and Lodge and Lyndon Johnson, June 28, 1960. Tactics for U.N. resolution on resuming disarmament talks; State Department appropriations bill. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
577	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, June 30, 1960. Use of nuclear explosions in seismic research. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
578	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Caccia, and other U.S. and U.K. officials, June 30, 1960. Seismic testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

No.	Document Description
579	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, July 6, 1960. Opening nuclear weapons for seismic research program to inspection. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.
580	Telegram 219 to London, July 9, 1960. Transmits letter to Macmillan from Eisenhower on opening nuclear weapons for seismic research to inspection. Secret; Presidential Handling. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/7-960.
581	Memorandum from Beckler to Goodpaster, July 14, 1960. Transmits description of Plowshare study proposal. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Dr. Kistiakowsky.
582	Memorandum from Henderson (IO) to Merchant, July 19, 1960. Background briefing for Merchant's meeting with Hood on position on timing of a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.12/7-1960.
583	Letter from Herter to McCone, July 20, 1960. Conveys copy of presentation by the Science Advisory Board entitled "Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations." Confidential. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing.
584	Letter from Wadsworth to Herter, July 21, 1960. Exchange of three letters on state of negotiations and possibility that Wadsworth will replace Lodge. Personal and Confidential. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Letters-1960.
585	Record of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, July 21, 1960. U.S. request to UN Secretary-General to convene the Disarmament Commission. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.
586	Letter from Eaton to Herter, July 25, 1960. Sums up ten-nation disarmament conference. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/7-2560.
587	Official Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, March 15-June 28, 1960, undated. No classification marking. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/7-2660.

No.	Document Description
588	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of Geneva Test Group, August 2, 1960. Instructions to U.S. delegation to test ban negotiations. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.
589	Letter from McCone to Goodpaster, August 2, 1960. Transmits statement by the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on "U.S.S.R. Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium." No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AEC, Vol. II.
590	Memorandum of conversation among Principals of the Geneva Test Group, August 11, 1960. Discussion of resumption of testing. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
591	Position paper used by Herter at 455th NSC Meeting, August 12, 1960. Proposed course of action in test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Papers, Disaster File, Disarmament.
592	Memorandum from Farley to Dillon, August 12, 1960. Update on test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1260.
593	Memorandum of conference with the President, and McCone and Goodpaster, August 15, 1960. Preparation for McCone's discussions with Macmillan. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.
594	Memorandum from Dillon to Eisenhower, August 22, 1960. Establishment of U.S. Disarmament Administration within the Department of State. No classification marking. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/8-2260.
595	Memorandum from Farley to Herter, August 27, 1960. Update on test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2760.
596	Report of Working Group to Committee of Principals, August 31, 1960. Preparations for resumption of nuclear test negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing.

No.	Document Description
597	Letter from Herter to Gray, September 14, 1960. Approves Gray's proposed amendments to statement of functions for the new U.S. Disarmament Administration. No classification marking. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, State Department.
598	Memorandum from Twining to Eisenhower, September 15, 1960. Views on a draft speech on disarmament. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
599	Memorandum from Parsons (FE) to Merchant, September 20, 1960. Possible addition of Communist China to Ten-Nation Disarmament Commission. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1772.
600	Memorandum from Farley to Herter, September 23, 1960. Analysis of new Soviet disarmament proposals. No classification marking. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1772.
601	Memorandum of conference with the President, and Menzies, Macmillan, and other officials, October 2, 1960. Resolution of five neutrals calling for a U.S.-Soviet summit. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
602	Memorandum of conversation among Herter, Home, and other U.S. and U.K. officials, SecDel MC/110, October 7, 1960. Disarmament at the United Nations. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
603	Letter from Eisenhower to Kistiakowsky, October 25, 1960. U.S. Disarmament Administration. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the President's Science Advisory Committee, U.S. Disarmament Administration.
604	Memorandum from Herter to Persons, November 16, 1960. Proposes recess in test ban negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series.
605	Memorandum from Persons to Clifford, November 18, 1960. Conveys Herter's memorandum on recess in test ban negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series.

No.	Document Description
606	Letter from Gray to Herter, November 30, 1960. Endorses Gates' proposal for single NSC document on U.S. arms control policy. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Records of the Office of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Arms Control.
607	Memorandum from Gray to Herter and Gates, December 14, 1960. Directs preparation of a codification of U.S. arms control policy in a single document. No classification marking (Top Secret enclosure). 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Arms Control.
608	Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, December 16, 1960. Transmits report on implementation of NSC 5725/1, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Confidential. 23 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725.

National Security Policy

1. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting¹

Washington, January 3, 1958, 9 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

The following were present:

President Eisenhower

Vice President Nixon	Gov. Adams
Sec. Dulles	Gen. Persons
Sec. Anderson	Mr. Rabb
Sec. McElroy	Gov. Stassen
Mr. Rogers	Dr. Killian—in part
Mr. Summerfield	Adm. Strauss—in part
Sec. Seaton	Mr. Randall—in part
Sec. Benson	Mr. Siciliane—in part
Sec. Weeks	Gen. Cutler
Sec. Mitchell	Mr. Hagerty—in part
Sec. Folsom	Mr. Morgan—in part
Director Brundage	Dr. Hauge
Mr. Gordan Gray	Mr. Larson
Dr. Saulnier	Mrs. Wheaton
	Gov. Pyle
Under Sec. of Defense Quarles	Mr. Harlow
Asst. Sec. McNeil—in part	Gen. Goodpaster
Judge Walsh, Deputy AG—in part	Mr. McCabe
Mr. Stans, Budget	Mr. Patterson
Mr. Cole, MHFA—in part	Mr. Martin
Mr. Whittier, VA—in part	Mr. Minnich
Mr. Tootell, Farm Credit	
Mr. Robertson, Federal Home	
Loan Bank Board	

¹ Source: State of the Union message; Department of Defense budget. Confidential. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

State of the Union Message (CP 58–76)—The Cabinet discussed in great detail the content and wording of the message, each Cabinet member having full opportunity to suggest changes so as to achieve precisely the right tone and shade of meaning.

Some of the more significant comments follow:

The President stressed the desire to talk common sense, because so vast a part of America is common sense-minded and have made it evident by newspapers other than in New York and Washington.

Sec. Dulles believed that care should be taken to avoid emphasis on military “superiority”, a concept that could only result in invidious comparisons. He preferred to stand on the concept of having sufficient military power to deter aggression.

Sec. Dulles favored giving attention to the fact that new hazards result from the advent of any new weapons but that the destructive potential of missiles is not greatly different in character or scope than what could be delivered by the bombers against which we have made our preparations.

The President felt that, although he needed to refer to the increased rate of missile development in recent years, he ought not try to pin precisely the party responsibilities involved, especially since his major effort must be directed to constructive accomplishment while others would have opportunity to establish any other pertinent facts.

The President recounted for the Cabinet how the Administration set out at the beginning to take a new look at national security, particularly with regard to modern weapons, and how the Killian Committee was set up in 1954 to make some necessary studies which were reported to the NSC in 1955.

Dr. Killian pointed to the need for discussion by the military experts of the paragraph relating to the retaliatory power of the Strategic Air Command, which might be actually too categorical. Sec. Dulles reiterated his point that only the means of delivery had been changed, then added that the major need was for something to provide greater warning. The President commented that the possibility of the Russians having intercontinental missiles before we do was not catastrophic since that by no means removed the power of our bombers.

Sec. Folsom stressed the need for sacrifice by the American people by way of eliminating luxury items so as to allow not only for security planning but also for other necessities such as schools and hospitals. The President agreed that the country is capable of making all necessary sacrifices at a time when we must concentrate on essentials rather than non-essentials.

Sec. Dulles saw some possibility that the message would be criticized as being on the complacent side and he called attention to the

various forms of the Russian threat, especially economic warfare. Yet he believed the resourcefulness of a free society would always overcome the rigidity of a bureaucracy.

At the President's request, Mr. McElroy read the current draft of the section on Defense Reorganization in which the President would outline the governing principles without yet stating specific changes. This led the President to recall his long interest in the matter. In reply to a comment on the apparent absence of administration activity in this field, the President quickly cited the earlier effort which had produced only a "useless thing". He emphasized the control now possessed by the three services by virtue of direct appropriations to them, and he commented that the handling of missiles programs had been hurt by self-styled experts at Congressional hearings. He felt that interpretations like Rep. Vinson's ('this is just long range artillery') consisted of taking something that is wrong to start with and trying to build on it. He explained his feeling that it would be best for the study to be made by others than himself since he had had such positive convictions for so long a time.

The Vice President hoped the message would contain at least a sentence on the great increase in Russian economic efforts.

Sec. Mitchell felt that the message ought to be more explicit as to the purpose of our mission and he asked if it were not mainly to fight Communism. The President commented that he knew of no great problem today but what it is tied to the Communist threat.

In discussing the Education Section of the State of the Union message, the President noted Dr. Milton Eisenhower's apprehensions especially as to singling out the pay of science teachers for improvement. The President felt that the Administration program should stay away from salaries.

Regarding the section on sacrifices, the President said that somehow the United States had to put on hair shirt and sackcloth yet avoid scaring people.

Defense Department Program—For the benefit of Cabinet members who could remain and who had not heard this at the NSC meeting, Asst. Sec. McNeil gave an extensive briefing on the FY 1959 Defense budget. He reviewed the procedure used in developing the budget which now reached slightly over \$39 billion in NOA and nearly \$40 billion in expenditures. He pointed out that provision had been made over and beyond the original \$38 billion concept for (1) Cordiner implementation, (2) SAC Alert and Dispersal, (3) Ballistic Missile Detection, (4) Ballistic Missile Acceleration, (5) Satellite and Outer Space Programs, (6) Anti-sub Warfare Capabilities, (7) Increased Research and Development, (8) Modernization of Pentomic Divisions, and (9) Force Levels.

Mr. McNeil also stressed that the decision had been made to go ahead with both Thor and Jupiter, to put Polaris into production, and to increase the pace of work on Atlas.

He stressed that the services would be numerically smaller but more powerful and better equipped. He noted also that over 75% of \$15 billion procurement money would be spent for items that were not even on the market in 1955.

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

Copies to:

Mrs. Whitman (2)
Mr. Rabb
Mr. Minnich

2. Briefing Note for the 350th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 4, 1958

1. The *next item* concerns the Security Resources Panel, chaired by Mr. Gaither, set up on April 4/57 by an NSC Action directing a study “as to the relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems.”

2. On November 7/57, the Panel presented to the Council its 28-page report (including 5 annexes). I understand from Dr. Killian that the Panel did not officially adopt the 500-page Background Studies made by the Panel Staff (filed with the Council on December 9).

3. After the November 7 Council Meeting the Panel Report was circulated—under special security precautions and on a need-to-know basis—to responsible Executive Branch departments and agencies for comments on the 26 Panel recommendations. The Planning Board has discussed and analyzed these agency comments, which are before you.

4. The Panel based its study on intelligence and factual material furnished to it by government departments and agencies, as to Soviet and U.S. present and estimated future military capabilities. From the

¹ Source: Security Resources Panel (Gaither Panel) report. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

summarization of this material, appearing largely on pages 1–4 of the Report, these points stand out:

(1) The Soviet Gross National Product is now more than 1/3 of our GNP and is increasing at a faster rate.

(2) Soviet expenditures for armed forces and heavy industry in 1957 about equal ours (\$57 billion at 1955 prices).

(3) Soviet concentration since World War II on military power and heavy industry has resulted in a spectrum of nuclear bombs and enough fissionable material for over 1,500 nuclear weapons; in 4,500 long- and short-range jet bombers; in 250–300 long-range submarines, some probably equipped with aerodynamic missiles; in an air defense system which includes 4,000 ground radars, over 3,600 launching pads for surface-to-air missiles, and 10,000 jet fighter planes.

(4) Soviet ballistic missiles with 700 nautical-mile range have been in production for at least a year; with 950 nautical-mile range, have been successfully tested.

(5) The Soviets may have a capability to launch an attack with 100 ICBMs carrying megaton nuclear warheads, possibly by late CY 1959.

(6) The Soviet Army of 175 line divisions has been largely re-equipped.

5. The Panel concluded that, in case of nuclear attack against the U.S. continent, our programs in effect last summer for *active* and *passive* defense would not protect the civil population, and that SAC was currently vulnerable to surprise attack when not on a “SAC alert status” and would be seriously threatened by the early-indicated Soviet ICBM capability.

6. Accordingly, the Panel made some 26 recommendations:

(1) Measures to lessen SAC’s vulnerability to bomber and to ICBM attack, to increase SAC’s strategic offensive power, and to suggest forces for limited war. To these measures it assigned the *highest value*, relative to cost, for protecting the civil population. (Estimated 5-year cost of these measures—\$19 billion.)

(2) Measures (*lower than highest value*) to reduce vulnerability of U.S. people and U.S. cities. (Estimated 5-year cost—\$25 billion; exclusive of additional contingent measures costing \$17 billion.)

(3) Other measures of related concern. (No cost estimates provided.)

7. The Panel’s expenditure estimates cannot readily be correlated, by item, with Defense current and projected spending. They were (according to Dr. Killian) intended to represent order-of-magnitude rather than precise costs. The agencies have not calculated what part of the Panel’s total expenditure estimates for FY 59 might be covered by our proposed FY 58 Supplemental Appropriation Request and FY 59 Appropriation Request. However, Defense estimates *expenditures* in FY 58 and FY 59—above a \$38 billion level—of \$2.64 billion, as compared with the Panel’s estimate for FY 59 of \$2.87 billion for “highest value measures” and \$4.7 billion for its total program.

8. After making a brief over-all summary of the agency comments in relation to the Panel recommendations, I shall ask Dr. Killian, who has helped with this summary, to comment at the end, before the individual agencies discuss their views.

9. To facilitate Council consideration, the Panel recommendations have been grouped on the sheets distributed to you (and to be collected at the end of the meeting), in accordance with the position taken by the agency having primary responsibility to comment. Such a grouping does not indicate the position of any *other* agency, or that implementing action would be taken before Presidential decision.

10. *As to Group A:* "Panel recommendations which the agency assigned primary responsibility for comment fully concurs in, and would carry out in general conformity with Panel views", I shall advert to only four items:

No. 1. Using SAC's planning criterion for reaction time to a bomber attack, i.e., 30 to 120 minutes, depending on the base location; only 1/10 SAC (157 bombers) are at present on an alert status to get off, weapons aboard, on way to target, within the assumed tactical warning time. By mid-59, 1/3 SAC (515 bombers) will be on such an alert status.

No. 3. We will have 3 nuclear-powered Polaris submarines (each with 16 Polaris missiles)—currently budgeted for—operational well ahead of the Panel's CY 62 deadline. We are still studying whether to increase the force from 6 to 18 submarines.

No. 4. While concurring in the urgency of this anti-missile area defense program against ICBMs and of research and development therefor, Defense believes a decision as to installation of such a system would be premature before the research is completed.

No. 5. Because of the complexity of the fallout shelter program, and because the final comments of certain agencies have not yet been received, it will be desirable to put this item over until the January 16 NSC Meeting, together with certain other items not yet fully ready.

11. *As to Group B:* "Panel recommendations which the agency assigned primary responsibility for comment partly concurs in, and would carry out on a modified basis."

Generally speaking, current Defense plans would not implement Nos. 11 to 18, inclusive, as rapidly as or in the quantities recommended by the Panel.

For example, No. 11 and No. 12, which seek to lessen SAC's vulnerability to now-existing bomber threat. The main part of our early warning network from Midway to mid-Atlantic is now operational with substantial capability, and will be operational with modernized equipment by mid-1960. Segments of the network and the 100,000-ft. altitude radars will not be effective until 1960–1962. Only 29 of 52 SAC bases will have anti-aircraft missile defenses by mid-60. Whether to provide missile defenses at *all* SAC bases, in addition to area defenses, has not yet been decided.

Now look at Nos. 13, 14, and 15, which seek to lessen SAC's vulnerability to a possible late CY 59 ICBM threat. The first of three ICBM early warning stations (the Thule arc) will be operational in late CY 59, and the remaining operational by December 60. Tracking radars to identify probable targets will be operational one year after early warning radars are operational. Only one-fifth of SAC will be on a 15-minute alert by mid-CY 60 (one-fourth of SAC by mid-CY 61). SAC (which now has 31 bases) will be further dispersed to SAC bases as follows: 44 by mid-CY 59; 52 by mid-CY 60; 53 by mid-CY 61. The Air Force is studying interim dispersal to non-SAC military bases and to civilian airfields.

Now look at Nos. 16, 17, and 18, which seek to increase SAC's strategic offensive power. We will increase the IRBMs to be produced by early CY 60 to 120 (as compared with 240 recommended by the Panel for the end of CY 60). We will increase the ICBMs to be produced by the end of FY 63 to 130 (as compared with 600 recommended by the Panel). The initial operational capability of the first 15 U.S. IRBMs and the first 10 U.S. ICBMs will equal or better the Panel time phasing; but not (under present plan) the operational capability of larger numbers of these missiles.

According to the latest NIE, the earliest date at which the Soviets could have a 100 ICBM capability would be mid-1959. At this time the U.S. would have operational 10 ICBMs and at most 45 IRBMs. However, our early warning ICBM detection system, our 15-minute SAC alert status, and our dispersal of SAC to SAC bases would be deficient as indicated in the short-page table before you. (Examine table.)

12. *As to Group C:* "Panel recommendations which the agency assigned primary responsibility for comment would further study before deciding to carry out, modify, or reject.

No. 20, which is another measure to lessen SAC's vulnerability to a possible late CY 59 ICBM threat, is under study in Defense, but preliminary findings indicate that, because modification of available anti-aircraft missiles would have too limited effectiveness, Defense prefers an R & D program for a new anti-missile system.

As to *No. 21*, Defense agrees in principle that *capabilities* for limited military operations should be augmented. However, Defense believes that consideration of this problem should be deferred, pending completion of a national-level study, a plan for which will be recommended by Defense to NSC. I understand this plan will not be ready for some two months.

13. Recommendation No. 26 is the only one in *Group D*. "Not concurred in and not proposed to be carried out." Defense points out that blast shelters would not protect SAC runways or reduce fallout radiation, and believes SAC can be better protected, for the cost involved, by alert and dispersal measures.

14. As the footnote on the last page points out, Sections V and VI of the Report contained no specific recommendations. The comments of Treasury, Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers on the “Costs and Economic Consequences” of implementing the \$44 billion recommendations over 5 years will be presented at the January 16 NSC Meeting, together with a current estimate of the fiscal and budgetary outlook.

Dr. Killian	{	On Defense recommendations
Mr. McElroy and Mr. Quarles		
General Twining		

3. Record of Legislative Leadership Meeting¹

Washington, January 7, 1958

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

National Security—Missiles—Satellites—Sen. Saltonstall noted the situation developing in the Defense Preparedness hearings, and how some heat generated from Gen. Gavin’s resignation. The President commented that he had had absolutely no advance notice of Gen. Gavin’s intention to resign until he saw it in the newspapers. His behavior was hard to understand, for if it was greater centralization he was after, that was what the President wanted too.

Sen. Saltonstall understood that Gen. Gavin had wanted assignment to the only 4-star post of the Army in the Continental U.S., but General Taylor had told him he ought to stay with missiles for another year, then there would be a post for him in Europe where he could expect promotion within the year. Sen. Saltonstall then went on to say that Gen. Gavin didn’t want to stay with missiles for another year because he wasn’t satisfied with the budget set-up for missiles, and he didn’t want to have to testify before Congress on that. Only after that did he testify on unification. Sen. Saltonstall added that Gen. Gavin had originally requested \$519 million for Army missile development, had agreed to a figure of \$372 million, and had only gotten \$374 million, of which some \$18 million had to be devoted to the continuation of Jupiter and Redstone, which Gen. Gavin did not desire to do.

¹ Source: Missiles, satellites, and Department of Defense unification. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

The President commented on how Dr. Killian had given much attention to the programs for research, that a very generous \$5 billion was set up for research and development, and that things were moving so rapidly that there might well be additional requests for 30 or 40 or 50 million dollars for basic research.

The President noted how inter-service rivalries had come out into the open. He knew of several specifics, but they were not as important as public reaction to this rivalry, so he was devoting a big piece of the Message to what the Administration intends to do about it.

There was extensive discussion of the actual strength of the United States that exists in contrast with the sudden concern about Russia being ahead.

The Leaders urged the President to make a strong personal-type statement that would inspire the trust and confidence of the American people. The President replied that actually he had been trying to play down the situation, but perhaps he had been guilty of understatement in regard to the strength of the Nation's defenses despite Sputnik.

The Leaders commented on the defeatism evident in so many newspaper columns. The President commented that history seemed to be repeating itself—he recalled how there was such a tremendous gloom around Washington in 1942 after Pearl Harbor, the fall of Tobruk, and as the Japs approached Brisbane. But on July 4th, he had been asked to make a speech before the Red Cross in London, which he did, and he devoted his whole speech to how the Allies would win the war—and quickly. It had seemed to be a very effective antidote.

Sen. Knowland was anxious to see a U.S. earth satellite go up successfully soon, to keep demands on the budget from going hog wild.

On Sen. Knowland's mention of getting up a U.S. satellite, the President recalled that we had announced our plans for trying one as far back as May, 1955. Since that time, the scientists had come back several times for more money for the project, but no one had ever said anything about speeding it up. Only very recently had this psychological factor of beating the Russians to it been introduced. It seemed ironic, the President added, that we should undertake something in good faith only to get behind the eight-ball in a contest which we never considered a contest.

The President's final comment on the broad subject of defense was to highlight how this was a long term problem. It was possible to do almost anything you wanted for one year, but when it was a matter of having to carry on for thirty or forty years, that was entirely different. He referred to the import regulations that the British had had to have for so long, and he concluded that if we finally get to the point where the economy won't readily provide what is necessary, then we would have to put on controls. But what we really want is for people to do the maximum voluntarily, and if they would do that, then in his opinion

that would be enough. But it certainly wasn't the answer just to say, "give the military another ten billion dollars."

Defense Unification—The President outlined his general objective, but said specifics would come later on. What he wanted to do was to get so organized that, just as the NSC brings together all the policymakers in the security field, so the JCS ought to bring together all elements of the military to resolve questions. He said he often had to settle disputes that ought to have been settled at the Defense level. He believed the new organization should be such as to avoid having each service head devoted only to running up the plans of his own service.

The President felt deeply that authority had to be centralized in the Secretary of Defense. If the Congressional Leaders would agree to it, he would have all appropriations made to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary would have control of all appointments, promotions, etc.

In discussion of Congressional attitudes, the President asserted that one thing was sure: if there's any real fight in Congress on the things we need, he would take a large personal part in pressing the Administration view on the Congress.

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

Copy to:

Mrs. Whitman (2)
Mr. Minnich

4. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, January 21, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
Dr. Killian
General Cutler
General Goodpaster

The meeting was concerned with adjustments in the priority accorded our major missile programs. Mr. McElroy had a memorandum

¹ Source: Priority for missile program. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

for the President suggesting certain changes, and General Cutler had a summary table highlighting the proposals made.

In the course of the discussion the President indicated strongly that he thinks future missiles should be brought into a central organization, and their use should be subject to centralized control. He said he would assign operational use not to any of the existing services, but rather to the major field commands which could make use of them.

In reviewing the documents, he said he thought that the Vanguard and Jupiter C earth satellite programs should be placed in the group accorded the highest priority rating. It was left that the papers would be revised in this sense and resubmitted.

Secretary McElroy then stayed on for private discussion with the President relating primarily to reorganization of the Defense Department.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

5. Memorandum of Discussion at 352nd NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 22, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, January 22, 1958

Present at the 352nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Donald A. Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Secretary of the Army; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information

¹ Source: Agenda item 3: Priorities for Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Programs (see print Document 5). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Agency; Dennis A. FitzGerald for the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Smith; the Special Assistants to the President for Disarmament, for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. *PRIORITIES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS* (NSC 5520; NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1545, 1653, 1656, 1713, 1765, 1799, and 1800)

After General Cutler had read the record of action on the subject, Secretary Quarles stated in explanation that if it proved practical to provide the proposed latitude on priorities to the Secretary of Defense, such a course of action would seem desirable and helpful.

The President emphasized that when the issue of the size and scope of programs for the procurement of the missiles came up, this matter would have to be approved specifically by the President.

The National Security Council:

Noted that the President, on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, has established the following programs as having the highest priority above all others for research and development and for achieving operational capability; scope of the operational capability to be as approved by the President:

(Order of listing does not indicate priority of one program over another.)

ATLAS (ICBM) Weapon System

TITAN (ICBM) Weapon System

THOR-JUPITER (IRBM) Weapon Systems

POLARIS (FBM) Weapon System

Anti-missile missile defense weapon system, including active defense and related early warning for defense of the United States proper

IGY scientific satellite (VANGUARD-JUPITER C) programs

Satellite programs (other than VANGUARD and JUPITER C) determined by the Secretary of Defense to have objectives having key political, scientific, psychological or military import.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, superseding those portions of the referenced actions and of NSC 5520 which are in conflict with the above priorities.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

6. Memorandum for the Record of Meeting¹

Washington, January 25, 1958, 9:45 a.m.

On January 25, at 9:45 a.m., the President, accompanied by General Goodpaster and Mr. Harlow, left the White House to attend a meeting called by Secretary McElroy in the Pentagon Building. The President arrived at 10:00, met for a few minutes privately with Secretary McElroy, and entered the Secretary's Press Conference room at 10:05, where the following persons were present:

Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles
Secretary of the Army Brucker
Secretary of the Navy Gates
Secretary of the Air Force Douglas
JCS Chairman Twining
Admiral Burke
General Lemnitzer
General Pate
Admiral Radford (arrived at 10:30)
General Bradley
Mr. William Foster
Mr. Coolidge
Mr. Gale
General Randall

The meeting opened with a briefing given by Colonel Rosson, in behalf of General Twining, on JCS functions, duties and procedures. The presentation continued without interruption for approximately thirty minutes.

Thereafter, Secretary McElroy asked for comment, turning first to Admiral Radford. The Admiral said the first problem is the inadequate time the Chiefs have for JCS business, that it has always been insufficient, and that he hardly knew of a remedy. The Joint Strategic Survey system, he said, has never worked well, the officers assigned to this effort being too low-ranked; and the committee system has not been too good, the team papers, he found, being better than the committee papers.

Secretary McElroy raised the question of increased authority for the Chairman of the JCS, suggesting, as an example, that the Chairman be granted a vote, and also asked about the proposal to create a planning staff separate from the individual services.

Admiral Radford said the Chairman JCS already has great influence and is now in effect the principal military to the Secretary of Defense.

¹ Source: JCS organization. Confidential. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on January 30.

He pointed out that the long-range strategic plan makes little sense because it attempts to project 12 years into the future. He thought things might be improved if Operation Deputies were located near the Chairman JCS and be available on a continuing basis.

General Bradley, on suggestion of Secretary McElroy, commented that the service chiefs do not have enough time to do their work, that they are always behind trying to stay ahead of both their service and JCS duties. He said he knew of no remedy. He added that he had seen times when there was too much emphasis on strictly service views in JCS deliberations, but again, he said, the remedy he did not know. It was his opinion that it would be very difficult to have the operational deputies working with the Chairman because the service chiefs would not take well to this arrangement. He thought the chiefs need to be together more and did not see how this could be accomplished while they remain chiefs of individual services. He thought that the Chairman needed no greater authority than he now has as long as the chiefs remain service chiefs. He pointed out that the Chairman's leadership and personal direction provide adequate authority.

As for the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, General Bradley mentioned that the Rockefeller Committee gave close attention to this activity and concluded that it must be strengthened in order to do its job properly—especially, that it should have outstanding officers assigned to it at the end of their periods of service and also that scientists should participate. He said that how and where to bring scientists into this process still is not clear. General Bradley concluded that while the JCS is a wonderful organization and is doing a good job with few disagreements, still it can and should be substantially improved by executive action and by law.

Admiral Radford commented on scientific advice available to the JCS, referring to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group. He pointed out that this process is now on a contract basis and that the Joint Chiefs get excellent results from this Group. General Twining pointed out that this Group can go straight to the Secretary of Defense if it feels it receives inadequate or improper action from the JCS, and he confirmed that the Group is doing excellent work.

Secretary McElroy then asked the views of General Twining. The General stated the opinion that the elimination of the committees would improve JCS action—an opinion, he said, he had not held before becoming Chairman of the JCS. He said, however, that eliminating these committees might not get the unanimity that the Joint Chiefs now have. He strongly endorsed the suggestion that operational deputies be brought closer to the Chairman and suggested that these men be separated from the actual operation of the operation divisions of each of the services.

Admiral Burke thought that the operational deputy suggestion would probably be desirable and would relieve a good deal of the load now being carried by the JCS. He thought that these would take the place of the present operational deputies in the Joint Staff and might be called Deputies for Planning—the alter egos of the service chiefs.

General Lemnitzer thought that this operational deputy idea would be superior to separating the Chiefs from their service responsibilities, but he did think that this process would not remove the need for the committees in the Joint Staff. Admiral Burke agreed with this observation.

Secretary Douglas expressed the view that special deputies would help the JCS a great deal. He said however that the process might remove the chiefs of services from full responsibility for JCS activity, and he mentioned the tendency even now to rely more and more on the Vice Chiefs of Staff for the day-to-day administration of the military services. General Bradley pointed out that in World War II General Marshall left his administrative duties almost entirely to Generals Somervell and McNair while Marshall worked almost full time on JCS war planning. Admiral Radford pointed out that in time of war the Chiefs do not have to go to Capitol Hill nearly as often as in peacetime.

Secretary McElroy asked about the feasibility of short-circuiting the line between the JCS and the chiefs of services designated as agents to the Joint Chiefs. Secretary Gates commented that the peacetime problems of the forces are charged with political, economic, and public relations considerations and therefore that the intervention of the service secretaries is essential. He said the present process works satisfactorily because the service chief goes right ahead with his responsibilities but keeps the Secretary informed. He felt that this relationship would continue because many JCS undertakings have significant civilian as well as military implications. For the same reasons, Secretary Brucker also felt that the service Secretaries should not be by-passed. He said the present system does not delay action in any way, and he emphasized that this viewpoint was not prompted by any feeling on the part of any service Secretary that by-passing the Secretaries would tend to downgrade them.

General Twining said he thought the command channels should be straightened out. Secretary Douglas, however, took the same view of Secretary Gates.

Secretary McElroy observed that going around the service Secretaries would not be a substantial change, that it would simply make sure that the command line would go straight to the service chief who in turn would inform his Secretary. Admiral Burke commented that the chief certainly should contact his Secretary swiftly because of the many non-military considerations involved in such matters.

Deputy Secretary Quarles expressed the view that the greatest need is to clear up command channels. He thought the channels would

be clearest if the JCS issued the orders of the President and Secretary of Defense, using the respective service chiefs for direct action. He said that he realized that the process actually works this way now but is fuzzed up because we assert that we do not do it.

On the invitation of Secretary McElroy, the President then commented on the foregoing discussions. He said we cannot laugh off the present criticism. He said it won't do simply to justify everything now being done. Public opinion, he said, is a strong force and must be respected.

He said he thought the people present had been talking about details before discussing basic concepts. He agreed that things are going rather well now, said he had no criticism of JCS now, nor did he see any present trouble in getting overall strategic plans and concepts. But, he said, don't forget the things that happen afterwards—the administrative and operational as opposed to the strategic projects that have to be applied in the Atlantic or Pacific. He said, to be sure, the JCS can have 872 agreements and only 3 disagreements; but then he wants to know about the 3 disagreements, for these might well be the only really fundamental matters.

He then said that Congress is of course very important in these connections, and he remarked that the services now have some 130 liaison officers assigned to Congressional work. The trouble is, however, whatever differing views service leaders may have get worse as the individual service officers put out their own personal propaganda. He said the same thing applies to public relations and commented that Secretary Wilson once told him that each service has a public relations office larger than the Secretary of Defense's. The President suggested the need of better organization of such matters.

He then urged that the JCS integrate the staff, with the JCS functioning corporately as a single Chief of Staff. He thought the JCS system as it now exists is too complicated to work in wartime, especially in relation to new weapons. He said that the executive agency process is "crazy." He said that the JCS staff should be the G-2/G-3 staff. For an emergency, he said, the organization must be gotten so simple and clear that the job will be done free of delaying obstructions.

The President said it must be realized that there have been frictions and differences and some duplication of effort. We have got to work at this, he said, not merely by clearing command channels, but also by setting up under the JCS a really effective, integrated staff, with the whole business directly under the Secretary of Defense.

The President said, as regards having the Joint Chiefs always with the Chairman and as regards continuing interference from the Congress, that this practice of the Congress to demand appearances of the top men has grown markedly over the years. He said little can be

done about it, but that this might be helpful: the Secretary of Defense could say that the priority of duties lies with the Joint Chief of Staff whose main job it must be always to give good advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs must respect each other and be ready to act at once, the President said, and the more we get into advanced weaponry, the more this will be so. He suggested, therefore, that the Secretary of Defense give an officer an imposing enough title within each service that he could suitably assume the burden of testimony before the Congress. The President said he would certainly try to keep the JCS from having to report constantly to the Congressional committees. Such a man might be called an Operational Chief of Staff, the President suggested.

The President said that it is of course necessary for the Chiefs to maintain close relations with their individual services but that this is mainly to keep things going properly rather than to keep abreast of information.

The President said that the absolutely vital thing is the validity of the joint advice and counsel that the members of the JCS give to the Secretary of Defense and the President, how they are doing their work in allocating functions, how they formulate strategic concepts, and how they deal with new weaponry, research, etc.

The President then said he does not believe in a single Chief of Staff but that the chiefs together should constitute the equivalent of a single Chief of Staff.

The President stressed that there should be no fear of new ideas in approaching this problem. He said that the process is working better now than it was when first established.

Secretary Gates then asked what the role of service Secretaries should be. The President said he thought the service Secretaries should retain certain statutory duties. The civilian Secretaries, he said, would normally be interested in JCS plans and military orders, but that they should have a lot of duties not within the province of the JCS.

Secretary McElroy then asked Mr. Foster to comment. Mr. Foster said he thought the briefing on the JCS organization was excellent but did not meet the need. He thought the command function must be more clearly in the hands of the civilian authority than is the case today. He stressed that we are today truly in war—cold war—and that the JCS process should be thoroughly streamlined. He said there is too much confusion in some of the executive agent responsibilities. He thought the Secretary of Defense must have a staff that combines the wisdom of the service leaders and must be more available to him much more continuously than is now the case. As regards long-range planning, he said that the only way we can get a long look down the years is by some such devotion of military leaders to the single

responsibility of making such plans. These plans, he said, are of great importance to the nation.

He thought that the service Secretaries had very important jobs to do that are separate from the responsibilities of the JCS. He thought it might be wise to bring the civilian and military leaders together in a strengthened Armed Forces Policy Council, commenting that Under Secretary of War Patterson did this during World War II with General Somervell. Today, he said, the process is “all fuzzed up.”

Mr. Foster said that the present need is for a clearer and more direct source of military advice for the Secretary of Defense and a more immediately responsive command process. He expressed opposition to the committee system in the joint staff, saying that it does not work fast enough. In this connection he mentioned that it takes too long to develop new weapons.

At this point Secretary McElroy advised the President that the meeting would adjourn for lunch and would continue during the afternoon. The President’s parting remark was to emphasize the need for a completely fresh look and uninhibited ideas in approaching the problem. At 12:20 the meeting adjourned.

Bryce Harlow

7. Record of Legislative Leadership Meeting¹

Washington, January 28, 1958

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Postal Rates and Salary Increases—As a preface to this discussion, Mr. Hallock joked that Mr. Summerfield should be made to pay an initiation fee since he would be meeting so often with the Leaders in the weeks to come.

Mr. Summerfield made a lengthy presentation of the situation in Congress on these matters, and an extensive discussion of tactics ensued. The entire item required about an hour, with decisions reached as stated in the letter to Mr. Brundage.

¹ Source: Defense reorganization. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

Defense Reorganization—The President recounted to the Leadership the developments in regard to Defense reorganization.

He said it seemed clear to him, though he might be speculating a bit, that the majority of the people over in the Pentagon desired to avoid any radical change since they felt the best chance of securing *some* improvement rested on a cautious approach to a number of relatively small things.

The President said that Secretary McElroy appeared to be adamant on his right to establish new agencies within DoD as required for new developments. It also seemed clear that he hoped to get a greater degree of flexibility in the use of funds for new developments. He added that Bill Foster was strong for a tightening up of Defense organization all along the line.

The President then said that he had listened to their plans for two and a half hours the preceding Saturday morning at the Pentagon and everything seemed to be in terms of “little improvements,” whereupon he challenged them to say how they were going to do something real instead of glossing over the problem.

The President asserted to the Leadership that if something good did not come out of the Pentagon study, he would have to take the bull by the horns, otherwise he would lose his own self respect after having been into this business for eleven years. Presently, however, he very much wanted those in the Pentagon to develop an effective plan if they could so that subsequently they would be able to go to Congress and support the plan enthusiastically. Failing in this, the President continued, he would only be able to call in the Leadership, including Democrats, in an effort to try to get direct Congressional support. He then restated his hope that it would not become a situation where the Defense people would be going to Congress opposed to what he thought we needed.

Asked by Senator Knowland how much could be done under administrative authority, the President pointed out that administrative action was sharply limited ever since Congress passed the law (National Security Act of 1947) and the President at that time signed it.

The President then stated emphatically that at the very least Congress ought to repeal some of the restrictions on the Executive’s ability to shape organization. He strongly desired to see that all the strategic planning and the power to organize and direct the several unified commands would be vested right in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He asserted also that it was necessary to establish the authority of a unified commander to be the disciplinary director, as well as the policy director, of all Services in his command rather than continuing the present situation whereby the head of a unified command has to report the improper conduct to others and ask that they do something about it.

As a third point, the President said that the Secretary of Defense had to have more freedom in regard to research and development and any other new situations such as “space operations,” all of which ought to be under a scientific czar, with the Secretary having the power of decision as to where any particular activity will be carried on, and with the Secretary being the one to whom appropriations are made by the Congress.

The President stated that he did not expect to propose doing anything more now regarding budgetary aspects beyond the already requested \$500 million contingency funds and the authority to transfer up to \$2 billion to take care of new developments.

Subsequently, the President amplified his remarks on the need for establishing an effective staff immediately under the Secretary by pointing out that the lack of such had been one of the reasons that Mr. Wilson had had to request authority for many Assistant Secretaries—he had to rely chiefly on having an “expert” here and another there, and they had to have the rank of Assistant Secretaries.

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

Copy to:

Mrs. Whitman (2)

Mr. Minnich

8. **Presentation on the U.S. Ballistic Missiles Program at the 353d NSC Meeting¹**

Washington, January 30, 1958

MR. W.M. HOLADAY
DIRECTOR OF GUIDED MISSILES
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I will present a progress report on the THOR, JUPITER, POLARIS, ATLAS, and TITAN ballistic missile programs for the calendar year 1957.

The over-all achievements during 1957 were good in spite of some failures and setbacks. The year’s progress gives us complete confidence

¹ Source: Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

in meeting future milestones at the accelerated pace which is now programmed.

During the year, ATLAS, THOR and JUPITER missiles were produced and underwent intensive captive and flight tests with gratifying results. In addition, significant events took place in the POLARIS development and test schedule.

CHART 1

Here you see the THOR program highlights for 1957. Among these were the first THOR launch, a maximum range demonstration of over 2400 nautical miles. This was a lightly loaded missile; a successful, all-inertial guidance flight resulting in an impact within the target area. In 1957 ten THOR missiles were launched, four were completely successful, three attained partial test objectives, and three were unsuccessful.

CHART 2

The JUPITER highlights are shown here. The outstanding point was the successful re-entry test flight of the scale model of the JUPITER-C heat protected nose cone and its recovery at sea. The flight tests demonstrating full range capability with missiles of greater weight than the tactical missiles; the inertial guidance system tests to target area; the full-scale nose cone flight test; the first 150,000 pound thrust engine and the XW-35 warhead adaption kit tests. In 1957 seven JUPITER missiles were launched, three were completely successful and four were partially successful.

CHART 3

The development engineering inspection of THOR launch and ground support equipment took place at Douglas Aircraft Company in December 1957. This chart illustrates that ground support equipment comprises a large part of a ballistic missile system. In the foreground is a propellant servicing system and trailerized ground support equipment can be seen in the background. THOR ground support equipment is in production. The missile and ground support equipment is air transportable. Contracts for JUPITER ground support equipment and operational missiles have been established and the engineering design review completed.

Looking toward the deployment of the first squadrons of both THOR and JUPITER before the end of 1958, the Air Force has approved a deployment plan for the first IRBM squadron to the U.K. The JUPITER deployment plan must await detailed negotiations with NATO countries.

CHART 4

This chart represents the host air base with a launch position of three THOR missiles. The host base also provides necessary buildings for maintenance of missiles and ground support equipment and other logistical support. The other three launch positions are dispersed to insure survivability. Plans to deploy the JUPITER missile are following a similar squadron configuration.

CHART 5

The outstanding POLARIS development events of 1957 are indicated on this chart. Among these are: the successful tests of thrust termination for large solid propellant motors; the establishment of the POLARIS weapon system parameters; a demonstration of the warhead design feasibility in which the re-entry body is part of the warhead envelope.

CHART 5A

Successful tests of the gas eject method of launching the missile; the feasibility of achieving the required specific impulse in a large solid propellant motor of the size of POLARIS; excellent progress in developing precise navigation equipments and methods for POLARIS submarines; completion of the breadboard design of the missile guidance system and a successful test of the prototype first-stage POLARIS motor as well as a flight demonstration of the jetavator control system. As a result of the foregoing tests, it was decided that the POLARIS program could be accelerated. This was done in December 1957.

3 submarines

CHART 6

The year 1957 also saw many significant achievements in the ATLAS program. Three launches took place, of which, one was completely successful and two partially so. Subsequently, in January 1958, a fourth ATLAS flight test was successfully accomplished. Cooke AFB was obtained as the first ATLAS operational site in addition to being a THOR and TITAN training base. Warren AFB at Cheyenne, Wyoming, was selected as the second ATLAS operational site. Approval was obtained to conduct confidence firings for operational crews from Cooke AFB and construction of ATLAS launch sites is well under way.

CHART 7

The basic building block of the ATLAS force is the squadron. The basic squadron is composed of six horizontal readiness launchers; two block-houses or launch control centers; two guidance stations composed of six doppler radars, two track radars, and the guidance building. A squadron maintenance area is located about one mile behind the

guidance building. The redundant guidance stations can control either of the two launch complexes. In the lower left is a typical horizontal launcher with the missile in place and the environmental cover partially withdrawn. In this position, the missile is in a readiness state of something greater than 15 minutes but less than two hours. In the lower right, the missile is shown in the erected position ready for launch. This represents a readiness state of something in the order of 15 minutes.

CHART 8

TITAN. The Martin factory at Denver was completed on schedule. A design engineering inspection of the complete TITAN missile was held in March. This was the first time the using agencies were able to thoroughly examine a TITAN configuration. Design criteria were established for the TITAN operational hard base. The Aerojet General Corporation delivered the first TITAN production engine to Martin. The first complete radio inertial guidance system was delivered in the spring.

CHART 9

This is the squadron configuration of the TITAN hard base. The missile will be stored in a hardened site designed to withstand 100 psi over-pressure. The silo-type launch facilities are grouped around a central launch control facility resulting in a very compact unit.

As we near our initial operational dates, the areas of logistics and operational training assume greater priority and importance. In this respect the Air Force's Air Materiel Command established a ballistic missile logistics system designed to react instantly to resupply. This has been accomplished through an electronic data processing system for the control of spare parts for the land-based ballistic missile program.

Another significant event occurred at the close of 1957 when the Strategic Air Command assumed responsibility for the initial operational capability for Air Force ballistic missiles. This is the step that had been planned from the beginning and comes at a time when maximum benefit can be realized by the operational command. The added strength of the Strategic Air Command to the program will accelerate planning, training, and strategic-operational capabilities.

CHART 10

Now, Mr. President, I would like to present the current plans for the build-up of our ballistic missile forces. The first in the series is the land-based 1500 mile IRBM's bearing a 1500 pound thermonuclear warhead in the excess of 1 megaton yield. These missiles have been designed against conservative operational characteristics and performance criteria in order to insure their earliest possible deployment and

deterrent exploitation. On this chart, the IRBM IOC force build-up is shown under current directives. As you are aware, the recent decision to produce both the THOR and JUPITER ballistic missiles has resulted in doubling the effective operational force expectancy and prior operational dates have also been stepped up. The combined THOR–JUPITER operational inventory will total 120 missiles at the end of the initial operational capability force build-up overseas. These missiles have been designed with particular emphasis in their ground support equipment given to movability from one site location to another and dispersibility from a common support base of operations. Although somewhat different development approaches have been used by the Air Force on the THOR and by the Army on the JUPITER resulting in the development program as shown, it should be particularly noted that both missiles bear the same squadron operational dates overseas. The annual production schedule to attain this force build-up is shown along the bottom line of the chart. The total 272 missile production figure shown accounts for all missiles incurred to cover test flights, training, and exercise firings to support the operational inventory.

CHART 11

This chart shows the ATLAS IOC force build-up. In addition to the two Cooke AFB training complexes, which have inherent operational capabilities, the newly directed ATLAS program will have four soft squadrons by mid-1961. In addition, consideration to four additional hard base squadrons are planned to be completed by early 1963. The research and development part of the program remains unchanged since it is progressing as rapidly as possible.

CHART 12

The TITAN IOC force build-up is shown here. Significant scheduled development milestones during 1958 will be captive firing of the missile at Martin, Denver, in April 1958, and the first flight of the TITAN from Patrick in September 1958. There is every indication that these dates will be met. Selection of the first TITAN operational site near Denver, Colorado, was approved during January 1958 by the Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee. Plans are moving ahead to start construction in May 1959. The first operational TITAN squadron is scheduled for activation in July 1961 with 3 more squadrons to be completed in July 1962.

CHART 13

POLARIS. Significant scheduled development milestones are: the first fully guided flight in October 1959, the delivery of the first POLARIS nuclear powered submarine in October 1960 complete with

its missiles, and the delivery of two additional submarines by July 1961. It is expected that these dates will be met.

CHART 14

The Air Force ballistic missile program alone is sizable in the number of people engaged in the military-industry team effort. Illustrated are some 55,000 industrial and military personnel working in the program. Although there will be a leveling off and a gradual decrease in the number of industrial personnel in these programs, it can be readily seen that the decrease will be off-set as military personnel build-up increases in the operational units.

CHART 15

This chart summarizes the large ballistic missile funding picture. The column on the left contains the amounts originally approved in 1958 for our five missiles. The next column shows the supplemental 1958 funding. The increase in the amount for THOR includes common ground support items for both JUPITER and THOR. The third column shows the total amount of augmentation these five programs require this fiscal year and includes money reprogrammed by the Services. Total 1958 funding requirements amount to \$2223.1 millions.

The FY 1959 funding is indicated in two columns. The first shows what was originally planned. Supplemental amounts considered necessary are as indicated in the last column. The FY 1959 program for these five missile systems as we see it now calls for obligational authority of \$2023.9 millions.

In summary and conclusion, Mr. President, our ballistic missile programs are going well. Our present operational objectives, which we feel confident of meeting, are as follows:

a. Two IRBM squadrons to be operationally deployed by December 1958 with six more to follow by March 1960.

b. The first ATLAS squadron to be operational at Cooke AFB, California, by June 1959 and four more squadrons to be operational at other bases by June 1961. A total of nine squadrons are now programmed for operational use in early 1963.

c. The first TITAN squadron should be operational by July 1961 and three others will come into being by July 1962. All TITAN units are to be deployed on a hardened basis.

d. Three POLARIS FBM submarines will be operational by July 1961.

At the present time, we foresee no technical, operational, logistic or training problems during 1958 which will prevent us from meeting this schedule.

9. Briefing Note for the 353d NSC Meeting by Cutler¹

Washington, January 30, 1958

ITEM 1—BALLISTIC MISSILES PROGRAM

1. In September, 1955, the President first gave highest priority to the ICBM program. At that time, the Secretary of Defense was asked to give a special briefing once a year on the status of ICBM progress; this request being later broadened to include highest priority IRBM progress and anti-ballistic missile defense programs. Additionally, the Defense Department has for some time been reporting monthly to the President on ICBM and IRBM programs.

2. The last annual briefing was given in January, 1957. You will remember that last July the Council heard an over-all presentation by the Defense Department, dealing with 41 different ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, with cost estimates projected through FY 1963.

3. The most recent Presidential action on missiles was, of course, last week, when the ICBM (ATLAS and TITAN), the IRBM (THOR-JUPITER, POLARIS) and the anti-missile missile were all placed in the highest priority both for research and development and for achieving operational capability.

4. This morning we will hear the third *annual* briefing by Defense. Because of the amount of consideration the Council has recently given to the subject in connection with the 1958 budget augmentations, the 1959 budget, and the "Gaither Report," today's briefing will be shorter than usual. It will not deal with defense against ballistic missiles, but will cover only the ICBM and IRBM programs.

5. At next week's Council meeting the Department of Defense will report its recommendations on certain additional "Gaither Panel" resources the production of and initial operational capability dates for ICBM weapon systems, IRBM weapon systems, and POLARIS submarine weapon systems; the installation of interim defenses against ballistic missile attack at SAC bases by using modified available anti-aircraft missiles; and the hardening of SAC bases.

Secretary McElroy—

R.C.

cc: Dearborn
Lay
Gleason
Hawkins

¹ Source: Introduction to Holaday's briefing. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

10. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, January 31, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

A short summary of progress during December 1957 on the ballistic missile programs is attached.

December was the most active and successful month to date in the ballistic missile flight test program. An ATLAS ICBM was launched on 17 December and all flight test objectives were achieved by this third flight test ATLAS missile. This was the first successful flight of our intercontinental ballistic missile. A THOR IRBM, the tenth THOR flight test missile, was successfully flight tested on 19 December. All sub-systems functioned perfectly and the IRBM impacted within approximately three nautical miles of the target at a range of approximately 1,200 nautical miles. This was the first completely successful flight with full inertial guidance. Two other flight tests of a THOR and a JUPITER were partially successful. A flight test of a POLARIS development test vehicle also successfully achieved all test objectives.

All ballistic missile programs except that of TITAN have been accelerated. The presently estimated initial operational capability dates by missile system are:

THOR and JUPITER—December, 1958

ATLAS—June, 1959

POLARIS—October, 1960 (date of completion of the first missile/submarine system)

TITAN—July, 1961

During calendar year 1957, no new technical obstacles appeared and significant advances were made in resolving previously anticipated difficulties.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

Neil H. McElroy

¹ Source: Transmittal letter for progress report on ballistic missile programs. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

11. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 4, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Dr. York
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian opened by saying that real progress is being made in the missiles program. It has gone at a faster clip than was foreseen in 1953 and 1954. There are grounds for real confidence that both liquid and solid-propellant missiles will perform satisfactorily, from a technical point of view. He then asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to report in more detail.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that technical progress has been all that was expected, and more. There are no scientific problems remaining with regard to the first generation of missiles. The problems are engineering problems—specifically to build the elements so that they will perform reliably. There are certain problems which need attention. We can be sure that the Thor will function satisfactorily. The Jupiter missile is, production-wise, behind the Thor. To go forward with production on both requires the Air Force to set up two different systems for training and handling. Technically the missiles are almost identical. The Thor production model has been better tested, since the Jupiter must be redesigned for production by Chrysler. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that specifically, within the next few months, a decision ought to be made in this matter. Dr. Kistiakowsky said the major additional cost in the Jupiter program is that of putting Chrysler into production. The first missiles from Chrysler may be expected in January 1959. Dr. York added that the biggest cost in other than money terms—i.e., in talent and decision energy—is to the Air Force in preparing for the use of two missiles.

The President said that he has come to regret deeply that the missile program was not set up in OSD rather than in any of the services. Personal feelings are now so intense that changes are extremely difficult. Dr. Killian commented that the group was giving advice from the technical standpoint solely. The President asked that they give their advice to the Secretary of Defense and it will be up to him to make a decision, with the President giving him support.

¹ Source: Progress in ballistic missile programs. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on February 6.

Dr. York suggested that the Army Ballistic Missiles Agency is a highly competent organization, and is interested in satellites. The President quickly interjected a caution not to put the satellite job in any service.

Dr. Kistiakowsky went on to say that the Titan will be superior to the Atlas, but it is behind it by eighteen months to two years. The President stressed that what we must have is the earliest possible operational capability. Dr. Kistiakowsky went on to say that work is well under way on the Polaris missile. He thought it should be said, however, that we are not sure we can meet an operational date of 1963 for a 1500-mile missile—we can meet an even earlier operational date for a 1000-mile missile, however.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that a solid-propellant ICBM cannot be expected until 1965–66. Thus there will be a gap of about five years between quantity availability of liquid propellant ICBMs and solid propellant. There is reason in his mind to set up a systematic production-improvement program for liquid missiles, for example going to storable fuels that are ignitable on contact. Titan and Thor have many opportunities for substantial improvement. He suggested that we should terminate the Atlas program after eighty missiles are produced. He added that Titan seems to offer the best booster for space missions.

The President stressed the importance of picking out the phases of activity in which we should undertake to compete with the Soviets, and to beat them. We should not try to excel in everything. He added that psychological as well as technical considerations are important—at times appearances are as significant as the reality, if not more so.

The President asked if there is some area in the United States where we could conduct missiles tests in secrecy—keeping undesired visitors out. He was told that Camp Cooke seems to meet many of these requirements. He said he would like to see it called the Defense Testing Station—and see it kept out of service politics.

Dr. Kistiakowsky went on to give a technical net evaluation of our relative position respecting the Soviets. As to the ICBM, he thought they were probably about one year ahead of us in propulsion, one year behind us in warhead development, and somewhat behind us in guidance, but with a much simpler operational concept based on a mobile rail-based system. He added that because of more powerful propulsion, they could have simply designed their weapon to carry the heavier, older-style warhead. In the medium range missile of 100–600 mile range, they are probably about three years ahead of us, having initiated troop training in 1953 and 1954. Their weapons are highly mobile, using track-laying and road vehicles. In guidance they are probably behind us, with a one-mile CEP for small weapons and a five-mile CEP for large. Their IRBM is a 1000-mile missile, which is probably a 600-mile missile with a lighter warhead.

The President said that in evaluating material of this kind it is necessary to consider relative probabilities. Until an enemy has enough operational capability to destroy most of our bases simultaneously and thus prevent retaliation by us our deterrent remains effective. We would make a mistake to credit him with total capabilities. Dr. York pointed out that an enemy who planned to make an attack could select a time for his attack and delay until he is ready.

Dr. Killian asked if the President thought all of this should be presented to Mr. McElroy, and the President said he thought it should, informally initially, but then put into document form. He thought it was very important to act in these matters in order to avoid wasting money and talent.

The group next discussed questions of outer space. Dr. Killian referred to discussions at the Leaders Meeting earlier that morning, and said there is great pressure in the Congress and elsewhere to have some space work done outside the Department of Defense. His thought was we should get down some objectives in our space program. He hoped to come in soon with this. It would cover scientific as well as military objectives. The President said that space objectives relating to Defense are those to which the highest priority attaches, because they bear on our immediate safety. He recognized that the psychological factor is of importance to our security, for example to the attitude of our allies. He did not think that large operating activities should be put in another organization, because of the duplication, and did not feel that we should put talent etc. into crash programs outside the Defense establishment. He added one general proviso and condition to all of this—that Defense gets its own organization correct, i.e., that there is a central organization to handle this in Defense. He said he wants to get the broad principles of organization right, not bowing to pressures. He did not want to concern himself with details, but felt that it is vitally important to get the relationship to Defense correct.

Dr. York pointed out that the Army and Air Force statements concerning satellite projects are in the talking stage—none are approved projects. The President said that even the announcements and the discussion of these matters should come from Defense. The President asked for the organizational thoughts of the scientific group on space research and missiles, both in Defense and outside, now and for the future.

The President thought it would be a good thing for two or three people to meet with him every now and then just to talk over some of these questions and make sure that their thinking is correct. He named Dr. Killian and Mr. Hagerty in this respect.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

12. Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Killian¹

Washington, February 13, 1958

SUBJECT

Technical progress and actions required in the Long Range Ballistic Missile Program

FROM

G. B. Kistiakowsky, Chairman, Ballistic Missiles Panel

I. The technical progress in long-range ballistic missiles has been faster than anticipated in 1953–54 when the large-scale effort began. This progress can be summarized as follows:

(a) there is now a high degree of confidence that both the liquid and the solid propellant engines of large thrust will perform satisfactorily, although neither type will have 100% reliability in the early phases of operational use;

(b) the airframes light enough for long-range missiles have been shown to have satisfactory structural strength and aerodynamic properties;

(c) self-contained, “all-inertial”, guidance has already exceeded initial expectations and CEP *due to guidance alone* at 5500 mile range of less than 1 mile is within sight;

(d) the re-entry of the nose-cone into the atmosphere without burning up appears to be near solution, not only for the 1500 but also for the 5500 mile range missiles;

(e) thermonuclear warheads of megaton yields and acceptably small weight, which were predicted but doubted four years ago, are now a reality.

II. This rapid technological progress gives assurance that every major ballistic missile program *can* result in a prototype operational missile system within originally planned time scale or very shortly thereafter. The initial uncertainty of success led to a number of back-up programs: Thor and Jupiter for the IRBM; and Atlas and Titan for the ICBM. Now that there is high confidence that each one of these programs will produce an operational missile within specified time requirements, the justification for continuation of all four missiles should be examined.

Thor and Jupiter are technically and performance-wise very similar, but they are sufficiently dissimilar to require two different ground support efforts, different training staff and manuals, and spare parts pipelines for each of these missiles. There seems to be very little

¹ Source: Progress and recommendations in ballistic missile program. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

justification to producing two similar missiles with the same performance. Thor has had more advanced testing and is closer to production than Jupiter. We recommend that it alone should be chosen for continued development and use, while Jupiter should be terminated as soon as practicable. This decision will result in considerable dollar savings, will reduce the burden on the Air Force of making two weapon systems with different GSE, training procedures and spare parts operational at the same time and will make ABMA available for other projects.

In the case of Atlas and Titan the situation is different because Atlas is much nearer being operational but Titan promises to have better initial performance and has greater improvement potential. The need for an early operational ICBM makes the termination of Atlas impractical, but this project should not be encouraged to engage in development work beyond that needed for IOC, because Titan can become operational some 18 months later if adequate funding is provided.

III. The Fleet Ballistic Missile, Polaris, with a solid propellant engine, is in an early stage of development. The introduction of solid propellant engines into long-range ballistic missiles has many important advantages: the engines are comparatively simple and are instantly ready to fire; the reliability, judging by the performance of smaller rockets, is very high. The performance characteristics required of solid propellant engines for use in ballistic missiles are, however, far higher than achieved in the past. Furthermore, solid propellant engines add greatly to the difficulties of all-inertial guidance. It is believed that in time these problems will be solved and since the solid propellant ballistic missiles are very advantageous from the operational point of view, their vigorous development is strongly recommended.

The first version of Polaris, A-1, a missile of about 1000 miles range, is scheduled to be operational in 1960. This schedule appears to be realistic, but there may be navigational and guidance difficulties in conjunction with its use as a FBM which will not be entirely solved in the early stages of operational availability of Polaris.

Polaris B, a missile of 1500 mile range, is planned to become operational in 1963. The advance from Polaris A-1 to B involves some rather dramatic improvements in the solid propellant engines and we are not at all sure that the actual progress will be as rapid as planned. It should also be emphasized that the reliability of the early operational Polaris may not be all that is being anticipated for it by its enthusiasts because of several novel features never before used in solid propellant engines.

At about the same time that Polaris will become a fleet ballistic missile it should be possible to have a land based version of this missile, provided the Air Force is satisfied with its performance. If the Air Force desires to change the specifications then there might be an additional delay of one or two years in obtaining a solid propellant land-based IRBM.

IV. The earliest availability of a land-based 1500 mile missile with a solid propellant engine is thus 1963, but it will probably be delayed until 1964–65, notwithstanding a maximum effort. To develop a solid propellant ICBM is a still more difficult undertaking and its earliest availability is 1965, while 1966–67 is a more realistic date, unless a crash program is initiated. There is thus a gap of some five years or more between an early IOC of present IRBM and ICBM and the start of their possible replacement by solid propellant missiles. This gap justifies the consideration of a systematic “product improvement” program on *one* present IRBM (Thor) and *one* ICBM (Titan) to accompany the steady growth of operational capability of both. We should like to emphasize that the value of liquid propellant engines and of missiles using them need not end with the present models. It appears that the present types of airframes and engines can be comparatively readily modified to use storable, self-igniting (“hypergolic”), propellants, which will give them the advantages of solid propellant engines—simplicity and thus greater reliability, rapid reaction time, easier transportability, reduced ground support equipment and operational personnel. For a rather long time to come liquid propellant engines will carry heavier payloads for longer distances than will solid propellant engines of the same total weight.

While these considerations justify a steady improvement program for the Thor IRBM, they are truly compelling in the case of ICBM Titan. This is a missile with a great growth potential as an ICBM of unlimited range and very large payload. If anti-missile-missiles become effective the large payload of Titan may become a necessity, to carry along sophisticated devices to overcome the defenses. Solid propellant ICBM of similar payload capacity are presently not within sight. A retaliatory ICBM force made up of Titans with sophisticated nose cones and of solid propellant ICBM’s with much lighter (and therefore not so sophisticated) nose cones, may prove to have an exceptional effectiveness.

V. We as a nation seem to commit ourselves to a substantial effort toward space exploration. In any such program the propulsion is an essential and the major part. For economy’s sake we should use for this purpose rockets developed as ballistic missiles. Titan even in its presently conceived form is a better booster for space missions than is Atlas. A systematic improvement program on it will provide a satisfactory booster for rather advanced space missions. For still more advanced missions, such as manned flights to the moon and beyond, far larger and more advanced engines will be required than are now in the state of development. To avoid being caught in a crash program, it is advantageous to initiate preliminary work on such engines in the near future.

13. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, February 14, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. Overseas Military Bases

REFERENCE:

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 14, 1958

The enclosed report by the NSC Planning Board on the main issues of the Report to the President on the subject, prepared by the late Mr. Frank C. Nash and transmitted by the reference memorandum, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, February 27, 1958.

The Planning Board recommends that the Council:

a. Adopt the recommendations contained in the enclosed report.

b. Recommend that the President authorize the responsible agencies to circulate the Nash Report, together with the recommendations adopted pursuant to *a* above, to key operating personnel in this country and overseas, for information and such action as each agency deems appropriate consistent with approved national security policy. In view of the sensitivity of the Report in its entirety, distribution of the full Report should be limited to key operating personnel, and only appropriate extracts from the Report should be circulated to personnel having particular responsibility for specific subjects.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Transmits NSC Planning Board report on U.S. overseas military bases. Secret. 15 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Enclosure

Report Prepared by the NSC Planning Board

Washington, undated

U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

Planning Board Comments and Recommendations on the Main Issues of the Nash Report

MAIN THESIS

1. Present and Future Need for the Base System.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 4–5, 7–13): Our base² system is key to our survival as a nation. During the next ten years, despite changes in weapons technology, our overseas base system will remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to maintain tactical forces to deter and cope with local aggression; and (c) to support foreign policy objectives. The general scope and pattern of our base system are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this period, and a net increase will probably be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons, to meet new Soviet offensive techniques, and to disperse. Adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of our tactical forces, and the political or military vulnerability of particular overseas areas. The central problem, therefore, is how the United States can maintain substantially its present overseas base complex over the next ten years, recognizing that to maintain it calls for a positive but flexible approach in our relations with our allies, and in the formulation and administration of our own policies.

Planning Board Comment: Substantially our present base system will be needed for at least five years, although it is not certain that it will be needed for the next ten years. After five years, a number of technological and political developments could alter the base system or the reasons for its maintenance. Even if such technological developments should permit some reduction in base requirements related to general war, there will probably remain substantially the present requirement for bases to maintain tactical forces against local aggression and to support foreign policy.

²The word “base” is used in its broadest sense to cover the installations and deployments of all elements of the U.S. ground, sea and air forces located outside the territory of the United States. [Footnote is in the original.]

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council accept the validity of the thesis that:

The tremendous changes in weapons technology will not, in the immediate future, alter the need for substantially our present overseas base system. Most probably for at least five years, this system will remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war; (b) to maintain tactical forces to deter and cope with local aggression; and (c) to support foreign policy objectives. In fact, a small net expansion of our base system may be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and to meet new Soviet offensive techniques.

OTHER CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2. IRBM's Around the Sino-Soviet Periphery.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 7–10): In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting vast increase in the vulnerability of the continental United States, our ability to retain the edge in the deterrent race requires the positioning of IRBM's at widely-dispersed bases around the Sino-Soviet periphery.

Such positioning must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline it to miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive, thereby making it feel obliged to react violently. Because the untested state of the IRBM's prevents us from placing full reliance on them and reducing our dependence on the manned bomber, and because existing air bases will not always be the most suitable IRBM locations, the IRBM program will necessitate some enlargement of our overseas base system.

Planning Board Comment: With respect to NATO, the U.S. policy decision on this matter was taken prior to the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1957. The positioning of IRBM's in other selected strategic locations around the Sino-Soviet bloc might be considered a logical corollary on the grounds that such positioning would represent essentially only a modernization of our current forward strategic forces and would be designed only to maintain the present strategic balance between the United States and the USSR. Although the stationing of IRBM's outside the NATO area would probably not in itself cause the USSR to retaliate with actions that would run serious risk of general war, it might produce a strong Soviet reaction in some areas, and would cause the USSR to step up its efforts to persuade host nations to restrict our freedom to use bases.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capability and the resulting increase in the vulnerability of the continental United States, our continued ability to deter general war will be better ensured by the

positioning of IRBM's in selected areas around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Such positioning must be carefully planned to avoid pressing the Sino-Soviet bloc to the point that may incline it to miscalculate our objectives and conclude that our intentions have become aggressive, thereby making it feel obliged to react violently. [The implications of positioning IRBM's around the Sino-Soviet periphery outside the NATO area are of such import that a decision to do so should be made through NSC procedures, only in light of the over-all advantages and disadvantages.]³

3. *Western Mediterranean Pact.*

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 45): Because experience to date with our various mutual security arrangements has demonstrated that they afford the most enduring cement for our overseas base complex, immediate and thorough consideration should be given to the feasibility of a Western Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.

Planning Board Comment: This idea is already an item of discussion between State and Defense, and consideration should be given to including the United Kingdom in any such arrangement because of its position in Gibraltar and Malta. It is questionable, however, whether such a defense arrangement would be feasible so long as the Algerian situation remains critical. In addition, NATO countries which might become members of the pact might find that such an organization would entail the diversion of resources from the NATO area. Further, there is no current U.S. military requirement for such a pact except as additional means of ensuring adequate bases in the area.

Planning Board Recommendations: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council note that:

Consideration is being given by the Departments of State and Defense to the feasibility and desirability of a Western Mediterranean defense arrangement embracing Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.

4. *A New Base Chain in Central Africa.*

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 25): In light of the exposed position of our bases to the north, the technological developments in the long-range plane and missile fields, and the objective of getting a political "foot-in-the-door" in rapidly-developing Central Africa, we should seriously consider, from both the political and military points of view, whether a line of "back bases" across the waist of Africa, with Ethiopia as its eastern terminus, would be worth the cost involved.

³ ODM-Treasury-Budget proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

Planning Board Comment: Paragraph 20 of NSC 5719/1 (approved on August 23, 1957), dealing with the strategic importance of Africa South of the Sahara, says:

“No immediate action appears called for. The area should be kept under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements.”

There is no need at this time to revise this policy.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

The United States should not, at this time, establish a line of “back bases” across the waist of Africa; but should, in accordance with NSC 5719/1, keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements.

5. *Alternative Bases in the Far East.*

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 27–28, 36): In view of the weaknesses in our present Far East defense perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile achievements, alternatives to our present base system should be examined for the dual purpose of increasing dispersion and of establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.

Such a program would be costly, but the alternative to a soundly-based defense perimeter in the West Pacific is a retreat to “Fortress America” which would be infinitely more costly in every respect. It is not a question of withdrawing entirely from any country. This would be considered by our friends as abandonment, and they would feel compelled to make concessions to the Communists even while pursuing a policy of neutralism. The need is for alternate positions which will protect us by dispersion and afford insurance against a situation developing in the present host countries that would lead us to a decision to withdraw. There are a number of good possibilities—The Bonins, the Marianas, Ulithi, North Borneo, Brunei, and Australia.

Planning Board Comment: Because of the increasing political and military vulnerability of our existing bases, alternative bases should be considered even though sizeable expenditures would be involved and many of the alternative bases might contain weaknesses similar to those in our present Far East defense perimeter. The Department of Defense is currently giving consideration to such alternatives.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

Because of weaknesses in our present Far East defense perimeter and the increased threat inherent in Soviet missile achievements, the Department of Defense should continue to study the desirability and feasibility of alternatives to our present bases in the area as a means of increasing dispersal and establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas.

6. *Postwar Stockpile in Australia.*

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 28): Because of her remote geographical position, consideration should be given to transferring to Australia a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet, and to establishing stockpiles of surplus grain and other provisions there.

If, as seems likely, the aftermath of an atomic war involving Europe, Russia, and the United States would be characterized by acute shortages of food and transport, it would seem prudent to develop now a reserve stockpile of both in a place relatively secure from the immediate consequences of a global atomic conflict.

Planning Board Comment: In the preparation of NSC 5713/2, the Planning Board rejected last May a similar but broader idea. The stockpiling of food and a portion of our “moth-balled” fleet in Australia would be of only marginal value to the United States in the event of nuclear war and therefore not worth involving the expense and overcoming other difficulties in implementing the proposal.

The policy on continental defense (NSC 5802/1, paragraphs 3 and 23) recognizes the desirability of “appropriately organizing, protecting and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival”.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

The United States should not [now]⁴ transfer to Australia a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet or establish stockpiles of surplus grain and other provisions there. However, studies under NSC 5802/1, paragraphs 3 and 23, should be made on placing a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet and stockpiling surplus grain and other provisions in areas outside the continental United States.

7. *The Organization of American States.*

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 46): Greater use should be made of the OAS and its military organs to provide a collective security framework for U.S. bases in Latin America. In this connection, it is further recommended that early consideration be given to the desirability of bringing the now-developing West Indies Federation into the OAS.

While it does not seem practicable at this time to consider the adoption of an infrastructure program for the OAS (similar to that in NATO), nevertheless the establishment of a framework of hemispheric defense in place of the present framework of unilateral U.S. interests would do much to relieve the U.S. of such difficulties as those recently encountered with Brazil in securing a small area for use in the guided missile testing range, and those presently involved in the efforts to obtain from Panama a limited amount of real estate for radar facilities.

⁴State-Defense-JCS-ODM proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

If the incorporation of the West Indies Federation into the OAS should be found impracticable, consideration might be given to the development of a Caribbean security grouping.

Planning Board Comment: The present organization (the Inter-American Defense Board operating within the framework of the OAS) is an adequate institutional framework. Any additional or more substantial collective security framework within the OAS would not be desirable from a U.S. point of view and would probably not be acceptable to the Latin American states. There is no reason to hope that the Latin American states would concede to an international organization the right to establish military bases in their territories. Further, it is improbable that Brazil, Panama, or any of the others would provide facilities to the OAS which they were unwilling to provide to the United States. Almost all of the Latin American states are unwilling to enlarge in any respect the obligations they assumed under the Rio Treaty. With respect to the entry of the West Indies Federation into the OAS, any independent American state may choose to join the organization.

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

Any additional or more substantial collective security framework for Latin America would, on balance, be infeasible and undesirable at this time. Consideration should be given to bringing the West Indies Federation into the OAS at an appropriate time.

8. Criminal Jurisdiction.

Statement of the Issue (Report, pp. 53, 58–60, 63): Except as may be specifically determined to the contrary by the Secretaries of State and Defense, U.S. forces should not in the future be stationed in peacetime on any additional foreign territory unless satisfactory arrangements on criminal jurisdiction—i.e., in substance the NATO Status of Forces Agreement as a minimum—have been made in advance. Where existing agreements fall below satisfactory standards in terms and practice, they should be renegotiated at the earliest practicable time. Where U.S. forces are now stationed on foreign territory without any status arrangements and host governments refuse to agree to such arrangements, U.S. forces should be withdrawn unless the Secretaries of State and Defense jointly determine that overriding national interest demands their continued presence. The Executive Branch should undertake an urgent, intensive, and continuous effort to inform and explain to the American people and its representatives in Congress the nature and facts of U.S. policy in regard to criminal jurisdiction.

The exercise of criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen abroad is a relatively new problem resulting from the peacetime stationing of large numbers of troops in friendly countries. The issue has not yet seriously affected U.S. military operations, Free World solidarity, or

other U.S. national objectives and policies, but potentially it contains the seeds of serious danger.

Planning Board Comment: In view of public concern and Congressional sensitivity on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over servicemen by foreign courts, it is believed that the recommended position is the appropriate standard and that the national policy should be to achieve that standard wherever possible. [In those cases where this standard cannot be met, it is believed appropriate that the decision not to insist on the standard should be taken only at a high level.]⁵

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

The objective of the United States should be to obtain, where feasible, criminal jurisdiction arrangements, with all countries in which U.S. forces are stationed now or in the future, at least as favorable as those contained in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. [U.S. forces should not be stationed on foreign territory unless protected by criminal jurisdiction arrangements at least equal in substance to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, except on determination by the Secretaries of State and Defense that overriding national interest demands their presence notwithstanding the absence of satisfactory arrangements.]⁶

9. *Sharing Defense Responsibilities with Canada.*

Statement of the Issue (Report, p. 19): The United States should enable Canada to assume a growing share of the responsibilities for defending North America and the North Atlantic.

Although our base relationships are generally excellent, and Canada realizes how closely her existence is identified with that of the United States, both within and without NATO, there is a growing Canadian sensitivity and feeling of national destiny that will spell trouble for us if we do not take every step we can to give Canada a practical sense of equality with the United States, particularly in defense matters. Further, the manifold problems inherent in providing [*text not declassified*].

Planning Board Comment: The same general position is taken by existing policy on continental defense (NSC 5802/1). Although we have gone far in cooperating with Canada in the military field, [*text not declassified*]. However, the principal areas for improvement are the political and economic. Better cooperation is also required in non-military defense matters. There is at present no national security policy paper on Canada. There is a Joint (U.S.-Canada) Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, made up of the U.S. Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, and their Canadian counterparts.

⁵ Defense-Treasury proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

⁶ Defense-Treasury proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

Planning Board Recommendation: Accordingly, the Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council agree that:

Majority Proposal

The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be requested to study all possible means of improving U.S.-Canada economic relations, and to transmit to the National Security Council any recommendations requiring Presidential consideration.

ODM Proposal

The Planning Board should prepare, for consideration by the National Security Council, a draft policy paper on all aspects of our relations with Canada.

14. Memorandum of Conversation Between Dulles and Gruenther¹

Washington, February 19, 1958, 2 p.m.

We talked about Tunisia, Mutual Security, and so forth. Then I discussed the disarmament situation. I said I felt that it was essential that the disarmament work should be an integral part of the State Department activity and not operated independently. Disarmament involved too many political considerations, the future of NATO, the future of Germany, and so forth. Gruenther said he agreed. I further said that I was very sceptical about there being any reduction of armament purely as a matter of agreement. There might be reduction for domestic reasons or because some political issues were settled, but the disarmament problem was so complex, the balance so difficult to find, and enforcement so precarious, that I doubted that there could be reduction of armament purely as a result of reciprocal and balanced agreement. Nevertheless, I felt it was vital to continue to seek limitation of armament. I referred to the German attitude prior to World War I and the disastrous consequences to them of being regarded throughout the world as militaristic. General Gruenther indicated his general agreement with this point of view. I then indicated that I was thinking of handling the matter, perhaps through Wadsworth, as far as negotiation was concerned, and through the regular Departmental officers, but I did feel it necessary to have some qualified persons from outside who could serve as kind of an advisory panel to keep us moving and moving in sound directions, taking into account all

¹ Source: Possibility of establishing disarmament advisory board. Confidential; Personal and Private. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Drafted by Dulles.

relevant factors, including public relations. General Gruenther expressed the thought that perhaps some of our allies were making us carry too heavy a public relations burden by getting us to take positions which they wanted but which they were not willing to associate themselves with publicly, e.g. non-suspension of testing. I agreed. I asked General Gruenther whether he would be willing to serve on such a panel and he said that he would if I thought this could be reconciled with his being out of town a good deal of the time. I said I thought it could be. I mentioned General Bedell Smith, and he thought that he would be a good member, subject to the fact that he also was out of town a good deal of the time. General Gruenther suggested Arnold Wolfers as someone here whom he regarded as intelligent and knowledgeable and a student of the subject.

I spoke of Sprague but said I was a little bit concerned because he seemed to be emotional about certain aspects of the matter including shelters. General Gruenther said he had no knowledge of Robert Sprague but did not think we needed to worry much about the shelter program. He said he did not think it would ever take hold or be a popular or political problem. He did express regret that Senator Humphrey had attacked the Administration on the disarmament theme.

I thanked General Gruenther for his willingness to serve and said I would communicate with him later on.

JFD

15. NSC Report¹

NSC 5802/1

Washington, February 19, 1958

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5408
- B. NSC 5606
- C. NSC Actions Nos. 1574, 1781, 1814, 1815, 1841 and 1842

¹ Source: "Continental Defense." Top Secret. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense.

D. Executive Order No. 10173

E. NSC 5802

F. NSC Action No. 1862

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, at the 355th Council meeting on February 13, 1958, adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5802, subject to the amendments thereto set forth in NSC Action No. 1862–*b*.

In adopting the statement of policy in NSC 5802, the Council also (NSC Action No. 1862–*c*, –*d*, –*e*, –*f*, and –*g*):

c. Agreed that the statement of policy in NSC 5802, as finally adopted and approved, is intended to supersede NSC 5408; but is not intended, of itself, to cancel or change any program set forth in NSC 5408, each of which programs should be reviewed by the responsible departments and agencies in accordance with paragraph 1–*b* of NSC 5802.

d. Recommended that the responsible agencies should use, on a continuing basis, available passive devices for the detection of fissionable material, pursuant to paragraph 14 of NSC 5802.

e. Noted that the Department of State would undertake to examine and report at the next Council meeting, on whether, if there were substantial evidence that any shipment entering the United States under diplomatic immunity contained radioactive material, the Department should advise the diplomatic representatives of the country concerned that the shipment would be opened by U.S. officials, in the presence of representatives of such country, to determine the nature of the radioactive material.

f. Requested the Departments of the Treasury and Justice, in view of the decision in *Parker v. Lester*:

(1) To draft an Executive Order, to supersede Executive Order No. 10173, which will enable Federal authorities to take the most effective action possible in the circumstances to deny access to U.S. merchant vessels, ports, and waterfront facilities on the part of individuals considered inimical to the security of the United States.

(2) To draft proposed legislation, which would enable Federal authorities to take more effective action in this area, for consideration for submission at this session of the Congress.

g. Requested the Department of the Treasury to prepare for Presidential approval the programs to implement all aspects of paragraph 19 of NSC 5802; such draft to include (1) instructions taking into account the new Executive Order referred to in *f*–(1) above and (2) appropriate provisions along the lines of those stated in NSC Action No. 1781 (which related U.S. policy toward Poland to the port security provisions of NSC 5408).

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5802 as amended, adopted, and enclosed herewith as NSC 5802/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments

and agencies of the U.S. Government; and directs that the departments and agencies indicated in the table on “Primary Responsibilities for Implementation” (with the exception of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency) report, in a special annex to their respective annual status reports, on progress in implementing the appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5802/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

- cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman; JCS
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, IIC—The Chairman, ICIS

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

<i>Paragraph and Subject</i>	<i>Primary Responsibility</i>
5—International Collaboration	State in collaboration with Defense
6—Strategic Warning (1st two sentences)	Intelligence agencies under DCI coordination within existing law and established policy
(Last sentence)	All appropriate agencies
7—Tactical Warning	Defense
8—Active Defense	Defense
9—Passive Defense of Retaliatory Capability	Defense
10—Improvement of Alert Status of Air Defense Forces	Defense
11—Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil Defense	Defense in collaboration with FCD
12—Research and Development	All appropriate agencies
13–18—Internal Security	IIC and ICIS coordination
19—Port Security	Treasury, keeping IIC and ICIS fully informed

<i>Paragraph and Subject</i>	<i>Primary Responsibility</i>
20—Continuity of Government	ODM in collaboration with all participating agencies
21—Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities	ODM in collaboration with all participating agencies
22—Continuity of Industry	ODM
23—Stockpiling of Civilian Survival Items	ODM in collaboration with FCDA
24–27—Civil Defense	FCDA

STATEMENT
of
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

SCOPE

1. This statement of policy on “continental defense” does not encompass all elements of U.S. or allied strength contributing to the defense of North America, but is limited as follows:

a. Only those U.S. policies are included which are essentially defensive in nature, i.e., which contribute directly to the defense of the North American Continent and to the protection of that element of our retaliatory capability based on the North American Continent.

b. This statement of policy does not include programs. The omission from this statement of programs does not of itself cancel or change any program set forth in NSC 5408. However, the responsible agencies should review such programs in the light of this policy statement to determine whether such programs are currently valid or should be cancelled or changed.

RELATIVE EMPHASIS

2. The defense of the United States is an integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements and of military and non-military measures. Each of these has its proper role in deterring an attack or in the defense of the United States should an attack occur. Predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen our effective nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures. Particular emphasis should be accorded those active and passive defense measures essential to the protection of the U.S. capability for prompt nuclear retaliation. An effective North American continental defense system will constitute one of the key deterrents to an attack on the North American Continent.

OBJECTIVES

3. The United States should be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation.

a. Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World nations, a continental defense readiness and capability which will protect and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory forces, even in the event of surprise attack.

b. Such preparation should:

- (1) Provide warning to alert the nation to impending attack.
- (2) Counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts.
- (3) Prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale.
- (4) Maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology permits and as the nature of the threat changes.

(5) Provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil population.

c. Such preparation should include appropriately organizing, protecting and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival.

TIME-PHASING

4. The time-phasing of U.S. "continental defense" measures should take into account the threat posed by the present nuclear megaton attack capability of the USSR and by anticipated future improvements in Soviet weapons and delivery capabilities, particularly the achievement of a significant ICBM capability.² Effective continental defense requires that the United States should be constantly on guard against "technological surprise" and should continually strive for technological superiority.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION

5. Continental defense requires close collaboration with certain allies; in particular, Canadian agreement and participation remain essential to effective continental defense. Efforts should also be continued to achieve more effective collaboration with Mexico and Iceland.

² SNIE 11-10-57, "The Soviet ICBM Program", December 17, 1957, estimates that the USSR will probably have an operational capability with up to 10 prototype ICBM's, capable of carrying high-yield nuclear warheads, during the period mid-1958 to mid-1959; and could have 100 operational ICBM's about one year after its first operational capability date (i.e., mid-1959 to mid-1960), and 500 ICBM's about two, or at most three, years after first operational capability date (i.e., mid-1960 to mid-1962). It is estimated that the first 100 to 200 Soviet ICBM's would have a fifty per cent system reliability and that succeeding weapons would have a system reliability up to seventy per cent. [Footnote is in the original.]

STRATEGIC WARNING

6. As achievable tactical warning time decreases, it becomes increasingly important to obtain strategic warning of Soviet Bloc attack against the United States. Even if some risks have to be taken, vigorous efforts should be made, including the development of new techniques, to collect and accurately evaluate indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior strategic warning of hostile action against the United States. Because it cannot be concluded that the United States surely will, or surely will not, have strategic warning of attack, U.S. planning should take account of both possibilities.

TACTICAL WARNING AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES

7. Tactical warning of an impending attack, including very high- and very low-level altitude detection and sea surveillance, should be provided to assure adequate time for counter-offensive forces to initiate action, for defense forces to achieve alert readiness, and for civil defense, internal security and other non-military measures to be effectively implemented. To this end:

a. Our early warning radar network and its seaward extensions should be improved.

b. Weaknesses in identification techniques should be remedied.

c. An effective early warning radar system against ICBM's should be developed and brought into operation as an integral part of the air defense system, as a matter of the highest national priority.

ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES

8. The United States should continue to improve, and to maintain at a high state of readiness, an effective, integrated system of air surveillance, weapons, and control elements, providing defense in depth capable of detecting, identifying, engaging, and destroying enemy aircraft or missiles approaching or operating over the North American Continent before they reach vital targets.

a. *Defense against Bomber and Non-Ballistic Missile Attack.* Such a defense in depth should include interceptor and fighter aircraft and air defense missiles. In addition to primary air defense forces, all other forces with an air defense capability which can be made temporarily available should be made immediately available and employed as required within this system in the event of attack or the threat of immediate attack.

b. *Defense against ICBM Attack.* In view of continued USSR advances in ballistic missile development, the United States should develop an anti-ICBM weapon system as a matter of the highest national priority.

c. *Defense against the Threat of Missile Attack Launched from Ocean Areas.* In order to meet the threat of missiles launched from ocean areas, the United States should develop and maintain at a high state of readiness integrated sea surveillance systems which will provide for detection and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within

missile-launching range of the North American Continent; and should improve its defense against submarine-launched missiles and its anti-submarine capability.

PASSIVE DEFENSE OF RETALIATORY CAPABILITY

9. Passive measures, such as dispersal, reduction of reaction time, and protection of essential facilities, should be taken to minimize the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory striking forces.

IMPROVEMENT OF ALERT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES

10. The United States should continue to improve and maintain the alert status of its primary air defense forces, and cooperate in improvement of Canadian primary air defense forces, so as to provide an immediate reaction to warning of an enemy attack. Passive defense measures, such as dispersal and protection of essential facilities, should be taken to minimize the vulnerability of air defense forces.

EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES IN CIVIL DEFENSE

11. In the event of attack on the United States, the active defense of the United States and the U.S. nuclear counter-offensive will be the paramount and most immediate tasks of certain U.S. forces. Additionally, certain other forces will be immediately involved in support of these defense and counter-offensive forces. Forces not required in the execution of essential military missions should be prepared to assist civil authorities, for a temporary period, in maintaining law and order and in other essential civilian tasks.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

12. A vigorous research and development program should be maintained in order to develop new weapons and needed improvements in the continental defense system and to counter improving Soviet technological capabilities for attack against the United States. Of particular importance are the following (without indication of priority):

- a.* Early warning capability against enemy aircraft and non-ballistic missiles, by radar and other techniques.
- b.* Detection and defense against very high- and very low-level attacks.
- c.* Reduction of vulnerability to electronic countermeasures.
- d.* Submarine detection, identification, and defense against submarines and submarine-launched missiles.
- e.* Early warning capability against ICBM's, by radar and other techniques.
- f.* Active defenses against ICBM's.
- g.* Defense against satellites and space vehicles.

INTERNAL SECURITY

13. The Soviet Bloc should be confronted with internal security measures presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to covert attack against the United States.

14. In particular, the United States should, to the extent practicable, increase safeguards so as to provide adequate deterrents (a) to clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by any means such as submarines, small craft, merchant vessels, aircraft, illegal entries of persons and things, and diplomatic channels; and (b) to utilization of such weapons against vital targets. Intensive efforts should be continued to develop active and improved passive devices for the detection of fissionable material introduced by such means, and to assure their effective use.

15. Measures should be taken to protect U.S. aircraft and airports, as appropriate, against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities, and to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the operations within the continental United States of Soviet Bloc airlines.

16. Selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly critical nature should be protected against espionage and clandestine attack by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and conventional sabotage.

17. Selective counterintelligence coverage should be maintained of foreign diplomatic and official personnel suspected of engaging in activities beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic assignments.

18. Plans for the detention in the event of emergency of persons potentially dangerous to the United States should be maintained in a high state of readiness.

*Port Security*³

19. Measures should be taken (a) to protect U.S. ports and vessels therein against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities, (b) to supervise and where appropriate deny entry of vessels, and (c) to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the presence in U.S. ports of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels. In so far as feasible, having due regard for legal procedures and rights, subversives should be excluded from vessels and waterfront facilities.⁴

³ Certain measures under this heading are supplemental to those contained under the previous heading, "INTERNAL SECURITY". [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Experience has shown that only a very small percentage of the persons believed to be subversives can be excluded under procedures acceptable to the courts. [Footnote is in the original.]

CONTINUITY OF ESSENTIAL WARTIME FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

20. Plans and relocation facilities needed to ensure the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government should be completed and maintained in a state of operational readiness at the earliest time practicable.

a. Plans should provide a ready and certain system of attack warning, reaction and decision-making, with adequate communications and provision for conducting emergency operations.

b. Emergency Federal relocation facilities should be equipped as required to permit immediate activation upon arrival of relocated personnel, and should be continuously staffed as determined by the President.

c. The few most critical emergency Federal relocation facilities should be protected against blast, thermal and radiation effects at the earliest time practicable. Other Federal relocation facilities in "the Federal arc"⁵ should be protected against fallout.

PROTECTION AND DISPERSAL OF FEDERAL FACILITIES

21. *a.* Except as otherwise determined by proper authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of existing Federal facilities, important to national security, should not be located in target areas. The location of new or expanded military installations, excluding the Pentagon and other similar administrative headquarters, shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary of Defense.

b. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable size, designed after this date, along the lines stated in NSC 5807/1.

CONTINUITY OF INDUSTRY

22. *a.* (1) Dispersal of private industrial facilities, and the inclusion of fallout shelter therein, as appropriate, should be encouraged.

(2) Guidance and leadership should be provided to industries essential to initial recovery from nuclear attack in the development of plans and programs designed to insure the continuity of essential production and services.

b. Action should be taken to determine the critical industries (such as drug, liquid fuel) in which construction of hardened, dispersed plants is essential to insure national survival.

⁵ Relocation sites are located in dispersed sectors within a westerly arc approximately 30–300 miles radial distance from Washington, D.C., zero milestone. [Footnote is in the original.]

STOCKPILING OF CIVILIAN SURVIVAL ITEMS

23. Civilian items essential to initial recovery from nuclear attack should be identified, minimum requirements determined, and industrial inventories located and related to Government and State stocks. Where total availabilities appear inadequate, measures should be developed to meet minimum requirements with the least disruption of the economy, the least cost to the Government, and maximum encouragement of private participation.

CIVIL DEFENSE

24. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is improved and strengthened civil defense which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack and to contribute to deterring such attack.

25. In order that Federal, State and local governments may carry out their essential responsibilities during and after nuclear attack or other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments to function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance in the form of guidance, direction and resources. Such assistance should include pre-attack planning for the use of local resources and, as provided in paragraph 11 hereof, of military forces not required in the execution of essential military missions.

26. Civil defense policy for protection of the civil population in case of nuclear attack, while continuing to include local planning for the emergency dispersal of urban populations on attack warning, incorporates the concept of fallout shelter in accordance with NSC 5807/1.

27. The United States should continue its present policy of supporting activities which will:

a. Warn the people of impending attack and make possible essential communication before, during and after attack.

b. Give emphasis to the protection (including dispersal where necessary) of essential civilian survival supplies, equipment and facilities.

c. Provide for a continuing effort in research and development of civilian measures in radiological defense, defense against chemical and biological warfare, mass communications, medical care, survival requirements, and other survival measures.

d. Provide appropriate and adequate information to the public of the nature and extent of the dangers from nuclear attack on the United States now and in the future, and of the measures being taken or which could be taken to alleviate them.

16. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 25, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Admiral Strauss
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian reported on an unexpected effect anticipated from exploding nuclear weapons at very high altitude. An “electron capture” phenomenon is anticipated which might have major effects on communication and radar. There was discussion of the possibilities in relation to “blanking out” of radars of certain wavelength.

The significance of this discovery to the shot planned for 250,000 feet altitude during the weapons tests this year was also discussed.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: High-altitude nuclear explosions. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

17. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100-58

Washington, February 26, 1958

(Supersedes NIE 100-3-57)

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

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¹ Source: “Estimate of the World Situation.” Secret. 17 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.

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ESTIMATE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The year 1957 saw some improvement in the world position of the USSR, and some setbacks to the US; the two movements together were great enough to constitute a significant—though not necessarily a continuing—trend in world power relationships. Sino-Soviet bloc influence continued to rise in parts of Asia and the Middle East, largely as a result of mounting respect for the power and policies of the two principal Communist powers. The USSR became increasingly regarded in certain underdeveloped and uncommitted countries as a new political champion and example of progress. Remarkable Soviet scientific achievements—coupled with widely publicized initial US failures with the earth satellite—caused US power, leadership, and guarantees to be subjected to close scrutiny. US policies were more closely questioned and more often challenged, and doubts were expressed as to the wisdom of relying so heavily on US protection in the future.

2. A year ago² it was clear, as evidenced by the Suez affair, that the Western alliance system was under great strain and that the USSR was making inroads in areas of the world where previously its political assets were minimal. These developments, serious though they were, seemed less grave than they do at present, because the Soviet bloc itself was suffering severe strains. The exposé and repudiation of Stalinist terrorism created unrest in the USSR and in the European satellites, and shocked many Communists in Western countries. The change of regime in Poland and the uprising in Hungary added to Soviet difficulties. The Communist world, in the aggregate, appeared to have weakened.

3. However, during 1957 the Soviet Union regained much of its lost ground. Control was restored in Eastern Europe, and the entire Soviet bloc took on an appearance of more unity and strength, dramatized at the 40th anniversary celebrations in Moscow during November. The USSR's achievements and its comparatively unruffled emergence from major changes within its leadership have contributed to an air of recovery and self-confidence.

4. It was not in re-establishing the equilibrium of the bloc, however, that the USSR made its most formidable gains. The principal developments of 1957 were the Soviet demonstration of scientific achievement in the field of rocketry, and the extraordinary impact which this demonstration made on the world. In underdeveloped and backward countries, for example, the Soviet accomplishment was widely acclaimed as proof of the intellectual, economic, and military progress which the USSR—itself so recently an underdeveloped country—had made. Throughout the world during the year 1957 the prestige of the USSR was enhanced.

5. The prospective Soviet achievement of an ICBM capability has brought into the minds of statesmen and peoples, for the first time, a general sense of US vulnerability to Soviet attack, and consequently a sense that a major change in the world military situation is impending. It is now generally believed that the USSR will, during the next year or two rather than at some time in the distant future, be able to inflict instant and crippling damage on North America, with a consequent deterrent power as effective as that which the US has exercised. The implications of this development are not yet fully understood, but there is some belief—mixed with hope—that a general war will be rendered less likely by the mutual capacity of the two great powers to destroy each other. Corollary to this belief in the existence of a condition of mutual deterrence is a strengthened conviction in the free world that,

² See NIE 100-3-57, Estimate of the World Situation," 29 January 1957. [Footnote is in the original.]

while it is vital not to allow the USSR to attain military superiority, it will not be possible to prevent a further expansion of Soviet influence simply by strengthening the free world militarily.

6. Under the cover of this condition of mutual deterrence, the USSR apparently intends to wage against the US a vigorous contest for world leadership. This contest, already under way, is taking place against a background of accelerated social and economic revolutions in many parts of the world. Both sides possess many assets capable of exploitation, and the contest seems likely to go on for many years. In the following paragraphs we discuss the changes which have occurred and the basic forces and attitudes with which the US must contend.

II. CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION

A. *The Strategic Situation*

7. The leaders of all the nations in the West have long been aware of the fact that the USSR had some capability to strike the US with nuclear weapons. They have also realized that the time would come when the USSR, through its growing nuclear weapons stockpile and as a consequence of its development of long-range aircraft and ballistic missiles, would develop the capability—barring some revolutionary development in defensive arms—to inflict critical damage upon the US. Heretofore Western statesmen and Western peoples have thought of this largely in terms of some vague future date, and many of them hoped that somehow something would intervene which would prevent this prospect from materializing or from becoming unmanageable if it did. Now, as a consequence of recent Soviet developments in the missile field, the general public has had dramatically brought home to it a realization that the USSR will be able, within the next year or two, to bring the US under direct nuclear attack with ballistic missiles.

8. Since the end of World War II, US military capabilities, and particularly the capability to deliver nuclear weapons on the USSR, together with US assurances and US demonstrations of its intention to protect victims of aggression, have created some sense of security among peoples who feared Communist internal or external aggression. What made US actions and assurances persuasive to these peoples was a conviction of US superiority over the USSR in nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities and a belief that the vital centers of North America (including its retaliatory capability) were relatively safe from severely damaging Soviet attack.

9. To many observers Soviet progress in ballistic missiles appears not merely as a gradual improvement in military capabilities but as the portent of a new military situation. They foresee a situation in which the US—although it will retain the power to deliver nuclear weapons on the USSR if the latter engages in political or military aggression—will

become increasingly inhibited from doing so because of the knowledge that the USSR could reply in kind. Thus, some of the nations now under US protection fear that the US will no longer be willing to threaten nuclear retaliation in order to deter Soviet pressure or Soviet action in matters of vital concern to them. They also fear that, even if the US did attempt to make such a threat clear to the Soviets, the latter would not necessarily believe it. One special and immediate stimulus for these fears is the belief, recently induced, that the US will not achieve an effective ICBM capability until a year and a half or more after the USSR has done so. This fear is not wholly offset by recognition of the deterrent effect of IRBMs on African and European bases.

10. This is not to say that US nuclear capabilities have ceased to have deterrent effect on the actions of the Sino-Soviet bloc. We think, and we believe that most of the free world also thinks, that Soviet respect for US nuclear power will continue and that the Soviet leaders will not pursue courses of action which in their judgment seriously risk general war. Indeed they appear to believe that much safer methods will yield sufficiently profitable results. Yet even comparatively "peaceful" methods of Communist aggrandizement lead from time to time to sharp international crises, in which the relationships of military power are likely to be all-important. As the USSR through the development of advanced weapons systems enlarges its capability to inflict major nuclear devastation upon the US, the Soviet leaders will judge that the US will risk such devastation only for the gravest reasons and that the scope of the actions which the USSR can take without serious risk of general war is somewhat expanded.

11. In this situation, many leaders of the free world are increasingly concerned with the problem of deterring minor thrusts and local aggressions, and believe that it is necessary to develop a capacity to deal with them by means short of a full counteroffensive. This involves difficult decisions. No one can be certain about how to mix and to balance nuclear and non-nuclear forces in order to gain the widest deterrent effect, or how best to prevent limited engagements and local quarrels from expanding into major war. In any case, implementing any new decisions regarding force structure, weapons, and deployment would be extremely costly, and no one could be reasonably satisfied that these decisions, once made and implemented, would not need comprehensive and costly revision at an early date. In considering how to deal with this new situation, there is much confusion and hesitation throughout the free world—as indeed there must be in the USSR.

B. Soviet Progress and Policy

12. Even before their publicized successes in the scientific field, the Soviet leaders were pursuing a policy marked by greater flexibility

and innovation than in the days of Stalin. They have sought, through a less hostile posture, to dispel the image of aggressive Soviet intentions. They no longer display Stalin's tendency to regard as hostile everyone not subservient to the USSR, and they have seized upon the aspirations and needs of the emergent Asian and African countries to undermine Western influence and to expand their own. They appear to be acting on the assumption that it is more profitable to pursue a course of "peaceful competition" with the West, and particularly to exploit weak points in the free world by diplomatic, economic, and subversive methods, than to attempt to follow the dangerous course of territorial expansion by military means.

13. The Soviet leaders, after several years of this policy, probably look upon their present position as quite favorable. They probably attribute this in part to their improved military capabilities, but primarily to the developing world situation and to their own skill in manipulating existing opportunities and issues—especially in extending economic aid to selected countries, exploiting world desires for disarmament, supporting nationalist causes in Asia and Africa, and expanding diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations throughout the world.

14. In addition to its obvious bearing on their military capabilities, recognition of continuing Soviet scientific and economic progress has greatly advanced the Soviet political position, both directly and through its psychological impact. In mathematics and the physical sciences, including nuclear research and its applications, the USSR has amply demonstrated its high degree of skill; in other scientific fields it is making rapid progress. The output of scientifically-trained personnel already exceeds that of the US and the gap appears to be widening. Moreover, because of extensive governmental control over the use of manpower and resources, the USSR is able to concentrate its scientific personnel on activities directly concerned with foreign and military policy objectives.

15. Soviet economic progress has been continuing at a rapid pace. Soviet gross national product has recently been growing nearly twice as fast as that of the US. Currently Soviet GNP is about 40 percent that of the US, but consumption in the USSR is only at about 25 percent of US levels. The USSR—by restricting consumption and concentrating on priority objectives—is already even with the US in one or two important areas of production and is rapidly approaching equality in some others. The USSR allocates its resources in such a way that, in terms of resources available for national policy, i.e., for research, defense, industrial investment, and foreign aid, its aggregate effort already approaches that of the US. Soviet defense expenditures in recent years, when converted into dollar values, appear to be of roughly the same

magnitude as US defense expenditures, and annual Soviet industrial investment is presently about 85 percent that of the US.

16. Although the Soviet rate of economic growth is slowing down somewhat, we believe that it will continue to be faster than that of the US, and will enable the USSR to achieve along with other economic and military programs some modest gains in consumption at home. These gains will be tangible, though they will not satisfy consumer expectations, particularly in view of the continued housing shortage. While rapid advance on all these fronts at a time of reorganization, experimentation, and labor problems will cause difficulties, the size and shape of the Soviet economy is such that—even though less than half that of the US in terms of GNP—it will be possible for the USSR to utilize it extensively to advance its political and diplomatic objectives.

17. In these circumstances, the USSR has a wide range of policy choices open to it. Because of its increased military strength, it is in an improved position to engage in threats and blackmail, and it can negotiate from a stronger position than in the past. Alternatively—or even at the same time—it can soft-pedal such policies and proceed with the less dramatic business of gaining influence and prestige through diplomacy, cultural exchanges, expansion of foreign trade, grants of economic assistance, propaganda, and subversion. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders have made a decision to follow any particular line to the exclusion of others. Their entire approach has been too pragmatic and flexible to justify clear prediction. We believe that they will keep open the possibilities of negotiation on virtually every issue in the hope that they will gain something by negotiation that would not be attainable so quickly by other means. We believe they will press vigorously their campaign to gain influence in underdeveloped areas by political, economic, and diplomatic means. On the whole, we believe that the Soviet leaders will seek to avoid policies which they believe would clearly lead to serious risk of general war.

18. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders probably believe that they can pursue bolder policies than in the past without a corresponding increase in risk. As time goes on, they might again utilize war-by-proxy to gain local objectives, particularly in situations where they calculated that the US or its allies would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons to defend their position. They almost certainly foresee that crises will develop from time to time as a consequence of Western resistance to the expansion of Soviet influence. In these situations we expect the Soviet leaders to be firm—and occasionally bellicose.

C. Psychological Impact of Soviet and US Policies

19. As a result of Soviet scientific achievements, some of the world's ideas about the US were shaken. There is now doubt in many quarters

that the US can produce anything it wants better and faster than anyone else. To the discovery that the USSR, too, is highly advanced industrially, the Soviets have sought to add another element: the belief that the USSR is more interested than the US in the independence, development, and security of the newer nations of the world. The USSR has also, and with some success, continued to attempt to establish itself as the symbol and proponent of change, movement, progress and development. The US, on the other hand, tends to be regarded, particularly among some of the newer nations, as standing for slow and cautious amelioration or as defending what they regard as the evils of the past.

20. The US, of course, possesses great moral, material, and political assets. For many people throughout the world, it continues to represent the most important force standing for political freedom and constitutional government. It is widely admired for its achievement in using its rich natural environment in the creation of an advanced industrial society and spreading the benefits among all classes of people. Other nations seek to benefit from US technical experience and economic resources. Many present and potential leaders in underdeveloped countries have been profoundly influenced by American institutions and ideas. Wherever people favor moderate, as opposed to extreme solutions, US objectives are highly regarded—even where US methods and actions are criticized.

21. Nevertheless, during the past several years the USSR has appealed more successfully than the US to the emotional needs of many of the earth's peoples. It has gained more credit for advocating the cause of disarmament; it has become more closely identified with the interests of the colored peoples; it has more consistently supported Afro-Asian nationalism against colonial rule; finally, well-advertised Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress since the end of World War II has appeared as a demonstration of the effectiveness of "socialist" methods.

22. In many respects it has been less difficult for the USSR and Communist China to raise themselves in world opinion than it has been for the US to retain or advance its position. A higher standard of behavior for the US has been set in men's minds nearly everywhere; because we are richer, we are expected to be more forthcoming with aid; because we threw off colonial rule, we are expected to give indiscriminating support to nationalist causes. Moreover, our shortcomings are—because of our democratic processes, freedom of speech and the press—more obvious to the world. We cannot with the same ease as our competitors hide our race problems, adjust our trade policies to our foreign policy objectives, or commit ourselves in foreign policy without regard to competing domestic and foreign interests. Unfortunately, some of our most cherished traditions—our regard for

the rule of law, our desire not to offend our old friends, and even our high regard for human life—are often regarded as unrealistic in those countries where the struggle for existence and the social tradition do not encourage such attitudes.

23. While the educated classes almost everywhere have some familiarity with the Western tradition, many of them resent the high level of American consumption and deplore what they see as a US preoccupation with military security. Although not necessarily pro-Communist, and often opposed to Communism, they join many past critics in looking upon US policy as too inflexible and moralistic, and too exclusively concerned with the struggle against Communism. Thus, despite the intellectual and realistic justification of US policy, the simple formulas proposed by the USSR—European zonal demilitarization, a ban on nuclear tests and on the use of nuclear weapons, industrialization, anti-colonialism, peace, and so on—often have a greater appeal even when they are little better than slogans.

24. As a consequence, the Communist states are gaining ground as advocates of peace and social progress, while the US is increasingly accused of indifference to these causes. Whether these images of the Communist states and of the US grow more firm depends largely upon the interplay of US and Soviet policies in the years to come. The Soviet leaders are doing all they can to sharpen these images wherever the US and the USSR confront each other in both the developed and the under-developed areas of the world.

III. KEY AREAS OF US-SOVIET COMPETITION

A. Cohesiveness of Power Groupings

25. Although the nations of the world may be divided, for purposes of analysis, into three main groups—the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Western alliance system, and the uncommitted areas—we must recognize that the boundaries between these three are indistinct and changeable. Some allies are closer allies than others, some countries are less uncommitted than others, and there is frequently considerable ebb and flow in the positions and strength of individual states or regional associations. Moreover, both the USSR and the US are engaged in efforts to break existing ties in the other camp and to prevent new accretions to it.

26. *The Sino-Soviet bloc.* The solidarity of the bloc rests primarily upon the military power of the USSR and upon a strong identity of interests and ideology among the various ruling groups—the latter consideration applies especially to Communist China. Since the death of Stalin, there has been a trend toward redefinition of relationships. Moscow's monopoly of Communist thought and power has been diminished by Yugoslavia's maintenance of an independent position,

by the emergence of a semi-independent Poland, and by the growing power and influence of Communist China.

27. These changing relations have created problems for Moscow. They have released forces of instability in Eastern Europe and in satellite relations with the USSR. They have added to Peiping's stature and given the Chinese Communists a greater latitude for independent action, especially in the Far East. But they have also created the appearance of a more flexible and less monolithic group of states with which other states might think they could associate themselves without wholly losing national independence.

28. Recent Soviet successes in pulling together the Communist world have not resolved the problem, but they have stabilized a situation which for a time threatened to become disastrous. A full return to Stalinist police-state methods and enforced conformity would not only be difficult, but would be inconsistent with the more flexible approach which dominates present Soviet policy. The Soviet leaders apparently believe that they can gradually and judiciously accede to the national sensitivities of their bloc partners and still retain sufficient authority and influence to preserve Communist solidarity.

29. We see little chance that during the next several years, short of major changes within the Soviet regime itself, any of the Communist states will alienate themselves from the USSR to an extent which would damage the Soviet world position. Indeed, if the USSR grants some greater autonomy for Communist states, this might even add to Soviet stature by contributing to the Soviet pose of flexibility and respect for national aspirations. Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the possibility that some popular uprisings, perhaps on a local scale, might occur.

30. *The Western alliance system.* This system, consisting essentially of a group of multilateral and bilateral arrangements built around the US and UK, was developed largely upon three basic propositions: (a) that there was a danger of Soviet bloc external and internal aggression, (b) that alliance with the US was an effective way to deter, or if necessary to counter, such aggression, and (c) that because of Soviet bloc intransigence and determination, there was no acceptable alternative to creation of a counter-bloc. We believe that the fundamental validity of the three propositions is still generally accepted, but that the force and impact of each of them has diminished since the alliances were created. Thus, while the possibility of Soviet bloc military aggression continues to be recognized, such aggression has for some time appeared to most of the NATO partners to be much less imminent than when NATO was formed. Accordingly, NATO has lost much of the impetus which was initially supplied by an urgent sense of immediate danger, though it is still valued by its members as the chief counterbalance to bloc military power.

31. The second proposition has been weakened more recently by the developments mentioned in paragraph 9 above, relating to new weapons and the growth of the Soviet deterrent. Among our allies there is a declining confidence in the deterrent effect of US military power. This doubt has produced two contradictory results; one is a desire to knit the alliances more closely together and the other a desire to achieve greater independence from US policy. In support of the view that alliances with the US should be tightened are a variety of important considerations: the inescapable fact that the US and its allies have a common interest in preventing Soviet aggression, the mutual importance of each other's territories in maintaining and further developing deterrent and defensive military power, doubt that any one nation or even a regional grouping independently could create an adequate deterrent or defensive capability, and the gains to be achieved through sharing costs and responsibilities.

32. On the other hand, some influential political groups in allied countries see dangers in developing a closer association with the US. Some of them in particular are concerned over their inability to influence US policy, and they fear that their national interests will increasingly come under US control, that they will be unable to take independent action to support their own interests, and that they will be unable to disassociate themselves from the US when the US takes action in its own interests.

33. Finally, in its recent diplomatic offensive the USSR has encouraged an element of doubt respecting the third proposition which originally underlay the alliances: that there was no acceptable alternative to the creation of a counter-bloc. Through a variety of formal and informal proposals—such as the Soviet disarmament schemes, the ideas of a European security pact and of nuclear-free zones—and through other suggestions contained in the various Bulganin letters, the USSR has appeared to be offering an alternative worth consideration. The Soviet leaders apparently hope that some of these suggestions will produce political rifts within allied countries and reduce allied ties with the US, especially in Europe.

34. Some of these Soviet suggestions have struck a responsive chord, even in moderate Western European opinion. At the moment, public interest in talks with the USSR is still at a high point. This European responsiveness is partly the result of anticipated changes in the military situation and of lessened confidence in US power and US leadership, but primarily the result of a growing conviction that Western Europe's only hope of survival is to explore fully and patiently every possible opportunity for living at peace with the USSR. At the moment the strongest forces favoring negotiations with the USSR are political parties, predominantly socialist, who do not now exercise

effective political power. But these parties, even when out of power, exercise a strong influence upon their governments, and some of them may gain power, or come to share more effectively in it, during the next three to five years. We believe this pressure will continue and that it will eventuate in high-level talks with the USSR. However, we also believe that most European leaders do not expect significant results from such talks, since they see no indication that either side is prepared to make substantial concessions.

35. On balance, we believe that the potentially disruptive forces within the Western alliance system have been stimulated more than the cohesive forces by the recent changes in the world situation. In Europe, these changes have led to much soul-searching about the military and political adequacy of NATO, and about the role each country should play in it. Despite widespread interest in various proposals for national or collective disengagement, the alliance remains essentially intact; but its character is undergoing a gradual change in response to the changing world power situation and the increased military vulnerability of the US. The UK and the major continental powers have asserted a more independent position within the alliance, and we believe this tendency will continue.

36. Over the next decade, France, or more likely several continental European countries jointly, will almost certainly try like the UK to develop a capability in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles sufficient to constitute in their view some independent deterrent to Soviet aggression. In some respects, the achievement of such a capability would strengthen the alliance. On the other hand, it would enable the European allies to pursue somewhat more vigorous policies in defense of their individual interests, with effects which may or may not further the interests of the alliance. Moreover, they could then afford to be more flexible in dealing with the Soviet Union; and they would be better able, if so inclined, to remain neutral in the event of a local conflict in which their vital interests were not engaged (for example, in the Far East). A gradual transformation of the Atlantic alliance could thus come about, although we do not believe that the major European powers will wish to stand alone against the USSR without a US security guarantee.

37. Trends toward neutralism will probably occur among the allies in the Middle East and Asia, with certain notable exceptions, such as Turkey and Australia. Some of the members of the Baghdad Pact are already beginning to question the advantage of maintaining their membership. In various countries, domestic groups who favor a more neutral position are becoming increasingly vocal. Japan's relationship with the US also seems likely to undergo considerable change. The Japanese are restive over restrictions upon trade, both with Communist China and the US, and they will become reluctant to withhold recognition of

Communist China. While the Japanese value US protection, they are also clearly seeking a more independent position, and their deep aversion to nuclear weapons suggests that they would make great efforts to extricate themselves from any threatened conflict in which such weapons might be used.

38. In general, we believe that the US will encounter increasing trouble in retaining overseas bases on terms assuring their availability and effectiveness in case of need. In particular, the US may well encounter new problems over the next few years in its attempts to increase allied military strength through the establishment of missile bases or the further deployment of nuclear weapons overseas. Although our Western European allies have agreed in principle to the installation of IRBMs, some of them will refuse to accept them in their own countries, and others—believing that the US considers their establishment crucial to its own defense for a period of time—may attempt to exact a stiff price for accepting them. These difficulties will be especially serious in those countries where it is believed that establishment of such bases would substantially increase the likelihood of Soviet attack in case of war, would make disengagement impossible if international tension increased, or would hinder negotiation with the USSR to settle outstanding issues. The IRBM issue may become a symbol which will divide those people who seek early negotiations from those whose principal concern is to maximize the military strength of the alliance before negotiating. The issue will certainly offer opportunities for exploitation by the USSR in both Europe and the Asian-African world and for maneuvers designed to delay the installation of IRBMs.

39. Beyond these considerations the dual control provisions of the IRBM agreements will introduce new elements into the operation of the NATO alliance. On the one hand, these provisions may stimulate closer coordination of political decisions affecting East-West relations—a process which may be used to influence the US toward adopting positions agreeable to its European partners. On the other hand, joint decision may lead to hesitation in major crises, with consequent slowing and weakening of Western response.

B. Europe

40. Even though the Atlantic alliance has declined in vitality, the Soviets still must find Europe the most frustrating of the areas of competition between the US and USSR. Despite ten years of Communist control, the vast majority of the Eastern European peoples are still anti-Soviet. In Western Europe, the Communists have retained significant support in the labor movements of certain key countries, but they have been conspicuously unable to gain political strength. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders have remained faithful to their belief

in the inevitability of the Communist victory; while they have turned some of their attention to other areas of the world where opportunities have been greater, they have not given up the effort to find some way to bring about a Communist victory in Europe. Thus, the XXth Party Congress acknowledged the possibility of different roads to socialism, an attempt to provide doctrinal justification both for a more liberal evolution in Eastern Europe and for acceptance of parliamentary methods in Western Europe.

41. In spite of these new doctrinal approaches, there does not seem to be any likelihood that Soviet Communism *per se* will gain any greater acceptance in either Eastern or Western Europe than it has in the past. The greatest political concern of most Eastern Europeans is to escape from the Soviet yoke; although some of the social and economic changes which have occurred have been welcomed, few Eastern Europeans would willingly have paid the price for them which has been extorted by Moscow and the local Communist leadership. Despite the pressures which exist, it does not appear to us that substantial changes in Eastern Europe will occur, although minor modifications, for example through a more liberal evolution, are possible.

42. *Possibilities of Negotiation.* In Western Europe there is great anxiety to find some way to escape from international tensions, the build-up of armaments, and the dangers involved in the confrontation of US and Soviet forces in the heart of Europe. Although repeatedly frustrated by Soviet intransigence, the desire to explore the possibilities of a settlement is readily revived at every suggestion of flexibility in the Soviet position.

43. There are many uncertainties about Soviet intentions, and US policy will affect the development of the situation. The greatest problem will be that of developing an arrangement for Germany which will be acceptable to both sides. Since the USSR almost certainly considers that it occupies a position of considerable strength, we consider it most unlikely that the Soviet leaders would give up very much without very great concessions from the West. Yet they must realize that, unless they are prepared to make substantial concessions in East Germany, no settlement will go very far toward the reduction of international tensions. These concessions they are unlikely to make because of fear that the release of Soviet control over East Germany would weaken Soviet authority in other parts of Eastern Europe, and because of a longer-run fear of a revived nationalistic Germany backed by the US and determined to establish hegemony in Europe.

44. West German governments will continue to regard the achievement of reunification as a major political goal and they will seek support toward this end from their allies. In general, bloc proposals on the present scale are recognized as attempts to consecrate the political *status*

quo and to divide and weaken the alliance; Soviet leaders have made it perfectly plain that a loosening of the Soviet grip on East Germany and the other satellite countries will not be permitted. In the unlikely event, however, that the USSR should make a serious proposal for a complete mutual withdrawal from Germany—especially if coupled with an unequivocal assurance against Soviet re-entry, and with a specific US guarantee—European reaction is likely to be more favorable. As modern weapons development progresses, the European governments, and the West German government in particular, may come to believe that withdrawal of US forces from Germany and German withdrawal from NATO would no longer represent a critical loss to NATO's overall strength. The time may come when they would be willing to pay this price for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from a broad central European area, even without a simultaneous agreement on German reunification, in the hope that reunification and a general detente would follow in due course.

45. *General Prospects.* In the internal politics of Western European countries, there seems generally to be taking place a gradual shift of the political center of gravity toward the left, but it is not so great a shift as to be likely to produce strongly leftist governments—certainly not popular front governments. During the next few years center parties, where they are predominant, may be obliged to rely more extensively upon socialist support; socialist parties, where they are in power, will need to pursue moderate policies in order to retain power. While these shifts seem to presage somewhat less responsiveness to US influence and somewhat greater interest in social programs at the expense of military programs, they are not likely to produce major changes in foreign outlook.

46. The coming into effect of recent agreements for European economic integration appears likely to enhance political and military cooperation among the continental countries. Already France, West Germany, and Italy are more closely concerting their foreign and military policies, and this trend is likely to continue. However, the schemes for economic cooperation and the European atomic community are not likely to mature fully for many years. A number of important and complex issues have yet to be resolved, including the extent to which concessions to special interest groups—particularly in France—may exert a restrictive influence on the cooperative effort. In addition, the problem of assuring preferential British access to the continental market in a way which will not damage Commonwealth ties or upset the carefully negotiated arrangements among the continental countries is likely further to complicate relations between these countries and the UK. Nonetheless, these developments reflect a strong European desire to make integration a reality, and the US will probably be dealing with a more unified continent than in the past.

C. The Underdeveloped and Uncommitted Countries

47. Most of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries have one primary political and social aim; they want to modernize their countries. They are not greatly concerned with what we regard as the evils of Communism. What we regard as the advantages of democracy and capitalism are associated largely in their minds with the evils of colonialism. The methods of Communism, judging by the great success they have had in the USSR and appear to be having in Communist China, often appear more relevant to their problems than the methods of democracy and capitalism.

48. Most of these countries are undergoing social and economic revolutions in which the methods and the leaders of the past are under attack or being cast aside. Many of them are unstable politically and socially; some are coming increasingly under authoritarian control. Many are also interested in increased military strength and prestige, and thus frequently threaten regional stability. All have grave economic problems. Population growth frequently exceeds the growth of the economies; Western civilization, with its improved standards of health, has sometimes brought greater poverty. There is a widespread lack of capital and a shortage of administrative and technical skills. In some countries the indigenous Communist movement is weak, in others it is strong, but in nearly all there are serious internal divisions based upon class, religious, ethnic and other factors.

49. The world has witnessed during the past fifteen years the rapid emergence of many new and often very populous states. The process has not much farther to go. There are still a number of important areas in Africa which will probably gain statehood during the next five to ten years, but the big increase in the number of sovereign states has already occurred. The uncommitted and underdeveloped world is a problem, not so much because there are still people under colonial control as because so many people have so recently emerged from such control.

50. Most of the leaders in the new countries of Asia and Africa look upon the US and USSR as engaged in a world power struggle which is of no direct concern to them, except as it might engulf them or as they might use it to advance their economic development. These people tend to believe that the safest and most advantageous course for them to pursue is one of neutralism. The USSR is generally playing to this belief by making no ostensible efforts to recruit them into its camp. Offers of foreign aid have been made without apparent strings, and indigenous Communist movements—where they are significant—have appeared more nationalist than pro-Soviet. The US, on the other hand, has appeared to them as opposed to neutralism and as attempting to force them into the Western alliance system. This many of them interpret as an effort to prolong colonial sponsorship and authority and

as an effort to block their further development as independent states. Many of them are becoming increasingly susceptible to Sino-Soviet influence. It appears to us that the principal choice which will increasingly confront underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa will not be between East and West but between neutralism and pro-Communism.

51. *The Middle East.* Most of what we have described in the preceding paragraphs applies with particular force in the Middle East. The politically-conscious majority throughout the area, and especially the leaders of the revolutionary governments of Egypt and Syria, are deeply suspicious of the West. Despite US condemnation of the attack on Egypt, the US is predominantly identified in the popular mind with Israeli "imperialism," support of the colonial powers, and exploitation of oil resources. The US is regarded as not genuinely interested in Arab objectives, but primarily desirous of mobilizing the area against the USSR. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, have skillfully represented themselves as ideologically and emotionally on the side of the Arab nationalists. They have created the impression of wanting to help the Arabs because they support their general objectives. The radical Arab nationalist leaders believe they can accept a considerable amount of Soviet assistance without danger to themselves and that they can replace their traditional social and economic institutions with a state socialism of their own contrivance.

52. The Arab nationalist movement, with its devotion to Arab unity, to economic change, and to its various conceptions of neutralism, appears to be here to stay. It aims to extend its influence widely through those parts of the Middle East and Africa where the inhabitants are Moslems. We see little chance that the pro-Western conservative Arab governments will be able to direct the movement in channels satisfactory to them; indeed some of them will have difficulty in preventing their own overthrow.

53. *Asia.* The US has greater assets in Asia than in the Middle East. Respect for Communist China's power and economic progress is tempered by fear of its growing military capabilities and by dislike for certain Communist methods. In some countries there is a recognition that US assistance was essential to the establishment and maintenance of independence. In some countries, especially those which have experienced Communist pressure or aggression, there are strong and vigorous anti-Communist sectors in the society. Nevertheless, the Communist countries, and particularly Communist China, have achieved some successes in expanding their influence. Having failed notably to expand their influence further by insurrection and invasion, the Communists have shifted to the less obvious methods of diplomacy, propaganda, subversion, cultural exchanges, and economic inducement. This growth

in influence seems to us likely to continue, although we expect it to be gradual.

54. The greatest difficulties in Asia are not directly associated either with Soviet or US policies, but with the multitude and magnitude of the problems which confront many countries in attempting to establish political stability, carry on economic development, and build viable states on the rubble of insurrection, subversion, ethnic differences, and political ineptitude. In addition, the unresolved problems of Korea, Vietnam, and China are a continual irritant to relations among states within the area and a constant source of apprehension over the future.

55. *Africa.* Except perhaps in North Africa, nationalist and revolutionary movements are not as advanced as in the Middle and Far East. Nevertheless, in Tropical Africa, knowledge of the outside world, detribalization, better facilities for transportation, the growth of market economies, urbanization and industrialization, are proceeding apace. As in Asia, questions of increasing national prestige, obtaining freedom of action and implementing sweeping internal reforms are urgent issues in the newly independent African states. In the colonial areas the drive for self-government is being spurred by the example of the independent states, the moral encouragement of the United Nations and world opinion, and support from Egypt and the USSR. Relations between African territories and their former or present European metropolises will be transformed in varying ways and degrees over the next decade. In many areas under British and French control there is likely to be a rapid emergence of new native states during the next few years. If the European powers implement liberal colonial policies, they probably still have sufficient time to exert a moderating influence on nationalist movements. However, the determination of European settlers to maintain control in some areas will probably provoke extremist African response.

56. As they achieve independence, Tropical African dependencies will be confronted with enormously complex problems. The creation of political stability is likely to be critically hampered by frustrated popular expectations and by internal disputes between rival factions reflecting ethnic, tribal, religious, and linguistic differences; the experiences of such independent countries as Liberia and Ghana illustrate the difficulty of overcoming factionalism by other than authoritarian means. The problems will be particularly difficult in those parts of Africa where there are mixed racial societies in which a smaller white minority dominates a much larger native population. Virtually all Tropical African territories will continue to be highly dependent on foreign economic assistance. Whether free of colonial control or not, many of them will turn increasingly to the US—among other possible

sources—for financial aid in the likely event they are unable to obtain sufficient sums from the colonial powers.

57. The USSR will make an increasing effort to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the new African governments. Since the latter, like the USSR, maintain a high level of governmental participation in the economy, government-to-government trading is facilitated. Many African territories are dependent upon the sale of one or two primary commodities for an important share of their national income and foreign exchange, and thus are highly vulnerable to world market price fluctuations. By absorbing commodity surpluses and extending credits for development in selected countries, the USSR could gain substantial benefits both in prestige and in the opportunities thereby offered for gaining greater influence on the continent.

58. In North Africa, despite several years of a highly revolutionary atmosphere, Communism and Pan-Arabism have made comparatively little headway. Throughout the three areas of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia the current prevailing attitude, while strongly anti-French, is not anti-West. This is due in part to the cultural affinity for the West of the Moroccan and Tunisian leadership and in part to the US policy of extending support to Morocco and Tunisia. Even in Algeria, Communists have gained little leverage within the revolutionary organizations. In all three territories, however, there are serious potential dangers. Unless the Algerian rebels are soon able to gain some kind of acceptable conditions from France, a gradual continued radicalization of the revolutionary movement and a rise of Communist influence seems unavoidable. Moreover, in both Tunisia and Morocco, there are radical forces in opposition to the present moderate leadership. If the situation in Algeria should further deteriorate or if the Tunisian and Moroccan governments cannot make noticeable progress toward solution of their serious economic problems, they are in danger of replacement by forces less sympathetic to Western interests.

59. *Latin America.* Although Latin American society has generally been more developed and better organized than that of other underdeveloped areas, it also is passing through a social and economic revolution marked largely by industrialization and urbanization. These changes have produced serious economic problems—inflation, exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, and labor and agrarian unrest. Traditional ruling groups, particularly the military and the landed aristocracy, are coming under increasing attack by new social forces. These forces are dominated variously by an urban and educated middle-class, by military elements with a more modern and liberal orientation than in the past, and by labor. The common denominator in most of these groups is the desire to break with the forms and the stagnation of the past. Often the groups are in conflict with each other as well as with

the traditional elites. As a consequence of all these factors, many of the governments and the societies are unstable.

60. Basic antipathy for the US is relatively limited. Anti-US attitudes tend to vary with time and circumstances. These attitudes are consistently maintained by the Communists, but in a number of countries they are also the stock-in-trade of some politicians who exploit the growing nationalism in the area. The Communists constitute a danger to the US largely because of their discipline and their alertness to opportunity. Over the longer run, the revolutionary pressures in Latin American society are irrepressible, and the society is destined to be gradually transformed. Insofar as the US is identified with the forces of change, as for example in Bolivia, it appears likely that US influence will be enhanced. In some cases, however, some unpopular ruling classes in Latin America—often supported by US citizens—have been able to retain power and have become identified in the popular mind with “Yankee imperialism” and “dollar diplomacy.”

IV. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

61. A current source of concern is the emergence of weaknesses in the free world economy. By and large, the developed economies of the West have enjoyed unprecedented prosperity for the past several years. It now appears, however, that these economies are growing more slowly and that world trade is expanding at reduced rates. In some of the developed countries, a rise in consumption without corresponding rises in production has resulted in inflation and, in some instances, balance-of-payments crises. More pronounced inflationary pressures have occurred in most of the underdeveloped countries as a consequence of ambitious development programs. Late in 1957 the US entered a period of economic recession, and fears have been expressed abroad that the recession will develop greater intensity. Since the US accounts for about 40 percent of free world production, the economic prospects of other countries are greatly affected by the manner in which the US deals with its own problems.

62. If the US recession should terminate by mid-1958, other economies may not find it too difficult to make a satisfactory adjustment. On the other hand if the US recession is prolonged, some other countries will face increasingly serious economic and political problems, much of the blame for which they will place on the US. In any event, there is danger that some governments will seek to correct internal difficulties by raising trade barriers, which would reinforce tendencies toward world recession. Thus far, however, greater concern has been expressed abroad regarding the course of US trade policy than about the now anticipated recession in US economic activity.

63. The probable decline in the international economy during 1958 would increase the vulnerability of many underdeveloped countries to Soviet bloc economic penetration. In times of actual or expected declines in prices and foreign exchange earnings for their major export commodities, the receptivity of these countries to Sino-Soviet propaganda against the West increases, as does their willingness to expand trade relations with the bloc. Communist propaganda certainly can be expected to capitalize on the lower levels of economic activity which are in prospect.

64. Over the longer run, prospects for economic growth are favorable for many areas of the non-Communist world, but rates of growth in most cases are likely to remain well below that projected for the USSR. In Western Europe, it appears likely that, barring a severe US recession, gross national product and levels of consumption will continue to increase at only slightly lower rates than during the last five years. Although long-term inflationary pressures are likely to persist, the application of various schemes for trade liberalization and economic integration will tend to moderate these pressures, since they will oblige the European countries to adjust their economic and fiscal policies to those of their neighbors. To the extent that these inflationary pressures are moderated, the European competitive position in other areas will be improved. The outlook is equally favorable for those underdeveloped countries which are rich in resources relative to their sparse populations (e.g., Australia, South Africa, and much of Latin America).

65. For the generally over-populated and poverty-stricken countries of Africa and Asia, the outlook is less favorable. Most of them lack the degree of political and economic organization necessary for achieving desired rates of economic growth. They are nevertheless committed to ambitious economic development programs which, in the absence of a strong indigenous business community, are largely state-conducted and state-financed. Government revenues and private savings are in general grossly insufficient to provide for these programs; in many countries inflation is rampant. Economic and political uncertainties, and in some places hostility to foreign investment, are discouraging private foreign lenders and investors and to some extent foreign governments and international institutions as well. In these circumstances, many underdeveloped countries are becoming increasingly disposed to accept Soviet economic offers. Over the longer run, some of them may see no way to realize their ambitions for economic development, except by adopting the methods which appear to them to have been so conspicuously successful in the USSR and in Communist China.

V. OVER-ALL PROSPECTS

66. *Likelihood of General War.* Despite the pride which the Soviet leaders take in their achievements and the confidence with which they seem to view the future, they still have and are likely to retain a healthy respect for US power. Even when the USSR acquires a substantial capability in ICBMs it will still be faced with great uncertainties about its capacity to wage successful warfare against the US. Moreover, like the leaders in the West, the Soviet leaders have a keen appreciation of the extraordinary destructiveness of nuclear weapons and of the dangers which they pose to victor and vanquished alike. We believe it unlikely, therefore, that the Soviet leaders, for at least the next five years, will deliberately initiate general war or embark upon a course which they believe involves a serious risk of general war.

67. During the foreseeable future there will be a constant jockeying for position between the US and the USSR. This will create for the world's leaders a most difficult problem in calculating the risks involved in their actions—or their inactions—in particular situations. Failure to calculate accurately could lead to various conceivable forms of local war or even to a general conflict. We do not see any easy way to determine whether local wars will break out and whether, if they do, they can be kept limited, or to determine what techniques, weapons, diplomatic warnings, and maneuvers are most likely to contribute to a limitation of such conflicts. We believe that all the major powers will attempt to keep wars limited if they do occur, but the various pressures on chiefs of government in particular situations, the rapidity with which events often occur, and the great importance of timing and of time, often confuse and distort the intentions of the parties involved. The circumstances of today with respect to the importance of surprise and with respect to the widespread destructiveness of war are unprecedented in human history. We are not persuaded to believe that wars would remain limited simply because it would be sensible not to allow them to expand. On the contrary, we can conceive of a variety of ways in which they could expand even though it was the initial intention of the parties to limit them. Consequently, we believe that the chances of keeping wars limited, whenever major areas or causes might appear to either party to be affected, are at best not too promising.

68. The United Nations, judging by its performance during the Suez crisis, might prove in some instances a useful instrument in preventing or limiting conflicts. For example, if a country is prepared to compromise rather than to fight or to extend a conflict, the UN can provide a means to do so with less loss of prestige. In most cases, however, the UN probably will not be effective in halting a conflict unless the US and USSR happen to be agreed on such an outcome.

69. *Evolution in the Communist World.* One of the most important factors shaping the world will be the manner in which the Soviet bloc evolves. Despite some current tightening of controls, we foresee a continuation of the trend toward greater flexibility in bloc relations and toward greater recognition of individual differences among the bloc members. In the case of Communist China, this trend will be fortified by that country's growing power, self-sufficiency, and national pride. In Eastern Europe, it will probably be favored by the survival of a semi-independent Poland and an independent Yugoslavia. But we think that prolonged development in this direction would be necessary before serious differences arose within the bloc on questions of relations with the Western powers; here the cement of common interests and a common ideology among the various regimes is exceedingly strong.

70. Because the USSR will remain the keystone of the bloc structure, the most important changes will be those which will occur within its own borders. More widespread and better education, the growth of a professional and managerial class, greater personal freedom, expectations of higher living standards, and more contact with other countries are indications of significant changes within Soviet society. These changes might in the long run alter profoundly the content and structure of Soviet political life, possibly through a dissipation of the Communist party's unchecked monopoly of power, more likely through a change in the political climate within the ruling party. However, the party has lately reasserted its monopoly status against incipient challenges from several quarters and its near-term position appears to be completely secure.

71. The liberalizing tendency within the USSR and in intra-bloc relations could not be reversed without considerable difficulty, but the Soviet leadership has been generally successful in controlling its pace and course. We do not believe that such tendencies will significantly weaken the bloc during the next five years.

72. *The Free World Problem.* Assuming that the evolution in the Communist world is so gradual that its impact upon Soviet policy will not be significant for some years to come, the free world faces a prolonged period of cold war with intermittent upsurges and declines in intensity. Coincidental with these shifts in intensity, there seems likely to be a periodic rise and fall in the extent to which free world nations—both the committed and the uncommitted—will alternately fear for their futures or hopefully try to arrive at settlements for co-existence with the Soviet bloc. The combination of increasing Soviet military power with flexible Soviet diplomatic tactics will make it difficult for individual countries to determine the policies most consistent with their own long-term interests. This uncertainty will probably induce additional nations to seek refuge in neutrality.

73. In spite of the confusions and uncertainties which have been described in earlier sections and the strong desire to relax international tensions by negotiating with the USSR, there seems to be an inclination among the more powerful and thoughtful Western nations to strengthen the deterrent to general war and to improve the common defensive posture. But these objectives, if achieved, will only establish the background against which will continue to be waged an intensive and world-wide competition between the Soviet bloc and the US. In this competition, the Soviet bloc will wage vigorous economic and political offensives; it will take advantage of world trouble spots; it will exploit the nationalistic and revolutionary emotions of peoples now rapidly emerging from poverty, ignorance, and foreign control; it will vigorously pursue such profitable themes as disarmament and peace. It seems to us that the USSR and Communist China will have some measure of success in these efforts, and that this will generate increasing nervousness in the West over real or imagined losses of position.

74. While some further losses of position for the West seem likely to occur, we do not consider that there is any irreversible trend in this direction. Even though the Sino-Soviet bloc will almost certainly become an increasingly formidable opponent, its leaders must cope with major problems and difficulties in exploiting their strength. We believe that the general course of events in the East-West contest will depend more than anything else on the manner in which the West mobilizes and employs its political, economic, and military resources.

18. Briefing Note for the 356th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 27, 1958

NASH REPORT

1. Mr. President, in October, 1956, you asked Frank Nash to “carry out a study of and make recommendations with respect to our system of overseas military bases and operating facilities.” (This language is quoted from your detailed instructions to Mr. Nash, annexed to his Report.) Mr. Nash completed his Report just before his death last

¹ Source: Nash Report on overseas military bases. No classification marking. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

December, and you referred it to the National Security Council for appropriate consideration and further action.

2. The Report consists of a 93-page Report proper and a 191-page Appendix. The Report is remarkably fine, comprehensive, and detailed, and should be most useful to appropriate operating personnel as a source of information and guidance.

3. Much of the Report is consistent with approved U.S. policy. I do not understand that Mr. Nash thought of his Report as a means of raising policy issues for Council consideration. In fact, the Report is not framed in the form of policy recommendations or issues. Yet scattered throughout the Report, the NSC Staff identified a total of 123 separate conclusions and recommendations.

4. It would be impossible to summarize briefly the contents of this magnificent work. Its first three sections, pages 1–13, do contain a summary of past U.S. base development and of considerations for the future. The remaining sections of the Report proper cover:

Section IV—Analyses by country and by region.

Section V—Major problems common to most areas.

Section VI—Operational and Administrative Policies.

Section VII—Internal U.S. Government organization for base matters.

5. The entire Appendix volume is devoted to a country-by-country analysis of twenty-nine nations. Each of those analyses is for convenience presented in a uniform format. Naturally, each analysis varies with the importance of the area under consideration. One wonders whether any comparable mine of exact and detailed information on this subject will be found in any one place in government.

6. It would obviously not be appropriate for the Council to give detailed consideration to most of the material in the Report. However, the Planning Board has identified nine issues for Council consideration.

7. I will call to the Council's attention the Planning Board's comments and recommendations on these nine issues, with respect to which we suggest that the Council:

a. Adopt the Planning Board's recommendations, and

b. Recommend that the President authorize the responsible agencies to circulate the Nash Report, together with the Planning Board's recommendations as adopted, to key operating personnel in this country and overseas, for information and such action as each agency deems appropriate consistent with approved national security policy. In view of the sensitivity of the Report in its entirety, distribution of the full Report should be limited to key operating personnel, and only appropriate extracts from the Report should be circulated to personnel having particular responsibility for specific subjects.

8. First, *the main thesis* of the Report (which you will find on page 1 of the February 14 NSC memorandum), which I will read:

The Planning Board believed that substantially our present base system will be needed for at least five years, but thought that it is not certain that it will be needed for the next ten years. With this modification, it recommended that the Council accept the validity of the main thesis, in these words:

(*READ the recommendation on page 2, pointing out the three suggestions by the Chiefs, discuss and dispose*)

9. The *second* of the nine issues (page 3) concerns positioning IRBM's at widely-dispersed bases around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Here the Planning Board rejected the notion that such positioning is *required* to retain the edge in the deterrent race, but felt that it would *better ensure* our ability to deter general war. There was a split on whether the implications of positioning IRBM's outside the NATO area should require an NSC decision, after giving consideration to the over-all advantages and disadvantages. Specifically, the language of the Planning Board recommendation is as follows:

(*READ the recommendation on pages 3–4, discuss, and dispose*)

10. The *third* issue (page 5) concerns a policy proposal for a Western Mediterranean pact, to include Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, which the Nash Report found desirable if feasible. The Planning Board recommends that the Council note that State and Defense are considering the feasibility *and desirability* of such a pact.

(Discuss and dispose)

11. The *fourth* issue (page 6) concerns a new chain of bases across Central Africa, which the Nash Report thought should be seriously considered. The Planning Board, however, saw no reason to change the position taken in the U.S. policy on Africa South of the Sahara approved last August, which called for keeping the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements. The specific Planning Board recommendation is as follows:

(*READ the recommendation on page 6, pointing out the suggestion by the Chiefs, discuss, and dispose*)

12. The *fifth* issue (page 7) concerns alternatives to our present Far East base system. The Nash Report said that such alternatives should be examined for the dual purpose of increasing dispersion and of establishing bases in the most politically reliable areas. Such a program would be costly, the Report admitted, but a retreat from the area would be even more costly. It is not a question of withdrawing entirely from any country, but rather of establishing alternate positions such as the Bonins, the Marinnas, Ulithi, North Borneo, Brunei, and Australia. The

Planning Board noted that Defense is currently considering such alternatives, and recommends the adoption of the following language:

(*READ* the recommendation on page 7, discuss, and dispose)

13. The *sixth* issue (page 8) concerns transferring to Australia a portion of our “moth-balled” merchant fleet and stocks of surplus grain and other provisions, for possible use in the aftermath of an atomic war as reserves in a place relatively secure from the immediate consequences of such a war.

(*READ* the entire Planning Board comment)

(*READ* the Planning Board recommendation, explaining the split, discuss, and dispose)

14. The *seventh* issue (page 9) involves two matters concerning the Organization of American States. The Nash Report recommended (a) that greater use be made of the OAS and its military organs to provide a collective security framework for U.S. bases in Latin America; and (b) that early consideration be given to the desirability of bringing the West Indies Federation into the OAS. The Planning Board rejected the first recommendation but accepted the second.

(*READ* the Planning Board comment on page 9, discuss, and dispose)

15. The *eighth* issue (page 11) concerns criminal jurisdiction, which the Nash Report found to be one of the major common problems of our existing base system. The Report recommendation is as follows:

(*READ* the “Statement of the Issue” except the indented portion)

(*READ* the Planning Board recommendation with its split, discuss, and dispose)

16. The *last* issue (page 13) concerns sharing defense responsibilities with Canada. The Planning Board felt that the military aspects of US-Canadian relations were already stated in a general way in existing policy, but that better cooperation is required in non-military matters. The Planning Board comment points out that there is no national security policy paper on Canada, and that there is a Joint US-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs at the Cabinet level.

The Planning Board recommendation on page 14 is split between a majority proposal to ask the CFEP to study means of improving US-Canadian economic relations and a proposal by ODM for the preparation by the Planning Board of a full-scale policy statement on U.S. relations with Canada.

(Discuss and dispose)

(Approve suggested Council action)

19. Briefing Note for the 356th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 27, 1958

The next item is to hear a report from the Department of Defense on certain military measures included in the so-called “Gaither Report,” as to which there was not sufficient time available for discussion before the Council at its meeting on January 6.

Originally scheduled for the Council meeting on January 30, these measures were deferred at the request of the Department of Defense (Dr. Killian agreed).

The matters to be reported on are:

First—whether to produce additional first-generation ICBMs beyond the 130 currently programmed to be operational prior to the end of FY 1963; whether to build the additional launching sites required for an operational capability of such additional ICBMs; and whether to harden such additional launching sites.

Second—Whether to order new production of more than 3 POLARIS submarine missiles systems and whether possibly further to accelerate POLARIS production.

Third—Whether to utilize modified existing anti-aircraft missiles (THE TALOS) as interim defense against ICBM attack at SAC bases, pending the development of an initial operational capability of the more effective NIKE-ZEUS anti-missile missiles.

Fourth—Whether to harden SAC bases by providing blast shelters for a large part of SAC planes, weapons, personnel, and supplies.

MR. HOLADAY will speak on the first 3 items, and MR. QUARLES on the 4th item.

1. During a discussion relative to the Continental Defense policy at the last Council meeting concerning internal security measures to protect against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, it was brought out that:

a. Soviet Bloc diplomatic personnel may enter the United States through only five port areas;

b. at the time of entry, such personnel and their diplomatic pouches, baggage, and shipments are examined externally on a covert basis by detection devices which are capable of identifying radioactive material but not of distinguishing fissionable from non-fissionable.

c. When the devices disclose the presence of radioactive material in the baggage or effects of Soviet Bloc diplomats, no internal examination

¹ Source: Defense Department report on the Gaither Report; continental defense policy. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

of the same may be made, but the official or package is traced to ascertain the destination.

2. As a result of this discussion, the State Department undertook to examine and report on whether, if there were substantial evidence that any shipment entering the United States under diplomatic immunity contained radioactive material, the Department would be prepared to advise the diplomatic representatives of the country concerned that the shipment would be opened by United States officials in the presence of representatives of such country, to determine the nature of the radioactive material.

3. The Secretary of State will now report on its study of the feasibility of adopting such a practice.

20. Memorandum of Discussion at the 356th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 27, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 27, 1958

Present at the 356th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (participating in Items 2–4); Mr. Maurice H. Stans for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 2–4); the Acting Secretary of Commerce (participating in Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 4); the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item 2); Brig. Gen. Austin W. Betts, USA, Office of the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item 2); Mr. A.G. Waggoner, Office of the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item

¹ Source: Agenda item 4: Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

2); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield D. Sprague; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1–3.]

4. *SHIPMENTS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY* (NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 1862)

General Cutler reminded the Council that at its last meeting, and in connection with the discussion of the continental defense policy, the Council had discussed internal security measures to protect the United States against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, including their introduction through diplomatic pouches, baggage or shipments. As a result of the discussion, the State Department had undertaken to study and report on whether, if there were substantial evidence that any shipment entering the United States under diplomatic immunity contained radioactive material, the State Department would be prepared to advise the diplomatic representatives of the country concerned that the shipment would be opened by U.S. officials in the presence of representatives of such country, to determine the nature of the radioactive material. General Cutler then called on the Secretary of State to report on the results of this study.

Secretary Dulles said that his people had studied the matter in the light of international law, and he proceeded to read the procedure on which the State Department had agreed; noting, however, that this proposed procedure had not been staffed through the Department of Justice.

After Secretary Dulles had read the proposed procedure, Mr. Allen Dulles asked whether under this procedure we would permit our shipments to the Soviet Union under diplomatic immunity to be investigated by the Soviets if they alleged something against us. He pointed out that we needed to get certain items into the USSR. Secretary Dulles replied that in this kind of situation we would be obliged to accept the practice of reciprocity.

The National Security Council:

Concurred in the following procedure recommended by the Secretary of State, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1862-*e*, relative to the use of devices to protect against the clandestine introduction of nuclear materials as provided in paragraph 14 of NSC 5802/1:

If a detection device indicates substantial radioactivity in a diplomatic shipment, the shipment will be detained and the Department of State will request the appropriate foreign diplomatic mission in Washington to have one of its officers appear at the port of entry to remove the objectionable object for examination.

If the request is refused, the shipment will be removed from the United States forthwith. If examined, the material will either be

permitted to enter if it is not dangerous or removed as soon as possible if it is dangerous.

Foreign diplomatic missions will *not* be advised of this policy. The Department of State will develop procedures for giving appropriate instructions to all U.S. personnel concerned with the entry of diplomatic shipments.

NOTE: The above recommendation, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation in coordination with the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

S. Everett Gleason

21. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 27, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy, Mr. Coolidge
General Goodpaster

Mr. Coolidge outlined three charts, one showing the present structure of the Department of Defense, one showing in simplest outline the proposed new structure, and the third elaborating on the second.

In the discussion which resulted, the President said he thought that unified commanders should have the same disciplinary authority over personnel of all services that they have over their own service component. He also thought that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commanders should be commissioned in the armed forces of the United States. Mr. Coolidge said that the group working with Mr. McElroy had felt that this arrangement was suitable for the three- and four-star officers, subject to certain safeguards which have to be worked out, but there is question regarding officers of two-star grade and lower. In the discussion, it was not completely clear whether the proposal related simply to the members of the JCS and the unified commanders, or to members of their staffs as well.

¹ Source: Department of Defense reorganization. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on February 28.

Mr. McElroy said that the unified commanders who had appeared before his group had said that they did not wish to take on the court martial responsibility for personnel of the other services. The President said that the requirements in war and peace are quite different. Negotiation and action through cooperation is all right in peacetime where time is not of the essence, but would not work in war. He did not think the system should be subjected to change at the onset of war; consequently, we should have in peace what we need in war. Mr. Coolidge said that General Twining is now making a study to assure that the unified commander is given the same authority over personnel of the other services that he has over his own component.

Mr. Coolidge said that the group has found a great deal of difficulty in deciding where to put research. One alternative is to set up a Defense Research Institute at the same level as the JCS. Another would be to set up a fourth department, paralleling the Army, Navy, Air Force. In any case, a Director of Research would allocate tasks to the services and control the funds available to them. The President said the weakness today is decentralized authority resulting from provision of law or seizure through having money voted directly to the services.

Mr. Coolidge said that the group had not settled on titles for the heads of the services but are inclined to favor a title of Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Army, etc. They were strongly of the view that the Vice Chief of Staff of each service should take on added responsibilities of his own. The President indicated he had had some question about the "Deputy Secretary" solution, but that the idea of putting the Chief of Staff in the JCS and having service operations performed by the successor to the Vice Chief of Staff gave some desirability to the use of the "Deputy Secretary" title. He said that there is substantial reason why the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have some control over their respective services.

Mr. Coolidge said that there is probably a lot to be gained through straightening out the organization within the respective services but the present group feels that they should not try to get into this. The President indicated general agreement with this view.

The President advised Mr. McElroy and Mr. Coolidge to be very careful on the research arrangement. Mr. Coolidge said they are thinking of having all research funds appropriated to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McElroy added that they may decide to recommend having all funds appropriated to the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Coolidge reported that the group agreed the Chairman of the JCS should be in charge of the assignment of work to the Joint Staff. The President spoke in favor of making the staff an integrated staff. Mr. Coolidge said that, at least for the operations section, this would be done. The President also said that he thought the lower level committees in the

Joint Staff structure should come out. Mr. McElroy said they are planning to drop out the committees, at least on an experimental basis.

Mr. McElroy said they are also planning to recommend eliminating the service “roles and missions” from law, and the President enthusiastically endorsed this action.

The President referred to a plan announced by Mr. Vinson and other Congressmen yesterday. It showed considerable signs of being a reversion to a three-department setup. He thought that if the authority of the Secretary of Defense were thus reduced the position would be untenable and should be abolished. In that case, the result might be that Congress would also be organized in comparable committees.

The President indicated some question regarding the element called the “Joint Secretaries.” Mr. McElroy said that there will be many problems of personnel, administration and procurement which will require coordination. He reiterated that research is a great problem. The President advised them to talk with Dr. Killian, and Mr. Coolidge said they are trying to arrange a time to get together. The President said he rather liked the idea of the Defense Research Institute.

In summarizing, the President said that the essence of the matter is to establish the power of the Secretary of Defense to get things done and to go into everything that needs corrective action. He suggested that the group get their thoughts into the most simplified form possible—one that could be put out to the public should there be a decision to do so.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

22. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 3, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster

Mr. Gray first discussed his proposal to send letters of appointment to Emergency Agency designees. He drew the President’s attention to the fact that the proposed titles for the agencies used the word

¹ Source: Emergency planning; Net Evaluation Subcommittee work. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on March 4.

“National,” such as National Food Agency. The President thought that the title “National Emergency Food Agency” or just “Emergency Food Agency” would be better. After discussion, the style “Emergency Food Agency” was adopted. The President also approved a proposed draft text with certain minor changes.

Mr. Gray next raised a point in connection with the Emergency Food Agency. The question is whether this should be a separate agency, or whether the functions should be handled in the Agriculture Department. The President said that he did not want the same agency handling peace-type and war-type activities at the same time. If an agency had a function that stopped in war, the agency could be used in a war-time role. Mr. Gray said the proposal was that all emergency functions relating to food would go to the Secretary and the Under Secretary; all normal functions would be handled by the Assistant Secretary. The President confirmed that he thought it would be a mistake to have both groups of functions under the same man, since there would be a tendency to use the emergency powers and merge them into the normal powers of the department. He said that Secretary Benson could of course come in to discuss the matter with him if he wished.

Mr. Gray next discussed the question of radio telephones in the cars of Cabinet officers, pointing out that there are some 46 on the same channel and that this does not seem too sound a system. After discussion of some of the values of having the capability for getting in touch with these officials immediately, the President indicated that Mr. Gray could modify the system (for example, through the addition of channels) as he might think best.

Mr. Gray then commented on the work of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. He said that estimates of tremendous numbers of casualties, such as the ones they are providing, seem to him of diminishing usefulness. The President strongly agreed, saying that he is certain that there is some maximum amount of damage we can sustain and still operate with any organization or effectiveness at all. Mr. Gray said that he has on occasion used assumptions of up to 50 million casualties, of which one-half would be killed, and it did not seem to him that a situation involving greater losses than this would be manageable or useable as a basis for planning. The President suggested that Mr. Gray talk to General Twining, with the aim of bringing out a basis for further planning which is in the range of something reasonable. Mr. Gray said he would go ahead on the basis of developing “manageable” assumptions.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

23. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 7, 1958

SUBJECT

Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations

REFERENCES

- A. NSC Action No. 1814
- B. NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1
- C. NSC Actions Nos. 1841, 1842, and 1844

The enclosed memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense transmits the plan on the above subject developed pursuant to NSC Actions Nos. 1842-g-(4) and 1844-b, which has been concurred in by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The enclosures are transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, March 20, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum From Quarles to Lay

Washington, March 5, 1958

SUBJECT

Study Relative to the Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations

1. Forwarded herewith, for circulation to the members of the National Security Council, is the plan on the above subject developed pursuant to NSC Actions Nos. 1842-g-(4) and 1844-b. It has been concurred in by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is contemplated that the plan will form the basis for a study by the Departments of State and Defense which will be sufficiently broad

¹ Source: Transmits Defense plan on capabilities of forces for limited military operations. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RC 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

to include consideration of the entire range of U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations. It is not intended, however, that this examination will extend to the preparation of detailed plans to deal with each situation.

/s/ Donald A. Quarles

Attachment

Washington, undated

*TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR COORDINATED STUDY
GROUP PURSUANT TO NSC ACTION NO, 1844-b*

PROBLEM: To examine U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations from the present to 1 July 1961.

DEFINITION: *Limited Military Operations* include any armed conflict short of an overt engagement of U.S. and USSR armed forces which has been directed by or concurred in by competent political authority. There exists the possibility of isolated incidents involving small units of the U.S. and USSR forces which would not lead to war. The degree of participation in limited military operations by the United States may vary from the furnishing of military supplies to the engagement of a portion of the U.S. armed forces.

ASSUMPTIONS:

a. The essential elements of U.S. national strategy as set forth in NSC 5707/8 will remain unchanged during the period covered by the study.

b. Unrestricted U.S. military operations against mainland China would probably lead to general war. On the other hand, it is probable that the United States could engage in effective military action against mainland China without undue risk of initiating general war.

c. Limited military operations could be in progress in more than one area of the world simultaneously.

SCOPE OF STUDY:

a. An examination will be made of existing and projected (to 1 July 1961) U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations with or without the use of nuclear weapons.

b. An examination will be made of the most likely situations which may develop around the world and which could, in the light of U.S. commitments and security interests, involve the United States in

limited military operations. This examination will include, with respect to each such situation, a consideration of

- (1) Domestic and foreign political background and implications,
- (2) Enemy objectives and capabilities,
- (3) U.S. national objectives,
- (4) Available U.S. and allied capabilities,
- (5) Effect of U.S. involvement on the U.S. and allied posture for general war, and
- (6) Special political and military problems involved in the use of nuclear weapons.

The examination will not extend to the preparation of detailed plans to deal with each situation.

c. Conclusions will be drawn as to

- (1) Capabilities required to deal with the situations most likely to involve the United States in limited military operations, in a manner that will minimize the likelihood of general war.
- (2) Adequacy of existing and projected U.S. and allied capabilities.
- (3) Other significant issues revealed by the examination under *a* and *b*.

d. In the light of the conclusions, appropriate recommendations as to U.S. national security policy and U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations will be presented for NSC consideration.

DATE OF COMPLETION: The study should be completed by 1 June 1958.

24. Memorandum From Chief of Staff, USAF, to the JCS¹

CSAFM-72-58

Washington, March 10, 1958

LAUNCHING OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND ALERT FORCE (U)

1. I am concerned over the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command alert force under current operational policies and consider that the U.S. deterrent capability is invalidated to a substantial degree by:

- a.* NORAD's marginal capability for providing early warning.
- b.* The lack of a rapid decision-making process.
- c.* The lack of authority to launch the alert force.

¹ Source: Launching of the SAC alert force. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 218, CCS 381 U.S. (5-23-46), Sec. 94.

2. In recognition of these weaknesses, the Air Force has developed a "Fail Safe" concept designed to establish a capability to launch the alert force with positive assurance that it would not continue to the target unless specifically instructed to do so. This is accomplished by prebriefing the air crews prior to launching, to "fail safe" and return to home base at a given point along the EWP route if the "go" word is not received. During the past few months we have tested our capability to direct the force, once airborne, to continue on the mission. To date we have achieved success in passing the "go" word to 95% of the mission aircraft tested. Through the development of better communications facilities and procedures, we expect to approach 100% effectiveness in the near future. This concept insures the entire force will, as the name depicts, FAIL SAFE if authority is not received to continue to the target. At the same time, as our tests have proved, it guarantees a large portion of the force will receive the "go" word if execution is directed by higher authority after the force is airborne. Obviously, this type of operation would materially improve our deterrent posture.

3. It is apparent that as we and the Russians progress further into the missile era this problem becomes even more acute. The terrific speeds with which we must cope in the missile era and the limitations of our air defense systems reduce the time available to implement the procedures now established to obtain an effective strike decision. Our future early warning radars will undoubtedly be susceptible to false targets which would initially preclude positive identification of a missile attack against the United States. Under these circumstances, we most certainly would not want to launch our own missiles which could not be turned back if the alert were a false alarm. Launching our manned bomber alert force, however, under the "Fail Safe" concept would be most appropriate in this circumstance, providing us positive assurance of having a part of our retaliatory power airborne without the slightest risk should the alert prove to be false.

4. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby informed that on 1 March 1958, I instructed CINCSAC in the event of a defense emergency to automatically launch his alert force under the "Fail Safe" concept.

25. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 10, 1958, 10:20 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Dr. Kistiakowsky
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian spoke from a memorandum, the original of which he handed to the President.

With regard to the proposal for a well-conceived basic research effort on solid propellants, the President strongly stressed that an overall group, such as ARPA, should conduct this research. Otherwise, it would be done in bits and pieces. In fact, he thought that all research on fuels should be kept centralized, avoiding the wastes of duplicating effort. Dr. Kistiakowsky reported that there has really been very little support for, or interest in, a solid propellant development program. There have been many starts and stops, and the effort that has been devoted to these fuels has been very small. In the interest of economy of effort and continuity, he would agree with putting the program into ARPA. The President suggested that it might even be put in the civil agency now under consideration.

Dr. Killian stressed the need for a review by the President of proposals for "second generation" missiles. The President strongly agreed and asked that necessary directives be developed.

The President further agreed with the recommendation for a program of improvement on the TITAN missile, and for phasing out the ATLAS as soon as consistent with an adequate rate of buildup of total missile forces.

The President said that he conceived of the missile activity as separate and distinct from traditional air, ground, and sea operations. He would accept the logic of a decision by the Department of Defense to assign a submarine-based missile such as POLARIS to the Navy, but he saw no reason for the Air Force or for the Army to try to preempt the field. Instead, he would incline toward a single missile command. Specifically, he agreed that we should not rush into the proposed Minuteman program; he asked that there be no approval along these lines until the matter had been much more carefully considered, and presented to him. Dr. Killian repeated his recommendation that Defense

¹ Source: Centralizing direction of missile program. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Drafted on March 11.

should not produce both THOR and JUPITER. The President said that so far as he is concerned there is no problem with dropping either of these. He asked what could be done with the team at Huntsville, which he understood was a group of outstanding ability. Dr. Killian said that they are working on the PERSHING missile family. He also said that this group is well suited to conducting space program activities, either under ARPA or NASA.

The President asked why Drs. Killian and Kistiakowsky thought that the THOR was a better missile than the JUPITER. Dr. Kistiakowsky said it is not better, but simply nearer to quantity production. He feels that the shift to industrial producers of the JUPITER (Chrysler, Ford Instrument, and Goodyear) would delay its availability. The President said that he would agree to closing out the JUPITER, but thought the Huntsville force should be promoted to space and similar activities. He thought consideration should be given to taking them out of their present assignment and assigning them to ARPA, or even to NASA. Dr. Kistiakowsky commented that the PERSHING is an excellent approach, and the President said that the Huntsville group could work on that project too.

The President asked Dr. Killian to prepare for him a series of decisions very tightly drafted and very positive in tenor to accomplish what had been recommended. He said he strongly agreed with the basic proposal to obtain centralized direction and thought this should be done soon.

Dr. Killian asked whether he should ask the Secretary of Defense to carry out studies to give effect to the proposals. The President said this would be all right, but that we should make clear what the scientific conclusions and recommendations are. Dr. Killian said he was prepared to do this.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

26. Letter From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Farley) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (Loper)

Washington, March 10, 1958

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/3-1058. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

27. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 12, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
Mr. Coolidge
General Randall
General Persons
Mr. Harlow
General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy began by saying that his group, although initially divided on the matter, has now come to believe that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not also serve as Chiefs of their respective Services. The President said that a problem arises from this solution—to be sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff member is recognized as having the highest position and authority in his Service. Control of “patronage,” i.e. promotion and assignment gives the Service Chief tremendous power; amenities of office at his command add to this. The President thought it might be well to reserve to the member of the Joint Chiefs a few specified powers of highest type, e.g. selection of individuals for top commands, and recommendation of individuals for the post of Chief of Service.

The next point raised by Mr. McElroy related to the manner in which the command line ran from the Secretary of Defense to the operating commands. The President thought that, legally, the line ran directly from the Secretary of Defense to the commands, but functionally it would go through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President spoke at considerable length on the matter of research. He thought that basic research on space activities should be put into NASA, and that DOD research should be limited to the applied phase—this to be centralized in ARPA. He thought there were great gains to be made from centralizing the basic research on space activities. Mr. McElroy agreed. He said he thinks that these questions are largely extraneous to the Defense Department, which has plenty to do to handle its own tasks properly. Both he and the President recognized

¹ Source: Department of Defense reorganization and control of missile programs. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

that there are certain military applications of outer space activities, such as reconnaissance and communications.

The President went on to question any action to put the Minuteman project in the Air Force. He thought that there is developing more and more reason to have a separate long-range missile force. Mr. McElroy saw certain logic in having this project in the Air Force, because of the close operational tie to other strategic bombardment activity. He said he, too, felt that the trend is toward a single strategic attack force, which would include non-Air Force elements such as POLARIS.

Mr. McElroy next asked as to the title for the civilian head of the Service—whether he should be called a Secretary of the Service, or an Under Secretary of Defense for the Service. The President thought that if his duty can be tightly defined, it would be well to make him a Secretary. However, if Congress tries to pull authority away from the Secretary of Defense, then in order to make clear his control, it would be preferable to make these individuals Under Secretaries. Mr. McElroy said that the group thinking is exactly in line with the President's suggestion on this matter. He thought that by having them as Secretaries they could take a great deal of the burden off his shoulders, for example, in testifying before Congress.

In discussion of the further steps to be taken, the President asked for a brief statement to be prepared of the reasons why reform of the organization is required. This should bring out the things that must be eliminated. There should then be a statement of objectives and of principles. It should also be stated that we are not prepared to write a bill in its entirety on all phases of the matter, but that we are ready to start hearings at an early date. The President stressed that the message should bring out with great clarity the necessity of organizing for top efficiency—for getting maximum results from the tremendous resources that are being put into our military establishment.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

28. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

NSC 5807

Washington, March 14, 1958

MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1
- B. NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842
- C. NSC 5802/1

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee established for the purpose by NSC Action No. 1842–e, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council.

The enclosed report will be considered by the Council at its meeting on Thursday, March 27, 1958, in the light of discussion of an oral briefing on the subject by the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission, and of a presentation on Soviet Civil Defense and Air Raid Construction by the Director of Central Intelligence, at the NSC meeting on March 20, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning

Enclosure

**Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Special
Interdepartmental Committee on Shelters (Berry) to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)**

Washington, March 14, 1958

Transmitted herewith is the report of the Special Committee on measures to carry out the concept of shelter, established pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842.

¹ Source: Transmits Interdepartmental Report on NSC 5807, "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter." Top Secret. 16 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.

Except as specifically noted, the report carries the full endorsement of the Committee, which was composed of myself as chairman; Mr. William E. Carey, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Vincent Rock, Office of Defense Mobilization; Col. James E. McHugh, Department of Defense; and Dr. Robert L. Corsbie, Atomic Energy Commission.

In the course of preparing the report, the Committee consulted with representatives of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and Public Works Planning as suggested by the Council. However, the Committee has not requested the representatives of these agencies to express their views on the final report.

/s/ Lewis E. Berry

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared for the National Security Council

Washington, March 13, 1958

SUBJECT

Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter

REFERENCES

- A. NSC Action No. 1814
- B. NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1
- C. NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842
- D. Memorandum for the NSC dated Jan. 22, 1958
- E. NSC 5802/1

Introduction

Your Committee has adopted the following frame of reference for its task:

(1) That shelter from radioactive fallout is required to limit expected casualties from a nuclear attack to a level which would permit the United States to survive as a nation. The concept of fallout shelter is to be incorporated into the national Civil Defense program for protection of the civil population.

(2) That measures taken to incorporate fallout shelter construction must avoid so far as possible adverse psychological effects upon the United States and allied nations as well, and must not detract from support of retaliatory and active defense capabilities.

(3) That measures taken must rely primarily upon private and local Governmental initiative, stimulated by Federal leadership, including Federal example.

(4) That effective Federal leadership will require a skillful and expanded program of public education with emphasis upon weapons' effects and ways in which citizens can protect themselves.

(5) That measures adopted must not be inconsistent with the possibility that the Government may wish at some future time to initiate a program of the type recommended by the Security Resources Panel, possibly upon a compressed time schedule. However, measures undertaken at this time should not be based upon the assumption that there will be a nationwide Federal construction program; rather the effort should be designed to preclude the necessity of such direct measures if possible.

Proposed Measures²

The Committee recommends adoption of the following measures:

1. Research and Development, including prototype construction (exploiting multiple-use principle to the maximum)

	<i>\$ Millions</i>
a. <i>Research</i>	\$6.5 (annual rate)

Although sufficient knowledge of weapons' effects and of shelter design now exists to permit proceeding with a complete and effective fallout shelter program if this were deemed desirable, expanded research is necessary to refine our knowledge, particularly of blast shelter, and develop more economical and efficient shelter models. In a program of this magnitude, well considered research should save many times its initial cost.

The following program of research is already identified and can be undertaken as rapidly as funds are made available.

(1) The field testing, with nuclear weapons, of shelters, other structures, and shelter equipment; provision for development and execution of radiological defense measures; exposure of animals to weapons' effects; and the instrumentation necessary to evaluate results obtained.

----- \$2.0 Millions

² Note on Costing: The Committee has accepted without critical review the cost factors proposed by FCDA with the understanding that these cost factors are consistent with those used in the *Report to the Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs* and the *Report of the Security Resources Panel*, both prepared pursuant to NSC No. 1691-b. [Footnote is in the original.]

(2) The design of various prototype shelters, the development of shelter programs, and development and laboratory testing of structures, facilities, equipment and materials not requiring nuclear field tests.

----- \$1.0 Million

(3) Studies dealing with psychological, emotional, educational and morale problems and determinations of tolerance limits under emergency conditions; medical, food, and water requirements in shelter habitation; and sanitary controls to permit tolerable occupation.

----- \$1.5 Millions

(4) Development of architectural designs and specifications for new types of multiple-use shelters which will be attractive as well as practical. The Committee believes that attention should be given to the use of grants to schools of architecture and engineering which would stimulate curriculum development, training of new students, and new concepts of shelter design.

----- \$2.0 Millions

While the above program will be of highest importance in improving our capabilities to develop a comprehensive shelter system, there are serious unsolved problems relating to effects of nuclear attack on humans, including the immediate and long-range effects of radiation, and to the development of measures to provide protection against or mitigate those effects. The Committee feels that a special assessment is required to determine whether present research efforts in this field by the several agencies of Government are reasonably adequate or whether further coordination or acceleration is indicated. It is therefore recommended that a suitable group be designated to evaluate the present efforts and to report on their adequacy, including recommendations for improvement of the total national effort, if such is warranted.

b. Prototypes

\$Millions

\$55.4 (3 year program)

This program combines (1) engineering development of multiple use shelter types, (2) exercise of Federal leadership and (3) public education. Each prototype will be one-of-a-kind, multiple-use where possible. Experience will be gained not only in design and construction, but in administration. Prototype structures will be erected on Government-owned land where necessary and desirable. Costs are based on estimated cost of the shelter features only, except in the case of garages and new school prototypes, where the entire cost of the structure is included. The Federal Government will recover as much of the beneficial-use value of underground garages as possible.

The Committee recommends the following types (including in each group both blast and fallout prototype designs):

(1) Underground parking garages

10 prototypes of variable size, ranging from 100–1000 car garages
-----\$31.9 Millions

(2) Understreet shelters

4 prototypes ranging in size from 1000–3000 shelter spaces
-----\$2.1 Millions

(3) Subway shelters

4 prototypes, ranging in size from 1000–5000 shelter spaces
-----\$1.5 Millions

(4) Shelters under new highways

16 prototypes, ranging in size from 500–5000 spaces
-----\$4.6 Millions

(5) Shelters as additions to existing schools

8 prototypes, varying designs to include classrooms, cafeterias, and assembly space, and groups of 4 classrooms
-----\$1.9 Millions

(6) New schools, incorporating shelters

4 prototypes, ranging in size from 200–500 pupils, each sheltering twice the normal school population
-----\$1.6 Millions

(7) Shelters as additions to existing hospitals

6 prototypes of needed hospital additions, including cafeterias, visitors' and convalescent rooms, and reserve areas. Will vary from 500–2000 person shelters.
-----\$1.1 Millions

(8) Multiple-use shelters for incorporation in new hospitals

6 prototype multiple-use shelters ranging in size from 300–2500 shelter spaces
-----\$1.6 Millions

(9) Shelters for industrial plants

15 prototypes, ranging in size from 500–5000 spaces, including special decontamination features
-----\$6.0 Millions

(10) Shelters for commercial buildings

6 prototypes, ranging in size from 1000–5000 person shelters
 ----\$2.3 Millions

(11) Single and multi-family residence adaptations to provide shelter

16 prototypes, including bathroom shelters, basement recreation areas, farm storage areas, basement work areas, and enlarged basements under porches for storage, and larger shelters for multi-family use.
 ----\$0.8 Million

\$Millions

2. Surveys and Pilot Studies \$75 (3 year program)

a. Development of estimated availability of existing shelter on a sampling basis

As a basis for national planning, definitive information is needed regarding the capability of existing structures to provide fallout shelter, particularly in large cities. The Committee recommends that a survey of existing structures be conducted on a sampling basis to yield such information. This would be handled through direct Federal contract, and would be completed in one year.

----\$2.0 Millions

³b. Survey of Existing Shelter

The Committee recommends that priority attention be given to a systematic survey of the potential of existing buildings and other structures such as mines and subways to provide fallout shelter with little or no modification. Such areas should be identified for immediate use. Property owners should be urged to modify their buildings to provide fallout shelters where feasible, and assisted in plans and designs incident thereto.

The survey would require approximately two years for completion and would start after completion of the sample survey of existing structures. It would be conducted as an extension of the survival planning program through Federal contracts with States and cities, with the Federal Government providing the money. Costs are estimated as

³ The Department of Defense and Bureau of the Budget members believe that the survey and pilot studies described under 2b and 2c should require an appropriate percentage of State and/or local participation. They believe that this procedure would be more effective in stimulating locally financed shelter construction and would avoid establishing a precedent which might preclude local financial support of subsequent shelter construction. The other members believe that such a requirement would delay unduly an effort which gives promise of identifying quickly a substantial amount of effective fallout shelter at very little cost. [Footnote is in the original.]

follows: 100 largest cities at an average of \$200,000 per city, \$20 million dollars; the next 400 cities in order of size, an average of \$50,000 each, or \$20 million; remaining areas (predominantly rural), \$8 million. Surveys would take full advantage of data already collected by survival plans.

-----\$48 Millions (2 year program)

⁴c. Pilot Studies

The Committee believes that the nationwide survey of existing shelters should be supplemented by an intensive study of the total range and nature of problems which might arise in conjunction with a shelter program. This would be done by intensive study of selected metropolitan areas on a pilot basis. The studies would extend to the development of complete engineering plans and specifications; problems of zoning, condemnation, local organization and administration; detailed site studies, and plans for maintenance and operation.

Studies of the type proposed would cost approximately \$5 million for a major metropolitan area. It is proposed that 5 representative cities be included in the pilot study program, with all studies to be completed within two years. Studies would require State and local participation, but the major part of the work would be done through research-contract financed by the Federal Government.

-----\$25 Millions (2 year program)

	<i>\$Millions</i>
3. Public Education	\$12.5 (first year)
	25.0 (annually thereafter)

The Committee agrees that greatly increased public understanding of bomb phenomenology, especially the nature of gamma radiation, is required if Federal urging of fallout shelter construction is to be effective. There must also be increased awareness of the probable extent of the fallout hazard resulting from all-out nuclear war, and the public must be convinced that the problem is not hopeless, but can be dealt with effectively through provision of fallout shelters.

The program recommended would be conducted in a low key of gradually increasing intensity in three parts:

⁴ The Department of Defense and Bureau of the Budget members believe that the survey and pilot studies described under 2b and 2c should require an appropriate percentage of State and/or local participation. They believe that this procedure would be more effective in stimulating locally financed shelter construction and would avoid establishing a precedent which might preclude local financial support of subsequent shelter construction. The other members believe that such a requirement would delay unduly an effort which gives promise of identifying quickly a substantial amount of effective fallout shelter at very little cost. [Footnote is in the original.]

a. A nationally conducted program, using all available communications media, and working through all agencies of the Federal Government (the Agricultural Extension Service, etc.) is proposed. In addition to general information on nuclear effects, the program would urge that citizens provide themselves with fallout shelters; would provide wide dissemination of information and methods by which private citizens may provide in their homes fallout-protection for themselves and their families (1) by adapting existing cellars or other structures or (2) by incorporation of family shelter in new residential construction; and would publicize the Government's own program of incorporation of shelters in public buildings, prototype construction, etc.

-----\$6 Millions (annually)

b. Working primarily through adult education programs of the States, provide courses in "Problems of Living in the Nuclear Age." These would be designed to reach at least one person in every family in America. Generalized courses would be accompanied by personalized technical advice in planning fallout construction for those who wish it.

-----\$3.5 Millions (first year)

-----\$13 Millions (annually thereafter)

c. On a pilot area basis, find and support local leadership in neighborhood groups. Leadership would be provided with sufficient professional and other support to organize a community shelter effort. This program is regarded as a complement to the research program in that it would yield data on the extent to which local participation can be stimulated by this means. It is also regarded as a complement to the intensive pilot study program of five representative cities.

-----\$3 Millions (first year)

-----\$6 Millions (annually thereafter)

\$Millions

4. Elements of a Base for Rapid Acceleration \$1.5 (annually)

The measures proposed above are designed to promote shelter construction without extensive financial participation by the Federal Government. The Committee recognizes, however, the possibility that these measures may be ineffective and that the Government might later wish to initiate a shelter program on an accelerated basis. Many of the other recommended measures will assist in preparing a base for rapid expansion, but in addition it is believed that specific attention should be given to the preparation of a "shelf" of plans and information which might save months of delay in an emergency.

Specific items proposed are:

(1) Identification of materials, equipment and manpower

-----\$1 Million (annually)

- (2) Preparation and maintenance of standby orders and organization
-----\$0.5 Million (annually)

5. Incorporation of shelter in civilian Federal buildings

The Committee agrees that Federal example is an indispensable element in any combination of measures designed to stimulate State, local government, and private spending for fallout shelters.

	<i>\$Millions</i>
a. New Construction	\$6.5 (annually)

Projections of new Federal construction activity (including the Post Office construction program, but excluding military construction) indicate a potential level of about 125,000 shelter spaces annually at an average cost of \$52 per shelter space. This assumes utilization of new buildings for community shelter where practicable, thereby setting an example to local Government and business, and avoiding charges of favored treatment for Federal employees.

	<i>\$Millions</i>
b. Modification of Existing Federal Buildings	\$90.6 (3 year program)
	\$30.2 (annually)

Federal example is as important in providing shelters in existing buildings as in construction of new buildings, since it is hoped that a large part of all fallout shelter can be provided through renovation and alteration of existing structures.

The program proposed at this time is limited to provision of community fallout shelter in existing Post Offices on a 3-year schedule. Based on an average of 2 shelter spaces for every full time postal employee, and an average weighted cost of \$113 per shelter space, the total program would cost approximately \$90.6 million. Annual rate, \$30.2 million for 3 years.

6. Incorporation of Fallout Shelters in Military Construction⁵

The Committee believes that an effective Federal program must include selective shelter construction at military installations. In the absence of such action it is very unlikely that private individuals, corporations and local governments could be induced to finance their own shelter construction. Emphasis in the programs proposed is on military facilities whose location and function is such as to make them most effective as an example to the general public. However, the proposed

⁵ Department of Defense support of the military programs proposed herein is contingent on NSC approval of generally parallel programs of shelter construction for the protection of the civil population. These proposals are made without prejudice to the current protective construction policy of the Department of Defense. [Footnote is in the original.]

programs have also been designed to contribute to meeting military operational needs.

Selective incorporation of fallout shelter in military construction is proposed to include: public access buildings such as headquarters, new public quarters and hospitals; other facilities such as air defense and communications facilities and emergency relocation sites selected according to operational importance, estimated hazard, and effectiveness in demonstrating Federal example to the civil population.

	<i>\$Millions</i>
a. New Federal military construction	\$20 (annual rate)
b. Modification of existing military facilities	\$100 (5 year program)
	\$20 (annual rate)

*Summary of Costs by Fiscal Year**
(\$Millions)

	<i>1959</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1961</i>
1. a. Research and development	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$6.5
b. Prototype construction	18.5	18.5	18.5
2. a. Nationwide survey, sampling basis	2.0	—	—
b. Nationwide survey	—	24.0	24.0
c. Pilot studies	12.5	12.5	—
3. Public education	12.5	25.0	25.0
4. A base for rapid acceleration	1.5	1.5	1.5
5. a. Shelter in new civilian Federal buildings	6.5	6.5	6.5
b. Shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings	30.2	30.2	30.2
6. a. Shelter in new military facilities	20.0	20.0	20.0
b. Shelter in existing military facilities	20.0	20.0	20.0
TOTALS	130.2	164.7	152.2

*The Bureau of the Budget believes the scope of the financial outlay proposed is too broad, and that the total three year program should be restricted to \$100 million.

LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Adequate authority is currently contained in the Federal Civil Defense Act to undertake all measures recommended except the incorporation of shelters in Federal buildings, whether new or existing.

The incorporation of shelter in new Federal buildings would require only that express language be contained in the applicable

appropriation acts indicating that the inclusion of protective construction was contemplated. Modifications of most buildings owned by the Federal Government could be accomplished in the same manner. Incorporation of shelter in existing buildings leased by the Federal Government would, in many cases, require legislative modification specifically to exempt such expenditures from the provisions of the Economy Act.

FINANCING AND ADMINISTRATION

The Committee is agreed that responsibility for preparing detailed budgetary estimates to support the measures proposed should rest initially with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, except in the case of new Federal construction or modification of existing Federal buildings (Measures No. 5 and 6), in which cases the agency which normally budgets for construction would also budget for the additional cost of fallout shelter features. The Bureau of the Budget may later recommend that funds for certain of the detailed projects be obtained by other Federal agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) The Committee has recommended measures to support the concept of shelter. Such measures are put forward as first or partial steps which if adopted, could provide the Federal leadership and example necessary to stimulate State and local governments and the private economy to take necessary shelter measures. Unless such stimulation is truly effective in inducing the provision of nationwide fallout shelter under local governmental and private auspices, and unless and until improvements in active defenses are brought about, estimated civilian casualties, in the event of nuclear attack on the United States, will not be limited to a level that will permit the United States to survive as a nation.

(2) With Federal leadership and example, it is believed that the direct measures proposed can be undertaken in ways that will obtain the support and cooperation of the American people.

(3) With respect to public information and education, it is believed that the critical factor bearing on maintaining a low-key program is not the level of effort expended, but rather the manner in which the nature and imminence of the threat is handled.

(4) Since the measures point to a partial program, they cannot engender public overconfidence in shelter, nor yet create a public passive defense psychology.

(5) Because of the emphasis which will be placed upon improved active defenses, because of the low key of the public information program on shelters, and because of existing Congressional and

public attitudes, it is not believed that the measures proposed will cause Congressional or public reaction prejudicial to higher priority national security programs; nor that the shelter proposals in and of themselves will cause a loss of support by our allies. Furthermore, it is believed that they will not present the posture of the United States as that of a nation preoccupied with preparations for war.

(6) The Committee believes that incorporation of fallout shelter in military construction on a selective basis is vital, not only for the protection of military personnel, but as an example to the civilian population.

(7) The measures recommended must be regarded frankly as experimental. If satisfactory progress in shelter construction is not achieved as a result of these measures, consideration may need to be given at a later date to additional inducements which might be resorted to on a progressive scale as required. Such inducements could include: (a) requirement of shelters as a condition for Government loan guarantees under all existing programs, (b) low-interest loans for shelter construction, (c) rapid tax amortization, (d) other incentives, including matching grants by the Federal Government.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis E. Berry,
Chairman
Federal Civil Defense Administration

William E. Carey
Bureau of the Budget

Vincent P. Rock
Office of Defense Mobilization

Col. James E. McHugh
Department of Defense

Robert L. Corsbie
Atomic Energy Commission

29. Briefing Note for the 359th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 20, 1958

ITEM 1—MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

The Council's attention today is again directed to the question of providing shelter for the population against the hazard of radioactive fallout. This matter will be considered at two successive Council meetings. Today we shall first hear a factual presentation by FCDA on radioactive fallout and on types of protective measures against it. Following that, the Director of Central Intelligence will present a new estimate of the Soviet civil defense program, including shelter construction. Then at next week's meeting, we shall discuss the excellent report by the Interdepartmental Committee on "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter" (circulated on March 14).

A brief word on the history of civilian shelter as it has been discussed by the Council.

You will recall that on December 21, 1956, in the Indian Treaty Room, Governor Peterson presented a proposed nation-wide shelter program which would have cost \$32 billion over an 8-year period. As an outgrowth of that proposal, in April 1957 the Council called for four studies on various aspects of shelter which culminated in the Gaither Report last November 7. The Gaither Panel, although placing shelter in a second priority, nevertheless recommended a nation-wide fallout shelter program estimated to cost \$22.5 billion over a 5-year period. At its meeting on January 16, 1958, the Council agreed that existing civil defense policy should be modified to incorporate the concept of fallout shelter, but that the U.S. should not initiate a nation-wide fallout shelter program of the type recommended by the Gaither Panel, and that implementation of the shelter concept should be deferred pending Council consideration of the Interdepartmental Committee report, which we shall take up next week.

First, then, let us hear the factual presentation.

GOVERNOR HOEGH

ITEM 2—SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION

We shall now hear the intelligence estimate of what the Soviets are doing in the way of civil defense and the extent to which they are believed to have shelters for the civil population.

¹ Source: Civil defense and civilian fallout shelters. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

MR. ALLEN DULLES

1. Each year, as you know, the Planning Board undertakes to review our Basic National Security Policy. Last winter's review, based on a series of discussion papers, extended from February into May; our current Basic Policy (NSC 5707/8) having been finally adopted on June 3, 1957. Whereas it is not proposed, this year to undertake such an arduous review procedure the Planning Board has already spent five meetings in ground work for the annual review.

2. This work has been based upon the new "Estimate of the World Situation", produced by the Intelligence Community on February 26, 1958. We consider this National Intelligence Estimate most significant and serious; and the Director of Central Intelligence deserves great credit for the superior job done. Each Council Member will find its contents necessary background information to the basic policy review before us. I personally feel that it is a part of my duty to assure that so basic an intelligence appraisal is studied by the Council Members.

3. The Planning Board's consideration of this Estimate has been stimulated by a novel procedure. During the last two weeks, we have asked men outside of Government, who have very broad experience and high intelligence, to read the Estimate and sit down for an afternoon of discussion with the Planning Board on major problems affecting our national security. These men included General Gruenther, former Assistant Secretary Bowie, former Under Secretary of the Army Bendetsen, former High Commissioner McCloy, and former Chairman of the CEA Arthur Burns.

4. I am going to ask Mr. Dulles first to express in his own words what he considers the most significant changes between this Estimate and the "Estimate of the World Situation" made last year, and also to call attention to any other significant part of the Estimate that occurs to him.

MR. DULLES

5. The Planning Board has developed, in the course of its consideration of the Estimate during the last month, a great many significant points. On the blue sheets which are before you we have picked out five of these points for discussion today. I will read each of these points, and ask for comments. It will be of great help to the Planning Board in drafting the revision of our existing Basic National Security Policy (which we hope to be able to present to you about May 1st) to have the benefit of your views on the current World Estimate, whether or not they coincide with it.

cc: Messrs. Lay
Gleason
Smith

30. Paper Distributed at the 359th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 20, 1958

IMPORTANT POINTS IN THE "ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION" (NIE 100-58)

(Figures in parenthesis refer to "Estimate" paragraphs)

1. *Soviet Strength and Intentions.*

a. The Soviet world position vis-a-vis the West has improved in 1957 over 1956, in part due to its demonstrated scientific capabilities, its reasserted control over Bloc countries, and the effective psychological impact of its propaganda effort to depict Russia as the advocate of "peace" and "disarmament." This Soviet trend is not necessarily irreversible. (1, 19).

b. The Soviet determination to achieve world leadership is unabated. (6, 40).

c. It is unlikely that at least in the next five years the Soviet Union, even with an ICBM capability, will embark on general nuclear war or deliberately take actions involving serious risk of such war. The Soviet Union has still a healthy regard for U.S. retaliatory capability and of damage attending nuclear exchanges. (10, 66).

d. Changes in top Kremlin personnel do not indicate a deterioration or disintegration in the Soviet regime's policy or determination to gain world leadership for Communism. However, there are evolutionary changes in Soviet society which might in the long run (but not in nearby times) turn Russia into a nation with which the Free World could live more at peace.

e. During the foreseeable future there will be a dangerous jockeying for position between the U.S. and the USSR, involving the most difficult calculations of risk of actions or inactions in particular situations. (67, 70). Failure to calculate accurately could lead to local war or even to a general conflict. Despite efforts to keep wars limited, the chances of doing so whenever major areas or causes are involved are at best not too promising. (67).

2. *The State of Mutual Deterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position.*

a. The U.S. and the USSR will soon achieve a state of mutual deterrence, under which each will try to avoid a general nuclear conflict

¹Source: Important points in NIE 100-58. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

because of the resultant inestimable damage to both and to the world. (5, 6, 66).

b. Under these circumstances, (a) potentially disruptive forces within the Western Alliance have been stimulated; (b) some friendly nations fear that the U.S. will no longer be willing to threaten nuclear retaliation in order to deter Soviet actions in matters of vital concern to them; (c) the Soviets will take more bold actions in the fields of economic penetration and subversion, perhaps in the area of limited war; and (d) there will be a weakening in the Free World alliances, less confidence in U.S. leadership and military power, increased respect for Russian achievements in science, technology, rocketry, and nuclear weapons, more susceptibility to Russian propaganda for East-West negotiations—all in the hope of escape from tension. (9, 30, 34, 42, 72, 73)

3. U.S. Bases Overseas.

a. The U.S. will encounter increasing trouble in retaining overseas bases on terms assuring their availability and effectiveness in case of need. (38)

b. The dual control provisions of the IRBM agreements will introduce troublesome elements into the operation of the NATO Alliance. The division between people who seek early negotiations with the Russians and people whose principal concern is to maximize the military strength of the Alliance before negotiating, will offer opportunities for exploitation by the USSR and for Soviet maneuvers to delay the installation of IRBM's. (38, 39).

4. Competition for Underdeveloped and Uncommitted Countries.

a. Most of these countries believe the world power struggle is of no direct concern to them. They are not greatly concerned with "anti-Communism," but are interested primarily in their own economic development. Their choice will increasingly be, not between East and West, but between neutralism and pro-Communism. (47, 50, 87).

b. Most of these countries lack political and economic organization to achieve desired economic growth. There is a shortage of administrative and technical skills. Local capital is insufficient, and economic and political uncertainties and (in some cases) hostility, discourage private and to some extent Governmental foreign investment. Population growth frequently exceeds the growth of the economies. Many underdeveloped countries are increasingly disposed to accept Soviet economic offers, and some may come to adopt Communist methods which appear to them to have been successful in the USSR and Communist China. (48, 65).

5. *Competition Between Free World and Soviet Systems.*

a. The economic strength of the USSR will continue to grow at a faster rate than that of the U.S., and the Soviet regime will continue to have the capability to direct its economic strength in support of its internal and external policies which seek world leadership. (15).

b. Weaknesses in the Free World economy have emerged, including slower economic growth, slower expansion of world trade, inflationary pressures, and the U.S. economic recession. However, over the longer run, prospects for economic growth are favorable in many Free World areas. (61).

c. An intensive, world-wide competition between the Soviet Bloc and the U.S. will continue for some years to come during which the Soviet Bloc will undertake vigorous economic and political offensives. (73).

d. The general course of events in the East-West contest will depend more than anything else on the manner in which the West mobilizes and employs its political, economic, and military resources. (74).

31. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 359th NSC Meeting¹**

Washington, March 20, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 359th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 20, 1958

Present at the 359th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 1-4); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (participating in Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter; Agenda item 2: Soviet Civil Defense and Air-Raid Shelter Construction. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on March 21.

Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Karl G. Harr, Jr., Department of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Paul McGrath, Charles Shafer, and Robert Stokley, Federal Civil Defense Administration (for Item 1); Dr. Gordon Dunning, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee", dated January 22, 1958; NSC 5807)

In briefing the Council, General Cutler indicated that the problem of providing shelter for the population against radioactive fallout would be considered at two successive meetings of the Council. At the first one, today, the Council would hear a factual presentation by the Federal Civil Defense Administration on radioactive fallout and on the types of protective measures against it. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) Upon the conclusion of his briefing, General Cutler called on Governor Hoegh, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, who in turn indicated that the presentation would be given by Dr. Paul McGrath of FCDA.

Upon the conclusion of Dr. McGrath's presentation, General Cutler complimented him on the high quality of his report, and advised the Council that the purpose in hearing this factual presentation was to remind members of the Council of the basic facts relating to shelter prior to Council consideration next week of the report of the Interdepartmental Committee entitled "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter" (NSC 5807).

The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization inquired of Dr. McGrath the number of casualties estimated in Dr. McGrath's discussion of Operation Sentinel. Dr. McGrath replied that the casualties were estimated at about 82 million.

Mr. Stans, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, pointing out the arbitrary level of tolerance of radiation which Dr. McGrath had set at 75 Roentgens, inquired what was the general range of tolerance in human beings. Dr. McGrath explained that the figure of 75 Roentgens had been selected because this intake of radiation would not make many

people sick and accordingly unfit to work. A dose of 200 Roentgens, on the other hand, would cause disabling sickness.

Admiral Strauss commented that the natives on some of the islands in our Pacific proving grounds, and some of our own U.S. personnel there, had undergone much larger doses than 75 Roentgens without serious ill effect.

The President inquired how one could distinguish the degree of contamination from radioactive fallout in a given area at a given time. Mr. Shafer, of the FCDA, explained that it was proposed to distribute instruments for this purpose immediately after a nuclear detonation.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, concurred in generally by the Atomic Energy Commission, on the hazards of radioactive fallout and on the relative effectiveness of types of protective shelter.

2. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION

(NSC Action No. 1842-*f*; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 14, 1958)

Having done a lot of hard work on this intelligence estimate, the intelligence community, explained Mr. Allen Dulles, was still of the opinion that the Soviet Union did have a program of civil defense and of air-raid shelter construction. It was not easy to pin down and describe this program, but Mr. Dulles said that he would be glad to invite skeptics into his office to see the enormous mass of evidence of the existence of such a program in the Soviet Union. Incidentally, he added, the present estimate had been concurred in by all of the agencies of the intelligence community.

Mr. Dulles then went on to cite certain specific evidence from training manuals, Soviet Red Cross reports, and other sources. Weighing all the evidence, Mr. Dulles then summarized his conclusions. First, that a minimum of from 10 to 15 million people of the Soviet Union's urban population are now afforded some degree of protection, and that the effort to provide more is a continuing effort in the Soviet Union. All this was true despite much uncertainty as to the precise character and size of the Soviet program.

When the Director of Central Intelligence had concluded his remarks, General Cutler informed the Council that when it was produced before the Planning Board, this estimate on the Soviet program had been received with a certain amount of skepticism, particularly in view of two sentences—one in paragraph 2, reading "It is impossible

to determine the precise state of readiness in the USSR", and secondly, the first sentence of paragraph 11, reading "The adequacy of protection afforded by the shelter program outlined in the above paragraphs has not been analyzed in this report." General Cutler also pointed out that Ambassador Thompson was of the opinion that no shelters were being provided in the enormous Lenin Hills housing development in Moscow. Mr. Dulles replied that he was inclined to disagree with Ambassador Thompson's interpretation of what had been observed in the Lenin Hills development.

General Cutler said that in any case Mr. Dulles presumably agreed with his advice to Mr. Dulles that he should not go out too far on a limb with respect to this estimate of the Soviet program. Mr. Dulles indicated that he had been inclined to go along with this view when it had first been expressed to him by General Cutler, but that he had somewhat changed his mind after seeing more of the concrete evidence to support the existence of a Soviet civil defense and air-raid shelter program. General Cutler inquired whether Mr. Dulles proposed to continue his efforts to discover the size and character of the Soviet program, and he received an affirmative answer.

Mr. Gordon Gray questioned whether it was meaningful to cite as evidence of a modern Soviet program shelter structures which had been built as early as 1949. To Mr. Grey, such structures would have little or no use in a future nuclear war. Dr. Killian, however, pointed out that such structures might still prove helpful as shelter against radioactive fallout as opposed to blast or thermal effects. Secretary Dulles agreed with this opinion, but pointed out that this was not the type of shelter which the United States was contemplating in its current study of shelter programs.

Mr. Stans inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles how many of our American population could be protected by some of the same sort of measures, such as subways, which the intelligence estimate cited as being part of the Soviet program. There was no answer to this question.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an estimate on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842-f and transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 14, 1958.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

32. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 20, 1958, 3 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian reported the results of his analysis of Defense proposals for budgetary augmentations, which the President recently asked him to analyze. He said that the Services had asked for augmentation totalling \$10 billion. At this point the President interjected that this type of thing seemed to him to show a lack of responsibility, and that he found it hard to retain confidence in the heads of the Services when they produce such proposals as these. Dr. Killian said the sum had been screened, in prolonged discussions in Defense, to some \$1,648,000,000.

The President asked how much of this was for the continuation of the B-52 line. Dr. Killian said that \$456 million was for B-52s and the air tankers to go with them. This would be enough to keep one production line open at five per month for about a year. The President indicated he supported this program.

Dr. Killian said the next sum was \$225 billion for the conduct of the NIKE-ZEUS program, and to continue development of the anti-ICBM. Up to one-half of this total was intended for the overall development phase. The Signal Corps also had a very attractive program for acoustic detection (using a "corridor" in the upper air), amounting to \$3.7 million. The President said that is the kind of project he likes to hear about.

Dr. Killian said the next proposal is for \$400 million to increase the IOC for POLARIS. This sum would add two more submarines, plus tenders, bringing the total number of subs up to five according to Dr. Killian. (I think the correct figure may be eight).

The next project was for a radio telescope development, involving \$71 million. Dr. Killian said there are scientific and technical questions still remaining concerning this project, and he would like to suggest that it be subject to the review of the Science Advisory Committee.

The President agreed, and said that in fact he would like to see the study and review conducted, and then have Defense come in for supplemental funds if the project proves out.

¹ Source: Defense proposals for budgetary augmentations. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on March 21.

The next item was for anti-submarine warfare—\$91 million. This would provide a greater capability for keeping track of submarines once detected. The President recalled that we have put tremendous amounts of money into SONAR, and now it is apparently not satisfactory. Dr. Killian indicated the difficulty is that the total system has not been properly integrated. There has been some tendency not to concentrate funds on the basic technical system, but to disperse them over a wide range of facilities and activities. Dr. Killian said the next proposal is for \$100 million for solid propellant development. The present intent is to put this work into ARPA. The President agreed with this proposal.

Next was a project for an air-to-surface missile called GAM-77, at \$91 million. This would extend the range and penetration of the B-52. These funds are for development purposes. The President indicated concurrence.

Next was the provision of \$100 million to ARPA. Dr. Killian thought this should be made with the understanding that when the new space agency is established, this allocation will be reviewed.

It was next proposed to provide an additional \$100 million for the TITAN program, intended to accelerate development, achieve storable propellants, and harden the TITAN bases. The President said he would like to see the TITAN project given to ARPA. He did not consider that the existing Services had any proper claim on future systems development.

The final project reported by Dr. Killian was an intelligence type radar for the Far East at \$10 million. (Checking on this subsequently, he determined that it is similar to one in Turkey, and is to go into the Aleutians.)

Dr. Killian then took up a memorandum to the President from Secretary McElroy requesting authorization for certain ARPA projects. The President indicated his general approval, subject to checking out certain specific details.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

33. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 20, 1958, 4 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
Secretary Quarles
General Twining
Mr. Stans
Dr. Killian
General Persons
General Goodpaster

Secretary McElroy gave the President a sheet showing proposed augmentations to the military budget.

Before discussing the details, the President asked what the Pacific missile range is, and why it should be assigned to the Navy. Mr. Quarles indicated that it is to be a national missile range, and said the Navy will be serving as the executive agent, adding that the range will be available to the Services and that it will permit launching satellites on Polar orbits.

The President said he saw several groups engaged in solid propellant work—the Air Force, the Navy, and ARPA. He thought it should all be given to ARPA. Mr. Quarles said that ARPA is intended to pull together the development of solid propellants; it is not intended, however, to be the manager of the missile development aspects (i.e. the hardware).

Referring to the MINUTEMAN project, the President said it looks as though the Air Force is getting into long-range solid rockets, and he questioned whether the second generation should be approached in this way. Mr. Quarles confirmed that the intention was to start a solid ICBM development in the Air Force. The President said that he thought that this should not be assigned to any of the Services, but Mr. McElroy reported that he had assigned the development and operational use of all ICBMs and IRBMs to the Air Force. Dr. Killian said he understood that the \$75 million assigned to the Air Force for the MINUTEMAN project would not include any hardware, but would be purely for development activities for the missile itself, as distinguished from its propellant. One of the Defense representatives confirmed that this is correct.

The President said he thought there is duplication between the POLARIS and the MINUTEMAN programs. Mr. Quarles said the MINUTEMAN is based on a more advanced warhead, more advanced guidance and propellant, and more stages. The President indicated he

¹ Source: Defense budget and missile development. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on March 21.

had reservations as to the wisdom of this way of going about future missile development.

After a brief discussion, the President indicated agreement with the proposal for GAM-77, as a penetration aid for the B-52.

The President then asked what the NRRO proposal is, and why it is assigned to Naval Research. Mr. Quarles said that it is the radio telescope project, and that Naval Research has the best experience for this. The President spoke strongly that we have not freed our minds from existing systems and organizations. We continually find ourselves prisoners of free-wheeling activities that have been going on for a number of years in each of the Services. Mr. McElroy said he thought that the NRRO should be an ARPA project, and the President strongly agreed. The President said he would not like to see large sums of money being expended for intelligence activities by a multitude of services and agencies. Ideally, the function should be in the CIA. Practically, we should put such activities more and more into ARPA. He asked that this be put into ARPA. Dr. Killian pointed out the tie-in between this project and some of the NASA activities, and the President confirmed that there should be coordination as the project develops.

The President again said that we are prisoners of custom, and of particular past history in which we have had all of these separate research activities. Mr. McElroy said the activity would be placed under the proposed Under Secretary for Research and Engineering in the new scheme of organization.

Mr. Stans recommended that the proposal be put into the budget process, for review and screening. He said he wanted to point out where we seem to be going. The budget has already gotten to the level of \$41 billion for FY 59, and \$42 billion plus if these accelerations are included. There is a built-in expansion of a very large magnitude, since these proposals are still in the research and development stage. Mr. McElroy said that we could not hold to \$38 billion with the world in its present state. The President pointed out that the civilian and military chiefs in Defense have a very heavy responsibility, and that he is tending to lose confidence in some of their recommendations when they come in with proposals for \$6 billion to \$10 billion augmentations.

The President then recalled that the \$400 billion shown for POLARIS is going to give us just two submarines. While he did not challenge this proposal, he did feel that this simply confirmed that aircraft carriers have run their course. Mr. McElroy said that he has been very much concerned on this subject. A wide variety of delivery systems seems to be emerging. He now has the Joint Chiefs of Staff studying what would be the best "mix" of delivery systems.

The President indicated he supported the continuation of the B-52 production line as recommended.

He indicated that because some of the supplementals have been for such things as bases, he was hoping that the program would not level off at a permanently higher level than \$40 billion a year.

Mr. McElroy said that if it were possible to have a determination of policy before the end of the month, this would help him with the Johnson Committee.

The President concluded by saying that he hoped we could get our organization plan through the Congress. Thereby we would get money into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and he could exercise much stronger control.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

34. Letter From Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, March 21, 1958

Dear Foster:

Herewith a draft of the talk I am planning to make before the Editors on April seventeenth. There is still quite a bit of work to be done on it.

My theme is that *we* must find ways of reducing the *need* for armaments. I mention various proposals that we have put forward during the past five years to ease tensions and promote peace—for example disarmament, atoms for peace, science for peace, control of outer space for peaceful purposes, exchanges of students, leaders of thought and so on, and a general diminishing of the barriers between free intercourse of ideas, persons and things. But I have wanted to make a rather startling new proposal.

I wanted to suggest that, if the Soviets were interested, I would recommend to Congress the inviting of several thousand students for one year. Maybe this idea is not completely sound, but we need some vehicle to ride in order to suggest to the world, even if ever so briefly, that we are not stuck in the mud. We realize that the world is asking for something that is almost impossible when it insists that we should

¹ Source: Transmits draft speech with proposal to invite Soviet students to U.S. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

give to all peoples complete assurance that we are not only peaceful and friendly, but that we shall “hold the initiative” in striving for peace.

Our public relations problem almost defies solution. The need always for concerting our views with those of our principal allies, the seductive quality of Soviet promises and pronouncements in spite of their unreliability, the propaganda disadvantage under which we operate because of the monolithic character of Soviet news broadcasts, and the readiness of many nations to take a virtual black-mail position as they make more and more urgent requests for aid—all serve to make us appear before the world as something less than persuasive in proclaiming our peaceful purposes and our effectiveness in pursuing them.

I didn’t mean to write at this length. I only want to ask for your comments on the draft as it stands now. Any penciled notes in the margin would be completely satisfactory.

If you could let me have the draft back some time the early part of the week. I would be grateful.

With warm regard,
As ever,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

P.S. Your note of this morning, enclosing some comments by your staff, seems to condemn my idea as futile. But I’m not yet certain that, as presented in the accompanying draft, it may not have some value.

35. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 24, 1958

SUBJECT

Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter

REFERENCE

NSC 5807

The enclosed comments and recommendations on NSC 5807, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on

¹ Source: Transmits NSC Planning Board comments on NSC 5807. Top Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.

Thursday, March 27, 1958, in connection with its consideration of NSC 5807.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning

Enclosure

Washington, undated

MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER
Planning Board Comments and Recommendations on NSC 5807

Research (Pages 2–3)

1. The Planning Board noted the Committee's statement, in the unnumbered paragraph on page 3 that—beyond the four research programs outlined in paragraph 1–a and continuing research bearing on the shelter problem in all its aspects—there were “serious unsolved problems relating to effects of nuclear attack on humans, including the immediate and long range effects of radiation” and measures to mitigate such effects. In support of the recommendation of the Committee, the Planning Board *recommends* that:

The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology be requested to recommend a qualified group to make a special assessment as to (1) the adequacy of present research efforts by the several agencies of Government on the design and testing of shelters and on the effects of nuclear attack on humans, including the immediate and long range effects of radiation and measures to mitigate such effects; and (2) whether such research efforts should be better coordinated, integrated, or accelerated; the group to report on such special assessment, with recommendations, to the Council prior to July 1, 1958.

2. The Planning Board also recommends studies additional to those proposed by the Committee:

a. One study would appraise, in relation to a massive nuclear exchange involving nuclear detonation totaling millions of kilotons concentrated within a short time, the upper limits of such nuclear detonation and its by-products which could be tolerated by the peoples of the world and by the world itself.

b. A second study would appraise the problem of survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter after a massive nuclear exchange. Further study is required, relating to the immediate and longer-range period following such coming out of shelter, with respect to such factors as: sources of food, water, and fuel; methods and feasibility of decontamination; measures to care for casualties and bury the dead; means of restoring transportation and utilities; requirements for stockpiling survival and relief items and of their protection from blast or fallout; the psychological and morale problems confronting survivors who have lost members of their immediate families and face an environment without accustomed social, economic, and governmental institutions.

[c. A third study would attempt to appraise what level of active defenses and of shelter, in any projected combinations, is required to limit casualties to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation.²]

The Planning Board, therefore, *recommends* that:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, be requested to undertake through appropriate means a study appraising the upper limits of massive concentrated nuclear detonations and their by-products which could be tolerated by the peoples of the world and by the world itself.

b. The Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, be requested to undertake a study appraising the problem of survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter after a massive nuclear exchange.

[c. The Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Department of Defense, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, be requested to undertake a study appraising what level of active defenses and of shelter, in any projected combinations, is required to limit casualties to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation.³]

d. The reports referred to in *a*, *b* and *c* above should be made to the Council prior to July 1, 1958.

Flexibility of Prototypes (Pages 3–5)

3. The Planning Board deems the Committee's recommendation with respect to the construction of 95 prototype shelters, some designed for fallout protection and others for blast protection, to be illustrative, and believes that there should be flexibility in choosing numbers and kinds of prototypes to be constructed.

²Proposed by the ODM Planning Board Member. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

³Proposed by the ODM Planning Board Member. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

Pilot Studies (page 7)

⁴4. Decisions under the Committee's recommendation to provide Federal funds for pilot shelter and site studies in five cities, determined by FCDA to be representative, may be complicated by political considerations. The Planning Board believes that one solution might be to invite cities, so determined to be representative, to come forward on a sharing basis, matching on a stated basis local funds with Federal funds. Under such an arrangement, selection might be made on the basis of the first five cities to volunteer within a specified time, appropriately distributed among representative categories. Only if such an offer prompted inadequate response would the Federal Government undertake the studies with 100% Federal funds.

Improvement in Active Defenses (See page 12)

5. The Committee did not address itself directly to the provisions of NSC Action No. 1842-d-(2) which specifies one of the conditions upon which adoption of the concept of fallout shelter is based:

"Improvements in active defenses can give reasonable promise, together with fallout shelters, of limiting estimated civilian casualties, in the event of nuclear attack on the United States, to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation and will in no case be greater than a similar casualty ratio in the USSR."

The Committee did not make a determination under the foregoing condition because it did not have enough information on prospective improvements in active defenses to make a finding on this point and because its proposed measures were only partial in nature. The Planning Board does not consider itself competent to make a judgment on this point on the basis of information available at this time.

General

6. In the light of the above comments and recommendations:

a. The State, JCS, ODM, FCDA and AEC Planning Board representatives endorse the report by the Interdepartmental Committee on "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter" (NSC 5807).

b. The Treasury,⁵ Defense and Budget Planning Board Members recommend that the Council endorse those proposals contained in the report by the Interdepartmental Committee on "Measures to Carry Out

⁴(1) The Treasury Planning Board Member objects to the Planning Board's solution as not being politically practicable. However, the Treasury Planning Board Member does believe that research on site-planning should be conducted.

(2) The ODM Planning Board Member favors the pilot studies but believes that, in addition, research on site-planning should be conducted. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵For additional Treasury comments, see Annex. [Footnote is in the original.]

the Concept of Shelter” (NSC 5807) with respect to research studies and public education, but that Council decision as to the remainder of the recommendations (specifically those contained in paragraphs 1–b, 2–c, 5 and 6 of NSC 5807) be held in abeyance pending completion of the studies recommended by the Planning Board in paragraphs 1 and 2 of its comments and the studies recommended by the Committee covering psychological, emotional, educational, morale and other problems of shelter.

Annex

ADDITIONAL COMMENT BY THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON NSC 5807

Deferment of Measures Which Could Commit the Nation to a Network of Large Public Shelters

Treasury notes that the Committee, recognizing the psychological, emotional, morale and other problems incident to shelter plans requiring large groups of individuals to spend many days in public shelters providing space for 500 to 5000 persons, has recommended studies covering such problems.

The Planning Board, in reviewing NSC 5807, has noted and commented on the serious unsolved problem relating to effects of nuclear attack on humans, including the immediate and long-range effects of radiation and measures to mitigate such effects, and has recommended a special assessment of the adequacy of research efforts in these areas.

An additional study has been recommended by the Planning Board to appraise the problem of survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelters after a massive nuclear exchange, including such matters as sources of food, water and fuel, the means of restoring transportation and utilities, and the psychological and morale problems confronting survivors.

The Planning Board has also recommended a study appraising the upper limits of massive concentrated nuclear detonations and their by-products which would be tolerated by the peoples of the world and by the world itself.

The Planning Board has further noted that the Committee did not make a judgment on the question of whether improvements in active defenses can give reasonable promise, together with fallout shelters, of limiting estimated civilian casualties, in the event of nuclear attack on the United States, to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation and will in no case be greater than a similar casualty ratio in the USSR.

In view of the inadequacy of information in the foregoing areas, it is believed that the efficacy of large public shelters (of the range from

500 to 5000 persons) has not yet been sufficiently tested and the contribution of such shelters sufficiently evaluated to warrant the conclusion that a network of such shelters is desirable, however financed, as opposed to a program placing major emphasis on smaller private shelters available at places of residence and employment.

It is believed that construction as prototypes of a number of public shelters to accommodate 500 to 5000 persons, development of comprehensive shelter plans and organization in a few typical cities, inclusion of public shelters in new Federal civilian buildings and in many new military facilities, and the construction of shelters in existing post office buildings throughout the nation as well as in many existing military facilities, might well, because of public and Congressional reaction to such steps, commit the nation to an approach to the shelter problem which would rely heavily on large public shelters, placing only minor emphasis on shelter protection in homes, other places of residence, and places of employment.

It is believed that steps which would lead to such commitment are premature and should be held in abeyance pending completion of the above-described studies. Treasury proposes, therefore, that the Council withhold decision on recommendations 1-*b*, 2-*c*, 5 and 6 of NSC 5807.

36. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower¹

Washington, March 25, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

I have read the draft you sent me of your proposed speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and make these comments: It seems to me to be unnecessarily somber. After all, quite a lot of your "Chance for Peace" aspirations have been realized.

There is the Korean Armistice. There is an Indochina Armistice. There is an Austrian State Treaty. There is an International Atomic Energy Agency. There is great progress in the development of a "European community, conducive to the free movement of persons,

¹ Source: Comments on draft speech. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Exchange.

trade, and of ideas.” There was achieved at Geneva at least an *agreement* for the reunification of Germany by free elections—although the Soviets have now repudiated it.

The “Chance for Peace” has been greatly increased by the apparent abandonment by the Soviet leaders of methods of violence such as were used in the prewar and postwar period up to 1953. The shift to political-economic offensives is, of course, highly dangerous, but it does bring an enhanced “chance for peace”. There has been a definite evolution within the Soviet Union toward greater personal security, increased intellectual freedom and increased decentralization. This also increases the chances of peace.

As you said in Paris, “There is a noble strategy of victory—not a victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples”.

I devoutly believe in the truth of this, and that you are carrying out that strategy. The principal aspect of your April 1953 speech which has not been realized is the limitation of armament and any permanent reduction of the costs of armament. I do not think, however, that it is necessary to be despairing even as to this. I am not particularly confident of evolving any complicated, formal agreement with the Soviets, but I think that there could be perhaps parallel unilateral acts which would slow down the pace consistently with our safety.

It does seem to me our security does not require us to develop *every* military potential, but to have sufficient to deter attack. I think in this respect we have some margin on which to operate, at least experimentally, as a challenge to the Soviets.

I am not sure but what you might not make a major point in this respect. I suspect that it might draw a positive response from the Russians if only because they must be even more burdened than we by the cost of modern weapons.

As you know, I am somewhat skeptical as to whether the proposal for the reception—or exchange of students—will make a big hit. But I certainly see no harm in trying. I do, however, suggest that attribution to democracies of “peacefulness” is perhaps not fully justified by the facts, e.g., Suez, and its statement implies that the purpose of the student exchange is not merely to import understanding but to subvert the Soviet form of government so as to make it more “democratic” and thus more peace-loving.

I would have a number of detailed suggestions, but perhaps it is not worth while to put them forward at this time in connection with this particular draft.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles

37. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 26, 1958

SUBJECT

Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter

REFERENCE

NSC 5807

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the reference report (NSC 5807) are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council, in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, March 27, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning

Enclosure

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McElroy

Washington, March 25, 1958

SUBJECT

Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter (NSC 5807) (C).

1. Reference is made to Armed Forces Policy Council Advice of Action, dated 29 January 1958, subject "DOD Comment on Certain Gaither Items", and to the report, NSC 5807, prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee which was established by NSC Action No. 1842-*e*.

¹ Source: Transmits JCS views on NSC 5807. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the nationwide fallout shelter program as acted upon by the National Security Council at its meeting of 16 January 1958 and the report, NSC 5807, of the Interdepartmental Committee established to propose measures to carry out the concept of shelter. As a result of this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their comments with respect to Item III–B–3 of the Security Panel Report, as contained in their memorandum for you, dated 4 December 1957.

3. With respect to a military fallout shelter program, the current J.C.S. Policy for Protective Construction provides adequate guidance for use of available funds.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the programs proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee of research, education, and construction of prototype shelters are desirable measures for carrying out the new national shelter policy. However, the following specific comments are offered for consideration:

a. As proposed by the Committee the general programs of research, education and construction of prototype shelters are considered desirable measures for carrying out the new national concept of fallout shelters. However, it appears that with the extensive knowledge already available on weapons' effects and shelter design that decreased support should be given to this phase with increased emphasis on actual construction of prototype shelter. Further, that this preliminary testing-educational program, if accelerated, would be more responsive to that period which the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee considered the critical period, namely, the next two years.

b. Although it may be desirable to construct shelter in military facilities in such a manner as to provide effective examples to the general public, first level of importance should be given to military operational needs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

38. Letter From Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, March 26, 1958

Dear Foster:

I called you on *the* phone, but find you are still on the Hill. I wanted to talk to you about your conclusion that I was becoming a pessimist.

In trying to produce a draft of a talk before the Editors, an effort which I am now disposed to postpone, I deliberately wanted to stress the difficulties now confronting the world. Of these, the greatest are:

(a). The costs of relative security with the attendant possibilities of, either:

(1). Seeing the American people get so tired of these huge expenditures as to cause them to refuse to support necessary appropriations and thus expose us to unacceptable risks.

(2). Imposing upon our people such political and economic controls as would imply a dangerous degree of regimentation.

(b). The task of reaching some reliable agreements with the Soviets that will make it possible, with confidence, to reduce armaments.

To my mind this transcends all other objectives we can have. Security through arms is only a means (and sometimes a poor one) to an end. Peace, in a very real sense, is an end in itself.

It is, of course, quite comforting to recite all of the international difficulties that have, over the five years, been either surmounted or ameliorated. I've personally recited these in a number of speeches.

But these specific successes cannot blind us to the most potentially dangerous of all the situations now developing. This is the credence, even respect, that the world is beginning to give to the spurious Soviet protestations and pronouncements. As their propaganda promotes this world confusion, the tone of Soviet notes and statements grows more strident. The more the men in the Kremlin come to believe that their domestic propaganda is swallowed by their own people and by the populations of other countries, including some we have counted upon as allies, the greater the risk of American isolation. One great step we can take to counteract this trend is to make sure our own people are not deceived.

It is not pessimistic to face up to difficulties and to seek ways to overcome them. We must never confess that we have gotten to the bottom of the barrel in searching for ideas to stem and turn the tide of Soviet propaganda success.

¹ Source: Thoughts on dealing with Soviet threat. Personal and Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

I personally believe that one of the main objectives of our own efforts should be to encourage our entire people to see, with clear eyes, the changing character of our difficulties, and to convince them that we must be vigilant, energetic, imaginative and incapable of surrender through fatigue or lack of courage.

So, no matter what the preoccupations we daily have with the unfolding scene—both international and domestic—I feel that our principal responsibility is to try unceasingly to create both general and specific situations under which the consummation of reliable agreements conforming to our ideas of right and justice can be more probable.

I have not the temerity to argue that any idea I have advanced is necessarily good; I just say that we have one basic job to do. A part of this is educating and informing our own people—so that they will support every burden we must carry, and will dedicate themselves to helping seek out new ways to dispel the basic differences between us and the Soviets that, becoming more and more unyielding in character, could finally lead to consequences that could be most unpleasant.

My own feeling about this business is simple. Optimism is not the ability to smile because of a refusal to face disagreeable facts; it is the seeking unceasingly (and, if possible, intelligently) for the methods and means to overcome difficulties.

With warm regard,
As ever,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

39. Memorandum of Discussion at the 360th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
March 27, 1958

Present at the 360th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter; Agenda item 3: Proposed Reorganization of the Department of Defense. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—15 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on March 28.

of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Judge Lawrence E. Walsh for the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Capt. John H. Morse, Jr., USN, for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Item 1); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (*participating in Item 1*); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the U.S. Ambassador to NATO; Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Brig. Gen. Carey Randall, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Mr. Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Ralph E. Spear and Mr. Robert Stokley, Federal Civil Defense Administration (for Item 1); The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, for Security Operations Coordination, and for Public Works Planning; the White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; Mr. Bryce N. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee", dated January 22, 1958; NSC Actions Nos. 1877 and 1878; NSC 5807; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 24 and 26, 1958)

General Cutler briefed the Council at very great length on the background of the subject report (NSC 5807), as well as the report's content and recommendations, including also the comments and recommendations by the NSC Planning Board with respect to the report, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, he distributed at the meeting an extract from the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of January 16, 1958, which he said described the framework of the Council's considerations today. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note and the aforementioned extract are filed in the minutes of the meeting, and are also attached to this memorandum.) Thereafter, General Cutler called on Governor Hoegh to summarize the contents of NSC 5807.

At the beginning of his remarks, Governor Hoegh referred to the simulated attack upon the United States in Operation Alert 1957, and indicated the difference between the effect of the use of “clean” nuclear weapons and “dirty” nuclear weapons in such an attack, with respect both to casualties from blast and thermal effects and casualties from radioactive fallout. His chart indicated that the total casualties (dead and injured) would have amounted to 51.3 million people if “dirty” nuclear weapons had been used by the enemy, and to 30.4 million people if only “clean” weapons had been used.

Thereafter, Governor Hoegh summarized the contents of the report of the Interdepartmental Committee (NSC 5807), including the terms of reference, the recommendations, and the conclusions.

When Governor Hoegh had completed his summary, General Cutler briefly commented, first, on the recommendations and the comment of the NSC Planning Board. He pointed out that the majority of the Planning Board had endorsed the report by the Interdepartmental Committee; but, in addition to the measures to carry out the concept of shelter in the report itself, the Planning Board had also called for the preparation of three additional studies beyond those contemplated in NSC 5807. General Cutler also referred briefly to a fourth proposed study suggested by the ODM Planning Board Member, which neither the Planning Board nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had viewed with favor at this time. He then pointed out that while the majority of the Planning Board had endorsed the measures set forth in NSC 5807, the Treasury, Defense, and Budget Planning Board Members had confined their recommendation to the research studies and the public education programs in NSC 5807, and recommended that the Council defer a decision on the remainder of the recommendations in NSC 5807. He noted that the Treasury Department, in explanation of this view, had submitted an Annex to the Planning Board report, in which it advocated deferring measures which would commit the nation to a network of large public shelters. He thought it appropriate at this point to call on Secretary Anderson for further explanation of the Treasury’s point of view.

Secretary Anderson said that officials of the Treasury Department have given very careful thought to the report of the Interdepartmental Committee. He agreed with these officials that the decision with respect to the proposed measures was as significant a decision in the realm of domestic policy as the Government could take. First, he said, he wished to commend Governor Hoegh for reducing the broad and general recommendations of the Gaither Panel with respect to shelter, to something which was clear, tangible, and susceptible of being dealt with. The problem posed by a shelter program, continued Secretary Anderson, was not only a grave financial problem or merely a grave financial problem. The main problem lay in the fact that we simply do not know enough at present to determine whether to go ahead with a large Federal program

of shelter as a means which will really contribute to the survival of the United States in a terrible nuclear war. While the Treasury Department agreed with the Interdepartmental Committee that the Government should go ahead with the proposed educational program for the American people on shelter, the Treasury also put very heavy emphasis on the creation of home shelters by private individuals, as well as on the research programs which the Interdepartmental Committee and the Planning Board had recommended. On the other hand, the Treasury Department did not believe that the Government could proceed to build prototype shelters all over the United States (as recommended in NSC 5807) without involving a serious popular and Congressional reaction which would eventuate in a huge and costly Federal shelter program. If we proceed now to commit ourselves to such a program of prototype shelters, we shall presently find that we have committed ourselves to an economic program of such magnitude that it would be bound to have a significant bearing on the economic strength of the nation. In conclusion, Secretary Anderson stressed the point that the Treasury was not prepared to oppose such a program of shelter-building, but it was urging that we defer a decision until we know more about the implications of such a construction program.

General Cutler thereafter briefly summarized Secretary Anderson's view with respect to what portions of NSC 5807 Treasury did favor and the objections of the Treasury Department to the proposed program to construct prototype shelters. Secretary Anderson concurred in General Cutler's summation, and warned again that proceeding with the prototype construction program might commit us to a wholesale Federal shelter program whether we really wished to undertake such a program or not.

General Cutler then asked General Twining to comment on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the comments and recommendations of the Planning Board regarding NSC 5807. General Twining stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked with favor on the three additional studies proposed by the Planning Board, but that the Chiefs did not agree with the proposal of the ODM Planning Board Member for a study "appraising what level of active defenses and of shelter, in any projected combinations, is required to limit casualties to a level which will permit the United States to survive as a nation." In general, said General Twining, the Chiefs felt that such a study was too vague in its present terms of reference, and in particular that if such a study were to be made in the future, it should be done by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group rather than by ODM, FCDA and the Department of Defense, as had been suggested by the ODM Planning Board Member.

General Cutler then summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs as consisting of agreement with those recommendations of NSC 5807

which called for programs of research and of public education, but that the Chiefs had certain reservations with respect to proposals to construct shelter in military facilities.

General Cutler thereafter requested the Secretary of State to present his views to the Council. Secretary Dulles stated that he wished to commend the authors of NSC 5807 just as Secretary Anderson had a while ago, for bringing the subject of shelter out of the ether and down to earth where we could observe and understand it. Beyond this commendation, he added, he had a few observations to make.

In the first place, it seemed to Secretary Dulles to be a serious question whether the emphasis in the program set forth by the Interdepartmental Committee in NSC 5807 was actually in the right place. In the United States today there are millions and millions of basements which could provide a shelter which would reduce the hazard of radioactive fallout to as much as one-tenth. On the other hand, we have no basements which would actually enable people who sought refuge in them to survive over a considerable period. There seemed to Secretary Dulles no sense whatever in providing basements where people merely died of radiation sickness more slowly than they did outside. Accordingly, the obvious first thing to do was to improve existing basement facilities to a point where people seeking shelter in them could have a real hope of surviving. This would include provision for what comes after the nuclear exchange—the provision of food, water, heat, medical supplies, and the like—in these improved basement shelters. The kind of program that he was suggesting, said Secretary Dulles, made use of widespread existing house shelters all over the nation. To achieve such a shelter program wouldn't cost the Government anything significant, and would add greatly to the chance of national survival in a nuclear war. In short, the measures he was advocating would provide the population with a high degree of protection while at the same time avoiding the problems and dangers which so worried Secretary Anderson.

Continuing, Secretary Dulles stated his firm opposition to the construction of massive shelter in the basements of public buildings. A measure like this must be approached gingerly. Programs calling for the addition of massive basements in new Federal construction would certainly involve very large costs to the Government and might not add significantly to our survival capacity. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles thought it would seem desirable to carry out the public education program recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee and programs which would convert existing facilities into shelters rather than into living tombs. Accordingly, he was inclined to cut the program of the Interdepartmental Committee further.

Secretary Dulles also said he assumed that the Interdepartmental Committee had given careful thought to the experience of the European

countries in the matter of building prototype shelters. These countries have had much more experience than we have in this field, and we could probably obtain this information from them for nothing.

In conclusion, Secretary Dulles stated that his own Planning Board Member (Assistant Secretary Gerard Smith) had gone along with the recommendations in NSC 5807 100 percent. He, Secretary Dulles, didn't go quite that far. He would cut out the construction aspects of NSC 5807, and would stress the use of private funds. He strongly opposed any massive shelter construction program.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his observations, General Cutler said he understood that Secretary McElroy had some rather special reservations with respect to the Interdepartmental Committee's report, and that these probably related to the possible impairment of active defense measures if a large-scale shelter program were adopted by the United States. He called on Secretary McElroy to express his views.

Secretary McElroy said that of course he was concerned about the costs of a shelter program in relation to other programs deemed vital by the Department of Defense. This, however, was not the point that he wanted to emphasize at the present time. He then explained that the several research programs described in NSC 5807 were quite acceptable to him. Where he differed from the Interdepartmental Committee was on the matter of the program of public education. Secretary McElroy believed that until the Government had sufficient knowledge and information to answer the public's questions, we should not expose them to an educational program. We don't yet know enough to answer their questions, and we needed to undertake further research and study before we launched a program of public education as to the nature of radioactive fallout and the hazards resulting from all-out nuclear war. Furthermore, added Secretary McElroy, he was not at all sure that it was at present in the public interest for the Government to urge the people of the United States to store large amounts of food, water, and drugs in basement shelters, at a time when we may need to encourage other types of investment and consumer buying by our people. Such a proposal might hurt our economy at a serious time.

The President observed that he wished to ask a couple of questions with respect to the assumptions or the frame of reference which the Committee had adopted in order to carry out its task. Addressing himself to Governor Hoegh, he said that he judged that the Committee was talking about protection from radioactive fallout rather than protection from the blast and thermal effects of nuclear detonations. But if the primary targets of the enemy are to be our U.S. cities, then such things as subways and the like won't help to provide shelter—unless, of course, we prove to be wrong in our assumption that the Soviets will aim their attack on our population centers. Governor Hoegh

replied that of course it is conceivable that we might be able to prevent nuclear bombs falling upon our cities; but we could certainly never avoid the hazard of widespread radioactive fallout in the event of a nuclear exchange.

The President likewise addressed his next question to Governor Hoegh. If, he said, we are thinking of an attack which would involve some 30 million U.S. casualties in the initial exchange, we have still not approached the casualty limits because there may be repeated attacks by the enemy after the initial attack. Such attacks might occur at a time when people were just coming out of shelter from the first attack. So, said the President, he concluded that when we talk about a vast nuclear exchange between us and the enemy, we are in fact talking about something the results of which are almost impossible to conceive of.

With respect to the psychological aspects of the problem of shelter, the President said he had got together some knowledgeable people and asked them just how much money it would take to build a fallout shelter on his farm sufficient to hold some 14 or 15 people. They had estimated the cost to be between \$25 and \$30 thousand, and the shelter was by no means elaborate. This posed the psychological problem. The President said that maybe, if he got a good job after he ceased to be President, he could afford to build such a shelter, but most of his neighbors would not be able to do so. In that case, won't they argue that only the rich are managing to get shelter protection? And will they not go on from that point to insist that the Federal Government build shelters for them? The President stressed that he was all for the construction of private shelters as far as this seemed likely to go, but he confessed that he was baffled by the problem of working out a scheme that offered hope of real success. Accordingly, the over-all answer seemed to him to be for this Government to assure that no doubt whatsoever existed about the protection of our massive retaliatory capability. In summary, the President stated that he agreed with the measures which had been proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee, as modified by the comments of the other Members of the Council.

Secretary Dulles turned to Governor Hoegh and complained that no one in all these years had ever told him what he should store in the basements of his houses. Why had he not been told? Governor Hoegh explained the reasons why. Since there was no visible shelter program, anyone who was found building a private shelter was thought to be eccentric. Secretary Dulles pressed the question as to what kind of food should be stored in his basement. Governor Hoegh replied by asking the Secretary what he liked to eat.

Secretary McElroy commented that in his opinion it would be necessary to terrify the people of the United States before they will do what Secretary Dulles was suggesting—namely, to build and stock shelters

in their basements. Secretary Dulles disagreed with Secretary McElroy on this point.

General Cutler next called for the views of the Director of the Budget. Mr. Stans stated that the Budget Bureau believed it undesirable to proceed at this time with any more than a small part of the program recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee in NSC 5807. The financial problems were, of course, obvious, but Mr. Stans could perceive other objections as well. He believed that if we undertook the prototype shelter construction program, recommended in NSC 5807, we would be inevitably committed to a full-scale shelter program. Moreover, undertaking a shelter program would interfere seriously with vital programs for strengthening the active defenses of the United States. But above all other objections was the fact, attested to by both the Interdepartmental Committee and the Planning Board, that many "unresolved problems" existed with respect to the shelter program. Therefore, before we invest substantial sums in any shelter construction program, the Bureau of the Budget feels that further studies, such as those recommended by the Planning Board, should be undertaken. In illustration of his point, Mr. Stans cited the value of studies on human tolerance of radiation. In summary, concluded Mr. Stans, the Budget Bureau favored only the following recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee: (1) research on weapons effects; (2) research on the human tolerance level of radiation; (3) a very limited program of public education; and (4) studies as to what protection now actually exists throughout the United States. Mr. Stans added his belief that all these measures should be undertaken at a cost of no more than \$25 million a year for two years, assuming some financial help from the States and the municipalities.

In reply to Mr. Stans, the President said that we could talk all we wanted about money, but if we know that shelter programs will save the lives of millions of people, money won't matter much in the final decision.

Dr. Killian expressed the view that the primary task of the United States was to concentrate on developing our active defenses in order to keep the nuclear bombs away. These should have priority over passive defense measures. Secondly, said Dr. Killian, if the Government were to embark on the kind of program of public education recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee, it was quite likely that we would find ourselves obliged to go on to undertake a much larger shelter program. Thirdly, and with respect to the Planning Board recommendations for three additional studies over and above those recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee, Dr. Killian expressed doubt that any of these studies would actually bring us to as definite conclusions as the Planning Board hoped to achieve. Nevertheless, Dr. Killian advocated proceeding with the studies recommended by the Planning

Board. The first and second studies seemed to him, on the whole, very reasonable. As to the third study—to wit, the problem of the survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter after a massive nuclear exchange—Dr. Killian was not sure that further study would throw much light on this problem, although he believed that it was probably worth trying. As to the fourth study, proposed unilaterally by ODM, this seemed to Dr. Killian infeasible as an undertaking. At best, it would require years to complete, and would involve an enormous effort if any conclusion were to be reached, although admittedly this was the heart of the problem.

The Acting Director of ODM, Mr. Patterson, in response to a question from General Cutler, said that he would not press for the time being the inclusion of the study proposed by the ODM Planning Board Member, although he reserved the right to bring the matter up at a later time, on grounds that ultimately it could not be passed over.

Apropos of a remark by Dr. Killian that the public education program proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee would tend to alarm the people of the United States, the President said that he must strongly disagree with Dr. Killian. He believed, on the contrary, that the program of public education would make us more effective.

At this point General Cutler reminded the Council that the Holifield (Chet Holifield, D-Calif.) Committee would commence public hearings on shelter early in April. Perhaps, therefore, it would be advisable to hear now from the Vice President as to what these hearings were likely to involve.

The Vice President replied that, generally speaking, the views that Dr. Killian had just expressed made very good sense to him, and that he would like to add that Governor Hoegh, as Federal Civil Defense Administrator, had just about the most thankless job in the world. While Governor Hoegh had done a fine job in producing the report of the Interdepartmental Committee, the Vice President said that he could not but be concerned also by the statements that Secretary Anderson had made at the outset of the meeting. The Vice President felt that if we went beyond educational and research programs in the field of shelter, we would presently generate political pressures for a Federal shelter program which might involve a serious loss in our active defenses and in our capacity for massive retaliation. He added that he shared the President's viewpoint that there really wasn't much difference, in terms of national survival, between casualties of 30 million and of 50 million Americans. While it might matter to the 20 million who were not killed, the Vice President believed that if 30 million Americans were killed in a nuclear exchange, there would be no hope of the United States surviving. What would really save the United States were our active defenses. While we certainly have to do something in the way

of a shelter program, because the country demands it, we should do as little as we can to satisfy this demand. If we went further than that, and became too involved in a shelter program, we would be bound to lose the correct balance between active and passive defenses. This, concluded the Vice President, was the right line to take in dealing with the Holifield Committee.

General Cutler asked the Vice President if he had observed strong pressure in the Congress for a large-scale shelter program. The Vice President said that he thought not, and added that he was inclined to agree with Under Secretary of the Treasury Scribner, that the Planning Board suggestion—that a selection for pilot studies might be made on the basis of the first five cities to volunteer matching funds—was politically impractical. The Vice President counselled against stirring up the public when at the present time all they want us to do is to spend ourselves out of the recession.

General Cutler next called on Governor Hoegh, suggesting that he speak to the point of the Federal example as a necessary stimulant to the construction of private shelters. He asked Governor Hoegh how we could possibly proceed with an effective public education program if we did not set some kind of example to our citizens by building shelter at the Federal level. Had this not been the gist of Governor Hoegh's arguments? Governor Hoegh replied emphatically in the affirmative, and enlarged on his point. It might be possible to reduce the size of the recommended program for the construction of prototype fallout shelters, but it was absolutely essential to build some such prototypes. Governor Hoegh also felt that the construction of shelter in new Federal buildings was a necessary example for the States and local communities.

At this point General Cutler undertook to describe the consensus of the meeting. He believed that this consensus favored going forward with the research programs which had been recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee and by the Planning Board. He believed also that the sampling surveys and pilot studies were approved by the Council. It likewise seemed to favor starting a program of public education and the program with respect to providing the elements of a base for rapid acceleration; but the consensus opposed adoption of the other programs recommended in NSC 5807.

(At this point, the President announced to the Members of the Council that he had just been brought a note indicating that Khrushchev had replaced Bulganin as head of the Soviet Government.)

General Cutler went on to say that he was not sure of the attitude of the Council toward the pilot studies, but he was sure that the rest of the Interdepartmental Committee's recommendations were not acceptable until the Council had had another look at the matter after completion of the research programs which the Council apparently endorsed.

The Acting Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Mr. Abbott Washburn, spoke in support of undertaking the construction of at least a few prototype shelters because, he warned, without such shelters it would be impossible to launch an effective program of public education. General Cutler thought well of this suggestion, and asked Governor Hoegh certain questions about this matter.

Mr. Patterson said that he, on the other hand, was disturbed about the program for public education if this were to be undertaken prior to the completion and evaluation of the recommended research programs. He felt that the Government must be in a position to answer clearly the public's questions. Governor Hoegh said that he believed that we were already in a position to answer the public's questions, as a result of the knowledge and information which had been acquired by FCDA and AEC.

Mr. Patterson then expressed himself as being in favor of a matching program for building shelter in public buildings, rather than a program in which all the costs of shelter construction were borne by the Federal Government. In reply to this argument, Governor Hoegh again stressed the value of the example set by the Federal Government.

The President said that this was one of the hardest problems in the world on which to make a wise decision. General Cutler therefore suggested leaving the matter where it was. He would undertake to write a Record of Action which he would discuss with the President so that the President could make a decision after thinking the matter over at greater length.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject (NSC 5807) prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee established for the purpose by NSC Action No. 1842-*c*; in the light of (1) the comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board on NSC 5807, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958, and (2) the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5807 (transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 26, 1958) and on the above-mentioned Planning Board comments and recommendations (as summarized orally at the meeting).

b. Agreed that the following measures should be undertaken to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1842-*d*:

(1) A research and development program along the lines of:

(a) The recommendations in paragraph 1-a of NSC 5807; and

(b) The recommendations by the NSC Planning Board in paragraph 1, page 1, and subparagraphs 2-*a* and -*b*, page 3, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958.

(2) A limited program of prototype construction of relatively small-capacity fallout shelters, differing in design and type (including multiple-use) and adapted to differing conditions such as climate;

appropriate tests by actual occupancy for realistic periods of time to be conducted after completion (total cost not to exceed \$6 million).

(3) A nation-wide survey along the lines recommended in subparagraph 2-a of NSC 5807.

(4) Initiation of a program of public education along the lines recommended in paragraph 3 of NSC 5807, as modified by FCDA in the light of NSC discussion and as outlined in the Annex hereto (cost estimated at not over \$12.5 million for FY 1959; subsequent annual appropriations to be determined on the basis of experience).

(5) The elements of a base for rapid acceleration along the lines recommended in paragraph 4 of NSC 5807.

(6) The incorporation of fallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable size, designed after this date, along the lines recommended in paragraph 5-a of NSC 5807. (Supplemental appropriations for such shelter in buildings for which funds have already been appropriated will not be sought.)

c. Requested that the studies recommended by the NSC Planning Board and referred to in *b*-(1)-(b) above, and a report by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator on the status of plans and actions to carry out the other measures described in *b* above, be submitted to the Council by July 1, 1958.

d. Deferred action on the measures recommended in paragraphs 1-b (except the limited program in *b*-2) above), 2-b, 2-c, 5-b, and 6-a and -b of NSC 5807; pending consideration by the Council of the reports requested in *c* above.

NOTE: The actions in *b* and *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted for implementation as follows:

b (except *b*-(1)-(b)) and *c* to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
b-(1)-(b) and *c* to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Chairman, AEC, the Director, ODM, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

[Omitted here is agenda item 2.]

3. PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1)

Secretary McElroy said that the presentation of the Defense Department's proposals for reorganization would be given by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, of Boston, who was in charge of this project at the Pentagon. In anticipation of presenting these proposals to the President, and in order to obtain the best available advice, the Defense Department had employed a large group of consultants, quarterbacked by Mr. Coolidge and including Admiral Redford, General Twining, General Bradley, General Gruenther, Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Foster and, on occasion (because of ill health), former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett. As the Council would perceive, continued Secretary McElroy, we have moved in four directions in these recommended improvements in the organization of the

Defense Department, namely: (1) the command structure, (2) elimination of interservice rivalry, (3) better direction of research and engineering, and (4) improvements of efficiency both within the Military Services and within the Department of Defense, with a view especially to speeding up decision-making.

Secretary McElroy then called on Mr. Coolidge, who spoke from notes with the assistance of a large chart of the new organization. Among other matters, Mr. Coolidge pointed out that in the revised command structure it was proposed to abandon the use of one or another of the Military Services as an executive agent of the Department of Defense. The line of command for the future under this proposed reorganization plan would be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the fighting forces. Thus there would be no intervention of a Service Chief of Staff in the line of command. Such an improvement should enable us to face up more promptly to any emergency.

Mr. Coolidge pointed out also that a great deal of time and thought had been given to the oft-mentioned proposal for the creation of a single Chief of Staff. However, it had been decided to retain the present system with certain changes which might, perhaps, appear at first sight picayune but which, in fact, Mr. Coolidge thought might prove very effective. He cited a number of such changes, of which perhaps the most significant related to Research and Development, whose head was in the future to be provided with a lot more authority than the heads of R&D in the past. Under the new system, the head of R&D would supervise all the research and engineering activities of the Department, and would be responsible for making certain that all the research and development required for the several missions of our armed forces (such as CONAD and Continental Defense) were actually being carried out. Appropriations for research and development would be made only to the Secretary of Defense, and not to the several military departments. Mr. Coolidge said that no decision had yet been made as to the precise title to be given the head of R&D, but that, regardless of title, he would rank as an Under Secretary.

With respect to the general functions of the Department of Defense, the new reorganization plan would suggest the elimination of paragraph 4 of Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, which states that the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force "shall be separately administered by their respective Secretaries under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense." Mr. Coolidge pointed out that such elimination would not mean that we would abolish the Service Secretaries, but the elimination of this phraseology would enable the Secretary of Defense clearly to direct the Service Secretaries. Moreover, all appropriations by the Congress henceforth would be made solely to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Services.

It was likewise proposed that the promotion of all officers above the rank of Major General or its equivalent in the other Services should be made on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense rather than upon recommendation by a Service Secretary. This move was designed to encourage an over-all rather than a Service point of view among officers of senior rank. In this connection, the proposed reorganization would seek authority to transfer an officer from one Service to another with the officer's own concurrence.

With respect to cutting down the number of Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Coolidge indicated that the proposed recommendations had not gone as far as Mr. Vinson and other Congressional critics would like us to go. We believe that many of the demands for wholesale reduction in the number of Assistant Secretaries were not realistic. If we attempted to get rid of too many such people, we would find ourselves back in the Forrestal days, with a Secretary of Defense who was simply physically unable to carry out all the details of his responsibility. Nevertheless, according to these recommendations the Secretary of Defense would plan to review the operations of each of the Assistant Secretaries to see that there was no duplication or inefficiency. Thus far, only one Assistant Secretaryship will be abolished.

Secretary McElroy commented that whatever one called these Assistant Secretaries, their functions were necessary, and it was easier to induce better men to serve if they were given the rank and title of Assistant Secretary of Defense.

At this point the President said that he would presently be obliged to leave the Council meeting, and he would like to offer one or two thoughts for discussion after his departure. The President said he firmly believed that if this reorganization could achieve the elimination of the artificial roles and missions of the Services, and depend instead on the unified commands, and if, secondly, we could get rid of the concept of "separately administered" referred to by Mr. Coolidge, and thirdly, if we could achieve sufficient financial flexibility in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, the President was convinced that we would have achieved three great legislative changes which very much needed to be made. On the whole, therefore, the President seemed to indicate approval of the proposals which had been outlined by Secretary McElroy and Mr. Coolidge.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that since the recommendations which had been presented for information to the Council had yet to be formally presented to the President for his approval, the content of the proposals should not be discussed outside the walls of the Cabinet Room except under most careful security safeguards. The President agreed, and said he expected the foregoing recommendations to be coordinated, and he hoped that the Military Services would vigorously support these

recommendations. If they were so supported, the President was confident that we could win Congressional approval for the recommendations.

(The President then left the meeting.)

The Vice President inquired as to the effect of the elimination of Section 202(4) concerning the separate administration of the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force by their respective Secretaries. Secretary McElroy replied that the effect of the elimination of this phraseology would be largely psychological in character. This concept of separately administered Services was used to support divisiveness on Capitol Hill more often than in the Pentagon itself. Indeed, in general inter-service rivalry on Capitol Hill was worse than it was in the Pentagon. He believed that this was as important a change as any that the Defense Department was making in its recommended reorganization proposals.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report on the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense on the subject, as presented by the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Charles A. Coolidge.

S. Everett Gleason

40. Record of Legislative Leadership Meeting¹

Washington, April 1, 1958

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Outer Space—Doctors Killian, Purcell and York gave a briefing similar to that at Cabinet and along the lines of the recently issued Report, elaborating somewhat on the missile requirements for carrying various payloads, showing that from any particular rocket, the heaviest payload could be had for a satellite mission, whereas the payload was sharply reduced for projects involving the moon, and still further reduced for shooting as far as Mars.

The plan for establishing the National Aviation and Space Agency was outlined. Dr. Killian emphasized that peaceful space research would long be dependent on Defense Department missiles, yet it was

¹Source: Outer space; Department of Defense reorganization; nuclear test cessation. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

desirable to conduct the non-military research outside of the Defense Department. Hence, the decision to continue ARPA even while setting up NASA. Discussion was very limited, consisting mostly of Sen. Knowland's interest in being certain that space projects would not be considered a secondary interest by the NACA people, who would be predominant in the new agency. Dr. Killian was able to assure him that the NACA was already enthusiastically pressing into the new field, and the problem would rather be one of overenthusiasm if anything.

Defense Reorganization—Mr. McElroy and Mr. Coolidge made a lengthy presentation of the changes to be recommended by the President. The plan for revising the appropriations process, so that appropriations would be made to the Secretary of Defense (rather than the services) stirred Sen. Bridges' interest particularly. He thought this was an especially important item because it involved getting into a field that had traditionally belonged to the Congress which always had made specific appropriations to the services. Sec. McElroy pointed out that the customary specific amounts for specific items would be developed as always in the Committee hearings, but by appropriating to the Secretary, and by giving him flexibility, he could modify programs as required by new developments—but he would have to inform the Congress of any changes being made.

At the end of the presentation, the President said he wanted to put a foundation under this in terms of his own thinking. He then spoke at length and with much intensity on the importance of streamlining the security organization to meet modern requirements. Hence came the great need for looking more to the unified commanders, for giving the Secretary greater flexibility, and for eliminating and controlling the rivalries among the services in research and development. He concluded by saying that he wasn't greatly concerned with the details of changes to be made, just so the Secretary got the authority and the flexibility that would prevent him from being hamstrung in his efforts to get the best defense for the nation.

Sen. Knowland, in response to a direct question from the President, said he had no question about the basic need which concerned the President. He felt, however, that in handling the detailed proposals, there was great need to recognize the concern that people in Congress would have about maintaining their traditional power of appropriating funds; Congress would not surrender this lightly.

The President agreed this would be of concern, then went on to stress again the need for avoiding duplication among the services, especially when the defense budget was getting to \$41 billion. If just one billion could be saved through this, he pointed out, it would cover a vast amount of requirements in other places in the government.

Nuclear Test Cessation—The President told the Leaders that the Khrushchev statement on cessation of tests was something anticipated

by Administration officials. He said the Administration had had many conferences as to whether we might do something like that if only as a move in the contest for world opinion; but the decision had been made, in the interests of our national security, not to end our nuclear testing.

The President saw some relationship between the Soviet announcement and their frantic search for a Summit meeting—perhaps they hoped this would obviate the need for discussing the problem.

The President asserted that Americans can properly say they want to be friendly, but certainly they must keep their powder dry. A list of all the things the United States has done is being pulled together, the President said, so the best presentation can be made of our position—which we must stick to. The President said he would welcome any new ideas on how to convince the world of our friendliness, and our desire to be decent and peaceful.

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

Copy to:

Mrs. Whitman (2)

Mr. Minnich

41. NSC Report¹

NSC 5807/1

Washington, April 2, 1958

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

REFERENCES

A. NSC Action No. 1814

B. NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1

C. NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842

D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee", dated January 22, 1958

E. NSC 5807

F. NSC Actions Nos. 1877 and 1878

¹ Source: "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter." Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.

G. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 24 and 26, 1958

H. NSC Action No. 1882

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, Judge Lawrence E. Walsh for the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, Capt. John H. Morse, Jr., USN, for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the 360th Council Meeting on March 27, 1958, noted and discussed the report on the subject (NSC 5807) prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee established for the purpose by NSC Action No. 1842-*e*, in the light of (1) the comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board on NSC 5807, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958, and (2) the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5807 (transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 26, 1958) and on the above-mentioned Planning Board comments and recommendations (as summarized orally at the meeting).

By NSC Action No. 1882-*b*, the Council agreed that certain measures should be undertaken to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1842-*d*. This action is enclosed herewith as NSC 5807/1.

The Council also (NSC Action No. 1882-*c* and -*d*):

c. Requested that the studies recommended by the NSC Planning Board and referred to in NSC Action No. 1882-*b*-(1)-(b), and a report by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator on the status of plans and actions to carry out the other measures described in NSC Action No. 1882-*b*, be submitted to the Council by July 1, 1958.

d. Deferred action on the measures recommended in paragraphs 1-*b* (except the limited program in NSC Action No. 1882-*b*-(2)), 2-*b*, 2-*c*, 5-*b*, and 6-*a* and -*b* of NSC 5807; pending consideration by the Council of the reports requested in *c* above.

The President, on April 2, 1958, approved NSC Action No. 1882, and paragraphs *b* and *c* thereof have been referred for appropriate implementation as follows:

b (except *b*-(1)-(b)) and *c* to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

b-(1)-(b)—the recommendation by the NSC Planning Board in paragraph 1, page 1, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958—to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

b-(1)-(b)—the recommendation by the NSC Planning Board in subparagraph 2-*a*, page 3, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958—to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

b-(1)-(b)—the recommendation by the NSC Planning Board in subparagraph 2-*b*, page 3, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum

of March 24, 1958—to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning

Enclosure

MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

1. By NSC Action No. 1882–*b*, the National Security Council agreed that the following measures should be undertaken to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1842–*d*:

a. A research and development program along the lines of the recommendations in paragraph 1–*a* of NSC 5807, which reads as follows:

“(1) Research and Development, including prototype construction (exploiting multiple-use principle to the maximum)

\$Millions

“(a) *Research*

\$6.5 (annual rate)

“Although sufficient knowledge of weapons’ effects and of shelter design now exists to permit proceeding with a complete and effective fallout shelter program if this were deemed desirable, expanded research is necessary to refine our knowledge, particularly of blast shelter, and develop more economical and efficient shelter models. In a program of this magnitude, well considered research should save many times its initial cost.

“The following program of research is already identified and can be undertaken as rapidly as funds are made available.

“(i) The field testing, with nuclear weapons, of shelters, other structures, and shelter equipment; provision for development and execution of radiological defense measures; exposure of animals to weapons’ effects; and the instrumentation necessary to evaluate results obtained.

-----\$2.0 Millions

“(ii) The design of various prototype shelters, the development of shelter programs, and development and laboratory testing of structures, facilities, equipment and materials not requiring nuclear field tests.

-----\$1.0 Million

“(iii) Studies dealing with psychological, emotional, educational and morale problems and determinations of tolerance limits under emergency conditions; medical, food, and water requirements in shelter habitation; and sanitary controls to permit tolerable occupation.

-----\$1.5 Millions

“(iv) Development of architectural designs and specifications for new types of multiple-use shelters which will be attractive as well as practical. The Committee believes that attention should be given to the use of grants to schools of architecture and engineering which would stimulate curriculum development, training of new students, and new concepts of shelter design.

-----\$2.0 Millions

“While the above program will be of highest importance in improving our capabilities to develop a comprehensive shelter system, there are serious unsolved problems relating to effects of nuclear attack on humans, including the immediate and long-range effects of radiation, and to the development of measures to provide protection against or mitigate those effects. The Committee feels that a special assessment is required to determine whether present research efforts in this field by the several agencies of Government are reasonably adequate or whether further coordination or acceleration is indicated. It is therefore recommended that a suitable group be designated to evaluate the present efforts and to report on their adequacy, including recommendations for improvement of the total national effort, if such is warranted.”

b. A research and development program along the lines of the recommendations by the NSC Planning Board, as follows:

(1) The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to recommend a qualified group to make a special assessment as to (a) the adequacy of present research efforts by the several agencies of Government on the design and testing of shelters and on the effects of nuclear attack on humans, including the immediate and long-range effects of radiation and measures to mitigate such effects; and (b) whether such research efforts should be better coordinated, integrated, or accelerated. (Paragraph 1, page 1, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958.)

(2) The Atomic Energy Commission, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, to

undertake through appropriate means a study appraising the upper limits of massive concentrated nuclear detonations and their by-products which could be tolerated by the peoples of the world and by the world itself. (Paragraph 2–a, page 3, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958.)

(3) The Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, to undertake a study appraising the problem of survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter after a massive nuclear exchange. (Paragraph 2–b, page 3, of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 24, 1958.)

c. A limited program of prototype construction of relatively small-capacity fallout shelters, differing in design and type (including multiple-use) and adapted to differing conditions such as climate; appropriate tests by actual occupancy for realistic periods of time to be conducted after completion (total cost not to exceed \$6 million).

d. A nation-wide survey along the lines recommended in subparagraph 2–a of NSC 5807, which reads as follows:

“2. Surveys and Pilot Studies

“a. Development of estimated availability of existing shelter on a sampling basis

“As a basis for national planning, definitive information is needed regarding the capability of existing structures to provide fallout shelter, particularly in large cities. The Committee recommends that a survey of existing structures be conducted on a sampling basis to yield such information. This would be handled through direct Federal contract, and would be completed in one year.

“-----\$2.0 Millions”

e. Initiation of a program of public education along the lines recommended in paragraph 3 of NSC 5807, as modified by FCDA in the light of NSC discussion and as outlined below (cost estimated at not over \$12.5 million for FY 1959; subsequent annual appropriations to be determined on the basis of experience):

Outline of Proposed Coverage of FCDA
Information and Education Program

(1) Objectives

(a) Public understanding of nuclear weapons effects, particularly radiation.

(b) Instruction on effective measures of protection.

(2) Low-Key Characteristics

The program would avoid harmful over-excitement of the people by careful treatment of the nature and imminence of the threat.

(a) Prudence, not alarm, is the keynote. All of our best efforts will be directed toward avoiding nuclear war; but prudence and a concern for the Country's future dictate the desirability of taking steps to improve chances of survival in order to rebuild and protect our national heritage if nuclear attack should occur. (We pay a lot of money for insurance of various sorts while doing our best to avoid the contingencies against which we are insuring ourselves.)

(b) The national fallout shelter policy is based *firmly* on the philosophy of the obligation of each property-owner to provide protection on his own premises. The Federal Government will provide information on how to do it, backed up by example of providing fallout protection in its new buildings in the future.

(3) Programs

(a) Support of adult education programs to increase understanding of (i) the effects of nuclear weapons, (ii) what can be and is being done to provide protection, and (iii) the place of individual preparedness in the total national security program.

(b) Combination of training films, instruction materials, magazine articles (popular, trade, etc.), newspaper features, TV programs, etc., aimed in appropriate combination at the following broad subjects:

- (i) Nuclear weapons effects on people, plants and animals.
- (ii) How to provide fallout protection.
- (iii) Family fallout protection (including simple "How-to-do-it, information).
- (iv) Improvised home and basement shelters.
- (v) Protection of food and water.
- (vi) What governments (Federal, State, local) are doing about fallout protection.
- (vii) Radiological decontamination.

(c) The use of national organizations to disseminate information.

f. The elements of a base for rapid acceleration along the lines recommended in paragraph 4 of NSC 5807, which reads as follows:

"4. Elements of a Base for Rapid Acceleration	<i>\$Millions</i> \$1.5 (annually)
---	---------------------------------------

"The measures proposed above are designed to promote shelter construction without extensive financial participation by the Federal Government. The Committee recognizes, however, the possibility that

these measures may be ineffective and that the Government might later wish to initiate a shelter program on an accelerated basis. Many of the other recommended measures will assist in preparing a base for rapid expansion, but in addition it is believed that specific attention should be given to the preparation of a “shelf” of plans and information which might save months of delay in an emergency.

“Specific items proposed are:

“(1) Identification of materials, equipment and manpower
-----\$1 Million (annually)

“(2) Preparation and maintenance of standby orders and organization

“-----\$0.5 Million (annually)”

g. The incorporation of fallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable size, designed after this date, along the lines recommended in paragraph 5-a of NSC 5807, which reads as follows (supplemental appropriations for such shelter in buildings for which funds have already been appropriated will not be sought):

“5. Incorporation of shelter in civilian Federal buildings

“The Committee agrees that Federal example is an indispensable element in any combination of measures designed to stimulate State, local government, and private spending for fallout shelters.

\$Millions

“a. New Construction \$6.5 (annually)

“Projections of new Federal construction activity (including the Post Office construction program, but excluding military construction) indicate a potential level of about 125,000 shelter spaces annually at an average cost of \$52 per shelter space. This assumes utilization of new buildings for community shelter where practicable, thereby setting an example to local Government and business, and avoiding charges of favored treatment for Federal employees.”

42. Draft Paper¹

Washington, April 7, 1958

Some Elements of a National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension, Distrust and Destructive Capability

1. Because of the incalculable destructiveness, general war affords a means of achieving only one important national objective; i.e., use as a last resort to prevent Soviet imposition of its will on the U.S. by force.

2. Only when convinced that a Soviet all-out attack is imminent will the U.S. consider launching a preventive war.

3. The purpose of maintaining a capability for massive nuclear retaliation is deterrence.

4. Because U.S. *strategic* nuclear capability is intended *almost entirely* for retaliation

5.

6. Strategic nuclear capability, *in contrast to tactical nuclear capability*,

7.

8. The U.S. must oppose limited aggression with whatever weapons are necessary and suitable, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Should the Soviet Union or our allies come to suspect that fear of general war would prevent us from effectively opposing limited aggression, such aggression would become inevitable and would not be resisted by our allies.

9. (I disagree with this thought.)

10. (I disagree here, as well, on the same grounds; i.e., that the Soviets are emboldened by weakness and deterred by strength, in my view.)

¹ Source: "Some Elements of a National Military Strategy in a Time of Maximum Tension, Distrust and Destructive Capability"; attached to print Document 19. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Nuclear Policy.

43. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 9, 1958

The President said he had an excellent talk with Secretary Gates and Admiral Burke at the White House last evening. They said the Marines are particularly emotional over the proposed reorganization.

As to themselves, they said that they completely accept the basic propositions of unified strategic planning and direction, and placing all activities under the control of the Secretary of Defense. They are rather afraid of what their staffs might do, however, since there is a great deal more emotionalism and apprehension at lower levels than they themselves feel.

Also, they said that they had prepared a plan a few months ago, which was very thoroughly worked out and coordinated within the Navy Department, and they don't see how they can change their position so quickly.

They added that they knew a lot of people were calling them recalcitrants. They do not feel that they are that at all, since they support the basic concept the President has put forward. They told the President they were worried about the situation they would face when they were called to testify. The President said it is simply a matter of not getting rattled. He felt that they can answer questions quite satisfactorily, given that they have the conviction favoring unified strategic planning and command direction which they had earlier indicated.

The President said that several times in the conversation they mentioned their "apprehensions" over what might be done under some future President or some future Secretary of Defense. The apprehensions do not apply in the present circumstances. The President said he talked these apprehensions out with them. The primary one represented concern over a single service of supply. The President told them he had never believed in it and does not now. There should, however, be the capability for single management of various "common use" items. The President thought they accepted this line of thinking very well. They also said they were afraid that the services might become "mere shells" with consequent loss of morale. The President said he stressed to them the tremendous responsibilities and tasks that would still remain, and felt that their minds were much put at ease by this explanation.

Again they came back to the need for the provision "separately administered." Here he made clear that he expects the Secretaries

¹ Source: Conversation among Eisenhower, Gates, and Burke on Defense reorganization. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

to administer their departments; the point is to remove the basis for the argument and resistance now encountered in attempts to eliminate duplication, etc.

They expressed full and wholehearted agreement with the proposals that are being made concerning research and development.

The President said they expressed most effusively their gratitude for inviting them in and talking the matter out with them, and said that he had removed a tremendous burden from their minds. The President commented that there was need for someone who has worked closely with them, such as General Persons if he were available, to stay in close contact with them, and work out additional points of concern that might arise.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

**44. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles)
to Secretary of State Dulles¹**

Washington, April 22, 1958

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56300/4-2258. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

45. Presentation to the NSC by Holaday¹

Washington, April 24, 1958

Mr. President:

At the 27th February meeting of the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense agreed to report to the Council his recommendations concerning the following three points given in the Report to the

¹ Source: Missile development and deployment. Top Secret; attached tables are Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee. These are:

- (1) Report on whether decisions should be made now:
 - (a) To produce additional first-generation ICBMs beyond the 130 currently programmed, to be operational prior to the end of FY 1963;
 - (b) To build additional launching sites required to make operational any additional first-generation ICBMs so produced; and
 - (c) To harden such additional launching sites.
- (2) Report on whether to order now production of more than 3 POLARIS submarine missile systems; and on possible further acceleration of production.
- (3) Report on whether to install interim defense against ballistic missiles attack at SAC bases, utilizing modified available anti-aircraft missiles.

The Secretary of Defense agreed at the 16 January meeting to report on whether to increase the number of operational IRBMs beyond the 8 squadrons (120 missiles) now approved.

In arriving at our decisions it appeared appropriate to consider these questions in the light of the over-all missile capabilities which the U.S. would have during this time period. Presented on this chart are the following missiles:

JUPITER
 THOR
 ATLAS
 TITAN
 POLARIS
 MACE
 REGULUS
 SNARK

The basic chart shows those programs specifically approved by the President in black. The programs recommended by the JCS as a part of JSOP 61 are shown in blue on the first overlay.

Although the three additional programs here indicated, the MACE, the REGULUS II and the SNARK are aerodynamic missiles somewhat more vulnerable to enemy defenses than are the ballistic missiles, we consider that these missiles will be effective weapons for some time to come. The capability which they represent must be considered as complimentary to the several ballistic missile programs.

On the basis of the information available, the Department of Defense does not at this time propose an increase in the ATLAS program over the 9 squadron approved program. While ATLAS bases are currently planned to be soft, latest studies indicate that the

effectiveness of these missiles can be improved by diversification of deployment. Plans call for 1 squadron at Camp Cooke, 2 squadrons at Warren AFB, Wyoming, 1 squadron at Offutt AFB, Nebraska and 1 squadron at Fairchild AFB near Spokane, Washington. Considerations are being given to a semi-hard, 20 1b. base deployment method for the 6, 7, 8 and 9 squadrons.

With respect to the TITAN program, the 1959 budget augmentation request includes 50 million additional dollars for this program. Total will now be \$454.5 million. This funding will permit the deployment of three TITAN squadrons on a hard base by CY 1961. The 4th squadron will be deployed in CY 1962, using later funding. These squadrons will be deployed outside of Denver, Colorado and will be serviced by the Martin plant located at Denver.

We are at the present time reviewing the TITAN program to determine whether it will be practicable to substitute a storable propellant combination instead of the current liquid oxygen-kerosene combination. There are several factors in favor of making such a substitution, including a significant reduction in logistics and reaction time. On the other hand, there are certain engineering problems which must be resolved before we can be assured that this simplified technique can be used. It is expected that these studies will be completed this summer. While we are not recommending an increase in the TITAN program over the approved level of 4 squadrons and 40 missiles, we believe that if the fuel work is successful we will need additional squadrons and would ask for an increase to a total of 8 squadrons as part of the 1960 budget.

With respect to the POLARIS program, the FY 1959 budget augmentation request included funds for two more POLARIS submarines and the necessary missiles. This will provide 5 submarines plus missiles as the approved program. It is not practicable to program, at this time, for additional submarines and missiles until the development program proceeds into the test phase and a better measure is established of system performance and the projected availability dates. The present Navy plan is to continue the production of POLARIS submarines at a rate of about 1 per quarter. If the program continues to show promise, it is likely that additional funds will be included in the 1960 budget request to finance 3 additional submarines.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the number of operational IRBMs be increased to a total of 16 squadrons (240 missiles) by FY 1963. On the basis of a review of the possible deployment locations suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comments on these locations by the State Department, and progress at the NATO

meeting, it appears that we can make reasonably firm plans for the following deployments:

United Kingdom	4 squadrons
France	3 squadrons
Italy	2 squadrons
Turkey	1 squadron
Alaska	1 squadron
Okinawa or Near East	1 squadron
Total	<u>12 squadrons</u>

Accordingly, at this time the Department of Defense recommends that the total number of squadrons for the first generation of IRBMs be held for planning purposes to 12 squadrons (180 missiles). On the basis of a review of the THOR and JUPITER programs and even though we have only had sporadic successes in both programs, we would not have any reason to believe that either program will result in a complete failure. Because of the inherent differences between the two missile systems, particularly the ground support equipment, we do not feel that it would be desirable to place both JUPITER and THOR in the same overseas deployment locations. Accordingly, we have allocated the first three squadrons of JUPITER to France and would propose that the fourth JUPITER squadron be dropped from the program. We would propose that the remaining requirement of five squadrons be met by the THOR to achieve the program objectives at the lowest cost. To meet the schedules for deployment shown on the chart and the needs of the space program, it will be necessary to increase the THOR production rate from 6 to 8 missiles per month. We also propose to arrange with the Army for a finite program for a total of 3 JUPITER squadrons. This is essentially a buy-out type program. We feel it is necessary to pursue this course of action so long as we do not have proven weapon systems, but are at the same time proceeding with the assumption that both programs will be successful.

The decision as to whether to install interim defense against ballistic missiles attack at SAC bases, utilizing modified, available anti-aircraft missiles, such as NIKE-HERCULES and TALOS has been given extensive study. It is estimated that a 25 unit land-based TALOS program, to be effective in a timely manner, would require immediate approval and obligation of nearly one billion dollars, mostly to be spent over a period of three years, with additional funds required to develop and incorporate the anti-ballistic missile capability. A lesser program, on the order of 12 land-based TALOS units, would require expenditure of approximately

600 million dollars over a period of three years. Although the implementation of this program could result in the earliest possible interim defense against ballistic missiles at a limited number of SAC bases, the expenditure of additional funds in these amounts does not appear to be justified. Since the NIKE-ZEUS system on the basis of available data will probably have a much greater capability, although it will be a year to 18 months later, the Department of Defense feels that the available effort should be devoted toward moving the NIKE-ZEUS system along at an optimum rate to achieve the earliest practicable capability with that system.

Accordingly, the Department of Defense proposes to accelerate the development of the NIKE-ZEUS system, placing particular emphasis on the electronic part of the development program.

Mr. Holaday here summarized.

In summary,

(1) We do not recommend an increase in the ICBM program above the approved 13 squadrons and 130 missiles at this time.

(2) If the development work on the TITAN missile continues successfully, we may recommend an increase of 4 additional squadrons of TITAN in submitting the 1960 budget, that will give a total of 17 squadrons and 170 missiles.

(3) Bases have been selected for the deployment of 5 squadrons of ATLAS missiles on soft bases. A study is being made on making semi-hard the remaining 4 squadrons. Selection of these bases has not been made to date; they will probably be selected to give diversification of deployment at or near present SAC bases.

(4) One hard base for the deployment of 4 TITAN squadrons has been selected near Denver, Colorado. Sufficient money is in the present budget to provide for the deployment of three squadrons. The 4th squadron will be financed in the 1960 budget request. If additional squadrons of TITAN missiles are provided, they will be deployed on hard bases.

(5) We do not recommend an increase in the POLARIS program above the 5 submarines and 80 missiles at this time. We may request additional money in the 1960 budget request to add 3 more submarines, giving a total of 8 submarines and 128 missiles.

(6) We recommend an increase in the IRBM program from 8 squadrons and 120 missiles to 12 squadrons and 180 missiles.

(7) We recommend an accelerated program using the NIKE-ZEUS system as a defense against ICBM missiles.

CALENDAR YEARS						
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
JUPITER						
Squadrons	1	3	4	4	4	4
Missiles	13	45	60	60	60	60
THOR						
Squadrons	1	3	4	4	4	4
Missiles	15	45	60	60	60	60
ATLAS						
Squadrons	1	1	4	9	9	9
Missiles		10	40	90	90	90
TITAN						
Squadrons				3	4	4
Missiles				30	40	40
POLARIS						
Subs			3	5	5	5
Missiles			64	80	80	80
MACE (MATADOR B)						
Groups						
Missiles						
REGULUS						
Subs/Cruisers						
Missiles						
SNARK						
Squadrons						
Missiles						

CALENDAR YEARS						
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
JUPITER						
Squadrons						
Missiles						
THOR						
Squadrons						
Missiles						

CALENDAR YEARS						
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
ATLAS						
Squadrons						
Missiles						
TITAN						
Squadrons						
Missiles						
POLARIS						
Subs						
Missiles						
MACE (MATADOR B)						
Groups		2	3	5		
Missiles		127	233	270		
REGULUS						
Subs/Cruisers	2/	3/	3/1	4/4		
Missiles	19	36	47	109		
SNARK						
Squadrons		1	2	2		
Missiles		15	30	30		
Blast [illegible in the original] : JCS Recommended Program						

CALENDAR YEARS						
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
JUPITER						
Squadrons		2	3	3	3	3
Missiles		30	45	45	45	45
THOR						
Squadrons		4	8	9	9	9
Missiles		60	120	135	135	135
ATLAS						
Squadrons						
Missiles						
TITAN						
Squadrons						

CALENDAR YEARS						
MISSILE	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Missiles						
POLARIS						
Subs						
Missiles						
MACE (MATADOR B)						
Groups						
Missiles						
REGULUS						
Subs/Cruisers						
Missiles						
SNARK						
Squadrons						
Missiles						

46. Memorandum From McNeil to McElroy¹

Washington, April 25, 1958

SUBJECT

Comments on NSC 5810, "Basic National Security Policy"

The paper as proposed for NSC consideration is definitely an improvement over NSC 5707/8 which it is designed to replace. I note that many of the suggestions we made last year in connection with the review of NSC 5707 have been incorporated in the present paper. In one most important respect, however, the paper is still seriously deficient; namely, US objectives towards the USSR itself.

The policy paper in this regard appears to suffer from what might be called a "containment psychology"—not in the old Kennan or geographical sense of the term, but rather in the sense of trying to contain Russian progress in science, technology, education, production, foreign

¹ Source: Comments on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.

trade, etc. Throughout the paper there are statements of policy which imply that we should try to isolate the Communists behind the Iron Curtain and minimize their contact with the rest of the world. Our major political and economic efforts, apparently, are to be devoted to maintaining the free world alliances and winning over the neutrals to our side, thereby helping to isolate the Communists.

In my judgment this policy is both negative and inadequate. Note paragraph 4 of the new paper which deals with the "basic problem". Listed in this paragraph are four courses of action which, if followed, are supposed to achieve our basic objective "to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions". I submit that even if we are successful in carrying out these four necessary courses of action, this, in itself, would not achieve our basic objective as stated in the paper. Even if we were to win over to our side all the neutral nations and succeeded in completely isolating the Communists behind the Iron Curtain, our national security would nevertheless continue to be endangered. The Communists already have very great resources and a rapidly advancing technology behind the Iron Curtain. There is no way in which we can alter this situation. It is the military power which these resources and technology generate that poses the basic threat to our national security. In fact, isolating the USSR from contact with the rest of the world might well increase our danger.

It seems to me that the only way in which we can hope to alleviate the basic threat to our national security is to effect a fundamental change in the character of the government of the USSR. No matter how remote this eventuality may seem to be, it must remain our *ultimate* objective.

But this is not enough. We must also know in which direction we wish to effect this change in the Russian government. To my mind the desired direction is unmistakable. It must be toward a government more responsive to the will of the people, and, eventually, a government squarely based on the will of the people. This is the most dependable and perhaps only real assurance for world peace in the future. Agreements with dictators, no matter how well meant they may be, are always subject to sudden renunciation. Furthermore, Khrushchev is here today but may be gone tomorrow. The United States could not with assurance embark on a major disarmament program so long as the government of the USSR is in the hands of a real dictatorship. It is much more difficult for democratically based governments to initiate sudden aggression, especially when it would expose their people to virtual annihilation. It should, therefore, be our objective not only (in the words of paragraph 4(d) of the paper) "to engage successfully in a world-wide peaceful contest with the USSR", but more importantly to influence and encourage the USSR directly

in every possible way to move, no matter how slowly, towards a more popularly based government—and to move, no matter how slowly, into becoming a respected member of the family of nations.

It will probably be argued by many people that this is a Utopian objective; that there is no hope of ever converting the Communists to a less aggressive, more peaceful and democratic way of life. This, to my way of thinking, denotes a negative and defeatist attitude. It denotes a crisis of confidence in our ability to surmount the obstacles confronting us. This psychology is dangerous to our leadership in the world—moreover, it is not justified.

The increasingly dangerous situation in which we now find ourselves is by no means one-sided. The increasing threat to our security arises from the explosive progress in science and technology which is producing weapons of ever increasing speed and destructive power. But the USSR is in the same boat. They have every reason to be just as fearful as we are—and more so. Ironically, of all the peoples in the world, they and we are the most in danger. In this we have a community of interest and for this reason the people of the USSR and the people of the United States have the greatest stake in the achievement of a solution to this terrible dilemma.

On the political-economic side of the problem we have every reason to be confident that ours is the “wave of the future”. Present trends in the USSR give strong encouragement to this belief. President Eisenhower, in his recent address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, noted this trend. He said:

“And slowly but significantly the Iron Curtain has started to lift. Behind it the personal security and intellectual freedom of the oppressed peoples gradually increase—another development not without promise.”

It is unfortunate that this same hopeful and positive note is not reflected in the proposed policy paper. In this connection, of all nations in the Communist bloc the USSR is, in certain respects, the best prospect for conversion to a way of life more similar to ours. The more advanced, educated and prosperous the people of the USSR become the greater will be their demand for a voice in their own destiny and the right of freedom of speech and movement and in the selection of jobs. It is not fortuitous that Khrushchev holds up the United States as a shining example of achievement towards which the Russian people should strive. He is constantly exhorting the Russian people to catch up with the United States in food, clothing, industrial production, etc. After forty years the leaders of the USSR are still striving to achieve the material success that we have achieved in this country. Our policy should be to encourage this competition; to take up this challenge and make it more difficult for the Russian

leadership to reverse this trend. The Russian people have everything to gain and we have nothing to lose in a race to see which system can do more for its people.

This point of view was most eloquently expressed by President Eisenhower in his Second Inaugural Address. He said at that time:

"We honor, no less in this divided world than in a less tormented time, the people of Russia. We do not dread, rather do we welcome, their progress in education and industry. We wish them success in their demands for more intellectual freedom, greater security before their own laws, fuller enjoyment of the rewards of their own toil. For as such things may come to pass, the more certain will be the coming of that day when our peoples may freely meet in friendship."

Again, it is unfortunate that nowhere in the policy paper do we find this positive objective with respect to our policy towards the USSR itself. Instead, we find in those paragraphs of the paper dealing with "Other Means of Influencing the Communist Bloc" (pp. 16, 17, 18) vague references to "alternatives. . .which would be acceptable to the United States"—"Measures which make more difficult the reversal of policies more acceptable to us"—"Sustaining current ferment in the thinking, and fostering evolutionary trends, within the Bloc"—"Accelerate evolutionary changes in Sino-Soviet policies"—etc. Nowhere in the paper is there any clear indication as to what alternatives", what "measures", what "evolutionary trends" and what "evolutionary changes" we would like to see take place behind the Iron Curtain. Certainly, in this most important of all policies, we should have positive, specific objectives.

The negative tone of the paper is clearly indicated in paragraph 33 *a* (5), "undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system and ideology". Why should not our policy be positive? Why should we not seek to hold up to them the advantages of our own system and way of life? Do we or don't we believe that our system is superior to the Communist system as a way of life? Undermining their faith in their own system would simply leave a vacuum. Would it not be wiser to offer something better to take its place? Certainly if we have faith and confidence in our own way of life we should not hesitate to urge it on other peoples for their own good and ours as well.

I am personally convinced that as time goes on our way of life with its many freedoms and respect for the rights of the individual will look better and better to the people of the USSR. Already the Russian leadership is under great pressure to meet the growing demands of the people for more and better consumer goods. Khrushchev's constant harping on such bourgeois frills as better food, more attractive clothing, is a far cry from the hard-bitten, austere communism of the Stalin regime. Already the communist economic system of the USSR

is beginning to show signs of its inability to cope effectively with the problems emerging as a result of Russia's present stage of economic development. Note the recent decentralization of industrial administration and the transfer of farm machinery to the collective farms. (For a further discussion of USSR economic problems see Harry Schwartz's article beginning on p. 145 of the April Conference Board Business Record.)

Regarding specific paragraphs of the paper, I would like to offer the following comments:

Paragraph 3 (d)—It seems to me that this overstates the problem. We have a tendency in government to blame the people for our own failures.

Paragraph 14—The words in brackets, "an appropriate conventional capability", do not appear to be necessary. It is getting increasingly difficult to define "conventional capability". For example, does it include non-nuclear armed missiles? small nuclear weapons?

Paragraph 27 c (5)—With respect to economic development aid, we should recognize that here is another competitor for the government dollar. If what is said in paragraph 43, "Sound U.S. Economy", is to be taken literally, care must be exercised not to go overboard on expanding economic development assistance to other countries, or seek to outbid the USSR in every instance.

Paragraph 28—This paragraph represents an improvement over existing policies but it does not go far enough. While we should do everything possible to prevent the Communist bloc from subverting or gaining political control of independent states through economic aid, we should not oppose Communist economic aid, per se, to these countries. The US must recognize that the productivity and technological capabilities of the USSR will continue to grow. These capabilities will be used for one purpose or another. It would seem that the use of Soviet resources in the form of economic aid to independent states offers less of a danger to the security of the US than the use of these same resources for weapons production or for advancing their military technology. Therefore, we should oppose Communist economic aid only when there is clear evidence that such aid is being directed towards subverting or winning political control of independent states.

Paragraph 35 a (1)—Here is another good example of the negative approach in this paper. The paragraph talks about giving the peoples of communist nations a clear conception of the true US and the free world purposes and offers as an example only what we are against—not what we are for. The quote from the President's Second Inaugural Address is highly pertinent in this connection.

Paragraph 35 b—Should be read in conjunction with the first sentence of Paragraph 39. In paragraph 35 *b* the point is made that we

should, among other things, take every opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet bloc. Paragraph 39 reads, "The United States should continue its readiness to negotiate with the USSR whenever it appears that U.S. interest will be served thereby." Paragraph 35 *b* says we should take the initiative—paragraph 39 is completely passive. This inconsistency probably arises from the fact that paragraph 35 *b* is new, whereas the first sentence of paragraph 39 has not been revised and except for the deletion of one word is the same as in the old paper.

Paragraph 36 b (2)—This is another example of the timid, uncertain approach toward the USSR. Why must we *discreetly* inform Free World nations that expansion of US-Soviet Bloc contacts does not signify US acceptance of Soviet Bloc attitudes? Why should our talking to the Communists raise any question about our accepting their attitudes? It seems to imply a lack of confidence in our own values. We should say openly and most emphatically to the whole world, and particularly to the USSR, that we are expanding contacts with them in the hope of making them better neighbors in this world that we both inhabit.

Paragraph 40—The last part of this paragraph is a considerable improvement over the old paper. But I believe it can be sharpened. Our overriding objective with respect to disarmament, arms reduction, etc., should be to make more difficult a surprise attack against the US. Any reduction in the possibility of surprise would be of the utmost value to the US—of much greater value, for example, than say a 25% reduction in the active duty strength of Communist forces or even a 25% reduction in the number of their active aircraft. It is reasonably certain that the USSR would never contemplate an all-out attack on the US unless it felt sure of virtually complete surprise. President Eisenhower recognized this point in his address to the NATO heads of government last December when he talked of "establishing a system which would exclude the risk of massive surprise attack".

Paragraph 42 c—This should be the job of many people in government, not just the USIA. We should have a positive program which would entail the deliberate preparation of official statements designed to get our views across to the world and particularly to the people of the USSR. We should carry the battle to the Communists by taking the initiative and every allegation made by the Communists should be promptly answered by an appropriate official of the US Government. We should exploit their vulnerabilities and expose their every weakness in an organized, planned national effort. For example, on the matter of housing the head of the Federal Housing Administration, should, in public statements, point out the glaring inadequacies of Russian housing as compared with the US; the Secretary of Agriculture should point to the great

advances in American agriculture as compared with the backwardness of Russian agriculture, etc.

Paragraph 43 a (1)—This sentence should be revised to read:

“Counter the current recession *in such a way as to* foster sustainable economic growth”, etc.

This is the essential point in the present policy as I understand it.

Paragraph 47—The last sentence of this paragraph should be revised to read:

“Implementation of these objectives should *give priority to those* measures which would contribute to immediate combat readiness,” etc.

This would be more in line with our intent.

W.J. McNeil

Assistant Secretary of Defense

47. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

Washington, April 25, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5810

1. With respect to the Service comments on the whole of the proposed Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5810, I do not agree with the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view, nor do I agree with the Air Force position.

2. The key to both positions is the wording of paragraph 14 in the draft statement of the Basic National Policy.

3. The wording supported in the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view was proposed by the Chairman of the Planning Board, General Cutler, contrary to the views of the majority of the Planning Board. In my judgment, this wording would water down our resolution to strike back against Russia in any aggression, and would indicate that we are willing to conduct limited wars without using the force required. This

¹Source: JCS views on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

intent would probably become known to the USSR and would be an invitation to start limited wars.

4. The Air Force position supports the wording in paragraph 14 as now written in the draft, which is a repeat from last year's edition of the statement of Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5707/8. However, it proposes delaying the settlement of this issue until the results of a study now being conducted jointly by State, Defense, and the JCS are available. This study was directed by NSC action No. 1844b and is an investigation of limited wars. In my judgment, there is no need to await the findings of this study in order to settle one of the most important controversies in military strategy of recent years. We have sufficient information at hand, now, for decision.

5. I recommend that your position before the National Security Council be to support the wording of paragraphs 13 and 14 as now written in the draft statement of the Basic National Security Policy — NSC 5810. I further recommend that you non-concur in the footnote which refers to paragraph 14 and which recommends deferral of decision.

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Memorandum From Twining to McElroy

Washington, April 25, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810) (C).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their divergent views regarding a draft statement of policy on the above subject, prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 1 May 1958.

2. The majority view submitted by the Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps is attached as Appendix "A". The minority view submitted by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, is attached as Appendix "B".

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

Washington, undated

*VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY: CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS: AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS*
on
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5810) (C)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5810) which was prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 1 May 1958.

2. From a military point of view, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps consider that certain changes are necessary in order to provide a Basic National Security Policy which is responsive to the present world situation. Over the past several years, a trend in world affairs has developed which has increased Sino-Soviet power and influence, both actually and relatively. The United States, as the leader of the Free World and the heart of its collective security system, has reached a point where we must take action to halt and reverse this trend or resign ourselves to its indefinite continuation.

3. Our national military strategy must not only be designed to cope with the condition of nuclear parity in an era of mutual deterrence to general war, but it must be a strategy which attracts rather than repels the rest of the Free World if we are to maintain an international environment in which the United States can sustain its fundamental values and institutions.

4. Basic National Security Policy must provide the guidance for strong Free World leadership. Four issues are fundamental:

a. Initiative and an Active Policy. The United States must act to seize the initiative, thus shifting the onus of counteraction to the Communist leaders. Initiative is required in all fields but particularly in the political and economic, where it must be supported by appropriate military measures. The adroit employment, particularly movement, of U.S. or allied forces as a cold war operation might spell the difference between success or failure of a bold political move. The United States must exert active pressures against the Sino-Soviet Bloc wherever and whenever possible in order to disrupt Communist designs for world domination. Pressures should specifically include efforts to splinter and reduce the existing Communist structure.

b. Mutual Deterrence. Relative nuclear parity has already made the policy of massive nuclear retaliation unacceptable as anything but a deterrent to total nuclear warfare. Both the United States and the USSR will be increasingly deterred from implementing such a policy except

in response to an attack on them of such proportions as to threaten their national survival, since its implementation could only result in mutual destruction.

c. Nuclear Weapons Policy. Because of mutual deterrence and the dangers of limited conflicts broadening into general war, the United States can no longer base its national policy on placing main reliance on atomic weapons for situations short of general war. In such situations the United States must maintain forces capable of reacting to aggression with *either* nuclear or non-nuclear means in the most effective manner to achieve U.S. national objectives while at the same time minimizing the risk of general war.

d. Limited War. It is important that our policy recognize that limited aggression is essentially any war in which neither the national survival of the United States nor that of the USSR is at stake, that it may include direct conflict between U.S. and Soviet forces, and that it may be intense and of significant duration. The objective may require a military victory, in the traditional sense, or some lesser solution which is to our net advantage. Since limited aggression is increasingly the more probable form of conflict which we must face, national policy should put increasing emphasis on suitable ready forces with a flexible combat capability and provided with transportation which insures their strategic mobility.

5. It is recommended that the four objectives outlined above, together with the implementing textual changes in NSC 5810 which are attached as the Annex hereto, form the basis of your position on Basic National Security Policy.

Annex to Appendix A

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

(Changes indicated in the usual manner)

1. Page 2, paragraph 5, second sentence—Change to read: “5 . . . (b) in a time of relative nuclear parity and increased Soviet political and economic aggressiveness, to place greater emphasis on ~~non-military~~ political and economic measures and on the military capability to support these measures and to deal with limited Communist aggression.”

REASON: Relative nuclear parity increases the likelihood of limited aggression and requires a military capability to deal with it and to support more active U.S. political and economic policies.

2. Page 3, paragraph 6—Insert as subparagraph 6b and reletter subsequent subparagraphs:

b. To apply pressures actively against the Sino-Soviet Bloc whenever and wherever possible in order to disrupt Communist designs for expansion and

aggression, to reduce Communist influence and control, and to further U.S. objectives.

REASON: U.S. policies should be designed to mount a psychological, economic, and political offensive against the Bloc as well as to shore up the defenses of the Free World against a comparable Bloc offensive.

3. *Page 4, paragraph 8, last sentence*—Change to read: “Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced *by obvious U.S. ability and willingness to meet a wide range of military contingencies with means appropriate to the objective at stake* that aggression will not serve their interest; that it will not pay.”

REASON: To meet the flexible Communist strategy, the U.S. deterrent must include both a nuclear retaliatory force to deter total war and flexible ready forces to deter or deal with limited aggression; and above all, must be made credible to Communist leaders and our Allies by an unmistakable U.S. willingness to employ military force of a quality and degree appropriate to the situation.

4. *Page 4, paragraph 9*—Change to read:

“9. The higher purpose of military strategy must be to affect the will of the enemy, not merely to destroy him. The U.S. recognizes the increasing probability of long term mutual deterrence with respect to general war and the reduced political usefulness of massive retaliation as a means of insuring the security of the Free World. In this era of mutual deterrence to general war, massive retaliation can only be used as a threat, and in the event of general war, in reprisal. To deter the Communists from the use of their military power, the If this purpose is to be achieved U.S. and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and effectively severely with Communist overt aggression in any possible its various form, including general war. and to prevail in general war should one develop. In addition the. This deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the U.S. and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force when necessary against such any aggression.”

REASON: As set forth in Section A of NSC 5810 the United States must recognize the existence of a mutual deterrence to general war and the reduced political usefulness of massive retaliation as the principal means of insuring the security of the Free World.

5. *Page 4, subparagraph 10a*—Change to read:

“10. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons. to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view, and to Nuclear

weapons will be used them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use *in either general or limited war* is as determined by the President."

REASON: It is essential that U.S. policy, in an era of relative nuclear parity, be extremely flexible and provide for adoption of whatever forces and weapons best serve U.S. interests.

6. Page 5, paragraph 13—Change to read:

"13. In carrying out our aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain *under its own control*, as part of its military forces, ~~sufficient its effective nuclear retaliatory power and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet Knockout blow, even by surprise~~ *capability to reduce the Soviet powercomplex to impotency. To the degree that it approaches invulnerability, this force can be made progressively smaller without any decrease in the certainty of its availability for effective application. Security of the deterrent force is a crucial factor in obviating the requirement for immediate or automatic political decision as to its use. Thus, it would minimize the risk of hasty or ill-considered decision in time of crisis.* The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. *Defensive elements must be premised on acceptance of the fact that general war would probably result in large scale damage to the United States. The national effort devoted to defense should provide for early warning, defense of retaliatory forces, and a level of defense in vital areas sufficient to require a significant enemy effort to overcome it, leaving no single threat totally unopposed.* So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the survival of the USSR."

REASON: To establish terms of reference for the deterrent force and defense requirements.

7. Page 5, paragraph 14—Delete and substitute the following:

"14. *a.* There is a steadily increasing probability that armed conflicts of the future will be limited wars. Limited war can be defined as an armed conflict in which U.S. national survival is not directly at stake. It would probably be characterized by mutually accepted limitations on objectives, locale, weapons and participants. While maintaining our nuclear capability to deter general war, and during a period of relative nuclear parity, it becomes increasingly important further to develop and maintain a capability to oppose limited military aggression wherever U.S. security interests are involved.

b. In each case of limited military aggression, the United States must determine whether: (1) vital U.S. interests require the defeat of such limited aggression by prompt and resolute application of whatever

degree of force is necessary, even at the risk that major Communist counteraction may spread the hostilities into general war, or whether (2) U.S. interests would be served by applying only that degree of force judged necessary to confine the hostilities to a limited area and to the objective of restoring the *status quo ante*, thereby seeking to minimize the risk that major Communist counteraction would spread the hostilities into general war.

c. Within the total U.S. military forces, therefore, there must be included ready forces which, with help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (1) to present a deterrent to limited military aggression, and (2) while minimizing the risk of general war, to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such limited aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be deemed necessary to suppress the limited aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of mal-deployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose limited military aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including an appropriate nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President."

REASON: This paragraph is a realistic and workable policy for the United States in an era when Soviet ability to deliver a massive nuclear attack on the United States will provide a strong deterrent to such an attack by the United States, except in retaliation. It properly emphasizes the increasing importance of further developing and maintaining the capability, including a nuclear capability, to oppose limited aggression, and recognizes that limited aggression may occur wherever our potential enemies see advantage in such action. Furthermore, it allows much needed political flexibility in that it does not require in advance that the United States, once committed to action in a limited war, must apply unlimited force to achieve military victory regardless of consequences, but leaves the United States free to fight for a limited objective if such is the best course under the conditions then existing.

8. Page 7, paragraph 19—add new last sentence to read:

"In addition to the foregoing, the United States should be prepared to provide limited military assistance to uncommitted nations as required to prevent such nations from seeking and obtaining military assistance from Communist sources and thus falling within the Communist sphere of influence."

REASON: To establish a policy intended to avoid repetition of difficulties in Egypt, Indonesia, etc.

9. Page 8, paragraph 20, third sentence—Change to read:

". . . At the same time it must be recognized that the attainment of relative nuclear parity by the USSR will probably result in Sino-Soviet Bloc

actions at a higher level of provocation than in the past which will confront us with increasingly difficult decisions. Therefore, the United States. . . ."

REASON: A logical consequence of nuclear parity is an increasingly provocative attitude on the part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Aggressive actions stemming therefrom will pose an ambiguous threat to national security. Nonetheless, they must be resolutely opposed at the moment of their initiation, if the Free World is to avoid a steady attrition of its position.

Appendix B

Washington, undated

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE on BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (C)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5810) which was prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 1 May 1958.

2. It is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, that the majority position on NSC 5810 is suitable as a basic statement of United States policy. In reaching this conclusion the following areas have been especially considered:

a. Over-all U.S. Strategy. The basic U.S. security objective should continue to be the maintenance of a position of military strength permitting aggressive political action to achieve, by peaceful means, U.S. national objectives. NSC 5810, as written, is a comprehensive and adequate development of this objective. It provides a comprehensive basis for the development and execution of those programs in the political, economic, military and other fields necessary to give meaning to the basic strategy. The supporting military forces and tasks, and their priorities, necessary to provide the position of strength to permit the exercise of U.S. initiative in world affairs, are correctly and adequately described. In this connection, in the annual report to the National Security Council on the Status of U.S. Military Programs as of 30 June 1957, the Department of Defense indicated, based on Joint Chiefs of Staff advice, that forces are in fact in existence to fulfill the military commitments and the basic objectives outlined in basic policy.²

b. Nuclear Parity. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force agrees that we may be approaching a position of relative nuclear parity between the

² NSC 5720, Part 1. [Footnote is in the original.]

United States and the USSR. As stated in national policy, the basic threat to U.S. security is the Communist Bloc determination and ability effectively to direct rapidly growing military and economic power toward the objective of world domination. The most dangerous military manifestation of this threat is the possibility of general war. The over-riding military requirement thus continues to be the development and maintenance of adequate and safe-guarded nuclear retaliatory power. As the USSR approaches relative nuclear parity with the United States it becomes even more essential to deter conflict. The United States must ensure that the Soviet leaders recognize as unacceptable the consequences of retaliation for actions which the United States considers threaten its security.

c. Nuclear Weapons Usage. Primary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and for selective use in actual conflict, is the keystone of U.S. policy and posture. This concept is the only course of action open to the United States compatible with the economic well-being of the United States and the free world, and hence with the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions.

d. Limited Aggression. With regard to the position taken by the majority of the Planning Board in connection with paragraph 14 of NSC 5810, it is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that review of this paragraph should be deferred pending the State-Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration of limited aggression now in progress. However, a valid statement of national policy in this regard is a continuing essential; therefore, current national guidance, as repeated in paragraph 14, NSC 5810, should remain in effect for the interim. In this connection the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force agrees that within the total United States military forces there must be a capability of deterring or, if necessary, defeating, local aggression with forces able also to contribute in general war. This requirement has existed and will continue to exist regardless of forecasts as to relative probabilities of local aggression requiring United States military intervention. With respect to existing U.S. limited aggression capabilities, as of 30 June 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Department of Defense advice to the National Security Council that "the United States has ready forces capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression in peripheral areas of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and to carry out initial general war tasks."³

3. It is recommended that the foregoing form the basis of the Department of Defense position on NSC 5810 at the National Security Council meeting on 1 May 1958.

³ NSC 5720, Part 1. [Footnote is in the original.]

48. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Anderson¹

Washington, April 30, 1958, 3:45 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY ANDERSON

The Sec returned the call and A said he was briefed for NSC tomorrow. It seems to him we are getting away from what he has thought of as military power being a means of enforcing the policies of the U.S. and being an implement by which we achieve our policy. A thinks we should develop more flexibility to give strength to State—apart from dropping the atomic bomb. The Sec said the trouble is people doubt we would do it and therefore we have nothing. The Sec went to the Pres and asked if he could not go to Defense and meet with the officials and JCS and discuss this problem and he agreed and the Sec went and they are making a review of the strategic concept, but the fact is our present policies are running into a dead end. They agreed we need more flexibility but also think we are getting more in the way of deterrent power than we need. A said if he says he thinks we should have more flexibility they say this is good—give us money for the nuclear defense and [illegible in the original] what we need for flexibility. We, said the Sec, have got to make some kind of an estimate and admit it cannot be 100%. Our deterrent capacity does not go down as the Soviet capacity goes up. The Sec said it goes down as they develop means of shooting down bombers so we can't get through. The Sec thinks we are embarked on a theory—not on a really thought-out thing. We are trying to get all we can as fast as we can and not accepting any limit other than the limit which seems to be imposed by physical limitations or lack of knowledge or budgetary controls. If we are given knowledge and no limitation from a budget point of view, there is no limit. A said it will never be settled by Defense or the JCS and the Sec agreed. A said para 14 is the focus of it and he was wondering tomorrow. . . . The Sec. said we should spend several sessions on it. A said to get the top fellows of the NSC spelling it out *clearly*, review it for the Pres and take it in as top-side policy for his consideration. The is the top problem ever since A hit Defense. A said it is worthy of such time and debate as it takes to get it resolved. The Sec did initiate this request to reexamine the strategic concept which involves pretty much what is in para 14. He might want to see it before we try to formulate this. A said that is perfectly all right. They agreed it is crazy to resolve the paper between

¹ Source: Basic national security policy. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

9 and 11. The Sec thinks at the proper time the three of them (probably McElroy too) should sit down and work out what they think is sound, show it to the Pres but it should come from the top down and not down up. A agreed and said we should not pass on this.

49. Draft Briefing Note for 364th NSC Meeting by Cutler¹

Washington, April 30, 1958

Introduction

1. The Planning Board has devoted much of the last two months to concentrated discussions of the world situation and in annual review of Basic National Security Policy (the current policy statement having been approved by the President last June).

2. Our review took into account major security policy decisions since last June; the Intelligence Community's February "Estimate of the World Situation"; the Council's discussion of that Estimate at its March 20 Meeting; and other factors. We were stimulated by informal discussions with General Gruenther, Arthur Burns, Jack McCloy, Karl Bendetson, and Robert Bowie.

3. The result of this reappraisal is the proposed revision before you, NSC 5810. The chief elements of this revised policy are stated in *Section A* on p. 2–3, (The Outline of U.S. National Strategy), and developed in detail in *Section B* (Military, Political and Economic Measures, and Domestic Strength and Other Measures). The chief elements are substantially the same as in existing policy, but there is different emphasis upon them.

4. As an orderly procedure, consideration today will be divided into three parts:

First: an introductory summary of the principal factors influencing our review of last year's statement, and of their reflection in the new statement before you.

Second: focussing attention on two significant paragraphs—one on limited military aggression; and the other on Red China-Formosa. Here will be taken up the oral views of Defense and of the Chiefs.

Third: five economic paragraphs which reflect splits of opinion in the Planning Board. Here will be taken up Mr. Randall's comments.

¹ Source: Basic national security policy, NSC 5810. Top Secret. 14 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

Part I

1. Very many factors influenced, and are reflected, in this revision. I have placed the major factors on a single white sheet, which is at your place.

(REVIEW FACTORS)

Major Factors Influencing Review of Basic Policy

First. The realization that both sides are capable of delivering massive nuclear devastation (regardless of which side strikes first) increasingly deters each side from initiating, or taking actions which directly risk, general nuclear war.

Second. During this time of nuclear parity and mutual deterrence: (a) there is growing doubt in the Free World whether the United States will use its massive nuclear capability, except in retaliation to direct attack on the United States or its forces, leading to a growth of neutralism and a weakening of Free World alliances; (b) the USSR will be more bold—especially toward less developed and uncommitted nations—in economic penetration, in political action, and perhaps in probing through means of limited military aggression.

Third. Weakness or instability in less developed or uncommitted nations, and their primary aim for “modernization”, renders them vulnerable to expanding Sino-Soviet political and economic penetration.

Fourth. Changes in top Kremlin personnel do not indicate a deterioration or disintegration in the Soviet regime’s policy or determination to achieve world domination for Communism.

Fifth. A U.S. massive nuclear retaliatory capability, invulnerable and sufficient to deter general nuclear war, and to prevail in such a war if it comes.

Sixth. A U.S. flexible and selective capability (including nuclear) to deter or suppress limited military aggression; realizing that the chances of keeping a conflict limited—whenever major areas or causes are involved—are at best not promising.

Seventh. Advances in Soviet military technology and scientific skill.

Eighth. The false images presented by Communism to the world of U.S. intentions and objectives, and of the USSR as the advocate of “peace and disarmament”.

Ninth. The adverse effect of the U.S. economic recession upon a healthy, expanding U. S. economy, which is essential to the security of the United States and the Free World.

Tenth. The ability of the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their economic strength in support of internal and external policies which seek world domination.

Eleventh. The American people lack appreciation of the extent of the crisis facing the United States.

2. I wish to draw attention to some of the new guidance and new emphasis in the revision before you, which reflects the impart of these factors. Please turn to Page 2, the “Outline of U.S. National Strategy,” where we restate the basic threat (Par. 3), the basic problem (Par. 4), and the nature of U.S. policies to meet them. (Pars. 5 and 6).

(READ)

3. Perhaps the *principal new emphasis* in this Planning Board revision may be characterized as follows:

a. The U.S. is facing an enduring crisis *greater* than heretofore recognized, which calls for mobilization of *more* human and material resources and for better appreciation by the American people of the extent of the crisis. (Pars. 3, 46).

b. If general nuclear war can be deterred, this crisis will involve a long, drawn-out contest for world leadership with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. (Par. 4).

c. During this time of relative nuclear parity, while the U.S. must securely maintain its deterrent power, military aggression will more likely be of a limited nature. Such limited conflicts should be dealt with in ways which will minimize their spreading into general nuclear war.

d. Concurrently, the U.S. must take a more positive initiative by increasing its efforts (1) in peaceful *political* and *economic* competition with the Sino-Soviet Bloc for the uncommitted and less-developed areas of the world (Par. 5, 6–*a*), and (2) in influencing acceptable changes in the Soviet Bloc through expanded exchanges and contacts, liberalized multilateral trade controls, etc. (Par. 35–37).

Part II

1. How I draw attention to two significant paragraphs in the new statement, which repeat and continue in effect the texts of last year’s statement: *Par. 14* dealing with limited military aggression, and *Par. 41*, dealing with Communist China.

2. There was some sentiment in the Planning Board that *both* paragraphs required amendment. However, the Planning Board did *not* formally recommend their revision;—in part because there is in existence high-level consideration of limited war strategy and in part because both paragraphs affect most sensitive relations with our allies. Instead, it was left that I, as Chairman, would report *orally* upon the views shared by some of us on the Planning Board.

3. *a.* First, as to *Par. 14, p. 5*, dealing with limited war. For discussion purposes, I have drafted an alternative *Par. 14* on the single blue sheet before you. This alternative is based upon the estimate that, in a period of relative nuclear parity and growing unwillingness on the part of both sides to start general war, the USSR may be more bold—not only in political and economic fields—but also in probing (perhaps by proxy) through means of limited military aggression. (NIE *Par. 18, p. 4*).

b. This alternative would make two major changes in existing policy guidance:

first—that, in this period of relative nuclear parity, limited aggression may *not* always be confined to less-developed areas;

second—that, this period of relative nuclear parity, it may *not* be in the U.S. interest to deal with *every* limited aggression by applying whatever degree of military force necessary to suppress it.

The purpose of the proposed changes is to ensure that the U.S. will have a flexible capability so that it can determine the application of force best serving U.S. interests under the circumstances existing in each case of limited military aggression.

c. I will read the alternative on the blue sheet:

(READ ALTERNATIVE)

May 1/58—R.C.

ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 14

14. *a.* During a period of relative nuclear parity, it becomes increasingly important—while maintaining our nuclear capability to deter general war—to develop further and to maintain a capability to oppose limited military aggression wherever U.S. security interests are involved.

b. In the case of any such limited military aggression, the United States should decide whether: (1) vital U.S. interests require the defeat of such limited aggression by prompt and resolute application of whatever degree of force is necessary, even at the risk that major Communist counter-action may spread the hostilities into general war, or whether (2) U.S. interests would be served by the application of only the degree of force necessary to achieve objectives of limiting the area and scope of the hostilities and restoring the *status quo ante*, thereby seeking to minimize the risk that major Communist counter-action would spread the hostilities into general war.

c. Within the total U.S. military forces, therefore, there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (1) to present a deterrent to limited military aggression, and (2) in accordance with *b* above, to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such limited aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be deemed necessary. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of mal-deployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose limited military aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including an appropriate nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President.

d. The reasoning behind this suggested alternative is:

(1) The *present* guidance (Par. 14 in the revision before you) does *not* envisage the possibility of limited aggression in “developed areas” (including the NATO area). For two reasons this guidance seems “unrealistic”, in a period when both sides are coming to realize that general war is so horrible that it must be avoided.

First, in such a period, limited aggression may occur, and have to be dealt with, in *any* area. For example, the Soviet Union might take steps which seemed to risk general war—even in a place like Berlin—in the belief that the U.S. or its allies would not allow the confrontation, or the military conflict which might ensue, to get out of hand.

Second, while it is obvious that the capability for massive nuclear retaliation remains the deterrent to general war, is that capability *sure* deterrent to limited military aggression? Both the Free World and the Soviet Union are beginning to doubt whether massive retaliation to punish limited acts of aggression will actually be invoked, because of the devastation which would inevitably result to all concerned.

(2) The *present* guidance states that the best way to prevent limited military aggression from spreading is the prompt and resolute application of the degree of military force necessary to defeat it. But, in a time of nuclear parity, is this course in *every* case the *best* way? Because of the unacceptability of a general nuclear conflict, which might result from application of such a degree of military force, should a different principle be invoked? Whether in limited aggression to crush the enemy, or to seek only to restore stability to the situation, may depend on the circumstances of each case.

Expending the degree of force necessary promptly to defeat limited military aggression may, through resulting action and counteraction, bring on general nuclear war. Despite this risk, *some* cases may be so vital to U.S. interests that prompt and massive action to defeat limited aggression may *have* to be taken. But may there not be other cases where U.S. interests would be better served if we did not try to win *too much*, and thereby provoke hostile counter action and perhaps resultant general war,—if we satisfied ourselves with trying to restore the *status quo ante*:

- (1) MR. McELROY—MR. QUARLES
- (2) GENERAL TWINING
- (3) General TAYLOR (BURKE & PATE)
- (4) GENERAL WHITE
- (5) GENERAL TWINING
- (6) SECRETARY OF STATE
- (7) OTHERS

My suggestion is that the Council might recommend approval of the revised policy statement before you (NSC 5810), including as Par. 14 the existing basic policy regarding limited aggression, without change; pending submission of recommendations by the Department of Defense as to any revision of the military strategy paragraphs of this

new basic policy in the light of Council discussion at this meeting and of the joint study on capabilities for limited warfare called for by NSC Action 1881 (due June 1, 1958).

4. *a.* Now, as to Par. 41 (p. 20), which repeats last year's guidance dealing with Communist China. This paragraph contains no guidance as to a future attempt by other nations to seat Red China, rather than the Chinese Nationalist Government, in the United Nations.

b. In this connection, the Planning Board considered:

(1) that the General Assembly in 1957 adopted the "moratorium resolution" by a vote of 48 to 27, with 6 abstentions and 1 absent;

(2) the current withdrawing of Chinese Communist troops from Korea;

(3) the indication by Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand that at some time he might have to honor Labor's pledge to recognize Red China;

(4) the possibility that in 1960 (or perhaps earlier), in U.K. general elections, the victory may go to the Labor Party, which has repeatedly called for the admission of Red China to the UN; and

(5) informal estimates that the U.S. might not be able to hold enough votes to defeat some resulting move in the UN to seat Red China and to turn out the Chinese Nationalist Government as representative of China.

c. Some Planning Board members thought the U.S. should be considering *how*, while it still enjoys its strong position in the UN, alternative ways of dealing with such a contingency, and of finding a way—so vital to U.S. interests—to preserve the independence of Taiwan despite the loss of her status as representative in the UN of all-China.

d. Whether stated in the policy paper or not, should we now be thinking about how to preserve an independent Taiwan in a future contingency that the U.S. might not be able to rally enough UN votes to prevent the seating of Red China in the UN?

SECRETARY OF STATE

Part III

1. There remain five split views to be resolved, all dealing with foreign economic matters.

2. Mr. Randall (who cannot be here today) has advised that the draft statement is generally satisfactory and consistent with U.S. foreign economic policy, with three exceptions relating to the three following splits:

(1) *Page 12, par. 27-d*

This paragraph, part of our economic policy towards less-developed nations (especial "one-crop" nations) provides that the U.S., for political reasons, may on "occasion join in multilateral examination of price, production, and demand trends which might help to promote

readjustments between supply and demand and reduce price fluctuations. *Treasury* and *Commerce* wished to add that the U.S. should not discuss the making of, or participate in, any international commodity agreement. The Planning Board did not agree with this addition.

Mr. Randall has called my attention to the fact that the CFEP on October 11/55 generally disapproved international commodity agreements, and that CFEP policy requires interagency policy level approval before such an agreement may be discussed with a foreign nation. Neither of these points is reflected in par. 27–d. Mr. Randall believes that the whole paragraph should be deleted until present policy in this regard is modified by the CFEP, on motion of a CFEP member.

May I suggest, accordingly, because I agree, that this paragraph should be stricken and its substance referred to the CFEP for action as a matter within its jurisdiction.

(COMMENT:)

(2) *Page 13, par. 29–a.*

This paragraph deals with the total level U.S. economic assistance world-wide. *Treasury* and *Budget* wished to continue the qualifying provision, which appeared in the 1957 policy statement: "Increases in economic development assistance should, to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs." The Planning Board did not agree with this addition.

Mr. Randall thinks the addition of this provision undesirable, because there may be circumstances where such an offsetting would not be wise. He thinks each problem should be determined individually in the light of all the pertinent considerations.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
DIRECTOR, BUDGET
SECRETARY OF STATE

(3) *Page 18, par. 37–c.*

This paragraph states the existing U.S. policy for a unilateral embargo on U.S. trade with the Chinese Communist Bloc. The ODM member suggested a liberalization of our embargo policy to conform with multilateral liberalization. The Planning Board did not agree with this suggestion at this time.

Mr. Randall commented that proposals for changes in our economic defense policy should be made first in CFEP. I agree with his position.

MR. GRAY

(4) *Page 12, par. 27–e (6).*

This paragraph, part of our economic policy towards less-developed nations, provides: "Be prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, participation with other Free World nations in multilateral development projects or funds." *Treasury* and *Commerce* would delete. The Planning Board did not agree with the deletion.

Since the circulation of the policy statement before you, State, Treasury, and Commerce have agreed to a rewording of this paragraph as

follows: "Be prepared to study the acceptability of proposals for the establishment of international institutions for development financing." The agreement on this language stems from a current study by the National Advisory Council on proposals for an affiliate of the IBRD which would help in financing less-developed countries.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
SECRETARY OF STATE

(5) *Page 5, par 14.*

This is a modification which the ODM member wished to make in the old text of the guidance on limited military aggression: to specify that the "flexible and selective capability" should include "an appropriate conventional capability" as well as a nuclear capability. The Planning Board did not agree with this amendment.

MR. GRAY

3. On *Page 3, par. 6-e*, I would like to suggest a correction which has recently come up. The present provision is that our policies should be designed—"e. To deter *Communist* limited military aggression" etc.

I suggest that it is not only *Communist* limited military aggression that should be deterred and defeated. The Communists may well seek to act by stirring up a neutral or uncommitted nation to aggress. Furthermore, *any* limited military aggression is dangerous. Therefore, I suggest that this provision should read:

"To deter limited military aggression wherever U.S. security interests are involved,"

Such a revision would conform to the general language on limited military aggression in existing policy.

SECRETARY McELROY
GENERAL TWINING

Attachment

Summary Paper

Washington, April 30, 1958

SUMMARY OF TEXTUAL CHANGES IN DRAFT BASIC POLICY
*PROPOSED BY CHIEFS OF STAFF OF ARMY,
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS*

Para. 5, second sentence (page 2)

Greater emphasis on those military forces needed to support a U.S. political and economic offensive and to deal with limited Communist aggression.

Para. 6 (page 3)

New subparagraph (6–b) basically alters present strategy by calling for active, intensified pressures on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, including deployment of U.S. forces to back up bold political moves. Purpose of new offensive is to splinter and reduce existing Communist structure.

Para. 8, last sentence (page 4)

Military posture to meet all contingencies is required in order to convince Communist leaders that the U.S. is willing *and* able to make any aggression unprofitable for them.

Para. 9 (page 4)

Two major changes in military thinking:

1. Use of force is to affect will of enemy, not merely to destroy him.
2. Massive retaliation can no longer insure the security of the Free World. It can only be used as a threat, and in the event of general war, as reprisal.

Para. 10–a (page 4)

Two major changes in the use of nuclear weapons:

1. Main, but not sole reliance on such weapons in *general* war.
2. Limited war to be fought with or *without* nuclear weapons.

Para. 13 (page 5)

Major changes are:

1. Sufficient nuclear retaliatory power to reduce Soviet power complex to impotence must be *under U.S. control*.
2. As nuclear retaliatory power approaches invulnerability, (a) it can be reduced in size, and (b) launched only after due consideration rather than, as now, automatically or hastily to prevent its destruction in the event of surprise attack.
3. No continental defense can prevent large-scale damage to the U.S. in event of general war. Vital areas in U.S. should be defended to the extent that a significant enemy effort is required to destroy them.

Para. 14 (page 5)

Two now introductory sentences to alternate para. 14:

1. Defines limited war as *an armed conflict in which U.S. national survival is not at stake*. (Explanation of this definition in Appendix A, para. 4–d, states that direct conflict between the U.S. and Soviet forces may be included within the new definition.)

2. Estimates that future armed conflicts will probably be characterized by mutually accepted limitations on objectives, locale, weapons and participants.

Para. 19 (page 7)

New last sentence authorizes limited military assistance to uncommitted nations in sufficient quantities and on terms adequate to prevent such nations from accepting Communist military assistance.

Para. 20, third sentence (page 8)

Estimates that achievement by USSR of relative nuclear parity will result in increasingly provocative actions by the Sino-Soviet Bloc with the corresponding increase in number of difficult decisions to be made by U.S.

50. Letter From Cutler to McElroy¹

Washington, May 5, 1958

Dear Neil:

The President has just approved the Record of Action of the Meeting of the National Security Council for May 1, relative to NSC 5810—the revision of Basic National Security Policy—and it is being transmitted to you formally. In addition, I thought it might be useful for me informally to summarize the points made by the President at the NSC Meeting which affect the Department of Defense (the following statement of which he has checked):

(1) He doubted the validity of the concept that “mutual deterrence” provides an umbrella under which “small wars” could be waged in areas such as NATO without expanding into general nuclear war. Accordingly, he thought this concept required further study.

(2) He asked for further study and debate on the view that it would be possible to withhold involving our massive nuclear retaliatory capability in the event that the Soviet Union attacked in the NATO area.

(3) He thought there were various alternative courses of action, if we were to strengthen our forces and our capabilities for limited war. One alternative might be at the expense of our nuclear deterrent capability. If such an alternative were adopted, we would need a detailed accounting by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to precisely what would constitute a satisfactory deterrent. Another alternative could involve a massive increase in resources allocated to defense. If such a course were adopted, it would be necessary to study what methods might be found

¹ President's comments on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

to maintain much greater forces, without resorting to a controlled society or becoming a garrison state.

(4) He thought there should be provided to the National Security Council more definitive information as to the exact size of the deterrent forces which the U.S. requires in this calendar year and will require over the next two or three calendar years.

As you will see from the Record of Action, we have included in NSC 5810/1 the exact language for pars. 13 and 14 of the existing basic policy (NSC 5707/8) without change.

You will note in the approved Record of Action that the President revised the June 2 date for receiving from the Department of Defense (perhaps in the form of a limited-distribution-supplement) recommendations for any revision of the military strategy outlined in NSC 5810/1, after Defense shall have given further consideration in the light of the Council discussion at the May 1 Meeting. The President has authorized an extension of this date to June 16, because he wants these important matters brought up for further discussion and final approval, while the significant issues raised are still fresh in our minds, without there being requested any further postponement.

Accordingly, he has approved a Council Meeting on June 26 to hear the Defense recommendation. This schedule will permit advance circulation of the Defense recommendation due June 16 (on such limited basis as may be deemed necessary) to Council Members, in plenty of time to be fully prepared for the Council Meeting on June 26.

It would obviously be very desirable to receive the joint study on limited war capabilities pursuant to NSC Action No. 1881 on or before June 16, so that its consideration could be coordinated with the above Defense recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Cutler

Special Assistant to the President

cc: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Special Assistant to JCS for National Security Council Affairs
Lay
Asst. Sec. of Def (Sprague)

51. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, May 7, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding herewith the first quarterly report of progress in the Military Reconnaissance Satellite Program undertaken by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense.

The Military Reconnaissance Satellite Program is the initial satellite program (other than VANGUARD and JUPITER C) which I have this far determined, in accordance with National Security Council Action No. 1846, "to have objectives having key political, scientific, psychological or military import."

This initial report covers historical background and program plans for the development of Weapons System 117L which consists of the satellite vehicle, its information sensing, storage and transmission devices, and the ground receiving equipment and facilities. A financial plan for this project through Fiscal Year 1959 is also included.

Weapons System 117L is the culmination of extensive research and investigation since 1946 to determine the feasibility and operational capability of a satellite as a military reconnaissance vehicle. These studies have concluded that a Satellite Intelligence System is feasible and has potential operational capability of providing current and reliable intelligence information. Need for this information will continue to become more critical as technological advances enable a potential enemy to bring into being offensive weapons with constantly increasing range and greater destructive power.

Contracts for development and test of Weapons System 117L were let in October and November 1956. The first test flight of the Weapons System 117L satellite vehicle is planned to be conducted in late 1958. Successive tests of orbital capability of the vehicle and performance of the reconnaissance equipment are planned to continue through 1960.

Expected useful life for pioneer versions of the Military Satellite Vehicle equipment is 10 to 30 days and for later versions one year. The satellite vehicles are planned to be equipped with sensing devices which will relay reconnaissance information to the earth at a rate which would permit coverage of the entire Soviet Bloc by a single vehicle as frequently as once every eight days.

Successive progress reports will be provided to you each quarter showing highlights and significant accomplishments in the execution

¹ Source: Transmits report on military reconnaissance satellite program. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

of the Military Reconnaissance Satellite Program. Additional interim reports will be submitted in event of breakthrough or other occurrence which would rapidly modify the schedules or objectives of the program.

In accordance with National Security Council Action No. 1846, the “scope of operational capability” of Weapons System 117L will be promptly raised for your approval when such approval becomes necessary in carrying forward the program.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

Neil H. McElroy

1 Incl

Report, subject
as above

**52. Memorandum of Discussion at the 365th NSC Meeting
of the NSC¹**

Washington, May 8, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 8, 1958

Present at the 365th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Others present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (for Item 1); the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (participating in Item 6); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, President’s Science Advisory Committee; Colonel John White, Central Intelligence Agency; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Abbott Washburn for the Director, U.S. Information

¹Source: Agenda item 6: US–USSR Ballistic Missile Developments. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects (Item 1), for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the Naval Aide to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion of the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1–5.]

6. *US-USSR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS*

(NSC Action No. 1833)

In introducing the subject, Dr. Killian indicated that it was essentially a comparison of developments in the Soviet ballistic missiles program with our own U.S. ballistic missiles program. This was primarily a technical study, but the conclusions that he was about to produce were based upon sound technical judgments. The study was essentially an analysis of Soviet tests since 1954 of ballistic missiles in the various ranges, in comparison with U.S. experience in developing and testing similar missiles. Among the conclusions thereupon presented by Dr. Killian, there was one to the effect that in the field of the shorter-range ballistic missiles the Soviets had a larger variety of types and ranges than did the United States. With respect to both the intermediate range ballistic missiles and the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union was approximately a year ahead of the United States. There was also a suggestion of greater mobility for the longer-range Soviet ballistic missiles. ICBMs may be transportable by railroad. If so, this would indicate that the Soviets had developed a storable liquid fuel for their ballistic missiles.

Dr. Killian added that this general situation stemmed from the fact that the Soviets had inaugurated their ballistic missiles programs so much sooner than had the United States, rather than from the fact that the U.S. program was itself behind schedule. Dr. Killian then asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to provide the technical back-up and details behind these conclusions.

In his report, Dr. Kistiakowsky used two charts. The first was entitled "Guided Missiles Test Ranges"; the second, "Soviet Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Firings Since 1954".

Following Dr. Kistiakowsky's report, Dr. Killian added two conclusions.

The President commented that he had just read in the papers that a high official of the Defense Department had spoken in opposition to the creation of a civilian space agency. The President inquired whether this could be true. General Cutler identified the Defense Department official as Mr. Roy W. Johnson (Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Pentagon).

Secretary Quarles rose to defend Mr. Johnson. He first described his own difficulties during his testimony before the Lyndon Johnson committee, and explained that Mr. Roy Johnson had been led into a trap of words. He was quite sure that Mr. Johnson did not disagree with the fundamental proposition of civilian control of the space program.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the report of Dr. Killian and Dr. Kistiakowsky again brought up the matter which he had earlier proposed to the President and the Council, of the desirability of relative net estimates respecting U.S. and Soviet programs. Since that time, some weeks ago, he, General Twining, Dr. Killian, and General Cutler had had some conversations on this subject and were still working on a possible procedure to provide such comparative estimates. In a certain sense, the report today constituted the first trial of such a relative estimate. The President expressed his very strong approval of this kind of comparative estimate.

General Twining inquired of Dr. Killian whether he thought that there were any measures by which we could speed up the procedure for testing U.S. ballistic missiles. Dr. Killian replied that we were building a new test area on the West Coast to supplement the test facilities at Cape Canaveral. On the other hand, our immediate problem was not to provide more room for ballistic missiles tests, but to solve the propulsion problem in our ballistic missiles.

The President observed that Dr. Kistiakowsky's report clearly showed that the Soviets were ahead of us in developing propulsion systems for their missiles. They may not, however, have been so successful in other aspects of their missiles program. Secretary McElroy wondered whether this report did not tend to over-emphasize Soviet capabilities for the reason mentioned by the President. It might be well if we did so over-estimate their capabilities, but we should bear the matter in mind. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that every effort had been made to avoid over-emphasis.

At the conclusion of the presentation on this subject in the Cabinet Room, the President and certain members of the Council adjourned to the President's office, where Dr. Killian and Dr. Kistiakowsky discussed for a quarter of an hour the intelligence material on which their report on Soviet ballistic missile developments had been based. A list of the persons attending this meeting is filed in the minutes of the NSC meeting; another is attached to this memorandum.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, assisted by Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky.

b. Noted the comment by the Director of Central Intelligence that this report was an example of the comparative estimates of U.S. and

Soviet capabilities which he had recommended in NSC Action No. 1833; and that he was continuing to consult with Dr. Killian, General Twining and General Cutler to develop the best procedure for making such estimates.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for National Security Affairs.

S. Everett Gleason

53. Memorandum From Stroh to Robertson¹

Washington, May 8, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

Encl: (1) CNO's Views on Basic National Policy—NSC 5810

1. Attached hereto (encl (1)) is a copy of the paper which I understand Admiral Burke spoke to you about last evening (7 May).

2. Admiral Burke would very much appreciate it if you could glance over it and give him the benefit of your reaction as to the language, grammar, or any other field, but more particularly the appropriateness and verity of the thoughts expressed.

3. As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to confer with the Secretary of Defense next Tuesday (13 May) on this matter, at which time each of the Chiefs and the Chairman will express their views and state why they feel NSC 5810 should be altered or left alone as the case may be.

4. Admiral Burke would also very much appreciate it if you could find the opportunity to ask for Mr. Murphy's opinion in this matter even if he can spare the time only for a cursory glance.

Very respectfully,

Robert J. Stroh

¹ Source: Transmits views of Chief of Naval Operations on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5/5-858.

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations

Washington, undated

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS' VISION ON THE BASIC NATIONAL POLICY—NSC 5810

Basic National Security Policies—as other statements of policies and objectives—are frequently defined in such broad and ambiguous terms that, although everybody can agree to the wording, the language cannot serve as a guide in any specific case.

Our major difficulty in writing a National Security Policy is to obtain specific language which will convey the same general thoughts to those who must plan for, and execute the policy.

There are several different ways of losing Europe, the Middle East, Asia and other areas; one of them being destruction of the United States, another being by permitting any one of our allies to be attacked by any communist country without immediately coming to our allies' aid; and another by permitting our allies to lose confidence in our intentions, or our strength, or our willingness to help, or our judgment; and as a result, accommodate themselves to communism.

The main military elements of national strategy—*now*—are:

To reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war, while at the same time making it clear that we are determined to oppose aggression despite risk of general war.

To deter the Soviets from starting general nuclear war by convincing them the United States has the nuclear power to destroy Russia, and will do so if they initiate general war.

To maintain the various United States nuclear retaliatory forces in such deployment and posture that regardless of what Russia does, even with a surprise attack, Russia will be utterly destroyed by the retaliatory attacks.

To build and maintain a defensive system for the continental U.S. of sufficient size and effectiveness that our military striking forces in the U.S. cannot be dealt a knock-out blow by a Russian surprise attack and be sure that the Russians are convinced that this is true.

To convince our allies that an overt military attack by Russia on any one of our allies will automatically cause the U.S. to unleash a nuclear retaliatory attack on Russia.

To maintain United States military forces of appropriate types, adequate and ready to defeat or hold, with the help of indigenous forces, local communist aggression in undeveloped areas of the world.

To render direct economic and military assistance to allies in order to build up recipient nation's ability to participate in its own defense.

The Situation Now

The United States has had, for quite a few years, the assured nuclear retaliatory capability to destroy Russia.

Russia probably *is* convinced she will be destroyed if she attacks the United States in general war.

Russia on the other hand probably also is convinced she cannot destroy U.S. retaliatory power, in a surprise attack, or by any other means.

The United States does not find itself in a wholly satisfactory international position at the present time. American prestige is not as great as it has been in the past, our influence throughout the world is lessening somewhat, our military and economic power does not command the respect and admiration it once did.

The Soviets and the other Communist States have lived under the shadow of powerful United States nuclear retaliatory forces for a decade—and have become accustomed to their existence, and yet—the Communists have taken actions to expand their control over more territory and more people of the world without let up.

Egypt and Syria are coming more and more under communist domination. Nasser is in Russia being advised that the sure way of filling his empty coffers is to seize all Middle East oil properties, a view he may find attractive if he can figure how to do it—and the Soviets will assist in the machinations to accomplish this end.

Indonesia is in a turmoil and the probability of this rich undeveloped country coming under communist control is greater than it was a year ago.

Should Indonesia go communist, Thailand, Laos and other Asian countries may follow suit to accommodate themselves to what they may consider the winning side.

Russia has made technical advances as well. The USSR has developed the capability to wreak severe damage on the United States with nuclear weapons. She has a large number of submarines. She has developed some ICBM capability. She was the first to put a satellite in orbit.

The world was surprised at the technological advances made by Russia, and probably credits the USSR with capabilities greater than actually exist.

It is just recently that the world has come to place significance on the USSR ability to severely damage the United States with several weapons systems regardless of the efforts we may make on our continental defense.

People are now commencing to question our policies, or perhaps only our relative superiority to the USSR, probably due to many factors, but certainly including the continuing expansion of communism,

the increasing technical competence of the USSR, and the means Russia now has to damage the United States.

The fact that, despite our great defensive efforts, the USSR can now inflict severe damage on continental United States, apparently has shaken the confidence of some of our allies that the United States will in fact make a nuclear retaliatory attack on the USSR unless the immediate security of the United States is jeopardized. They may believe that the fear in the United States of the threat that we have not yet learned to live with stoically will immobilize our will—and our power—at the crucial showdown. They really question our national will to act as we say we intend to.

Others among our allies question our judgment on placing sole reliance on massive nuclear retaliation to defeat aggression, of launching headlong into a general nuclear war in retaliation of what they may consider a “small aggression.” Especially is this questioned when they visualize that the nation aggressed against is not a near neighbor, nor is its opinion necessarily asked before action is taken. These people are reported not to want to associate themselves in alliances which may become involved in a general nuclear war, automatically initiated to defend some other nation—and a war to which they cannot contribute, will have little voice in the control thereof, and, in their view, provide only their country as a battleground to be devastated.

Probable Future Situations

The USSR, as she develops an ICBM and a submarine missile capability, also may come to believe that the United States will not actually launch retaliatory strikes unless United States security is directly jeopardized. If she comes to believe this, the USSR can be expected to continuously expose the United States to the *threat* of severe destruction so as to keep the United States so pre-occupied with preparing for general nuclear war that we will not take appropriate action in time to stop the gradual expansion of communist domination of other countries by other means. She can also be expected to be very careful not to provide sufficient provocation to the United States to launch our nuclear retaliatory forces.

Also, Russia may be expected to continue to exploit U.S. general war posture in perpetrating fear among our allies that through nervous anxiety the U.S. might itself set off the nuclear war either (1) as an inappropriate response to little probes or (2) by accident.

The communists, by intrigue, subversion, political warfare, and propaganda, will do their best to intensify any lack of confidence of our allies, not only in our ability and willingness to conduct general war in the protection of our allies, but also in our willingness and skill to prevent nations from coming under communist domination by less dramatic action.

They will continue blackmail, sabotage, espionage, guerrilla warfare, economic warfare, local civil insurrection, and all the other tricks that they have used in the past, including limited war by proxy, to conquer more countries.

The threat of massive nuclear retaliation will not stop these actions in the future any more than it has in the past. Massive nuclear striking power is important, but it is not the solution to all of our problems, or even most of them.

Future Policy

It isn't that we don't need adequate retaliatory power of diverse types. We do. The difficulty is in determining how much we need. Any more than what we need is not only wasted, but it uses resources which might otherwise be made available for the more probable military actions. Of course, we must have a safety factor in determining the amount that we need. Probably the maximum amount of retaliatory force the U.S. needs for a general war would not exceed twice the amount required to kill half the Russians. These retaliatory forces should be reasonably immune to a Soviet long-range missile build up. The point is, I think, that even if we had an unlimited and overwhelming retaliatory force, there are many situations which have arisen, and similar situations will arise again, where these overwhelming forces would not provide the solution. We should not therefore imply that these forces can solve all of our military problems. It comes down to a question of emphasis, or degree, or balance. In my opinion, we have given the appearance of becoming so engrossed and absorbed in the prospects of general nuclear war that our allies, as well as the communists, and I think even we ourselves, are not sufficiently alert to the prospects of other types of military action.

The USSR must remain convinced that if the USSR overtly attacks any one of our allies directly, we will launch those retaliatory forces against the USSR. But at the same time, the USSR, as well as our allies, must also be convinced that we would not launch a massive retaliatory effort against the Soviet Union in reply to every *communist* effort to expansion, including overt attacks by non-Russian communists.

Russia and China and other communists, and most particularly the free world, should be convinced that we will use sufficient force promptly to quell even non-Russian communist attacks and will not rely solely upon massive retaliation as punishment. The punishment must fit the crime.

The world must realize that we intend to use atomic weapons when the situation may call for atomic weapons in any action, but at the same time, they must have confidence that we will use them with

discrimination in limited war because we realize that excessive amounts of force would unnecessarily destroy people and facilities.

We are at war now—not peace. We should not only realize, but act upon the realization, that treaties, negotiations and economic pacts, as well as limited military operations, are the weapons of this war.

Therefore, in addition to the performance of their combatant functions, the U.S. must have military forces also capable of performing various other functions which will permit diplomatic maneuvering in support of U.S. cold war offensive.

The U.S. must be able to recognize and act quickly on small problems as they occur in the world and before those problems grow to a big size requiring big action.

In order for the U.S. to continue to be an influence in the world, the U.S. must have allies and friendly neutrals.

Our allies will require forces under their own control sufficient to enable them to contribute significantly to their own defense, since they are showing increasing reluctance to placing major reliance on the United States' massive retaliatory strikes on Russia.

The U.S. should permit our allies the pride of achievement associated with contributing significantly to their own defense. Since their greatest commodity is manpower, the U.S. will probably have to continue to supply our allies with a great deal of their armaments.

In my opinion, these steps would make it clear to the world that communist expansion by whatever means will be dealt with by the U.S. by the most appropriate means. No one, least of all the Russians, should have any doubt of our determination.

Probably the only effective way of convincing the world of our resolution is to take firm and timely action of whatever kind is necessary to prevent the communists from gaining further footholds in non-communist countries. This should include the willingness to conduct limited war, to assist friendly countries to maintain freedom from communism regardless of the steps that are taken to impose communism.

It is my opinion that the adoption of the more specific language proposed by the JCS majority view will more nearly provide the necessary guidance for reorientation of our military strategy to meet the requirements of the situation which now faces us.

54. Memorandum From Green (FE) to Robertson (FE)¹

Washington, May 9, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

Rear Admiral Stroh has just brought over to you for comment a copy of a paper (at Tab A) which Admiral Burke proposes to read at a meeting of the JCS with Secretary McElroy next Tuesday (May 13). According to Admiral Stroh, Admiral Burke has already spoken to you about this paper.

The background, I understand, is as follows: General Cutler has recommended fairly extensive rewording of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the new Basic National Security Policy paper (NSC 5810). The general effect of Cutler's proposed revisions would be (a) to include Europe and Turkey within the area where potential limited wars might be fought, (b) to require the use of "precision" weapons and something less than maximum nuclear countermeasures in the event of local war, and (c) to recognize that in certain local war situations it might be in our national interests if we could restore the status quo ante rather than try to "defeat" the enemy and occupy his terrain.

The JSC are split over the Cutler reformulation of paragraphs 13 and 14. The Air Force opposes, whereas the Army, Navy and Marine Corps favor the Cutler changes. Admiral Burke's paper provides effective and logical arguments for the majority JCS view.

I believe you will agree with the point of view presented in Admiral Burke's paper, for he argues for the retention of a diversified arsenal of weapons systems, both conventional and nuclear, and for a capability to cope with small brushfire wars quickly and in a manner least likely to cause a spread of the war. The nucleus of his argumentation will be found on pages 6-8 of his paper at Tab A.

It is therefore recommended that you telephone Admiral Burke to say that you have read his paper with great interest and appreciation; that you thoroughly agree with the logic of his case; that you could supply any number of political arguments in support of what he has so effectively analyzed from a military viewpoint; and that you are passing his paper on personally to Mr. Robert Murphy (as Admiral Burke requests).

¹ Source: Comments on CNO's views on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5/5-858.

Comment

When occasion permits you might make the following additional comment:

There are many types of war or crises situations requiring many types of weapons to meet those situations. If we narrow the spectrum of our weapons system to nuclear weapons or if we are only prepared to use large-scale military measures designed to “defeat” the enemy, we may well find ourselves frozen into inaction in situations where we would properly hesitate to apply the required atomic weapon (as in infiltrations, evacuations, guerilla fighting, etc.). On the other hand, if we were to plunge into these situations from the outset with nuclear weapons or with excessive retaliatory measures, we not only would risk a major nuclear war but would forego all possibilities of settlement involved in diplomacy conducted at the outset of a conflict before it spreads into the nuclear field or before it spreads geographically.

Attachments:

1. Admiral Burke’s paper
2. NSC 5810

55. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, May 12, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

This was the first of General Twining’s “periodic” meetings with the President (intended to take place once each two weeks unless there is not enough agenda to justify a meeting).

General Twining first took up the question of the internal organization of the Joint Staff following defense reorganization. He said there is now a chance to set it up on a sound basis. However, there is one view

¹ Source: Defense reorganization; nuclear test ban; outer space. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

in the Chiefs that the present set-up should be continued simply adding an integrated operational section; others feel that a J-Staff should be instituted, comparable to the staffs the unified commanders now have. He felt that if this step is not taken now, it may never be taken.

The President, after reviewing charts showing alternative patterns, said that the "J-Staff solution" is the way he would do it.

General Twining reported on recent developments regarding the reorganization proposal. General Twining said Congressman Vinson had tried to freeze the joint staff organization in its present form, but Defense is not agreeing to that. The President referred to several recent instances of Defense representatives departing from Administration positions in testimony to the Congress. The Navy is trying to get authorization for twice as many Polaris submarines as approved. Mr. Roy Johnson is opposing the Administration's proposals regarding the NACA. The President was delighted, however, to see the fine support Admiral Radford had given for the Defense reorganization bill. General Twining added that Admiral Burke has really been doing a good job on the Defense reorganization. His problem comes from the pressures on him from within the Navy.

General Twining then showed the President a copy of a memorandum the Chiefs have submitted to the Secretary of Defense opposing the stopping of nuclear tests. He said the Chiefs of course realized that there are many factors that enter into the question with which they are not concerned, but they felt that the military aspect of the matter is such that there should be no cessation. The President said that if he could get the changes made in the law that he had asked, and could provide information to the United Kingdom, he thought we might very well want to achieve an agreement to stop tests after the present series. For the present, however, he thought we should just be negative on the proposal; after Hardtack, and on the basis of an agreed and effective monitoring system, he thought he would be agreeable to cessation. General Twining said the Joint Chiefs felt this action should be part of a wider package. The President stressed the great importance of getting inspection groups, capable of unimpeded movement, into Russia. Profound consequences could be expected, and we could anticipate extension of such inspection to other phases of disarmament. He repeated that as of now he would not stop the tests.

The President reverted to his comment about organization for outer space activities, and said he was concerned that the top-most officials in Defense do not see the need to be firm on these matters and to stop the free-wheeling testimony now going on. He recalled that Secretary McElroy and the scientists had agreed with him on the assignment of

these responsibilities (for other than military applications) to civilian organization. General Twining said it was not clear to him what the point of some of the recent testimony was.

Referring to Defense organization, General Twining said that Defense is not giving an inch on the provision concerning “separately administered.” He said the President’s letters to business leaders are having an effect, as well as is other activity, and grass roots sentiment is showing up heavily in favor of the reorganization proposal. There is an increasing feeling in Congress that Defense will get what the President has proposed. The President recalled that he has felt the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have less and less to do with the administration of the military departments. Instead they should spend their time studying the over-all Defense problems that affect our country. Visits such as those to Puerto Rico and to Quantico were, in his view, highly useful techniques for this purpose.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

56. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, May 15, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Continental Defense

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5802/1

B. NSC 5807/1

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Continental Defense”, dated April 21, 1958

D. NSC Action No. 1911

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, by Memorandum Action as of May 15, 1958,

¹ Source: Transmits revised pages of NSC 5802/1. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense.

(NSC Action No. 1911) concurred in the revisions of NSC 5802/1 ("Continental Defense"), prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of NSC 5807/1 ("Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter") and transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 21, 1958.

The President has this date approved the above revisions of NSC 5802/1.

Accordingly, it is requested that the enclosed revised pages 7-9 of NSC 5802/1, incorporating the above revisions, be substituted for the corresponding pages in all copies thereof and that the superseded pages be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

57. JCS Paper

Washington, May 1958

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1958

[Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351. Top Secret. 35 pages of source text not declassified.]

58. Briefing Note for 367th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, May 29, 1958

ITEM 3

1. The next item is a Progress Report by the Department of Defense, relating to the Military Mobilization Base Program.

2. In March, 1957, the Department of Defense presented to the Council a new Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base.

3. That concept was reflected in our 1957 and 1958 Basic National Security Policy statements. The significant new features of this concept were:

(1) Meeting the requirements of only those forces which would be mobilized by M + 6 months (instead of M + 36 months).

(2) Taking account of the possibility of substantial bomb damage to the U.S.

(3) Covering the eventualities of cold war, military conflict short of general war, and general war.

(4) Positioning pre-D-Day stocks overseas sufficient to insure reasonable effectiveness of forces there surviving enemy nuclear attack.

4. Defense was then requested to prepare at the earliest practicable date an outline—using this new concept—of the Military Mobilization Base Program, force structure, and annual costs in order of magnitude.

5. Today we will hear from Defense a report of difficulties encountered and progress made in meeting this request. Later, in the 1958 Defense annual status report, we shall receive a statement of the actions taken by Defense up to June 30 to develop the Military Mobilization Base Program, using the new concept. Still later, hopefully in early fall, Defense will present to the Council its proposed Military Mobilization Base Program for FY 1960.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY McGUIRE

¹ Source: Status of military mobilization base program. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

59. Memorandum of Discussion at the 367th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, May 29, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 367th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
May 29, 1958

Present at the 367th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of Defense McGuire; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of State Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; the Naval Aide to the President; Mr. Harrell B. Altizer and Mr. Donald Schwartz, Department of Defense; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1–2.]

3. STATUS OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION BASE PROGRAM

(NSC Actions Nos. 1680 and 1698; NSC 5707/8, paragraph 47; NSC 5810/1)

General Cutler briefed the National Security Council on the subject item. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) He then called on Assistant Secretary of Defense E. Perkins McGuire, who read his report with the assistance of visual aids. (A copy of Secretary McGuire's report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Secretary McGuire's report, General Cutler first called on Secretary McElroy, who complimented Secretary McGuire and said he had nothing to add.

¹ Source: Agenda item 3: Status of Military Mobilization Base Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Mr. Gordon Gray commented that Secretary McGuire's office was doing a splendid job on those responsibilities for the mobilization base which pertained to the Department of Defense. On the other hand, ODM was gravely concerned about the three problem areas which Secretary McGuire had mentioned in his report, and particularly the last one, namely, the lack of any bomb damage assessment.

Mr. Gray said that ODM was also concerned about a matter relating to the prepositioning of military supplies. While some protection was being afforded to military materiel prepositioned overseas, there was no adequate protection for military materiel prepositioned in the United States.

The President noted that one reason which clearly explained the need for affording greater protection to existing military supplies had derived from the conclusions of the studies by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. These results had indicated that even after a not too devastating Soviet nuclear attack on the United States it would be extremely difficult to go on producing any single military end-item because components which went into the production of the end-item were manufactured in a variety of different cities, all of which would be target areas in a Soviet attack. Mr. Gray said that the subject of the President's comment—the so-called vertical factor of production—also concerned him. The component situation had not improved.

Secretary McElroy predicted that it would not improve in the future, and suggested that there were good reasons why it should not improve.

Mr. Gray then pointed out what he considered to be a development which needed to be watched and which was under study in the ODM. It would appear that under the new mobilization planning concept if we could assume that limited war would last for as long as three years the United States would not be confronted, as in past wars, by the familiar conflict between guns and butter. Instead, it might face a serious unemployment problem. This was true because under the new mobilization planning concept we no longer assume full-scale mobilization during a war.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Department of Defense, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1680-*b*, as presented by Assistant Secretary of Defense McGuire and commented upon by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

60. Memoranda From Several DOD/ISA Offices¹

Washington, June 11, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING**SUBJECT**

US and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

This planning study was received on June 2nd and while the time element imposed upon the Office of Department of Defense is appreciated, the Regional Director, Far East would have preferred additional time for thorough study of so important a matter and to allow more people to express their views.

In general this is an excellent planning study and certainly a good thinking exercise. It cannot help but be felt however that a succession of limited wars or simultaneous limited wars on two far-flung fronts could pitch the U.S. economy and way of life to a point where it might become preferable to throw aside normal restraint and restrictions defined for limited war in this study. Limited wars have brought the UK and France to an economic crisis that has only avoided catastrophe through extensive US support. Also it is felt that the study could stand a little more emphasis on the psychological, economic warfare phases. There is no doubt that limited warfare is precarious at best and any use of nuclear weapons, "Tactical, Minor or Clean", can hardly but raise a doubt that the action will remain a limited rather than an overt conflict.

Specifically, (1) On page 11, at the end of paragraph 2, after the word "southward" recommend that the period be deleted and the following added: "as a concurrent and supporting operation." (2) It would appear that the present version of US and Allied capabilities was prepared before the recommendations submitted concerning appendix D were considered. It is suggested that attention be invited to the Regional Director, Far East comments on this subject. (3) Attention is invited in conjunction with the immediately previous comment concerning the U.S. capabilities together with strong loyal Vietnamese forces to reestablish the independence and territorial integrity of Laos. This is not considered possible with forces outlined in this study, especially in view of the conclusion on page 3 that the U.S. cannot assume effective employment outside their national territory of the Vietnamese. (4) Another possible conflict exists in the

¹Source: Comments on "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961." Top Secret. 10 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files.

statement on page 13 that the provision of airlift could present a major problem and the general conclusion that the U.S. has the capability of dealing successfully with the situation. It is suggested that conclusion #1 be hypothecated to some degree to account for the present lack of adequate airlift to move ground forces.

L.M. Stevens, II, Capt. USN for
B.A. Robbins, Jr. Capt. USN
Regional Director, Far East

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Near East, South Asia and Africa Region, DOD/ISA (Bergin) to the Director of the Office of Planning

Washington, June 11, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

Reference is made to I-14298/8, returned herewith.

This Regional Office has studied the attached document and, in accordance with your request, desires to comment as follows:

This is a well-constructed study and the conclusions and recommendations appear to grow logically from the facts used, the assumptions employed, and the lines of action considered in the formulation of the 12 hypothetical situations utilized in the development of the study.

Although this Office has been asked to limit itself to major points of substance, it feels obligated to comment on the methodology of the study, since the results flow inescapably from it and their validity depends directly upon it. At the outset, it is agreed that the choice of the method of study—the use of a sampling of hypothetical situations—was a reasonable one, probably the only method applicable. The crux of the matter is stated in Para 5, page 10: “The military responses are hypothetical ... and have not been war-gamed to develop detailed plans.” This is understandable, but it does not prepare one for the uncompromisingly self-satisfied tone of Conclusion 1, page 2: “The U.S. has the capability to deal successfully” Somehow this is all too comfortable, and too comforting, and scarcely squares up with what might well develop in the way of “limited war”.

To cite just a single item: our performance to date in creating adequate transportation capabilities for the “quick” application of U.S. force—the *sine qua non* of a successful response—has been anything but

reassuring. One fears the possible soporific effect upon the NSC of such an optimistic assessment as Conclusion 1, page 2.

On the whole—and with the above reservation—the section labeled “III. CONCLUSIONS”, on pages 2–6, is a very well put-together and persuasive passage, and this Region is in general agreement. It is difficult to conceive of how “nuclear strikes deep into Communist China” will fail to bring on a general war.

With the major caveat that Conclusion 1, page 2, may have mischievous results in creating an unwarranted feeling of self-satisfaction about our conventional forces, this Region feels the paper should prove most interesting to the NSC.

Charles K. Bergin

Rear Admiral, USN

Director

Near East, South Asia and Africa Region

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the European Region, DOD/ISA (Guthrie) to the Director of the Office of Planning

Washington, June 10, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

The following comments on the study prepared by a State-Defense-JCS Working Group are offered in furtherance of your memorandum of 29 May:

GENERAL COMMENTS:

In view of the importance of a study on this subject, it is considered extremely important that the generalized conclusions and recommendations regarding our military capabilities to conduct such operations must be supported by a detailed analysis and study within the Department of Defense. A review of the attached document indicates that there is no such documentation. Instead, the discussion rests primarily on the views of the authors without any factual backup. In light of this fact, it is considered most important that the Department of Defense should not take a position on this paper in the NSC until such a time as the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been formulated and considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

*SPECIFIC COMMENTS:**a. Conclusions:*

1. The first conclusion that “The United States has the capability to deal successfully with situations requiring limited military operations” is not completely supported by the remaining conclusions and the discussion. It would seem that the conclusion requires qualification.

2. Reference Para. 4. The intent of the first sentence, i.e., “No military tasks were found to be unique to limited military operations,” is not clear. Certainly many of the tasks which may have to be performed under such conditions would be vastly different from those in the event of general war. This raises the question as to whether the present trend of weapons is such that U.S. forces will become increasingly more inflexible. In this connection, it would appear that this Para. was written primarily from a viewpoint of air operations and does not give due recognition to the problems arising in connection with ground forces.

3. Reference Para. 7. It is noted in this Para. that “initial reliance was placed upon Air and Naval forces because they were in position and most capable of fast reaction.” While the Air and Naval forces may be positioned and capable of fast reaction in certain instances, there is a question as to their capability to react effectively under all situations. In this connection it is pointed out that in the early days of Korea the initial U.S. position was to counter the aggression by use of Air and Naval forces. It soon became evident that such action was not sufficient and that ground forces had to be deployed to the Peninsula at an early date. Although this Para. recognises that in many cases the intervention of U.S. ground forces will be essential, the timely availability of these forces is predicated on their proximity or on available air/sea lift.

4. Reference Paras. 9 and 11. These conclusions indicate that for U.S. forces to be most effective, they must be applied quickly. Yet the rapidity with which ground forces can be committed to action is dependent upon availability of sea/air lift, a questionable capability.

5. Reference Para. 15. This conclusion raises a question as to whether or not the U.S. stocks of “low yield weapons” and “clean weapons” are available in sufficient quantities for use in the operations as visualized to allow the U.S. to carry out defense without generating adverse reactions referred to in Paras. 17 and 18. A more complete factual exploration and exposition of the subject seems indicated.

b. Recommendations:

1. Reference Para. 2. This Para. points out that “even though nuclear weapons are not used in limited military operations, public reaction world-wide, based primarily on fear of general war, will be adverse to U.S. military intervention.” This recommendation would seem to be

based more on a matter of opinion than on fact and in this connection it is pointed out that the bulk of the free world applauded the decision of the U.S. intervening in Korea at a time when the prospects of World War III were equal to, if not greater than, might be the case today.

2. Reference Para. 4 (See Para. 5., above). It is not made clear just what degree of "cleanliness" will not arouse adverse world opinion.

3. With reference to Paras. 6 and 7, it would appear that effective and prompt U.S. response to limited military aggression requires facilities and capabilities to a greater extent than that now in existence.

In view of the above comments, it is believed that the first conclusion and the first recommendation are not borne out by the supporting comments and recommendations. As pointed out above, it is believed that ISA should suspend further action on the document pending the receipt of the formal views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to their professional judgment as to any military capability to conduct limited operations.

No detailed comments are made with regard to the "hypothetical situations" in view of the comments contained in Para. 8 of the basic memorandum and of the earlier comments furnished your office by this office.

John S. Guthrie
Brigadier General, USA
Director, European Region

Attachment

Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Washington, May 29, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

1. The inclosed study on the above subject, prepared by a State-Defense-JCS working group is scheduled for transmission to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of Defense and State on or before 16 June 1958.

2. Your comments on the study are requested not later than 10 June 1958 to assist the Secretary of Defense in determining the Defense position on the study. It is desired that comments be limited to major points of substance, and be related to the study itself rather than to the attachments detailing the hypothetical situations and hypothetical responses. It is also requested that you return the inclosure hereto with your comments, if you have no particular requirement for its retention.

3. It is requested that the study be handled on a limited distribution basis with access restricted to those with a “need-to-know”.

[illegible in the original]

Attachment

Memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance Program, the Military Advisor, the Directors of the European Region, the Far East Region, and the Near East, South Asia and Africa Regions, and the Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs

Washington, May 29, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

1. The inclosed study on the above subject, prepared by a State-Defense-JCS working group is scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at an early date.

2. Your comments on the study are requested not later than 10 June 1958. It is desired that comments be limited to major points of substance, and be related particularly to the study itself rather than to the attachments detailing the hypothetical situations considered. It is also requested that you return the inclosure hereto with your comments.

3. It is requested that the study be handled on a limited distribution basis with access restricted to those with a “need-to know”.

P.H. Greasley
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Office of Planning

Attachment

**Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Planning,
DOD/ISA**

Washington, May 29, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SPRAGUE

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

1. The study on limited military operations which the State-Defense-JCS working group has prepared is being reproduced by the Joint Staff and is expected to be in our hands this afternoon.

2. General Cutler has indicated the desirability of having the limited military operations study available on or before 16 June so that it can be reviewed by the other members of the Planning Board prior to its consideration on Friday 20 June. As you are aware, the Planning Board is also scheduled to take up at that time the residual problems in the basic policy paper. The close relation between the two studies makes it desirable to speed up the processing of the limited military operations study.

3. Attached for your signature is a brief memorandum requesting comments from appropriate elements of OSD. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be concurrently reviewing the study as will the State Department. It is our intention together with State and the Joint Staff to try to produce shortly after 10 June a draft letter to the NSC which both Secretaries McElroy and Dulles would sign, reflecting their views and comments on the study.

4. Signature is recommended.

P.H. Greasley
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Office of Planning

61. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 17, 1958

Participants

Department of State

Secretary Dulles
Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary
Gerard C. Smith, Asst Secretary–Policy Planning

Department of Defense

Secretary McElroy
Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary
Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary
John N. Irwin II, Deputy Asst Secretary
Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of the Navy
James H. Douglas, Secretary of the Air Force
Wilbur M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army
General Randolph McC Pate
General N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations
General T. D. White
General Maxwell D. Taylor
Rear Admiral Charles O. Triebel, USN
General Cutler

Secretary Dulles said he would like to commend the cooperation which the Department of Defense had given in connection with the Lebanon affair, pointing out that needed equipment had been supplied to the Lebanese government in exceptionally fast time. He pointed out that it would be best if the Lebanese forces could handle the problem themselves. If we have to intervene, it will be only the choice of the lesser of two evils—the greater of the two evils being the political repercussions of our failure to come to the aid of our friends, the Lebanese.

Secretary McElroy then opened the discussion on the Strategic Concept. He said that Defense officials and the JCS had two discussions on the matter. They had given a good deal of thought to the type of military backing that the US should have for its diplomatic aims.

Secretary McElroy felt that, perhaps, Defense had failed to give the Secretary of State a clear picture of our limited war capabilities. He suggested that some situations could best be handled by non-US forces. Of course, it would be preferable if these were UN forces. But until that became possible, he wondered if some type of volunteer forces,

¹ Source: Strategic concept for the defense of Europe. Top Secret. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548.

including non-white forces, should not be recruited. This idea is being examined now in the Department of Defense. Also being examined is whether the US needs the numerous strategic weapons systems which it now plans for. It does not follow that, if our strategic weapons can be cut down, we would automatically build up our limited war capabilities. Over the long run one might be able to reduce over-all defense expenditures, but not now. He speculated as to whether we should let our allies know more about our limited war capabilities—but, perhaps, we don't have enough to do this.

Secretary McElroy then introduced Rear Admiral Triebel, who gave a briefing on the Joint State-Defense-JCS limited war capabilities study. As this study is available in the Department of State, this briefing will not be detailed here.

Upon conclusion of the briefing, Secretary McElroy asked what the basic problem was. Is it because our allies do not know about our limited war capabilities or are our capabilities insufficient?

Secretary Dulles said there were two problems: (a) the Strategic Concept; and (b) our limited war capabilities.

These capabilities are relevant if our strategic concept contemplates limited war. The Joint State-Defense-JCS study shows that we do have a doctrine for limited war, and we seem to be in reasonably good condition in regard to limited war capabilities and in the matter of relations with our allies in this respect.

Secretary Dulles said that, although there is no US commitment to come to Iran's defense, there is a gap in our military capabilities in regard to Iran. He referred to the concern reported by General Taylor last winter that Iran would be used as a funnel for an attack. We must face up to this problem in connection with the forthcoming visit of the Shah of Iran.

The Secretary said that the big problem involving the strategic concept is in relationship to NATO. In our thinking we assume that there can be no limited war in Europe. He said he did not quarrel with this assumption—he shared this judgment. However, we in the State Department detect a growing concern, voiced by responsible European officials as well as demagogues, that the US, when it comes squarely under the threat of ICBM attack, will not launch an all-out nuclear attack on the Soviet Union if another NATO nation is attacked.

Secretary Dulles referred to Duncan Sandys' concern to this effect, of which he had been advised at Copenhagen. The Secretary then read pertinent excerpts from Sandys' paper which had been presented to the British Cabinet.

Secretary Dulles also reported Ambassador Houghton's judgment that, during the forthcoming visit to Paris, de Gaulle would make two points in justification of a French nuclear weapons production program.

First, the prestige of being in the nuclear club; and, second, France's fear that the US would not call upon massive retaliation to save Europe when the cost in US casualties became clear to US leaders.

Secretary Dulles said that none of us doubts that President Eisenhower will order a strategic nuclear attack in that event. But his term has but two years to run and who knows what his successor's views will be. Secretary Dulles said he knew of one potential successor who might not be as firm as President Eisenhower on this score.

Secretary Dulles said he felt that the time was near when our European allies are not going to be satisfied with a strategic doctrine depending on a US decision to invoke all-out nuclear war in the event of an attack on Europe. He felt that the European countries would go their independent ways unless we find with them a concept they consider more dependable.

The Secretary said he did not think limited war in Europe was possible. The important thing, however, was what the allies think and do. The Europeans are just starting to think about this problem in a fuzzy manner. Two alternatives seem to be opening to them. One was to develop independent nuclear weapons production capability, such as the British and the French are trying for. It is only logical that others will follow. Maybe this course is right. But it is dangerous not to have an agreed strategic concept which is satisfactory to all the NATO partners. It is dangerous for them to prefer that each one have its own nuclear capability.

In the case of the French, a nuclear weapons program is something of a gesture. They cannot afford a real program. They must depend on us or accept risks of another kind. Even the United Kingdom cannot afford such a program. Certainly Italy cannot. In the case of Germany, there are strong public opinion controls. The Brussels treaty only prevents production of nuclear weapons on German territory. The French-Italian-German (FIG) program may get into nuclear weapons production.

The second alternative is to drift into neutralism.

Secretary Dulles said that he and others had thought about the possibilities of "area" defense with tactical weapons. He did not believe a war in Europe could be confined to a limited area. However, in order to give our allies a credible policy, we should think of how to create a situation where our allies would have greater rights in regard to the future use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. If we insist that, with the exception of possible hostilities in Yugoslavia and Berlin, the only conceivable type of European war is all-out nuclear war, the result will be a feeling of futility—a brief effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, followed by an abandonment of that effort because of its expense, and then a drift to neutralism. That is the likely course of events under present circumstances. We can hold on one or two years.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that Sandys' statement was no mere informal effort. It had been formally submitted to the Cabinet, which had apparently acquiesced in Sandys' subsequent publication.

Mr. Quarles asked what Sandys' alternative was. The Secretary replied that it was total disarmament, which no responsible official considered seriously.

Secretary Dulles said that he quoted Sandys as representative of leading statesmen in Europe. He could quote plenty of others to the same effect. Indeed Sandys' doubt is a rational doubt. No one knows what a future President will do. There may be future moods of isolation in the US. No nation likes to have its national existence depend on a decision which may involve the destruction of another nation—so thought is being given in Europe to alternatives. Sandys' alternative is fantastic. But Prime Minister Macmillan thought it was good propaganda.

The Secretary said there seemed to be two serious alternatives under consideration—separate national nuclear weapons programs or neutrality. The Secretary said he had no definite answers to this problem. He did feel that a strategic concept, which was wholly dependent on a US decision to incur nuclear devastation, would not be gambled on by our allies. We must think of alternatives. He has no cure for the problem and no special competence in this field.

Secretary McElroy asked if the Europeans think that we would withdraw our forces from Europe. If they do, that would really be bad. But our forces in Europe are developing an increased tactical weapon capability. In the event of war, how would it be possible for the US nuclear forces not to be drawn into action.

Secretary Dulles recalled a Sunday afternoon in December 1950. It then seemed possible that the American divisions in Korea would be wiped out. Radical alternatives were considered, but no thought was given to using nuclear weapons. Who was to say that the same situation might not come up in the future in regard to our divisions in Europe.

Mr. Gates asked if this situation warranted a reconsideration of preventive war. Secretary Dulles said it did not in his judgment. This might be a logical alternative, but it was not practical in view of the beliefs of the American people and their form of government. He said he wanted to make it perfectly clear that he was not backing down nor did he have any feeling of fear. Mr. Quarles said that we didn't have any freedom of choice about preventive war. Mr. Gates said he had in mind preventive strikes after a European ally is attacked. Secretary Dulles said that is different. If our allies thought that "we could shoot the works" without getting badly hurt they might have more confidence in us. Mr. Quarles said that is our present policy. General Twining confirmed this. General Taylor said that he had some doubts that this was our policy.

Mr. Sprague asked how it would help European nations' confidence to have control over nuclear weapons since they would not have enough weapons to give them parity with the Soviet Union. In this situation, would not the same doubts about non-use of nuclear weapons crop up?

Secretary Dulles agreed and said he felt that European nations would not long pursue individual programs to manufacture weapons. He feared they would then attempt to "stay out" of the conflict.

Mr. Quarles said that, as a matter of logic, if countries become neutral they are in more danger than if they are in the alliance. If this is true, why would they drift to neutralism?

Secretary McElroy said that it appeared that we could not match the USSR in Europe without resorting to at least tactical nuclear weapons, but use of such weapons would bring all-out nuclear war unless the hostilities were quickly stopped by common consent.

Secretary Dulles said he thought a war in Europe could not be limited. Many people think that US involvement in a European war would be more likely if it developed gradually than if the US was faced suddenly with a "cold blood" decision looking to all-out war, which might lead to the end of the US.

Secretary Dulles recalled being in Japan at the beginning of the Korean war when it was thought that no US ground forces would be needed—only some air support. Later it was felt that small ground forces would be needed to stiffen the Korean forces. Later large US forces were required. In the first World War, American participation was in the beginning to be only logistical. Later large manpower contributions had to be made. Once in a fight, emotions may lead to decisions different from those facing a nation in "cold blood" when a decision may have to be taken which would involve destruction of all life in the northern latitude.

Secretary McElroy said the important thing is the continued deployment of US troops in Europe. He recognized the possibility of American divisions being sacrificed in a European war, but failure in such situations to bombard the USSR would sit terribly with Americans. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the same was true in the case of the alternative.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that if we lost Western Europe, we would be isolated by the Communists.

Mr. Quarles said it would be poor tactics for the Soviets to destroy US forces in Europe. It would be a sure way to incur the destruction of Russia. Even if the Soviets felt that in the first instance we would not fight, an attack on American troops would lead to the opposite result.

Mr. Douglas asked if we would be able to hold allies if we could assure them of tactical nuclear weapons sufficient to meet Soviet attack with conventional forces. He recalled Secretary Dulles' point that it

was important to force the Soviets to first use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Douglas said that this would avoid having to meet conventional attack with strategic bombardment.

Secretary Dulles said that our allies' concern is based on doubt that they can count on a nuclear response from the US. He mentioned thinking in the State Department about a NATO authority which might hold custody of nuclear weapons and suggested that this might be a useful project to explore.

General Taylor said that that was the objective of our program—to spread nuclear weapons laterally and to our allies. We have no illusions that 175 divisions can be stopped without the use of large yield nuclear weapons. But we have to believe and act as if we believed that there is an intermediate response to a Soviet attack in Europe short of all-out nuclear war.

Secretary McElroy asked if we had been too preoccupied and made too many statements in regard to our strategic bombing capabilities. Have we deemphasized our tactical nuclear and carrier forces and Marine divisions? Perhaps not enough attention had been paid to the fact that somewhere between 25% and 40% of the defense budget was going to our limited war capabilities. Perhaps our allied visitors should see our limited war capabilities rather than concentrate on visits to SAC and Cape Canaveral.

General Pate pointed out that during the past two years the Marines and the Navy had had ten joint exercises involving seven different nations.

Mr. Sprague pointed out that George Brown (UK laborite), a recent visitor to the Pentagon, had told him that too few people knew about US limited war capabilities.

Secretary Dulles observed that from the briefing he had gathered that we do have plans for the use of small nuclear weapons—that we are not gambling everything on high yield weapons. This means to him that there are some possibilities in regard to “area” defense. General Taylor said that this is what we are shooting for—small, light weapons with little fall-out.

Secretary Dulles said that there was time enough—if our allies knew that we had more to our strategy than trans-polar strategic nuclear exchanges with megaton weapons.

Governor Herter asked if the number of our limited war effectives would be reduced if there was a concurrent threat of general war. Admiral Burke said that in such a situation, which would be like the Suez situation, we would be increasing both our capabilities for limited and general war simultaneously. General Twining said in such a situation we would limit mobilization. Governor Herter asked if our limited

war air and sea lift capabilities would be prejudiced by a simultaneous general war threat. Mr. Gates observed that our capabilities for air and sea lift for general war and for limited war were compatible. General Taylor was inclined to disagree with this conclusion and stated that one could not be sure where we would stand in regard to sea and air lift if there was both a limited and general war threat at the same time.

Mr. Quarles pointed out that if events developed in that sequence, we could generate more capabilities by mobilization, but he acknowledged that certain transport would have to be pre-empted for general war preparation. General Pate said that under these circumstances the Navy would be in a building-up phase. General Twining said you can't have capabilities for both situations simultaneously. In the given circumstances, you would have to go all-out for general war preparation and your limited war capability would have to suffer.

General Twining said one cannot say categorically that there could be no limited war in Europe. Anything can happen. But we must keep the Russians believing that a limited war cannot happen there. The Russians apparently believe that now. They have not gained an inch in Europe since we promulgated our present strategic concept. We don't know how a future President would reply to a nuclear attack in Europe, but we must keep the integrity of our present strategy. We must stay with it for awhile.

Admiral Burke said that it was not a question of our capability but of the allied attitude toward our strategy. They know that in regard to nuclear weapons they are mendicants. If they are attacked "they can only cry". What they want is a mortgage on our future action. They have hostages in the form of our ground forces in Europe. Is this not enough for the present? They apparently want some control over nuclear weapons. But it is up to us to keep some control over their control. We must look out for the danger of possible "trigger happy" foreigners to whom we may have transferred some control over nuclear weapons. But we will have to take some chances in this respect.

Secretary Dulles said that surely General de Gaulle will raise with him next month the question of a French nuclear weapons capability. The French will want to be on an equal basis with the US and the UK. If we turn down his request for some share in the nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle will press on to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability for France and an independent foreign policy which may even involve making an accommodation with the USSR.

Mr. Gates asked if the cause of European concern was our failure to finish up the jobs in Korea and Indochina. If we did not push for victories there, perhaps the Europeans feel there is little chance that we will take risks in Europe where the dangers were much greater. Secretary Dulles said he doubted that this was the reason. He felt the

primary cause of European concern was simply that they could read current articles about the tremendous casualties estimated to occur in nuclear war and logically had been led to wonder if any country would be willing to pay such a high price to come to the aid of its friends. He believes the US would pay such a price—not because of any “love” for our friends, not because of any agreement which we would feel an obligation to honor, but out of the belief that if we did not take this action we would be faced with a worse alternative later. We would be crowded and crowded by the Soviet Union.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that he never shows any sympathy for foreign anxieties in this respect. He personally truly believes that the US will, if necessary, carry out its strategic plans.

Mr. Quarles said in regard to General de Gaulle that we should make clear to him that US policy is not to try to prevent the French from developing a nuclear weapons capability. He believed that our previous policy of trying to stop the French had been greatly resented. He also felt that it was not logical to think of transferring nuclear weapons to the French because they could not obtain enough to have an independent deterrent. France is a member of an alliance and as such should rely on the capabilities of the alliance and not on the few weapons which it may be able to construct. (The tenor of Mr. Quarles’ remarks was that France should be “admitted” into the nuclear weapons club.²)

Secretary Dulles said that General de Gaulle might well take the position that the US’s attitude means that France will have to spend much of its treasure for obsolete weapons during a period of critical financial strain. And France will wonder if this is the type of treatment an ally should receive.

Secretary McElroy thought that France merely wanted to produce weapons and not necessarily to receive US help in producing them. He feels that the French don’t care about the quality of the weapons, but are mainly interested in salving national pride.

Mr. Quarles observed that our law prevents the transfer of nuclear weapons to the French.

Secretary McElroy said that he now had a better understanding of Secretary Dulles’ views and would like to be of help. He reverted to the concept of volunteer forces which might be used until a truly UN force could come into being. He suggested that such force would not wear US uniforms. It would be made up of yellow, black and white people, and would not be identified with national units. The idea would be to try to avoid involvement of national pride in certain types of limited hostilities.

² NSC policy on France is that we should seek to persuade France not to make nuclear weapons. [Footnote is in the original.]

Secretary Dulles felt that this was a very useful concept. He pointed out that some years back a Volunteer Freedom Corps had been explored but abandoned because of practical considerations. For example, where would the forces be located? However, the Indonesia situation justified a restudy of this problem. Prime Minister Macmillan had raised this question with the President during his recent visit. He had in mind recruiting forces out of the North Atlantic alliance to function somewhat like a UN Emergency Force. Macmillan was keen for the idea and wanted to pursue it further with the President. If such a force was not a US national force, it would meet the type of problem we are going to have to face. Even though Secretary Dulles feels that our massive retaliation policy may be losing credibility, the fact is that it has stopped communist aggression and now the primary threat is subversion. The communists have great assets to carry out subversion.

Secretary Dulles cited their control over various informational media. He pointed out that the communists can effectively assist revolts against legitimate governments. He spoke of their capability to manipulate mass emotions. He referred to their participation in the Lebanon affair. In such a situation, it would be extremely valuable if we could turn to some international force.

Another aspect of this threat is inherent in the world-wide movement toward self-government. Actually this gives promise of being in some cases merely a transfer from one form of despotism to another.

Secretary Dulles cited the slow evolution of American political democracy, pointing out how in the beginning only a small percentage of our governmental officials were directly elected by the people. Contrary to this experience, the new countries today are trying to go directly to an advanced form of democracy. The communists are capitalizing on this fact.

Secretary Dulles spoke of Soviet professional capabilities in agitation and subversive work, and the lack of capability of the US in this respect. He spoke of communist organization in Indonesia in labor groups and among teachers.

The combination of the two above-mentioned aspects of the subversive threat in Secretary Dulles' judgment is more serious than that of overt military aggression. The USSR believes our strategic doctrine even if our allies don't. Massive retaliation still has a certain life expectancy, but in the case of civil wars we don't have a good strategic answer. Perhaps the US will have to go in more for manipulation of government structures of other countries. These questions raise serious problems calling for original thinking.

Secretary McElroy suggested that a joint State-DOD study of the "volunteer" problem be undertaken. Governor Herter pointed out that

Allen Dulles was presently thinking about a study of the covert capabilities the US had in this field.

Mr. Brucker recalled that in 1953 a study was made of the Volunteer Freedom Corps idea and recommended that it be reviewed.

Secretary McElroy said that what we needed was a force somewhere between the covert type of force and the US Marines. The question of whether or not such a force would be directly managed by the Pentagon was not important. It was felt that the US could do a good deal to help train and equip such a force. He recognized that such a force would obviously be ascribed to the US and its non-national character would be a fiction, but we would have to learn to deny these things as does the USSR. It was decided that the matter would not be pursued with the UK until we had a US position clarified.

Secretary McElroy said in regard to the strategic concept, the DOD would have another go at preparation of the statement.

Secretary Dulles felt that it was not so much a matter of formally modifying the statement of the present strategic concept or of changing our defense budgets. Rather it was "the way these things are presented." We must find a way to let our allies feel that there is some "intermediate cushion" between unconditional surrender and total war.

Secretary Dulles recalled the "trip wire" theory put forward by the UK which had proved shocking to Europe and had been rejected. We have more than a "trip wire". There can be intermediate stages in the application of our military force. Let us learn to become somewhat more articulate about these possibilities.

Secretary McElroy said that he would like to direct more of our allies' attention to our limited war capabilities—to show them some of our new equipment and our reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.

Secretary Dulles said that it was a matter of psychology—to get away from the "nuclear death" neurosis that has appeared in Europe. There are other ways of defending ourselves and we must get across to the Europeans that we are not neglecting to develop these ways. However, Secretary Dulles said, if a war comes in Europe he believes that it cannot be kept limited.

Mr. Quarles said that is the most important and the most dangerous problem, and that is why we are so sensitive to any changes in our strategic concept. The dilemma is how to improve our allies' confidence and yet at the same time keep the Soviet certain that any substantial attack by them in Europe will lead to strategic bombardment of the Soviet Union.

62. Note From Cutler to Goodpaster¹

Washington, June 18, 1958

For your information, I enclose a draft of some rough notes I made at the Dulles/McElroy Conference Tuesday afternoon.

Obviously, these should be very closely held.

Robert Cutler

Enclosure

Notes Prepared by Cutler

Washington, June 17, 1958

CONFERENCE—June 17, 1958

Sec/State; Under Sec/State; Sec/Defense; Deputy Sec/Defense; Service Secretaries; Joint Chiefs; Smith; Sprague; Cutler; Irvin; Triebel; Randall.

Concluding Recommendations of Study

1. Increase capability of CRAF for limited war—also parallel shipping facilities.
2. Notify enemies of intention in limited war action.
3. Public information to place in proper context use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary of State

1. We do have a strategic concept for use of limited war.
2. We are in reasonably good shape as to capabilities to wage limited war in twelve areas studied: Far East (4), Mid-East (4), Europe (2), South Asia (2).
3. Query as to capability in Iran. Iran is worried and we have no real plan. Do a little extra preparatory work in this regard.
4. Big question is as to Europe and NATO allies.
 - a. Little chance of limited war in Europe—he does not quarrel with this judgment.
 - b. However, growing concern if U.S. will accept general war alternative when it comes, especially when USSR has ICBM capability and

¹ Source: Strategic concept for the defense of Europe. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Exchange.

we do not. This doubt is increasingly expressed by governments and demagogic mass leaders. Reads Sandys' statement at Copenhagen (based on Cabinet submitted paper) to above effect (i.e., after U.S. is under USSR ICBM capability of attack, will it go to help Turkey or Western Europe). Cannot rely indefinitely on our nuclear retaliatory attack to preserve peace?

c. France pushing nuclear programs (a) to get in nuclear club; (b) sharing Sandys' doubts, it wants own capability to invoke nuclear defense of France. What will JFD say when he visits de Gaulle in July.

d. Time is soon coming when our NATO allies will not be satisfied that U.S. will surely go to general nuclear war to defend them, if attacked, and risk American devastation; and will demand a surer strategic concept. They do not yet know what they will do:

(1) Probably try to develop own nuclear stocks so as to create nuclear war, if they wish, regardless of U.S.

(2) Dangerous situation if we do not have *common* strategic concept to use in defending our *common* alliance.

(3) France can't financially afford to be an independent nuclear power. Can the British or Italians? Will public opinion permit West Germans to do so? Perhaps the four together could.

e. Is an area defense in Europe based on use of tactical nuclear weapons a feasible enough arrangement to calm our allies? If they have somewhat greater right to use nuclear weapons in area defense, would that suffice? Otherwise, a futile brief effort on their part to become nuclear powers, followed by trend to neutralism. Dulles feels this trend is inevitable, within a few years (not in next one or two).

f. The European doubt is rational—will U.S. return to isolationism? Would another President than Eisenhower take the awful risk of damaging so much America to go to help Turkey?

g. Dulles does not have answer to problem. All he says is to doubt whether Europeans will long continue to rely on the military concept that U.S., after ICBM capability of USSR to plaster U.S., will come to help an attack on Europe by USSR.

5. *McElroy*: Is not the continued presence of U.S. troops in large numbers in Europe a gage that the U.S. *will* respond to protect them in Europe.

Dulles: If a conventional war starts in Europe, would we involve in nuclear retaliation or would we consider slaughter of U.S. troops overseas? Neither he nor *McElroy* could answer this question.

He does not consider preventive war as a solution to the problem. (Even with preventive war, the U.S. cannot be safe from terrible harm. (*Quarles*))

6. *Quarles*: Does not neutralism endanger a European country more than association with the U.S., and punishment resulting?

7. *McElroy*: Can you use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe without spreading into general nuclear war? Dulles thinks not. But he says many people might think the U.S. more likely to get into defense of Europe, if gradually by using tactical weapons, instead of a massive sudden nuclear retaliation.

Retention of American forces in Europe should be a great assurance to Europeans. (McElroy)

8. *Douglas*: If our allies in Europe had sufficient limited nuclear capability to defend themselves against conventional attack by USSR, would they not be less fearful of the outcome? (Meaning, if *we* increased their capability.)

9. Dulles thinks we should explore a wider internationalization in NATO of nuclear capability. Max Taylor—this is the ultimate answer: act on it and believe in it.

10. Have we been too focused on massive nuclear retaliation with large weapons to realize our current, increasing ability with tactical nuclear ability, carrier forces, mobile marine battalions? (McElroy) Perhaps 30% of our money is going into this kind of capability. Should we emphasize this capability more to our allies and to the public and to the Congress?

11. *Dulles*: We are planning to make small nuclear weapons in quantity. For what purpose?

McElroy: To use against conventional forces which would overwhelm us.

JFDulles: We will have time if this comes in 1961–1962 and *allies know we have this intended capability and use it*.

Quarles does not think small war preparations would hinder going on into general war, but that going into a general war would limit your limited war capability.

12. *Twining*: You can't say that there will never be a limited war in Europe. But you must never let Russians think that we won't use our nuclear retaliatory capability, toy with idea of limited war. Only solution is to get comprehensive safeguarded arms control system.

13. *Burke*: Our allies want a mortgage on us, as security we will come to help. Our forces in Europe are hostages. Must we give a new, different, or bigger mortgage? Perhaps giving them a nuclear capability of their own or in common control.

14. What will JFDulles tell de Gaulle? He will require France to have a greater nuclear independence *or* to have an independent foreign policy.

15. Dulles always tells our allies we're going to help you because if we don't we'll be crowded and crowded against our own interest. They are convinced as to this in the case of present Administration.

16. *Quarles*: We should make clear to de Gaulle (a) not part of our policy to prevent France from acquiring independent nuclear capability, (b) our equipping them is a different thing. But would de Gaulle be in a good posture unless France had enough by itself to defend France? No, in a better posture to share in our common nuclear power in NATO. Perhaps let him have a few to bolster his morale.

JFDulles: De Gaulle will ask—"Why should I spend a lot of money to get a few inadequate weapons? Why don't *you give* me some?"

(Our law does not permit us to give weapons to France now.)

17. *McElroy*: Desirability of supporting indigenous forces in non-identifiable national units (as mercenaries?) for use in limited wars throughout the world.

Dulles: A useful concept, though not an answer to the main question. Volunteer Freedom Corps referred to. Perhaps this concept should be restudied.

Can we recruit from our various alliances certain elements to function on behalf of Free World, like UN force for UN world? Macmillan interested in idea. Idea of usable forces other than distinctly national U.S. forces.

R.C.

63. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, June 18, 1958

SUBJECT

Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations

REFERENCES

- A. NSC Action No. 1814
- B. NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1
- C. NSC Actions Nos. 1841, 1842 and 1844
- D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 7, 1958
- E. NSC Action No. 1881

The enclosed memorandum from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the attached study on the subject,² prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with appropriate participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to the plan concurred in by NSC Action No. 1881, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, June 26, 1958.

¹ Source: Transmits study on capabilities of forces for limited military operations. Top Secret; Special Limited Distribution. Se 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

² Study not enclosed. [Footnote is in the original.]

The enclosures are being given a special limited distribution. It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling thereof, and that access thereto be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

Memorandum for the National Security Council From McElroy and John Foster Dulles

Washington, June 17, 1958

SUBJECT

Study relative to the Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations in
Response to NSC Action No. 1881

1. There is submitted herewith a coordinated study of United States and allied capabilities for limited military operations to July 1961, prepared by the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with appropriate participation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. We wish at the outset to stress the limitations of this study.

a. It does not examine capabilities for limited military operations against Soviet armed forces. The study was undertaken within the framework of our current strategic concept which holds that a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and the United States are overtly engaged is a general war.

b. It does not examine capabilities for limited military operations against an enemy using nuclear weapons. The study assumes that enemy use of nuclear weapons to 1 July 1961 would be construed as overt employment of Soviet armed forces.

c. It does not examine capabilities for covert limited military operations.

d. The study's approach to limited military operations in the Far East is based upon an assumption—i.e., “that the United States could engage in effective military action against mainland China without undue risk of initiating general war”—which the NSC observed in

Action No. 1881-c was "to be regarded only as a working assumption for the purposes of this study."

e. The study is not a complete and final analysis of limited military operations upon which the size and nature of United States forces required for limited military operations can be determined for future years. Estimates of enemy action were, of necessity, hypothetical and thus are not a basis for military planning. None of the situations studied have been war-gamed. The conclusions and recommendations, based as they are on hypothetical but possible situations, should not be considered as definitive.

3. We consider the significant findings of the study to be as follows:

a. *U.S. Capabilities*

(1) Within the limitations set forth in paragraph 2 and if the use of nuclear weapons as required to achieve military objectives is authorized, United States capabilities for limited military operations are adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations of the nature examined.

(2) In many such limited military operations, the use of nuclear weapons would be required only as an unlikely last resort.

(3) In the Far East, however, the United States does not now have a ready non-nuclear capability which alone could cope satisfactorily with limited military operations against overtly engaged substantial Communist forces. The selective use of nuclear weapons against such forces and the facilities supporting them would be necessary.

(4) The withholding of authorization to use nuclear weapons for limited military operations against overtly engaged substantial Communist forces in the Far East would be likely to entail requirements for additional overseas deployment of United States forces, the construction of bases and other facilities overseas, augmentation of sea/airlift in being and expanded logistic support capabilities and "pipelines" both overseas and in the United States.

(5) The burden of the initial military response will fall on the U.S. forces deployed in or near the area involved, regardless of Service. Prompt and vigorous response by these forces may obviate a requirement for major reinforcements.

(6) The effectiveness of United States limited military operations will be affected by the timely availability of sea/airlift for the provision of logistic support to our own and friendly forces and particularly for the movement from the United States of ground forces committed to action. To the extent that the limited military operations examined in this study are expected to affect adversely our posture for general war, the temporary diversion of transport from general war tasks is usually cited as the principal adverse factor.

(7) Only small numbers of "clean" nuclear weapons, which will be in the high yield category, will be available to United States forces to 1 July 1961.

b. Allied Capabilities

(1) The indigenous forces which we might find it necessary to support in limited military operations will have widely varying capabilities. Some, such as the GRC and ROK forces, have significant capabilities on the ground. Practically all have marked deficiencies in air and naval capabilities.

(2) Very few of our allies could or would provide significant forces for limited military operations outside their national territory. Most lack capability. Some, e.g. Pakistan facing a real or assumed threat from India, would be loath to send substantial forces abroad. The provision of forces by others, e.g. France in the Middle East, would be politically disadvantageous.

(3) Our allies can provide base and other facilities that will ease and lend flexibility to the application of United States power in limited military operations.

c. Political Considerations

(1) Failure by the United States to undertake effective limited military operations in support of other free nations in situations such as those examined would have seriously adverse consequences throughout the free world, particularly among our allies, and would encourage the Communists to adopt a more aggressive posture.

(2) Anticipation of the need for United States limited military operations in developing situations and the earliest possible decisions (i) to intervene if necessary and (ii) on the nature and objectives of the intervention are essential.

(3) We need the political support of our allies for United States limited military operations. We should also ensure that appropriate regional collective security organizations and their members have some military role, no matter how minor, in such operations in order to maintain the solidarity and *raison d'être* of these organizations.

(4) Emotional aversion to nuclear weapons is widespread in the free world, particularly among Asians, and our use of these weapons in limited military operations would incur seriously adverse political consequences.

4. We make the following additional observations.

a. The study understandably devotes relatively little attention to the deterrent aspects of United States capabilities for limited military operations. Deterrence of local aggression undertaken or inspired by, or serving the interests of, the Communists is a major aim. As the study suggests, timely political action supported by capabilities for limited operations can frequently avert the need for the commitment of United States forces in combat.

b. The determinative factors in decisions as to the initiation and conduct of United States limited military operations are political rather than military. In practically all likely situations, it is the political

consequences for our general position in the world of inaction or action, and the nature of our action, that will govern United States decisions.

c. Selective nuclear strikes deep into Communist China, as contemplated in the Quemoy and Matsu, Taiwan and Korea hypothetical situations, could elicit a Sino-Soviet nuclear response. Serious consideration would, therefore, have to be given to the proclamation of at least a limited national emergency if the United States were to undertake limited military operations of this nature.

d. The increased possibility of general war inherent in most limited military operations requires precautionary and alerting steps. Even one limited military operation requiring heavy logistic support and deployment of major forces from the United States might necessitate partial mobilization.

e. Additional comments which should be taken into consideration in any possible further use of this study are contained in the Annex immediately hereunder.

5. We make the following recommendations.

a. The Director of Central Intelligence should be asked to initiate the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates on (i) world reactions and (ii) Sino-Soviet military reactions to United States use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations against Communist (non-Soviet) forces in the Far East.

b. The findings of the present study with respect to the availability of allied forces for employment outside their national territory should be taken into account among other factors in the review of 1962 force goals for nations receiving United States military assistance directed by NSC Action No. 1908.

c. Greater efforts should be made to clarify to the free world United States intentions with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and to inform the free world of the radiation effects of low yield weapons and their relative efficiency in certain limited military operations.

/s/ Neil McElroy

/s/ John Foster Dulles

Annex

SUPPLEMENTAL POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED ALONG WITH THE STUDY

1. The studies do not in all instances give sufficient emphasis to the difficult command and communications problems which would be encountered in operations in areas remote from the U.S.

2. The studies give no specific recognition of future modernization or buildup of military forces hostile to the U.S. by Soviet Bloc military

aid. It is possible that such aid in any given instance could be significant, particularly if the recipient forces were applied exclusively against local allied forces.

3. While employment of chemical and biological capabilities has not been reflected in the studies, it should be noted that limited supplies of standardized chemical and biological capabilities are currently in the U.S. stockpile; much greater quantities of these could be produced before 1961 without further development.

64. Briefing Note for 369th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 19, 1958

1. The next item is to report on a review which the President directed of a paragraph in another security policy statement—Par. 27-*d* on Page 12 of the draft Basic National Security Policy discussed at the Council Meeting on May 1.

2. This paragraph—which appeared in the economic section of the basic policy paper—proposed, in recognition of the problems of “one-crop” countries, that, for political reasons, the U.S. might “on occasion, join in multilateral examination of price, production, and demand trends” for basic commodities “which might help to promote readjustments between supply and demand and reduce price fluctuations”. Treasury and Commerce wished to add that the U.S. should not *discuss* the making of, or *participate* in, any international commodity agreement without Presidential approval.

3. Mr. Randall called attention to the fact that this paragraph, as proposed by the Planning Board, did *not* reflect existing CFEP policy of general disapproval of international commodity agreements, or the requirement that *CFEP* give its advance approval to any participation by U.S. representatives in international discussion of any such agreement, or to U.S. participation in any such agreement.

4. At the Council Meeting on May 1 it was agreed to delete Paragraph 27-*d* and to refer it, and an alternative proposed by the Secretary of State, to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to consider in reviewing the existing CFEP policy on international commodity agreements.

¹ Source: Draft basic national security policy paper. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

5. On May 22 Mr. Randall filed with the Council a memorandum report, which is before you, stating (1) the text of the existing CFEP policy on international commodity agreements, and (2) the consensus of CFEP that this policy should be continued in effect. In the light of this review, there appears no need to include any paragraph on this subject in the basic policy statement, and none has been included.

6. It may interest the Council to know that the CFEP, under the exceptions procedure in its existing policy, recently authorized the Department of State to participate in an international coffee study group and to discuss an international coffee agreement, if such an agreement is proposed by one of the members of the study group. The CFEP also urged State to take every precaution not to imply directly or indirectly, that the U.S. *would* participate in or police such an agreement.

cc: Mr. Harr
Mr. Lay
Dr. Gleason
Mr. Johnson

65. Memorandum of Discussion at the 369th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 19, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 19, 1958

Present at the 369th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Walter Williams for the Secretary of Commerce (Items 2 and 5); the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Items 1 and 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Basic National Security Policy. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield Sprague; the Naval Aide to the President; the Executive Secretary; NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY*

(NSC Action No. 1903; NSC 5810/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 26, 1958)

General Cutler explained that the President would be delayed for a few minutes and he would accordingly change the order of items on the agenda, dealing first with the question of U.S. policy with respect to international commodity agreements which had been unresolved when the Council last discussed it in connection with Paragraph 27–*d* of our new Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1), at the Council meeting on May 1, 1958. He pointed out that on this occasion the issue had been referred to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy. On May 22, 1958 the Chairman of the CFEP, Mr. Randall, had filed a report with the Council giving the text of existing CFEP policy on international commodity agreements and also the consensus of the CFEP that this policy remained valid and should be continued in effect. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this memorandum).

At the conclusion of General Cutler's briefing, Secretary Dulles stated that he had an observation to make with respect to the text of our policy in the matter of commodity agreements. He pointed out that the text of our policy as formulated by the CFEP revealed two different emphases. The first paragraph which reads as follows:

"The United States shares the concern of other nations about the problems arising from commodity price and market instability and is prepared to discuss and explore with other governments possible approaches to these problems"

according to Secretary Dulles emphasized the willingness of the United States at least to discuss and explore approaches to these problems. On the other hand, the last paragraph of our policy reading as follows:

"Representatives of the United States will not participate in any discussion or meeting with respect to an international commodity agreement and will make no commitment as to U.S. participation in such an agreement until approved at the interagency policy level within the Executive Branch."

appeared to have a somewhat conflicting emphasis. It seemed quite possible to Secretary Dulles that the discussions authorized by the first paragraph could lead to a commodity agreement in which other nations than the U.S. would participate. A current example is that of coffee. Under existing world economic conditions, Secretary Dulles felt that we would want to be sure that the first paragraph of this policy was literally interpreted when it was implemented, although of course we would not agree to actual U.S. participation in any commodity agreement.

Mr. Randall said he not only understood Secretary Dulles's point but agreed with him. Indeed this specific matter had been discussed at great length by the CFEP. The general view in the CFEP was that the U.S. should go ahead and discuss commodity problems with other nations as much as they desired but not to the point of sticking our necks out too far and being committed to participation in an international commodity agreement. Mr. Randall thought it was extremely difficult to express in words the sensitive emphases that both he and Secretary Dulles were agreed upon. It was hard to draw so fine a line.

Secretary Dulles said he believed that Mr. Randall was on the right track. Under current conditions the U.S. simply could not hold itself aloof from these problems of commodity price and market instability as we had been in a position to do when our policy on this subject had first been adopted and when commodity prices were relatively high.

The National Security Council:

a. Concurred in the recommendation by the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903-b-(5) and transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 26, 1958, that existing policy or international commodity agreements is satisfactory and should be continued.

b. Noted a statement by the Secretary of State that, in the implementation of U.S. policy on international commodity agreements, a liberal interpretation should be given to that portion of the policy which states that the United States is prepared to discuss and explore with other governments possible approaches to problems arising from commodity price and market instability; while adhering to that portion of the policy which states that the United States will not participate in any discussion or meeting with respect to an international commodity agreement and will make no commitment as to U.S. participation in such an agreement until approved at the interagency policy level within the Executive Branch.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, CFEP.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

66. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, June 23, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

General Twining reported that General Cutler is recalling copies of instructions regarding the Net Evaluation Sub-Committee's next effort in order to edit one provision. A small follow-up study will be made after the main project, and an oral report will be given to the President on that phase.

General Twining said that Secretary McElroy has read in full Admiral Burke's testimony on defense reorganization. His general feeling is that Admiral Burke had done well in his testimony, but did not go "down the line" as some of the others had. General Pate goes up to testify this week, and there is more concern regarding his appearance. General Twining next mentioned a direct leak to Hanson Baldwin of some of the proceedings in a very private meeting Mr. McElroy had held with the Chiefs and Secretaries last week, with no one else present. This matter is being pursued.

Next General Twining reported that the President's talk at Quantico had a very fine effect on the participants—it gave them a shot in the arm in stirring up interest in the meeting, and what the President had to say, as well as his personal vigor and force in saying it, had a profound impact on the participants.

The JCS are starting work tomorrow on the budget guidelines for fiscal year 1960. General Twining has told the Chiefs that if they do not turn in a satisfactory job on the guidelines, the Secretary will make the determination himself.

The President referred briefly to additions that the Congress is proposing in the FY-59 budget. He said that the talk that having one more division in reserve in the United States makes a great difference in our small war capability is meaningless to him. Also, he said we are apparently planning to "kill every Russian three times" in the development of our forces for massive retaliatory attack; because the Polaris looks like a promising weapon, to be fired from under water, we are hurrying into construction of nine submarines, without apparent study of the capability as a whole. Finally, he said that statements

¹ Source: Defense reorganization, FY 1959 Defense budget. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

such as Sam Anderson's regarding "shooting the moon" in August are very harmful, and muddy the water. We have gone to great effort to make this project a scientific project under ARPA direction and cognizance.

The President said it is clear to him that we are all going to have to think a great deal more of national solvency. General Twining said the Quantico meeting was useful in that respect. There was greater consciousness of this factor as a result. He indicated that the Secretary stated if he could not get such a program from the JCS he would do the job himself—he stressed that we must cut out some of the duplicatory weapons systems we have carried through the development stage.

Finally, the President suggested that General Twining stress some theme such as "security and solvency demand unity" in our defense effort, at every opportunity. Apparently it takes persistence to get such a point across. He added he would like to see Admiral Radford do some speaking on this—his testimony had been very effective. General Twining said he had been taking the line that economy and defense go hand in hand and that if one is destroyed the other must also be lost. In concluding, the President said that our country can afford what is needed for defense, but it cannot afford the costs that might be added by wastefulness.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

67. Briefing Note for the 370th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 26, 1958

1. The principal item today is the 250-page State-Defense Study on "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1961", based on the examination of 12 hypothetical situations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.

2. This Study grew out of a recommendation of the Gaither Panel last November (classified by the Panel as a "highest value measure") that U.S. and allied forces for limited military operations be augmented

¹ Source: U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

and that a Study be undertaken to develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons could contribute to such limited operations.

3. State and Defense prepared terms of reference for a limited was Study covering the entire range of U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations (NSC Action No. 1844–b).

The terms of reference, as approved by the Council (NSC Action No. 1881, March 20) anticipated that recommendations as to U.S. national security policy and U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations would result from the Study.

The terms of reference precisely defined limited military operations, Study assumptions, and the scope of the Study—matters which will be covered in the presentation of the Study by Admiral Triebel.

4. The written memorandum of the Secretaries of State and Defense, submitting the Study to the Council, summarized 14 Study findings which they deemed significant, made 8 additional observations, and stressed 5 Study limitations. While listening to the presentation of the Study, the Council should keep in mind these 5 limitations:

(1) The Study does *not* contemplate limited military operations against *Soviet* armed forces; because, under the current U.S. strategic concept, overt military engagement of USSR and U.S. armed forces is deemed to be general war.

(2) The Study does not cover *enemy use of nuclear weapons* in limited military operations; because such use of nuclear weapons up to July 1, 1961, would be construed as overt employment of Soviet armed forces. (However, I should point out that some of the 12 hypothetical cases call for use by the U.S. of nuclear weapons.)

(3) The Study does not examine U.S. capabilities for covert limited military operations.

(4) The Study assumes—as a working assumption—“that the U.S. could engage in effective military action against Mainland China without undue risk of initiating general war.”

(5) The Study should not be used for determining the size and nature of U.S. forces required for limited military operations; and its conclusions and recommendations are not to be considered definitive.

5. The two Secretaries state in their memorandum, as a significant finding of the Study, that, within the foregoing limitations and if the use of nuclear weapons as required to achieve military objectives is authorized, U.S. capabilities for limited military operations are adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations of the nature examined.

6. The Secretaries’ memorandum makes three recommendations (par. 5, page 4):

a. A National Intelligence Estimate should be prepared on world reactions and Sino-Soviet military reactions to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations against Communist (non-Soviet) forces in the Far East.

b. The review of 1962 force goals of nations receiving U.S. military assistance—to be presented to the Council on September 1 (NSC Action No. 1908)—should take into account the findings of the Study as to the availability of allied forces for employment outside their national territories.

c. Greater effort should be made to clarify to the Free World U.S. intentions with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, and to inform the Free World of the radiation effects of low-yield weapons and their relative efficiency in certain limited military operations.

7. Because of the importance of this fine Study and of the submissions by the two Secretaries, and before the Council takes positive action on the recommendations in the Study and the submission, it is suggested that, after today's presentation of the Study, the Planning Board be asked to prepare comments and recommendations on the subject for future consideration by the Council.

Admiral Triebel will present the Study.

68. NSC Report¹

NSC 5816

Washington, July 1, 1958

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Reference: NSC 5728

The President, on the recommendation of the Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, approved on June 25, 1958, the withdrawal of NSC 5728 and the issuance, on a special limited-distribution basis, of the amended Directive enclosed herewith as NSC 5816. The amendment consists of the deletion of the last two sentences of paragraph 3 and of subparagraphs 3-*a*, *b* and *c* of NSC 5728, and the substitution therefore of a new paragraph 3.

The enclosed Directive has also been revised in paragraph 5, to include on the membership of the Subcommittee the Director of the Office

¹ Source: "Directive on Net Evaluation Subcommittee." Top Secret; Special Limited Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5816 Series.

of Defense and Civilian Mobilization in place of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, in accordance with Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, effective July 1, 1958.

NSC 5816, as approved by the President is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council, and is being referred to the members of the Subcommittee for appropriate implementation.

The enclosed Directive supersedes NSC 5728.

Special security precautions should be observed in the handling of the enclosure, with access thereto limited to those individuals having a strict "need to know" in the performance of their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Enclosure

DIRECTIVE

on

A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 1260–b (November 4, 1954) and my subsequent approval thereof, I hereby establish the following permanent procedure (superseding NSC 5605) to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities.

2. Each integrated evaluation should:

- a.* Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;
- b.* Include consideration of the several courses of action which the USSR is capable of executing; and
- c.* Take into account the estimated future status of approved military and non-military U.S. defense programs.

3. Each integrated evaluation report should estimate, from the practical standpoint, the extent and effect of direct injury, including radioactive fall-out, upon the continental United States, resulting from the most probable types and weights of attacks which the USSR is capable

of delivering during the nuclear phase of a general war (i.e., the period during which the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile or means of delivery of nuclear weapons on the United States would be substantially expended). Military operations overseas should be considered only in so far as they (a) require a diversion of Soviet resources from attack on the continental United States, or (b) affect U.S. capabilities to execute the Bravo mission and consequently the Soviet capability to attack the continental United States. Each report should consider, in so far as damage to the USSR is concerned, the effects of U.S. attacks on the USSR which would affect their capability to damage the United States. In addition, a general estimate should be made of the over-all effects of the U.S. attacks against the USSR which would show the general order of magnitude of destruction, disruption of communications and government, and loss of life in the USSR. In arriving at this general estimate, it is not expected or anticipated that detailed analyses will be undertaken. An evaluation will be made annually on the basis of an assumption or assumptions of conditions under which a general nuclear war might be initiated. Such assumption(s) should be developed by the Subcommittee after careful consideration of the implication of the world situation, and submitted for my approval.

4. Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Council on or before November 15 of each year, and relate to the situation on a critical date normally about three years in the future. In addition to these annual integrated evaluations, an integrated evaluation should be submitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee feels that a change has become apparent that would significantly alter the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States.

5. In order to prepare these integrated evaluations I hereby establish a Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will serve as Chairman, the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Each Subcommittee member shall be consulted regarding and given ample opportunity to review the following prior to adoption by the Subcommittee: (a) subsidiary terms of reference, (b) the assumptions to be used as a basis for each evaluation report, (c) the complete evaluation report (less background material, which shall be made available only on a "need-to-know" basis), and (d) any recommendations which the Subcommittee may choose to submit. If the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, after adoption of the evaluation report by the Subcommittee, has any additional comments which he believes should be presented to the

NSC, such comments may be submitted to the President, through the Chairman of the Subcommittee, for consideration. The Chairman of the Subcommittee, in consultation with the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, will prepare regulations and establish procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information² required in the preparation of an evaluation report so as to safeguard its security on a strict “need-to-know” basis and to preclude the assembly of an unwarranted amount of sensitive information in one document. Such regulations and procedures shall not be finally adopted until the other members of the Subcommittee have been consulted concerning them.

6. Subcommittee members are designated to act as individuals, but each shall have the right to consult, at his discretion and under appropriate security safeguards, with his agency or committee prior to Subcommittee action on matters normally within the cognizance of his committee or agency. In subscribing to the reports and recommendations of the Subcommittee the individual members shall not be expected to assume responsibility for technical matters or conclusions not normally within the cognizance of his own parent committee or agency. Reports as submitted to the Council should show, so far as possible by textual footnotes, any dissents by Subcommittee members.

7. The Subcommittee will have a Staff, composed of individuals assigned by member agencies, as required by the Director, and under the direction of a Director whom I shall designate. The Director may be compensated through the National Security Council from contributions by the member agencies. Individuals assigned to the Staff from each military service and by the Central Intelligence Agency should normally serve for two years and be so appointed that, to insure continuity, not more than fifty per cent will vacate each year.

8. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established is empowered under the terms of this Directive to call on any agency of the Government for relevant information, evaluations, and estimates, subject only to establishment of appropriate security regulations and procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as provided under paragraph 5 above.

9. Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report will be determined at the time by me.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

² Information such as that relating to war plans, new weapons and equipment, techniques and tactics for their employment, the vulnerability of U.S. defenses, and domestic and foreign intelligence sources and methods. [Footnote is in the original.]

69. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles¹

S/P-58-193-1A

Washington, July 10, 1958

SUBJECT

National Security Council Meeting, July 14, 1958

The items for discussion at this meeting are four reports called for by NSC action, approved by the President on April 2, 1958, on Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter. There will be oral briefings on the reports (attached as Tabs A to D). High points in them are:

1. ADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN NON-MILITARY DEFENSE. Principal conclusions are that adequate shielding is the only effective means of preventing radiation casualties; that there is no lack of essential scientific knowledge which warrants postponement of basic shelter construction; that if no action is to be taken on shelter construction, the decision must be based on other than technical reasons; that there is need to investigate many details in order to provide an effective and coordinated shelter system; that since a substantial program of shelter construction could not be completed for a period of years, supplementary research and studies should be carried out while the basic shelter structures are being constructed; and that although a shelter system is the essential core of an effective non-military defense system, it cannot of itself be regarded as sufficient to assure our survival as a nation.

2. THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH MIGHT BE TOLERABLE TO WORLD POPULATIONS. The report concludes that there would be adverse effects on populations of non-combatant countries of the Northern Hemisphere as a result of nuclear detonations in general war but they would not be as serious as some have assumed. This is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons used on both sides would have a total yield of 15 million kilotons. (15,000 megatons).

3. SURVIVAL OF POPULATION FOLLOWING A MASSIVE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. This report assumes an attack on the United States in 1965; fallout shelter will be provided for the population; and the war will be over after one exchange of nuclear weapons. Principal conclusions are:

a. Ninety-four million Americans (49 percent of the estimated 1965 population of 192 million) will survive the attack and its aftermath of fallout.

¹ Source: Briefing for July 14 NSC meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

b. Fallout shelter will save 67 million, while 27 million will survive in any event, since the areas where they live will be substantially free from fallout.

c. The people who emerge from fallout shelter will be able to survive in the postattack environment, provided that emergency food supplies have been located at suitable distribution points prior to the attack.

d. The nation will be able to rehabilitate itself, provided that measures have been taken to insure the availability of refined petroleum at key locations.

e. The struggle for survival and recovery will be long and difficult, and the rehabilitated United States may bear little resemblance to the pre-attack nation.

4. STATUS OF SHELTER MEASURES AS OF JUNE 30, 1958. Very little has been done to carry out the concept of shelter approved by the President on April 2, partly because no appropriation has been made for the purpose. It was then estimated that \$28.5 million would be required for the program in FY '59. The figure recently approved by the Budget Bureau is \$11.35 million but a request for this amount has not yet been sent to Capitol Hill. Because of the lateness of the time it is possible that no appropriation for shelter will be made at this session of Congress.

COMMENT. If, as indicated in report No. 3 above, fallout shelter could save 67 million Americans in a future war, the Government should move more rapidly and with more vigor to carry out the concept of shelter. This is especially necessary because the States and individual citizens will do little if the attitude of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government is lukewarm. The President has not yet mentioned the subject publicly.

RECOMMENDATION: That at the NSC meeting, which is expected merely to note these reports, you stress the need for more urgency in the shelter program because of the present and long-term danger to the United States from nuclear war.

Attachments:

Tabs A, B, C and D

70. Briefing Note for the 372d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 14, 1958

1. This meeting is chiefly concerned with the problem of shelter against radioactive fallout in case of nuclear attack—three studies previously requested by the Council and an interim report by Governor Hoegh on the status of shelter measures.

2. Following the meeting of the Council on January 16, the President approved a modification of then-existing civil defense policy by incorporating the *concept of fallout shelter* for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, subject to certain specified conditions. One of these conditions was that the implementation of the concept be deferred pending Council consideration of a report by an Interdepartmental Committee as to appropriate measures to carry out the concept.

3. On March 27 the Council considered the measures recommended by this Committee, together with recommendations by the Planning Board for certain further studies. Thereafter, the President approved (1) the taking of six specific measures (to be mentioned later) to carry out the concept of fallout shelter; (2) the submission of a report by Governor Hoegh on the status of these measures through July 1; (3) the making of the three studies recommended by the Planning Board; and (4) the deferring of action on five other measures proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee, pending consideration by the Council of the studies and the report.

4. Today, there will be presented the three studies and Governor Hoegh's report. The Council is not being asked to take any policy decision on these items at this time.

5. a. The *first* study was to make a special assessment as to (1) the adequacy of present research efforts by the several agencies of Government on the design and testing of shelters and on the effects of nuclear attack on humans; and (2) whether such research efforts should be better coordinated, integrated, or accelerated.

b. The *second* study was to appraise the upper limit of massive, concentrated nuclear detonations which could be tolerated by the peoples of the earth and, in fact, by the earth itself.

c. The *third* study was to explore the problem of survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter, after a massive nuclear exchange.

d. The *fourth* item is Governor Hoegh's status report.

¹ Source: Problem of shelter against fallout. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

6. First, then, the report on the “Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-Military Defense”—a study prepared by the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council, under the chairmanship of Dr. Lauriston Taylor of the Bureau of Standards, with the assistance of consultants from within and without the Government. The study lists research areas in which the initiation or acceleration of projects might save lives or enable survivors better to cope with their environment. One of the principal conclusions of the Committee appears to be that the low priority hitherto placed on civil defense makes it difficult to attract high calibre scientists into civil defense research projects.

DR. TAYLOR

MR. STANS—Comment.

7. *a.* The purpose of the *second* Study, to have been made by AEC in consultation with Dr. Killian, was to appraise the upper limits of *massive concentrated* nuclear detonations and their by-products which could be tolerated by the peoples of the world and by the world itself. The question had arisen in the minds of laymen as to whether a massive nuclear exchange, involving the detonation simultaneously or within a few hours of many millions of kilotons, could be sustained by the peoples of the earth and by the earth itself. It was desired to have the most qualified scientific opinion upon this question.

b. The formal study prepared by AEC assumes four instances of massive nuclear exchanges in the Northern Hemisphere (varying in intensity from 10,000 MTs to 1 million MTs) and examines the *average* effect of the radiation fallout therefrom on all peoples in the Northern Hemisphere *outside* of the areas in which the nuclear weapons were actually detonated. This study, although a partial answer to the question, does not deal with all aspects of the problems. Therefore, Dr. Libby has agreed to make a broader statement, to be followed by Dr. Killian.

DR. LIBBY

DR. KILLIAN

8. *a.* The *third* study is concerned with the survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter, after a massive nuclear exchange. ODM and FCDA requested Stanford Research Institute to undertake this study within the terms of an existing research contract. Three representatives from Stanford who worked on the study are here this morning.

b. The study conclusions have not been approved or disapproved by ODM and FCDA; and are still being evaluated by the successor agency, OCDM.

c. The study assumes (1) a hypothetical attack initiated by the Soviet Union upon the United States in 1965, directed at both military and

industrial targets; (2) that there will be one nuclear exchange *only*; (3) that fallout shelter will be available for the population of the United States, and that 90% of the people not killed by blast and thermal effects will enter and stay in shelter for the necessary periods of time (which will vary from a few hours to as many as 13 weeks); (4) that no assistance (food, medicine, etc.) will be available from *outside* the United States.

d. Because the assumed attack (a) takes place in 1965 (when more weapons, including ICBMs, will be available), and (b) uses more than one weapon per target, the severity of the attack—and the resulting fallout and casualties from fallout—is greater than we have seen in other hypothetical attacks (98 million fatal American casualties).

e. The details of the attack assumed are covered in Chapter II of the Study and form a framework for the later chapters, which deal with the problems faced by *survivors in a post-attack environment*.

MR. CANNELL, of the Stanford Research Institute, will speak on the problems of survival and recovery.

Questions.

9. The last of the four items is the report to be given by Governor Hoegh on the status of the six approved measures to carry out the concept of shelter. Those measures are: (a) research on shelter design, shelter habitation, shelter equipment, weapons effects on animals, etc.; (b) a limited progress of construction of shelter prototypes; (c) a sampling survey of existing structures; (d) a program of public education; (e) a “shelf” of emergency plans; and (f) incorporation of fallout shelter in appropriate *new* Federal civilian construction. At the time the President approved these measures in March, it was estimated that the cost to FCDA in FY 1959 of the first five items would approximate \$28.5 million. I now understand that the FCDA program for these five measures, as agreed upon with the Budget Bureau in late June, comes to only about \$11 million.

10. Action on five other measures proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee in March was deferred pending consideration by the Council of the reports you are hearing this morning (NSC Action No. 1882-*d*). Those five measures are further shelter prototype construction, pilot studies in selected communities, shelters in existing civilian Federal buildings, and shelters in existing and new military construction. I understand that OCDM is not seeking Council approval *now* for those additional measures, but will come back to the Council later in this calendar year after further evaluation of the studies presented today.

GOVERNOR HOEGH

cc: Mr. Harr
Mr. Lay
Dr. Gleason
Mr. Haskins

71. Memorandum of Discussion at 372d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 14, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 372nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, July 14, 1958

Present at the 372nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Gerard C. Smith for the Secretary of State; and the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for Public Workd Planning; the President, National Academy of Sciences; Dr. Willard F. Libby, Member, Atomic Energy Commission; Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell for the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for the Atoms for Peace Program, for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Deputy Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization; Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; Gordon Gray, NSC Consultant; Charles A. Haskins, Member, NSC Special Staff; Dr. Lauriston Taylor, National Bureau of Standards; Richard Park, National Academy of Sciences; William L. White, Rogers Cannell, and George Hopkins, Stanford Research Institute; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

**1. ADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN
NON-MILITARY DEFENSE**

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1, 1958)

General Cutler briefed the Council on this and the following three studies. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes

¹Source: Agenda item 1: Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-military Defense; Agenda item 2: The Number of Nuclear Weapons Which Might Be Tolerable to World Populations; Agenda item 3: Survival of Population Following a Massive Nuclear Exchange; Agenda item 4: Status of Shelter Measures as of June 30, 1958; Agenda item 5: National Security Council and NSC Planning Board Meetings, September 1947 Through July 21, 1958. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) He then called on Dr. Lauriston Taylor to summarize the contents of the subject report.

Dr. Taylor's summary was related to the seven Conclusions set forth in the Summary at the beginning of the written report. (A copy of the report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Dr. Taylor's presentation, General Cutler suggested, by way of Council action, that the above-mentioned report be referred to Governor Hoegh for study and such recommendation to the Council as he might deem appropriate.

General Cutler next called upon the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Stans pointed out that, as the report itself said, there was certainly a lack of coordination in some of the areas of research in non-military defense programs. The most effective use to which the report could be put would be to fill in these gaps in coordination.

The President counseled Governor Hoegh to pay particular attention to the 6th and 7th Conclusions, which seemed to him to deal largely with procedural problems.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject prepared, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1882-*b*-(1)-(2), by the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, with the advice and assistance of personnel from a number of other committees of the Academy-Research Council and of individual consultants, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 1, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by Dr. Lauriston Taylor.

b. Referred the aforementioned report on the subject to the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, for study of the Conclusions contained therein (especially Conclusions Nos. 6 and 7 on page 2 of the Summary), and such recommendations to the Council as he may deem appropriate.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, for implementation.

2. THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH MIGHT BE TOLERABLE TO WORLD POPULATIONS

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 7, 1958)

After a further short briefing by General Cutler, Dr. Libby was called upon to comment on the written report. He pointed out that the world-wide effect of a nuclear war fought with "dirty" bombs having a megatonnage of 15,000, would result in serious effects on the health of the non-combatant peoples of the world, but would not actually lead to the end of life on the earth. The main point was that these effects

depend particularly on whether the bombs detonated are “dirty” or “clean”, because the world-wide effects of the nuclear exchange (as opposed to the effects on the combatant nations) derive from radioactive fallout. Certainly a nuclear exchange involving the detonation of 15,000 megatons would push the people of the world toward the limit of tolerance.

Dr. Libby went on to point out that it was extremely difficult to estimate the biological effects of such a detonation on the peoples of the non-combatant nations, simply because we do not know enough about such biological effects. On the other hand, with respect to the physical effects of such a holocaust, these were easier to establish, on the basis of some experience—for example, in the field of weather. Dr. Libby stated that the physical effects of such a detonation of nuclear weapons would be quite minor.

General Cutler pointed out the Planning Board’s fear that the concentrated explosion of 15,000 megatons would have particularly grave effects because of concentration. As a result of Dr. Libby’s statements and the conclusions of the written study, the Planning Board was now less fearful. General Cutler then asked Dr. Killian if he had any comments to make.

Dr. Killian stated that he and his people had not participated in the making of this study, but he was inclined to agree that Dr. Libby’s views were certainly conservative and perhaps even pessimistic. At the very least, it was a reasonable statement of the problem.

The President inquired as to the assumptions in the study regarding the mix between “clean” and “dirty” bombs. Dr. Libby replied that the assumed mix had been 50–50 between fission and fusion.

Secretary Anderson inquired the reason behind the apparent lack of Russian concern about “clean” nuclear weapons. Does this lack of concern derive from the Soviets’ realization of our superior knowledge in the field of making “clean” weapons? Dr. Libby stated that we did not know the reason for the apparent lack of concern, a statement in which Admiral Strauss concurred, adding, however, that the apparent lack of concern in the Soviet Union over the “clean” bomb may reflect merely what is said in Soviet public statements and not what the Soviets are thinking about in their laboratories.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the report on the subject showing the radiation effects on non-combatant population of a massive, concentrated exchange of nuclear weapons, prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to NSC Action No. 1882–b–(1)–(b) and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 7, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by Dr. Willard F. Libby, Member of the Atomic Energy Commission.

3. SURVIVAL OF POPULATION FOLLOWING A MASSIVE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 27, 1958)

After a short briefing, General Cutler called on Mr. Rogers Cannell, of the Stanford Research Institute, to summarize the contents of the written report by the Stanford Research Institute. (A copy of the SRI report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) After Mr. Cannell had set forth the general conclusion that both survival and recovery were possible if the nation possessed fallout shelter in 1965, General Cutler noted that the qualified optimism of the report rested on two assumptions: First, that the Soviets would make a single nuclear attack only on the United States, with no repeats; and second, that 90% of the American people who were not killed by blast and thermal effects would make effective use of the fallout shelter provided.

The President inquired as to the ways and means of decontamination, to which question Mr. Cannell provided an answer.

The President then inquired whether it was fair to conclude from the Stanford study that if we do undertake to create a fallout shelter system in the United States, every American should do his best to provide the shelter with emergency food rations and emergency fuel storage. The President thought that every industrial plant should have underground fuel storage and each American household ought to store up food for use in a shelter in the event of an emergency. Mr. Cannell agreed with the President, and pointed out that it would be extremely difficult for the average American to know how much food or fuel to store, inasmuch as he would not know whether he would have to stay in his shelter for as little as three days or as much as thirteen weeks. As a result, many people would simply give no thought to the problem.

Governor Hoegh commented that the FCDA had advocated that every individual stockpile in his own home a supply of food and other necessities designed to last for two weeks. The requirements thereafter should be taken care of by the public authorities of the community.

Secretary Anderson asked how, with so many people in shelter, anyone would know when to come out. Governor Hoegh and General Cutler attempted to answer Secretary Anderson's question.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the report on the subject (including its assumptions) prepared, pursuant to paragraph I-b-(3) of NSC 5807/1 ("Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter"), by the Stanford Research Institute and transmitted by the reference memorandum of

June 27, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by Mr. Rogers Cannell, of the Stanford Research Institute.

4. STATUS OF SHELTER MEASURES AS OF JUNE 30, 1958

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1, 1958)

Governor Hoegh stressed that it was the note of prudence rather than the note of alarm which had been emphasized in the FCDA program on shelter measures. The program had been given to the American people in a low key. He then went on to summarize the contents of his report, a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting. After concluding his summary, Governor Hoegh stressed the importance of Congressional provision of sufficient funds if the shelter program was to be carried forward along the lines suggested. Governor Hoegh felt that the program could be successfully accomplished if Congress provided \$13 million. After Congress had acted on the appropriation, Governor Hoegh indicated his desire to present to the Council a supplementary status report.

The President asked several questions about the construction characteristics of shelters, particularly as to means of entrance and exit. These questions were answered by Governor Hoegh.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration pursuant to NSC Action No. 1882-*c* and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 1, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization.

b. Noted that the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, would submit to the Council a supplementary status report following Congressional action on FY 1959 appropriations, and appropriate recommendations on shelter measures (including those on which action was deferred by NSC Action No. 1882-*d*) in the light of Congressional action on appropriations and of further study of the reports presented in Items 1 through 3 above.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, ODCM, for appropriate action.

5. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND NSC PLANNING BOARD MEETINGS, SEPTEMBER 1947 THROUGH JULY 21, 1958

General Cutler asked the President's indulgence while he briefly explained a tabulation comparing the number of meetings of the National Security Council and the NSC Planning Board during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. General Cutler stated that he realized that more important than the number of meetings was the quality of the actions taken by the Council, but, being possessed of a finite mind, he could not resist giving the Council members this

tabulation. There was no comment. (A copy of General Cutler's tabulation of Council and Planning Board meetings from September 1947 through July 21, 1958, is filed in the minutes of the meeting; another is attached to this memorandum.)

The National Security Council:

Noted the tabulation of Council and Planning Board meetings, from the establishment of the Council in 1947 through July 21, 1958, as distributed at the meeting by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

* * * * *

NOTE: Following completion of Item 5 above, the President held a special meeting in his office to consider current developments in the Near East, in the light of a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance at this meeting were the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Gordon Gray, and other staff officials.

S. Everett Gleason

72. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 15, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1): NSC Review of Military Paragraphs 13 and 14 Scheduled on July 24, 1958

I

Your concept of main reliance on a capability for massive retaliation to deter Communist aggression has served the free world well. You have, however, recently expressed doubts as to the continuing validity of this concept. These doubts are shared by W, C, ARA, FE, NEA and IO which believe that the time has come to adopt a new concept placing greater emphasis on varied and flexible capabilities. (See Tabs A-F.)

Doubt has arisen because:

¹ Source: NSC review of military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1; recommendation for a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

1. Given present and prospective Soviet nuclear capability, our decision to launch massive retaliation would also be a decision to commit national suicide. (The JCS February 1957 statement, "Strategic Concept", attributes to both the US and the USSR "the capability to destroy each other even after a surprise attack.")

2. Our allies, and in time the Communists, will become increasingly doubtful that we would launch massive retaliation unless nuclear attack on the US itself had taken place or was imminent.

3. Our allies (and in time perhaps our own people) will also become increasingly doubtful that massive retaliation is a rational response to anything less than Communist aggression on a scale that clearly threatens major free world areas—e.g. Western Europe as a whole.

4. Communist aggression is likely to be of an ambiguous nature which neither our allies nor our own people would recognize as warranting massive retaliation.

5. Our capability for massive retaliation will continue to be improved at the expense of other capabilities with the result that we shall become increasingly dependent upon a capability which we shall be increasingly inhibited from using.

EUR, while recognizing the force of some of the preceding considerations and sharing the concern of other offices at the growing inflexibility of US capabilities, believe that "a possible revision of the US strategic concept requires far more consideration than the Department has yet been able to give." (See Tab G)

II

I believe that continued main reliance on a capability for massive retaliation entails unacceptable risks to the US. This reliance is gradually limiting our freedom of action to two choices: total nuclear war with unimaginable death and devastation, or cumulative retreat before Communist menace and subversion ending in the isolation of the United States and the perversion of "its fundamental values and institutions."

In certain Far Eastern situations we may already be limited to a choice between total nuclear war and retreat. You will recall that the recent State-Defense study of capabilities for limited military operations projected immediate US nuclear retaliation in the hypothetical event of substantial Communist aggression against Quemoy and Matsu, Taiwan or the ROK. Nuclear retaliation of the magnitude indicated in the study would, in the opinion of a number of qualified State and CIA officers, entail grave risk of nuclear counter-strikes by the Communists which could lead to progressive expansion of the hostilities to general war. The President has directed the preparation of an NIE evaluating this risk.

III

The NSC agenda for July 24 includes reconsideration of the military strategy paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy (paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1).² If as a result of Council discussion the President confirms those paragraphs, your concept will continue to shape military plans and weapons development. Unless you take the lead, it seems likely that the paragraphs will be confirmed and movement toward a new concept deferred at least until mid-1959.

Delay would, I believe, be unfortunate. Although your recent discussions with Secretary McElroy on the strategic concept produced no tangible result, there is considerable evidence that your initiative has stimulated new thinking in the Pentagon, particularly in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. If we could move quickly to a *joint* State-Defense review of an alternative concept (in contrast to the unilateral Defense review which presumably took place between your two meetings with Secretary McElroy), a practicable new concept might emerge.

You will recall that General Cutler circulated to the NSC an alternative version of paragraph 14 of NSC 5810/1. (See Tab I.) W, C, FE and IO specifically endorse the Cutler alternative. I understand, however, that Defense and the JCS strongly oppose that version. I accordingly do not recommend that you seek NSC agreement to Cutler's paragraph 14 on July 24.

Recommendations

It is recommended that

1. You inform the Secretary of Defense that you have concluded that we must now begin to move toward a new strategic concept.
2. You suggest to the Secretary of Defense that you jointly propose to the President that (a) NSC consideration of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 be deferred until early October and (b) State and Defense immediately undertake a Joint study of an alternative strategic concept on the basis of which the two Departments will prepare, and circulate to the NSC by the end of September, an agreed revision of paragraphs 13 and 14.

Approved____JFD____
Disapproved_____
Date_____

²(See Tab H). [Footnote is in the original.]

73. Note From Howe (S/S) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 17, 1958

THE SECRETARY

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1); NSC Review of Military Paragraphs 13 and 14 Scheduled on July 24, 1958

On July 16 you approved recommendations contained in Mr. Gerard Smith's memorandum of July 15; 1) that you inform the Secretary of Defense that you have concluded that we must now begin to move toward a new strategic concept and 2) that you suggest to Mr. McElroy that you jointly propose to the President that NSC consideration of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 be deferred until October and State and Defense immediately undertake the joint study of an alternative strategic concept (Tab II).

Mr. Smith has drafted a letter to Mr. McElroy for your signature along the lines of the recommendations that you approved yesterday (Tab I).

Fisher Howe

¹ Source: Approval of recommendation for a new strategic concept; transmits draft letter to McElroy from Dulles. Top Secret Attachments (not included). 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

74. Memorandum of Conversation¹

S/P-58203-3A

Washington, July 18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

DOD/ISA

State—S/P

Mr. John N. Irwin II

Mr. Gerard C. Smith

Gen. Alonzo P. Fox

Mr. Elbert G. Mathews

Mr. Robert H. B. Wade

Mr. Smith told the DOD representatives that the Secretary of State would probably send the attached letter to the Secretary of Defense

¹ Source: New strategic concept. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

and informed them of its contents. He explained that the letter reflected growing State concern over our current strategic concept which seems in a very wide range of contingencies to face us with a choice between doing nothing and moving to general war which, according to the JCS, could result in the destruction of the US. Many people in State believe that we must develop doctrine and capabilities that would afford us some intermediate choices.

Mr. Irwin indicated that DOD would be reluctant to have NSC action on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 further postponed. DOD had submitted to Secretary McElroy for signature a memorandum to the NSC urging confirmation of the two paragraphs. A copy of this memorandum was displayed. *Inter alia*, it said that there were no "present developments" that changed the "military undertakings" required of the US, that the US and its allies had adequate limited war capabilities which were in any case being improved and that there could be no limited war between the US and the USSR.

Mr. Smith commented that State was less concerned with the formalities of NSC endorsement of the two paragraphs than with reaching an understanding with DOD that there would be a thorough review of our current strategic concept with recognition of its inevitable inacceptability in a few years time. We must begin to plan and prepare for an alternative strategic concept allowing us a wider range of responses to Communist aggression.

Mr. Mathews pointed out that the DOD memorandum perpetuated and strengthened the current, orthodox interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. If the NSC confirmed paragraphs 13 and 14 on the basis of this paper, there would be little room for the re-examination desired by State.

The DOD representatives stressed the budgetary difficulties of changing our strategic concept, our manpower deficiencies as compared with the Soviet bloc and the strong probability of any US-USSR clash, even if we desired and had the capability to deal with it in a limited way, developing into total war.

As the discussion ended, Mr. Smith again emphasized State's conviction that we must begin a thorough re-examination of doctrine and capabilities.

75. Letter From McElroy to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 18, 1958

Dear Foster:

I am sending the enclosed Memorandum on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1) to the National Security Council today. In view of our recent conversations on this subject I wanted you to have a copy simultaneously.

You will note that this Department considers that the military section of NSC 5810/1 provides adequately for this segment of our security policy. Our belief is that there is plenty of flexibility in this statement to let us adjust our balance of forces as may be desirable. At the same time, by retaining the present language we do not suggest to any of our allies that there is any retreat in the offing from our past policy of firm resolution to use all required military force for whatever may be the situation that must be met.

I think it would be highly constructive if State and Defense might have reached a common point of view on this matter before the meeting of the Security Council next Thursday. If you find difficulty in accepting the position we have taken in the attached, perhaps you would phone me and give me your views.

Sincerely,

Neil

¹Source: Department of Defense position on retaining current strategic concept. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

76. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 19, 1958

SUBJECT

Military Paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy Paper (NSC 5810/1)

Secretary McElroy has formalized the DOD position on this matter by sending in a memorandum to the NSC urging that the existing “military” paragraphs of the Basic National Security Policy paper be

¹Source: Question of a new strategic concept. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

retained. (*Tab A*). Before knowing of McElroy's action, we prepared for your signature a letter proposing that the NSC postpone decision on this matter pending a further joint State-Defense study. (*Tab B*).

In view of this difference between State and Defense, I suggest the following procedure:

That you call McElroy and point out the desirability of keeping this matter as "private" as possible. To this end you might suggest that Gordon Gray at the NSC meeting merely state for the record that it has been agreed that paragraphs 13 and 14 of the existing paper are to stand unchanged. This acquiescence by you in the existing language would be based on the expectation that the President, at a subsequent private meeting with yourself, McElroy and the JCS, would direct that this whole matter be further urgently studied.

You may recall that at the last NSC meeting on this subject General Max Taylor seemed to agree with your diagnosis of the short-life expectancy of our present strategic concept, but he expressed the opinion that within existing budgetary limitations important steps in the way of planning and weapon research and development could be accomplished to permit us subsequently to live with a modified strategic concept. Perhaps the President would direct a study of the implications of the type of program General Taylor had in mind.

In addition, it would be your hope that the President would direct the Joint Defense-State study of the possibility of formulating a new strategic concept which you propose in your letter to Secretary McElroy (*Tab A*).

Gerard C. Smith

77. Letter From John Foster Dulles to McElroy¹

S/P-58202-3A

Washington, July 19, 1958

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is my understanding that at the next meeting of the NSC on July 24 you are to report on the key military paragraphs (13 and 14) of NSC 5810/1.

¹ Source: Question of a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

It seems to me that, in the light of our two recent conversations concerning the “strategic concept”, much work still remains to be done in our two Departments before a final recommendation can be made to the President concerning these paragraphs. If you agree, I suggest that you advise the President that both of our Departments would like to have this matter deferred for several months.

In the meantime, I suggest that we urgently undertake a joint study to determine whether we can begin to move toward a new strategic concept. I do not conceive that we should abruptly abandon our present concept, but I am increasingly convinced that we shall have to adopt a more flexible alternative within the next few years. Therefore, I believe planning should now start for the weapons systems and doctrines which will be needed to support such a change.

If you agree, I will ask Assistant Secretary Gerard C. Smith to stand ready to meet with your people to develop the necessary study for our consideration. It might be well to inform the President also of our intended joint study.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

78. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

OD-NSC-58225-33

Washington, July 21, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5810/1

B. NSC Actions Nos. 1903 and 1934

The enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, setting forth recommendations by the Department of Defense relative to the military elements of national strategy in NSC 5810/1, including paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No.

¹ Source: Transmits McElroy's memorandum on strategic concept (print Document 30). Top Secret; Limited Distribution, 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

1903-*b*-(3), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, July 24, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum From McElroy to the NSC

Washington, June 18, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5810/1
- B. NSC Action No. 1903-*b*-(3)
- C. NSC Action No. 1934

1. Transmitted herewith are Department of Defense comments and recommendations pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903-*b*-(3). In the formulation of these views, the conclusions and recommendations of the State-Defense study, "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961", the memorandum signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense forwarding that study to the National Security Council, and the comments on that study developed by the Planning Board and forwarded by the Chairman of the Planning Board, have been seriously studied and taken into account.

2. As a result of the review by the Department of Defense of the military aspects of Basic Policy, it is concluded that there have been no recent developments which change fundamentally the major undertakings for which the military should be prepared. The major threat to the security of the United States continues, and will continue in the foreseeable future, to reside in the capability of the Soviet Union to precipitate and wage general nuclear war against the United States. Therefore, the highest priority in our military effort must continue to be given to the deterrent to all-out nuclear war.

3. In this connection, it is the intention of the Department of Defense to insure that this deterrent is adequate for its purpose but not excessive. It is believed that the conclusions of the Department of Defense study on Defensive and Offensive Weapons Systems, which

will be presented to the NSC upon completion, will be pertinent in this regard.

4. The Department of Defense fully recognizes the need for flexibility in U.S. forces, to the maximum degree attainable within available resources, in order to deter or meet limited war. Both the limited war study and our recent thorough examination of our force structure have revealed a significant U.S. and allied capability to cope with a wide variety of limited war situations, and efforts are continuing toward the improvement of this capability.

5. Certain problem areas relating to limited military operations are raised by the study on this subject, and others are highlighted in the memorandum from the Chairman of the Planning Board. These problem areas have significant bearing on our capabilities for limited war and must receive continuing attention in our national planning—military, political, and economic—in order to insure the most effective use of available resources. The questions raised will receive continuing attention in our military planning.

6. In earlier NSC discussions a question was raised concerning the implications of increasing doubt on the part of our European allies that the United States would risk its own devastation by “massive retaliation” in response to aggression not directly involving U.S. territory. There was expressed the possible need for a modification of U.S. strategy in order to convince our allies that their security is not subject to an “all-or-nothing” decision by the United States. The problem raises the issue of whether limited war with the USSR is possible.

7. The Department of Defense has given careful consideration to this question. It is our considered opinion that war with the USSR cannot be held to limited operations and limited objectives. Moreover, to imply that we might seek to hold a war with the USSR to limited operations and limited objectives would involve a dangerous weakening of our deterrent position and certainly have a deleterious effect on the attitude of our allies.

8. Because of the almost certain adverse effect on our over-all deterrent inherent in any modification of strategy, the Department of Defense does not favor any such modification at this time for the purpose of reassuring our allies, nor does it favor any revision of the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1 which can be interpreted as a departure from current strategy. The Department of Defense does subscribe to any measures designed to allay doubts on the part of our allies as to the firmness of our purpose and intentions and to reinforce their confidence and determination, along the lines contemplated in paragraph 17 of NSC 5810/1, which states in part: “. . . In particular, to counter existing uncertainty, the United States should reaffirm that its nuclear weapons will be used, as necessary, to defend the Free World interests.”

9. In the light of the foregoing, the Department of Defense considers that the military section of NSC 5810/1 adequately sets forth the military role in national strategy and provides the necessary basic guidance for development of the U.S. and Free World force structure in the national security interest. Accordingly, the Department of Defense recommends no change in the military section of NSC 5810/1 and recommends adoption of paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, as already tentatively approved.

/s/ Neil McElroy

79. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100-7-58

Washington, July 22, 1958

SINO-SOVIET AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO US USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WARS IN THE FAR EAST

THE PROBLEM

This estimate was requested by the NSC as a result of a study prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with appropriate participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, on *US and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961*, 29 May 1958. Among the limitations under which this study was prepared were that it did not examine US and Allied capabilities against overtly employed Soviet armed forces; nor against an enemy employing nuclear weapons, since the latter case was construed as overt employment of Soviet forces. On the other hand, it was assumed that the US used nuclear weapons selectively from the outset in four hypothetical cases involving Communist aggression in the Far East.

This estimate examines whether or not the enemy would employ nuclear weapons if the US employed them, and assesses the impact on world attitudes if either the US or both sides employed them. It confines itself to assessing the above reactions in the four hypothetical cases given in the State-Defense study where the US employed nuclear weapons at the outset in response to Communist aggression through mid-1961: (1) North Korean invasion of South Korea, (2) Chinese

¹ Source: "Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to US Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East." Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 12 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.

Communist attack on Quemoy and Matsu, (3) Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan, and (4) North Vietnam attack on South Vietnam and Laos. It is based on the hypothetical situations which are developed in Appendices A–D of the State-Defense study and which are summarized at the outset of Sections III–VI of this estimate.

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that if the US used nuclear weapons in meeting Bloc local aggression in the Far East, there would be a grave risk that the Communists would retaliate in kind. Indeed any Far East Communist state, taking into account the possibility of such US action, would be unlikely to launch a local aggression without having received assurances of Soviet support.

2. We estimate that, though the USSR will be determined to avoid courses of action gravely risking general war throughout the period concerned, it probably calculates that its growing military capabilities likewise increasingly deter the US from taking such risks. Therefore, the Soviets would probably estimate that local Communist use of nuclear weapons in direct and localized response to their use by the US would not necessarily lead to expansion of hostilities into general war, and they would under certain circumstances be prepared to use such weapons.

3. If the Communists retaliated with nuclear weapons, they would attempt to do so in such a manner as to limit the risks of general war. The USSR itself would probably prefer to avoid open involvement, and would probably provide the necessary weapons to Communist China or North Korea, though retaining Soviet control. Moreover, the Communists would probably confine their use of nuclear weapons within limits comparable to those observed by the US.

4. The likelihood of Communist retaliation with nuclear weapons would be greatest if the US mounted nuclear attacks deep into Communist China, creating a situation to which Moscow and Peiping would almost certainly feel compelled to respond by attacks on US bases and nuclear capable forces in the Far East. If, in the case of Communist aggression against South Korea or Taiwan the US nuclear response were limited to Korea or the Straits area, the Communists would probably respond in kind in the same area. In the case of local aggression against Quemoy and Matsu or South Vietnam, the Communist response would be less certain. If US nuclear attacks were confined to the immediate Quemoy and Matsu areas or Vietnam and Laos, the Communists might attempt to win without using nuclear weapons or seek to break off the action. However, even if the US nuclear response were limited to the immediate area of Korea, Taiwan, Quemoy and Matsu, or Vietnam and

Laos, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Communists would respond in kind, possibly including nuclear attacks against US bases in the area selected to minimize the additional risk of general war.

5. Many Free World governments and countries would be impressed and encouraged by the prompt US resistance to Communist aggression, but the US use of nuclear weapons would arouse widespread fear of general war and would tend to obscure Communist responsibility for initiating hostilities. The US would be widely condemned by popular opinion, especially in Asia, for the use of nuclear weapons. We believe that the adverse reactions would overshadow the favorable effects in most countries.

6. The adverse reaction would be mitigated if the US response quickly halted the fighting without causing large civilian casualties, and respect for US power would be enhanced. Even so, the stigma resulting from the US initiation of the use of nuclear weapons would not be removed. On the other hand, if the Communists responded with nuclear weapons and hostilities were prolonged and expanded, fears of general war would rise even higher, and great pressure would be exerted on the US to reach a settlement.²

² The Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff, agrees with the principal conclusions that:

a. US nuclear response to Communist aggression would be likely to result in Bloc response with nuclear attacks in the first two cases examined and less likely in the second two cases.

b. Considerable adverse political and psychological reaction, particularly in Asia, would initially result from US nuclear attacks.

The DDI, Joint Staff, disagrees, however, with certain lesser estimative judgments and estimative yardsticks applied in these conclusions and in the supporting discussion. He believes:

a. The paper fails to recognize adequately the meaning of *selective* US use of nuclear weapons: specifically, it tends to equate "selectivity" to geographical limitations on target areas. "Selectivity" also applies to weapons yield, precise target choice, and accuracy of delivery. Given these factors, references to "heavy civilian casualties" appear incompatible with the basic assumption.

b. The paper reaches certain qualitative judgments as to the relative weights of adverse popular reaction and favorable popular reaction to US nuclear attacks: these relative measurements are largely conjectural. Such judgments also appear to fail to give due weight to many factors which would influence popular reactions in addition to the fact that the United States employed nuclear weapons. Some of these additional factors would be the initial success achieved by US military forces, the public statements of US governmental leaders concerning US objectives and intentions, and the extent to which popular opinion clearly recognized the military action as resulting from Communist aggression. There would certainly be both applause and boos; to say that in most countries the boos would drown out the applause—as in the words "... would overshadow ..."—is to attempt a precision of estimating not considered feasible for the hypothetical situations being analyzed. [Footnote is in the original.]

DISCUSSION

I. THE GENERAL SINO-SOVIET MILITARY REACTION

A. Factors Bearing on the Initial Communist Decision to Attack

7. In our view the crucial determinant in any Sino-Soviet decision to initiate local aggression, or subsequently to respond in kind to US use of nuclear weapons in countering such aggression, would be the Sino-Soviet estimate of the resultant risks of general war. We continue to estimate that respect for US nuclear power will remain such that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese Communists are likely to pursue courses of action which in their judgment seriously risk general war. Largely for this reason, we do not believe that any of the four hypothetical cases of Communist aggression considered in this estimate is likely to occur through mid-1961.

8. We must assume, however, for the purposes of this estimate, that such aggression has taken place. Several consequences flow from this assumption. Most important, the Communists would have launched this aggression only after careful calculation of the likelihood of US intervention and of the resultant risks of general war. Both US statements and the general posture of the US forces in the Far East would almost certainly lead them to calculate that US intervention with nuclear weapons would be the only immediately effective US response.

9. The most likely calculations, therefore, under which the Communists would decide to launch local aggression in the Far East would be that the chances that the US would be deterred from even a local nuclear response were sufficient to justify taking the risk and that even if the US did respond, their own capabilities were sufficient both to cope with this reaction and to deter the US from broadening the conflict to general war. This circumstance might arise in the case of a substantial increase in Communist capabilities vis-à-vis those of the US, especially in the Far East—as for example by the possible stationing of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery vehicles in Communist China. Particularly in this situation, the Bloc leaders might estimate that the US would be unwilling to accept the risks and the adverse Free World reactions involved in responding with nuclear weapons to Bloc attacks, and being unable to respond effectively in any other manner, would choose not to do so at all.

10. We believe it most likely that any Communist aggression in the Far East would be undertaken only in full consultation with Moscow, since the Chinese, North Koreans, or North Vietnamese would almost certainly insist upon certain guarantees of Soviet support in event of US retaliation beyond their capabilities to counter. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of unilateral action on the part of the Chinese Communists, based on their calculation that despite Soviet reluctance

the USSR would be compelled to come to their support if the US replied with nuclear weapons. We regard such adventurism as unlikely, although possibly less so in the case of Quemoy and Matsu.

11. In any event, regardless of their estimate of the likelihood of US nuclear intervention, the Communists almost certainly would have made plans and preparations to meet this contingency. If the decision to launch a local war had been taken well in advance, Moscow might have already provided Peiping with some nuclear weapons and perhaps advanced means of delivery, both to deter a US nuclear response and to counter it if it came. We believe that in any event the Chinese will press the USSR for such weapons, and that the USSR may introduce these weapons into Communist China by 1961, although they will almost certainly remain under Soviet control. Alternatively, the Soviets might promise the Chinese to provide them quickly with such capabilities if required. Moscow would also probably attempt to deter the US at the time of the aggression by threats of intervention in case the US uses nuclear weapons.

B. Factors Bearing on the Subsequent Communist Reaction

12. Once Communist local aggression in the Far East had been launched, and the US had responded locally with nuclear weapons, Moscow and Peiping would face a critical decision. Broadly speaking, their reaction might range from abrupt termination of the conflict or seeking negotiations, through continuing the fight with conventional forces, to replying in kind with nuclear weapons.

13. As already stated, we believe the crucial determinant would be their estimate of the resultant risks of general war. Moscow and Peiping would be acutely conscious that the risks of general war had materially increased. The very fact of US use of nuclear weapons would reflect US determination to accept some risks. We believe, however, that if they had initially launched the aggression anticipating a US nuclear response and if they were confident of their capability to deal with it locally, they would promptly react with nuclear weapons themselves.

14. If, on the other hand, Moscow and Peiping had miscalculated our response, they might be more disposed to seek a quick settlement on the basis of the *status quo ante* rather than further increasing the risk of general war by a nuclear response of their own. Even in this case of initial miscalculation, however, the Soviets might regard their over-all nuclear deterrent power as making US resort to general war sufficiently unlikely that they could afford to take the risk of making a nuclear response. Moreover, they would have powerful additional reasons for a nuclear response, among them: (a) considerations of prestige, including a Soviet feeling that having threatened dire consequences if the US intervened with nuclear weapons, they must save

face by following through; (b) the vulnerability of the US bases in the Far East; (c) on the Soviet side, the importance of supporting their chief ally; and (d) the damage to the Soviet deterrent posture if the USSR failed to respond.

15. The manner in which the US employed nuclear weapons could have a critical bearing on whether or not the Communists made a nuclear response. If such use were highly selective, and above all if confined to the immediate area of hostilities, the Communists might not respond with nuclear weapons. But especially if the US launched nuclear strikes deep into Communist China, Peiping would almost certainly appeal desperately for Soviet assistance, and we believe that the Soviets would feel compelled to come to the support of their chief ally. They would probably calculate that they could not afford the loss to the Bloc and the blow to their own prestige and position of a crippling of Communist Chinese power.

16. The Communist reaction would also be conditioned by their appreciation of the general US posture at the time. They would look to other US military movements, the degree of alert in the US, and US statements for evidence of whether the US was preparing to fight a prolonged local war if necessary, to expand the conflict, or to accept a return to the *status quo*. In this connection US statements of the limited nature of our objectives, if consistent with our military actions, might have considerable impact. Such statements might tend to reassure the Communists that a negotiated termination of the conflict on an acceptable basis was feasible. On the other hand, these statements might reassure them that their use of nuclear weapons locally would not lead the US to broaden the conflict.

17. If it appeared to the Communists that the US was not prepared to expand the conflict or to conduct a prolonged war, they would probably be more inclined to continue the fighting using nuclear weapons selectively. If on the other hand the US, while limiting its initial nuclear response, nevertheless appeared determined to press on to victory, and prepared to expand the conflict in the Far East if necessary, the Communist reaction would tend to be more cautious. They might still launch some nuclear attacks to reduce US strike capabilities in an attempt to achieve a stalemate, but they would probably also move to secure an early end to the conflict.

C. The Modes of Sino-Soviet Nuclear Response

18. In case the Communists decided to react with nuclear weapons if the US had used such weapons in the Far East, Peiping and especially Moscow would nevertheless do so in such a manner as to limit the risks that hostilities would expand into general war. For this reason we believe that the Soviets would be loath to intervene directly

through using identifiable Soviet forces to attack US bases and forces. They would probably prefer covertly to provide the necessary weapons and support to the Chinese Communists or possibly the North Koreans. We believe they would also calculate that the limited US base structure in the Far East would be highly vulnerable even to attack by Chinese Communist forces alone. But the Soviets would provide extensive aid and support, extending possibly to "volunteers." They would almost certainly provide Soviet forces to participate in the air defense of Communist China. Moreover, in event of widespread US attacks on Communist China, we cannot exclude the possibility of open Soviet intervention in the Far East.

19. Peiping and Moscow's desire to limit the risks of general war also would probably lead them to confine their nuclear attacks within limits comparable to those observed by the US. If US use of these weapons was confined to the immediate combat area, we believe that the Communists would similarly limit their response. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that even if US use of these weapons were confined to the immediate combat area, the Communists might also launch nuclear attacks against US bases in the Western Pacific selected so as to minimize the danger of general war. If the US attacked targets deep in Communist China, the enemy would probably react by attacking selected US bases in the Western Pacific.

II. GENERAL FREE WORLD REACTIONS

20. Free World reactions to a US response with nuclear weapons to Communist aggression in the Far East would vary widely. Provided that the aggression were clearly identifiable, most of our allies, and probably some neutral opinion, would be inclined at least initially to view with approval our prompt and forthright aid to the victim of attack. However, this feeling would be overshadowed by fear that nuclear war in the Far East would spread into general war. Such apprehension would rise greatly if the US nuclear counterattack were of such a nature—including for example strikes deep into Communist China—that it appeared to be in excess of the force required, and particularly if the Communists employed nuclear weapons in retaliation. Even if the war were localized there would be fear that one side or the other might subsequently broaden it. These developments would lead to strong pressures on the part of other governments to seek a prompt end to hostilities.

21. Along with Free World fear of expanding hostilities would be a widespread adverse emotional reaction to US use of nuclear weapons. Should these weapons inflict large casualties, particularly among civilians, it would intensify this feeling. If, however, US use of nuclear weapons led to a quick victory without large civilian casualties this

attitude of repugnance would tend to diminish and to be offset by confidence in US deterrent power.

22. The adverse reaction to US use of nuclear weapons would be particularly strong throughout most of Asia. Here such use would tend to be looked upon as callous white indifference to the lives of Asians. Indeed the inflicting of large-scale casualties on Asian civilians might have enduringly adverse consequences for the anti-Communist position in Asia. The reaction in Japan would be especially adverse, in view of deep Japanese emotional antagonism to the use of nuclear weapons, and Japan would probably not allow US use of bases on its territory. The adverse reaction might be mitigated to a limited extent if the Communists in turn employed nuclear weapons, but the US would still incur the odium of having used them first.

III. THE CASE OF NORTH KOREAN INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA

23. *Assumptions.* It is assumed for the purpose of this estimate that at a time when the situation in South Korea is confused following President Rhee's incapacitation, and rival groups are seeking power, the North Koreans charge South Korean border violations, step up subversive activities in South Korea, and then invade. Chinese Communist assistance to North Korea is covert, including troops disguised as North Koreans. It is also assumed that most US forces have been withdrawn prior to the attack. However, the US intervenes initially largely with air power, and with subsequent commitment of ground forces as necessary. The US uses nuclear weapons against enemy military targets in Korea and China, the destruction of which is considered requisite to successful prosecution of the action. The US seeks UN backing, or, failing this, the support of the other fifteen members of the UN Command, but does not await such support before intervening.

A. The Sino-Soviet Military Reaction

24. The initial Communist attack on the ROK would probably only have been undertaken in anticipation that victory could be gained despite US counteraction, or that the US would be deterred from effective counteraction by the chaotic situation within the ROK, allied hesitations, and fear of Sino-Soviet countermoves. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet leaders, recognizing that the US might use nuclear weapons in Korea, would probably be prepared to counter this development by similar local use of nuclear weapons.

25. If the initial US reaction were quick, effective, and limited to Korea, the Bloc might attempt to achieve a cease-fire, cut its losses, and redress its loss of face, in the belief that the fruits of victory were not worth the risks of expanded war. In this case it would attempt to exploit

politically the US use of nuclear weapons, but we regard it as more likely that the Chinese Communists and North Koreans would reply with nuclear weapons obtained from the USSR.

26. If US use of nuclear weapons were restricted to North Korean targets, the Communists would probably use nuclear weapons only against targets in South Korea. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that if the attacks were launched from outside Korea, the Communists might also launch nuclear attacks against US bases selected so as to minimize the additional risk of general war even though the US strikes had been confined to Korean territory. If a stalemate developed on the ground, a new armistice would be sought.

27. The likelihood of Communist nuclear reaction would be greatest in the event that US nuclear attacks were directed against targets in China itself. The Chinese Communists would probably attack with nuclear weapons selected US bases and naval forces in the West Pacific. If ballistic missiles capable of reaching these targets had been deployed in China prior to the aggression, they would also be used.

B. Free World Reactions

28. Assuming Bloc aggression appears clear-cut, the general attitude of the Free World, probably even including India and other neutrals, would initially be sympathetic toward the ROK and the United States. A large measure of diplomatic support would be forthcoming and some of our allies would be inclined to offer some token military assistance, though the US could not count on any significant Free World military support.

29. Free World sympathy would be overshadowed generally by fear that the conflict would expand since the US had used nuclear weapons, particularly if the US attacked targets outside of Korea. Our principal NATO allies would probably seek to restrain the United States from continuing nuclear attacks. The neutralist countries would almost certainly have backed away from any initial approval. Conversely, if the Communists did not launch nuclear attacks, or if the conflict were effectively localized, concern over the spread of hostilities would diminish, and initial Free World approval of the US action would probably be strengthened. Even so, if heavy civilian casualties were inflicted, it would probably cause a feeling of revulsion, particularly in Asia, against the US.

30. From the outset, the Japanese reaction would constitute one of the greatest problems for the US. While the government and much of the public would be sympathetic to the US-ROK cause, fear of Japan's involvement would create great pressures to deny the United States the use of Japanese bases. US use of nuclear weapons, whatever the targets, would inflame Japanese reactions, public and official, almost certainly

to the point of demanding that the US not use its bases in Japan for nuclear attacks. Japan might even insist on complete US withdrawal, particularly if the US expanded air attacks beyond Korea.

IV. THE CASE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK ON QUEMOY AND MATSU

31. *Assumptions.* Two weeks of stepped-up artillery attack on the offshore islands, a buildup of jet fighters and bombers in the Southeast China area, and concentration of amphibious assault forces herald a coming invasion. GRC supply and reinforcement of the islands becomes difficult, due to heavy bombardment. In this charged atmosphere, Soviet spokesmen recall the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the US in turn stresses its Mutual Defense Treaty with the GRC. The US informs our allies that it will assist in repelling an invasion, using nuclear weapons, if necessary against mainland China. A general alert is declared throughout the Pacific Command. Japan announces it will never permit bases on its territory to be used for atomic warfare. When the invasion begins, the US immediately provides assistance to the GRC including selective nuclear attacks on military targets within a 500 n.m. radius from the islands (including targets in the Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton areas), and on enemy strike force bases wherever located in China, as well as on the invasion force itself.

A. The Sino-Soviet Military Reaction

32. Confronted with such an extensive nuclear response, Peiping and its Soviet ally would probably feel compelled to react with nuclear attacks at least on Taiwan and on the Seventh Fleet. Whether they would extend their attacks to other US Far East bases would depend largely upon whether these bases were used in our nuclear offensive and upon their assessment of our intentions. If US nuclear weapons were used extensively against interior Chinese targets, the Communists would probably feel compelled to respond against other US bases and forces in the Far East.

33. On the other hand, the firmness and promptness of our response would probably convince Peiping of our determination to retain control of Quemoy and Matsu. If at the same time our attacks were initially limited to forces and facilities in the immediate area and directly supporting the aggression, this factor might also convince Peiping that our objectives were limited to defense of the islands. Under these conditions, the Chinese Communists, if they had failed to seize the islands, would probably abandon the attempt despite the loss of face they would suffer from this defeat. This outcome would be most likely in the remote event that Peiping had launched the aggression without full Soviet concurrence and support. In this situation the

USSR, despite Chinese Communist pressures, would probably seek to close out the actions as quickly as feasible, and attempt to compensate for Communist military defeat by political exploitation of the US use of nuclear weapons.

B. Free World Reactions

34. The predominant immediate Free World reaction to the US use of nuclear weapons against Communist China would be highly adverse, with many allies as well as the neutrals considering that the US was risking general war over what most of the world regards as unimportant parcels of real estate. Most of our allies, including those in NATO, would probably shun any responsibility for, or connection with, the US action, in an attempt to avoid involvement in hostilities developing from Quemoy and Matsu. In Asia, only a few countries, notably Nationalist China and South Korea, would be encouraged by the vigor of the US response to Chinese Communist aggression, whereas strong antagonism would be aroused generally throughout the continent by US use of nuclear weapons.

35. The adverse reaction would tend to be modified to the degree that the US action brought the hostilities to an early successful end without heavy civilian casualties. Under these conditions, some Asian countries would probably come to have greater confidence in the ability of the United States to defend them against Communist aggression. But the reaction in most countries would remain adverse.

36. Conversely, if the conflict were prolonged or were to spread, and especially if large-scale casualties were inflicted on Chinese civilians, the adverse consequences for the US might be irreparable. Particularly in Asia. We might be forced to withdraw from our bases in Japan, and Japanese pressure for our withdrawal from Okinawa would increase. Our influence in most other Asian countries would be seriously undermined. In Western Europe fears of general nuclear war and popular pressures on governments to end the fighting would increase.

V. THE CASE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION OF TAIWAN

37. *Assumptions.* As a result of effective Chinese Communist interdiction of the offshore islands, the GRC successfully evacuates Quemoy and Matsu, unopposed and with the assistance of the US Seventh Fleet. There follows a buildup of invasion forces and air-power in East China. The GRC calls on the UN to condemn such war preparations, and asks for military assistance; the US reiterates readiness to aid the GRC if it is attacked. Japan announces it will never consent to its bases being used for atomic warfare, while the Philippines and South Korea announce their support of the GRC. There is a

7–10 day warning period before the actual attempted invasion, during which US forces could deploy in the area. Upon the actual invasion attempt, the US renders assistance by air and naval forces, employing nuclear weapons against the enemy invasion forces, enemy bases for the attack (including air bases wherever located), and any successful enemy lodgment on Taiwan. If this does not fully succeed, SAC is to be employed against other Chinese Communist forces and the warmaking capabilities of Communist China. All present US bases in the area are used, except those in Japan.

A. The Sino-Soviet Military Reactions

38. Since Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan would require the commitment of a significant portion of the Chinese Communist armed forces, and would in Peiping's eyes carry great risk of US nuclear intervention, we regard it as almost certain that Peiping would not undertake such an operation without prior assurances of Soviet support. Furthermore, we believe that the Sino-Soviet leaders would have regarded the likelihood of US nuclear intervention to be sufficiently great that they would have deployed Soviet nuclear weapons (under Chinese Communist cover) in East China. In the assumed case, the Bloc would probably calculate either that the US would be deterred by fear of Bloc nuclear retaliation from responding with sufficient force to thwart the invasion, or that Bloc nuclear capabilities were sufficient to cope with US nuclear intervention.

39. If the initial US response with nuclear weapons were limited to the attacking forces and the immediate area of Taiwan, and particularly if it quickly defeated the initial Chinese Communist attempt at invasion, the Communists might seek to close out the war quickly, preferring military defeat to expanded war. They might calculate that their loss of military prestige would in part be compensated by propaganda dividends from US use of nuclear weapons against Asians and that the ultimate effects in weakening the US position in Asia might be considerable.

40. However, the extent to which Chinese Communist prestige had been committed by an operation of this size and the difficulty of reaching a settlement which the Chinese Communists could accept without loss of face might lead the Bloc to retaliate with nuclear weapons even if this meant serious risk of expansion of hostilities in the Far East. Accordingly, if they decided to continue the campaign in the face of US nuclear attacks in the Taiwan Straits area, they would retaliate with similar nuclear attacks upon bases in Taiwan and upon the Seventh Fleet.

41. If the US extended the area of its nuclear attacks deep into mainland China, we believe that the chances of Communist nuclear

counterblows would be substantially greater. The USSR would be faced with the difficult decision either of permitting its major ally to suffer a humiliating defeat, or of taking the risks involved in the necessary steps to prevent such a defeat. We estimate that the Communists would launch reciprocal nuclear strikes against selected US bases and naval forces. If ballistic missiles capable of reaching these targets had been deployed in China prior to the aggression, they would also be used.

B. Free World Reactions

42. Even though most Free World countries would recognize that Communist aggression had clearly occurred, this factor would be outweighed by concern throughout the Free World lest World War III result from the postulated US use of nuclear weapons. Most of our allies, including those in NATO, would probably think that protection of Taiwan was not of sufficient importance to warrant actions which they would consider to promote serious risk of general war, or even of major war in the Far East. Some of them would express some support of the US, but they would exert strong pressure for a ceasefire. Popular pressures on Allied governments for ending the fighting would increase, as would sentiment for restricting US ability to launch nuclear strikes from bases elsewhere in the world. The US would almost certainly be denied the use of its bases in Japan for the campaign.

43. The adverse reaction would tend to be modified to the degree that the US action brought the hostilities to an early successful end without heavy civilian casualties. Under these conditions, even some Asian countries would probably come to have greater confidence in the ability of the United States to defend them against Communist aggression. But the reaction in most countries would remain adverse.

VI. THE CASE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS

44. *Assumptions.* The Vietnamese Communists infiltrate the equivalent of two regular divisions and as many irregulars into all the Indochinese states, and concentrate a dozen divisions of regular forces in North Vietnam. Sporadic clashes occur and there is a spate of assassinations in Vietnam. President Diem proclaims a state of national emergency and siege, invokes the SEATO treaty, and calls for aid from all members. There is no clear cut beginning of the invasion. US military action would include the selective use of nuclear weapons as appropriate, against the invading forces, targets in North Vietnam, and in adjacent areas of Communist China. The US, before moving, advises Communist China and the USSR of its intention to assist Vietnam militarily unless the invaders withdraw.

A. The Sino-Soviet Military Reaction

45. In initiating the attack on South Vietnam, the Bloc would almost certainly have counted on achieving its objectives before an effective US intervention could develop, and possibly on deterring any US intervention at all. Once the US nuclear response occurred, the Bloc would be confronted with a difficult choice among: (a) seeking a negotiated settlement; (b) continuing the war without Bloc use of nuclear weapons, calculating that the US would not in this case employ nuclear weapons against Communist China itself; or (c) reacting by use of nuclear weapons against US forces, with the resultant risks involved.

46. If US use of nuclear weapons were restricted to targets in Indochina, there is an even chance that the Communists would attempt to continue the campaign without using nuclear weapons themselves. In this case, the Bloc would continue to provide military assistance and equipment to the North Vietnamese, including a buildup of Communist air power. If the Communists were able to continue effective military operations in South Vietnam and Laos despite US use of nuclear weapons the impact in Asia would be substantial. If US-Vietnamese forces were threatening to cross the 17th Parallel they would probably seek to close out the conflict on the basis of restoration of the *status quo*. Should North Vietnam nevertheless be invaded, Chinese Communist forces would probably enter in force to hold at least the Hanoi-Haiphong and northerly areas. In this case, the Communists would also probably threaten to use—and indeed might use—nuclear weapons in Indochina itself to stave off defeat.

47. Moreover, if at any stage the US made nuclear attacks on adjacent areas in China, the Communists would probably respond with nuclear attacks on targets in Indochina, and possibly on selected US bases in other countries.

B. Free World Reactions

48. Initial support among Free World governments and peoples for US determination to resist Communist aggression would be offset in large measure if the US used nuclear weapons. Opposition to US use of nuclear weapons would be particularly strong if the US attacked targets in Communist China, even if Communist Chinese use of “volunteers” in Vietnam were large-scale and widely known. As in the previous cases, opposition to US use of nuclear weapons would be sharpest in Asia.

49. If the US response involved only limited and selective use of nuclear weapons in Indochina alone, the reaction of most US Allies would be less adverse. Such action would have the support of South Korea and Nationalist China, and would have the support of some SEATO governments if they thought this action necessary to repel the aggression.

However, the reaction of most Free World countries, and particularly of the Asian neutrals, would still be generally adverse, even if the conflict remained localized and the aggression were turned back.

80. Memorandum for the Record of Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and McElroy¹

Washington, July 22, 1958

SUBJECT

Military Paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy Paper (NSC 5810/1)

In a discussion of the above subject with the Secretary on July 21, Secretary McElroy said that Defense felt that, while it is appropriate to continue work on the development of an alternative strategic doctrine, the present situation required us to have a firm basis on which we could proceed in the meantime.

The Secretary asked if it would be acceptable to Secretary McElroy if we agreed that, as far as the record was concerned, paragraphs 13 and 14 of the paper would stand unchanged, but that the President would privately ask Secretary McElroy and himself to continue studying the question until a better recommendation could be made. Secretary McElroy accepted this idea.

The Secretary emphasized it was important that this information be closely held to a small group, since it would be dangerous if our allies and others knew about it before an adequate alternative doctrine was evolved. He said he would instruct our Planning Board representative to state that we accept paragraphs 13 and 14, but that information about the President's request for further study would be kept secret. Secretary McElroy agreed.

D.E. Boster

¹Source: Strategic concept. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

81. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower¹

Washington, July 23, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

At the National Security Council meeting on July 24, 1958 I shall concur in Secretary McElroy's recommendation that paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1) be adopted without change.

I have told Secretary McElroy that I remain of the opinion that the doctrine set forth in paragraphs 13 and 14 is rapidly outliving its usefulness and that we need to apply ourselves urgently to finding an alternative strategic concept. I did not, however, wish to air my misgivings on this sensitive subject before the Council.

I suggested to Secretary McElroy that we should seek your approval of further urgent study of our strategic concept and doctrine by a small State-Defense group, the existence of this group and its task to be very closely held. He agreed.

I should be grateful for an early opportunity to discuss this matter further with you and Secretary McElroy.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles

¹ Source: Question of a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

82. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, July 30, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5810/1
- B. NSC Actions Nos. 1903 and 1934
- C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 21, 1958
- D. NSC Action No. 1952

¹ Source: Approval of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 373rd Meeting of the Council on July 24, 1958, noted and discussed the recommendations by the Department of Defense relative to the military elements of national strategy in NSC 5810/1, including paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof (prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903-*b*-(3) and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 21, 1958), in the light of (1) an oral summary by the Secretary of Defense, (2) an oral summary by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, originally presented at the 364th NSC meeting on May 1, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1903-*a*); and (3) a statement by the Secretary of State that he concurred at this time with the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that no change be made in the military section of NSC 5810/1, but that U.S. military doctrine should be kept under study and review.

On July 28, 1958, the President, after further study and consideration following the meeting, approved paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1, with the understanding that they would be kept under continuing study pending the next annual review of basic policy.

The above decision by the President is accordingly transmitted herewith to all holders of NSC 5810/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

83. Briefing Note for the 374th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 31, 1958

ITEM 3—OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES

1. Last January, the Council noted (NSC Action No. 1846) that the President had established certain missile and related programs “as having the highest priority above all others for research and development and for achieving operational capability; scope of the operational capability to be as approved by the President.”

2. Included were “satellite programs (other than VANGUARD and JUPITER C determined by the Secretary of Defense to have objectives having key political scientific, psychological or military import.”

3. On April 10, 1958, Defense advised that pursuant to delegated authority, the Secretary of Defense had determined that the Air Force reconnaissance satellite vehicle program was a satellite program having key political, scientific, psychological or military import.

4. Before proceeding to the question of operational capability, I am going to call on Mr. Quarles to give the Council a brief report on the status of the reconnaissance satellite program—its progress, objectives, potentials, and priority.

5. There has been circulated to you a table which shows a proposed launching schedule. I should point out, however, *that the Council is not being asked to approve any specific number of test shots. That decision will be worked out in due course through the normal budgetary process.* Mr. Stans understands this.

(CALL ON MR. QUARLES)

6. On July 3, there came before the Council the question of Presidential approval of the “scope of the operational capability” of the reconnaissance satellite. The Council noted and discussed a Defense Department recommendation on operational capability, but deferred action on the recommendation pending study and report back to the Council by Dr. Killian on July 31 (NSC Action No. 1941).

7. Before the Council today is the original Defense recommendation and Dr. Killian’s proposed amendment thereto, as shown on the sheet before you. The JCS have indicated their concurrence with Dr. Killian’s modification, which clarifies the language and makes clear that Presidential authorization will be sought before any actual launching

¹ Source: Operational capability of reconnaissance satellites. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

over the Soviet Union, of a satellite carrying reconnaissance equipment. The modified language reads:

(READ)

8. If that recommendation is adopted, it will authorize the development of an operational capability of 8 Atlas-boosted satellites, although it will leave the decision as to the actual launching to be made later by the President.

(CALL ON: Secretary of Defense (or Deputy SecDef) *Dr. Killian*)

Attachment

ADVANCED RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE PROGRAM
SCHEDULE THROUGH CY 1960

<i>Number and Type of Vehicle</i>	<i>Some Recon. Equipment Aboard</i>	<i>Launching Location</i>	<i>Orbit over USSR</i>	<i>Schedule</i>
<i>Initial tests</i>				
10-19 Thor	No	South Camp Cooke, Calif.	Yes	Begin November 1958
5 Atlas	Yes	Cape Canaveral, Florida	No	Begin about July 1959, one every other month
² 1 Atlas	Yes	South Camp Cooke, Calif.	Yes	March 1960
<i>Pioneer Visual Recon.</i>				
³ 4 Atlas	Yes	South Camp Cooke, Calif.	Yes	Begin May 1960, one every other month
<i>Pioneer Ferret (Electronic) Reconnaissance</i>				
3 Atlas	Yes	South Camp Cooke, Calif.	Yes	Begin August 1960, one every other month

²Visual components test. [Footnote is in the original.]

³First satellite with reconnaissance equipment that will orbit over USSR. [Footnote is in the original.]

As of June 30, 1958

Attachment

Defense Recommendation on the Reconnaissance Satellite (submitted to the NSC on July 3, 1958, NSC Action No. 1941–a) and Proposal for Modification in Dr. Killian's Recommendation of July 28, 1958

Although a satellite with reconnaissance equipment in orbit over the USSR is not expected to be operational prior to March 1960, it is necessary at this time to plan for the launching of eight test satellites of this general type. Accordingly, it is recommended that the reconnaissance satellite program, including the eight test vehicles which will orbit over the USSR, be approved for planning purposes,

Defense

with the understanding that Presidential authorization with respect to the scope of the operational capability of the program will be sought by the Department of Defense in early 1960.

Dr. Killian

with the understanding that Presidential authorization with respect to the launching of the eight development satellites capable of reconnaissance over the USSR and the subsequent scope of the operational capability of the program, will be sought by the Department of Defense in early 1960 or prior to the launching of the first of the above eight satellites, whichever date is sooner.

84. Memorandum of Discussion at the 374th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 31, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 31, 1958

Present at the 374th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of

¹ Source: Agenda item 3: Operational Capability of Reconnaissance Satellites. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for Atomic Energy, for the Atoms for Peace Program, for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Smith; the White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; Bryce N. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. *OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES*

(NSC Action No. 1946; NSC 5814; NSC Action No. 1941; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 29, 1958)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the subject (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting and attached to this memorandum). After Mr. Gray had read paragraph 5 of his briefing note, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget confirmed Mr. Gray's statement that the decision as to the specific number of reconnaissance satellite test shots to be attempted would be worked out through the normal budgetary process. Mr. Gray then called on Secretary Quarles for a brief report on the status of the reconnaissance satellite program.

Secretary Quarles said the reconnaissance satellite program antedated the IGY satellite program and was motivated by the desire to have a vantage point from which to view what goes on behind the Iron Curtain. In order to operate reconnaissance satellites for this purpose, however, it would be necessary to establish the doctrine of freedom of outer space. In the last two years, technology had advanced to the point where we can now proceed actively with the development of reconnaissance satellite vehicles. The program for the current fiscal year calls for the use of intermediate-range rockets to put into orbit reconnaissance test vehicles weighing from 20 or 40 pounds up to a few hundred pounds. Later intercontinental-range rockets will be used, and the reconnaissance vehicle will weigh 3000-4000 pounds. The goal of the program (but not a firm commitment) is to send up the first operational reconnaissance satellite in March, 1960.

Secretary Quarles summarized the objectives of the reconnaissance satellite as follows: (1) to photograph the earth through TV cameras and on command transmit these pictures to a station in the United States; (2) to survey and transmit information on electromagnetic radiations;

(3) to develop infra-red reconnaissance techniques; (4) to act as a line-of-sight relay station for communications purposes. In conclusion, Secretary Quarles noted that substantial sums had been budgeted for the reconnaissance satellite program.

Mr. Gray then continued his briefing, and read a Defense recommendation on the subject (as submitted to the NSC on July 3, 1958, NSC Action No. 1941–*a*) and Dr. Killian's proposal of July 28 for modification of the Defense recommendation.

Dr. Killian said his review of the subject had been addressed to a proposed NSC Action, not to the budgetary aspects of the reconnaissance satellite program nor to the number of vehicles. He then read from his memorandum (as transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 29) in order to explain his proposal for modification of the Defense recommendation.

The Secretary of Defense said he was in full accord with Dr. Killian's proposed modification of the Defense recommendation. Dr. Killian had said better than Defense did what Defense thought it was saying.

The President approved the Defense recommendation as modified by Dr. Killian's language.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the amendment to the recommendation on the subject by the Department of Defense contained in NSC Action No. 1941–*a*, proposed by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 29, 1958; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting, and of an oral summary of the advanced reconnaissance satellite program as presented at the meeting by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

b. Noted that the President approved for planning purposes the advanced reconnaissance satellite program presented by the Department of Defense, including the eight test vehicles which will orbit over the USSR; with the understanding that Presidential authorization with respect to the launching of the eight development satellites capable of reconnaissance over the USSR and the subsequent scope of the operational capability of the program, will be sought by the Department of Defense in early 1960 or prior to the launching of the first of the above eight satellites, whichever date is sooner.

c. Noted that the total number of test vehicles and the amount of funds required for the advanced reconnaissance satellite program were subject to further review.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

The action in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, for appropriate action.

Marion W. Boggs

*Director
NSC Secretariat*

85. Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, August 7, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
August 7, 1958

Present at the 375th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (participating in Item 6); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (participating in Item 5); General Thomas D. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item 3); The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Special Assistants to the President for the Atoms for Peace Program, for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, President's Science Advisory Committee (for Item 3); the Acting NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 6); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1–5.]

6. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES

(NSC Action No. 1640; NSC 5618; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated July 22 and August 8, 1957, and June 24, 1958; NSC Action No. 1774)

Mr. Gray presented the Annual Report of the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)

The President asked whether there was any possibility of placing electronic "jamming" devices in such rooms as the Cabinet Room to

¹ Source: Agenda item 6: Technical Surveillance Countermeasures; Agenda item 7: U.S. Policy on Antarctica. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on August 8.

make clandestine listening devices ineffective. Mr. Ash said that the NSC Committee had this defensive measure under consideration, and that State Department technicians were experimenting with a prototype “jamming” device which, however, required excessive voltage for operation. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that one object of searches is to tune in on the wave-length of the opposition device. The President understood that this type of search applied to radio-type devices.

The President then asked whether the United States tried to exploit devices that had been discovered in a kind of “double-agent” way. Mr. Dulles said attempts were made to exploit discovered devices, but that such exploitation was rendered difficult because of the tendency to rip out the device immediately upon its discovery. He felt that discovery of a device should be reported but the device should be left in place.

The President felt that experts should be available at foreign posts to exploit clandestine devices when they are discovered. He asked how often important offices and conference rooms were checked for clandestine listening devices, and recalled from his experience in World War I that induction principles could be used for listening without actual connection with a telephone line. Mr. Ash said that periodic technical examinations were made of White House and NSC offices. He added that the technicians could, through examining impedances on the lines, detect listening by induction.

The Vice President said he had been told that it was possible, through the medium of metal venetian blinds, for a man across the street to hear what was going on in a room.

The President remarked that the great ingenuity being displayed in connection with communications devices pointed to the need for the services of experts in this field.

Mr. Allen Dulles said CIA was engaged in a major research effort in the technical surveillance countermeasures field. Mr. Gray said that a panel of the Science Advisory Committee was engaged in basic research on passive (“room within a room”) and active countermeasures.

The President observed that if clandestine listening devices continued to improve, it might eventually be necessary to stop talking and start writing instead.

The Vice President asked if there were not measures which could be taken to prevent the use of a telephone instrument as a listening point. Mr. Ash said that telephones such as those in the White House and other important offices can be equipped with a mercury switch to knock out the tap.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the Annual Report of the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, prepared pursuant to paragraph 7 of NSC 5618 and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 24, 1958.

7. U.S. POLICY ON ANTARCTICA

(NSC 5804/1; OCB Report on NSC 5804/1, dated June 25, 1958)

Mr. Harr briefed the Council on the reference OCB Report on the subject. (A copy of Mr. Harr's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) There was no discussion.

The National Security Council:

Noted the reference Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

Marion W. Boggs
Director
NSC Secretariat

86. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 11, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

General Twining said that the Chiefs had been considering the situation in China, in the Formosa Straits area. They have started the preparation of contingency plans, and have alerted commanders in the area, but have directed no specific action. He understood the matter would come up for consideration in the NSC this week, and commented that the situation is unclear, perhaps intentionally so, with respect to the objective of defending the offshore islands. The President said he had spoken to Gordon Gray a few minutes earlier on this same subject, and had suggested it might be best to have just the statutory NSC members meet with him to discuss the question. He confirmed that the picture is cloudy regarding the offshore islands. There are good reasons for taking the view that they should be abandoned. However, a great part of the Chinese Nationalist forces are now deployed on the islands, and their removal or loss would be a signal to all of Asia that there is no hope that can be held out against the Communists in China. General

¹ Source: Formosa Straits; SAC dispersal; withdrawal from Lebanon; Department of Defense reorganization. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

Twining commented that the military authorities are concentrating on getting the F-86s on the islands into operational status quickly.

General Twining next reported briefly on SAC dispersal. He said he understood the President had expressed recent question about this. In general, our plans do not call for going beyond squadron dispersal and he did not think they should. He showed the President a graphic summary indicating that a substantial fraction are kept constantly ready and bombed up; others could be gotten in the air quickly, although not bombed up, unless there had been an alert warning (as in the case of the Lebanese crisis). The President raised for consideration the idea of putting parallel runways on existing bases, since the runway presently limits the number of planes that could be gotten off. He then said he questioned the validity of planning which contemplated putting on one field more planes than could be reasonably gotten away. Additional runways on the base would cost much less than additional aircraft which probably can't get off anyhow. He thought we should make all possible arrangements to "bomb up" rapidly and get the planes into the air. General Twining undertook to have this matter studied.

General Twining said that the Chiefs are making plans for troop withdrawal from Lebanon, so that when the time comes we will be in position to do it in a proper way. He thought any out-movement of troops should be done quietly and with dignity, without making a fanfare. The President indicated general agreement, commenting that he would have to look at any specific proposal.

As a final item, General Twining said that Defense is moving forward on the question of reorganization. A phased series of steps will be taken over the next three or four months. The President stressed the importance of watching the allocation of research and development projects very carefully—to see that once a project is assigned, other services do not duplicate the activity.

The President asked me to make sure Gordon Gray understood that General Twining should attend any meeting of the statutory members of the NSC, and I did so.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

87. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 19, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Chairman McCone
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said the question of custody of large weapons had been raised with him. The AEC retains custody of these, even if they are deployed to outlying locations. Defense now recommends shifting the custody to themselves, and the AEC has no objection if the President should prefer this. Senator Hickenlooper and others, however, bring out that there is a matter of civilian cognizance which may have considerable importance.

The President recalled that the point of this distinction had been the danger that some military man, acting without civil restraint, might so use these weapons as to start a war. The military people have authority for action in case of attack on the United States or on U.S. forces, but this is for tactical response. The larger weapons are intended for great retaliatory action, and this is not for military officers to authorize. He said it is not only a question of the danger, but also as to the concern our country might feel as to what military men could do. He asked Mr. McCone to consult the State Department on the matter.

Mr. McCone next talked briefly about the proposal to cease the testing of atomic weapons. He said he is sympathetic with the President's desire to find a way to move forward with disarmament after five and one-half years of effort. His Commission has strong feelings on this, but will accept the President's decision. Mr. McCone said he would like to ask reconsideration on one point—that of including, as an exception, fully contained underground tests for peaceful purposes. He cited the possible use of atomic explosions to extract oil from the Athabaska sands, and to achieve useful heat power by using the salt domes of the southwest. These uses could be made subject to UN agreement and inspection. The President said he had been searching his mind for some way to allow this exception. Mr. Wadsworth however had thought we would lose the political gains we are seeking if we try to make this exception. The President added that he had agreed with Secretary Dulles that if the Geneva meetings resulted in agreement—no matter what our military might

¹ Source: Control of large nuclear weapons; cessation of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

say—then we would make a public statement on this matter. The President said he would be sympathetic, if we would not therefore lose the entire effect of our action, to including the exception to having fully contained underground explosions conducted for peaceful purposes under UN observation. He asked Mr. McCone to take this matter up with Secretary Herter. The President added that Mr. Herter had told him that the protocol is expected to be signed at Geneva on Thursday, and that we hope we can make our announcement immediately thereafter. The British have, however, been showing some opposition to the project. Mr. McCone said he would get in touch with Secretary Herter at once.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

88. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–5–58

Washington, August 19, 1958

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

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¹ Source: "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles." Top Secret. 10 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.

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(limited distribution under separate cover)

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(limited distribution under separate cover)

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES²

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles and space vehicles, including earth satellites, through 1966,³ and to analyze factors affecting Soviet operational capabilities in these fields.

FOREWORD

This estimate supersedes NIE 11-5-57, SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD, 12 March 1957, and SNIE 11-10-57, THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM, 10 December 1957, as well as those paragraphs dealing with guided missiles (paras. 108 through 114) in NIE 11-4-57, MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET

² The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, is classified CONFIDENTIAL. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ For comparability with earlier estimates on this subject, the terminal date chosen for this estimate is the same as that of its predecessor, NIE 11-5-57, SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD, 12 March 1957. [Footnote is in the original.]

CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1957–1962, 12 November 1957. The new estimate, like its predecessors, is made in the light of our previous judgments that the USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of any particular future date. It also assumes that through 1966 there will be no international agreements on the control of armaments or of outer space.

The estimate is intended primarily to reassess and update our estimates of probable Soviet missile development programs, missile characteristics, and first operational capability dates. Some discussion is provided on factors likely to affect Soviet acquisition of substantial operational capabilities with missile systems, and Soviet capabilities to place various arbitrarily-selected quantities of ICBMs in operational use are estimated. The reader is cautioned that Annex A of NIE 11–5–57 is no longer applicable.

For the most part, changes in estimated missile characteristics and first operational capability dates result from the accumulation over the past year of a considerable body of new evidence. Of the 13 missile systems estimated as probably available for operational use in 1958 or earlier, we now have direct evidence on the existence of nine; we also have direct evidence on Soviet development of an ICBM. For some of these systems the evidence is extensive, while for others we have only limited information relative to characteristics and components. Serious intelligence gaps remain, particularly with respect to the operational status of various systems. Furthermore, we do not have sufficient evidence available on which to base an estimate of the vulnerability of Soviet systems to specific electronic countermeasures.

In making this estimate in a field where positive intelligence remains limited, we have considered the available evidence in the light of estimated Soviet military requirements, known and estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields, and US guided missile experience. The entire study rests upon our belief, now well-supported by evidence, that a concerted and continuous Soviet research and development effort in guided missiles was underway by 1948.

For guided missiles, except where noted otherwise, the operational capability dates given are the earliest years during which we believe missiles could probably have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment. We estimate that when they first become operational, the missile systems discussed herein will have a system reliability of 40–60 percent, and that improvement will occur thereafter.⁴ For space flight activities, the dates given are the earliest *possible*

⁴ The term “system reliability” is here defined as the percentage of missiles which function according to specifications from missile launching to detonation in the target area, excluding malfunctions prior to launching. [Footnote is in the original.]

time periods by which we believe each specific accomplishment could be achieved.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The USSR has continued to press ahead with its extensive guided missile research and development, generally along the lines indicated in our previous estimates. As a result of this effort, the USSR now has available for operational use a variety of missile systems. Soviet achievements in ballistic missiles have been especially impressive and have contributed to early successes in the USSR's space flight program. Substantial success in developing surface-to-air missile systems has also been achieved. Available evidence is not sufficient to indicate equal emphasis and similar success in other Soviet missile programs.

2. By itself, each of the guided missile or space programs estimated as a future development appears feasible both as to technical achievability and date attainable. However, some programs may be slowed or even halted by the competition of other missile or non-missile delivery systems, unforeseen development or production difficulties, rapidity of obsolescence, changing military requirements, and/or broad considerations of Soviet national policy. On the other hand, a significant advance in one or more of the programs might be possible if a scientific breakthrough is achieved.

3. *Surface-to-surface missiles.* We believe that the Soviet ballistic missile development program has emphasized reliability and simplicity, rather than miniaturization or extreme refinement of design. System mobility appears to have been a basic consideration since the early developmental stages. In developing longer-range systems maximum use has been made of proven components.

4. Since 1954 the USSR has probably had available for operational use ballistic missiles with maximum ranges of about 100 nautical miles (n.m.), 200 n.m. and 350 n.m. We believe that, depending upon various operational factors, nuclear, high explosive (HE) or chemical (CW) warheads would be used with these missiles.⁵ In addition, the USSR probably now has operational a very short range anti-tank missile equipped with shaped-charge HE warhead.

5. An extensive Soviet program to develop a 700 n.m. ballistic missile is indicated by a long series of test firings, averaging about two per month since 1955. We estimate that this missile probably became operational in 1956. On the basis of about a dozen test firings over the past year, we estimate that the USSR will also probably have operational in 1958 a modification of the 700 n.m. missile, capable of an 1,100 n.m.

⁵ Estimated nuclear warhead capabilities for these and other missiles discussed in this estimate are given in Annex C (limited distribution under separate cover). [Footnote is in the original.]

range. Nuclear warheads would almost certainly be used in both these missiles, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use in the 700 n.m. missile.

6. *Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)*. Since August 1957, the USSR has test fired at least four and possibly six missiles to a distance of approximately 3,500 nautical miles. We believe this represents the development of an ICBM system which, when first operational, will probably be capable of delivering a nuclear payload to a maximum range of about 5,500 n.m., with an accuracy (CEP) of 5 n.m. and a system reliability of about 50 percent. By the early 1960's reliability will probably be considerably improved. At the beginning of the period 1962–1966, the CEP could be about 3 n.m., and could be reduced to about 2 n.m. later in the period.

7. Available evidence is inconclusive as to the designed payload-carrying capacity of the Soviet ICBM, which we have previously estimated as about 2,000 pounds. Recent evidence and re-analysis may indicate that the USSR is developing an ICBM with a 5,000 pound payload. Serious logistical and operational problems are associated with missiles of the sizes necessary to deliver 2,000 or 5,000 pounds to a range of 5,500 n.m.; these problems would be greater in the case of the heavier payload. In the light of this consideration, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM is designed to carry a nuclear payload of about 2,000 pounds, although there is a possibility that it is designed to carry about 5,000 pounds.

8. The USSR will probably have a first operational capability with ten prototype ICBMs at some time during calendar 1959; the possibility should not be disregarded, however, that in the latter part of 1958 the USSR may establish an ICBM capability with missiles comparatively unproven as to accuracy and reliability.

9. We believe that Soviet planners intend to achieve a sizeable ICBM operational capability at the earliest practicable date, although we have no direct evidence on Soviet preparations for ICBM production and deployment. We estimate that the USSR has the technical and industrial capability to produce ICBMs, complete launching facilities, establish logistic lines and train troops at a rate sufficient to have an operational capability with 100 ICBMs⁶ about one year after its first operational capability date (i.e. some time in 1960), and with 500 ICBMs⁷ two or at most three years after first operational capability date (i.e.

⁶ These numbers are selected arbitrarily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet capacity to produce and deploy ICBMs; they do *not* represent an estimate of probable Soviet requirements or stockpiles. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ These numbers are selected arbitrarily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet capacity to produce and deploy ICBMs; they do *not* represent an estimate of probable Soviet requirements or stockpiles. [Footnote is in the original.]

some time in 1961, or at the latest in 1962). This implies that the USSR could achieve an operational capability with ten or more, but less than 100 ICBMs by the end of 1959, depending upon when during the calendar year the first operational capability is achieved.

10. *Surface-to-air-missiles.* For several years the USSR has had in operational use a fixed surface-to-air system which we believe is now capable of employment against aircraft at ranges up to 20–30 n.m., with greatest effectiveness at altitudes of 30,000 to 60,000 feet. This system is known to be employed in a dense and costly complex of 56 sites around Moscow; targets of lesser importance will probably be provided with considerably less elaborate surface-to-air missile defenses. We believe the Soviets also have available for operational use a surface-to-air missile with similar characteristics, except for improved capability to intercept small, supersonic targets. It is probably suitable for employment either with the Moscow system or with a semi-mobile system.

11. Neither of the above systems is likely to be effective against very low altitude attack. We therefore estimate that the USSR is developing and will probably have in operation in 1959–1960 a surface-to-air system with a maximum range of about 15 n.m., effective at altitudes from 50 feet to at least 40,000 feet. We estimate that for improved defense of critical areas, the USSR will probably have available in 1960–1961 a surface-to-air system with effectiveness at altitudes up to 90,000 feet and a maximum range of 75–100 n.m.

12. We estimate that in 1963–1966 the Soviets will probably achieve a first operational capability with a surface-to-air system of limited effectiveness against ICBMs. Such a system could possibly have some effectiveness against IRBMs. A surface-to-air system with limited capability to counter reconnaissance satellites could and possibly will be developed for use in 1960–1964; a more sophisticated system could be integrated with an anti-ballistic missile system at a later date.

13. *Air-to-air missiles.* Three short-range systems which employ HE warheads are now estimated as operational. Two are believed to have radar guidance with ranges of 5–6 n.m.; the other, with a range of up to 2½ n.m., is believed to use infrared guidance. Most currently operational Soviet fighter aircraft types could be modified to employ these missiles. In 1960 the USSR will probably have available a 15–20 n.m. air-to-air missile.

14. *Air-to-surface missiles.* The present operational system is capable of carrying a nuclear or HE warhead at subsonic speed to a range of about 55 n.m. against well-defined targets, such as ships. With different guidance, the system could be employed against land targets. We estimate that the USSR is probably developing and may now have operational an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bombers. We believe that the USSR will probably develop and have operational

in 1960–1961 a supersonic missile with improved guidance and a range of at least 100 n.m., suitable for employment against a wide variety of targets.

15. *Naval-launched missiles.* The Soviet navy probably now has the capability to launch subsonic cruise-type missiles from a few converted submarines of conventional design, although there is little direct evidence of submarine-launched missile development in the USSR. We estimate that the current system could deliver nuclear warheads against land targets within about 200 n.m. of the launching submarine. These cruise-type missiles could be launched by a submarine only after surfacing. We believe, however, that in 1961–1963 the USSR will probably have a submarine-launched ballistic missile system available for first operational use in a prototype submarine of new design. This system will probably be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead from a submerged submarine to a range of about 1,000 n.m.

16. We estimate that during 1959–1960 the USSR will begin equipping its surface fleet with surface-to-air missiles having a maximum range of 20 n.m., with effectiveness at altitudes from 50 feet to at least 40,000 feet. A Soviet shipborne surface-to-air system for use against targets at higher altitudes and longer ranges will probably become available in 1960–1961. These systems, while primarily for air defense, could be modified for employment against surface targets. Late in the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably also have available a missile system for use in anti-submarine warfare.

17. *Soviet space programs.* We believe that the ultimate foreseeable objective of the Soviet space program is the attainment of manned interplanetary travel. The program is supported by extensive Soviet research efforts in a number of related fields, including rocket propulsion, electronics, space medicine, astrobiology, astrophysics and geophysics. Present activities appear to be directed toward the collection of scientific data and experience applicable to future space accomplishments, the ICBM program, and basic scientific research. Soviet requirements for space vehicles have probably been established for fairly specific scientific and/or military purposes in accordance with a planned step-by-step progression.

18. Soviet success in ballistic missile development and earth satellite launchings to date leads us to estimate a considerable Soviet capability for early accomplishments in space including: surveillance satellites, recoverable aeromedical satellites, lunar probes and impacts, lunar satellites and planetary probes to Mars and Venus (1958–1959); “soft landings” by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earth satellites (1959–1960); a manned glide-type high altitude research vehicle

(1960–1961); heavy earth satellites and manned circumlunar flights (1961–1962); and manned lunar landings (after 1965). While each individual achievement appears feasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that the USSR can accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified.

SIMPLIFIED TABULAR SUMMARY¹

Probable Soviet Guided Missile Development Program

Arbitrary Designation	Operational Date	Maximum Range	Payload Weight and Type	Design Altitude
Ground-Launched Ballistic Missiles				
SS-1*	1954	100 n.m.	1,500 lbs. Nuclear, HE, CW	—
SS-2*	1954	200 n.m.	2,000 lbs. Nuclear, HE, CW	—
SS-3*	1954	350 n.m.	Up to 5,000–6,000 lbs. Nuclear, HE, CW	—
SS-4*	1956	700 n.m.	Up to 5,000–6,000 lbs. Nuclear, poss. CW	—
SS-5*	1958	1,100 n.m.	Up to 3,000 lbs. Nuclear	—
SS-6 ICBM*	1959	5,500 n.m.	2,000 lbs., poss. 5,000 lbs. Nuclear	—
Ground-Launched Anti-Tank Missile				
SS-a. t.	prior to 1958	6,000 yards	20–40 lbs. HE	—
Submarine-Launched Missiles				
SS-7 cruise-type	1955–56	200 n.m.	2,000 lbs. Nuclear	—
SS-8 ballistic	1961–63	1,000 n.m.	1,000 lbs. Nuclear	—

Arbitrary Designation	Operational Date	Maximum Range	Payload Weight and Type	Design Altitude
Ground-Launched Surface-to-Air Missiles				
SA-1*	1954	20–30 n.m.	500–800 lbs. ²	30,000–60,000 ft.
SA-2*	1957	15–30 n.m.	500–700 lbs. ²	20,000–60,000 ft.
SA-3	1959–60	15 n.m.	150–250 lbs. ²	50 ft–40,000 ft.
SA-4	1960–61	75–100 n.m.	500 lbs. ²	Up to 90,000 ft.
SA-5	1963–66	limited effectiveness against ICBMs		
Shipborne Surface-to-Air Missiles				
SA-6	1959–60	20 n.m.	150–250 lbs. ²	50 ft–40,000 ft.
SA-7	1960–61	75–100 n.m.	500 lbs. ²	Up to 90,000 ft.
Air-to-Air Missiles				
AA-1*	1955–56	5 n.m.	70 lbs. HE	—
AA-2	1955–56	2½ n.m.	25 lbs. HE	—
AA-3	1958	6 n.m.	50 lbs. HE	—
AA-4	1960	15–20 n.m.	150 lbs. ²	—
Air-to-Surface Missiles				
AS-1*	1956–57	55 n.m.	3,000 lbs. Nuclear, HE	—
AS-2	1960–61	100 n.m.	3,000 lbs. Nuclear	—

¹ Detailed summaries of each missile category, including all estimated characteristics and other pertinent data, are presented in Tables 1–5 in Annex A. A summary of estimated Soviet capabilities in space flight is presented in Table 6.

² Nuclear warheads would increase the kill probabilities achievable with these missiles and will be required for effective use of the missiles under some conditions. However, HE warheads will be effective in most applications.

* Those missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current intelligence are indicated by an asterisk following the missile designation.

89. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 27, 1958

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries McElroy and Quarles, General Twining, Chairman McCone, General White, General Loper, Colonel Harbour, Colonel Foster, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

The President referred to Dr. Fisk's comment which seemed to question the advisability of holding another large shot at Eniwetok.

The group then turned to its main subject which was a proposal for the conduct of SAC exercises involving aircraft carrying the "sealed pit" weapons. A "briefing" was given by Colonel Harbour and Colonel Foster, the charts of which are attached.

During the discussion the President alluded to his proposal to put parallel runways on SAC bases, so as to increase the number of planes that could be gotten off on short notice. General Twining said a study is going forward, and Mr. McElroy said he is setting up a project on this.

The President indicated a generally favorable view of the SAC exercise proposal. Mr. McCone asked whether, during the ground alert phase, aircraft would be taking off carrying these weapons all over the country, and General White said they would. Mr. McCone then said the AEC is concerned about this, since even if the weapons are safe against nuclear detonation the accidental HE explosion would scatter plutonium; he would recommend that they take off only from Loring. Colonel Harbour indicated that some detonation might occur; decontamination would not, however, be difficult. He pointed out that there is much less HE in these new weapons than in the old ones. The President asked if the test could be made using aircraft without weapons loaded, and was informed that tests of this kind are constantly being conducted.

The President then asked for a memorandum to which he might give his consideration. Mr. Quarles gave him one, requesting approval, but the President asked me to have the matter checked with the State Department. Subject to such a check he was generally agreeable to the proposal.

General White, General Loper and Colonels Harbour and Foster then left and the President discussed further the proposed test of a large weapon at Eniwetok. Mr. Quarles said that Defense is asking for this,

¹ Source: Testing at Eniwetok; SAC exercises. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on August 29.

since it is a more powerful weapon than we now have for our ballistic missiles. Defense would not press the matter, however, since it is an improvement not too high in priority or importance. Mr. McElroy also indicated Defense could give way on this. The President asked Mr. McCone to have work go forward constructing the weapon, and placing it in stockpile without making it the critical item in the stockpile. He did not think it was a good moment to conduct a large test in the Pacific. Mr. McElroy suggested building a modest number of weapons of this type.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

90. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 28, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT August 28, 1958—following Cabinet Meeting

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy, Secretary Quarles, General Twining, General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said the group had come in to take up with the President certain proposed steps in the Defense Reorganization program. These relate to eliminating the executive agent system. General Twining said that the establishment would be phasing over to the new system, and that it would be completely in effect by January first, with USEUCOM making the first transfer—on 15 September. The J-Staff system has been initiated, and should also be completely in effect by that time. Necessary changes in the command plan are being made, to strengthen the command authority of the unified commanders, to fix their force structure, and to eliminate the designation of departments as executive agents. He then outlined the main features of the change.

The President heartily welcomed this report. He hoped the Joint Staff would be made a true staff, getting away from the team system. He said he would be interested to see whether the Joint Staffs recognize the need for streamlining service staffs, and having plans originate with the central organization. He thought there should be savings in

¹Source: Defense reorganization and discipline on intelligence matters. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on August 30.

our best staff officers. General Twining said that the Joint Staff is taking in some of the best officers from each service. The President added that he hoped the G-2 and G-3 activities in each service would be minimized. He again said he was delighted with what was being done.

Mr. McElroy next referred to a request the President had made for thorough investigation of three instances reflecting faulty discipline. All three have been investigated. Regarding the violation of international boundaries by a B-47 over the Caspian Sea, it is clear that the commander of the plane was not at fault. Any fault that existed was that of his superiors, and this is mitigated by the fact that the location of the border is not certain or agreed. The President said he understood there was an agreement between Russia and Iran, and I confirmed that this was correct. Regarding the disclosure of location of storage sites for atomic weapons, Mr. McElroy said this occurred through a request for funds for military construction at AFSWP sites. There was a degree of carelessness, and Defense is undertaking to correct this. With regard to the balloons, decisions were taken by at least one officer and one civilian which were in error and in excess of authority; appropriate action will be taken. The President said that there is an evident usurpation of authority, and it is this he wishes to have corrected. Mr. McElroy asked if the President wished to know the specific action taken, and the President said he did not—he regarded that as Mr. McElroy's responsibility so long as the tendency he spoke of was corrected. He thought that we have too long been taking errors for granted. Mr. McElroy said this action has already had a tightening effect throughout the establishment. The President then said, with regard to the balloons, that much of the mistake had been made through people going ahead and developing and procuring the balloons, then telling him on short notice that the money would be wasted if some use could not be made of them.

Finally, Mr. McElroy raised the question of whether he should appoint an assistant secretary for legislative liaison, or retain the Assistant Secretary for Medical Affairs at least until Dr. Berry finishes his tour. The President said that the assistant secretaryship for legislative liaison had been strongly proposed by the man who has more experience probably than any other in this whole field—General Persons. The President said he thought he saw the value of it, but would leave the matter to Mr. McElroy and asked him to talk to General Persons about it.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

91. Letter From Senator Symington to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 29, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, briefed me in his office in late July re the current position of the Soviet in the long-range missile field, intermediate range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

I subsequently received information that would appear to show that Mr. Dulles heavily underrated Soviet missile development to date, as well as planned capabilities.

Upon receiving this information I analyzed our own missile programs and thereupon became convinced the latter are inadequate to meet the growing danger.

This conclusion would seem obvious if our planning has been based on incorrect information—and that is why I am presenting this paper to you.

More specifically, if the information contained is correct, we believe the planning incident to our weapons system, primarily missiles, beginning now and lasting at least into 1964, is so insufficient in this area as to leave ourselves and our allies subject to overt political, if not actual military aggression from the Sino-Soviet alliance—with a relatively slight chance of effective retaliation against such aggression between 1960 and 1962.

On August 6, therefore, I again saw Mr. Dulles with Mr. Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr. We pointed out to Mr. Dulles in some detail our reasons for believing that his estimates were inaccurate.

In each case where there was disagreement, the figures presented to Mr. Dulles were much greater as to Soviet accomplishment than the figures he had presented me a few days previously.

When Mr. Dulles inquired where we had obtained our information, we replied: "From your own and other elements of the national intelligence system."

Two days later, August 8, when Mr. Dulles briefed the Senate Subcommittee to which the CIA reports, the figures he gave that committee were the same as the figures he had originally given me.

The estimates he presented the Senate on August 8th are as follows:

The Soviets have fired many missiles up to 700 miles in range also many up to 1,000 miles. The total firings in these two categories are estimated to be some 300.

¹ Source: Question of a missile gap. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series.

So far the Soviets have accomplished 12 test firings of 1100 miles, and are considered to be operational with this missile this year.

The Soviets are known to have established a new 3500 nautical mile test range.

In the ICBM field, Russia is concentrating on a 5500 mile missile, with a warhead which may weigh 5,000 pounds.

Six ICBM missiles have been launched to date, of which four are known to have landed in the impact area.

It is estimated the USSR will have an operational quantity of ten of these 5500 mile missiles some time during 1959. They may have this capability some time in 1958.

From 2 to 3 years after the Soviets acquire these first ten, they will have 500 operational ICBM's.

The picture of the Soviet test program, as indicated by Mr. Dulles, finds the Soviet progressing from the basis of 12 IRBM test firings and 6 ICBM test firings to date, to 500 operational ICBM's two to three years from now.

The above presentation in itself is immediate ground for concern that Mr. Dulles' figures are too low, because the short lead time from this brief test schedule to 500 operational missiles two to three years from now is incompatible with the program planned for our own ICBM, the Atlas.

As example, the Atlas will have test fired approximately 100 missiles by the time some 64 Atlases are operational in 1961—three and a half years from now.

Mr. Dulles gave no indication of the number and location of medium and long-range missile bases the Soviets now have, or may be building.

Nor did he give any indication of the number and status of ballistic missile test ranges being used by the Soviets, as compared with our one range. This latter information is vital to any understanding of the true nature of the threat.

As to our own ballistic missile program, I am told we have successfully launched 29 Redstone type missiles of ranges 100–200 miles; 8 Thor type missiles of ranges from 1250 to 2,000 miles; and 5 Jupiter type missiles of ranges of 1500 to 1600 miles.

I am also told we have launched 3 Jupiter test systems (as compared with weapons systems) of ranges from 1200–3300 miles; and that, as of early this month, we launched our first relatively complete ICBM, an Atlas, over a range of 2600 miles.

I further understand that our planned ballistic missile schedules call for 10 IRBM bases and 150 operational IRBM missiles to be in position by the end of 1960; and also that we plan to have, by 1962, 12 bases and 180 missiles.

In the ICBM field I understand that in 1960 we will have 2 groups of launching sites, one in Wyoming and one in Nebraska, with a maximum capability of launching 24 ICBM's in twenty-five minutes. (This

excludes the training base in Southern California which may be established prior to this time, because the base itself is beyond the operational range from which the Atlas could reach a majority of the Soviet targets; and because the Atlas missile will not yet be reliably capable of less than 1/2 hour reaction time before 1960.)

By 1962 I understand we plan to have 13 groups of launching sites, with a maximum capability of launching 120–130 ICBM's in twenty-five minutes.

There are no known plans beyond this number of bases and missiles for the Atlas or Titan; nor are there any such plans for contemplated ICBM weapons systems like the solid-propelled ICBM Minute Man.

As to the Polaris systems, my understanding is that none of these systems would be operational until 1960 at the earliest; and that date appears over-optimistic to us.

There follow the figures given us by Mr. Dulles as to the Russian position:

1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
6 launchings, 4 impacts in 1957 to date, ranges 3500 mi. or more.					
	Maybe 10 operational @ 5500 mi. in this year.	-----	500 operational		Additional number, estimated to be operational, not given.
		10 operational	-----	500 operational	

As presented, we believe the above CIA estimate vastly understates Soviet testing to date. Even so, however, it predicts a greatly superior operational Soviet ICBM force, from 1960 through 1962, as compared with the actual program of the United States.

This latter program follows:

1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
3 @ 600–800 miles. 2 @ 2600 mi. 10 more Atlas and 1 Titan test this year		Approx. 100 test flights of Atlas & Titan scheduled for '59–'60 period. None fully operational.	24 Atlas operational capability. Polaris possibly operational.	65 operational Atlas, plus some Titans and Polaris	120–130 operational Atlas & Titan & Polaris

As to Soviet testing to date, we believe the more valid figures are as follows:

RUSSIA	1957	1958
Source #1	Approximately 60 test firings over ranges 3500 miles or more.	Approximately 20 test firings this year over ranges of 3500 miles or more. [Also 2 thermo-nuclear test firings accomplished as part of ICBM or IRBM test flights] ²
Source #2	Approximately 45 firings over ranges of 3500 miles or more.	Approximately 10 test firings this year, over ranges of 3500 miles or more. [Launching sites being established in Murmansk and Kamchatka area.]

The reason the number of ICBM firings, as reported by both the above sources, is so much less to date in 1958 as against 1957, is because of the long time lag incident to developing the final integrated analysis of the raw data.

This time lag may in itself furnish part of the clue to the difference between the Dulles estimates and the larger estimates we believe to be more accurate.

In analyzing raw data from either source, there may be gradations of opinion as to the meaning of the data. We would assume that these gradations of analytical opinion have been assessed at the policy level of the intelligence system. We would also assume one source of information has been integrated with the other.

If both these steps have been taken in the assessment of the information indicated from Sources 1 and 2, however, it is very hard to understand how the final conclusion as to the rate of ICBM test activity of the Soviets could be many times less than the raw data would indicate.

SUMMARY

The United States plans to have 24 operational ICBM's by 1960; and 120-130 by 1962.

In the same time period the CIA estimates the Soviets will have 500 ICBM's by 1960 or 1961.

Based on these accepted figures alone, we believe our currently planned defense programs are insufficient to meet the threat which the CIA estimates the Soviets will pose by 1961.

² These and following brackets are in the original.

But if we are correct in our belief that the Soviet ballistic missile testing program has been much greater than as estimated by the CIA, and if construction of Russian ICBM launching sites is as advanced and as wide-spread as we understand to be the case, it is clear that our planned defense programs are even more insufficient.

May we respectfully present the fact that you have said many times we should not underestimate a possible enemy.

Based on the information outlined, however, we believe our national intelligence system is underestimating the enemy's current and future ballistic missile capability.

As a result, we also believe that our national defense plans and programs are not being effectively related to sound estimates of Soviet capability.

Sincerely yours,

Stuart Symington

92. Memorandum From Lay to Gray¹

Washington, September 3, 1958

SUBJECT

Analysis of Draft "Implementing Instructions" submitted to the President for approval by letter from the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated August 23, 1958

Background

1. On April 18, 1956, the President approved the original "Authorization for the Expenditure of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense". This Authorization covered [*text not declassified*] the use of nuclear weapons, under specified conditions, for defense against air attack:

- a. In the United States, its territories and possessions;
- b. In coastal air defense identification zones;
- c. [*text not declassified*]

¹ Source: Analysis of draft implementing instructions on use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes.

This Authorization still remains in effect.

2. On May 22, 1957, the President approved a new "Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons" under certain conditions:

a. This Authorization first stated that, [*text not declassified*] nuclear weapons could be expended for:

(1) Defense of the United States, its territories and possessions:

(a) Against air attack in U.S. territories and coastal air defense identification zones (the same provision covered by the original Authorization);

(b) Against sea attack in U.S. territories and adjacent international waters (new provision);

(c) [*text not declassified*]

(2) Defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory and in international waters against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces (substantially a new provision).

b. This Authorization also stated that, in circumstances involving nuclear attack upon the continental United States [*text not declassified*] subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to agreements or understandings with the countries concerned (a new provision).

3. The new Authorization was not to come into effect until "Implementing Instructions" had been prepared by Defense, concurred in by State, and approved by the President.

4. On June 27, 1958, a meeting was held in the President's office to discuss two issues which had developed between State and Defense in preparing the "Implementing Instructions". The first issue, which the Secretary of State did not press, was the fact that the retention by the President of control over the use of nuclear weapons was of great political advantage at the present time. The other issue related to the question of whether authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory should be made subject to existing and future agreements and understandings with the country or countries involved.

5. As a result of this meeting, the President approved the following further action:

a. Defense, with the assistance and concurrence of State, would amend the draft instructions presented at the meeting to provide that the authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory against Sino-Soviet Bloc attack must not be implemented in violation of existing and future agreements or understandings with the country or countries concerned. Such amended instructions (to be made in only three copies) were to be submitted for the President's approval as a basis for the subsequent preparation and submission for Presidential approval of separate implementing instructions to each appropriate commander. Each such separate instruction was to contain specific guidance regarding applicable agreements or understandings

with friendly foreign countries, and was to be submitted in one sealed copy to the commander concerned.

b. State, in consultation with Defense, would review all existing agreements and understandings with friendly foreign countries affecting the "Implementing Instructions" and take action as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of State to revise any such agreements or understandings which impede U.S. forces in foreign territory in exercising the right to defend themselves.

6. State and Defense have now submitted to the President for approval the draft "Implementing Instructions" amended pursuant to 5-a above.

Comparison of Subject Draft Instructions With Previous Draft

7. After review of the notes taken by General Goodpaster and myself at the June 27 meeting, the amended draft instructions appear to carry out fully the President's action in 5-a above. Throughout these instructions, the authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces is made "subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned."

8. In addition, this quoted wording has also been used in paragraphs 4-a-(3) and 4-c, in place of the wording used in the original "Authorization" and the previous draft instructions. The new wording does not make a significant change in paragraph 4-c, which originally read "subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to existing and future agreements or understandings with the country or countries concerned." There does appear, however, to be a significant change in paragraph 4-a-(3), which originally read "subject to the consent of the country sovereign over the territory involved." Under the new wording, whether we obtained the consent of the sovereign country would depend upon any applicable agreements or understandings.

Comparison of Subject Draft With Original "Authorization"

9. Except as indicated in 8 above, all of the provisions of the original "Authorization" appear to have been appropriately taken into account in the subject draft instructions. However, certain new or supplementary material has been added as follows:

Paragraph 5-c, last sentence, adds a new limitation, which appears to be consistent with existing basic policy.

Paragraph 6-a, second sentence, contemplates that commanders of joint task forces and of other commands, "equivalent in stature to the

numbered forces”, might be “Authorizing Commanders”. The original “Authorization” stated that its implementation “will be extended where necessary and appropriate to the level, but not below that, of the commanders of numbered field armies, fleets, and air forces.” This does not appear to be a change in the sense of the original, [text not declassified].

Paragraph 6-a, third sentence, continues in effect the earlier “Authorization” described in 1 above rather than superseding it as contemplated in the “Authorization” described in 2 above.

Paragraph 6-d contains new factors to be considered by an “Authorization Commander”.

[text not declassified]

Section “B”, paragraph 2. Does the term “within effective enemy striking range of the United States, its Territories and possessions” have any real meaning in view of the long-range ballistic missiles?

Section “B”, paragraph 3-a, adds specific examples of attacks. *Subparagraph 3-a-(2)* cites as an example of an attack a submarine attempting submerged penetration of a major U.S. port or harbor. The term “attack” is elsewhere defined as “a major hostile assault of such magnitude and against such areas or forces as to constitute an immediate and vital military threat to the security of the United States or to major U.S. forces”. Presumably one submarine penetration of a major U.S. port is considered sufficient evidence of hostile intent to fit the definition of “attack”.

Section “B”, paragraph 3-a, provides that an unidentified submarine or aircraft engaged in an attack may be assumed to be a Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking force. Isn’t it conceivable that hostilities on the Middle East might under certain circumstances involve an attack on U.S. forces by submarine or aircraft of Middle Eastern countries?

Section “B”, paragraph 4-c-(1), authorizes expenditure of nuclear weapons “against all elements of the attacking forces, including those within Sino-Soviet Bloc territory.” While this fits the definition of defense against an attack, it also may become equivalent to retaliation in the case of long-range weapons.

[text not declassified]

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

93. Memorandum for Record of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, September 12, 1958

On September 10, I departed Washington at 5:50 a.m., by special mission aircraft in the company of General Goodpaster for a meeting with the President.

The President came to his office on the BARBARA ANN, and after General Goodpaster had completed his business, I discussed four items with the President.

1. The amended draft of "Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Accordance with Presidential Authorization dated May 22, 1957" which was transmitted to the President from the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 23 August 1958. After recounting the history of this document to the President, I suggested that it might not be profitable for him to go through it paragraph by paragraph but for me to indicate in what respects it deviated from the "Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons approved by the President on May 22, 1957." I used as a basis for my discussion, Mr. Lay's memorandum to me of September 3, which is attached.

I indicated to the President that the concern of the Secretary of State with respect to whether authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territories should be made subject to future agreements and understandings with the country or countries involved, had been met in the draft document. I also pointed out to the President that the draft document when finally approved, would be the basis for subsequent preparation and submission for Presidential approval of separate implementing instructions to each appropriate commander.

I pointed out what appeared to be a change of some consequence in paragraph 4 a (3), which originally read: "Subject to the consent of the country sovereign over the territory involved." It was indicated that under the new wording whether we obtained the consent of the sovereign country would depend upon any applicable agreements or understandings. The President found no difficulty with this change.

There follow the other points I made with the President:

Paragraph 5 c, last sentence. The President felt the new limitation, which is designed to limit hostilities, was an improvement.

¹ Source: Expenditure of nuclear weapons; NSC structure; Taiwan Straits. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.

Paragraph 6 a, second sentence. The President wished this sentence amended by adding after the words “numbered forces”, “as specifically approved by the President.”

Paragraph 6 a, third sentence. I felt it unnecessary to take the President’s time with this item.

Paragraph 6 d. The President felt that the new factors to be considered by an authorizing commander were helpful to the document.

Paragraph 6 g. The President indicated that he did not understand this paragraph and wants more information with respect to it. He expressed great concern about security and would not be inclined to approve this paragraph unless there were convincing evidence of the need for it.

Section B, paragraph 2. The President felt it was not necessary to make any change in this paragraph although he felt it was not entirely clear.

Section B, paragraph 3 a (2). This paragraph cites as an example of an attack which would be a basis for a decision by an authorizing commander within the context of the paper, “a submarine attempts submerged penetration of a major port or harbor in the U.S., its territories and possessions.” The President was quite emphatic in rejecting this as an example of what might be considered an attack. He pointed out that we had various other methods of dealing with a submerged submarine, if it were identified and located, without the use of nuclear weapons. He felt that this was similar to U.S. planes flying over the Caspian Sea.

Section B, paragraph 3 c. This paragraph gave the President some concern and he asked first why it was not possible simply to shoot the plane down or destroy the submarine without resort to nuclear weapons. However, as he thought about it, he thought perhaps that it might be appropriate to employ nuclear warheads on antiaircraft weapons and nuclear depth charges.

Section B, paragraph 4 a (1). (General Goodpaster joined us for discussion of this item, at my request). The President was disinclined to accept this paragraph as written feeling that it was too broad, general, and unqualified. He asked that it be tightened up measurably before again being submitted to him for approval. He particularly would not wish to have this paragraph in effect authorize a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union when the attack that had been launched upon the U.S. forces did not involve or threaten to involve the continental U.S.

Section C, paragraph 3 b. The President was not willing to accept this paragraph without a means of authentication having been specified for the authorizing commander. He recalled the Orson Wells radio episode. He spoke at some length of the seriousness of nuclear strikes on the basis of incorrect or misleading information. He would wish that

it be made very clear that an authorizing commander in fact knew that the nuclear attack had occurred on the continental U.S. He accepted the thought that it was insufficient in a case such as this to delegate authority to the Department of Defense but would wish to approve personally the specific authorizing commanders given authority under this section.

After this discussion, which consumed about an hour and a half, the President felt that he wished to tighten up the general authorization wherever it appears in the paper. For example, he wished the first sentence of paragraph 4 to read as follows: "When *the urgency* of time and circumstances *clearly* do not permit a specific decision by the President. . ."

2. I then indicated to the President that I had made available to Mr. Hagerty a copy of the OCB draft standby statements for possible use by the President in the event of the successful Soviet moon shot. General Goodpaster had earlier brought to the President's attention the fact that between September 11 and September 15 there was a high degree of possibility that the Soviets would succeed in such an effort.

3. I then discussed with the President the question of attendance at NSC meetings. He approved the amendments on page 5 (attached) of the document entitled, "The Structure and Functions of the National Security Council."

Paragraph 8 b should read as follows: "*Special request members*: For all agenda items which are the subject of official interest to his responsibilities until the President otherwise determined. (Currently the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration)"

In the subsequent discussion, the President made it clear that he wished, of course, the statutory members (including the statutory advisers) to attend all regular NSC meetings. In addition, he wanted the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget to attend. He would also expect the Director, USIA, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the NSC and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, to attend and sit at the table.

For agenda items which are the subject of official interest, he would expect the Attorney General, Chairman, AEC and the Administrator, NASA to sit at the table. He expressed his view that this should mean that the Attorney General and the Administrator, NASA would not find it necessary to attend all regular meetings. However, he felt that he wished the Chairman, AEC to participate as regularly as his convenience and conscience dictated.

Particularly with respect to the Chairman of the AEC, the President expressed the following views: In the context of modern and perspective

weapons systems, there is very little in the way of defense policy with which the Chairman of the AEC is not concerned. Furthermore, because of the special characteristics of the legislation under which the AEC operates and because of the constant effort of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, to have a dominant voice in all matters pertaining to atomic energy, the President wishes to make every effort possible to keep the Chairman of the AEC in the family of the Executive Branch of the Government. He therefore is willing in various ways to take what might be considered unusual steps to identify the Chairman of the AEC with the formulation of national policy. Finally, he felt that men such as Mr. McCone came to Washington at a considerable sacrifice and with only the motivation of service and to appear to exclude them from the high councils was something the President wished to avoid.

With respect to those who attend regular NSC meetings but do not sit at the table, he made the following comments:

Now that Arthur Larson has departed, he would not expect Mr. Larson's successor to attend meetings. He said that he had never understood why Larson had originally been invited. He felt that the Director, ICA, should continue to attend as long as Jimmy Smith occupies that position. He had not fully understood previously that the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs had succeeded to the coordinating functions formerly assigned to ICA. He felt that the Special Assistants for Atoms for Peace Program, Foreign Economic Policy, Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination should attend regular meetings and sit at the table when participating.

He had no objection to attendance as observers of the Assistant to the President, the Deputy Assistant to the President, the White House Staff Secretary and the President's Naval Aide.

The President felt that the foregoing would be appropriate for general NSC meetings. However, he acknowledged the need for special NSC meetings, and gave me the following instruction:

When, after talking with the Secretary of State and/or the Secretary of Defense, it was deemed by me that an item was of sufficient sensitivity to justify a separate meeting, he would wish one called with notification only to those who were to attend. The meeting would be simply described as a special meeting with the President. Upon the convening of the meeting the President would be asked whether he considered this a special NSC meeting and upon his affirmative reply it would be understood that the results of the meeting would become a part of the official records of the National Security Council. At such meetings he would expect the statutory members, the statutory advisers, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Executive Secretary of the NSC.

Others who might be invited, depending upon the nature and character of the items under discussion, would be the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, AEC, the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, as well as other officials whose presence might be from time to time required.

4. We then discussed the Taiwan Straits situation. I raised the question with the President as to how long we should continue to encourage Chiang Kai-shek in the notion that we would support his return to the mainland by force inasmuch as it seemed to me that this was no longer a reasonable possibility. The President said that Chiang Kai-shek hoped that there would be disintegration from within Communist China and that in the ensuing chaos he would be in a position, with our support, to move in and take over. He felt that this was a possibility and was to be distinguished from an attack by the Chinese Nationalists which would result in their taking over control of the country. He believed as long as the first possibility existed that it was important to maintain the morale of Chiang and his people.

With respect to the Off-shore Islands, I expressed my concern that we would not have the support of neutral countries, our allies, or indeed even possibly domestic public opinion if we engaged in hostilities which promised to become wide-spread simply for the purpose of holding on to the real estate. The President agreed with this in principle and said that he had done everything he could four years ago to prevent the movement of large numbers of troops to the Off-shore Islands. He indicated that he had sent two of his most persuasive spokesmen (Walter Robertson and Admiral Radford) who found Chiang adamant. He felt, however, that another principle was involved and that was the protection of the symbol of the free world. He felt that inasmuch as the Chinese Communists themselves had by statement and action indicated that the forceable capture of the Off-shore Islands was only a prelude to the forceful capture of Formosa, we would be compelled to assist Chiang if this became necessary, to prevent loss of the Off-shore Islands by force.

He did agree with the view that some honorable way out of the Off-shore Islands dilemma was desirable. In this he indicated that perhaps his views as to methods were somewhat at variance with the Secretary of State's.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr Lay

94. Memorandum of Discussion at the 379th NSC Meeting¹

September 18, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 379th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday,
September 18, 1958

Present at the 379th NSC Meeting were the Acting Secretary of State, presiding; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General (participating in Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Attending for Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Assistant Secretary of State; the Executive Secretary NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken:

[Omitted here is agenda item 1.]

**2. STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS ON JUNE 30,
1958: THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM (NSC 5819)**

Mr. Gray indicated that before getting into the details of this item he wished to raise a related point occasioned by the publication on September 17, 1958, in one of the Washington newspapers, of an article which attributed to Lt. General Arthur Trudeau, USA, a statement allegedly made on the previous day to the effect that the advanced state of Soviet technology was due more to Soviet success in espionage and subversion than it was to their scientific apparatus. Mr. Gray thought it timely to raise the Trudeau statement at this time inasmuch as the Status Report on Internal Security, which was before the Council for consideration, covered areas to which General Trudeau had made

¹ Source: Agenda item 2: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958: The Internal Security Program (NSC 5819). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

reference. Mr. Gray thought that if General Trudeau's statement were true, it was quite a serious matter. If it was not true, then it appeared not to be helpful inasmuch as it cut across efforts being made elsewhere in our Government to educate our people concerning Soviet scientific advances.

The Acting Chairman, IIC, indicated that representatives of the FBI had talked with General Trudeau following the appearance of the story in the Washington newspapers. General Trudeau indicated to the FBI that he made a talk before the annual convention of the American Society for Industrial Security; that he had thought, in appearing before these officials of industry, it would be an excellent opportunity to needle them concerning their responsibility for safeguarding classified security information and classified critical equipment in their possession. He said that in making his statements he did not have any specific cases in mind not already known to the FBI. He said he did have in mind past cases like the Abel espionage case, the cases which developed at Fort Monmouth, and the German espionage cases which were developed in World War II. He said his motivation in making his statement was simply to alert his listeners to the very real need for providing adequate industrial security.

The Director, USIA, indicated that when General Trudeau raises the hackles of the industrial security people in this manner, it has adverse reverberations elsewhere. Mr. Allen mentioned that the Department of State was presently negotiating with the USSR on increased exchanges of people and that he, himself, has been endeavoring of late to negotiate exchanges of films with the Soviet Union. On the latter score, arrangements had been made for the Soviet Ambassador to the United States to visit Hollywood to observe the making of a film, and the motion picture people involved were concerned from a security standpoint to the extent of requiring a letter from the Director, USIA, before they would permit Ambassador Menshikov to observe the making of a film. He thought that statements of the type attributed to General Trudeau would tend further to aggravate these and other exchange efforts which State and USIA had undertaken.

The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Dr. Killian, stated that, without belittling the importance of adequate security, he thought that U.S. scientists would feel that statements of the type attributed to General Trudeau constituted a disservice to this country to the extent that such statements created the impression that the Soviet scientists did not have the scientific prowess which they do in fact possess.

Mr. Gray indicated that he had raised the Trudeau matter for discussion, not with any intent of suggesting action be initiated against

General Trudeau, but merely because of its timeliness and its relationship to Item 2 on today's Council agenda.

Mr. Gray then went on to Item 2 and asked Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, the NSC Representative on Internal Security, to provide the Council with an oral summary of the highlights of the Annual Report submitted jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

The NSC Representative on Internal Security then provided an oral briefing of the Status Report (a copy of his presentation is filed in the Minutes of this Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

Following the oral presentation, Mr. Gray singled out for discussion the problem of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, noting that it was a very serious one and that it involved a type of attack against which it was most difficult to defend adequately. He said that he had the impression that the Status Report was a little more gloomy concerning the resolution of this problem than were the experts who discussed it with the Planning Board. Nonetheless, the Planning Board did feel that additional steps might be taken with respect to that aspect of the clandestine entry problem which involved the development and use of devices for the detection of radioactive material. Accordingly, he said, the Planning Board recommended unanimously that the Council adopt and the President approve an action calling for accelerated activity to develop, procure, and utilize devices designed to detect attempted introduction into the United States of materials which were or may be characteristic of fissionable material or other nuclear weapons components.

Mr. Gray referred to the fact that new and better detection devices would soon be available, adding that on this score there was some feeling in the Planning Board that a Council action along the lines suggested would give further stimulus to the program and might thereby expedite to some extent the development, procurement, and use of such devices.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Scribner, observed that the largest expense in connection with the device program involved operations and personnel, as distinguished from the cost of the devices themselves. He said that he had received a recent indication from the Bureau of the Budget that the Department of the Treasury should reduce rather than increase the number of its personnel, and he wondered how the direction of the Bureau of the Budget fitted in with the recommendation of the Planning Board for accelerated efforts in the detection devices area.

Mr. Gray agreed that the indication received from the Budget Bureau was a commendable one and consistent with recently expressed views of the President, but he added that it was not his understanding that the President had said that there must be a personnel cut in connection

with each and every program. It was Mr. Gray's view that hard choices had to be made in assessing the validity of all programs, but that this did not mean a personnel cut had to be made in each and every program. Mr. Gray thought that if the military and internal security people felt as strongly as they did about the clandestine entry problem, it was very important that their views be considered. He then related the cost of the device program to the very much larger cost of one cruiser or one B-52, noting that the clandestine entry program has its role to play in our defenses along with such items as the military ones he had cited.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury inquired what the language proposed by the Planning Board would add to the language already contained in the policy paper on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1) wherein it was directed that "intensified efforts should be continued to develop active and improved passive devices for the detection of fissionable material by such means, and to assure their effective use."

Mr. Gray recalled that this point had been made at the Planning Board and that he had asked the experts in attendance if the device program were proceeding as rapidly as possible, and he had received a negative response. He therefore asked at the Planning Board if a word from the President calling for further acceleration of that program would result in such acceleration, and the response was in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Planning Board agreed unanimously to recommend that such acceleration be directed.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury said he assumed that the recommended language related only to the acceleration of the program as it involved the new devices which are coming in, and not to the existing devices. Mr. Gray advised that his assumption was correct.

The Acting Secretary of State indicated that the Department of State favored the acceleration of the development, procurement, and use of the new devices which are coming in. He said that such devices would be tremendously helpful from the standpoint of his Department in that they would reduce the likelihood of retaliation being taken against our pouches going into the Soviet Bloc countries, should we open an incoming pouch which contained innocuous radioactive material.

Mr. Gray indicated that there was now before the Planning Board, and will soon be before the Council, a paper dealing with the recommended procedures to be followed in connection with incoming diplomatic pouches which might contain radioactive materials.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury indicated that he would have no objection to the action proposed by the Planning Board so long as it was limited to the better devices which were now being developed.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted the report on the status of the internal security programs on June 30, 1958, prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence

Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (transmitted as Part 8 of NSC 5819), as summarized orally at the meeting by the NSC Representative on Internal Security.

b. Agreed to submit to the President a recommendation that accelerated efforts should be made to develop, procure and utilize devices designed to detect attempted introductions into the United States of materials which are or may be characteristic of fissionable material or other nuclear weapons components.

NOTE: The recommendation in *b* above subsequently approved by the President and transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

95. Paper for Presentation to the NSC¹

Washington, September 18, 1958

U.S. Internal Security Program

In the joint report of the IIC and ICIS on the Internal Security Program of the United States, the Council's Internal Security Committees have presented the nature of the threat involved, the status of some 50 programs designed to meet the threat, and an assessment of the overall program as measured against the requirements of approved national policies which relate to internal security matters.

As provided in the charter responsibilities of IIC and ICIS, the overall objective of the Internal Security Program is the establishment, and maintenance by responsible agencies, of the highest practicable state of internal security, including plans for a war-related emergency. Consistent with this assignment of responsibility, and with the provisions of specific directives, the Internal Security Program is principally directed toward meeting the threat of Communist subversion, espionage, and sabotage, including the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons for use against military and other key installations in this country.

¹Source: U.S. internal security program. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Based on an appraisal of specific programs, the Internal Security Committees have made a general assessment which is highlighted by the following views and conclusions: (1) recognizing the impossibility of achieving total internal security defenses, it is nevertheless possible to establish a practical program providing substantial deterrents to espionage, sabotage and subversion, (2) however, because of lack of progress in certain important areas, such a program has not been achieved, (3) most of the measures required to implement the internal security provisions of our basic national security policy (Par. 44, NSC 5810/1) are expected to remain inadequate over the period of this fiscal year, particularly in the field of countermeasures against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, and (4) Net Evaluation Studies by IIC and ICIS, reflect that implementation of current internal security programs does not pose sufficient risk to deter clandestine attack, nor will sufficient progress to that end be made in the years immediately ahead.

In certain of the broad categories of internal security programs, progress is reported by the Committees. Some of the results of full-time investigative effort by the IIC agencies are reflected in the FBI's substantial coverage and penetration of the Communist Party, USA; the identification by FBI of U.S. citizens and aliens (now approximating 13,000 persons) who would be considered by the Justice Department for detention in an emergency, [*text not declassified*] and the development of evidence upon which legal action can be taken against subversive individuals and organizations. The IIC agencies anticipate no material change in the level of these particular aspects of the investigative side of the internal security program during this fiscal year, in the absence of a revision of present responsibilities as the result of international developments, new legislation, or new policy requirements.

In the prosecutive field, convictions have been successfully obtained in cases of individuals involved in Soviet espionage and other offenses of an internal security nature. (Examples of these are: (1) the conviction of a Colonel in the Soviet espionage service whose operations in New York included the use of fraudulent birth certificates, ciphers, radio and microfilm messages, etc., (2) convictions obtained under the Labor Management Relations Act for offenses involving the filing of false non-Communist affidavits by labor union officials, (3) successful prosecutive action in cases involving perjury before grand juries and Congressional Committees in internal security matters, false denials of Communist Party affiliations in loyalty certificates executed by Armed Forces personnel, and convictions for perjury and obstruction of justice arising out of grand jury investigations, (4) convictions of 6 defendants obtained under the Trading With the Enemy Act in cases involving trade with Communist China, and (5) as another example, in the cases of Cuban revolutionist activity in the U.S., 89 defendants were indicted, and 62 convictions obtained, on charges of

unlicensed exportation of arms, transfers of unregistered weapons, and violation of neutrality laws.) In other prosecutive areas, however, our internal security has suffered as the result of Supreme Court decisions reversing convictions under the Smith Act of 19 Communist Party leaders, the acquittal on appeal of 20 additional CP functionaries, and the remanding for retrial of 29 others. Although a selected number of these cases are to be re-tried, the prospects of successful prosecution are limited by the unavailability of witnesses by reason of death, illness, or the loss of their usefulness as confidential informants should they appear in court.

Some progress has been made in programs calling for security checks and other internal security safeguards on the entry and exit of persons who present a threat to the national security. However, the development of adequate safeguards in this area is hampered by such factors as (1) the extensiveness of our land and sea borders, (2) Supreme Court decisions under which the issuance of U.S. passports may not be denied to known Communists, (3) the current practice of admitting alien ships crewmen into the U.S. on the basis of visas issued to an entire ships crew, instead of issuing individual visas to each crew member, and (4) the ease with which enemy espionage agents may establish fraudulent identities with falsified birth records and other false means of identification in this country.

The ICIS, in consultation with the IIC, has established, or is in the process of establishing, security safeguards with respect to the substantial internal security hazards presented by the admission of Soviet bloc nationals under the current East-West Exchange Program; the admission of ships personnel from Polish vessels permitted entry to U.S. ports under present agreements with Poland; the prospect of admissions of Soviet bloc aircrewmen and administrative personnel under current policy looking to agreements for the operation of Soviet bloc airlines into this country; the prospective admissions in increasing numbers of Soviet bloc nationals under current policy calling for substantial increases in the admission of such persons as tourists, and cultural, information, and scientific specialists from Soviet-dominated countries in Eastern Europe; and the admission of refugees from Soviet bloc countries whose numbers have proved to include bona fide Communists and intelligence agents.

In the area of providing physical security for vital industrial and Governmental facilities, the Department of Defense and AEC are maintaining physical security programs for the protection of installations under their cognizance against sabotage, espionage and subversive activities. Insofar as other facilities are concerned, for which OCDM has overall responsibility by Executive Order issued in 1951, that agency has indicated that physical security measures will remain inadequate until security cognizance over the facilities has been assigned to appropriate

agencies, and until funds for the program are forthcoming. Meanwhile, the OCDM is in the process of preparing an order providing guidance to the agencies concerned. As for the protection of Government facilities housing essential functions, a guidance order to agencies is in preparation at OCDM—meanwhile the ICIS has circularized government agencies alerting them to the necessity for determining the extent of safeguards required to protect Government buildings against clandestine attack by chemical, biological, and radiological means.

Insofar as the problem of excluding subversives from employment in vital industries is concerned, Administration efforts to obtain remedial legislation has not resulted in action by the Congress.

With respect to the protection of classified U.S. defense information, the ICIS has continued to carry out the responsibility assigned to it by the NSC for surveying the implementation of the governing executive order issued in 1953. Its surveys reflect a general failure on the part of the agencies to effect downgrading and declassification of security information. These surveys have resulted in recommendations by ICIS for the improvement of the program, which recommendations are awaiting action by State and Defense preparatory to the submission by Budget of recommended amendments to the governing executive order.

With respect to the protection of other strategic information, under current policies directed toward foreign intelligence collection activities in the U.S., appropriate restrictions are applied to Soviet bloc officials on a reciprocal basis, bloc personnel and establishments are required to be appropriately identified as such, and Defense and AEC periodically alert their contractors to the efforts of Soviet bloc officials to obtain strategic information in this country.

Our defenses against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons continue to be inadequate. Indeed, we have not achieved the general objective of our Continental Defense policy wherein that policy directs that "The Soviet bloc should be confronted with internal security measures presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to covert attack against the United States". While some improvement has been effected in the capability and operation of devices designed to detect the presence of radioactive material, the likelihood is remote that we will achieve in the near future a practical device which is capable of distinguishing fissionable material from other radioactive sources. While we do have less discriminating detection devices in operation at key points of entry, they are not being used in the numbers considered as an essential minimum by the Council's Internal Security Committees. (To achieve that minimum program, 9 additional Mark I and 60 additional Mark II devices should be added to the 6 Mark I's and the 162 Mark II's now in operation). Meanwhile, the diplomatic pouch affords a channel of introduction for small, high-yield nuclear weapons for under present practices, Soviet bloc pouches and other diplomatic shipments

are afforded immunity from search even though our devices register the presence of radioactive materials which could conceivably contain nuclear weapons components. Aside from the diplomatic pouch channels, our defenses against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons are further affected by limitations inherent in the control of our vast coastal and land borders and by the limitations placed upon our spot-check inspections of incoming parcels, express, and freight shipments.

In the event you have questions concerning any aspect of the Annual Status Report on Internal Security, I am sure that the IIC and ICIS representatives who are present at this meeting will be happy to answer them. If I can also be of assistance to that end, I will of course do so.

96. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 22, 1958

SUBJECT

Revision of NSC 5410/1

Mr. Smith discussed with the Secretary this afternoon the subject of the attached memorandum.

The Secretary authorized Mr. Smith to take the position indicated during Planning Board discussions on this subject.

Howard Furnas

cc: Mr. Mathews

Attachment

Memorandum From Smith to Dulles

Washington, September 22, 1958

SUBJECT

Review of NSC 5410/1 "US Objectives in the Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc"

On Gordon Gray's initiative, the NSC Planning Board is again considering this subject which was postponed last May at our request

¹Source: State position on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5410 Series.

when you and Secretary McElroy were discussing alternatives to the present Strategic Concept.

This policy paper is an extremely important one, not because of the use which might be made of it during a period of hostilities, but because of the influence it has upon the development of a Strategic Concept and upon US military capabilities including force levels, weapon systems and strategic and tactical planning. It is the logical intermediary between Basic National Policy and the Strategic Concept and will, in large measure, determine the Strategic Concept since the latter depends for its characteristics upon the nature of the objectives which the US sets for itself in military situations.

The present statement of US war aims deals only with general war with the Soviet Bloc, and does not consider our objectives in any military engagement short of general war. In my judgment this is an incomplete treatment of this important subject, and the resulting gap can have serious consequences. So long as there is no stated objective for the case of limited operations, the development of doctrine and capabilities for such operations is inhibited. The policy statement is used as a guide for the planning of the whole range of US military activities. Under the present policy the emphasis is placed upon general war capability to the virtual exclusion of those factors necessary to provide the flexible capability called for in Basic National Policy, and this emphasis makes itself felt in inter-service competition for resources and in the overall structuring of US military strength. Thus a range of military alternatives is not available, the free choice of foreign policy alternatives may be correspondingly restricted, and at a time of serious threat the US may well be prevented from responding effectively to any military aggression short of general war.

I believe US war aims policy should consider three kinds of war, (1) general war initiated by the USSR; (2) major war initiated by Communist China; and (3) other war with the Sino-Soviet bloc; and that our objectives should be spelled out carefully and in detail in order to give the military the maximum guidance necessary for the development of an overall flexible capability consistent with the requirements of Basic National Policy.

Recommendation:

That I be authorized during Planning Board discussions of NSC 5410/1 to take a position along the lines described above.

97. Briefing Note for 380th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, September 24, 1958

STATUS OF MOBILIZATION AND CIVIL DEFENSE
PROGRAMS ON JUNE 30, 1958
(Parts 4 and 5 of NSC 5819)

The next item on the agenda consists of two annual status reports, one on the mobilization program and one on the civil defense program. These reports were prepared separately again this year, even though FCDA and ODM were merged on July 1, because they deal with a period before the merger.

The planning Board was particularly interested in five policy questions which arise out of the reports:

1. Should we continue to assume in our planning that there would be no further attacks after an initial massive attack?

2. Should the mobilization program be reviewed to assure that the requirements of the nuclear and missile age, as opposed to World War II concepts, have been taken into consideration, particularly in such fields as post-attack military production, economic warfare, and censorship?

3. Should we continue to base our relocation planning on the assumption that there will be adequate warning?

4. Does the question of emergency agencies vs. regular agencies need to be re-studied?

5. Should arrangements be made to relocate the families of relocated personnel?

I understand Governor Hoegh will cover these questions in his remarks.

Governor Hoegh ———

¹ Source: Mobilization and civil defense programs (NSC 5819). Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

98. Memorandum of Discussion at 380th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, September 25, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 380th Meeting of the National Security Council
Thursday, September 25, 1958

Present at the 380th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr. for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the U.S. Ambassador to NATO; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

[Omitted here is agenda item 1.]

**2. STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS ON JUNE 30,
1958: THE MOBILIZATION PROGRAM AND THE CIVIL DEFENSE
PROGRAM**
(NSC 5819)

Mr. Gray introduced Governor Hoegh and provided a short briefing to the Council on certain policy questions which seemed to emerge from the Status Report on the Mobilization Program (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

Governor Hoegh said that he would first report on the status of the mobilization program and thereafter on the status of the civil defense program inasmuch as the status reports covered the period

¹ Source: Agenda item 2: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958: The Mobilization Program and the Civil Defense Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

to June 30, 1958 and that the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration had not been merged until July 1, 1958. Next year these two Status Reports would be combined. Continuing, Governor Hoegh pointed out that the emergency agencies, proposed to be set up in event of war or national emergency, were being evaluated in the light of the findings of OPERATION ALERT 1958. Recommendations as to the emergency agencies would be made to the President on October 10, 1958.

Likewise, Mobilization Plans C and D-Minus were being reviewed. The results of the review of these plans would be ready by November 1, 1958 at which time all the President's Emergency Action Documents would be completed.

As to the program to strengthen the U.S. Mobilization Base, Governor Hoegh pointed out that it had been agreed that while we could fight a World War II type of war with our present mobilization base, further study was being undertaken with respect to the adequacy of the mobilization base in the event of general nuclear war.

The program for the relocation of federal agencies, said Governor Hoegh, was likewise being re-evaluated in the light of OPERATION ALERT 1958. Recommendations on this subject would be made to the President and the Cabinet on October 10. As Mr. Gray had pointed out, warning times were of the very greatest importance and the relocation plans needed a complete new look and evaluation. We did have, however, at the present time a continuing operational capability for nineteen agencies in the event of war.

Finally, Governor Hoegh pointed out that the results of the plan to disperse federal facilities had practically negligible results. The one exception was the Atomic Energy Commission which had relocated out of Washington.

Turning to the status of the federal civil defense program as of June 30, 1958 Governor Hoegh stated that the situation described in the Status Report was still far from satisfactory despite marked improvement in the course of the last fiscal year. Governor Hoegh illustrated this point by providing certain highlights of developments in that fiscal year. He stated that the passage of the Durham Bill on August 8 was a landmark in the development of the national civil defense program. No funds, however, had yet been provided for the shelter program and it would be necessary to go back to the Congress with a presentation on this program early in January 1959.

At this point Secretary Dulles interrupted and indicated that he would have to leave the meeting at 10 o'clock and wanted to raise one issue before being obliged to leave. He said he wished to deal with the statement on Page 18 of the Report on the Mobilization Program

which called for the creation of an economic warfare agency in the event of war or national emergency. The Secretary of State added that he did not think that the proposal to create such an emergency agency was wise. The Department of State and other agencies were already carrying out a considerable amount of activity related to economic warfare and would be able to carry on this activity in the event of war. While Secretary Dulles said he sought no decision on this matter at this time, he did wish to raise the question of the desirability of planning to create an emergency agency for the conduction of economic warfare.

In reply Governor Hoegh said that he and his people had come to much the same conclusion as the Secretary of State. Having reevaluated this proposal, he had come to feel that such an agency would not be necessary in the event of a general nuclear war.

Secretary Dulles left the meeting at 10 a.m. after which Governor Hoegh concluded his report on the status of the key elements of the civil defense program.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the reports on the status of the Mobilization Program and the Civil Defense Program on June 30, 1958, prepared by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (transmitted as parts 4 and 5 of NSC 5819), as summarized at the meeting by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

b. Noted that the Secretary of State and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, were in agreement that the concept of an emergency organization for economic warfare will not be adopted at this time.

NOTE: The action in *b* above as approved by the President subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

3. *U.S. POLICY TOWARD GERMANY*

(NSC 5803; OCB Reports, dated September 3, 1958, on NSC 5803)

The National Security Council:

Noted the reference Reports on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

S. Everett Gleason

99. Memorandum of Discussion at the 381st NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 2, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 381st Meeting of the National Security Council
Thursday, October 2, 1958

Present at the 381st NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; Brig. General Alfred D. Starbird for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, U.S. Information Agency (participating in Item 3); the Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Conference on Internal Security (attending for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, and Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield D. Sprague; the Press Secretary to the President (attending for Item 3); the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

**1. *SHIPMENTS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNDER
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY***

(NSC 5802/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1868 and 1984; NSC 5527; Memos for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 22 and 23, 1958)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this item along the lines reflected in the briefing note, a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of this Meeting. Mr. Gray then called on the Secretary of State for comment.

The Secretary of State indicated that the Department of State concurred in the proposed modification of NSC Action No. 1868 and he recommended that the modified language be approved by the President.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on October 3.

The Chairman, IIC, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, observed that it is well recognized by all that there is a threat posed by the capability which the Soviets have clandestinely to introduce nuclear bombs into the United States through diplomatic channels. He indicated that past studies reflect that two bombs, so introduced, could destroy Washington, D.C., and New York City. He noted that under the proposed modification of NSC Action No. 1868 nothing would be done in terms of opening suspect diplomatic shipments until sometime later when improved devices were installed at key ports of entry. He said that the Internal Security Committees, at the request of the Planning Board, were presently studying the question whether examination of diplomatic shipments by detection devices should continue to be covert, and he advised that there was some difference of opinion on this score among the interested agencies. He added that in due time a report would be submitted to the Council by the Internal Security Committees on the basis of the review which it was now making on this question.

The President inquired of Mr. Hoover whether the Atomic Energy Commission had given the Internal Security Committees the whole story relative to what the Soviets would have to do in order to introduce clandestinely into the United States a two or three megaton weapon. The Chairman replied that full information on this subject had been provided to the Internal Security Committees by the Atomic Energy Commission.

The President indicated that he was not thoroughly familiar with the sizes of diplomatic packages entering the United States and he wondered whether the size of such diplomatic packages was sufficient to accommodate large nuclear weapons. Mr. Hoover responded that some of the diplomatic packages entering the country weigh as much as two or three tons, and he added that it was quite feasible to introduce disassembled segments of such weapons in different incoming diplomatic shipments with the idea of assembling them subsequent to their arrival in this country.

The President inquired the reasons for having such large sized diplomatic packages, and the Secretary of State responded to the effect that the United States had to have the privilege of sending diplomatic packages of similar size to the Bloc countries in order to get in needed supplies and needed equipment such as heavy coding machines.

Mr. Gray indicated that some of the heavy packages coming into the United States under diplomatic immunity contained such things as household furnishings, liquor, and the like. Citing an example of the size of some of the incoming packages, Mr. Gray made reference to the fact that sometime ago the Czechs introduced four packages, each of which weighed 3,000 pounds.

The Director of Central Intelligence noted that each time this question came up in the Council, it was his suggestion that our Government work toward an international agreement which would restrict the size of diplomatic pouches. He could not see, for example, why it was necessary that household furnishings of an incoming diplomat be introduced via diplomatic channels.

The President observed that an agreement to reduce the size of such pouches might adversely affect our interests in getting coding machines into the Bloc countries via the U.S. diplomatic pouch. Mr. Allen Dulles agreed with this point but added that, if necessary, this Government could revert to the use of the one-time pad for coding purposes although, admittedly, this would effect substantially the time of delivery of such messages.

The Chairman, ICIS, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, in response to Mr. Gray's inquiry, advised that he had no comments to add to those which had already been made on this subject.

The President concluded the discussion on this item with the thought that the modification of NSC Action No. 1868 contained a satisfactory statement of policy on the subject.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the draft NSC Action on the subject (transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 22) prepared by the NSC Planning Board, with the assistance of representatives of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security as an amendment of the procedure states in NSC Action No. 1868, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 29).

b. Amended NSC Action No. 1868 by deleting the first paragraph of the procedure stated therein and substituting the following:

"If a detection device indicates the presence in a diplomatic shipment of plutonium (or other neutron source) or uranium, the shipment will be detained and the Department of State will request the appropriate foreign diplomatic mission in Washington to have one of its officers appear at the port of entry to remove the objectionable object for examination."

NOTE: The amendment in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation in coordination with the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

100. Memorandum From Lay to All Holders of NSC 5819¹

Washington, October 6, 1958

The enclosed Part 1 of NSC 5819 (Military Program) and Annex A thereto, are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council. *The enclosures are being given a special limited distribution, and access to them should be on a strict need-to-know basis.*

In view of the fact that Part 1 contains “RESTRICTED DATA”, if it is inserted in the covers previously circulated for NSC 5819, such covers should be stamped “RESTRICTED DATA”.

Annex A provides the special annex pursuant to NSC Action No. 1862 and the supplement required by NSC Action No. 1842–g–(10), –(11) and –(12).

This distribution completes NSC 5819.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

National Security Council Memorandum 5819, Part 1

Washington, September 22, 1958

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON
STATUS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS
AS OF 30 JUNE 1958

THE MILITARY PROGRAM
CONTENTS

BASIC REPORT

MILITARY FORCES

- I Objectives of the Military Program
- II JCS Evaluation of our Actual and Potential Capabilities
 - A. Nuclear Retaliatory Capability
 - Continental Defense System (Covered in Section III)
 - B. Ready Forces

¹ Source: Transmits Part 1 of NSC 5819 and Annex A. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Special Limited Distribution; Noform. Extracts—11 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5819.

- C. Maintaining Essential Sea Areas and Air Communications
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SELECTED MILITARY PROGRAMS

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(NSC 5408 Program Review, Status Distribution
of NSC 5802/1 Implementation,
and Certain NSC 5724 Items)
- ANNEX "B" — Statistical Data Supplement Special
(Detailed data on Status and Distribution
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NSC 5819, Part 1, THE MILITARY PROGRAM

I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY PROGRAM.

The basic national objective of the United States is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. The primary threat to fulfillment of this objective is that posed by an aggressive and deeply hostile International Communism. All elements of U.S. national power must be resolutely directed toward meeting this Communist challenge.

The objectives of the U.S. military programs, in support of the basic national objective and in light of the primary threat, are to provide:

An effective nuclear retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate action.

An adequate continental defense system.

Highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces, with the capability to respond selectively and flexibly to local aggression, using all weapons (including nuclear weapons) as required, and to carry out general war tasks.

A capability of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications.

A cold war contribution of U.S. military power to reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural measures.

II. *SUMMARY EVALUATION BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5810/1.*

The nuclear retaliatory forces continue to provide the United States with a capability to inflict such loss and damage upon the enemy as to achieve a margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit the United States and its allies to prevail in general war. "However, despite continued improvement in the quality and posture of these forces during FY 1958, and notwithstanding the promise of continued improvement in the future, recent Soviet technological advances and the concurrent quantitative reductions in U.S. forces have combined to diminish that margin of U.S. military superiority. If these trends continue, it is estimated that this superiority will be lost in the foreseeable future."

Improvements have been made in Continental Defense during FY 1958; but concurrent Soviet offensive improvements have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. The Continental Defense system is not capable of preventing an attack which could seriously damage the United States.

The ready forces of the United States are capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression in most parts of the world. These forces have been quantitatively decreased but qualitatively improved during FY 1958. This qualitative improvement has been attained by the further equipping of forces with advanced weapon systems, including more nuclear weapons, and by improved organization, planning, and techniques. The scope and timing of response to local aggression would be limited primarily by the degree to which maldesployment for initial tasks of general war could be accepted. The capabilities of our Allies to assist in coping with local aggression, with few exceptions, are very limited.

The United States and its Allies are capable of controlling essential air communications. The Soviet threat to the control of essential sea areas at the onset of a general war is so great that U.S. and allied forces, because of quantitative deficiencies and technological difficulties, are only marginally adequate to deal with it. As attacks at the source, offensive ASW operations and coastal and shipping defense operations take effect, U.S. capabilities to control essential sea areas will improve. The capabilities of allied forces to assist in the control of essential air communications and sea areas generally are limited to their homelands and coastal waters and are steadily diminishing.

The contributions of U.S. military forces to cold war activities have been significant, but potential capabilities have not been exploited fully. The increased emphasis recently given to this field should produce dividends.

A. *AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR-RETALIATORY CAPABILITY, ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED AND READY FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION.* The U.S. forces with a nuclear retaliatory capability include strategic bomber forces, carrier striking forces, tactical air forces, and other forces employing weapons armed with nuclear warheads which are ready to strike immediately and effectively against targets within the Sino-Soviet Bloc area.

The *Strategic Air Command* (SAC) has primary capability for nuclear retaliation and is charged with exploiting U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected targets and target systems immediately after outbreak of hostilities. Overall effectiveness of SAC has increased during FY 1958 with introduction of new equipment and procedures. Total SAC force has been reduced from 50 wings of bomber, reconnaissance, and fighter aircraft at end FY 1957 to 44 wings at end FY 1958. This reduction was effected through inactivation of 5 strategic fighter type wings (2 were redesignated fighter bomber and 2 fighter day) and one medium reconnaissance wing. Total of 39 bomber (11 heavy and 28 medium) wings remain unchanged; all but 5 of SAC's 39 bomber wings have a high degree of readiness. Inactivation of one more medium reconnaissance wing in FY 1959 will reduce the total to 43 wings, 39 bomber and 4 (3 medium and one light) reconnaissance.

Combat capability of SAC heavy bomber wings increased during FY 1953 as B-36 units were converted to B-52's and as the number of heavy bombers per wing was increased from 30 (B-36) to 45 (B-52). As of 30 June 1958, 7 wings have been converted and equipped with B-52 aircraft (compared to 3 on 30 June 1957), and one more wing is undergoing conversion. Of the 7 B-52 equipped wings, 4 are considered fully capable and 3 have limited capabilities due to combat crew training and recent conversion status. Remainder of 3 B-36 wings are fully operational. By end FY 1959, 9 wings will be fully converted to B-52's, and 2 more wings will be in process of conversion.

As the Soviet delivery capability increases, the vulnerability of SAC bases within and outside the United States becomes a matter of greater concern. To reduce vulnerability, SAC dispersal and alert programs are being implemented. The status of these programs is:

a. *Heavy Bomber Dispersal.* Although there is a goal to have no more than one heavy bomber squadron on any one base, 33 squadrons are presently (30 June 1958) located on 11 bases. By end FY 1959, these squadrons are programmed to be dispersed on 18 bases; i.e., 5 bases

each with 3 squadrons, 5 bases each with 2 squadrons, and 8 bases each with one squadron.

b. *Medium Bomber Dispersal*. At present there are 28 wings on 18 bases. Two heavy bomber bases are presently accommodating one medium wing each. At end FY 1959, medium bomber wings are programmed to be located on 17 bases; 11 bases each with 2 wings, and 6 bases each with one wing. Dispersal for heavy bomber squadrons, plus a required location of medium bombers on optimum strike bases, causes this temporarily reduced dispersal of medium bomber wings during FY 1959. (See SAC Base Dispersal Map, Section VIII, Installations).

c. *Alert*. As of 30 June 1958, 156 bombers with associated tankers are on *continuous* 15-minute alert. In December 1957, 20 bombers were on 15-minute alert. By end FY 1959, about 350 SAC bombers with associated tankers are expected to be on *continuous* 15-minute alert. Under emergency conditions, the present alert force can be readily increased by curtailing training operations, but the increased alert capability can only be sustained for short periods, possibly 30 days.

In addition to the increase in the status of alert forces, new concepts for meeting the threat were implemented in the Strategic Air Command. Two of the most significant are as follows:

"Positive Control". This allows CINCSAC to launch his alert force under conditions of little or no warning and buy "precious time" for a national decision. This concept, it is hoped, will save the force while the threat is being evaluated.

"Reflex Action". This concept replaced the old plan for rotation of bomber units to overseas bases. It gives SAC an improved overseas alert posture with reduced vulnerability, i.e., the only strategic bomber aircraft in the forward area are "cocked" and ready to go on emergency war plan missions.

In addition to the above, SAC is presently testing a plan for airborne alert in which a significant portion of the alert force remains airborne continuously.

Supplementing SAC retaliatory capabilities are the *USAF tactical nuclear strike forces*. In the *Pacific*, tactical forces consist of 3-2/3 wings (2-1/3 nuclear capable) of fighter bombers and day fighters, *decreasing* to 3 wings (all nuclear capable) of tactical fighters by end FY 1959; one wing of tactical bombers which remains through FY 1959; and one detachment of MATADOR tactical missiles, increasing to 2 groups by end FY 1959. Based in the *United Kingdom and Europe*, tactical strike forces consist of 6-2/3 fighter bomber and fighter day wings (in addition, one fighter day and 3 fighter bomber squadrons are maintained on rotation to Europe from continental U.S. based wings). Of these wings, 6-3/4 are nuclear capable. These tactical fighters remain through FY

1959. There is also one wing of tactical bombers on 30 June 1958, which remains through FY 1959; and 3 groups of MATADOR tactical missiles. One of the 3 MATADOR groups will be converted to the more advanced TM-76 A (MACE) tactical missile by end FY 1959. MATADOR missiles released by this conversion are expected to be transferred to a selected Ally. Tactical air forces in *United States*, capable of augmenting forces overseas, consist of 12-3/4 fighter day and fighter bomber wings (less 4 squadrons on rotation) of which 7 wings are nuclear capable, to be reduced to 7-1/4 tactical fighter wings (less 4 squadrons on rotation) all of which are nuclear capable, by end FY 1959; and one tactical bomber wing to be inactivated during FY 1959. By end FY 1959, all tactical fighter wings are planned to be totally equipped with modern "century series" fighters.

Continuing progress is being made in providing the above delivery systems with smaller diameter and lighter weight weapons and warheads of various yields. The *continuing dispersal of nuclear weapons* to combat units in the field has improved greatly the operational readiness of our offensive forces. This action, coupled with the streamlining of our release procedures, has reduced substantially the reaction time of these forces to counter enemy aggression. However, due to political denial of storage rights in certain countries, weapons allocated to some combat units are not immediately available to those units. Action is continuing to obtain greater latitude in the dispersal of nuclear weapons.

Certain *major U.S. Navy forces*, with the primary mission of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications, possess a significant nuclear retaliatory strike capability. This capability exists primarily in attack carrier striking forces with a secondary capability in missile delivery from surface ship and submarine. There are 15 attack carriers and 17 associated carrier air groups. Since the previous report (30 June 1957), deliveries of new jet aircraft and modernization and new construction of attack aircraft carriers have materially increased Navy's nuclear weapon delivery capability. Three CVA 59 (FORRESTAL) class carriers have replaced ESSEX class carriers for fleet operations. Included in Naval forces are *Marine Corps forces* which contribute to the over-all nuclear retaliatory capability. These include 3 Marine Aircraft Wings, 2 in continental U.S. and one deployed in the Pacific area, maintained in a state of readiness to operate from land or sea bases, and to deploy rapidly to a theater of operations from present locations.

Present *Naval capability for guided missile delivery of large nuclear warheads* from surface ships and submarines is represented by the REGULUS system, for which nuclear warheads are stockpiled. REGULUS I system is now installed in 3 submarines and 4 heavy cruisers. There are 8 submarines equipped with REGULUS radar guidance

system (TROUNCE). One of the 3 missile submarines in the fleet possesses both a REGULUS I and a REGULUS II capability.

Currently, *U.S. Army forces* contribute to the nuclear retaliatory capability with REDSTONE, CORPORAL, HONEST JOHN, 280mm gun, 8-inch howitzer units, and atomic demolition munitions now deployed in Europe; and with HONEST JOHN, 280mm gun, 8-inch howitzer units, and atomic demolition munitions in the Pacific.

The following *air defense capabilities opposing U.S. retaliatory forces apply in general to the Soviet Bloc's air defense system*:

a. Against penetrations conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes between about 5,000 and about 35,000 feet, capabilities of the system are greatest. At about 35,000 feet they would begin to diminish, and above 45,000 feet would fall off markedly; at altitudes below 5,000 feet, they would also be progressively reduced.

b. Against penetrations conducted at night and under poor visibility conditions, the capabilities of the system would be considerably reduced.

c. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers decoys, and electronic countermeasures, capabilities of the air defense system would be diminished through disruption and saturation.

The advantage accruing to the United States and its Allies as a result of a retaliatory offensive would be dependent on the amount of warning of Soviet attack and the degree of protection afforded military installations, particularly those installations from which our retaliatory effort would be launched. It is estimated that enemy losses sustained as a result of a U.S. offensive retaliatory attack would provide a margin of advantage to the United States and its Allies which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would assure eventual victory.

B. HIGHLY MOBILE AND SUITABLY DEPLOYED READY FORCES WITH THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND SELECTIVELY AND FLEXIBLY TO LOCAL AGGRESSION, USING ALL WEAPONS (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AS REQUIRED, AND TO CARRY OUT GENERAL WAR TASKS.

1. OVERALL CAPABILITIES.

a. *Army.* U.S. Army forces are capable of reacting flexibly to local aggression or general war utilizing selective fire power of the appropriate magnitude. Development of new infantry, armored, and airborne divisions, with organic nuclear capability, has greatly increased the operational capability of Army to meet the threat of a nuclear war. All active Army divisions are organized in the new Pentomic structure and are capable of integrating nuclear fire support with that of conventional

weapons and with maneuver. A nuclear projectile for the 8-inch howitzer is now in the stockpile. Additionally, Army has developed Army Missile Commands capable of rendering nuclear fire support to allied ground forces by various ground delivery systems. Addition of a limited number of helicopter units has provided Army with increased battle mobility. Principal limitations on effectiveness of Army forces are related to lack of modernization of non-nuclear fire support and an insufficiency of combat and logistic support because of manpower and budgetary limitations.

b. *Naval*. Increased nuclear capabilities of U.S. naval forces add materially to their effectiveness as a part of the ready forces. Included in naval forces are Fleet Marine Force divisions and air wings, with an organic surface and aircraft launched nuclear capability, capable of reacting to local aggression or general war. The new vertical helicopter assault doctrine provides a high degree of mobility for landing forces in assault and subsequent operations.

c. *Air Force*. USAF forces include units of Tactical Air Command, tactical air units of overseas theater air forces, and SAC bombardment forces described in previous paragraphs. USAF tactical air forces world-wide have been reduced from a total of 55 (including 15 airlift) wings on 30 June 1957 to 45 (including 13 airlift) on 30 June 1958, further to be reduced to 35 (including 11 airlift) by 30 June 1959. *The effectiveness, however, of both strategic and tactical air units to respond to local aggression or general war has not decreased since the 30 June 1957 status report as a result of the growing nuclear delivery capabilities of tactical air weapons and the improving reaction time and mobility of strategic bombardment units.*

d. In the succeeding paragraphs the ready forces capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression and general war are treated by geographical areas.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Section II, JCS Evaluation of Actual and Potential Capabilities.]

III. EVALUATION BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEM.

A. *OBJECTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTINENTAL U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS (Based on NSC 5802/1)*. To be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation. Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World nations, a continental defense readiness and capability which will protect and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory

forces, even in the event of surprise attack. Such preparation should: (1) Provide warning to alert the nation to impending attack; (2) counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts; (3) prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale; (4) maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology permits and as the nature of the threat changes; (5) provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil population; and (6) include appropriately organizing, protecting, and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival.

B. ESTIMATED SOVIET THREAT AND CAPABILITIES.

1. Soviet capabilities for full-scale air attack on the continental United States, while still subject to limitations, have been improved by phasing-in of additional jet bombers, by continued improvement in forward and staging air base capacities, by availability of greater numbers of megaton yield weapons and emergence of a limited capability for in-flight refueling. The numbers of aircraft launched against the United States in an initial attack, even under conditions where surprise was a major Soviet consideration, could range in the several hundreds.

2. In light of recent tests, it is estimated that USSR is developing and stockpiling a versatile group of nuclear weapons ranging from very low yield warheads to high yield thermonuclear weapons.

3. It is estimated that Soviets will achieve an initial limited capability for ICBM attack in 1959.

4. USSR could now have subsonic cruise-type guided missiles with nuclear warheads suitable for launching from submarines against targets in U.S. coastal areas, and have several guided missile submarines equipped to carry and launch these missiles.

5. Clandestine attack on the United States itself by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, could occur against specifically selected targets.

C. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF U.S. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND PROBLEMS. *The absolute capability of our forces to defend the United States against air attack has progressively increased since last report, as of 30 June 1957. This over-all increase is the result of establishment of North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); installation of additional early warning radar coverage, including seaward extensions of DEW Line, and contiguous seaward coverage; provision of more effective control of the air defense system through automation; increased coverage of the sea surveillance system; and availability of improved weapons systems, to include nuclear warheads. Although U.S. defense*

capabilities have improved during FY 1958, Soviet nuclear weapons development and improved delivery capabilities during same period, e.g., as demonstrated by Soviet launchings of space satellites, have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. Soviets are probably now capable of exploiting weaknesses in our defense system at very high and very low altitudes and of utilizing electronic countermeasures, sabotage, and deception to reduce the effectiveness of our defense system and contribute to success of their mission. During 1959, the estimated Soviet initial limited ICBM capability will provide an additional means of exploiting weaknesses in our defense system. The continental air defense system cannot be expected to counter completely an all-out attack of the magnitude which Soviets are capable of launching against the North American Continent. Solutions to following problems are being pursued on a high priority basis:

1. Procurement, training, and retention of highly skilled personnel required by modern and increasingly complex defense systems.
 2. Detection of airborne vehicles at very high and very low altitudes, and development and availability of weapons which can be effectively used at these altitudes.
 3. Development and implementation of measures to overcome or counteract enemy electronic countermeasures.
 4. Development of a system which can be used in defense against enemy ballistic missiles.
 5. Development of an effective and integrated sea surveillance system which will provide for detection, identification, and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within missile launching range of the North American Continent, toward goal of development of capability to establish control over the submarine or surface ship prior to launching of its missile.
 6. Identification and engagement of hostile aircraft as far from our borders as possible.
 7. Means to mitigate or shorten the long lead time involved in completion of programmed improvements to systems.
- [Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

101. Memorandum From Briber to Killian¹

Washington, October 9, 1958

SUBJECT

Dr. Kistiakowsky's Views on the N.I.E., "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles"

Dr. Kistiakowsky is "not completely happy" with this intelligence estimate, although in total it fits pretty well with the Gaither Panel estimate of the 1960–62 critical period.

His modest dissatisfaction stems mainly from the conservative impression left by the report. The Soviets are first credited (para. 75) with an I.O.C. of ten missiles sometime in 1959, and only later in the report is the qualification added, in speaking of the *end* of 1959, of "ten or more, but less than 100" missiles. Kisty was responsible for the qualifying phrase, but feels the report still gives the impression that 10 missiles are the only concern for 1959. He feels they will quite certainly have closer to 100 by the end of the year. He concurs with the final estimate of 500 Soviet missiles in 1961–62. This will be a critical period and so, in general, corresponds to the Gaither Report. We will then have 100 missiles but then bases will not be hardened, nor will BMEWS be operational.

He also criticizes this N.I.E. in that it speaks (para. 75) of an initial 50 per cent Soviet missile reliability and a 5 n.m. CEP; he feels both of these estimates are somewhat harsh toward real Soviet capabilities.

Robert M. Briber

¹ Source: Kistiakowsky's views on NIE entitled "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles." Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

102. Memorandum of Discussion at the 382d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 13, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 382nd (Special) Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, October 13, 1958

Present at this special meeting (382nd) of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy; Mr. Richard Horner for the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; and the Executive Secretary, NSC. The following members of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense, also attended the meeting: Vice Admiral Sides, Director; Charles A. Boyd, Director of Research; Richard H. DuBois, Assistant; Lt. Col. Bolton Miller; M/Sgt. Ralph Pearson; Michael Picchioni.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. EVALUATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

(NSC Action No. 1733)

Mr. Gray explained the background of the subject report. (Copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Mr. Gray asked Secretary Quarles if he had anything to add before calling on Admiral Sides.

Secretary Quarles emphasized that this evaluation should be viewed as an abstraction of the problem, as are all such evaluations. It treats of the problem apart from some of the practical aspects which are normally cranked in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Quarles stressed that this was a report by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as such.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Admiral Sides presented the evaluation with the use of charts. (Copy of Admiral Sides' notes for the presentation and of the charts used, filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

The President remarked that he would like to say one positive thing about the presentation. He thought that it was as dispassionate, low-key and thorough an exposition as he had ever heard.

The President went on to say that this evaluation opens doors for additional investigation. It alerts us to what we must do if anyone studies the fiscal situation. There must be some substitution in these programs. Otherwise we will no longer be able to say that we are defending freedom. The President said he did not believe that we could keep these expenditures going up indefinitely without some kind of controls on the financial situation. He pointed out that interest on bonds is going up at a time when we are not yet out of the recession. The President concluded by congratulating the Group on its report, but expressing the view that it gives us more anxiety than he had imagined it would.

Mr. Gray said that he would like to point out one serious statement. This was that some of the interim systems examined were designed as defense against manned aircraft, but would not be completed and installed in time to deal with advanced types of weapons. Mr. Gray pointed out that Admiral Sides had raised a question for decision as to whether some of these systems should be completed.

The President said that he thought we should identify what systems are obsolete. Perhaps some of them should be "bought out" at an earlier date than now planned. He believed that more evaluation should be made of our present and future plans, to determine what the rule of reason requires. He thought that we should identify those, such as the second generation of BOMARCs, which by the time they were completed would be outmoded by other systems, such as the NIKE-ZEUS.

In answer to the President's question, General Twining and General White indicated that the cost of a B-58 was about \$20 million and the cost of a B-70 about \$23 million.

The President said that he had the impression we were somewhat pessimistic about really developing a defense against ICBMs. He repeated that we should carefully review programs to see where they are antithetical or overlapping. General Twining assured the President that the Joint Chiefs were all taking a soul-searching look at this subject. Secretary Quarles said that such a review was beginning with the preparation of the FY 1960 budget.

The President commented that we were now seeing a new phenomenon in weapons development. It used to be that changes in weapons systems were made slowly and obsolescent models replaced gradually. Now, because of the urgent time element, we are trying to develop rapidly whole weapons systems to replace other systems. What he was

trying to say was that in this process we must make sure we are not substituting money for brains. He reiterated that in the long run he did not believe we could defend our freedom if we put too much money or resources into the machinery of war.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the report points up the vital need for improved intelligence on what the Soviets are doing. He noted that they had recently been cutting back production of heavy bombers. Also, they were not testing ICBMs to the extent expected. He wondered how effective the elaborate protective screen around Moscow would be.

Mr. Gray said that he thought one of the questions raised by the evaluation was the problem of dealing with limited wars, which had been before the NSC recently.

The President repeated that he expected the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to lay out clearly for the Joint Chiefs of Staff the advantages versus the disadvantages of various weapons systems. Then, he felt, some very tough decisions would have to be made. Admiral Sides said that the WSEG had presented its report in full detail to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were now considering it.

Secretary Quarles expressed the belief that, just as we have gone back to the manned bomber as an effective weapon, he expected that the Soviets would too. He thought it was risky to assume that the Soviets would forgo manned bombers. He believed they would find it very much to their advantage to have the same kind of capability that we are trying to develop. He thought that the Soviets might end up producing a heavy bomber somewhere between our B-58 and B-70.

Mr. Allen Dulles estimated that the Soviets will keep up a substantial manned bomber force. He didn't know yet whether they would be able to get high speed together with the necessary range.

The President noted that we expect to level out with about 600 B-52 s, while the Soviets will level off at about 200 heavy bombers. He questioned whether, as we convert to heavy bombers of 3-mach speed, we would still feel that we needed 600. He questioned whether we always needed to be three times better than the Soviets.

General White said that our problem was that we must assume that the Soviets will strike first. If they do, we cannot stop them by our Distant Early Warning lines. We must, therefore, find the number of bombers which it is logical for us to maintain in order to strike back after the initial Soviet attack.

Mr. Gray suggested, and it was agreed, that the Department of Defense be asked to review within the next year its report on relative advantages of ballistic missiles versus manned bombers.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

James S. Lay, Jr.

103. Record of Actions by the NSC¹

Washington, October 16, 1958

RECORD OF ACTIONS
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
at its
THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING
held on
October 13, 1958

(Approved by the President on October 16, 1958)

The President presided at this meeting. The Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, participated in the Council actions below. The Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended this meeting.

ACTION

NUMBER

SUBJECT

1994. *EVALUATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS*

(NSC Action No. 1733)

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, of an evaluation of offensive and defensive weapons systems, prepared by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group pursuant to request by the Secretary of Defense.

b. Noted the President's remarks that, while he congratulated the Group on an objective and thorough exposition, the evaluation and discussion also indicates the need for additional investigation to identify those weapons systems which may be obsolescent, antithetical or overlapping. The President stated that, unless tough decisions were taken regarding such systems, in view of the fiscal situation, we would find that in the long run we would encounter increasing difficulty in preserving our free way of life if we put unnecessary money and resources into the machinery of war.

c. Noted the President's request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct the additional investigation referred to in *b* above in the light of the evaluation and discussion, and report the resultant identification of obsolescent, antithetical or overlapping weapons systems.

d. Noted that although the above presentation contained a brief discussion with respect to limited war capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of

¹ Source: NSC Actions No. 1994 and 1995 taken at the 382d (Special) NSC meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council.

Staff would not be requested to include limited war capabilities in the investigation referred to in *c* above, in the light of the President's decision in NSC Action No. 1952.

e. Agreed that, in view of the above presentation, the results of this year's review, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1733-*c*, of the report on "Relative Military Advantage of IRBM-ICBM vs. Manned Aircraft and Non-Ballistic Missiles" did not require presentation to the NSC; but that this report should be again reviewed within the next year and results reported to the Council.

NOTE: The actions in *b*, *c*, *d* and *e* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

1995. *SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING
U.S. SECURITY*

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent unusual Soviet activity connected with outer space developments; Soviet nuclear tests conducted since September 30; and recent developments in the Taiwan Strait situation.

104. Memorandum of Discussion at the 383d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 16, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 383rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
October 16, 1958

Present at the 383rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Item 1); Dr. Willard F. Libby, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); Brig. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird,

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Status of the National Security Programs: The Atomic Energy Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Assistant to the Chairman, AEC (for Item 1); Capt. John H. Morse, Jr., USN, AEC Observer on the NSC Planning Board (for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for the Atoms for Peace Program, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretaries of State Rountree and Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS: THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM*

(NSC 5819)

The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Gordon Gray, introduced the new Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. McCone, who stated that he would give the first portion of the report on the status of the atomic energy program. In the course of his report, Mr. McCone dealt with the following main subjects: *First*, U.S. commitments for the purchase of uranium ores at home and abroad for the next several years; *second*, availability of fissionable materials—U-235, plutonium, and tritium—in the light of requirements of various kinds; *third*, the aging and deterioration of U.S. reactors and forthcoming problems of replacement; and *fourth* the program for nuclear power for peaceful purposes. On the latter subject, Mr. McCone indicated that the U.S. goal was to achieve economically competitive nuclear power in the United States in ten years, and in friendly foreign nations in five years.

Following Mr. McCone, the remainder of the status report was presented by Dr. Willard F. Libby, of the Atomic Energy Commission, who discussed the following subjects: The U.S. basic research program; the program for the study of radioactive fallout; isotopes; the non-military uses of atomic explosions (Project PLOWSHARE); forthcoming PLOWSHARE plans; the U.S. atomic weapons program (HARDTACK I); and the HARDTACK II series of tests now proceeding in Nevada. (Copies of the reports by Mr. McCone and Dr. Libby are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

The President asked a question with respect to the use of atomic explosions to recover oil, and was answered by Dr. Libby. Thereupon

Secretary Quarles indicated a desire to comment on the Department of Defense atomic weapons requirements. He pointed out that the Department of Defense had yesterday sent to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission its estimates of its requirements over the next ten years for both plutonium and U-235. Secretary Quarles indicated that the minimum requirements for small tactical nuclear weapons would continue to exceed the plutonium estimated to be available. The President, with a smile, stated that he was at least perfectly certain that Secretary Quarles was not going to reduce the requirements for fissionable materials.

The Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Roger Jones, asked whether these Defense Department requirements took account of the material discussed by Admiral Sides at the special meeting of the National Security Council on last Monday afternoon. The subject of this meeting was the evaluation of offensive and defensive weapons systems.

Secretary Quarles replied to Mr. Jones by stating that the Defense Department requirements were based on all the latest available information, including that presented at the special Council meeting on Monday. He again pointed out that the trend toward smaller sizes of nuclear bombs, such as the DAVY CROCKETT, was greatly increasing the plutonium content per bomb.

Mr. Jones pointed out that in view of the constant criticism by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy of the alleged failure of the Department of Defense to indicate its future requirements, which criticism extended also to the Administration as a whole, it would be worth while to advise the Joint Committee that the Defense Department had just sent to the Atomic Energy Commission its requirements over the next ten years.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the report on the status of the atomic energy program on June 30, 1958, prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission and transmitted as Part 3 of NSC 5819; as supplemented by an oral presentation by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and AEC Commissioner Libby, on developments in the program since June 30, 1958.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

105. Memorandum Prepared by the Office of the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology¹

Washington, undated

SELECTED ISSUES IN THE FY '60 DEFENSE BUDGET

(As of November 1, 1958)

Limitations and Approach of this Memorandum

1. It collects and classifies current questions about specific budgetary items; it does not seek to answer these questions. The questions selected deal primarily with the development and procurement of weapons systems. It does not, for example, cover military construction.

2. It reflects the methods and approach of scientists and engineers; it does not express or assume military judgment and experience. It does not attempt to evaluate the military risks entailed in making changes in the military program. It does not deal with factors arising from national domestic policy.

3. It does not assume that the total defense budget is too large, too small, or just right. The objective is to suggest those detailed questions which can help in answering this general question:

"How much military capability do we need and how much more or less will it cost?"

4. It does not exclude the possibility that our military capability may be substantially increased by a small increase in the total military budget. It is based on the conviction that expenditures for some weapons systems need to be increased, while expenditures for others can be cut back. It has not sought to determine whether the net effect of increases and reductions will be a reduction or an increase.

5. It reflects the strong conviction that questions about the effectiveness of weapon systems require a combination of technical evaluation and military value judgments, and that this combined evaluation is so complex that it warrants continuous effort by highly skilled analysts. It reflects the belief that increasing benefit can be derived from increasing the input of technical analyses. It recognizes that evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular military budget depends upon interaction between weapons systems, the nature of the threat, the strategic concept and consideration of relative costs.

¹Source: Selected issues in the FY '60 Defense budget (As of November 1, 1958). Top Secret. 21 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Offensive and Defensive Weapons.

6. It is not intended to imply that the questions raised have not already been considered by the services. Rather its purpose is to examine the basis for decisions on specific budgetary items and the extent to which relationships have been considered among alternate weapons systems designed to perform similar military missions.

7. The memorandum has organized the questions listed in the following four categories:

- a) the strategic striking force
- b) the defense of the striking force and home base
- c) ground and sea forces
- d) general military support

Determination of the balance of expenditure between the four categories presents many difficult issues. One class of issues is basically scientific, dealing with the estimation of probable consequences of allocation of military resources in the face of an assumed threat. The other class of issues involves value judgments as to what consequences, and hence what resource allocation are to be preferred. Military policy must be based upon decisions of both kinds.

Examples of technical questions relating to probable consequences are:

1. What is the most economical division of funds between the striking force and the defense of it, with the object of achieving a given strike force capability? Elements of the striking force are so expensive that a small expenditure on hardening, active defense, or quick reaction capability may significantly increase effectiveness per dollar of the striking force system.

2. What kind and what size of overseas war capability is needed to deal with the expected threat and what would be the costs of alternative assumed levels of capability?

Examples of questions requiring value judgment are:

1. What should be the proportion of the striking force directed to enemy attack bases as opposed to industrial or population targets?

2. What fraction of the military budget should be devoted to population defense against air attack?

Other questions of balance within each category are discussed below where relevant.

OUTLINE

I. *Strategic Striking Force*

A. *General Discussion*

B. *Strategic Missiles*

Atlas

Titan

- Minuteman
- Polaris Force
- Thor-Jupiter
- C. *Manned Bomber Striking Force*
 - B–52 with Hound Dog
 - B–58
 - KC–135 Jet Tanker
 - B–70
 - Goose
- II. *Defense of the Striking Force and Home Base*
 - A. *General Discussion*
 - B. *Active Defense*
 - Nike-Zeus
 - Nike-Hercules
 - Super Hawk
 - Bomarc
 - F–108 and GAR–9
 - ASW Expenditure
 - ASW Seaplane
 - C. *Passive Defense*
 - SAC Alert
 - Hardening
 - D. *Ground Environment*
 - SAGE
 - AEW and C
 - Badge-Alaska
 - Dewline
 - BMEWS
 - IREW
- III. *Ground and Sea Forces*
 - A. *General Discussion*
 - B. *Ground Forces*
 - Davy Crockett
 - Vigilante-Mauler
 - Redstone
 - Hawk
 - Short-range Missiles

C. *Sea Forces*

Fleet Missiles

Nuclear Powered Fleet

Eagle Missile

Bullpup v. White Lance

IV. *General Military Support*A. *General Discussion*B. *Research and Development*C. *Communications*

High altitude nuclear weapons effects

Global communications systems

D. *Navy Radio Telescope*E. *Pacific Missile Range*F. *Aircraft, nuclear propelled*G. *Dyna-Soar*H. *ARPA Space Program*I. *BW-CW*I. *STRATEGIC STRIKING FORCE*A. *General Discussion*

The mission of the strategic striking force determines, of course, related questions such as the size of the force, composition of the force, and the number of nuclear weapons it requires. In turn, the quantity of nuclear weapons assigned to the striking force will influence the number available for defense of the home base and for ground and sea forces and will affect substantially the budget of both the DOD and the AEC.

Is the size of the strategic striking force, therefore, to be determined principally in terms of its expected effectiveness against bases of the enemy striking force, or by its effectiveness for retaliatory purposes, or both? If intended targets consist of population centers and enemy war mobilization potential, would a smaller force be possible? Alternatively, if intended targets consist of enemy striking force bases alone, or such bases together with population centers, will a larger force be necessary?

With regard to the composition of the striking force, what is an appropriate balance between bombers and missiles? Is it desirable to have a mixed force of missiles, as, for example, a combination in the future of Titan, Polaris and Minuteman? Would such combinations reduce the vulnerability of the striking force and complicate the enemy's problems of countering it?

Decisions to proceed with research and development of new delivery systems should clearly be distinguished from decisions to develop operational capabilities. The parallel development of competing

delivery systems must take into consideration questions of relative technical certainty, costs, performance, time phasing and vulnerability to countermeasures.

It is within the framework of such considerations as these that the individual items listed below need to be evaluated when weighing their value to the striking force and in seeking alternative approaches.

B. Strategic Missiles

What is the most economical, fully adequate program for achieving a dependable strategic missile capability?

The strategic missiles, Atlas and Titan, are possibly redundant. Is this redundancy necessary to the reliable attainment of an ICBM capability?

Concerning Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman, the following comments are applicable.

1. Atlas

This missile provides the earliest possible ICBM capability.

If the Titan program is continued, should Atlas program be terminated as soon as adequate production of operational Titans is assured?

2. Titan

Do the improved characteristics of this missile justify its continued development in parallel with Minuteman?

Should there be a program for converting Titan to storable propellants?

Titan has much greater payload capability (or range) than Minuteman and promises an earlier availability. It is an improvement over Atlas and in the presently-planned sites is less vulnerable than Atlas.

3. Minuteman

Does this missile have a technical certainty and an expected operational performance and availability that would warrant exclusive reliance on it for an ICBM capability?

The most important feature of Minuteman is its large solid propellant booster. This feature may also be the most critical aspect of its development. Although there appears to be adequate back-up for the large-scale development of solid propellant grains required by Minuteman, the early stage of the development makes it difficult to predict the date of operational availability.

Is the level of development effort for Minuteman adequate to solve its problems and meet reasonable IOC dates?

4. Polaris Force

What constitutes an effective force level for this system, seen as an integral part of the strategic missile force of USA?

The cost and a great part of the complexity of this program arise from the nuclear submarine, not the missile. This makes an evaluation of force level an important consideration in assessing its effectiveness. Could the cost of this program be reduced and its effectiveness extended by installing Polaris missiles on other types of ships and by stretching out submarine procurement?

5. *Thor, Jupiter*

Are the problems of vulnerability as well as political acceptability of IRBM's sufficiently great to warrant limiting these weapons systems to a very small number of squadrons?

Should one of these programs be terminated at an early date since the missiles operationally are so similar?

Difficulties of obtaining foreign bases may considerably limit the use of these weapons.

Both of these missiles depend on cryogenics and lack mobility.

C. *Manned Bomber Striking Force*

1. *B-52*

Can the B-52, equipped with Hound Dog, compete with possible new developments? What is the potential of the B-52 system for growth in the future?

2. *B-58*

Does the B-58 represent a sufficient improvement over the B-52 delivery system to warrant its further development? What would be its requirement for increased KC-135 support?

3. *KC-135 Jet Tanker*

What is the proper relation of the size of the jet tanker force to the manned bomber force? What is the vulnerability of the jet tanker refueling system?

4. *B-70*

Are the speed and altitude advantages of the B-70 over the B-52 great enough to warrant the substantial investment such a force will require?

What will be the capability of the B-70 for penetrating enemy defenses at the time it is operationally available?

What capability would the B-70 have for maintaining a force on airborne alert?

5. *Goose*

Assuming the availability of Quail, what is the requirement of Goose, considering its inflexibility?

II. DEFENSE OF THE STRIKING FORCE AND HOME BASE

A. General Discussion

It is perhaps in this area that the interrelations of weapons systems with each other is most complex and the evaluation of the technical facts is most dependent upon policy judgments. Important among the issues involving policy judgments are:

- a. The size of the striking force to be defended;
- b. The missions assigned to that force and for which it must then be defended—this influences the composition of the striking force and the fraction of each component which must, in extremis, be preserved;
- c. The relative needs for defense of other targets on the home base, e.g. cities; determination of these needs involves judgment directly; it also involves judgment indirectly because decisions made under “a”, and “b”, above influence the amount of the enemy’s force available to attack targets other than the striking force.

In principle, once policies have been set which establish a yardstick for effectiveness, many technical issues can be settled by adequate analyses of systems and their costs. Interpreted in this light, the broader technical questions relate to:

- a. The choice of means for best defending the striking force—e.g., by warning and alert, by dispersal and hardening, and by active measures;
- b. The extent to which defense against aircraft must be prosecuted in a missile age;
- c. The choice of means for air defense;
- d. The extent to which the threat from missiles launched at sea should be countered by warfare at sea.

Once the policies mentioned above are set and the technical analyses just listed are done, it is possible in principle to consider the broadest issues: the extent to which a given budget should be apportioned between striking force and its defense, and finally, the budget for the two which best meets the country’s needs as set by policy.

Another issue of a somewhat different sort seems important in connection with defense. The complexity of the defensive mission places great demands upon the organization which conducts this mission. The present organization, NORAD, is unified in the somewhat narrow sense that it can deploy and command the forces made available to it. But the technical composition of these forces and the nature of their equipment and of their supporting elements, (e.g., SAGE), are determined by separate actions of the three services (and also the services of Canada). On these matters NORAD can advise and request but not control.

Nor, outside of NORAD, is there any other mechanism of authority by which policy decisions, such as those mentioned above, can be brought directly to bear upon procurement, or upon research and development as these relate specifically to defensive efforts.

For these reasons, the most complex of the military tasks facing this country, and the task most needing careful balancing and inter-relating of many components, is without an adequate structure for its management. Is an effort to improve the effectiveness of defense as a whole likely to fail without more centralized management?

The subsequent paragraphs of this section examine some specific technical issues.

B. Active Defense

1. Nike-Zeus

Is this system effective enough as planned at present to permit procurement plans to proceed, or should hardening of a fraction of SAC be undertaken instead, while R & D on the Zeus system is carried on at the highest practical rate?

A large ICBM can carry more than a dozen appropriately designed warheads which reenter separately and must be countered individually. The cost of an effective defense by Nike-Zeus then depends critically upon the cost of furnishing the necessary fire power. Does this fact, together with the fact that the radars of the Zeus system are necessarily soft targets, suggest that hardening may be both a cheaper and a more dependable alternative?

2. Nike-Hercules

Should this defense system, now becoming available, be installed to defend population centers or be used principally for the defense of SAC bases?

Would economy result from concentrating on the use of this weapon for SAC base air defense during the early time period when the manned bomber threat to SAC is predominant, and would this be militarily wise?

3. Super Hawk

What effectiveness will this weapon offer over other ground-to-air missile systems? Could this added effectiveness be bought more cheaply by increasing the use of Nike-Hercules or other existing weapons systems?

These questions seem particularly relevant in view of the similarities between Super Hawk and other air defense weapons, and in view of the fact that development costs are always high.

4. Bomarc

Since this system is controlled by the ground environment, is it so vulnerable to ICBM attack as to represent a questionable air defense?

Alternatively, should greater reliance be placed on more nearly autonomous weapons systems (including manned interceptors) with appropriate armament, designed for this mode of operation?

5. *F-108 and GAP-9*

What effectiveness will this interception system add to air defense of the home base? Is this development the best means to get this added effectiveness?

An interceptor system which does not depend too heavily on the ground environment is desirable during the ICBM era. But is the F-108 system too complex and the vehicle too small fully to exploit the concept? Can an effective radar for this plane be developed without degrading the performance of the plane?

6. *ASW Expenditure*

Is the large fraction of the Navy budget expended on ASW in need of redirection? Should there be more emphasis on development of better methods, including sea surveillance, as distinguished from marginal improvement and test of existing methods? Is the Navy recommending funds large enough to deal adequately with the solution of this complex problem?

7. *ASW Seaplane Development*

The prospect of success should be critically examined here on technical grounds. The use of the open ocean as a landing platform poses an extremely difficult problem under most conditions. Can this be considered a high-priority item if the questions in "6" above are answered affirmatively?

C. Passive Defense

1. *SAC Alert*

Is the planned SAC alert adequate to meet the enemy missile threat? Has there been a realistic forecast of the operating costs entailed by the continuous alert over the next several years?

How would these costs, as well as the operating capability of SAC, be affected by hardening a portion of each base?

2. *Hardening*

In addition to earlier questions which have related hardening of SAC bases to other defensive alternatives, the following questions appear:

To what level of pressure should bases be hardened? How is this level related to the number of aircraft to be protected by hardening? What levels of hardening are best for missile bases, and how many bases should be protected at this level?

In all cases, the protection obtained by greatly hardening a few bases needs to be compared in its cost with more widespread hardening to a lower pressure level.

D. Ground Environment

1. SAGE

Is this system so vulnerable to bomb damage that some of the scheduled improvements are of marginal value? Alternatively, should additional funds be allocated to hardening SAGE installations? What will be the traffic handling capacity of SAGE in the face of electronic countermeasures? Is this adequate to support the air defense mission of the interceptor and Bomarc force?

2. AEW and C

Are the Air Force and Navy programs in this area adequate to support the air defense of our coastal areas? Would augmenting these programs be an economical way to increase the effectiveness of air defense? Do these two programs lead to equipment which is mutually compatible, compatible with SAGE, and compatible with existing and programmed interceptor forces?

3. Badge—Alaska (extending air defense ground control into Alaska)

Would enough defense of the striking force be provided by this proposal to warrant the expenditure?

4. Dewline

Is the system likely to fail to give warning unless the contemplated radar replacements are made, or do the changes make only a marginal difference in performance? Should the programmed extensions to Dewline be accelerated?

5. BMEWS

Should the proposed additional site in Scotland be authorized?

What is the relation of the BMEWS system to the possible use of infra-red airborne devices for early warning (IREW, see 6 below)?

6. IREW

Should aircraft, devices, and communications for this warning system be developed? How, and how effectively, can this system supplement BMEWS or substitute for extensions of BMEWS?

III. GROUND AND SEA FORCES

A. General Discussion

New technological developments impinge directly on such questions as the size and make-up of conventional forces, logistic support, mobility, and increased firepower in relation to manpower.

The use of nuclear weapons by the fleet and by ground forces raises questions, furthermore, as to the extent to which these weapons

will contribute increased effectiveness for a given investment. What should be the relative emphasis given to increasing the use of nuclear weapons, as opposed to conventional weapons for tactical systems?

Other technical advances as, for example, nuclear engines for ships, will require examination. To what extent do they simplify the logistic support of ground and sea forces and increase the effective mobility of such forces?

At a more general level, the question arises, whether, on the whole, present funds for the Navy give adequate support to its several missions. The Navy contributes to the strategic striking force; the extent of this contribution, and the cost thereof, will increase as the Polaris program advances. At the same time, the Navy assists in defending the home base, contributes a mobile tactical force, is a stabilizing and deterrent element in peace time, and is a major troop carrier in the case of general war.

B. *Ground Forces*

1. *Davy Crockett*

Is there a clear understanding of the nuclear warhead requirements for this weapon system based on approved operational concepts for its employment?

This system provides great explosive power in a weapon of light weight. It is effective against armor, troops, and installations; nevertheless, its effects are restricted enough that it can be used safely in the vicinity of friendly forces, and discriminately against ground targets.

2. *Vigilante-Mauler (new AA gun and missile)*

Are both of these projects necessary for battlefield defense?

3. *Redstone*

Does this weapon have sufficient mobility and invulnerability to make it dependable under combat conditions and useful under present Army organization and requirements for mobility?

4. *Hawk*

Should the procurement of Hawk missiles be limited to the number required for use overseas?

This air defense weapon for general tactical use should be considered in relation to other tactical air defense weapons. It may be that Hawk is the only available air defense weapon under the direct control of Army field forces.

5. *Short-range Missiles (Little John, LaCrosse, Missile A, Missile B)*

Is there need for all of these tactical weapons?

C. *Sea Forces*

1. *Fleet Missiles*

Will the increased use of missiles in the fleet permit reductions in numbers and types of aircraft and carriers?

With cruisers and other vessels having a missile capability in the fleet, does the number of carriers needed for air defense, air attack of land installations and other carrier attack missions diminish?

2. *Nuclear Powered Fleet*

Does a second nuclear carrier commit the Navy to planning for an all nuclear task force? How much improvement in effectiveness and economy results from the use of an all-nuclear task force?

Since carriers are organized as units of a task force and cannot operate alone, do nuclear carriers of high speeds and long endurance require other ships in the force to have the same performance?

3. *Eagle Missile*

In view of the Navy's growing AA missile capability in ships of the fleet is the Eagle missile and associated aircraft development necessary? Is this program redundant?

4. *Bullpup v. White Lance*

Can one of these tactical air missiles be developed for use by both the Navy and Air Force?

IV. GENERAL MILITARY SUPPORT

A. *General Discussion*

This section does not include any items of general military support except those which clearly involve technical issues. For example, the possible economy that might result from a reduction of mobilization reserve procurement is not discussed.

B. *Research and Development*

Should an adjustment be made in the direction of more research and less development? Only a very small part of the total research and development budget goes into research, especially basic research.

There are several kinds of military *research*:

1. Basic fact-finding concerning natural phenomena. Examples are meteorology, solid state physics, and radio astronomy.

2. Inventions of components and devices of obvious utility to existing or foreseeable weapon systems. Examples are transistors, infra-red detectors and new rocket fuels.

3. Analytical studies of possible weapon system developments, utilizing all available scientific facts and guidance as to the objective to be achieved. The studies of the Nike-Hercules and Bomarc, in advance of their actual development, are typical of this type of research.

It is by no means true that all, or even a large fraction, of the research studies of the kind mentioned in (3) should lead to weapon system developments. The practical question is whether expensive delays and mistakes could be prevented by reducing the number of developments and using the money thereby saved to assure, by research studies, that the developments actually undertaken embody the best approaches to their military objectives.

Is the ratio of research to development expenditure too small for most economical operation and for the furtherance of our military technology? Any proposed reduction in research needs to be examined carefully in terms of its effect on the future national science effort and current policy for strengthening this effort.

C. Communications

1. High altitude nuclear weapons effects

Do any of the planned communication systems that are expected to operate during an all-out war depend upon the ionosphere?

Any such systems are expected to be undependable if high altitude nuclear explosions take place anywhere within hundreds of miles of the propagation path. A single shot of this kind produced strong effects, not yet fully understood, during recent tests in the Pacific.

Such communication systems, if they exist in present plans, may require substitution of other types, such as cable, which would not be affected. Are the budget implications of these findings reflected in the FY-60 budget?

2. Global Communications Systems

Should the expansion and improvement of a military global communications system be developed as a unified communications system for all three services?

All services require communication to many points on the globe. The increased vulnerability of overseas communications to enemy countermeasures and the corresponding need for greater reliability through use of alternate compatible routes raises the basic question of whether there is not need for a properly designed unified communications system. Has this possibility been examined for the armed services? The individual services will, in addition to any common global net, continue to need specialized communications to their mobile elements and for command purposes.

D. Navy Radio Telescope

The intelligence application of the system has been seriously questioned as well as the desirability of making so large a jump in size at one step. In the light of these technical questions, is the continuation of this project warranted under conditions of a tight budget?

E. *Pacific Missile Range*

Is all the presently planned instrumentation for this range necessary?

F. *Aircraft, nuclear propelled*

Has a major technical advance occurred since the recent technical review to warrant programs of the size put forth for FY-60 by the Air Force and the Navy?

G. *Dyna-Soar*

Does it have sufficient military usefulness to justify its inclusion in the Air Force budget?

H. *ARPA Space Program*

Has the proposed program been coordinated with that of NASA?

Presumably the National Aeronautics and Space Council will review the combined budget of the two agencies. Information is still incomplete about this combined budget, but enough information is available to indicate that a top policy decision must be made about the size of the national space program and the allocation of items between NASA and DOD.

I. *BW-CW*

Should research be expanded to uncover potential capabilities? Most of the funds for BW-CW are currently in procurement.

106. Memorandum From Gleason to the NSC Planning Board¹

Washington, November 5, 1958

SUBJECT

Review of NSC 5410/1

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5410/1
- B. NSC 5810/1
- C. Memos for Planning Board, May 16 and October 17, 1958
- D. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, October 17, 1958

As a result of discussion by the drafting committee constituted by the Planning Board on October 17 (Reference D), the enclosed alternative policy statements on the subject are transmitted herewith

¹ Source: Encloses alternative policy statements on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

for consideration by the Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, November 7, 1958.

Alternative A is a draft revision of NSC 5410/1 submitted by the Defense and JCS members of the drafting committee. Other members of the drafting committee feel that it might be preferable to deal with the substance of NSC 5410/1 along the lines of Alternative B, which is in the form of a draft Annex to NSC 5810/1.

Marion W. Boggs

Director

Policy Coordinating Secretariat

Enclosure

**Paper Prepared by the Department of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff**

Washington, undated

Alternative A

Defense-JCS Revision of NSC 5410/1

*U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR
WITH THE SINO SOVIET BLOC*

(Assumes that general war has been forced upon the United States, directly or indirectly. Reference to territory of the Soviet Union means the area included within the August, 1939, borders.)

1. To achieve a victory which will insure the survival of the United States.

2. To preserve and retain as many of its effective allies as possible.

3. To reduce by military and other measures the capabilities of the *USSR Sino Soviet Bloc* to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies.

4. Delete old par. 4 and renumber subsequent paragraphs.

5. 4. To render ineffective the control structure by which the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries *and over their own peoples*.

6. 5. To prevent, so far as practicable, the formation or retention, after the war, of military power in potentially hostile states sufficient to threaten the security of the United States.

6. While avoiding premature decisions or commitments, commence now formulation of, and keep under continual review, plans with respect

to such issues as terms of enemy surrender, border and territorial rearrangements, the forms or administration of government in enemy territory, independence for national minorities, and the degree of postwar responsibility to be assumed by the United States in readjusting the inevitable political, economic and social dislocations resulting from the war.

7. In pursuing the above objectives, the United States should from the outset of general war:

a. Mobilize fully its moral, human and material resources.

b. Obtain the full participation of its principal allies in the collective war effort.

c. Seek the participation in or contribution to the collective war effort by other nations, as consistent in each case with attainment of the above objectives.

d. Divide, as practicable, the peoples and armed forces of the Soviet Union and Communist China from their communist regimes, and the peoples of the satellites from their Soviet-dominated regimes; and so far as possible enlist the active support of these peoples on the side of the United States and its allies in prosecuting the war against the Soviet regime.

e. Make clear that this war is not an attempt by the United States to impose by force of arms a particular political or economic system upon the world, but rather a defense against efforts by the Soviet regime to do so.

f. Exert U.S. influence at every opportunity during the war to shape political and other developments in ways favorable to U.S. post-war objectives.

8. The United States should maintain after the cessation of hostilities, U.S. and allied military strength adequate to achieve post-war objectives.

Enclosure

Alternative B

DRAFT ANNEX A TO 5810/1

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ARMED HOSTILITIES

1. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1) calls for sufficient U.S. military strength to deter the Communists from use of their military power. The initiation by the U.S. of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese Communist military power is rejected as an unacceptable course of action.

2. If a general nuclear attack is launched against the U.S. directly or indirectly by the USSR, the U.S. plans to insure the survival of the United States by using all available means to destroy the will or ability of the USSR to wage war against the U.S. The only additional factor to be taken into account in such planning is the increase or decrease in

the amount of anticipated damage to the United States resulting from different kinds of U.S. retaliatory attacks on the USSR.

3. It is not now feasible to state U.S. policy for the period following a nuclear exchange between the USSR and the U.S. Decisions will have to be made at the time as to the post attack missions of U.S. military forces then existing. Consequently, the U.S. must refrain from public discussion of political actions it might take during the second phase of a general nuclear war with the USSR but must make clear its determination to prevail if general nuclear war is forced upon it.

4. If Communist China joins the USSR in a general nuclear war, the U.S. will seek to reduce by military and other measures the capability of Communist China to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States. The active participation of Communist China on the USSR side should be prevented by all means consistent with other U.S. objectives.

5. In the event that Communist China initiates all-out war against the United States or its allies, the U.S. will carry out its treaty commitments and seek to destroy the will and ability of the Chinese Communists to wage war against the U.S. or its allies. In conducting the war against Communist China, the U.S. will make a major effort to keep the USSR from actively engaging in the conflict.

6. Basic national security policy calls for U.S. military strength adequate to present a deterrent to limited aggression. In the event the deterrent fails, and if U.S. forces are to be employed, a decision will be made at the time (a) whether vital U.S. interests require the defeat of the limited aggression by using whatever degree of force is necessary, or (b) whether U.S. interests would be served by using force to achieve the objectives of restoring the *status quo ante* and of limiting the area and scope of hostilities.

a. The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its allies that it is committed to carry out its treaty obligations, including the UN Charter, and possesses the capability to fulfill its commitments, using nuclear weapons as necessary to defend Free World interests.

b. The U.S. should make clear that it will not use force to impose a particular political or economic system upon the world, but will take all actions necessary to defend against Communist use of force to impose its system upon the non-Communist world.

107. Memorandum of Discussion at the 385th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, November 6, 1958

SUBJECTDiscussion at the 385th² NSC Meeting on Thursday, November 6, 1958

Present at the 385th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The following members of the Comparative Evaluation Group also attended this meeting: the Under Secretary of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for National Security Affairs. Also attending the meeting were the Director and Mr. John H. Daniel of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; the Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Lt. General Karl W. Barnes and Mr. Charles Ahern of the Central Intelligence Agency; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; and the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION GROUP

(NSC 5815)

Mr. Gray opened the meeting by noting that its purpose was to hear an oral presentation of a Comparative Evaluation Study of U.S. and Soviet Air Defense Radar Developments and Capabilities. He said the study was undertaken pursuant to NSC 5815, which established, under the NSC, a Comparative Evaluations Group (CEG) responsible for making comparative evaluations of U.S. and Soviet capabilities in selected weapons systems. He mentioned that the CEG is comprised of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretary of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities; and the President's Special Assistants for Science and Technology and for National Security

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Comparative Evaluation Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

² This was a Special Meeting with limited attendance to hear the report of the Comparative Evaluation Group. [Footnote is in the original.]

Affairs. He said that the CEG was assisted in this study by Vice Admiral John H. Sides, Director, WSEG, and by Lt. General Earl W. Barnes, USAF (Ret.), of the Central Intelligence Agency. He then called upon Admiral Sides who made an oral presentation of the highlights of the study, a copy of which has been deposited in the files of the Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following Admiral Sides' oral presentation, the Secretary of Defense made inquiry as to what, if any, radar capabilities the Soviets have below 500 feet. Admiral Sides responded that the Soviets would not have too much capability below 500 feet. He mentioned that 500 feet is generally accepted as a realistic, minimum low level attack altitude because any attack attempted beneath the 500 foot level could result in serious trouble for the attacker.

Mr. Gray indicated that, as to future evaluations of this kind, the CEG, at a meeting held on October 27, recommended that the following topics, listed in order of suggested priority, be considered by the President as suitable subjects for comparative evaluations studies: (a) long-range ballistic missiles systems (to include ICBM's and IRBM's, but to exclude air-breathers); (b) computer technology; and (c) submarine weapons systems and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Mr. Gray suggested that the President might wish to designate one of these topics as the subject of the next study to be undertaken by the CEG.

The President stated that he personally favored the topic "submarine weapons systems and anti-submarine warfare capabilities", and Mr. Gray pointed out that this was also the selection of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President inquired whether we knew enough about computer technology to make a meaningful evaluation. It was his thought that a study of computer technology would be dependent in large measure upon the opinions of Dr. Killian's technical people as distinguished from the WSEG experts.

Dr. Killian thought that a meaningful evaluation could be made of computer technology, and he emphasized the view that such an evaluation would yield considerable valuable information concerning important aspects of various Soviet weapons systems.

Admiral Sides pointed out that it was not intended that WSEG should make all of the evaluations to be conducted pursuant to NSC 5815. He said that if computer technology were selected as a topic that others, such as Dr. Killian, might be given responsibility for the evaluation study.

The Director of Central Intelligence, reverting to the fact that the President had earlier indicated that he favored item (c), above, as the topic for the next evaluation study, stated that at the moment the Soviets are converting to and starting to build a new class of submarine. He said that we do not have much data as yet concerning this new class of submarine, and while the new sub will not be coming in for a year or two, it might be desirable to put off the selection of this subject for evaluation study until additional information is available.

The President again inquired as to what we know about Soviet computer systems, and Dr. Killian indicated that we have mixed information on that score. Dr. Killian commented there is reason to believe that the Soviets have misled the West concerning their computer technology capabilities. He said it appears that the Soviets may have developed much theory with respect to computer technology, but not too much technical apparatus in areas involving practical application of computer technology theories.

The Secretary of Defense noted that although the Soviets have embarked on the development of a new generation of submarines, the new subs will not actually be coming in for a year or two. He said in the meantime there is a present threat from existing Soviet submarines which threat will be with us for at least two or three years. It was his thought, therefore, that it would be desirable to make an evaluation study of this existing threat.

The President concluded that the next topic to be undertaken by the CEG as the subject of a comparative evaluation study should be submarine weapons systems and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. It was the President's thought that when the submarine evaluation is completed, it should be followed by an evaluation of computer technology.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the first report of the Comparative Evaluations Group, pursuant to NSC 5815, as presented orally at the meeting by the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.

J. Patrick Coyne
*NSC Representative on
Internal Security*

108. Memorandum From Murphy (G), Reinhardt (C), and Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, November 8, 1958

SUBJECT

Your conversation with Mr. McElroy and Mr. Quarles this afternoon

You asked us to suggest some thoughts for your meeting with McElroy. We believe that it would be unwise for you to get involved in any discussion of various weapons systems or any Department of Defense operational matters.

We believe that you should say that from a foreign policy point of view it would be well if the United States posed a more impressive military capability to meet less than all-out war situations. If additional budget cuts are essential the foreign policy argument favors a placing of the burden of the reduction on the massive retaliation capability and not on the limited war capability.

We see great political dangers in the suggestion that the United States security would permit of over-all inferiority militarily to the Communist bloc.

¹ Source: Suggestions for conversation with McElroy on Department of Defense budget. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 611.00/11–858.

109. Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Gray¹

Washington, November 19, 1958, 3:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

(Wednesday, November 19 at approximately 3:45)

I reminded the President that the upcoming meeting of the NSC on Thursday, 20 November, would be devoted to the 1958 Net Evaluation Subcommittee report. I indicated to the President that in my judgment

¹ Source: Nuclear targeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President. Drafted on November 22.

this meeting could be an important springboard for proposing vital questions looking to the future of our defense posture.

I recalled to the President's attention that the current study was based upon an attack pattern not addressed strictly to military targets but was based upon his directive that the attack pattern be designed to paralyze the Russian nation without, however, excluding military targets which would contribute to this objective. Thus, the study was an urban industrial-military mix with the emphasis on industrial urban resulting in effective paralysis with fewer weapons and less kilotonnage than used in the 1957 attack pattern. Incidentally, I reported to the President that in my judgment, he would not find the 1958 study "too academic in nature" as he had feared and had indicated to me in an earlier conversation.

Inasmuch as our military force requirements, including numbers and types of weapons and delivery systems were based entirely upon the purposes of our retaliatory force, the targeting system was central to our long-range planning with overwhelming implications for future defense budgets.

I then said to the President that I felt this was very closely related to the review of 5410/1 now in process. I reported that Robert Cutler had started this review in April and I had carried it forward at innumerable meetings of the Planning Board without an agreement as to the kind of paper that should go to the Council. I indicated to the President that in my judgment, we could not separate the question of effective deterrence from the question of war objectives and neither could be separated from our targeting plans. I then posed for the President the first problem in connection with 5410/1, which was whether we needed such a paper at all, expressing the judgment that the paper, as written in March 1954, was out of date and should either be updated or rescinded.

The President expressed his doubt as to our ability to do effective planning against a situation of mutual devastation. However, he approved the notion of bringing a discussion paper to the Council.

I suggested to him then that he might wish, following the presentation by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, to ask for a study of the targeting system for his consideration.

The President felt that I should raise this question and that I had a sufficient basis for it by reason of the directive he gave for the different targeting system to be used in this year's exercise. I then told him that I would make the effort to relate such an appraisal to the question of war objectives and seek to pull all of these matters together, which would also include weapons requirements.

I then reported to the President that with respect to the Defense budget, one of the recommendations he might have to face was one to cancel out the TITAN program. I reminded him that this might present

personal difficulties for him because the Glenn L. Martin Co. was reported to have spent \$30 million in Denver getting into the TITAN program. The President thanked me for bringing this to his attention but observed that “we must be selective or we will be broke.”

Gordon Gray

cc: Mr. Lay

**110. Memorandum of Conference with the President, and
Department of Defense and NSC Leaders¹**

Washington, November 28, 1958, 8:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
General Twining
Secretary Quarles
Mr. Holaday
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Stans
Mr. McNeil
Mr. Harlow
Brig. General Carey Randall
Brig. General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

The purpose of this meeting was to brief the President on the status of the Department of Defense budget request for FY 1960. The presentation was delivered by Secretary McElroy.

I.

Secretary McElroy began by giving the overall budget estimate for FY 1960 as compared to previous years. New obligational authority (NOA) for 1960 is estimated at \$42.8 billion, expenditures at \$41.6 billion. This cost level exceeds that of FY 1959, in which NOA is \$41.8 billion and expenditures are estimated at \$40.8 billion. Expenditures in FY 1958 were \$39.0 billion. Mr. McElroy noted that of the increase of

¹ Source: Department of Defense budget issues. No classification marking. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.

expenditures in FY 1959, over FY 1958, \$850 million has been required by the military and civilian pay raise.

Mr. McElroy then covered what he considered his “key” decisions. These had resulted in reduction of an original estimate of \$43.6 billion NOA for FY 1960 to \$42.8 billion. He then ran down the individual items, largely by Service, as follows:

NIKE-ZEUS—In this program \$700 million had been recommended by the Army. A scientific group in the Pentagon had revised this recommendation to include only \$626 million, of which \$300 million should be R&D funds. The reason for this reduction, besides economy, is uncertainty as to the efficacy of the NIKE-ZEUS. The cost of ZEUS overall would be \$7.0 billion. Therefore, Mr. McElroy feels that only the \$300 million R&D funds should be released for this year, and the country should be apprised of the overall cost before we go to production on this weapon.

The President then stated that we have wasted too much money by going prematurely into production on various items. In particular, he mentioned those of interceptors of interim value only.

Overseas Deployments—Mr. McElroy then mentioned the impact of cutbacks on the overseas deployments of the Army and pointed out the fact that every squeeze in manpower is difficult on the Army. He cited as an example the fact that 10,000 men are needed in 1962 for dispersion of atomic storage sites in Europe (this figure was questioned and discussed, but was used for illustrative purposes). Additionally, he mentioned the fact that the Army must expend manpower in the mission of training the National Guard. All this, he states, cuts into the Army combat forces. Therefore, in order to save as much as possible, areas other than manpower have been cut in this budget. Mr. McElroy’s concern with overseas deployments applies as of FY 1960.

REDSTONE—One of those areas is the REDSTONE, for which there will be no additional funding after FY 1959. To compensate for this cutback to some extent, Mr. McElroy plans to expedite the solid propellant PERSHING. He realizes that the cutback in REDSTONE means that some U.S. commitments in Europe will not be met.

Air Defense—One of Mr. McElroy’s key decisions is to cut back missile air defense by reducing both NIKE-HERCULES and BOMARC below NORAD-recommended levels. The Department of Defense feels that if we must be inadequate, the inadequacy should be sustained in air defense on the basis that no air defense is perfect and the best hope for protection of the U.S. is the threat of retaliation. Mr. McElroy feels that we must protect SAC bases and go beyond that only as necessary for psychological reasons.

Army Modernization—As a final item on the Army, Mr. McElroy pointed out that the Army's programs for modernization will slip, primarily with regard to modernization of those forces which will be mobilized between M-Day and M+6. (Note: The objectives and capabilities plans in the Pentagon are based on the assumption, for computational purposes, that D-Day will occur at M+6 months.)

Navy Missiles—In keeping with the policy of close scrutiny of air-breathing missiles, the Department of Defense has cancelled REGULUS II, which Mr. McElroy considers the best air breather in its range. This cancellation is considered justified in view of the advent of POLARIS.

The question of simultaneous R&D and production then came up. Mr. McElroy and Mr. Quarles ventured the opinion that we are currently undergoing a technical revolution which requires unusually large R&D funds. This situation, they feel, should correct itself when the transitions now under way are achieved.

With regards to POLARIS, the release of one submarine in FY 1959 brings the total at beginning FY 1960 to six, with three additional authorized by Congress but frozen by the Administration. Department of Defense, under its proposed budget, plans to release those three, bringing the total to nine, but not to request authority for any additional POLARIS from Congress during FY 1960. In addition, however, Department of Defense is including some specified long lead-time items for three more POLARIS in this FY 1960 budget. Mr. McElroy considers this a conservative approach with which the Navy and the Congress might disagree. If pressed on this issue, Mr. McElroy feels that he can request additional procurement when technical problems are solved.

Nuclear Attack Carrier (CVAN)—Mr. McElroy then stated that he proposed a second nuclear attack carrier to be built. Mr. McElroy pointed out the Navy planning now contemplates a two-year cycle in shipbuilding with a carrier program every other year for at least a couple more years, and support ships programs for the alternate year. He reminded the President that under such a program a carrier would have been included in 1959 but it was deferred. This statement caused rather considerable discussion. The arguments advanced in favor of the building of a second CVAN as set forth by General Twining were:

(a) Carriers are useful in cold war situations (General Twining discounts any great value of the CVAN in general war).

(b) If new carriers are built, in General Twining's view, they should be nuclear. He admits, however, that in his mind this production of a second nuclear carrier is one of the more questionable items in this budget.

Mr. Gray then interposed a word at the request of Secretary Dulles, not present at this meeting. Secretary Dulles had stated to Mr. Gray on

November 26 that were he present in the meeting he would make the following comment. Without wishing to pose as an expert on Defense budget matters, he nevertheless would like to point out that from the point of view of the conduct of foreign relations, the capabilities which we had recently exercised in Lebanon and the Taiwan Strait had been significant and vital. Mr. Dulles' view is that as long as we retain our deterrent capability, the major threat in years ahead is not one of general war but of local aggression. He therefore wishes to express the hope that budget decisions not be made which would cripple our capability in this area. Mr. Gray did not go so far as to specify whether this view indicated the necessity of the building of a new atomic carrier.

In justification for a sizeable carrier fleet, Mr. McElroy pointed out that the attack carriers had been extremely useful in Lebanon and Taiwan and that we had employed four in the Lebanon situation and five in the Taiwan situation.

As regards this item, the President has several reservations. First of all, he does not visualize a battle for the surface of the sea. Further, he desires to point out that our defense depends on our fiscal system. It is not a question of *either* defense *or* fiscal solvency. You do not have defense without fiscal soundness. He stated that he did not see building a new carrier at the moment but desires to defer decision temporarily. (This matter was brought up again later, at which time the President stated that he would defer this for a year.)

Block Obsolescence—Mr. McElroy then stated that we are currently facing block obsolescence of our naval vessels. He indicated that Defense had engaged the services of people outside the government to go over the Navy problem of block obsolescence and specifically referred to the President of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company as a participant. They had felt that a "refurbishing" program was indicated and the Navy's best judgment is that the report is sound. It involves three stages:

(a) When a ship has gone beyond repair it should be dropped off or replaced.

(b) Above that, there is proposed \$2–\$2.5 million per ship for piping and wiring which would extend the ship's life for five years.

(c) With respect to ships that are still in better condition, a program of real modernization is contemplated involving \$7–\$10 million per ship which would extend the ship's life eight to ten years. This total program involves \$200–\$250 million.

Mr. McElroy stated that the alternate to such a program is to postpone modernization but this would require an even larger program later. Mr. McElroy also stated that the Navy is reducing the number of its ships and aircraft.

THOR-JUPITER—With regard to the IRBM program, Mr. McElroy specified that only eight of the planned twelve squadrons of THOR-JUPITER will be organized. Four of these eight squadrons will go to the U.K. and one to Okinawa. The basis for this decision is that none of our allies desire IRBMs to be based on their soil. Mr. McElroy admits, however, that we must take into consideration the countries' desire to buy IRBMs from us.

The President asked why we spent billions on these systems which are to be deployed among our allies and then and only then ascertain from them whether the systems are acceptable. The real question is whether we are doing our homework ahead of time. Mr. Quarles then commented that when the ICBM programs were given the highest priority, the State Department asked for a high priority also for the IRBM. Mr. Quarles stated that State still feels that it is valid to have the IRBM and is not happy about the reduction to eight squadrons, wishing to have ten squadrons to meet the Norstad commitment. He pointed out that the remaining two squadrons can be taken care of through MAP procurement if the countries involved desire the weapons.

In this connection, Mr. McElroy stated that the development of the GOOSE, a long-range decoy, is being dropped, as is SNARK.

TITAN-ATLAS—The Department of Defense plans to retain TITAN in the ICBM program since the scientific community considers it superior to the ATLAS despite the fact that it comes in a year later than ATLAS, and like ATLAS is a liquid-propelled missile. The time in which MINUTEMAN can take over is unknown. Currently, the Department of Defense plans to program eleven squadrons of TITAN and nine squadrons of ATLAS.

Manned Bombers—In the manned bomber field, production of the B-52G is being stepped up to five or six planes per month. This is being done because "the B-47 is undergoing fatigue." One squadron of B-52s replaces two squadrons of B-47s.

Mr. McElroy went on to say that the Department of Defense considered cutting back B-58s and actually is planning to buy only three a month. Some procurement of this aircraft is considered justified since its speed of mach 2 will be a great advantage, and a limited number of these going in against Soviet defenders can open the way for the B-47s and B-52s.

Here the President interposed the question of why we produce B-58s along with more B-52s. He concurs with the policy of introducing a few new high performance aircraft for psychological purposes, but he questions the retention of TITAN, ATLAS, B-52s and B-58s. He voiced the question, "How many times do we have to destroy Russia?" This question, though rhetorical, was partially answered by General Twining when he stated that the total wings in the active Air Force go

down. He further specified that the B-58 may be able to replace the F-108.

Interceptors—Secretary McElroy specified that in line with the calculated rise of favoring nuclear retaliation over air defense, no programs for interceptors are being initiated in FY 1960.

MACE—This missile, although an air breather, has not been dropped from the FY 1960 program because of its contributions to NATO. It has a good tactical range and carries a large warhead. Furthermore, it provides the only all-weather capability in NATO against airfields.

Mr. Quarles then made a brief reference to the relationships between the Department of Defense (ARPA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In particular, he pointed out that the two agencies had joint research programs in solid propellants and in space activities.

Finally, Mr. McElroy expressed his concern with the unemployment effects of program elimination. He pointed out, as an example, that the TITAN cancellation would have involved some 25,000 people.

II.

At this point Mr. Stans began his discussion of the budget as presented by the Department of Defense. He began first by review of the general situation. He pointed out that in the original budget estimate the defense proportion of total national budget (of \$85 billion) was \$43/\$85. However, the civilian budget has since been reduced from \$42.0 billion to \$36.5 billion under a condition of extremely tight guidelines, in which all low priority items have been eliminated. Mr. Stans emphasized that the most optimistic revenue picture would indicate an income of \$76.0 billion; therefore, any failure to stay within this limit would result in a deficit. Accordingly, in the view of the Director of the Budget, the Department of Defense expenditures should be limited to \$40.0 billion with \$39.0 billion NOA. He desired, however, to congratulate the Department of Defense on the substantial reductions which had already been effected.

At this point the President interposed the idea that NOA should be reduced to the level of expenditures for the reason that NOA in excess of expenditures inevitably results in a raising of the expenditure level when the obligations become due.

Mr. Stans, in completing his overall view, mentioned that he had questioned some \$8.0 billion worth of programs and \$3 billion in expenditures in the initial Department of Defense budget, of which Department of Defense actually cut 10%. He pointed out that this effort still contains elements of a \$50.0 billion budget due to the inclusion of exotic and duplicatory programs. He admitted that his own view would include some strength and structural reduction, but he feels that

much room for reduction exists in construction, ARPA, maintenance and operation, installations, and proficiency flying.

There was then considerable discussion on the nuclear powered aircraft (ANP) involving \$200 million, including the AEC portion of \$130 million. The budget proposed the elimination of ANP, but Mr. McElroy argued for the validity of the program from the psychological point of view. The President questioned the nuclear-powered aircraft, asking if it were not slow. Mr. Quarles responded that it was up to mach 1 and that it could penetrate to enemy defenses and launch missiles. Mr. Quarles felt that it had real military use but agreed that it was premature to “barge” into the systems application at this time.

The President then questioned why the development of ANP was not given to NASA and to AEC. Mr. Quarles suggested that he get Drs. Killian and Glennan and Mr. McCone and bring the results of further study to the President. The President approved this suggestion but said he still thinks it should be out of Defense.

A discussion then followed, based on an example used by Mr. Stans, of the DYNA-SOAR. Since this program represents a space experiment, there is considerable question as to whether the program should be pursued with the Department of Defense or with NASA. The discussion of switching the program to NASA was not conclusive. However, the whole question of basic research was touched on to include the matter of reconnaissance satellites. In this connection, the President observed that he felt that satellites should be orbiting and working before Defense takes them over. Mr. McElroy defended the reconnaissance satellite but the President returned to his point, saying whenever we have the satellite we want, let us then give a defense application to it.

As a result of his studies of the practices of the Department of Defense, Mr. Stans concluded that as the President’s budget officer, he could not recommend approval of the budget as presented by the Department. His recommendation was to instruct the Defense Department to utilize the figure of \$40.0 billion as a ceiling in a fresh attempt to make up a new FY 1960 budget. The President did not directly respond to Mr. Stans’ proposal.

III.

The discussion then turned to basic philosophy. The President made a pointed effort to emphasize that Defense is the key to a balanced budget. He pointed out that if the Department of Defense desires to spend the kind of money requested in this proposal, they should realize that increased taxes are necessary in order to make it possible if the budget is to be balanced. He stated that he will, of course, listen when the Department of Defense says to him that national security

is imperiled; however, he wants everyone in the Department to have a complete understanding of the total problem of the interrelationship between national defense and the balanced budget, *that unless the budget is balanced sooner or later, procurement of defense systems will avail nothing.*

Mr. McElroy defended the Defense Department budget by pointing out the risks which he had consciously taken already in its composition. He pointed out the deliberate downgrading of the requirement for continental air defense confining our concern to the protection of our retaliatory bases. He further pointed out that this is the type of judgment which he feels qualified to make; but he emphasized that he hesitates to second-guess the scientists and those other people who are scientifically competent in judgments pertaining to their field. He concluded that there are two kinds of judgment involved and he himself is in a position to make only one kind.

As a final discussion item, the President reopened the matter of overseas deployments of Army forces. More specifically, he asked why we do not consider some redeployment from Europe. He pointed out the great savings that could be made by reduction of divisions in Europe by three. In this connection, the President drew upon his own experience as the first SACEUR. The U.S. had agreed to maintain six divisions in Europe on a temporary basis, with the concept that the ground role should be taken over by the countries on the spot.

General Twining agreed that it would be desirable to reduce forces in Europe by one division this year. All agreed, however, that the State Department should be consulted before this is pursued further.

Conclusions—The presentation and discussion being completed, it was concluded that a stag dinner scheduled for December 3 would give this group an opportunity to discuss philosophy in some detail. Based on this meeting, the Department of Defense will re-examine their budget with an effort toward further reductions for consideration at a later date.

(The NSC meeting scheduled for December 4 was deferred to December 6 to allow further study of the matter by the Defense staff.)

John S.D. Eisenhower

111. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, November 28, 1958

SUBJECT

Basic National Policy: Approach to President

1. Present budgetary policies seem increasingly likely to have the following consequences:

(a) The FY 1960 Mutual Security Program will, if there are significant BOB cuts in the Department's request, be inadequate to achieve the development objective which you outlined to your Wednesday press conference: that of creating enough progress so that there will be a feeling of dynamism rather than stagnation. Recent NSC Planning Board discussion indicates that attainment of this objective would call for substantial increase in present levels of development financing.

(b) Our local war capability will not be enhanced. As you suggested the other day, measures which might be directed to this end will probably be the first to feel the effect of a very tight DOD budget ceiling.

(c) The result could be a gradual weakening of our position in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, in the face of increasing Communist efforts at subversion and aggression. For we will not be able to offer needed help to countries which are progressively seeking economic growth; and we will not be able to respond effectively to limited military challenges.

2. We would not wish this administration to be recorded as thus having presided, in its last two years, over a weakening of US strength which could have even more serious consequences than the economy drive which preceded the Korean aggression.

What are the alternatives?

(a) We could proceed with deficit financing of necessary additional national security expenditures, which would probably run to a very few billion dollars, at most.

(b) We could raise these additional sums through taxes, e.g., a national sales tax explicitly designed to meet national security requirements until these could be covered out of rising revenues resulting from a resumption of economic growth.

¹ Source: Defense budget; includes three transmittal notes. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351.

3. I do not believe that there has so far been any deliberate comparison of the economic effects of these two courses of action with the security effects of the course on which we are now embarking.

4. If the President should decide to propose increased national security expenditures, and—if necessary—increased taxation, I believe that the country would welcome his leadership and rally vigorously to his support.

Present aggressive Communist policies in Berlin, and the tougher world-wide Communist posture, would provide a convincing rationale for that leadership.

Such a Presidential initiative—and the US response thereto—would encourage our allies to increased effort. It might deter the Communists from considering that the elections and the present budget-cutting exercise portend a period of weakness, which they can exploit through more frequent probing operations.

5. This need not involve abandonment of the President's economy campaign. Domestic expenditures could still be held to minimum feasible levels, and the disagreement with Congressional advocates of greater spending would focus on these levels.

6. *Conclusion.* It may be worth making these points to the President on Sunday:

(a) There is growing need for a more effective development program and local war capability, to hold our own against the increasingly aggressive Communist policies which now seem likely.

(b) If this need cannot be met within presently planned budgetary limits, it might be useful to have the executive branch (using the NSC mechanism as appropriate) urgently undertake a deliberate comparison of: (i) the security effects of failing to meet this need, (ii) the economic effects of meeting it through deficit financing and/or additional taxes. This comparison could provide a basis for final Presidential decisions on the FY 1960 DOD and MSP programs.

Attachment

Note From Leddy to Carson

Washington, November 29, 1958

Basic National Policy Problem

Mr. Dillon has approved the attached memorandum from Mr. Smith to the Secretary regarding an approach to the President. However, he

believes that it would be unwise for the Secretary to mention the specific example of a national sales tax, which is a controversial form of taxation.

John M. Leddy

Attachment

Note from Carson to Leddy

Washington, November 29, 1958

Basic National Policy Problem

May we have a W clearance on the attached.

You will note that Mr. Smith proposes that the Secretary discuss this with the President in Augusta on Sunday. If the memo is to be included among the materials for the Secretary's trip, it must be returned to S/S not later than noon today.

James Carson
Duty Officer

Attachment

Note from Carson to John Foster Dulles

Washington, November 29, 1958

Basic National Policy

In approving the attached memo from Mr. Smith, Mr. Dillon indicated that he thought it unwise for you to mention the specific example of a national sales tax, since this is a controversial form of taxation.

James Carson
Duty Officer

112. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

Augusta, November 30, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT**ALSO PRESENT**

Dr. Milton Eisenhower
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Greene

[Omitted here are paragraphs 1–5.]

6. I said that, with regard to the Mutual Security Program for FY 1960, there has emerged disagreement between the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget. While I would not ask for a decision on the spur of the moment I would hope that the President would give us our day in court before cuts are made as I believe that we cannot do what we must do to lift the peoples of the underdeveloped nations up onto a plane of economic dynamism with the cut in mutual security funds on which the Bureau of the Budget is now insisting. Given the size of the resources which the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are devoting to an economic offensive in underdeveloped countries I thought that we must be prepared to make some sacrifices if we are successfully to meet this competition. I suggested that increased taxation, perhaps new forms of taxation such as a national sales tax, might be envisaged.

The President agreed that the American people must better understand that they may have to undergo sturdy measures in order to be successful in the kind of world struggle in which we are engaged, and said that he felt this should be made clear in his State of the Union Message. He noted two conflicting elements of the problem: Indispensable confidence in the economic health of the US and in the dollar will not endure unless we balance our budget and correct our current unhealthy fiscal situation; at the same time we must find the funds to assist in the economic development of other countries. In this connection he referred to a letter which he had had from Lewis Douglas (copy attached) about the importance of the availability of dollars to the underdeveloped countries. He also mentioned a letter he had had from Lamar Flemming about the difficulties being experienced by American companies operating in Latin America.

¹ Source: Mutual Security Program funding. Secret; Personal and Private. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

The President also noted the political opposition in the US, as it is expressed in Congressional attitudes, toward cutting budgets for domestic programs in order to make funds available for Mutual Security Programs within a balanced budget. Dr. Milton Eisenhower suggested the policy of a two-year balanced budget, to get away from the problem to annually trying to accomplish this end; the President acknowledged that multiple-year budget balancing is intrinsically preferable but not sufficiently understood by the public to be politically practicable. He asked that the views of Secretary Anderson be sought on what further could be done to accomplish the objectives we had discussed.

John Foster Dulles

113. Memorandum for the Record²

Washington, December 3, 1958

SUBJ:

Meeting at the White House—12/3/58

Nothing was said about budgets until after dinner when we all gathered in the library in the basement. The following were present:

The President	Mr. Gordon Gray
The Vice President	LCOL Eisenhower
Secretary of the Treasury	Secretary of Defense
Controller of the Budget	Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Mr. Stans)	All Service Secretaries
Mr. Bryce Harlow	and all Chiefs
MGEN Persons	

The President: The President opened the meeting by making his usual speech that this country was endangered not only militarily but particularly economically. That if we increased our budgets very much we would have to go to a police state in order to get the tax. Our security in defense was tied up irrevocably in budgets and we all had the duty

²Source: White House meeting on Department of Defense budget. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on December 4.

to help him get the budget as low as possible. He made this speech of about half an hour.

I agreed with his statements.

Then he asked each of the Service Chiefs, not the Secretaries but the Services Chiefs, to make a speech in general terms, nothing specific, he wanted philosophical discussions.

Mr. McElroy tried to have the time divided into five minutes periods for the Secretary followed by his Chief, but Max Taylor was told to start it just the same.

Gen. Taylor: Made a speech on deployments, on our world-wide responsibilities. Stated that this was no time to cut personnel because of its effect on other nations.

Adm Burke: I made a speech stating that I believed Khrushchev, and that we hadn't read Marx, Lenin and Stalin enough. I thought that Khrushchev was going to use every trick in the book to try to beat us, including local wars, subversion, economic pressure, political, and everything else, and that we had to defeat him at every turn on each one of these moves. I agreed with the President that we could not continue going in debt indefinitely. I stated that the military could only solve a part of the problem and perhaps only a small part. As the President pointed out, the real problems in a conflict with the Soviet Union were not military problems, but were economic and political problems. The same thing was true inside the United States. The real problem inside the United States was political and not military. For example, the tremendous sums that were going into farm subsidies (this was a subject which had been previously discussed a little bit). The people were working for dollars instead of pride of workmanship which meant that everybody was out to get as much money as he could. This meant competition for money among various groups which perhaps caused a lot of inflation, and certainly did cause greatly increased prices for our military hardware. Labor and management both had to be controlled to bring prices down and to keep inflation from going up. Somehow or other we had to get the idea across that we were in a really dangerous period and that this period would last for generations, and that we had to sustain ourselves for generations of fight.

I then stated that I thought we should reexamine our air defense capabilities—there was too much money going into air defense. We were defending ourselves too much and spending too much money on marginal systems for their psychological effect.

We should perhaps reexamine all of our general war retaliatory systems and choose quantities of the various systems available which

would give us the cheapest, best all around retaliatory systems. We couldn't expect the people to agree on what would come out of this thing, but at least we ought to examine all of the programs together. I thought that we would have to continue to be able to apply military force quickly, positively, and with firm decisions whenever there was a local aggression or the need for the application of U.S. military force.

The President generally agreed but in his discussion of my remarks emphasized primarily his inability to control many things which were, such as farm subsidies, and emphasized primarily dollars.

Gen White: General White made a very short speech stating that he thought that our problems could be solved by more unification and a further reorganization towards centralization.

The President sort of agreed with him.

Gen Pate: Stated that we should be told what to do and that we would be very happy to do it.

The President: The President stated that he had to rely upon his advisers and that we were the chief advisers.

During the course of the evening the President said several times that he trusted the people in this room more than he did any other group of people. It was quite evident that he meant the military people. By his remarks it was evident that he believed that if the military people got together they could get anything done in Congress or in the country that they wanted to get done.

The Secretaries then spoke in general terms.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Anderson then spoke about debts. He said that we were now in debt for \$283 billion. That the indirect debt, and this I don't understand, was close to \$500 billion if we included only our indirect obligations to the world bank. He then went to the various international agencies, one at a time, stating the indirect obligation that we had with those agencies and it amounted to a total of \$1000 billion obligations which we had—direct and indirect—and a run on the U.S. bank would of course completely swamp us. It would be impossible to pay any such thing as this. The \$283 billion direct debt was bad enough, but coupled with the indirect debt we were in an impossible position if the world ever lost much confidence in our dollars.

Then he went to the New Delhi conference and stated that every nation, every fiscal expert, every Chief of State that he had talked to was concerned not about an attack by Russia, not about the spread of communism, but about the economic stability of the United States.

They stated that in the periods of the greatest national progress of the United States in the world, in a period when we had full employment, in a period of peace, in a period of expansion, we could not meet our obligations on a day to day basis and therefore there must be something wrong with our system if we were borrowing from the future in these good times, and we could certainly not pay back in bad times, so there was doubt. He said this was repeated by every nation from little nations, who didn't know very much about finances, to big powerful nations. He further said that nearly all of our outstanding obligations are not in the hands of the little countries—they are in the hands of our major allies. I don't know what he meant by this unless he was fearful of them putting the squeeze on us in our competitive marketing. He stated that there was a gradual flow of gold away from the United States, but that this did not mean that our gold reserves were in danger at the moment.

All in all it was a very sobering ten minute discussion.

Mr. McElroy: Then Mr. McElroy picked up the ball and gave a speech on the need for not cutting personnel, not cutting budgets too much.

It was a pretty good speech.

Vice President: The Vice President then repeated some of the President's remarks that what was needed was a unified voice from the Pentagon. He stated that if we put out the same story that this was enough—that we could sell the program regardless.

Gen Taylor: Max Taylor correctly brought out that we were subjected to very probing questions by Congress and that if, for example, they asked him whether or not the modernization of the Army was fast enough, he would have to say no.

He went into this at quite some length and the President started to take him apart.

Mr. McElroy: Then made a speech and said that in view of the remarks made by the Chiefs and the Services that it was apparent that we had to reexamine the budget. He misinterpreted the remarks or at least some place during about this period the remarks in general were misinterpreted by most everybody.

The President: The President stated that he hoped that we could get down to an agreed budget of about 40.8 or less—he meant expenditures.

I tried to break in twice to state that this could be done but if it were done we would have to do it—each Service would have to do it in its own way. We couldn't have people telling us what should be in the

budget and what should not be in the budget, and at the same time put tight limits on the budget. However, I was shut up twice before I got the words out—once by the President and once by Mr. McElroy, they each wanted to speak at that time.

The end result was that the NSC meeting for today was called off and was established for 8:30 or 9:00 on Saturday. The Department of Defense is to reexamine the budget, complete. The Joint Chiefs, I suspect, will be required to go over the other Services' programs.

Arleigh Burke

114. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, December 8, 1958, 11:15 a.m.

The following items were discussed with the President:

1. I raised with him the question of a "debriefing" for the Planning Board members with respect to the NSC meeting on December 6 involving the Defense budget. I indicated to the President that I had a feeling that the regular debriefing process should not be followed in this case. He agreed.

2. I then took up with the President the Record of Actions of the meeting of the National Security Council on December 3. He approved it with the amendment suggested by Mr. Dillon and agreed to by Defense and the JCS.

3. I then took up the Record of Actions of the meeting of December 6. The President read it carefully and initialed it. I then pointed out to the President that even the language he had approved would perhaps not be adequate guidance in the premises. I reported to him that there was not a clear and general agreement as a result of the Saturday meeting and that his statement in the Council perhaps would mean one thing to Defense and another thing to the Bureau of the Budget. I informed him that Defense and the BOB as far as I knew had not gotten together following the meeting on December 6 and that on the basis of a conversation with Mr. McElroy and Mr. Quarles I believed

¹ Source: Department of Defense budget; detection of underground testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Drafted on December 9.

Defense was awaiting a next move from someone else, probably the President himself.

The President then said that he felt there had been some progress and that he was hopeful that Mr. McElroy was finding it possible to make an adjustment in the Defense figures which would meet the budget problem. He based this optimism on a report of a meeting between Mr. Anderson and Mr. McElroy on Sunday. I indicated to the President that I believed his optimism misplaced and that as of the morning of December 8, Mr. McElroy was not prepared to make any meaningful adjustment. I told the President that Mr. McElroy was meeting again with Secretary Anderson at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 8th.

The President then asked me how I felt the Defense Department interpreted the Presidential statement in the NSC on December 6. I told him that Defense felt that the budget had gone through the normal budgetary process; that they had presented it to the President; and that it should be printed as presented. I told him on the other hand that I felt the Budget interpretation was that the whole budget was subject still to challenge specifically including the programs presented in the meeting.

The President then said that what he had meant by budgetary process was an examination of non-program areas, such as administrative costs, housing, construction, inventories, logistic support, etc., and that there had been no discussion in his presence of these matters.

I then pointed out to the President that time was an important factor inasmuch as Mr. McElroy was departing early on the morning of the 9th for the NATO Ministerial Meeting and that Mr. Stans was insisting that the budget had to go to print before Mr. McElroy's return. The President then expressed his irritation of the frequent absence of Cabinet Ministers.

The President then said that if he were in charge he felt that he could take \$5 billion out of the Defense budget but that Defense seemed not to be yielding at all. I observed to the President that if he were talking large amounts of money there couldn't be any significant reduction by further squeezing and that the only way to accomplish it was by the elimination of programs. He said he fully understood this. He said that if Defense, after all of the meetings and conversations on the subject, still maintained that the programs presented in the NSC meeting were essential to the national security, he had little choice but to approve them.

I repeated to the President that I felt that clarification was needed as to the result of the December 6 meeting.

He then said he thought he would call Secretary McElroy. I suggested that Mr. McElroy would probably still be with Mr. Anderson and the President did indeed reach him in Mr. Anderson's office.

The main points in the conversation between the President and Mr. McElroy were:

1. The President indicated that he had been "dragooned" into approving the Defense programs as presented. He made it clear to Mr. McElroy that his approval was reluctant but was given only because he felt he had no choice. He continued to have, however, reservations about the numbers of ATLAS and TITAN missiles, wondering if it was necessary to program as many of both. He then said that he wanted Mr. McElroy to get together with Mr. Stans right away and subject to further discussion the non-programmed items which he had mentioned to me earlier.

When he concluded the conversation the President instructed me to communicate the substance of it to General Persons with the request that General Persons reach Mr. Stans immediately and instruct him to get together with the Secretary of Defense.

4. I then presented for the President's signature a letter to the Chairman of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee thanking him for the work of the Committee and staff. The President signed this letter.

5. I then reported briefly to the President with respect to the questions which had arisen in connection with the detection of underground testing as a result of the evaluation of HARDTACK II. I pointed out to the President that the findings were not now considered to be authoritative or conclusive but they seemed to indicate a need for a vastly greater number of inspections than had been contemplated in the agreement of the experts at Geneva last summer. I reminded the President that this had important implications for the Gore proposal and that I expected in a few days, in any event, to have a coordinated government view with respect to the Gore proposal. I also reported to the President that Dr. Killian, with the approval and assistance of Mr. McCone, had established a high-level committee of scientists to review and report on the matter of detection of underground testing.

Immediately upon leaving the President's office at 11:40, I got General Persons out of a meeting in his office and informed him as requested by the President. He immediately got Mr. Stans on the telephone, with me on an extension, and I, at General Persons' direction, reported to Mr. Stans the substance of the President's conversation with Mr. McElroy. General Persons directed Mr. Stans to get in touch with Secretary Anderson to be brought up-to-date on his conversation

with the Secretary of Defense and then to get in touch with Secretary McElroy.

Gordon Gray

115. Memorandum From Stans to Persons¹

Washington, December 10, 1958

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President, Secretary of Treasury Anderson, Assistant to the President Persons, and Budget Director Stans on December 3, 1958

The Budget Director explained to the President that budget allowances for most of the agencies had now been worked out, and that the matter of a balanced budget hinged upon figures still to be determined for the Department of Defense and the Mutual Security Program. He stated that while he had originally urged, and still believed, that the Defense budget should not exceed \$40 billion, there was still room for balancing the budget if Defense were allowed as much as \$40.8 billion in expenditures, and if the Mutual Security expenditures were limited to \$3.5 billion.

The President indicated his strong desire for a balanced budget. Secretary Anderson reviewed the various reasons in support of so doing, including particularly the need of preserving the integrity of the dollar. The President indicated that he would go along with the \$3.5 billion figure for Mutual Security and suggested that the cut be made principally from the Military Assistance Program. He also supported the effort to resolve the Defense budget at \$40.8 billion, and directed General Persons to meet with Secretary McElroy along these lines.

Maurice H. Stans

¹ Source: Record of December 3 meeting among President, Treasury Secretary Anderson, Persons, and Stans on Department of Defense budget. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

116. Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 11, 1958

SUBJECTDiscussion at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday,
December 11, 1958

Present at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States presiding, the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also present and participating in Council action on Item 1 were the Attorney General; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers; the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for Public Works Planning. Also attending were the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Assistant Secretaries of State Gerard C. Smith and Livingston T. Merchant; the Deputy Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Affairs; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

(NSC 5807; NSC 5807/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1882 and 1948–b; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 5 and 18, and December 4, 1958)

Mr. Gordon Gray explained briefly the nature of this item and called on Governor Hoegh to summarize the main points in his report. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.)

After describing in general the status of measures to carry out the concept of shelter, Governor Hoegh went to the main point which was his specific recommendation for one additional measure to carry out

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

the concept of shelter, namely, to provide fall-out shelters by modification of existing Federal buildings on a selected basis. Governor Hoegh's recommendation envisaged a cost of this procedure of approximately \$5 million during the next fiscal year.

After Governor Hoegh had explained the reasons for making this recommendation and the great need for a Federal example, he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had signified their approval of the recommendation. General Taylor, the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that the approval of the Joint Chiefs was to be interpreted in terms of the principle but not the dollar costs.

The President referred to the fact that in the course of his remarks earlier, Governor Hoegh had referred to an individual who had built an extremely comfortable, commodious, and safe blast shelter at a cost of only \$15,000. The President inquired how deep this shelter was and how it was possible to build one for as little as \$15,000. Governor Hoegh replied by pointing out that the shelter in question was built only to withstand blast pressures of 30 psi. although it did qualify as a blast shelter.

The President said that the reason he had asked this question was that he himself had long been undecided as to whether or not it would be a good thing for the President to build such a shelter and thus set an example to other people or whether if he went ahead and built such a shelter, the effect would be to scare other people to death. But all his calculations had added up to a cost much larger than \$15,000. Governor Hoegh said he would undertake to get plans for the \$15,000 shelter to which he had referred for the President and the President said that he would very much like to see them.

The President then asked if there were any other comments. The Director, Bureau of the Budget said that he would like to make four points regarding Governor Hoegh's recommendation for a \$5 million appropriation to provide fall-out shelters on a selected basis in existing Federal buildings. The first point, said Mr. Stans, was to warn that the proposed \$5 million program might end up by becoming only the down payment on a much larger program. He reminded the members of the Council of an earlier \$90 million estimate for providing fall-out shelter in U.S. post offices over the country. He therefore doubted whether this program would stop with an expenditure of \$5 million.

Secondly, Mr. Stans said, he wished to raise a question as to timing. He pointed out that Governor Hoegh had already referred to research prototype programs which were being undertaken in order to determine the best type of shelter. Five million dollars had been allocated to this program. Would it not be premature to proceed to build shelters in existing Federal buildings until the results of the research and prototype programs had come in?

Mr. Stans' third point related to the nation-wide survey now underway to determine what existed by way of shelter in existing buildings.

Should not this survey likewise be completed and analyzed before Governor Hoegh's new recommendation was adopted?

His further and final point, said Mr. Stans, was to suggest that some of the \$5 million which had been allocated to the above-mentioned prototype shelter program might also be used to provide for shelters in existing Federal buildings and thus serve a dual purpose of building prototypes and setting an example of shelters in Federal buildings. Accordingly, Mr. Stans recommended that action on Governor Hoegh's recommendation be deferred for six months or a year until the results of the various surveys had come in.

The President expressed relief at being confronted with a figure of \$5 million which was low in comparison with the estimated costs of some of the shelter programs which the Council had considered in the past. He added that he did not wish to argue the matter of the \$5 million for Governor Hoegh's recommendation and said that the two or three officials most concerned should meet with him in the next few days and decide how to act on this recommendation. On the other hand, he did not believe that those in charge of the shelter program should cease in their efforts to determine what it is best for the country to do in this field. We are, of course, now discounting the likelihood of a worldwide holocaust as a result of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we are also anxious to give our people a feeling of confidence so we were on a kind of knife edge between providing some degree of confidence through the medium of a shelter program while at the same time not scaring our citizens to death by too elaborate a program. It was not, said the President, that he felt he knew exactly what to do about it and he therefore wanted to ponder the problem before adding anything more.

The President also commented on the fact that we were trying to prevent the General Services Administration from building any more new Federal buildings.

Governor Hoegh agreed that this latter statement was correct and explained that it was because we were unlikely to have examples of shelters in newly built Federal buildings that made it seem important to him for the Federal Government to set an example through the means of providing shelter in modified existing Federal buildings.

Secretary Anderson expressed the opinion that it might be wise to select and concentrate on one example of shelter in an existing Federal building. We would thus be doing something by way of setting an example for the people of the U.S. and would also in the course of so doing learn what is the best kind of shelter to build. Governor Hoegh replied to Secretary Anderson that the OCDM believed that we already knew pretty well what was needed in the way of building fall-out shelters.

The President concluded the discussion by stating that we should wait a day or two and then make our decision.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, contained in the enclosures to the reference memoranda of November 5 and 18; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 4, 1958, and the views of the Director, Bureau of the Budget as presented orally at the meeting.

b. Noted the President's statement deferring action for a short period on the recommendations presented in *a* above, pending further consideration of these recommendations by the President and the other officials most directly concerned.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

117. Memorandum From Gray to Morse (AEC)¹

Washington, December 11, 1958

Many thanks for your memorandum of December 5, which unfortunately did not reach me until after the NSC meeting. I shall be glad to discuss this with you at our convenience.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Attachment

Memorandum from Morse to Gray

Washington, December 5, 1958

SUBJECT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING SATURDAY—DECEMBER 6, 1958

You may know that on Saturday the DOD will present before the NSC its proposed programs indicating an across-the-board cut applied

¹ Source: Returns Morse's preview of December 6 NSC meeting on defense budget. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Projects Clean Up.

to all services approximately in proportion to their last year's budget apportionment.

Such an approach to budget control has no rationale except necessity, and represents arbitrary fiscal ceiling control at its worst. Even more seriously, it accords no recognition whatever to the coming revolution in concept whereby massive deterrent will receive less emphasis while capability for limited engagements receives more.

As you probably know, this issue first arose in the NSC last May 1, and was postponed until July 24, at which time the President requested continuing study of our military doctrine.

The issue is receiving great attention outside the Executive Branch, particularly within Congress where it will be used politically against the Administration during this coming session. If the cuts mean the withdrawal of one Army division from Germany as the Army is prepared to say they will, serious political repercussions both internally and abroad will occur.

Mr. Dulles may raise this issue at Saturday's meeting. If he does, one way to handle it might be for the President to postpone such politically dangerous across-the-board cuts pending completion of the study he requested July 24, which bears directly on this issue. Or, he might allow a week or two additional time for the two sides on the issue to prepare and present their views before him much as was done in the more general case before the NSC last May 1.

While I assume you will not wish to take sides at the Council table, I believe you should know what is behind the issues, if you do not already. And you might be in a position to suggest a solution. You probably know that I believe we shall be frozen into our present rigid and deadly posture forever if we do not begin to change some time, and soon. Even if we started *now* to change it would be several years before forces or weapons could significantly reflect changed emphasis. (This will be almost impossible without continued nuclear testing for air defense and tactical nuclear capabilities.)

I believe that any and every voice raised on the side of reason might help.

J.H. Morse, Jr.,
Captain, USN
Special Assistant to the Chairman

118. Briefing Note for the 391st NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 16, 1958

PRESENTATION OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION BASE

1. In March, 1957, the Department of Defense presented to the Council a new Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base.

2. That concept was reflected in our 1957 and 1958 Basic National Security Policy statements. The significant new features of this concept were:

(1) Meeting the requirements of only those forces which would be mobilized by M/6 months (instead of M/36 months).

(2) Taking account of the possibility of substantial bomb damage to the U.S.

(3) Covering the eventualities of cold war, military conflict short of general war, and general war.

(4) Positioning pre-D-Day stocks overseas sufficient to insure reasonable effectiveness of forces there surviving enemy nuclear attack.

3. Defense was then requested to prepare at the earliest practicable date an outline—using this now concept—of the Military Mobilization Base Program, force structure, and annual costs in order of magnitude.

4. Last May, the PB and the Council received a progress report. The report, however, was more a listing of difficulties encountered and assumptions made in working on the military mobilization base program, and did not fulfill Action 1680-*b* with respect to “an outline of the military mobilization base program, force structure, and annual costs in order of magnitude”. Neither did it show what OCDM needs for its work: how we stand item-by-item with respect to a military mobilization plan.

5. In the military status report there was a brief statement of the actions taken by Defense up to June 30 to develop the military mobilization base program, using the new concept.

6. Today we are expecting to hear from Defense about its proposed military mobilization base program.

¹ Source: Military mobilization base, July 1, 1961; fallout shelters; Top Secret; Confidential attachment. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

Attachment

Briefing Note for the 391st NSC Meeting

Washington, December 17, 1958

ITEM—FALLOUT SHELTER IN EXISTING FEDERAL BUILDINGS

An additional item before the Council today is some unfinished business concerning the provision of fallout shelter in existing Federal buildings.

At the Council meeting last week, we had before us a proposal by Governor Hoegh upon which the President deferred action for a short period pending further consideration.

Since then, Governor Hoegh and Mr. Stans have prepared a joint memorandum on the subject (copies of which have been circulated around the table.) In essence, their proposal is that contained in the recommended draft record of action which is also before you and which reads as follows:

(READ)

119. Memorandum of Discussion at the 391st NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 18, 1958

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
December 18, 1958

Present at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Laurence Robbins for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

¹Source: Agenda item 1: Status of Military Mobilization Base; Agenda item 2: Fallout Shelters in Existing Federal Buildings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Also attending the meeting were the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; from the Department of Defense: Assistant Secretary Perkins McGuire, Donald F. Bradford, and Harrell B. Altizer; the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Director of the NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *STATUS OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION BASE PROGRAM*

(NSC Actions Nos. 1680, 1698, and 1918; NSC 5810/1, para. 47)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council² and called upon Mr. Quarles for a presentation by the Department of Defense.

Mr. Quarles said the presentation which would be given by Defense would show the basis for mobilization planning, i.e., for the procurement of materials and the establishment of reserves. This basis as it now exists has some weaknesses. However, the test of a mobilization base should be, what is procured and what reserves are set up? The Department of Defense has attempted to establish a pattern of mobilization and is seeking to improve the pattern. Mr. Quarles then called upon Assistant Secretary McGuire to make the presentation.

A copy of Mr. McGuire's presentation is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this memorandum.

At the conclusion of the presentation, Mr. Quarles remarked that fundamentally the report just made represented a transition from World War II mobilization concepts to concepts consistent with the atomic age. From this point of view, the base has some inconsistencies, e.g., the National Guard and reserve programs. Defense can set up a logistics plan for the reserves, but Congress can upset that plan by its reserve legislation.

The President said he was intrigued by the assumption of a six months' period between M-Day and D-Day. He would repeat an old saw: plans are worthless but planning is absolutely invaluable. Plans would probably be inapplicable to the actual war situation, but their value lay in the study and thinking required to produce them. The mobilization base presented represents a doubt that war

² A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]

will necessarily begin with an atomic exchange; if it did, 42 divisions would not be very useful. It was wise to try to provide a base which would fit various contingencies. The President applauded the effort had been expended on this difficult problem. Mr. McGuire said he was glad someone applauded.

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board, when it heard the presentation, had been impressed by the progress made in Defense. The six-months' concept we still being examined. Defense had been frank in saying that its plans might be subject to great changes in case a satisfactory answer were found to the bomb damage problem. Mr. Gray hoped a later presentation would shed some light on this latter problem.

Mr. McCone recalled that 30 days ago the Council had heard a presentation indicating the war would be over in 30 hours.

The President said mobilization plans were affected by the amount of warning of attack received. If the 30-hour war occurred, little could be done unless strategic warning were received during the six-months period. Only in the pre-World-War-II period had any preplanning whatever been accomplished, and even this had been on a very austere basis. In 1941 many units drilled with dummy guns. Before the Korean War, the Chiefs of Staff warned of our weakness; despite these warnings we were unprepared when war broke out in Korea. The President believed the need for mobilization planning was absolute.

Mr. Dulles cautioned that six-months warning of attack would probably not come from intelligence sources. An intermediate possibility was that our mobilization activities during a period of increasing international crisis would serve as a deterrent.

Mr. McGuire hoped an assessment of probable bomb damage would eliminate the assumption that nothing useful could be done in the mobilization field. The President observed that he had asserted many times that if we assumed too much damage there would be little point in planning, since everything would be ashes. An earlier presentation had estimated that some areas would not be useable for 30 years after an attack; of course planning on that basis is impossible. While we won't get off scot free in case of attack, we should make assumptions which describe a realm in which humans can operate.

Mr. McCone felt a distinction between limited and general war was necessary. In general war maximum emphasis would be on readiness to respond on D-Day. Mobilization activities preparatory to a small war, however, would be possible.

Mr. Quarles said the concept was that the mobilization base could handle a limited war without unacceptably impairing the general war base.

Mr. Quarles then raised the question of "packaged plants". He said Defense had analyzed about half of these plants and considered

that about two-thirds of those analyzed might be liquidated. The tremendous stock of material involved might be of great significance for underdeveloped nations. The President said he had earlier opposed the "packaged plant" idea. He had been told by business that the material involved in this concept could not be suddenly thrown on the market but would have to continue to be held by the Government.

Governor Hoegh wondered whether the machine tools in the "packaged plants" could be used in the recovery period after a nuclear attack on the U.S. when the industrial capacity of the country would be impaired. He felt this matter should be examined before the plants were "unloaded." The President pointed out that, while machine tools were very hard to destroy, the labor force which would use them and the buildings in which they would be used were easier to destroy. Governor Hoegh, while admitting the importance of manpower, felt the problem should be studied. The President agreed; and added that the potential value of the plants to Latin America should also be studied.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral report by the Department of Defense, presented by Assistant Secretary of Defense McGuire.

b. Noted the President's statement that he concurred in the general direction being taken by the Department of Defense in its Mobilization Base planning, and that it should:

(1) Keep under study whether its Mobilization Base planning should continue to assume a mobilization period of six months prior to D-day.

(2) Continue its efforts to find a means of taking bomb damage into account in its Mobilization Base Planning, while keeping the assumptions as to the extent of damage within limits which provide a basis for feasible planning.

c. Noted the President's directive that the Department of Defense should, in its study of the disposition of Defense package plants:

(1) Consult with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization as to the possible need for such plants or equipment during the recovery and rehabilitation phase if there were nuclear attack upon the United States.

(2) Consult with the Department of State as to the possible use of such plants or equipment in assisting the economic development of under-developed Free World nations.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, and report back to the NSC on developments within the next three months.

The action in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation, in consultation with the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, as to *c* (1) above, and with the Secretary of State as to *c* (2) above.

2. *FALLOUT SHELTER IN EXISTING FEDERAL BUILDINGS*

(NSC 5807; NSC 5807/1; NSC Actions No. 1882, 1948–*b*, and 2015; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter”, dated November 5 and 18, and December 4, 1958)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this memorandum.) A draft Record of Action and copies of a letter from Mr. Hoegh and Mr. Stans to Mr. Gray (attached) were distributed.

Mr. Stans explained that a program of building shelters would not be started at this time, but it was proposed to make \$2 million available for research and the building of prototype shelters. The President wondered whether a strong ground floor in a building such as a public garage could be used as a fallout shelter.

In reply to a question from Mr. Dulles, Governor Hoegh indicated that under our policy the use of funds was authorized for installing fallout shelters in new Government buildings under construction.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed a joint memorandum on the subject (circulated at the meeting) by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2015–*b*.

b. Agreed that, as an additional measure to provide some Federal example in the area of fallout shelter, the present program of shelter research and prototype construction should be broadened to provide specific emphasis on such research and prototype construction in existing Federal buildings.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget for appropriate implementation; and incorporated in a revision of NSC 5807/1, circulated as NSC 5807/2.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

120. Presentation by McGuire Before the NSC¹

Washington, December 18, 1958

STATUS OF THE MOBILIZATION BASE 1 JULY 1961

PRESENTATION BY PERKINS MCGUIRE BEFORE THE NSC
DECEMBER 18, 1958

INTRODUCTION

Mr. President, Gentlemen:

I will report on the projected status of our mobilization base as of July 1, 1961 with particular reference to the adequacy of our materiel to meet the requirements of basic national security policy objectives.

Basic policy states "The mobilization base should be designed to meet the requirements of:

- (a) General war, initiated by the enemy with a nuclear onslaught or as a result of hostilities which were not intended to lead to general war
- (b) Cold war, and
- (c) Military conflict short of general war.

Emphasis should be given to those elements that will increase U.S. D-Day readiness and capability. Within the military, first emphasis should be placed on achieving readiness for the forces in being. The base should meet the objectives which I have summarized as follows:

(1) Maintenance of the active forces in a condition of optimum readiness to execute initial wartime missions.

(2) Maintenance and support of certain selected reserve forces in a high state of readiness.

(3) Maintenance and support of phased expansion to M/6 months force levels.

(4) The capacity to meet the combat requirements of all forces which would be mobilized by M/6 months.

(5) Pre-M-Day positioning of selected supplies within the continental United States.

(6) Pre-M-Day positioning of selected supplies reasonably protected outside the United States.

(7) Maintenance and support of industrial capability to replenish stocks used in local war.

The presentation consists of four parts:

The force basis used in determining requirements.

¹ Source: Status of the mobilization base, July 1, 1961. Top Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

Materiel readiness against the mobilization base objectives in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Selected problems.

Summary.

FORCE BASIS FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS

The force basis used in determining requirements is shown on the next three charts. All data are expressed as a percent of the active forces in being on M-Day. For logistic planning purposes we place D-Day at M/6 months. The first chart shows the Post M-Day mobilization of forces authorized in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan with an M-Day of July 1, 1961 which is our authorized planning base. The Post M-Day mobilization build up by Military Service is shown on the right. Army enters M-Day with 14 divisions, and proceeds to build up its forces to 21 divisions at M/1; then continues as indicated to 42 divisions by M/6 or D-Day. Navy begins with 684 combat ships, increases its forces to 1,044 ships by the end of the first month and, as indicated, to 1,630 combat ships by M/6. Air Force increases its 101 wings to 140 wings by M/1 and maintains that 140 wing structure constant throughout the build-up period. In like manner, the Marine Corps' strength at M-Day is 3 divisions and air wings. These are increased immediately to 4 division/air wings and maintained constant thereafter. The forces are portrayed on the left as a percentage increase to the active forces on M-day, during the M to D-Day build-up period. The Army mobilizes its forces throughout the six months, increasing to 150% of the M-Day forces by M/1 month; 229% by M/3; and 300% by M/6 months. Comparable positions for the Navy are 153% of its beginning forces by M/1; 225% by M/3; and 238% by M/6. Both the Air Force and the Marines complete their build up by M/1 month with the former increasing to 139% of its M-Day force and the latter 133%

The deployment of these forces during the M to M/6 and D to D/6 planning period is pictured here. JSOP-61 stops at D-Day. Post D-Day force projections, therefore, represent Service plans. For logistic planning purposes only, the deployment depicted here provides a basis for determining combat requirements for the forces engaged. Accordingly, they should not be interpreted as how deployment of the forces would actually take place under a variety of possible conditions. The effects of nuclear attack are not reflected in these force levels. For the Army and Marine Corps, the deployment figures represent total forces outside the U.S. For the Navy, deployment figures represent ships on station, and exclude ships in port in the U.S., or enroute. For the Air Force all combat units are shown as deployed, including those in the U.S., since all are in a position to perform their mission from their home bases. Of the 14 Army Divisions in being on M-Day, 8 are deployed; these rise to a level of 21 divisions by D-Day and continue upward, as indicated, until all 42 are assumed to be deployed at D/6 months. Of the Navy's

684 combat ships on M-Day, 610 are deployed. These rise to a level of 1,141 ships by D-Day, which remain on station throughout the D to D/6 period. The Air Force increases the deployment of its total forces to 140 wings by M/1. It remains constant through D/1, after which attrition reduce the force by 52 wings, leaving 88 wing equivalents at D/6. The Marine Corps starts on M-Day with one of its three divisions deployed and increases that deployment to the point where the D-Day force of 4 division/air wings is assumed to be fully deployed. This level of force remains constant during the Post D-Day period.

The third chart shows the relationship of U.S. forces engaged in limited war, to the active force structure and the Post M-Day mobilization of forces. An actual unified command contingency plan for resumption of hostilities in Korea is used for logistic planning purposes. 2 Army divisions or 13% of its active forces are assumed in this plan to be committed on M-Day to limited war. These rise to 6 divisions or 40% of the active forces by M/3 months. 114 combatant ships or 16.6% of those in the active forces will be committed on M-Day, increasing to 245 ships or 36% of the active forces by M/3. The Marine Corps with 1 division or 1/3 of its M-Day force, will increase its commitment of forces to 2 divisions or 2/3 of its active forces by M/2 months. It is not planned for the Air Force to commit forces over and above the 6 wings planned for commitment on M-Day. This amounts to 6% of its active forces on that day. Not shown here, are those indigenous forces which may require support in limited war. The degree of support could be substantial, particularly for Army materiel.

This chart shows the overall status of our quantitative readiness, in percent to total dollar figures. The requirement to support the total force objectives under the plan is shown as the 100% line. Assets on 1 July 1961 to meet this requirement will be 77% of this need, of which 48.5% will be comprised of aircraft, ships and strategic missiles. If we look at the active and selected reserve forces portion of the total, our estimate of assets will bring us to a readiness position of 84% of the requirement for these forces. For such capital items as aircraft, ships and strategic missiles, the requirement is based on the estimated availability of the items involved. For other hard goods, the requirement is derived from the force objective, just discussed.

An evaluation of our readiness status, by Military Service, for these other hard goods which are calculated against the force objective, shows that materiel to support the active and selected reserve forces is as follows:

- 66% for Army
- 65% for Navy
- 81% for Air Force
- 40% for the Marine Corps

We are faced with a qualitative as well as quantitative problem which reduces the effectiveness of our inventories, and accordingly,

attainment of 100% readiness on a quantitative basis will still leave us with a substantial modernization problem.

Illustrative of our qualitative situation is the following chart which shows the problem of modernization cycles. The 90 millimeter and 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns have served their purpose for over 15 years. They now have a very limited defense capability and are being phased out for modern weapons capable of destroying today's supersonic aircraft. The Nike-Ajax has been operational for only five years but is being modernized to the Nike-Hercules. Within the next five years, it is anticipated that the Nike-Zeus will be in the engineer-user test phase. The next chart shows the projected M-Day composition of the fighter-interceptor forces in the Air Defense Command and the Air National Guard. Nearly all the aircraft in the regular forces will be supersonic and most will have an atomic capability. The National Guard forces are equipped primarily with subsonic aircraft, with 69% of the forces equipped with aircraft having no atomic or Falcon capability. This is explained by the fact that generally new aircraft are not purchased for the Air National Guard. Both the Air Reserve and Air National Guard units are equipped with aircraft which are transferred from the Regular Air Force as it receives more modern aircraft equipment. Some of these aircraft, even though subsonic, are nevertheless effective operational aircraft.

In other areas, our rate of modernization is not keeping pace with the obsolescence of existing equipment. Our deferral of ship replacement has reached a point where the Navy foresees the loss of one half its force within the next ten years. To varying degrees, elements of the other Services are faced with like situations in either their force or equipment needs. In several instances our technology complicates the problem by out-distancing previously accepted modernization cycles.

Basic policy refers to two other aspects of our material readiness and I will address myself to these very briefly. One of these requires provisions of reasonably protected prepositioned stocks outside the United States. The next chart shows the current status of such stocks. The bars show the percentage of the requirement for prepositioned stocks which is located with forces or in depots overseas. All Services have met more than two thirds of their requirement, with Marine Corps and Navy in the best position. Most of the Air Force prepositioned stocks are with or immediately accessible to the using units as shown on the green portion of the bar, while most of the Army and Marine Corps stocks are in depots as shown in the yellow portion of the bars. Navy ammunition and petroleum products are likewise in storage sites. Additional pre-positioned stocks of *all types* of Navy supplies, are afloat with their mobile logistic support forces.

Limited protection of these prepositioned reserve stocks has been provided for ammunition and part of the petroleum products. This protection is of substantial value where coupled with dispersion, but is of

doubtful value against direct attack with nuclear weapons. Protection of other supplies depends almost wholly on dispersal. The Navy's mobile logistic support forces represent one type of dispersal. The Army gains protection by dispersing its reserve stocks into numerous small general depots, instead of concentrating them in a few large specialized depots. The growth of the Soviet tactical missile capability, which is forecast in current National Intelligence Estimates, makes it unlikely that substantial protection could be provided against direct attack. It now appears vital that greater emphasis be placed on the protection of critical supplies and facilities in the United States. I will discuss this problem further in connection with the problem of incorporating attack damage assumptions into our planning for general war.

Our industrial base to support the plan is generally adequate. This base consists of our current producers, which are a combination of private enterprise and the active portion of our DOD owned industrial facilities. This chart shows the progress being made in readjusting our packaged plants to the changes in strategic concepts. Packaged plants are, for the most part, groups of machine tools and production equipment held at a manufacturing facility or in storage to produce *specific* military end items for mobilization. As a result of our continuing review, considerable progress has been made in making these tools available for general re-distribution and utilization or disposal. Since April of this year, we have cancelled 210 such packages or 35% of the total that had been established. 105 or 17% have been re-approved while the remainder amounting to 294 or 48% are under review.

CONCLUSION

The status against the NSC objectives may be summarized as follows—necessarily these represent overall situations and do not reflect the Service variations associated with each of the objectives.

Readiness against the *first* objective exists in terms of quantities but not in terms of modernized materiel.

Readiness against the *second* objective exists in part but deficiencies in quantities as well as quality preclude a status equal to the high standards contained in this objective.

Readiness against the *third* objective is extremely limited.

Readiness against the *fourth* objective exists in terms of industrial capacity to meet the rate of combat consumption, provided there is no damage to our production resources.

Pre M-Day positioning of selected supplies within the continental United States is reasonable for limited war but relocation may be required under attack damage assumptions.

Pre M-Day positioning of selected supplies, reasonably protected, outside the United States has been accomplished in part.

Maintenance and support of industrial capability to replenish stocks for use in local war exists.

SELECTED PROBLEMS

I come now to the planning problem areas which I cited last Spring: namely, the M to M+6 months build up, individual Service interpretations of Post D-Day planning and the question of reflecting attack damage assumptions in our planning for general war.

In my May briefing, I listed as a major problem area in planning guidance, the assumption that “six months of full scale mobilization and deployment might precede the outbreak of general war” and stated that a reevaluation of this assumption would be undertaken. A revaluation of these assumptions has been undertaken, but as yet we have *not* come to a satisfactory conclusion.

As noted earlier, we have not attempted to reflect the effects of attack damage in planning force levels for general war. The JCS have felt it infeasible to base planning on the results of any single war-game analysis, because of the many possible variations in the design of enemy attacks and in the effectiveness of our active defenses against attack. Further, it would not be *necessary* to reflect attack damage in force levels in order to insure balanced support, *if* we could reasonably assume that the effects of attack damage on forces would be proportional to the effects on support.

Studies have now made clear that we can *not* reasonably assume that attack damage to forces will be even roughly proportional to damage to support, but may be either much higher or much lower, depending on the type of forces, and on the policies for the geographical distribution of logistic support. Thus it is clearly essential to consider in some detail the probable effect of attack on both *forces* and *supporting resources*, if we are to have any prospect of providing effective post-attack support for surviving forces.

A study of *hazard probabilities* consistent with forecast Soviet capabilities in 1962 is now nearing completion. This new study, being made in collaboration with OCDM, considers: (a) A range of possible attack designs; (b) chance variations in aborts, attrition, and aiming error; (c) random variations in the direction and speed of the winds carrying fall-out. The results of this analysis will provide a basis for calculating *the chance of loss of personnel or materiel* at particular locations; *for finding the places* where the hazard is least; and *for appraising the effectiveness* of alternative kinds of protective measures in relation to their cost.

Preliminary results of this study show that about one-third of the depot warehouse space in the U.S., would likely survive a premeditated surprise attack in 1962. Despite the substantial amounts of materiel surviving attack, war-game studies have shown that under present distribution patterns very little continuing military capability would survive. This is because most of our depots are specialized in a

particular class of products, and the surviving stocks would be so badly unbalanced that no surviving weapon system would be supportable. It seems clear that study must be given to the desirability of relocating a limited portion of selected assets so as to provide greater assurance of balanced post-attack support for a few weapon systems. To do this, however, we must decide what our post-attack national and military objectives will be. If we plan to try to support everything, we will not likely be able to support anything.

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

To summarize, Mr. President, we have reviewed the status of our material readiness on a quantitative and qualitative basis, related to Basic National Security Policy Objectives. We have also reported on the progress being made on the planning problems outlined last Spring. We believe the answers to some of the problems outlined may evolve from the studies we are undertaking in refining the mobilization base support concept and the application of attack damage to our logistics planning. Solutions are essential for the improved material posture required by Basic National Security Policy Objectives.

121. Memorandum of Conference with the President, and Department of State, Department of Defense, and NSC Officials¹

Washington, December 19, 1958, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Asst. Secretary Murphy
General Twining
Secretary Quarles
Mr. McCone
General Loper
Mr. Gordon Gray
Admiral Parker
Colonel Schinz
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

The purpose of this meeting was to present for the President's approval the joint Defense/AEC proposal for dispersal of atomic

¹ Source: Discussion of Presidential approval of Defense/AEC proposal for dispersal of atomic weapons. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on December 31.

weapons. (State had concurred.) Various items of discussion came out during the presentation. Essentially, these were:

a. Custody of atomic weapons, specifically that the military commanders be authorized to act as the agent of the AEC in maintaining custody of atomic weapons.

b. The precarious nature of our base agreements in such countries as [*text not declassified*] from a political standpoint.

c. Means of safeguarding dispersed atomic weapons in the event of limited or general war.

d. Relationship of the AEC with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in operational matters.

In further discussion, the President stressed certain points of particular interest. He queried how well protected our weapons are overseas, and Mr. Quarles said they have the same protective arrangements as here. The President added that he had the feeling there was increasing lack of control on these weapons, and emphasized that there must be no carelessness in their custody. General Twining pointed out the need to balance conflicting considerations: while dispersal undoubtedly lessens control, if the weapons are not locally available to commanders in an emergency they may not arrive in time. The President commented that, as to anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons, he did not have too much reservation; when it comes to increasing the number of large weapons that are dispersed, he wanted very careful review of protective arrangements.

The President then asked how many weapons could be carried [*text not declassified*] on the first sortie; no one was able to give him a definite answer. He said his thinking was that the United States may not be able to carry out more than one sortie from this area, because fields could well be immediately destroyed. He asked as to the Defense thinking on this matter, indicating that while enough weapons to arm the planes that are stationed there could logically be kept on hand one must ask why we could not send the other B-47s planned for straight from the United States with weapons aboard. The Defense members said they would study this matter further.

The President approved the dispersal plan as presented by Admiral Parker. However, he desired that he be briefed at a later date on the planning by which this dispersion scheme has been calculated in order to afford optimum economy and usefulness of our national stockpile. (Scheduled for January 5, 1959.)

At this point Admiral Parker and Colonel Schinz departed and Mr. Lay joined the group.

The group then presented a letter for the President's approval entitled "Instructions for the Expenditure for Nuclear Weapons in Accordance with the Presidential Authorization dated May 22, 1957." Mr. Gray brought the President up to date on this subject by reminding him that the matter had been discussed this last September in Newport, at which time Mr. Gray had presented a version of these instructions agreed between Department of State and Department of Defense. At that time the President had raised certain questions. Mr. Gray stated that the language had been agreed but had at that time been too broad in that it allowed [*text not declassified*] attack any element of Sino-Soviet forces, without restriction. He pointed out the revised language in this letter states with relation to retaliatory missions: [*text not declassified*].

In regard to this language, the President questioned the status of China pointing out that only the Soviet Union has been mentioned.

(At this time word was received that the ATLAS satellite was transmitting the President's voice over the radio.)

Mr. Quarles, in answer to the President's question, stated that this limitation does not preclude an attack on China.

The President then asked whether these instructions were confined to a situation in which the enemy used nuclear weapons. Mr. Gray responded to this by pointing out that they apply to any attack, nuclear or non-nuclear, which threatens to destroy U.S. forces overseas. He pointed out, however, that it requires a clear situation [*text not declassified*]. Mr. Quarles affirmed this statement adding that pursuit into any territory as necessary is permitted except into the USSR, unless [*text not declassified*] there has been an attack on the U.S.—in which case pursuit into the USSR is authorized.

The President expressed his concern by citing the example in which an enemy submarine shoots two torpedoes into a carrier. In this case, does the commander suddenly decide that he must destroy targets on land in order to assure the safety of the rest of the force? In other words, he points out there is an infinite variety of conditions possible. To this Mr. Quarles answered that this letter sets forth principles only and that each commander will receive separate instructions, each set to be specifically approved by the President.

The President continued to stress the point of degree of retaliation. He cited the case of China. There he felt that we might hit bases which threaten U.S. forces and would not go so far as to hit Chungking with big weapons. Mr. Gray said that retaliation would be only sufficient to eliminate the local threat of Sino-Soviet Bloc forces.

The President continued to express doubt on the degree of response, citing the USS PANAY incident of 1937 as a case of attack on a portion of a U.S. force. This type of incident is exactly what he does

not want parlayed into a major attack on our fleet. (Mr. Murphy gave as an example the necessity to strike [*text not declassified*] in the event of action in Korea.) The President let this subject pass, however, with Mr. Quarles' assurance that this letter sets forth principles only and that the implementing instructions will deal with these contingencies specifically.

The discussion then turned to [*text not declassified*] permission must be granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Presidential approval in each case. Such instructions will go to the unified commanders sealed.

[*text not declassified*]

Mr. Gray pointed out that if this letter is approved, it should be typed in three copies, one of which should be addressed to the Defense Department, one to the State Department, and one retained in the President's files. To this the President did not respond, but stated that he would like to retain this letter for further examination.

Mr. Quarles pointed out that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be seeing the President on Monday, December 22, and it could be discussed further at that time. This the President approved.

(It was later decided to hold off this discussion in order to give the President time to study the paper.)

John S.D. Eisenhower

122. Memorandum of Conference with the President, and Department of Defense, NSC, and White House Officials¹

Washington, December 22, 1958, 10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
 Secretary Quarles
 General Taylor
 Admiral Burke
 General Pate
 General White
 General Lemay
 Mr. Gordon Gray

¹ Source: Department of Defense reorganization and organization of military intelligence. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on December 23.

Mr. Harlow
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

Secretary Quarles, in speaking for the Department of Defense, summarized the questions for discussion as: (a) the revision of the Key West Directive in the light of the Defense Department reorganization, and (b) certain issues as to Service-DOD relationships in that directive.

Turning first to the revision of the Key West Directive as a whole (DOD Directive 5100), Mr. Quarles described it as a functional paper which sets forth the working relationship between unified and specified commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, channels of command requests, etc. As pertains to the military Services, and their relationship to each other (roles and missions), Mr. Quarles stated that this directive indicates nothing new. He assured the President, however, that the provisions of the new unified command plan have been brought into this directive without disagreement.

Mr. Quarles went on to say there were one or two points unresolved in this directive, however. In particular, he mentioned the manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are portrayed in the organization charts of the Department of Defense. In the two directives which are current, the Office of the Secretary of Defense proper is considered an extension of the person of the Secretary of Defense himself; whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff are treated as a separate military staff, through whom the Secretary of Defense issues his instructions in exercising strategic direction of our armed services. Mr. Quarles said that this proposed revision of the directive has also placed the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the Office of the Secretary of Defense; however, he feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could better be included within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Quarles admitted that this problem is largely one of semantics, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in either case would be components under the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McElroy pointed out that in the proposed directive the Assistant Secretaries are in one group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the other.

General Twining then spoke for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the Chiefs wish to avoid being under Assistant Secretaries of Defense. He supported this view by citing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible by law to be advisers to the President and to the National Security Council, as well as to the Secretary of Defense. He feels that incorporation of the Joint Chiefs establishment into the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be downgrading to them, and this would be bad for morale. He finished by stating that the "reorganization group" had not recommended this change.

The President then stated a basic viewpoint with regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is that a staff should be organized as the boss wants it organized. Minute organizational details he described as “straining at a gnat.” Regardless of the wording of the law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are direct subordinates of the Secretary Defense—they are his military staff. He recognized that the Joint Chiefs are probably concerned most about being placed under the Assistant Secretaries. General Twining assured the President that any arrangement will work and that this disagreement as to organization is largely a matter of prestige; the President then went on to summarize his conviction that in the defense of the United States the Joint Chiefs of Staff are far more important as a corporate body than as a collection of individual Service Chiefs; that if he were the Secretary of Defense he would not object to anything designed to maintain the dignity of the Joint Chiefs; and that the Joint Chiefs serve the Secretary of Defense primarily.

After Admiral Burke reinforced General Twining’s opinion as to the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vis-a-vis the Assistant Secretaries, General Taylor showed the President a diagram indicating an organization with the Joint Chiefs carried separately from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To this the President commented that military chiefs have always been technically considered advisers to the President (ever since 1903); but he is anxious that the Joint Chiefs be recognized as primarily a military staff for the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, he criticized drawing the line on the chart from the Joint Chiefs to the President equally as dark as that drawn from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense. (The line to the Secretary of Defense should be *solid*, indicating direct line of responsibility.) He admitted that the Joint Chiefs do have an additional responsibility and stated that he will always see the Chief of a Service on matters of importance to that Service.

In summation, the President stated that he would solve the organization diagram by drawing two boxes, one for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These two boxes should be joined with a dotted line, indicating close coordination, and he did not object to another dotted line running from the Joint Chiefs to the President. He recognized that the problem that would exist if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were incorporated directly into the Department of Defense office in that Assistant Secretaries might be prone to oversupervise. He stated further that Assistant Secretaries are created in order to make the job of the Joint Chiefs easier; and are not designed to be their superiors.

The President then proceeded to a problem corollary to that just discussed. He said that he did not see why we continue to use the

term "joint." Any strategic plan should be considered a "defense" plan (rather than a "joint" plan) which means that it is unified *from its inception* and is not the result of a welding of separate efforts. He stated that he would designate the senior military body the "Military Chiefs of Staff for Defense" rather than the "Joint Chiefs of Staff." This he said he would do in spite of current legislation, in answer to Mr. Quarles' statement that the name "Joint Chiefs of Staff" is statutory. (In this connection, the President pointed out that his residence is designated by law as the Executive Mansion, but he has never heard it referred to as anything but the White House. He voiced the opinion that many of these terms came about as a result of the school systems.)

The President then summarized the matters he would like to insure in his last two years in office. These he listed as follows:

(a) A realization of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Recognition of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprise a single group and not a collection of Service Chiefs. (The President recognizes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have some responsibilities to the President.)

(c) Amalgamation of the present "Joint Staff" into a truly single staff.

Mr. Quarles then stated that the only problem is to be sure that the Department of Defense is implementing the President's desires. He invited comments from Mr. Harlow and General Goodpaster. Mr. Harlow summarized his view of the President's desires on the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, emphasizing the statement of the President that excessive debate over organizational detail constitutes "straining at a gnat." He considered these matters clear. He then questioned the matter of budgeting in this new directive.

To this Mr. Quarles stated that the unified commanders make military requirements known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provisioning as such is requested by the Services through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Harlow objected to this explanation, pointing out that a separate provisioning channel sets up two channels, in that the component commanders of the unified commands go directly to the Services for their "provisioning."

When the President voiced objections, Admiral Burke attempted to explain the situation to some extent by assuring the President that the unified commander does know what is going on but does not concern himself with costs and finances. This appeared to alleviate the President's concern. General Taylor attempted to bring the matter into focus by pointing out that the channel from the component commander to the chief of a service is a budgetary channel; but that the channel from

a unified commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a strategic channel. The President stated that he would approve this arrangement, provided that decisions on strategic matters such as the strength of reserves, the numbers of carriers, etc., are reserved to the unified commanders.

Mr. Harlow expressed doubt that the paragraph places it in quite that perspective. Therefore, Mr. Quarles and the President checked the wording and agreed it should be substantially as follows: “. . . upon the basis of the agreed defense military requirements of that command.”

The President then brought up the question of intelligence services. He asked why there is not a solid military intelligence plan, pointing out that under existing arrangement three separate intelligence jobs must be done, and the material brought together. He stated he felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be better served by an autonomous intelligence service at the Defense level.

Admiral Burke made a case for separate intelligence services based on his experience in CINCUNC, in which General Willoughby (G-2 of a unified command) had believed there were no Chinese in North Korea (November 1950). He expressed the opinion that in this circumstance Service disagreements were healthy. He further went on to mention a meeting on the subject of Laos conducted by the CIA. Here the CIA had been able to quote from many sources, including service intelligence. He felt the diversity had been helpful.

General Taylor reinforced the views of Admiral Burke to some extent by stating that the Joint Staff is providing autonomous intelligence service for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as such, will make a great contribution. He went further, however, to say that there are intelligence matters of unilateral Service concern that separate services should perform.

The President admitted that every military force needs its means of intelligence. He felt that the basic difficulty in this area was the intelligence services located in the Pentagon. They should produce unified intelligence and the intelligence which is used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should come through unified channels. He went on to comment on the fact that the War Colleges may contribute to the present insistence on separate intelligence services. He stated his opinion that War Colleges should lose their Service identification and should be designated as Defense Colleges No. 1, 2, 3 and 4. On all the matters of intelligence, the President stated that he is not specifically requesting a change, but that he *is* requesting that the Department of Defense ponder these matters seriously.

John S.D. Eisenhower

123. NSC Report¹

NSC 5807/2

Washington, December 24, 1958

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5724, 5724/1, 5807, 5807/1
- B. NSC Actions Nos. 1814, 1841, 1842, [illegible in the original], 1878, 1882, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 2015 and 2020
- C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary:
 - (1) "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee", dated January 22, 1958
 - (2) "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter", dated March 24 and 26, and November 5 and 13, 1958
 - (3) "Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-Military Defense," dated July 1, 1958
 - (4) "The Number of Nuclear Weapons which Might be Tolerable to World Populations", dated July 7, 1958
 - (5) "Survival of Population Following a Massive Nuclear Exchange", dated June 27, 1958
 - (6) "Status of Shelter Measures as of June 30, 1958", dated July 1, 1958

At the 360th NSC Meeting on March 27, 1958, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, Judge Lawrence E. Walsh for the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, Captain John H. Morse, Jr. USN for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, noted and discussed a report on the subject (NSC 5807) and (NSC Action 1882, approved by the President on April 2, 1958):

(1) Agreed that certain measures should be undertaken to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1842-*d*. A statement of these measures was circulated as NSC 5807/1.

(2) Deferred action on the measures recommended in paragraph 1-*b* (except the limited program in NSC Action No. 1882-*b*-(2)), 2-*b*, 2-*c*, 5-*b* and 6-*a* and -*b* of NSC 5807; pending consideration of certain studies and reports requested by the Council.

¹ Source: "Measures To Carry Out the Concept of Shelter." Top Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5807 Series.

Subsequently, such studies and reports were submitted to the Council, which:

(1) Noted and discussed a report on “Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-Military Defense” (Reference C(3)) and referred it to the Director, OCDM, for study of the conclusions therein (especially Conclusion Nos. 6 and 7 on page 2 of the Summary) and such recommendations to the Council as he might deem appropriate (NSC Action No. 1945).

(2) Noted and discussed (NSC Actions No. 1946 and 1947) reports on “The Number of Nuclear Weapons which Might be Tolerable to World Populations” (Reference C(4)) and “Survival of Population Following a Massive Nuclear Exchange” (Reference C(5)).

(3) Noted and discussed (NSC Action No. 1948) a report on “Status of Shelter Measures as of June 30, 1958” (Reference C(6)); and noted that the Director, OCDM, would submit to the Council a supplementary status report following Congressional action on FY 1959, appropriations, and appropriate recommendations on shelter measures (including those on which action was deferred by NSC Action No. 1882-*d* in the light of Congressional action on appropriations and of further study of the reports referred to in subparagraphs (1) and (2) above.

In this supplementary status report (Reference C(2), November 5 and 18, 1958), the Director, OCDM, stated that, except for paragraph 5-*b* of NSC 5807, he did not recommend further action at that time on the shelter measures on which action was deferred by NSC Action No. 1882-*d*.

With reference to paragraph 5-*b* of NSC 5807, the recommendations of the Director, OCDM, were discussed by the Council on December 11 and 18, 1958. At the latter meeting, the Council (NSC Action No. 2020-*b*) agreed that, as an additional measure to provide some Federal example in the area of fallout shelter, the present program of shelter research and prototype construction should be broadened to provide specific emphasis on such research and prototype construction in existing Federal buildings. This action was approved by the President on December 24, 1958.

Accordingly, NSC 5807/1, revised by incorporation therein of NSC Action No. 2020-*b* and by deletion therefrom of paragraphs which called for reports which have now been noted and discussed by the Council, is transmitted herewith as NSC 5807/2 for appropriate implementation of paragraph 1 by the Director, OCDM, and of paragraph 2 by the Director, OCDM and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

NSC 5807/2 supersedes NSC 5807/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
The Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning

Enclosure

MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

1. By NSC Action No. 1882-*b*, the National Security Council agreed that the following measures should be undertaken to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1842-*d*:

a. A research and development program along the lines of the recommendations in paragraph 1-*a* of NSC 5807, which reads as follows:

“(1) Research and Development, including prototype construction (exploiting multiple-use principle to the maximum)

	<i>\$Millions</i>
“(a) <i>Research</i>	\$6.5 (annual rate)

“Although sufficient knowledge of weapons’ effects and of shelter design now exists to permit proceeding with a complete and effective fallout shelter program if this were deemed desirable, expanded research is necessary to refine our knowledge, particularly of blast shelter, and develop more economical and efficient shelter models. In a program of this magnitude, well considered research should save many times its initial cost.

“The following program of research is already identified and can be undertaken as rapidly as funds are made available.

“(i) The field testing, with nuclear weapons, of shelters, other structures, and shelter equipment; provision for development and execution of radiological defense measures; exposure of animals to weapons’ effects; and the instrumentation necessary to evaluate results obtained.
----- \$2.0 Millions

“(ii) The design of various prototype shelters, the development of shelter programs, and development and laboratory testing of structures, facilities, equipment and materials not requiring nuclear field tests.
----- \$1.0 Million

“(iii) Studies dealing with psychological, emotional, educational and morale problems and determinations of tolerance limits under

emergency conditions; medical, food, and water requirements in shelter habitation; and sanitary controls to permit tolerable occupation.

----- \$1.5 Millions

“(iv) Development of architectural designs and specifications for new types of multiple-use shelters which will be attractive as well as practical. The Committee believes that attention should be given to the use of grants to schools of architecture and engineering which would stimulate curriculum development, training of new students, and new concept of shelter design.

“----- \$2.0 Millions”

b. A limited program of prototype construction of relatively small-capacity fallout shelters, differing in design and type (including multiple-use) and adapted to differing conditions such as climate; appropriate tests by actual occupancy for realistic periods of time to be conducted after completion (total cost not to exceed \$6 million).

c. A nation-wide survey along the lines recommended in subparagraph 2-a of NSC 5807, which reads as follows:

“2. Surveys and Pilot Studies

“a. Development of estimated availability of existing shelter on a sampling basis

“As a basis for national planning, definitive information is needed regarding the capability of existing structures to provide fallout shelter, particularly in large cities. The Committee recommends that a survey of existing structures be conducted on a sampling basis to yield such information. This would be handled through direct Federal contract, and would be completed in one year.

“----- \$2.0 Millions”

d. Initiation of a program of public education along the lines recommended in paragraph 3 of NSC 5807, as modified by FCDA in the light of NSC discussion and as outlined below (cost estimated at not over \$12.5 million for FY 1959; subsequent annual appropriations to be determined on the basis of experience) :

Outline of Proposed Coverage of FCDA

Information And Education Program

(1) *Objectives*

(a) Public understanding of nuclear weapons effects, particularly radiation.

(b) Instruction on effective measures of protection.

(2) *Low-Key Characteristics*

The program would avoid harmful over-excitement of the people by careful treatment of the nature and imminence of the threat.

(a) Prudence, not alarm, is the keynote. All of our best efforts will be directed toward avoiding nuclear war; but prudence and a concern for the Country's future dictate the desirability of taking steps to improve chances of survival in order to rebuild and protect our national heritage if nuclear attack should occur. (We pay a lot of money for insurance of various sorts while doing our best to avoid the contingencies against which we are insuring ourselves.)

(b) The national fallout shelter policy is based *firmly* on the philosophy of the obligation of each property-owner to provide protection on his own premises. The Federal Government will provide information on how to do it, backed up by example of providing fallout protection in its new buildings in the future.

(3) *Programs*

(a) Support of adult education programs to increase understanding of (i) the effects of nuclear weapons, (ii) what can be and is being done to provide protection, and (iii) the place of individual preparedness in the total national security program.

(b) Combination of training films, instruction materials, magazine articles (popular, trade, etc.), newspaper features, TV programs, etc., aimed in appropriate combination at the following broad subjects:

- (i) Nuclear weapons effects on people, plants and animals.
- (ii) How to provide fallout protection.
- (iii) Family fallout protection (including simple "How-to-do-it" information).
- (iv) Improvised home and basement shelters.
- (v) Protection of food and water.
- (vi) What governments (Federal, State, local) are doing about fall-out protection.
- (vii) Radiological decontamination.

(c) The use of national organizations to disseminate information.

e. The elements of a base for rapid acceleration along the lines recommended in paragraph 4 of NSC 5807, which reads as follows:

"4. Elements of a Base for Rapid	\$Millions
Acceleration	\$ 1.5 (annually)

"The measures proposed above are designed to promote shelter construction without extensive financial participation by the Federal Government. The Committee recognizes, however, the possibility that these measures may be ineffective and that the Government might later wish to initiate a shelter program on an accelerated basis. Many of the other recommended measures will assist in preparing a base for rapid expansion, but in addition it is believed that specific attention should be given to the preparation of a "shelf" of plans and information which might save months of delay in an emergency.

“Specific items proposed are:

“(1) Identification of materials, equipment and manpower
----- \$1 Million (annually)

“(2) Preparation and maintenance of standby orders and organization

“----- \$0.5 Million (annually)”

f. The incorporation of fallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings, of suitable size, designed after this date, along the lines recommended in paragraph 5–a of NSC 5807, which reads as follows (supplemental appropriations for such shelter in buildings for which funds have already been appropriated will not be sought):

“5. Incorporation of shelter in civilian Federal buildings

“The Committee agrees that Federal example is an indispensable element in any combination of measures designed to stimulate State, local government, and private spending for fallout shelters.

	<i>\$Millions</i>
“a. New Construction	\$6.5 (annually)

“Projections of new Federal construction activity (including the Post Office construction program, but excluding military construction) indicate a potential level of about 125,000 shelter spaces annually at an average cost of \$52 per shelter space. This assumes utilization of new buildings for community shelter where practicable, thereby setting an example to local Government and business, and avoiding charges of favored treatment for Federal employees.”

2. By NSC Action No. 2020–b, the National Security Council agreed that, as an additional measure to provide some Federal example in the area of fallout shelter, the present program of shelter research and prototype construction should be broadened to provide specific emphasis on such research and prototype construction in existing Federal buildings.

124. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, December 24, 1958, 9:45 a.m.

1. I discussed the Record of Actions of the December 18 NSC meeting with particular reference to the Status of the Military Mobilization Base Program. I reminded the President that he had indicated that he wished the Department of Defense to keep under study the question of whether its mobilization base planning should continue to assume a mobilization period of six months prior to D-Day. The President said that he felt that it should be studied but that his guess was that planning had to assume both such a period and no period whatsoever. I also pointed out to the President that he had indicated that the Department of Defense should continue its efforts to find a means of taking bomb damage into account in its mobilization base planning while not making damage assumptions so extravagant that no planning is feasible. I indicated to the President that Assistant Secretary McGuire felt that it would be helpful to be asked to report back to the NSC on developments arising out of this study and I asked the President's approval for inclusion of a directive to this effect in the Record of Action. The President approved such a directive.

2. I discussed the Record of Actions of the December 23 NSC meeting with particular reference to the intelligence briefing with respect to Cuba. I indicated to the President that I was a little concerned as to what should be reflected in the Record of Actions in view of the indeterminate discussion. I suggested to him that the Record should reflect the statement that "responsible departments and agencies, particularly the Departments of State, Defense and Justice and the CIA are keeping the situation in Cuba under continuing scrutiny with a view to taking appropriate actions in U.S. security interests, and to making necessary contingency plans." The President felt that this would be satisfactory with the addition of a clause reading, "on the initiative of the Secretary of State."

With further reference to the intelligence item with respect to Cuba, I pointed out to the President that I had not been informed as to what was going on but that I had not pressed for any kind of directive in the meeting because it was not clear to me whether there were

¹ Source: Military mobilization base, situation in Cuba, intelligence procedures, Geneva conferences on test suspension and surprise attack. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President. Drafted on December 30.

not some programs which he had approved. The President indicated that whereas General Goodpaster and Major Eisenhower kept him well informed as to intelligence reports, he had not known until the NSC meeting that the view of the U.S. Government was that of wishing to oppose Fidel Castro in any event. He then said that he felt the situation had been allowed to slip somewhat.

He then said, in the light of the Hull Board meeting with him on December 16, and in view of what I had told him with respect to the inadequacies of the 5412 Group and its procedures, he wished to discuss this matter with Allen Dulles and me as a matter of urgency and that he particularly had in mind an effort to regularize the 5412 procedures. He instructed me to get Allen Dulles at the earliest opportunity (this meeting was set up for Friday morning, December 26 at 9:00 a.m.).

3. I then discussed in general terms with the President further preparations for the Geneva conferences on test suspension and on surprise attack in the light of reports that he had received at the NSC from Ambassador Wadsworth and Mr. William C. Foster. I pointed out to him that some time ago he had instructed me to suggest to the Secretary of State that he have one committee which might deal with both conferences but that no formal action had been taken. I pointed out that the Secretary of State for one reason or another had been out of his office for an extended period of time. I recommended to the President that the continued preparations be lodged in an interdepartmental committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State and composed additionally of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian. The President approved this suggestion and indicated that he saw no reason now to continue Secretary Anderson as a member of this committee working on this problem. He also said that he wished George Allen brought in to the deliberations whenever his advice would be helpful and his official responsibilities were involved. He instructed me to follow the course of these matters and to continue to “needle” for action where necessary and to report to him when desirable.

Gordon Gray

125. Questions and Answers Drafted in JCS¹

Washington, January 7, 1959

Q. To what extent did the JCS as a corporate body participate in the formulation of the FY 60 budget?

A. (C) The JCS approved on 3 Jan 58 a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP 61), which had been prepared in accordance with personnel guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and budgetary guidelines adopted by the JCS. The Joint Program for Planning states, as one of the purposes of the JSOP:

"e. Provide one of the bases for:

"(1) The annual statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of military requirements to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration in developing his annual budgetary guidelines for a fiscal year² beginning two years subsequent to the scheduled date of approval.

"(2) The preparation and justification of the annual departmental budget requests for the same fiscal year as in (1) above, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense's annual budgetary guidelines."

(C) The Deputy Secretary of Defense subsequently approved this JSOP for use by the DOD as a common point of reference for strategic and mobilization planning, subject to certain additional guidance which, included a statement that the JSOP would not be used as automatic justification of personnel, procurement, installation, or budget programs.

(C) DOD later issued directives to the individual services containing guidance on materiel requirements programs, and FY 60 strength for the active services, the National Guard, and the Reserves. There resulted a series of meetings in which each service discussed its budget with the Secretary of Defense and after which service budget ceilings were established. The services then submitted their individual budgets based on these ceilings to the Secretary of Defense for consolidation into a single Defense budget.

(C) On 5 Dec 58 this Defense budget was presented to the JCS who advised³ the Secretary of Defense that the Defense budget level is adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense

¹ Source: JCS role in Department of Defense budget formulation. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.

² For JSOP 61 the pertinent fiscal year is FY 60. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ JCS Memo for Sec/Def "JCS Position on the FY 60 Budget" dated 6 Dec 58, quoted in answer to next question. [Footnote is in the original.]

of the nation but the JCS all have reservations with respect to funding some segments of their respective service programs.

(C) As reflected above, the JCS participation in budget formulation was minimal. The JSOP and JCS deliberations on individual weapons, plans, procedures and strategic and organizational concept undoubtedly have an influence on the budget, but since budget submissions are made directly by the services to the DOD and not through the JCS, the JCS as a corporate body were not directly involved in the formulation of the FY 60 budget; they merely commented on the overall Defense budget after it was completed.

Q. What is the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the military sufficiency of this budget?

A. (C) On 5 Dec 58 the DOD budget for FY 60 was presented to the JCS who sent the following comment to the Secretary of Defense:

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the FY 1960 proposed expenditure figure of \$41,165,000,000 is adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense of the nation for the period under consideration. They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the budget in its present form, but all have reservations with respect to the funding of some segments of their respective service programs.”

126. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, January 7, 1959

SUBJECT

Review of NSC 5410/1

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5410/1

B. NSC 5810/1

C. NSC Actions Nos. 1077 and 1102

The enclosed Discussion Paper, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith as a basis for discussion of the subject by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 22, 1959.

¹ Source: Transmits discussion paper on NSC 5410/1. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be limited on a need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Discussion Paper

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER
on
U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR INITIATED
BY THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

NSC Planning Board review of NSC 5410/1, "U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc" (approved April 29, 1954) has developed a number of fundamental issues which the Planning Board submits herewith for discussion by the National Security Council, with a view to receiving guidance as a basis for rescinding or revising NSC 5410/1.

1. Should a statement of U.S. policy in the event of war be limited to the subject of existing policy (NSC 5410/1), i.e., U.S. objectives in the event of general war with the Soviet Bloc; or should it cover additional contingencies such as (a) major war initiated by Communist China, and (b) other war initiated by a member of the Sino-Soviet Bloc?

2. In the light of the capability of the United States and the USSR in the foreseeable future to destroy one another, even after a surprise nuclear attack, should the United States in the event of general war initiated by the USSR:

Despite the loss of U.S. lives and resources which might be involved, endeavor by all necessary means to reduce the capabilities of the USSR to the point where it has lost its will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies; and yet be prepared to consider an offer by the USSR to cut short the nuclear exchange at a point advantageous to the United States, even though the USSR might retain some will and ability to continue the struggle?

3. Should the United States accept an otherwise advantageous settlement:

- a. If Communist control were maintained over the satellites?
- b. If a Communist Government retained power in the USSR?
- c. Only if all Communist controls were destroyed?

4. In the event of general war initiated by the USSR, should the United States seek to keep Communist China out of the war, *or* endeavor by all necessary means to reduce the capabilities of Communist China to the point where it would be unable to endanger the security of the United States?

5. In the event of major war initiated by Communist China, or war initiated by a state other than the USSR, in which the USSR did not participate at the beginning, should the United States, in order to avoid a clear and immediate danger of general war with the USSR, be prepared to terminate hostilities before the aggressor state had lost its will or ability to continue to wage war?

6. Can and should the United States undertake now to formulate post-war policies and plans, e.g., terms of enemy surrender, border and territorial arrangements, administration of enemy territory, and independence for national minorities?

127. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, January 12, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Dr. Kistiakowsky
General Goodpastor

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, as the Geneva meetings on Surprise Attack went along, he became more and more impressed with the hazards to the United States of a system of inspection against surprise attack. While we tabled papers asserting the value of such a system, privately he had growing concern about it. Such a system would reveal detailed information on our deployments, our readiness, and the protective strengths and arrangements for our striking forces. If the system failed to give us warning, it would have given great net advantage to

¹ Source: Concerns about inspection against surprise attack and nuclear testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on January 14.

the Soviets. This advantage becomes especially great with ballistic missiles and supersonic aircraft.

The President recalled that he took initiative in 1955 (at Geneva) in proposing aerial inspection against the "means of delivery" of highly destructive weapons; at that time such means of delivery were aircraft. Except for that proposal, he said he had never been wedded to the concept of inspection against surprise attack. In particular, he questioned the significance of the far north, which to him is simply an area of passage.

Dr. Kistiakowsky added that, as against missile launching submarines, no way to monitor was seen. He added that both the scientists and the military men of the group came to feel that the only fruitful approach to this is to couple inspection with arms limitation. Through such a means, a reduction in the threat would be accomplished, without it being dependent for us upon obtainer split-second warning. There would be ample time to observe whether forces had in fact been reduced to and held at agreed levels. Such a limitation, in the case of aircraft, might provide that only so many could be in the air at once. Total numbers of missiles might be limited. As to submarines, not more than a certain number might be allowed to be on station.

The President recognized the difficulties but pointed out that, if we do not follow this line, we must face the question what line do we follow. He did not see much hope for a world engaged in all-out effort on military build-up, military technology, and tremendous attempts at secrecy. One reason for seeking an inspection system in connection with the atomic testing is that if we get one such system we may then be able to go on to another. He recognized that this matter is very difficult, but added that, with aerial inspection, we can find out where great military concentrations are located, and what is their state of readiness. Even if the Soviets should be contemplating a massive surprise attack, if they wish to secure the results of such an attack they must prepare forces to move into the devastated areas, and these we could see. He concluded by saying that, in the long run, no country can advance intellectually and in terms of its culture and well-being if it has to devote everything to military build-up.

Dr. Killian said that in view of the gravity of this matter there is a need to have a more sustained study under way. He suggested setting up study groups, and a standing group of top governmental officials concerned who would follow the matter. They would go deeply into the problems involved in monitoring surprise attack. Dr. Kistiakowsky commented at this point that the Soviets have had a high-powered group at work since the end of World War II on disarmament. They were very well up on this subject, as evidenced by the fact that when our delegation made proposals at Geneva, the Soviets instantly showed knowledge of the weak points and the implications of such proposals. The President agreed with the suggestion. He thought that someone

should draw up a charter for the effort, showing just who would participate—i.e., from what agency, having what qualifications—whose time would be devoted to the effort, and who would comprise the top-standing body.

To indicate the need for a competent body in this area the President cited the importance of a periodic inspection of the inspection system and operations incident to supervision of suspension of atomic weapons tests.

Dr. Kistiakowsky added the point that everything to this point has been done on paper. He thought there was need for a high-level command (actually a task force) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose job would be to conduct monitoring and inspection, carry out maneuvers and tests against various combinations of forces and develop the necessary doctrine. The President thoroughly agreed. Dr. Killian recalled that our group at Geneva had proposed that we set up in the United States a small pilot system to see just how the proposals would work.

Dr. Killian next said that there is a group studying ways of improving the inspection system for the supervision of test suspension, thus offsetting the effects of the findings of the Hardtack II series of tests (which indicated that the test system devised last summer at Geneva is less effective than was then thought). The President said he saw possible merit in a scheme which allowed underground tests up to perhaps 10 KT. A corollary would be, however, that we would have to tell if test shots greater than this size were fired.

Dr. Killian next referred to some of Dr. Kistiakowsky's impressions and observations about the Soviet missile capability, since these impressions ran counter to our best intelligence estimates. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was very much impressed with the importance that the Soviets attach to long-range ballistic missiles. These are in fact a focal point in their whole defense concept. They referred to it as a special area not subject to discussion at the Geneva meeting. He said it is his opinion that they now have an operational long-range missile force. The President said he could accept this possibility, but still holds a question as to the numbers and accuracy of such weapons. He then asked the question, if the Soviets should fire these weapons at us, where this action would leave them. They would still be exposed to destruction. In his mind there is the question whether this is a feasible means of making war; he granted that it is a feasible way of destroying much of the nation's strength, but the resulting retaliation would be such that it does not make sense for war. He said he thought it would be at least a few years before the Soviets could conceivably have enough missiles so as not to have grounds to fear retaliation.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

128. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, January 14, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

General Twining said he wished to give the President a further report on the proposal for dispersal of certain high-yield weapons to [*text not declassified*]. A certain number are to be there in storage, another number in aircraft that are always there on the ground, and an additional number would be authorized to be sent in, and kept in aircraft on the ground, if reason developed to send in such aircraft.

The President said that he saw the reason for this but that, if this is what is proposed, the authorization should be stated in these terms. Otherwise it would seem we are being insufficiently strict in our arrangements. He thought a provision should be introduced indicating that for brief transit, during authorized maneuvers or in an emergency, this third group of weapons is authorized to be there, in aircraft, but never to be unloaded. General Twining said he was confident this could be worked out.

General Twining next brought out, for the President's information, that, following coordination with State and CIA, the Air Force is training a certain very limited number of Chinese Nationalist pilots in the U-2 aircraft. No commitment whatsoever has been made concerning their future use. The President stated that he thinks we must stay out of the northern area of mainland China; but the same considerations do not apply in the south.

General Twining next reported that meetings have been held on planning for the Berlin situation, with representation from State, JCS and CIA. He added that the French and the British are showing some tendency to talk about use of airlift as a possible line of action but that our State Department is strongly opposed to this type of solution. The President recalled a recent exchange he had had with Macmillan on this subject. He commented also that we are handicapped by the fact that our rights on the ground for access to Berlin are not fully clear and explicit.

Finally, General Twining asked that when the President visits Colorado Springs in mid-year he dedicate the golf course there, in the

¹ Source: Dispersal of nuclear weapons, training Chinese Nationalists in the U-2, Berlin. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on January 15.

process making clear that it was not built at government expense. The President did not think he could dedicate the golf course since it is named for him, but would be glad to have some kind of ceremony there at which he would be able to make this point clear.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

129. Memorandum of Discussion at the 393d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 15, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 393rd NSC Meeting Thursday, January 15, 1959

Present at the 393rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the [Deputy?] Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; and the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1 and 2.]

¹ Source: Agenda item 3: U.S. Military Bases Overseas. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

3. U.S. MILITARY BASES OVERSEAS

(SNIE 100–10–58; NSC Action No. 1876)

Mr. Gray pointed out that last autumn when trouble arose over the retention of our bases in Morocco, the Planning Board had asked CIA to prepare an Estimate on the prospects for the retention of U.S. bases in Morocco and eight other countries. The Planning Board discussed this Estimate and agreed that it would be desirable for the Council to hear a summary of the Estimate together with the views of the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the net advantage to U.S. security of each of our overseas bases. In this connection he also reminded the Council that last March when the Nash Report on U.S. Military Bases Overseas had been discussed, the President had directed that our base system be reviewed each year and that “earnest and continuous scrutiny should be given . . . as to whether each U.S. overseas base throughout the world continues to represent a net advantage to U.S. security.” Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Allen Dulles who proceeded to report on our bases in North Africa, the Near East, on the three Far Eastern areas, Spain, Greenland, Iceland, and Latin America which latter area had not been in the original CIA Estimate.

Upon conclusion of Mr. Dulles’s report, Mr. Gray called on Secretary Dulles. Secretary Dulles said he had one observation to make about U.S. bases overseas. It was his view that in some of these countries at least we can probably carry on with our bases on a *de facto* basis for quite a little while if we are willing to do so. This was true especially of our bases in Africa. If, on the other hand, we try to formalize or legalize our position with respect to our bases, great difficulties would be created for us vis-a-vis the indigenous governments. Thus we have a situation which can be kept going on a *de facto* basis but not on a basis on which we formalize our specific rights and privileges over a specific number of years. Secretary Dulles said he realized this was not wholly satisfactory from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but was probably a situation which would have to be lived with.

Secretary McElroy commented that if the Secretary had summed up the situation with respect to our bases in North Africa accurately, it would be important to avoid announcing any agreement with the indigenous governments there but that instead we should simply let matters drag on.

Mr. Gray then called on General Twining who asked permission to run through briefly each of the nine base areas covered in the original CIA Intelligence Estimate in order to point out the importance of each base to the U.S. The President expressed his approval and General Twining read a report dealing with our bases in Iceland, Greenland, Spain, Morocco,

Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. (A copy of General Twining's report is filed in the Minutes of this Meeting).

In the course of this report the President inquired as to what constituted a reasonable *quid pro quo* for the maintenance of U.S. bases in Morocco while Secretary Dulles said that the situation with respect to our bases in Libya was very precarious. Secretary Dulles also pointed out that our negotiations with the Philippine Government on bases were not going at all well and that we have called Ambassador Bohlen home for consultation. He was expected to arrive in a few days.

As to Okinawa, Secretary Dulles recalled that about a year ago the President had suggested that a study be made as to the feasibility of consolidating all our military installations in Okinawa on one segment of the island. Secretary Dulles said he did not know whether this could actually be done but certainly at the moment our base installations in Okinawa sprawled all over the island. He then inquired as to the status of the study that the President had suggested. Neither Secretary McElroy nor General Twining knew about the precise status but Assistant Secretary Irwin pointed out that the study was being carried on. Already it had indicated the great difficulties of trying to concentrate all our military installations in one area of Okinawa. For one thing, such concentration would take up a disproportionate amount of arable land which would be hard on the natives of Okinawa.

The President commented in a familiar vein about the terrible difficulties which were inherent in the maintenance of U.S. bases in foreign countries. Secretary McElroy said that we would have to continue to run the island of Okinawa for a considerable time to come despite these difficulties. The President agreed that this was indeed the case but that we should run Okinawa in a way to cause the minimum amount of resentment from the inhabitants of the island. The President concluded the discussion of the subject by commenting on the spreading commitments of the U.S. both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific areas and suggesting that we might sometime have to make choices about our commitments.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral summary of SNIE 100–10–58 as brought up to date and with the addition of Latin American bases, presented by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Reviewed, on the basis of statements by the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the net advantages to U.S. security of U.S. bases in Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, Spain, Iceland and Greenland; as required each year, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1876.

c. Noted a statement by the President:

(1) Requesting a review of the importance of continued maintenance by the United States of the Sangley Point Naval Base in the Philippines.

(2) Agreeing as to the need for a timely report on the results of the study as to the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations in Okinawa in a single area.

NOTE: The action in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

130. Agenda for Special Meeting¹

Washington, January 15, 1959

(1) Third Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Intelligence Activities, 10/30/58.

(2) Annual Report on NSC 5412/2 Activities.

Memorandum written by the NSC Representative on Internal Security (filed in the office of the Executive Secretary, NSC, in "Third Hull Board Report", under COMINT-ELINT).

¹ Source: Report of President's Board of Consultants on Intelligence Activities, annual report on NSC 5412/2 activities. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

131. Letter From John Foster Dulles to McElroy¹

Washington, January 24, 1959

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I believe the time has come for our two Departments to undertake the joint study of our strategic concept which you and I have

¹ Source: Proposes State-Defense study of U.S. strategic concept; encloses S/P paper and covering memorandum. Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

discussed on several occasions in the past. This is, of course, related to the President's directive that paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1, Basic National Security Policy, be kept under continuing study.

In order to provide a point of departure for study of the strategic concept, the Policy Planning Staff of this Department has prepared the enclosed paper entitled "A Concept of US Military Strategy for the 1960s". This is a staff paper, put forward as a basis for discussion. I am myself reserving judgment on this paper pending such discussion.

As I have previously told you, I do not have in mind that we should make any abrupt change in our strategic concept, I am, however, convinced that IF we are to make a change in the next few years, we must now determine the direction in which we wish to go and begin to pave the way for the change.

Assistant Secretary Gerard C. Smith stands ready to meet with your people to discuss the enclosed paper or any other related proposals that your Department may wish to advance. I hope that we shall be in a position to report progress to the President within the next few months.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in S/P

Washington, January 5, 1959

A Concept of US Military Strategy for the 1960s

I. Objectives

1. The objective of US military strategy should be:

Primary, to deter Communist imperialism from resort to force; and

Secondary, to deal with Communist aggression if it occurs.

We also need to prevent and halt resort to force within the non-Communist world. We shall be militarily prepared to act to this end if we have an effective strategy and capability to deal with limited Communist aggression.

II. Deterring Communist Aggression

A. General War

2. We must deter Soviet nuclear attack on the US and other major Communist aggression which would threaten a permanent alteration of

the world balance of power against us. Although we must have active and passive defensive capabilities to reduce the disastrous effects of a Soviet nuclear attack and should undertake preparatory measures to facilitate national recovery after attack, the primary component of our general war deterrent is our strategic nuclear striking force.

3. If our deterrent is to be effective, the Communists must be convinced that retaliation will be inevitable. This requires that our strategic striking force be relatively invulnerable. As the USSR will know the location of most fixed installations (air bases, missile sites, etc.) in the non-Communist world, mobility and elusiveness are among the qualities we should emphasize in the further development of our striking force.

4. A relatively invulnerable US strategic striking force would make impracticable a pre-emptive Soviet nuclear attack to disarm us. It would also reduce the risk of war by misadventure as we would not have to react instantaneously to an ambiguous threat of major Communist aggression; we would have time to verify the threat; we might also have time for maneuver.

5. The Communists must also be convinced that our strategic striking force could inflict a scale of damage that would be fatal to the structure of their empire. It may not be necessary that we be able to destroy most Communist military targets, with the side effect of killing most of the Communist peoples. It may be sufficient to have a known capability to destroy the imperial control centers and power bases. A capability so designed would be more acceptable to our allies and the uncommitted peoples than a counter-force capability with its attendant danger of severe fall-out effects extending around the world.

B. Overt Limited Aggression

6. We must deter a wide range of possible overt limited aggressions by Communist imperialism. This kind of Communist aggression can best be deterred by further development of our present strategy of forward defense.

7. We should continue to encourage states on the periphery of the Communist empire to maintain armed forces commensurate in their economic capacity. Where the threat is great and the will to resist strong, but the indigenous economy weak, we should, as we have in the past, provide appropriate assistance upon request to enable the endangered state to maintain forces at least capable of harassing and delaying a Communist invasion.

8. We should also continue to encourage those few non-Communist states that have the requisite military experience, manpower and economic capacity to develop armed forces that could be made available outside their national territory for collective defense. We should where necessary provide military aid to this end.

9. The US will have to provide the major supporting force at all points on the periphery of the Communist empire. For us, the essence of a strategy of forward defense is speed of reaction.

10. Our deterrent limited war force should, therefore, be highly mobile and so deployed as to be able to react quickly in any part of the world. It should comprise a balanced and flexible combination of ground, sea and air power. In view of the growing difficulty of maintaining foreign bases, much of this force may have to be sea-borne in the 1960s. Its training should enable it to perform effectively in conjunction with widely varied local forces and in all types of terrain and climate.

11. The force should have nuclear capabilities but should be able to fight effectively without using those capabilities.

12. Such a US limited war force would give the nations under the threat of overt Communist limited aggression greater confidence than they now have in their security and defensibility.

C. Indirect Aggression

13. We must deter Communist imperialism from indirect aggression—covert resort to force. We should continue to encourage and where necessary assist all states outside the Communist empire to maintain the effective internal security forces and procedures which constitute the first line of defense against Communist indirect aggression. While this function can normally be left to police forces, the magnitude of the threat of indirect aggression to states on the periphery of the Communist empire requires that the training of their military forces include preparation for internal security duties.

14. Indigenous efforts to deter covert Communist resort to force should be reinforced by a readily available US limited war force as described in paragraphs 10 and 11. This is particularly important for the peripheral non-Communist states where the proximity of Communist military power, unless offset by the evident, prompt availability of US power, tends to sap the courage of non-Communists and to feed the aggressiveness of Communists.

III. Dealing with Communist Aggression

15. *General War.* Given a relatively invulnerable US strategic nuclear striking force with a known capability to inflict a scale of damage that would be fatal to the structure of the Communist empire, it is very unlikely that the Communists would venture major aggression which would risk bringing that force into action. If they did, the relative invulnerability of our force would enable us to tailor our response to the character of the aggression. At the maximum, we should employ the full power of our force to destroy the structure of the Communist empire.

16. *Limited Aggression.* Our military response to Communist limited aggression, overt or covert, should deny the objectives of the aggression in a manner least likely to lead to a large expansion of the scope and intensity of the hostilities.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Smith to John Foster Dulles

Washington, January 20, 1959

SUBJECT

Review of Strategic Concept

In your letter of July 23, 1958, to the President, you said you had told Secretary McElroy that you remained of the opinion that the military doctrine set forth in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Basic National Security Policy paper (Tab B) is rapidly outgrowing its usefulness and that we need to apply ourselves urgently to finding an alternative strategic concept. You stated also that we should seek the President's approval of further study of an alternative doctrine by a small State-Defense group. You will recall that the President later gave his approval for this study.

When I approached Defense on this subject in early August, they requested that the study be deferred until the FY 1960 budget was behind them. I accordingly let the matter lie dormant.

The budget process is now drawing to a close, and we should press ahead without further delay. My talks with General Picher, Director of the Joint Staff of the JCS, and others in the Pentagon have convinced me that we must take the initiative, as Defense and the Chiefs seem to be paralyzed by inter-service differences.

S/P has accordingly ventured to draft "A concept of US Military Strategy for the 1960s" (Tab C) to serve as a basis of discussion with the Pentagon. This concept, which I believe reflects views that you have expressed in several conversations with Secretary McElroy, differs from the current strategic concept in the following major respects:

1. We abandon the major premise of the current concept—i.e. the threat of massive nuclear retaliation is the primary deterrent to all kinds of Communist aggression. A corollary current premise is that general war forces are also limited war forces. Our premise is that the massive retaliation threat of our general war capability effectively deters only major Communist aggression. To prevent limited Communist aggression, a *separate* deterrent strategy and force, specifically designed for this purpose, is required.

2. We also abandon a major thesis of the current concept—i.e. any substantial overt engagement of US and USSR armed forces or any substantial Soviet aggression against the NATO area would automatically trigger massive nuclear retaliation against the USSR. As you have pointed out, this thesis is becoming less and less credible. Although not specifically stated in our paper, we assume the probability of lesser US response to Soviet aggression which does not clearly threaten a permanent alteration of the world balance of power against us.

3. We question the current counter-force strategy which provides that the primary mission of our strategic nuclear striking force is to destroy military targets, especially nuclear strike capabilities, in the Communist empire. We believe that this strategy will become increasingly infeasible in the dawning era of quick-reacting and elusive missile weapons systems. Moreover, the destruction of many military targets would require ground bursts of very large yield weapons with resultant heavy fall-out, the effects of which, in addition to causing millions of unnecessary casualties in the Communist empire, would extend around the world. Finally, the cost of matching the Communists missile for missile, an inherent necessity of the counter-force strategy, would in a very few years require defense budgets substantially larger than the much debated FY 1960 budget. You will recall that the President has on a number of occasions expressed concern that we seem to be “over-insuring” by accumulating too many strategic weapons systems. Our paper, therefore, inclines toward an alternative strategy, which has many adherents in the Pentagon, of striking a finite number of control centers and power bases of the Communist empire. Although the prime targets of this strategy are population centers, the fall-out effects and the number of casualties would be far less than under a counter-force strategy as we believe that air bursts of many fewer weapons of much lower yield would suffice to accomplish the mission.

4. Because we incline to a smaller strategic striking force, we place much greater emphasis than the present concept on the invulnerability of the force.

5. We question a major assumption of the current concept—i.e. nuclear weapons will be used in most limited war situations. The fact is that whenever the issue has arisen in the past decade, we have consistently drawn back from using nuclear weapons in limited war situations. We believe that we would rarely find it politically practicable or militarily desirable to use nuclear weapons and accordingly propose that our limited war force be able to fight effectively without these weapons.

Since the question of cost is now very much to the fore, it is pertinent to mention my belief that it is reasonable to assume that the savings resulting from a shift to a smaller strategic nuclear striking force would offset the increased costs of an effective limited war force.

As you indicated to the President that the review of the strategic concept would be held very closely, I have sought clearance of this memorandum from G and C only.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you sign the attached letter (Tab A) to Secretary McElroy transmitting the S/P paper as a basis for State-Defense discussion.

/S/ John Foster Dulles

Attachments:

NSC 5810/1 (Tab B)
Letter to Secretary McElroy (Tab A)
S/P Draft Paper (Tab C)

Approved _____
Disapproved _____

132. Memorandum From John Eisenhower to Goodpaster¹

Washington, January 27, 1959

SUBJECT

Comparison of NIE 11-4-58 with NIE 11-4-57

NIE 11-4-58 (hereafter referred to as NIE 58) and NIE 11-4-57 (hereafter referred to as NIE 57), which it supersedes, are generally consistent except for the estimates on Soviet long-range bombers.

ICBM

NIE 57 estimates ten prototype missiles of 5500 nautical miles, CEP 5 nautical miles, to be available for operational use in 1959. This assumes that the first operational unit will be equipped with prototype rather than series produced missiles. NIE 59, while it states that progress in ICBMs has not been so fast as had been estimated, continues to give the Soviets 10 operational ICBMs during the year 1959. It adds the factor of 50% operability and further estimates that as of 1962-66 the CEP could be reduced to about 3 nautical miles, with a payload of 2000-5000 pounds. Furthermore, NIE 58 estimates that the Soviets could have

¹Source: Comparison of NIE 11-4-58 with NIE 11-4-57. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office File, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, CIA.

in their inventory 500 ICBMs in 1962, a date which could possibly be pushed forward to 1961.

IRBM

NIE 57 estimates that the first operational capability of 1000 nautical mile missile occurred in 1958. NIE 58 deals with the IRBM very little but estimates this capability to be in existence.

Surface-to-Air-Missiles

Both NIE 57 and NIE 58 picture an extensive system of surface-to-air missiles in the complex around Moscow. These missiles are estimated to be effective at altitudes up to 60,000 feet. NIE 57 mentions vulnerability to low-altitude attack. This is confirmed in NIE 58 with the additional estimate that the horizontal range would be only 15–30 nautical miles. Furthermore, NIE 58 believes the Soviets will have a limited A-ICBM capability between 1963 and 1966.

Long-Range Aircraft

In the area of long-range aircraft, the two estimates represent a continuing downward trend. NIE 57 states that production of both BISONs and BEARs has fallen short of NIE 56 estimate. NIE 58 goes much further stating the belief that despite the efforts devoted to developing the BISON and BEAR the Soviets have probably decided within the last year or so to forego a rapid buildup with present heavy bomber models. The following estimates apply to heavy bombers and tankers.

<i>NIE 11-4-57²</i>			<i>NIE 11-4-58</i>		
1957	—	90–150		—	
1958	—	150–250	1958	—	100–125
1959	—	250–450	1959	—	100–150
1960	—	400–600	1960	—	100–200
1961	—	400–600	1961	—	150–250
1962	—	400–600	1962	—	200–300
1963	—		1963	—	200–300

² Here we have a three-way split. The Air Force claims that these figures will represent only bombers. The Army and Joint Staff think the figures are too high. The Navy thinks that the low-limit figures should be correct (400 aircraft in 60–62). [Footnote is in the original.]

133. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11-4-57

Washington, November 12, 1957

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¹ Source: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962. Top Secret. 74 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files. Supersedes NIE 11-4-56.

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THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal political situation, relations with Bloc states, economic situation, military programs, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through 1962.

SUMMARY ESTIMATE

1. Both the Soviet internal scene and Soviet external policy continue to be strongly marked by change and innovation. The ascendance of Khrushchev has further accentuated the flexibility and pragmatism of the post-Stalin leaders' approach to their major problems. But none of the changes in Soviet policy suggests any alteration in basic aims or in the concept of an irreconcilable conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Indeed the Soviet leaders display a great deal of confidence, buttressed by their recent political and technological successes, in the prospects for ultimate victory of their side.

Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy

2. The respect of the Soviet leaders for US nuclear power will continue and they are unlikely to initiate general war or to pursue courses of action which, in their judgment, gravely risk general war, over the next five years. At the same time, however, they are probably confident that their own growing nuclear capabilities, added to their great conventional strength, are increasingly deterring the US and its allies from courses of action gravely risking general war. As a result the USSR probably regards itself as progressively achieving greater freedom of maneuver in local situations.² The USSR's posture during the Suez and

² The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does *not* agree with the estimate that the Soviets are likely to feel that they are achieving *greater* freedom of maneuver nor that they will regard the US as *increasingly* inhibited by growing Soviet strengths.

The US has always been cautious of risking general war. This is certainly evident to the Soviets. But also evident to them are examples such as Berlin, Korea, Taiwan, and Syria which underline US firmness when a clear challenge is presented.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, has found no specific evidence or indicators from which the Soviets could derive the opinion that US caution will *increase* as Soviet nuclear capabilities grow. In fact, a convincing case could be made for increasing *Soviet* caution, based on fear that the West would feel compelled to exercise its superior military capabilities before the Soviets might reverse the relative military advantage.

Syrian crises convinces us that the use of threats will remain a basic element in Soviet policy. At times the Soviet leaders will probably bring the threat of Communist military strength into the open by menacing words or harsh diplomatic exchanges. Moreover, the USSR might go considerably further in certain situations—e.g., by supporting indigenous Communist or other forces in local military action, or even sending Soviet “volunteers,” judging that grave risk of general war would not result. Thus the risks of general war arising through miscalculation may increase.

3. But in general the Soviet leaders will probably continue to prefer non-military means of achieving their objectives. They probably regard the present world situation as ripe to develop further in their favor through continuation of such tactics. While determined to build up their armed strength against any eventuality, the present leaders have probably decided that a continuation of “peaceful co-existence” will best assure against the risks of nuclear conflict and at the same time offer far-reaching opportunities to weaken and divide the Western powers and to promote Soviet influence in the key underdeveloped areas of the world.

4. Almost certainly the Soviet leaders expect further crises as the interests of the two great power groupings clash in the Middle East and elsewhere. They will take a strong line in such crises. Yet we believe that in general they will continue to emphasize such tactics as high-level goodwill visits, broadened contacts, promotion of cultural and other exchanges, expanded foreign trade, long-term credits and technical assistance, and arms aid. Their aim will be to cause further blurring of the lines between the Communist and non-Communist worlds and to undermine and cause a retraction of Western, especially US, strength from around the periphery of the Bloc.

It appears to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, that *increasing* Soviet boldness during the next five years will be unlikely unless the Soviets attain clear military superiority, or unless the Soviets have reason to expect a wavering or irresoluteness in US policy. The first condition is not believed attainable; the second is not believed demonstrable. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes therefore that paragraph 2 should read as follows: “The respect of the Soviet leaders for US nuclear power will continue and they are unlikely to initiate general war or to pursue courses of action which in their judgment, gravely risk general war over the next five years. At the same time, however, they probably regard their own growing nuclear capabilities, added to their great conventional strength, as enforcing caution on the Western powers. The USSR’s posture during the Suez and Syrian crises convinces us that the use of threats will remain a basic element in Soviet policy. At times the Soviet leaders will probably bring the threat of Communist military strength into the open by menacing words, harsh diplomatic exchanges, by supporting indigenous Communist forces, or even sending “volunteers,” judging that grave risk of general war would not result. The Soviets must recognize, however, that the possibilities of miscalculation in crisis situations are such that general war might nevertheless occur, and that preparedness for it is therefore essential. We remain convinced that the USSR will not desire to let any crisis develop to the point of seriously risking general war.” [Footnote is in the original.]

5. The Soviets will almost certainly intensify their efforts to woo the underdeveloped countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, in order to estrange them from the West and to lay the groundwork for growing Soviet influence. The USSR has the economic resources for considerably expanding its "trade and aid" campaign, while its extensive stocks of obsolescent arms will permit it to capitalize further on the desires of many underdeveloped countries to strengthen themselves vis-a-vis their neighbors.

6. The USSR clearly regards the chief immediate opportunities for expanding its influence to lie in the Middle East. It is shrewdly supporting Arab nationalism against the West and thereby attempting to avoid the appearance of seeking undue political influence of its own. It is also conscious of the extent to which vital Western interests are involved in the area, and of the risks which would arise from a direct test of strength between the great powers themselves. Nevertheless, its longer run aims are to eliminate Western military power and political influence from the area; to attain a position from which to control Middle East oil, and ultimately to dominate the area.

7. During the next few years the chief Soviet objective in Western Europe will be to weaken and divide the NATO powers and above all to induce a withdrawal of US military strength. To this end the USSR will continue to promote some form of European security treaty to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But the USSR will almost certainly remain adamant on German reunification on any terms except its own, however much this may limit its maneuverability in Western Europe.

8. As a means of forwarding their peaceful co-existence policy and of advancing their efforts to neutralize US nuclear striking power, the Soviets will seek on the whole to give the appearance of a flexible and constructive attitude on disarmament. They probably desire some form of simple, "first-stage" agreement with minimum inspection and control but we remain convinced that they will reject comprehensive inspection and controls.

Trends in Soviet Relations with Other Communist States

9. The USSR's reluctant acceptance of a degree of Polish autonomy and of Yugoslavia's special position, as well as its recognition of Communist China's stature and role within the Bloc, indicates a continuing belief that some greater flexibility in Soviet relations with other Communist states is both necessary and desirable in order to preserve and strengthen the Bloc. However, mindful of last year's developments in Poland and Hungary, the USSR now seems determined to go slow in any further evolution of its relationships with the European Satellites, and above all to avoid any repetition of the Hungarian or even Polish experiences. It would almost certainly revert to repressive policies in

event of serious threats to its position in Eastern Europe. Barring such developments, we think the USSR will pursue a cautious policy of economic aid, adjustment to national peculiarities, and toleration here and there of a somewhat greater degree of Satellite autonomy.

10. The strong identity of interest among the various Bloc regimes, their dependence upon Soviet aid and support, and the USSR's overwhelming military power will tend to maintain the essential solidarity of the Bloc over at least the next five years. But the underlying forces released by developments since Stalin's death will persist, creating further instability within the Satellites. Additional changes in intra-Bloc relations are likely.

Internal Developments

11. Two of the major problems posed by Stalin's death have persisted: who is to rule, and how is the ruling to be done. While Stalin's successors agreed on fundamental objectives—maintenance of Party dictatorship, continued military buildup, and rapid economic growth—they differed as to the policies best suited to pursue these aims in the conditions of the USSR today. These differences in turn complicated the problem of who was to rule, rendering the leadership unstable.

12. Now, after four years of uneasy collective leadership, Khrushchev has emerged as dominant. Although he still lacks the degree of power achieved by Stalin through the use of police terror, he has disposed of his major rivals and asserted Party mastery over the economic bureaucracy and the military. These developments have probably enhanced the stability of the Soviet leadership, though this leadership will be subject to continuing strain over the next several years as difficult policy problems arise. We think that only the most severe problems could threaten the present leadership arrangements, but, considering the magnitude of the problems which the regime faces, and the risks of failure in the bold programs which Khrushchev has undertaken, issues of such gravity could arise. In such an event Khrushchev would probably move toward absolute rule, if necessary attempting to reinstitute terror for this purpose. But important elements among the elite groups would be alert to and would probably oppose such a development, particularly if a recourse to terror were involved.

13. As to the question of how to rule, the present leadership has shown awareness of the need to overcome the alienation of the Soviet population which has been caused by fear and deprivation and expressed in apathy. Instead of a widespread use of terror, which in the end might not spare the leaders themselves, another approach was felt to be necessary in order to keep the society cohesive and responsive to central direction. In addition, a shift in emphasis to the use of incentives and the encouragement of initiative seemed to give promise of increasing Soviet strength, particularly in the economic field.

14. This approach has been extensively applied to the Soviet economy. A series of administrative reforms has sought to make better use of specialist knowledge, local talent, and individual initiative. The latest and largest of these is a radical reorganization of industry which seeks to transfer to officials on the spot more powers in the detailed execution of national policy. The incentive program particularly in agriculture, aims not only at stimulating higher labor productivity but also at increasing popular support for the Khrushchev regime. The highly ambitious housing and agricultural programs will probably be successful enough to provide a gain of perhaps as much as one-fifth in per capita consumption over the next five years.

15. The achievement of such a gain would probably produce some increase in popular support, but a consumption program of this size will compete more sharply than heretofore with requirements for industrial investment and defense. This competition has already been partly responsible for the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956–60) in favor of a seven-year plan for 1959–65. The issue of competing priorities, however, has not been finally settled by this action and is certain to arise again.

16. Most of the changes which have occurred bear the stamp of Khrushchev; given his self-confidence and flexibility, the outlook is for further experimentation so long as he remains in power. By and large, we believe that his policies will be successful in generating more positive support among the population and in stimulating a further substantial growth in over-all Soviet power over the next five years. But his changes have created tensions and forces in Soviet society, the ultimate impact of which is difficult to foresee. The policy of a cautious relaxation applied in the intellectual field, for example, has had disagreeable consequences for the regime. Wider contacts with foreign countries have opened the USSR to disturbing influences. Youthful nonconformity is an increasing problem, and a number of critical writers are spreading among a small but increasing circle of readers a climate of dissatisfaction and of impatience with the pace of official reforms. The regime has made little progress in its counterattack upon these forces.

17. Moreover, Khrushchev's expansion of the Party's role as the chief instrument for managing the reform process places a heavy load upon it. With the downgrading of the secret police, the Party apparatus has assumed new responsibilities for insuring political conformity; with the abolition of most economic ministries it now has a much larger role in carrying out centrally determined economic policies. If the Party proves inadequate to these tasks, the prospects for success of the regime's ambitious economic and political programs will be greatly diminished.

18. The role of the party becomes even more critical when viewed in a perspective extending beyond the period of this estimate. For the next five years at least, the regime's totalitarian controls over the Soviet people almost certainly will not be seriously compromised. But over the longer run it is far from certain that the Soviet citizen can be educated to a higher level, urged to exercise his own initiative, given increasing opportunity for comparisons with other countries, and encouraged to expect a significant improvement in his living standard, and at the same time submit without question to a leadership which incessantly proclaims, and frequently exercises, the right to make all important decisions for him, regardless of his personal desires. Eventually it may turn out that the benevolent totalitarianism which Stalin's successors seek to achieve is an impossible contradiction and that the forces released in the search for it will require the leadership to revert to earlier patterns of control or to permit an evolution in some new direction. Even the latter changes would not necessarily alter the basic threat which a dynamic USSR poses to the Free World.

Trends in the Growth of Soviet Power

19. Notwithstanding the many problems confronting the Soviet leaders, we foresee a further rapid growth in the chief physical elements of Soviet power over the next five years. Particularly notable will be the continued rapid expansion of the Soviet economy, further scientific and technical advances in a wide variety of fields, and a continued buildup and modernization of the USSR's already massive military strength.

20. *Economic Growth.* Soviet economic growth over the next five years will continue to be faster than that of the US, though somewhat slower than during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–55), chiefly because of some redirection of investment and a declining rate of growth in the labor force. We estimate the average growth in Soviet GNP as around six percent annually during the next five years. In dollar terms Soviet GNP would rise from about 40 percent of US GNP in 1956 to about 45 percent in 1962. However, estimated Soviet defense expenditures, in dollar terms, are already about equal to those of the US.

21. *Scientific and Technical Progress.* The rapid expansion of the USSR's technical and scientific capabilities, critical to the growth of Soviet industrial and military power, will also continue. Although total Soviet scientific capabilities may not equal those of the US, the USSR has been able to make comparable achievements and to forge ahead in certain areas of critical military and industrial significance by concentrating its efforts in these fields. The number of university level graduates employed in scientific and technical fields already exceeds that in the US, and probably will be about 40 percent greater than that in the US by 1962.

22. *Military Strength.* Of outstanding significance has been the USSR's progress in the development of advanced weapons and delivery systems:

a. The USSR is developing a variety of improved nuclear weapons, particularly those employing thermonuclear principles; its present stockpile could include weapons with yields ranging from about 4 KT up into the megaton range. By 1958–59 the most powerful Soviet bombs could probably yield up to 20 MT, but missile warheads would still have yields considerably less than this. We also estimate a substantial Soviet program for expanding fissionable materials production, but the availability of such materials will continue through 1962 to be a limiting factor on the size of many military as well as nonmilitary programs.

b. The USSR has probably tested an ICBM vehicle and we now tentatively estimate that it could have a few (say 10) prototype ICBMs available for operational use in 1959 or possibly even earlier, depending upon Soviet requirements for accuracy and reliability.³ The USSR could now have available ballistic missiles with maximum ranges of 75, 175–200, 350, and 700 n.m.; by 1958 it could probably also begin to have available a 1000 n.m. IRBM.

23. Meanwhile, the USSR will probably continue to maintain a balanced and flexible structure of strong naval, air, and ground forces, supplementing these with new weapons. Nevertheless, the manpower strength of the Soviet forces appears to have been reduced considerably from Korean War peaks, and some further reductions and streamlining are likely, though not to a substantial degree.

a. We estimate that the Soviet long-range bomber force has grown to some 1,500 bombers at present, though it includes a larger number of jet medium bombers and fewer heavy bombers than we had previously estimated. While we think that this force will not change significantly in size during the period of this estimate, we believe that it will be further strengthened by the replacement of obsolete BULL piston medium bombers with jets, by the introduction of additional heavy bombers, and by further development of inflight refueling. However, any estimate of future strength must be highly tentative, especially for heavy bombers, since Soviet policy in these respects is still shrouded in doubt. Subject to such qualifications, we estimate that the Soviets may by mid-1960 have about 400–600 heavy bombers and tankers of jet and turboprop types, in a long-range air force totalling something between 1400 and 1700 bombers. We also estimate that the number of heavy bombers and

³ The estimate made in this paragraph must be considered tentative pending completion of SNIE 11–10–57: The Soviet ICBM Program. [Footnote is in the original.]

tankers will probably remain fairly steady after 1960, while the total long-range bomber strength will probably decline slightly.⁴

b. Further strengthening of Soviet air defenses will occur as a result of improved fighter performance, a higher proportion of improved all-weather fighters, better radar and communications equipment, and widespread employment of improved surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.

c. The Soviet ground forces have been extensively reorganized and modernized; further improvements in firepower and mobility are likely during 1958–62. Training and doctrine are being adapted for modern warfare, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. We still estimate about 175 line divisions, but their actual strengths probably vary from somewhat in excess of 70 percent of war strength to as low as 30 percent. Increasing attention is being paid to airborne and air-transportable forces, whose capabilities will increase considerably by 1962.

d. The Soviets are engaged in an extensive naval program, especially in the submarine category. There are recent indications that a shift to new designs of submarines may be in progress. Their submarine force is estimated at about 475 at mid-1957, including nearly 300 submarines of modern design. We estimate that the submarine force will approximate 560 submarines by mid-1962. The first submarine propulsion reactor could now be available, and by mid-1962 the USSR could probably produce about 20 nuclear-powered submarines. A few converted missile-launching submarines could now be in operation; and by mid-1962 the USSR may have a total of 50 in all categories of submarines equipped with guided missile armament.

I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Victory of Khrushchev and the Party

24. During the past year Khrushchev has succeeded in re-establishing the Communist Party's dominance over other elite groups in Soviet society and, within the leadership itself, has established his

⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the USSR would regard it as essential to have a more substantial intercontinental attack capability, providing for greater strategic flexibility and a much larger capability for re-attack—in short, a force which would provide the Soviets a greater chance of success in general war—while they are working to acquire an additional nuclear delivery capability with new weapon systems, including long-range missiles. He therefore believes that the 400–600 heavy aircraft estimated above would all be bombers and that by mid-1961 there will be 300–500 additional aircraft as tankers in operational units.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe, on the other hand, that the number of heavy bomber/tanker aircraft and the total number of long-range aircraft are both more likely to approximate the lower than the higher figures given above. See their footnote on page 33. [Footnote is in the original. For reference footnote, see the footnotes following paragraph 139.]

own pre-eminence. By means of the June and October 1957 purges and the industrial reorganization, the Party demonstrated its supremacy over the economic bureaucracy and the military, while Khrushchev, through skillful political maneuvering, eliminated his chief rivals from the Party Presidium.

25. The June purge of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich ended four years of joint rule by a small circle of Stalin's most prominent heirs. Both policy differences and personal rivalries were involved. The losing group not only distrusted many policy innovations sponsored by Khrushchev, but probably was alarmed by the way in which his energy and political acumen were enabling him gradually to assume a dominant role. From the key position of First Secretary, he had built a political machine within the Party apparatus, managing Party appointments so thoroughly that, although he seems to have faced defeat in the Presidium in June, he won an apparently hard-fought and decisive victory once he managed to transfer the dispute to the larger Central Committee.

26. Then in October, the Party moved against Marshal Zhukov, who had been elevated to full membership in the Presidium at the time of the June purge. It is likely that the Party feared an attempt by Zhukov to use his new political strength to resist certain aspects of Party control in the armed forces. He is known to have been impatient with such controls in the past. However, nothing in the Zhukov affair suggests that he had been preparing a coup by the armed forces against the Party or that he even had political ambition of this kind. But Khrushchev and other Party leaders were probably extraordinarily sensitive to the potential dangers of a military force not thoroughly under Party domination. Furthermore, Khrushchev himself may have regarded Zhukov as a potentially dangerous rival.

27. Although there remains a gap between Khrushchev's present powers and those accumulated by Stalin, he does not appear, for the present, to have any close rivals. Probably no major policy can be adopted without his approval. A majority of the new Presidium are his proteges, and the others lack resources sufficient to oppose him if they were inclined to do so. But while Khrushchev has gained a clear field for his policies, he has not used police terror against his colleagues in the manner of Stalin and has indicated in various ways that he does not propose to try. Moreover, though the Presidium is still the major repository of political power and is likely to remain so, Khrushchev by his recourse to the Central Committee in both June and October has re-emphasized the formal subordination of the Presidium to that body.

Future Leadership Problems

28. The same factors which led to the events of 1957 are likely to generate recurrent problems in Soviet politics over the next five years. Certain of these problems will arise from the Party leadership's continuing efforts, while utilizing the professional skills of specialized groups, to suppress the accompanying tendency for these groups to expand their political influence. Others will be created if Khrushchev, as seems likely, attempts to place beyond challenge his own position as undisputed head of the Party, and thereby of the USSR.

29. We believe that, despite the decisive victories scored by Khrushchev and the Party during 1957, these closely-related problems will provide continuing elements of instability in the Soviet leadership. As for Khrushchev's own position, even some of his present supporters in the Presidium and Central Committee may in time come to doubt the wisdom of his bold foreign and domestic policies. Others may become alarmed as they see in his maneuvers a tendency to one-man rule and perhaps a threat to themselves. The problem of succession to Khrushchev might add a further unsettling element; the usual intrigues within the Party are likely to be intensified by the maneuverings of his colleagues and subordinates to get into position for the struggle which they will anticipate following his death or incapacitation.

30. Furthermore, we do not regard the defeat of the economic bureaucrats and the military as necessarily final. So long as the Party refrains from a resort to widespread terror and continues to place a high premium upon professional competence, these groups will try again to influence policy in directions which accord with their professional interests and assessments. The economic bureaucrats are indispensable to the industrialized Soviet state, and this will tend to restore at least some of their political influence. The military impatience with Party controls which Zhukov represented is too widespread to be eradicated by his ouster and will probably find other spokesmen. A weakening of unity within the Party apparatus would improve the opportunities for such a development, since these groups probably will remain important enough to be regarded as desirable allies in intra-Party intrigues.

31. These elements of instability will subject the leadership to strain during the next several years as difficult policy problems arise. We think it probable, however, that only the most severe problems could threaten the present leadership arrangements. Khrushchev will almost certainly attempt further to consolidate his position, perhaps following up the Presidium purge with the elimination of opponents in the Central Committee as well. In view of his present strength and demonstrated political skill, only an issue grave enough to produce a general coalition against him appears likely to upset him or to force him into more than temporary compromises.

32. But considering the magnitude of the problems which the regime faces, and the risks of failure in the bold programs which Khrushchev has undertaken, we believe that issues of such gravity could arise. For example, the dislocations created by his industrial reorganization program, coming on top of an overambitious combination of programs—defense, heavy industry, agriculture, and housing—might so aggravate existing problems as to produce a severe crisis. So might foreign policy moves which appeared to raise the risk of general war to a level considered foolhardy by spirits less bold and confident than Khrushchev. In such grave instances his colleagues and perhaps even his defeated opponents might muster a formidable challenge.

33. We do not regard Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's use of terror against political opponents as a guarantee that, under such circumstances, or perhaps even in anticipation of them, he would not seek to reinstitute police terror to achieve absolute rule. Instead, we think it probable that, if other means were exhausted, he would make such an attempt. But important elements among the elite groups would be alert to, and would probably oppose, such a development, particularly if a recourse to terror were involved.

34. Whatever developments occur within the Soviet leadership over the next five years, they are not likely to result in widespread civil violence or to involve broad sections of the population in active politics. Instead, we believe that any changes which take place will be confined within a relatively small group which will continue to monopolize political power, although it may exercise that power with a somewhat greater regard for public morale.

Changes in Internal Policy

35. At present, despite the many problems created by the changes in internal policy, the regime's position vis-a-vis the population remains basically stable. A number of elements of stability have long been evident: the regime's monopoly of physical force and the means of communication, the vested interests which tie important groups to the existing system, the unifying effect exerted by the Party, a wide-spread apathy towards politics and a general disbelief in the possibility of radical change. In addition, Western contacts with the Soviet population have revealed a wide-spread sense of national pride over the USSR's material accomplishments and its role as leader of a world bloc.

36. Nevertheless, Stalin's successors recognized that his policies toward the Soviet population had produced so much apathy, antagonism, and fear that they were depriving the regime of popular support and inhibiting economic growth. Although differing among themselves on many issues, they generally agreed on the need, while maintaining as much control as possible, to find ways to narrow the rift between the

regime and the population. In contrast to Stalin's harshness and mistrust, they apparently started from the premise that the Soviet citizen is a basically loyal supporter whose energy and initiative, if encouraged and rewarded rather than repressed, can serve the regime's purposes. Most of the post-Stalin internal changes stem from this premise, of which Khrushchev is the prime exponent. He is, however, no less an exponent of the equally important principle that the Party retains unlimited rights to determine the pace and scope of relaxation, to reverse it at will, and to intervene at all levels of society.

37. In consequence, changes have been extensive but cautious. In the political sphere, they include the leashing of police terror, the destruction of the Stalin cult (but also the endorsement of much of Stalin's work), and an effort to humanize the style of leadership, both central and local, so as to narrow the rift dividing those in authority from the masses. Within the Party itself, a number of special channels by-passing the formal organization have been eliminated, the semblance of democratic procedures has been revived, and "loyal" criticism from rank-and-file members is encouraged in an effort to restore the Party's vigor and make it an effective political instrument. In economic matters, incentives are more widely used and a series of administrative reforms, culminating in a radical reorganization of industrial administration, has sought to make better use of specialist knowledge, local talent, and individual initiative. In the intellectual sphere, the regime has relaxed censorship to allow greater artistic freedom and has permitted, even encouraged in some cases, wider contacts with the West on a variety of levels.

Impact on Popular Attitudes

38. These innovations have produced mixed results. The lessening of terror has won the regime a favorable reaction from all sections of the population. Economic responses are less clear. Probably a part of the gain in agricultural output is attributable to improved morale among the peasants, but the campaigns for increases in worker productivity and for the rapid introduction of new technology, both dependent upon broad initiative, have to date fallen short of the regime's expectations.

39. Results in the intellectual field have also been largely disagreeable to the Soviet leaders. Wider contacts with foreign countries have opened the USSR to disturbing influences, not only from the Free World but also from Eastern Europe and Communist China. Youthful nonconformity is an increasing problem, especially on the occasions when it extends beyond rebelliousness to disagreement with the official line on matters of principle. A group of writers has arisen who, with bold criticism of the harsh and unpleasant aspects of Soviet life,

are spreading among a small but increasing circle of readers a climate of dissatisfaction and of impatience with the pace of official reforms.

40. This consequence of de-Stalinization, stemming from many of the same causes which produced direct challenges to Soviet rule in Poland and Hungary, has led the regime to define more sharply the limits of its liberalization program. Just as the Polish and Hungarian events led to renewed stress on Soviet leadership of the Bloc, so the unorthodox views of writers and students have been countered with a reassertion of Party infallibility. As part of the effort to stifle negative criticism, the propaganda line on Stalin has shifted: none of the crimes charged to him by Khrushchev has been whitewashed, but emphasis is now laid upon his "positive achievements" and on those of his ideological formulations still regarded as valid. The publication in August 1957 of Khrushchev's vigorous attack on dissident authors, like his recent endorsements of hard-line leaders in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, served notice that the June purge, with its condemnation of dogmatism, was not to be taken as a license for continued liberties.

Probable Developments in Domestic Policy

41. We do not believe that the foregoing measures indicate a change in the regime's basic intentions. Rather they appear to be an attempt to correct extreme interpretations of approved policies. Over the next several years, the regime is likely to continue its cautious experiments, especially in the economic field, constantly readjusting its policies in search of a better balance between freedom and coercion. We do not believe that the trend towards reform is as yet irreversible, and under circumstances of political crisis reversal may occur. Khrushchev's increasing ascendancy, by freeing him from the need to defend his past policies against the criticism of his colleagues, might facilitate such a reversal in response to difficulties or changed conditions. But the longer the period of relaxation is maintained, the higher the price the regime must pay, in terms of forfeited popular support and new disruption of the machinery of control, if it chooses to return to wholesale harshness in its dealing with the population.

42. Barring such a return, we estimate that, over the next several years, the fear and apathy which Stalinism produced will slowly diminish. Among the majority, this process will probably lead to a somewhat closer identification with the regime, which is being given credit for ending fears of the police and improving living standards. But the regime's own liberalizing policies, as well as Khrushchev's extravagant promises, raise the possibility that popular expectations will outrun actual gains and generate more disappointment than gratitude. A small minority, made up chiefly of students and intellectuals in cultural fields, appears already to have become so independent in its thinking that it

cannot be brought, either by persuasion or pressure to a whole-hearted acceptance of the regime. This group probably will maintain attitudes of dissatisfaction and even some oppositional feelings unless changes proceed far faster than is likely. Since these people are in a position to influence the public opinion now emerging in the USSR, they may be subjected to sterner measures in the future.

43. The regime's chief instrument for managing the reform process is the Party. With the downgrading of the secret police, the Party organization assumed new responsibilities for insuring political conformity; with the abolition of most economic ministries, it now has a much larger role in carrying out centrally-determined economic policies. Its capabilities for these assignments are uncertain; thus far it has demonstrated no marked success in eliminating dissent and has even shown a few signs of being itself infected with the same dissatisfactions which are agitating students and intellectuals. If the Party proves inadequate to these tasks, possibilities for success of the regime's ambitious economic and political programs will be greatly diminished.

44. The role of the Party becomes even more critical when viewed in a perspective extending beyond the period of this estimate. It is far from certain that the Soviet citizen can be educated to a higher level, urged to exercise his own initiative, given increasing opportunity for comparisons with other countries, and encouraged to expect a significant improvement in his living standard, and at the same time submit without question to a leadership which incessantly proclaims, and frequently exercises, the right to make all important decisions for him, regardless of his personal desires. The regime's best hope of managing the resulting tension lies in the activity of a disciplined minority, able, persuasive, highly resourceful, but completely responsive to the wishes of its leaders. Despite its highly favored position, this minority itself is subject to many of the same tensions as the population at large. Eventually it may turn out that the benevolent totalitarianism which Stalin's successors seek to achieve is an impossible contradiction and that the forces released in the search for it will require the leadership to revert to earlier patterns of control or to permit an evolution in some new direction.

II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Shifts in Economic Policy

45. The Soviet leaders continue to view their economy primarily as an instrument for the creation of national power. Thus heavy industry, and particularly military production, retain first-priority status. But the gap in the priority structure which separates heavy industry from other sectors is being narrowed by a new attitude toward consumption. Along with the traditional emphasis upon heavy industry, higher

living standards are being sought in an effort to stimulate higher labor productivity, to generate some active support among the Soviet population, and to remove the stigma of poverty from Communism in order to increase its attractiveness at home and abroad.

46. Accompanying this modification of Stalin's rigid priorities is a recognition that many of his economic methods—reliance more upon coercion than on incentives, extreme centralization of administration, resistance to innovation—are ill-suited to the current requirements of the Soviet economy. Thus his successors have exhibited more concern with material incentives and more readiness to experiment, exemplified in such ventures as the New Lands and corn programs in agriculture and the administrative reorganization in industry. These sweeping moves have been accompanied by a large number of lesser innovations, all designed to modernize an economy which, despite its rapid growth, was still being managed by methods developed during prewar years. Khrushchev has been the chief sponsor of these changes, and his present ascendancy suggests that, apart from such basic matters as state ownership and central planning, all of the institutional features and managerial practices of the Soviet economy are subject to critical review.

47. Both these tendencies—to modify the system of priorities and to revise the economic structure itself—are exemplified in the policy decisions of the last 12 months. First, when production results during 1956 indicated that the very high growth rates of the five-year plan were threatened by a failure to build enough new industrial capacity, the Soviet leaders refrained from the traditional response of cutting into the consumer sector for extra resources to meet the targets in heavy industry. Instead, they accepted the necessity of at least a temporary slowdown in industrial growth, meanwhile increasing allocations to agriculture and housing. Second, Khrushchev seized upon the defects of the ministerial structure as responsible for the difficulties experienced in 1956 and embarked upon a radical reorganization as the means of regaining the tempo of industrial advance.

48. During the next five years, it is almost certain that various ambitious programs for defense, industrial growth, and popular welfare will turn out to be incompatible. In these circumstances, we believe that the overall defense program would not be significantly curtailed. But the investment resources needed in industry to make acceptable progress towards overtaking American industry might conflict with the requirements of defense officials for expanded military expenditures. Furthermore, Khrushchev's sweeping pledges to improve consumer welfare, made in a bid for popular support in the aftermath of the Satellite crisis and during the Presidium struggle, commit him to achieving a palpable increase in consumption. Well before they reach their targets, however, his agricultural and housing programs will

probably compete with defense and industrial investment for both materials and labor.

49. The difficulty of pursuing all these goals simultaneously probably lay behind the decision to abandon the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956–60) in favor of a seven-year plan for 1959–65. Apparently the regime wished to erase from public record 1960 targets which it doubted its ability fully to meet. Probably it judged that, in the light of industrial lags in 1956–57 (see paras. 58–59), the original targets for this sector, particularly those for some key industrial materials, could not be reached without cutting too deeply into other programs. If this interpretation is correct, abandonment of the original plan appears to reaffirm and to extend into the future the decision, embodied in the 1957 plan, not to put all-out stress on heavy industry irrespective of the cost to other economic goals. The issue of competing priorities, however, has not been finally settled by this action and is certain to arise again.

Prospects for Economic Growth

50. Soviet economic growth during the coming five years will continue to be faster than that of the US, though somewhat slower than the pace achieved during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–55). The principal factors behind the past rapid rate of growth have been a high level of investment concentrated in sectors providing most rapid growth, increases in the industrial labor force, and gains in economic efficiency. We believe that a high level of investment will be maintained, amounting to more than one-quarter of GNP (in the US, investment's share is about one-fifth). However, in the future a greater share of total investment will have to be directed to programs in which the returns, in terms of additional production, are relatively low. These programs include expansion of the fuel and raw material base, where a chronic lag in new construction finally produced severe supply stringencies in 1956; development of the eastern regions, where initial investment requirements are high; and the large effort in housing. Total output will grow less rapidly under such a distribution of investment than it did when a greater share of funds were directed into such sectors as machine-building and chemicals.

51. Another major limitation upon rapid growth is the fact that the labor force will not grow as rapidly as before, especially toward the end of the 1957–62 period, as war-reduced age groups move into employment. Whereas during the period 1950–57 the labor force grew by an average of 1.6 million new workers each year (apparently with the aid of some reduction of military personnel after the Korean War—see para. 98), population growth will provide an average of only about 1.1 million during 1957–62. The planned reduction from 48 to 41 hours in the industrial work week, which will probably be carried out, will

reduce the net gain in labor time even further. On the other hand, if further reductions in military manpower occur, they will have some offsetting influence.

52. For these reasons, and because labor cannot be freely drawn from agriculture, the USSR must rely heavily on productivity gains to maintain the extremely high growth rates it desires. There is much room in the Soviet economy for gains in labor productivity resulting from the use of more modern machinery, from a wider and more precise application of incentives, and from improved efficiency in a multitude of planning and managerial activities. As a result of the vigorous attention being given to such problems and Khrushchev's relatively undogmatic approach to them, we expect continued gains in labor productivity over the next five years. The impetus to growth obtained from this source, however, seems unlikely to be so great as to offset the limitations cited above.

53. Thus we estimate that the average yearly growth of Soviet GNP will drop from perhaps as much as seven percent in recent years to around six percent during the next five years. Even so, the USSR will slowly gain further ground upon the US economy, which is expected to grow at an annual rate of about 3.5 percent. In dollar terms, Soviet GNP will rise from about 40 percent of US GNP in 1956 to about 45 percent in 1962. The USSR and the US, however, will allocate resources in sharply different ways. With a GNP only two-fifths that of the US, the dollar value of Soviet defense expenditures is estimated to be about equal to those of the US, and investment is about 55–60 percent as large as American investment; Soviet consumption outlays, on the other hand, have a dollar value only about one-quarter that of US consumption.

*Trends in Defense Expenditures*⁵

54. We estimate that in 1957 Soviet defense expenditures are about 15 percent of GNP in terms of rubles (the comparable US figure in dollars is about 9 percent). If our estimates of military trends are correct, defense expenditures will increase gradually, reaching in 1962 a level one-quarter to one-third higher than at present. Since GNP will probably increase at the same rate or faster, the relative burden on the economy will become no heavier in the aggregate, although defense needs will have to compete with other programs for manpower and for specific industrial products, such as electronics.

⁵ Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures are subject to a wider margin of error than other statistical estimates in this section and should therefore be used with greater caution. [Footnote is in the original.]

55. Most of the increase in defense expenditures will be caused by increasing allocations to aircraft, guided missiles, military research and development, and nuclear weapons. These programs together probably account for more than 35 percent of total expenditures at present. By 1962 they are expected to require about 50 percent more resources and to account for nearly 45 percent of total defense programs.

56. Soviet defense expenditures in recent years, when converted into dollar values, appear to be of roughly the same magnitude as US defense expenditures. Thus the Soviet defense effort, which consumes about one-seventh of the USSR's much smaller GNP, produces military goods and services with a dollar value roughly the same as the US. This is owing primarily to the facts that in the USSR military end-items are less expensive, relative to consumption items, than they are in the US, and that the average level of real pay and subsistence provided Soviet military personnel is much lower than in the US.

Industrial Prospects

57. The Soviet leadership remains committed to rapid industrial growth, with the eventual aim of overtaking US industry in per capita production. The now defunct Sixth Five-Year Plan, however, already contemplated a lower increase—65 percent—than the 85 percent claimed during the Fifth. Even this target now is apparently judged too high. As for overtaking the US, total Soviet output is increasing faster than US production but is still less than half that of American industry (see Figure 1).

58. Cumulative failures in completing new installations for several basic industries reached a point in 1956 which produced serious imbalances in the Soviet economy and necessitated a reduction of goals in the 1957 plan. Figure 2 indicates that these difficulties were not overcome during 1957. During 1957, moreover, the building of new capacity for coal, iron ore, rolled steel, and electric power almost certainly continued to lag behind plan. Accelerated production gains would have been necessary during the next three years if the original 1960 targets for these commodities, vital to the growth of other industrial sectors, were to be met.

59. The Soviet leaders hope that the slower growth of the industrial labor force will be offset to some degree by increased production per worker. One of the most important programs for raising productivity is the modernization and re-equipment of industrial plants. This program, of which automation is the ultimate expression, has lagged behind schedule, however, and seems unlikely to catch up. Industry as a whole probably will have to bear the brunt of increased investment in the consumption sectors and also the reduction in total investment at which Soviet sources have hinted in discussion of plan revisions.

Figure 1

US AND USSR
OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS





Figure 2

USSR
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES
IN OUTPUT OF SELECTED COMMODITIES



Within industry, furthermore, increased demands for investment in raw materials may require machine-building, upon which the modernization program depends, to get along with less. Apart from investment problems, inherent difficulties in getting new machinery first into large-scale production and then into use continue to plague Soviet industry. The productivity gains from modernization, therefore, while contributing substantially to industrial growth, are likely to fall short of the USSR's high expectations.

60. The Khrushchev regime has laid great stress on another means of raising productivity, by improvement of general economic administration and plant management. The major innovation in this field is the replacement of most industrial ministries with 105 regional economic councils. Basically, the new structure attempts to distinguish between those decisions which define national policy and those which concern its detailed execution and, while maintaining Moscow's monopoly in the first sphere, to leave the second to officials on the spot. We do not believe, however, that the reorganization itself will make much contribution to industrial growth. The inevitable period of initial confusion will perhaps last longer than anticipated. Even over the long run, while many sources of inefficiency will be eliminated, the regional system promises to breed its own bureaucratic excesses and perhaps, because of its greater susceptibility to local interests and consumer pressures, to deform central policy itself. A net gain will probably result, but this is likely to be rather small unless the reorganization is followed by other reforms which are at present only in the discussion stage, such as expansion of managerial rights, a more realistic pricing system, and improved criteria for economic performance.

61. During the coming five years, large-scale transfers of labor from agriculture in order to compensate for productivity shortfalls in industry will be much more difficult to carry out than in the past. Agricultural employment, which declined steadily during Stalin's later years, has risen with the higher priority which his successors have attached to this sector. While one of the ultimate aims of the agricultural program is to resume the flow of labor into industry, the immediate goal is to increase output. During the next five years, prospective agricultural programs seem as likely to increase labor requirements as to reduce them. Khrushchev will be loath to reduce the agricultural labor force until production successes are achieved.

62. Therefore, it appears that the lag in production of basic materials and the relative stringencies in labor and especially in investment funds available to industry will result in a somewhat slower growth of industrial production than in the past. Against a very large increase estimated at 65–75 percent during the Fifth Five-Year Plan, we believe that the gain from 1957 to 1962 will probably be about 50–60 percent.

The Consumption Program

63. A third major economic task is fulfillment of Khrushchev's consumption goals, which are more ambitious and more specific than those embodied in Malenkov's economic policy of 1953–54. In place of Malenkov's emphasis upon light industry; priority is now focused upon agriculture and housing. The goals are unlikely to be attained on schedule, but even the effort required to make substantial progress toward them may involve sharp competition with other priorities. In the distribution of state investment, for example, agriculture and housing together, which received less than one-fourth of the total in 1953, got almost one-third in the 1957 plan. Again, in its attempt to increase peasant incentives, the state markedly increased the prices it pays for deliveries of agricultural products. Great priority is being attached to the state farms, which are currently being rapidly expanded, partly at the expense of the collective farm sector.

64. The major agricultural target is to reach American levels of per capita production of milk and meat, the former by 1958, the latter by 1960–61. Fodder supplies are the primary obstacle, but a large increase in the grain harvest is hoped for. This increase is to be obtained from reduced losses as more machinery makes possible faster harvesting, from higher yields resulting from better cultural practices, and from some further expansion of cultivated area. A plan has been launched to increase the New Lands acreage by about one third in the next two years, partly to provide for proper crop rotation, and Khrushchev may be considering even further expansions of cultivation into marginal areas. The New Lands and any future additions will produce lower crop yields than those obtainable in the traditional areas of cultivation and will be subject to frequent failures, but we estimate that they will increase the total harvest at a cost acceptable to the Soviet authorities.

65. While many of the major commodity goals cannot be met, agricultural production as a whole will increase faster than population growth and may by 1962 be nearly one-fifth over the peak year 1956. Achievement of US levels of per capita meat and milk output on the stipulated schedule is out of the question, but the progress recently made and the great emphasis now being placed on these branches suggest that the Soviet consumer will note a substantial increase in supplies of animal products.

66. The housing decree of mid-1957 raised the Sixth Five-Year Plan target from 289 million to 329 million square meters. While the state left its own house-building target virtually unchanged, it did increase by about one-fifth the allocation devoted to meeting that target, and it also committed itself to provide additional materials to private builders. If the housing goal is to be met, either a substantial above-plan increase in production of building materials or diversion of them from other

uses will probably be necessary. Fulfillment would raise urban housing space per capita above the level attained before forced industrialization was launched three decades ago, but would still leave the Soviet population very poorly housed by Western standards.

67. If these and other programs to raise Soviet living standards retain their present priority, they will probably produce a gain of perhaps as much as one-fifth in per capita consumption between 1957 and 1962. As has been true for the last two or three years, this increase will probably be spread over the bulk of the population rather than directed toward small favored groups. As a result, the regime will probably enjoy some increase in popular support. On the other hand, Soviet failure to make at least the above estimated progress towards higher living standards would considerably undermine Khrushchev's attempt to create an image of a regime dedicated primarily to popular welfare and determined to fulfill its promises to the people. Such a failure would tend to weaken popular support and might even, by its effect upon worker incentives, damage the prospects for economic growth. To some extent, therefore, the regime's freedom of action relative to the population has been diminished, and the cost of regaining it has been increased.

Foreign Trade

68. Foreign trade continues to be of minor importance to the Soviet economy, accounting for only about two percent of GNP. While earlier attitudes of rigid autarky have weakened somewhat, the USSR is still far from willing to abandon considerations of self-sufficiency and to enter world markets whenever opportunities arise for economic gain. Trade is instead conducted for quite specific purposes, frequently political, and Bloc members or potential allies are preferred as trading partners.

69. Soviet imports and exports together rose by about one-tenth in 1956 to a total of about \$6.9 billion. Other Bloc states continued to account for about three-quarters of this trade; exchanges with the European Satellites grew by about five percent, and those with Communist China fell as Soviet aid shipments declined. The USSR and other Bloc members continued to boost their trade with underdeveloped countries, and in 1956 five such nations—Afghanistan, Iceland, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Burma—conducted more than 20 percent of their total trade with Bloc partners.

70. The USSR's harsh economic exploitation of the Satellites, which had gradually softened in the years following Stalin's death, virtually ended late in 1956. As a consequence of policy decisions in the wake of the Polish and Hungarian crises, the USSR has assisted the East European regimes with new credits and the cancellation of old obligations, which together will cost about \$2.5 billion over the next

decade. Soviet exports to this area have increased significantly, but the return flow of goods has grown slightly if at all. The current pattern of exchange requires the USSR to increase its shipments of grain and scarce industrial materials such as steel, coal, iron ore, and nonferrous metals, while simultaneously importing less Polish coal and Rumanian oil. While these shifts are less of a difficulty to the USSR than are its domestic economic problems, they do serve to aggravate the solution of these larger difficulties.

71. Trade outside the Bloc remains concentrated in the developed nations of Western Europe, which continue to account for about four-fifths of Soviet trade with the Free World. But Soviet trade with the underdeveloped countries, though small, is rising; in 1956 it grew by 35 percent to a total of nearly \$400 million. This trade is still roughly in balance, and drawings on nonmilitary credits extended by the USSR have amounted to slightly over \$100 million since the inception of this program. Thus the credit program, of which the USSR has provided about \$900 million out of the Bloc total of \$1.5 billion, is as yet a negligible drain on the Soviet economy. Even when the utilization of these credits increases, the net drain to the domestic economy will be small. The slowdown during 1957 in extension of new Soviet credits is due to the exhaustion of the most ready opportunities during the preceding two years rather than to limitations upon Soviet economic capabilities. The USSR will continue to press its foreign credits wherever it sees potential political gains, and considerations of economic impact on the USSR will remain relatively unimportant unless the magnitude of the program increases drastically.

71a. *Civil Air*. The USSR is in the first stages of a determined and vigorous program to enter international air routes and is embarking on an ambitious program to produce a modern civil air fleet. In entering international air routes the USSR is probably motivated more by political than by commercial considerations. The USSR apparently has now realized the significance of civil aviation capabilities as an element of national power and prestige and is developing a growing capability in this field.

III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY⁶

72. The closely-controlled Soviet scientific effort has focussed preponderantly on the building of a strong industrial base and the development of modern weapons. The USSR has placed great emphasis on science and technology and has concentrated manpower and facilities in an effort to achieve the high priority goals which it has established

⁶ For details on Soviet scientific strengths, developments, and policy, see NIE 11–6–56, “Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology,” 9 October 1956. [Footnote is in the original.]

for military production and for the industrial base. As a consequence, the USSR's achievements in areas of critical military and industrial significance are comparable to, and in some cases exceed, those of the United States. Research in areas to which the Soviets assign low priorities tends to progress at a much slower rate.

73. Highest priority will continue to be accorded to military-industrial research and development, but the rapid expansion of Soviet scientific resources will now permit greater flexibility. Greater individual initiative will probably be encouraged within assigned tasks of research, basic research in new fields undertaken, and somewhat more scientific and technical effort allocated to the consumer sector of the economy. Better direction of agricultural research is likely. As part of the current reorganization of the Soviet economy, efforts are apparently being made to improve coordination of the Soviet scientific and technical effort, and industrial research and development will probably be brought into better balance with production requirements at the local as well as national levels. At the same time, ideological obstacles to scientific research and development (never of much consequence in major industrial or war-supporting fields) will probably continue to diminish in the fields previously affected. These factors, together with continued emphasis on increasing scientific resources, will contribute to further substantial gains in Soviet science and technology over the next five years.

Scientific Manpower, Training, and Facilities




74. The reservoir of scientifically and technically trained manpower available to the Soviet Union has increased tremendously in the postwar period. Of the estimated mid-1957 total of 1,810,000 living graduates of university-level scientific and technical curricula, over 1,060,000 have graduated since the end of World War II. The total number of graduates actually employed in all scientific and technical fields in the USSR now exceeds those so employed in the US (see Chart on following page). We estimate that the high graduation rates of recent years will continue during the period of this estimate. By 1962 the USSR will probably have about 40 percent more graduates engaged in scientific and technical work than the US. In the particular fields of physical sciences and engineering, the number of Soviet scientists engaged in research and teaching is substantially smaller than in the US. However, Soviet emphasis on research in military and basic industrial fields probably results in a near numerical equality between the two countries in scientific manpower devoted to these critical activities.

75. In the postwar period the quality of Soviet scientific training has approached, and in some cases surpassed, US levels. Engineering training in the USSR, while not as broad as that given an engineer in the West, is good within the particular field of specialization. Some

US AND USSR

COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS

(Cumulative totals in thousands)



* Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to be correct to within plus or minus 10 percent. [Footnote is in the original.]

** Requirements of the Soviet Kandidat degree roughly equal those for the US Ph.D. In the physical sciences and engineering and in certain of the agricultural and health sciences. However, in health sciences, the Kandidat degree is more closely equals a US Master's degree. [Footnote is in the original.]

deficiencies continue in the practical and experimental aspects of training, particularly in some fields of biology and engineering, although efforts are being made to overcome them. The USSR is also not as well supplied with nonprofessional technicians, mechanics, and maintenance men as are the Western industrial countries, where broader sections of the population have acquired mechanical skills over a longer period. Considerable progress is being made in increasing the supply of such personnel, but shortages of skilled technicians will persist in the USSR as in other countries.

76. Soviet scientific facilities, in terms of financial support, organizational direction, and number and quality of laboratories, are generally adequate for the effective utilization of scientific talent. In a few fields Soviet facilities are superior to corresponding installations in the West. Notable in this regard are certain high energy particle accelerators and electronics research establishments. Although some shortages of complex research instruments are believed to exist, they probably do not significantly hamper research programs of major importance. For instance, though the US has a considerably larger number of high speed electronic computers than the USSR, the number of computer hours actually utilized for high priority research is probably nearly the same, since Soviet computers are not called upon to serve routine business and government functions.

77. During the next five years the Soviet Union will continue efforts to improve its capabilities in scientific instrumentation. More highly qualified engineers will probably be made available for the development and production of scientific equipment, especially in priority research areas, and an increasing amount of equipment will reflect original design concepts.

78. The Satellites continue to make significant contributions to Soviet technological development in certain fields, principally in optics, electrical measuring instruments, electronics, communication equipment, synthetic fibers, and pharmaceuticals. However, the importance of Satellite contributions is diminishing as Soviet capabilities in these fields improve.

79. The USSR is also progressively less dependent on Western research and development. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders have adopted a policy of acknowledging foreign achievement and encouraging maximum use of foreign experience. The USSR is clearly anxious to take advantage of the possibilities in international scientific exchange, and to make Soviet scientists fully conversant with developments in the West. The All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Academy of Sciences publishes and circulates extensive abstracts of foreign journals, and at least in high priority fields Soviet scientists

have access to the full range of scientific research published throughout the world.

Scientific Capabilities in Major Scientific Fields

80. Soviet scientists have made striking progress over the past few years in many areas of fundamental research. In mathematics, many fields of physics, and a few fields of chemistry, fundamental research appears to be comparable in quality to that performed in the US. In at least some fields, the best Soviet scientists are as gifted and competent as the best in the West, and have a similar potential for wholly new discoveries.

81. *Atomic Energy.*⁷ There is substantial evidence that the USSR is continuing to expand steadily not only its military atomic energy activities but its program for non-military uses. We estimate that the Soviet atomic energy program will continue to enjoy the very high priority that has been accorded to it in the past. The USSR is conducting extensive research in all major fields related to atomic energy, including controlled thermonuclear reactions.

82. The USSR is engaged in a comprehensive reactor development program which will permit it to keep generally abreast of world progress in this field. Although the USSR appears to have revised its ambitious mid-1960 nuclear power goal from 2,000–2,500 megawatts down to 1,400 megawatts of electric power, this reduced plan is still quite substantial, and is within Soviet capabilities if a high priority effort is devoted to it. The USSR will probably make further offers of technical aid, as well as of assistance in the construction of nuclear power stations, within the Bloc and to non-Bloc countries.

83. *Physical Sciences.* The present capabilities of Soviet scientists in the various fields of physics and mathematics are comparable to those of scientists in the leading nations of the West. Greatest capabilities are exhibited in nuclear physics, solid state physics, theoretical physics and high-speed digital computers. In the geophysical sciences, Soviet capabilities are also generally comparable to those of leading Western nations; during the next five years significant advances will probably be made in geomagnetism, permafrost research, geochemical prospecting, and polar geophysics. Recent progress has also been achieved in chemistry and metallurgy, notably in high-temperature alloys and ceramic cutting tools. Soviet capabilities in electronic component development

⁷ For further details on Soviet atomic energy research and nonmilitary programs, see NIE 11–2–57, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” 7 May 1957 (Limited Distribution). Soviet atomic energy activities of direct military significance are discussed below in Chapter IV. [Footnote is in the original.]

will keep pace with those of the West and may lead the US in some respects.

84. *Medical Sciences.* Soviet medical practice lags behind that of most major Western countries, but appears to meet standards adequate for current civil and military requirements. Clinical practice is of a fair standard in large urban areas but is still backward in rural areas. Medical research, on the other hand, is pursued with vigor and may reach a level which approximates or even surpasses that of the US in certain fields relative to military and civilian defense, notably neurophysiology, radiobiology, aeromedicine, and hematology.

85. *Biological and Agricultural Sciences.* Soviet biological and agricultural research has hitherto been generally backward, but a trend toward improvement in the quality of research is becoming evident as ideological restrictions on research diminish. Heavy emphasis will be placed on increasing per-acre crop yield and livestock productivity.

86. *Industrial Technology.* For the immediate future, we estimate that the over-all level of Soviet industrial technology will remain below that of the US. However, the most modern Soviet plants are already on a par with those in the US, and we expect the general level of heavy industrial technology to be improved. Striking progress has been made over the past few years in the theory and practice of automation. Additional semiautomatic and possibly fully automatic production lines will be established during the period of this estimate. There will probably be increased emphasis on engineering process research and on shortening the lead times necessary to bring developed items into production. However, research and technology in consumer goods fields will continue to lag far behind that in the US.

87. *Military Technology.*⁸ The USSR has the capability to develop weapons and military equipment generally equal to those of any other nation. Despite the increasing complexities of military equipment, the USSR will be capable of continuing the successful design and development of modern, integrated weapon systems.

IV: TRENDS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

SOVIET MILITARY THINKING AND POLICY

88. In the years since World War II, Soviet military thinking and the Soviet military establishment have been in a process of transition, dictated by rapid advances in military technology and by the fact that the USSR's chief potential enemy, the US, lies beyond the reach of traditional Soviet military power. This rethinking has been reflected in

⁸ Specific Soviet capabilities in military fields are discussed below in Chapter IV. [Footnote is in the original.]

greater emphasis on air defense, submarines, nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and guided missiles. Further evolution in Soviet military policy and force structure can be expected during the coming period under the impact of further rapid advances in technology, the growth in mutual capabilities for nuclear devastation, and other factors affecting the balance of military power.

89. The chief factor affecting Soviet military thinking and leading to changes in the Soviet military establishment has been a growing appreciation of the devastation inherent in all-out nuclear conflict, and of the threat to Soviet security and Soviet objectives posed by Western nuclear capabilities. This realization has led to strenuous Soviet efforts to develop both adequate air defenses and offensive nuclear capabilities. These efforts, as well as various declarations of Soviet political and military leaders, clearly indicate that the chief military contingency against which the USSR feels it must guard is that of general war involving all-out use of nuclear weapons. The USSR almost certainly believes that the West's current military posture and strategic doctrine are such as to compel the West, if general war occurred, to fight it primarily by nuclear means.

90. Despite their strenuous efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, the Soviets probably consider that present US capabilities to wage nuclear war remain greater than their own. They show acute awareness of the advantage accruing to the US from its deployment of nuclear striking forces on the periphery of the Bloc as well as within the continental US. We believe that, under these circumstances, the Soviet planners have concluded that at present the USSR, even if it launched a surprise attack, would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange with the US. Notwithstanding probable further improvements in the Soviet nuclear and delivery capabilities over the coming period, the USSR almost certainly will still not be confident that it can attack the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return. These estimates of Soviet military judgments underlie our basic estimate (see paras. 190 and 191, chapter VI) that the USSR will not deliberately initiate general war or undertake courses of action gravely risking general war during the period under review.

91. On the other hand, the Soviet civilian and military leaders probably regard their own growing nuclear capabilities, added to their already great conventional strength, as enforcing caution on the Western powers. They are probably confident that their own nuclear capabilities have already reached the point where the US and its allies will also be deterred, except under extreme provocation, from deliberately initiating general war or from reacting militarily to any local crisis in a manner which would gravely risk broadening such a conflict into general war.

92. We believe that the highest priority objective of Soviet military policy during the period of this estimate will be to maintain, and to develop further, such formidable nuclear capabilities as to continue to deter the US from resorting to all-out nuclear conflict on any provocation save the most extreme threat to national survival and to support continuation of an aggressive foreign policy. But the Soviets must recognize that the possibilities of miscalculation in crisis situations are such that general war might nevertheless occur, and that preparedness for it is therefore essential. For this and other obvious reasons they aim eventually to achieve a clear military superiority over the US. Accordingly, the Soviet planners probably desire to achieve a nuclear attack capability sufficient, together with the USSR's air defenses, not only to deliver a devastating attack on the US, but also to neutralize a US nuclear attack on the USSR (i.e. to prevent unacceptable damage to the USSR).

93. Given foreseeable technological developments and maintenance of US armed strength, however, the Soviets may regard the capability to neutralize US nuclear attack capabilities as unattainable during the period of this estimate. On the other hand, they probably consider that although they cannot prevent, even with surprise attack, a crippling retaliatory blow, they can maintain such capabilities to damage the US as will deter the US from resorting to general war. To this end they must keep a strong long-range bomber striking capability, while they are working to acquire an additional nuclear delivery capability with advanced weapon systems, including long-range missiles. But the Soviet planners may nevertheless think the prospects for development of advanced weapons systems so promising that they can accept a temporary risk of maintaining their manned bomber force at something less than they would otherwise consider desirable.⁹

94. In our view a major corollary aim of Soviet military policy, to which the maintenance of a strong deterrent posture is an essential concomitant, is to provide the Soviets with military superiority in situations which they may estimate can be dealt with short of all-out nuclear war. To the extent that such superior capabilities can be developed and

⁹ As estimated elsewhere in this NIE, the USSR must recognize that the possibilities of miscalculation in crisis situations are such that general war might occur, and that preparedness for it is therefore essential. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, therefore believes that the Soviet leaders will not be likely to accept needlessly the risk of maintaining their long-range bomber capability at less than they otherwise would consider desirable, and he believes a conclusion should be added to the paragraph as follows: "However, we think it unlikely the Soviet leaders will take such a risk." [Footnote is in the original.]

maintained, they enhance Soviet ability to use the latent threat of military action as an instrument of political warfare.¹⁰

95. An additional objective of Soviet military policy, which has assumed increased importance since the Hungarian revolt and Polish crisis, is to ensure essential Soviet control over the European satellites. Whatever plans the USSR might have had to withdraw forces from the Satellites prior to these developments, we believe that they must now contemplate an indefinite retention of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

96. In assessing the size and types of forces essential to meet the above requirements the Soviets have apparently concluded that they must keep a large and diversified force structure designed to meet a wide variety of contingencies. While they will place further stress on maintaining strong strategic nuclear attack capabilities and air defenses, the evidence indicates that they also are continuing to modernize and strengthen their forces in other fields. In view of their growing appreciation of the devastation inherent in all-out nuclear conflict, they must regard the growth of nuclear capabilities on both sides as making each side increasingly reluctant to use such weapons, and logically would not wish to deprive themselves of other military capabilities. In our view their continued maintenance of strong ground, naval, and tactical air forces, indicates their belief that such forces, equipped with conventional and nuclear weapons, would be of great importance in both general war and limited conflicts.

97. Since an important technological break-through by either side could greatly affect the present balance of military power, the USSR will continue to devote the highest priority to weapons research and development. It will produce advanced weapon systems in operational quantities using such weapons to enlarge its existing military

¹⁰ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that paragraphs 92–94, unless balanced by other considerations, represent an overemphasis on one segment of Soviet strategic thinking which is not necessarily the most significant in the Soviet view.

In the Soviet view the objectives of any military action would have to include definite gains for the Soviet state. In view of the devastation which could result to both sides in an all-out nuclear exchange it is almost certain that they see no advantage to any one in initiating such an exchange. Rather, they probably judge that as the nuclear delivery capabilities of both sides increase, the range of issues over which either the Bloc or the West would launch all-out nuclear war decreases.

Consequently, since both sides are developing effective forces to deter all-out nuclear war, the Soviet leaders probably believe that their strong ground, naval, and tactical air forces would permit resort to local military action, with substantial prospects of success, in any area where the US and its allies could not rapidly react on a comparable scale or where the issues or circumstances were such that the US and its allies chose not to broaden the conflict. The real threat of Soviet military action therefore lies in the type of situation in which the Soviets estimate the West while opposing the Bloc would not risk the devastation of all-out nuclear war. [Footnote is in the original.]

capabilities. We think it will not make early major alterations in its present force structure, although such factors as the increasing cost and complexity of new weapons and equipment, the competing demands of highly important nonmilitary programs, and the rapid obsolescence of various types of military equipment will probably dictate some alterations in the present balance of Soviet forces over the next five years.

98. *Likelihood of Force Reductions.* The USSR has publicized two reductions in military personnel strength: the first, a 640,000 cut, was announced in August 1955 and completion was claimed by the end of that year; the second, a 1.2 million cut, was announced in May 1956, with completion promised by May 1957. In our last estimate in this series, we concluded that total Soviet military manpower had probably increased during the Korean War period and that the first of the two Soviet claims may have related to a post-Korean reduction in force levels. Further evidence and analysis supports the belief that substantial changes in numerical strength have in fact occurred. The pattern of conscript call-ups and terms of service over the past decade suggests that military manpower may have increased to a peak of around six million in the early 1950's, and has been reduced substantially during the past several years. Moreover, recent analysis of Soviet statistics reveals increases in civilian employment which point to the possibility of a sizable flow from the armed forces since 1953. Thus the USSR, in announcing force reductions, may have been taking propaganda credit for force reductions from peak Korean War levels which had been made in large part prior to the announcements.

99. Some reductions probably continued to take place after the May 1956 Soviet announcement, but evidence is lacking as to the extent of these cuts. The promised token withdrawals from East Germany were actually carried out with much publicity in the summer of 1956, and there were fragmentary indications of a selective weeding out of officers and men elsewhere in the Soviet forces. But in the fall of 1956 there were reports that demobilization had been halted; since then we have had no evidence of further cuts, and Soviet propaganda has failed to make the claims that we would have expected had the announced cuts been completed. Therefore, we do not believe that cuts of the size the USSR announced in May 1956 for completion by May 1957 were carried out during that period. The disturbances in East Europe in autumn 1956, and further uncertainties created by the Middle East situation, may have led to Soviet suspension of such demobilization plans.

100. In any event, with respect to current Soviet military personnel strength, there is substantial agreement between our estimates made on the basis of unit order of battle and those made by analyzing conscription trends and population and labor statistics. On the basis

of estimated order of battle, total Soviet active military personnel as of mid-1957 would be about 4,275,000, including about 2,650,000 in the ground forces, 825,000 in the air forces (including 110,000 Naval Aviation personnel), 725,000 in the navy, and about 75,000 personnel whose subordination is unknown.¹¹

101. Because of the shortage of manpower in the Soviet economy and for various other reasons noted elsewhere in this estimate (Section VI, paras. 213, 215), the Soviet leaders probably believe that some further reductions in the numerical strength of their armed forces would be desirable. The relatively great size of Soviet forces-in-being may persuade the Soviet leaders that some reductions can be made without undue prejudice to the security or other interests of the USSR. Whether Soviet forces are in fact reduced, however, will depend to a great extent on the degree of danger and tension that the Soviet leaders feel in the international situation. It is possible that they will conduct their policy in such a way as significantly to increase international tensions, and thus to require armed forces as large, or even larger, than they have at the present day. We think it more likely that there will be some further reduction in Soviet force strengths during the period of this estimate, but we do not believe that the reduction will be substantial.

102. *Soviet Military Policy Toward the Satellites.* The Soviet leaders regard the Satellite area in general as vital to the military posture of the USSR, both as an extension of the defense perimeter of the homeland and as a base for Bloc offensive power. Even prior to the Polish and Hungarian uprisings the USSR probably had some reservations concerning the reliability of Satellite military forces, but we believe the events of last fall have reinforced Soviet determination to maintain substantial Soviet forces in and near the Satellites for an indefinite period. However, additional token withdrawals from East Germany may occur, and there may be some reduction in present Soviet strength in Hungary as the local situation stabilizes.

103. The events of last autumn probably reemphasized to Soviet leaders the desirability of using the Warsaw Pact, an ostensibly voluntary mutual defense arrangement, as the basis for Soviet-Satellite military relations. Under this pact the USSR will continue its efforts to develop and maintain reliable and effective Satellite forces, but it will probably not permit any significant expansion of these forces.

¹¹ In addition, there are an estimated 400,000 personnel in Soviet security forces. For detailed personnel strength estimates of Soviet and other Bloc military forces in mid-1957, see Annex, Table 1. [Footnote is in the original.]

TRENDS IN SPECIALIZED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES

Nuclear Weapons¹²

104. The USSR is making a concerted effort to perfect a variety of improved nuclear weapons, particularly those employing thermonuclear principles. Of the 42 Soviet nuclear tests detected between August 1949 and 10 October 1957, a total of 23 have been detected since January 1956, [text not declassified]. We estimate that the Soviet weapons stockpile in 1957 could include a variety of nuclear weapons, with yields ranging from about 4 kilotons (KT) up into the megaton range.

105. In general, we anticipate that the USSR will be capable of producing improved nuclear weapons of the yields and characteristics needed to support its military requirements. By 1958–59, the most powerful Soviet bombs could probably yield up to 20 MT, but the maximum yields of missile warheads will continue to be considerably less than this. In addition to the mononuclear [mononuclear] weapons, a wide variety of fission weapons, including very small, low-yield weapons, will become available. We believe that development of advanced weapons will require additional testing. The absence of such tests, however, would not preclude Soviet stockpiling of very high yield (above 8 MT) weapons on an emergency or provisional basis.

106. Although we estimate a substantial Soviet program for the expansion of fissionable material production, the availability of such materials will continue throughout the period of this estimate to be a limiting factor in determining the size of many military and nonmilitary programs. Our estimate of the cumulative quantities of nuclear materials available for weapon uses is given below. The amounts have been calculated by deducting from estimated production those quantities of nuclear materials estimated to meet pre-1957 nuclear test expenditures, and to meet the inventory and fuel requirements of research and power reactors. No deductions have been made for production reactor expenditures, future nuclear tests, propulsion applications, or materials tied up in weapons manufacturing pipelines. If a major nuclear propulsion program were undertaken, this would require substantial allocations of nuclear material.¹³

¹² For detailed estimates of Soviet capabilities in nuclear weapons design and dates of availability, see NIE 11–2–57, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, 7 May 1957 (Limited Distribution). [Footnote is in the original.]

¹³ The Director of Naval Intelligence does not concur in the quantities of fissionable materials listed herein as available for weapons uses, nor in the estimated production of fissionable materials upon which these figures are based. He believes that the quantities of material which will be available for weapons use will not exceed the lower limit of uncertainty indicated for the estimate. [Footnote is in the original.]

	<i>mid-1957</i>	<i>mid-1960</i>	<i>mid-1962</i>
Uranium-235	17,500 Kg.	56,000 Kg.	101,000 Kg.
Plutonium Equivalent ¹⁴	5,500 Kg.	12,400 Kg.	18,300 Kg.

The uncertainty in our estimate of cumulative U-235 availability through mid-1957 is large but probably does not exceed one-half to twice the value shown. The uncertainty in our estimate of cumulative availability of Plutonium equivalent through mid-1957 probably does not exceed plus or minus 50 percent of the value shown. These uncertainties increase rapidly as the estimate is extended into the future, and no meaningful numerical range of uncertainty can be given beyond mid-1957.

107. While there is considerable evidence to indicate the types of weapons the USSR is probably stockpiling and the delivery systems it contemplates, there is no direct evidence to support a quantitative estimate of the Soviet weapons stockpile by type.

*Guided Missiles*¹⁵

108. The USSR is capable of developing and producing during the period of this estimate advanced types of guided missile systems in all categories, and its research and development program in the guided missile field will continue to enjoy a very high priority. The USSR is also capable of developing various sizes of nuclear, high explosive (HE), and chemical (CW) warheads for its guided missiles, although the availability of fissionable materials will limit the extent of nuclear warhead production during the period of this estimate.

109. *Surface-to-Air Missiles*: An extensive system of surface-to-air guided missile installations is now operational in the Moscow area, and similar installations appear to be under construction at Leningrad. The Moscow system, which could include a limited number of nuclear warheads, can probably direct a very high rate of fire against multiple targets at altitudes up to about 60,000 feet, although it is probably vulnerable to very low altitude attack. During 1958–61, surface-to-air systems with increased range and altitude capabilities for static defense of target complexes, and with low and high altitude capabilities for defense of static targets, field forces, and naval vessels, could probably become operational. The maximum altitude capabilities of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems will probably keep pace with those of operational Western

¹⁴ The term "Plutonium equivalent" is used because our method of estimation does not permit us to distinguish between Plutonium, Uranium-233, tritium, or any other reactor-produced isotopes. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁵ For a more extended discussion of Soviet guided missiles, see NIE 11–5–57, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, 12 March 1957; see also appropriate sections of NIE 11–57, Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through mid-1962, 16 July 1957. [Footnote is in the original.]

bombers and cruise-type missiles. On the other hand, we believe the USSR will not be able to place in operation a weapon system capable of successfully intercepting ballistic missiles by mid-1962.

110. *Surface-to-Surface Missiles*: The probable Soviet firing of two ICBM test vehicles in the summer of 1957 and the successful Soviet launching of earth satellites attest both to the high capabilities of the USSR in long-range ballistic missile development and to the extremely high priority this program enjoys. In the light of this and other new evidence, we have re-examined our previous estimate of Soviet ICBM development, and have tentatively advanced from 1960–61 to 1959 the probable date when a few (say, ten) prototype missiles of 5,500 nautical miles (n.m.) range could first be available for operational use. This estimate is predicated upon: (a) a top priority flight test program over a period of about two years from the first firing of a test missile this summer; (b) a maximum range of 5,500 n.m. and a CEP of about 5 n.m.; and (c) the equipping of the first operational unit with prototype rather than series-produced ICBMs. Early success of any phase of the test program, or relaxed accuracy and reliability requirements, could advance the date of availability.¹⁶

111. We have likewise re-evaluated the Soviet program for development of an IRBM. Recent evidence indicates that the USSR has probably elected to develop a 1,000 n.m. ballistic missile which is essentially a modified 700 n.m. missile with a lighter warhead. With such a program, the USSR could take advantage of existing development, production, and operational capabilities and could probably achieve a first operational capability with a 1,000 n.m. missile in 1958. Most of the present targets on the Eurasian periphery which we believe the USSR would wish to attack would be within range of this missile fired from within the Bloc. While firm evidence indicated an early Soviet interest in IRBMs with ranges up to 1,600 n.m., there are no current indications of development of ballistic missiles of ranges beyond about 1,000 n.m., save for the ICBM.

112. As previously estimated on the basis of considerable evidence, the USSR has developed and could now have available for operational employment at least four shorter-range ballistic missiles, with maximum ranges of about 75 n.m., 175–200 n.m., 350 n.m., and 700 n.m. We believe the Soviet surface-to-surface program also includes submarine-launched missiles. We estimate that for this purpose the USSR could now have supersonic cruise-type missiles capable of maximum ranges of about 500 n.m., and that in 1962 a supersonic cruise-type missile of up to 1,000 n.m. range could probably become available. To an extent

¹⁶ The estimate made in this paragraph must be considered tentative, pending completion of SNIE 11–10–57: The Soviet ICBM Program, now in process. [Footnote is in the original.]

varying with the missile guidance system employed, their accuracy would depend on the ability of the launching or guidance submarine to fix its own position.

113. *Other Missile Categories*: For improving the effectiveness of its interceptors, the USSR could now have available short-range air-to-air missiles equipped with HE warheads, probably including one suitable for all-weather engagement at ranges up to 5 n.m. Soviet air-to-air capabilities will probably improve, and some large-caliber air-to-air rockets or guided missiles could be equipped with nuclear warheads during 1958–62. In the air-to-surface category, subsonic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads up to about 55 n.m. could probably now be available, primarily for use as anti-ship weapons, but also suitable for use against isolated and well-defined radar targets on land. In 1961, a 100 n.m. supersonic air-to-surface missile could probably be available for employment by heavy bombers. It will probably also be within Soviet capabilities to develop specialized decoys and anti-radar missiles to aid in penetrating enemy defenses.

114. *Earth Satellite*. In addition to their obvious psychological purpose, the artificial earth satellites launched by the USSR are intended to acquire data of scientific and military value. While it is too soon to say how much data is being acquired, the satellites launched to date are known to be providing new information on ionospheric effects and refractions at certain radio frequencies, and probably also on the effects of weightless flight and outer space radiation on equipment and living organisms. They are also providing data on pressure, temperature, and meteoric densities at extreme altitudes. Future Soviet earth satellites, which may be launched at any time, will provide additional scientific data contributing to both military and non-military Soviet projects. A reconnaissance satellite, previously estimated for 1963–65, may be available considerably earlier. Space vehicles and space platforms are almost certainly included in Soviet planning.

115. *Chemical and Biological Warfare*. Current Soviet military doctrine recognizes the potentialities of CW and BW as adjuncts to nuclear and other weapons, and Soviet forces are thoroughly trained in the offensive use of CW. A stockpile of CW agents is believed to have been maintained at least at World War II levels, and may have been increased. It probably consists primarily of such nerve gases as GA (Tabun) and GB (Sarin), as well as some standard agents such as mustard. One of the "V" series of nerve agents, far more persistent and toxic than the "G" series, may have been in production in the USSR since 1956; effective use would depend on Soviet solution of the problem of generating a proper aerosol for its dispersal.

116. Accumulated evidence also indicates an active Soviet BW research and development program encompassing anti-personnel, anti-livestock, and possibly anti-crop agents. Although relatively little is known about the scope of the program, particularly its offensive aspects, the USSR has probably had a capability for small-scale, clandestine BW operations for at least several years. We have no evidence of large-scale production of BW agents and munitions, but the USSR has the facilities, personnel, and materials needed for such production.

117. In the field of defense against BW and CW, Soviet capabilities are at least comparable to those of the major Western nations, and in the case of CW may be superior. Soviet troops are well-equipped with CW defense items, and the current issue gas mask appears to afford adequate protection against inhalation of known agents. Extensive programs are under way to indoctrinate both military personnel and civilians in defensive techniques.

118. *Electromagnetic Warfare.* Soviet offensive and defensive programs in this field are likely to be pressed forward during 1958–62. We believe that at present the USSR is capable of jamming and seriously disrupting Western long-range radio communications, and that it also has an appreciable capability for jamming Western bombing and navigational radars. Its jamming capabilities now extend up to frequencies of at least 10,000 mc/s; by 1960 some Soviet jamming equipment could operate at frequencies of 30,000 mc/s or higher. The USSR could also develop devices to enable missiles to home on electronic emissions. Soviet forces are now training in the use of CHAFF, research is under way on anti-radar coating materials, and we believe the USSR is developing active airborne jamming equipment. Conversely, known types of Soviet radio and radar equipment are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, particularly Soviet blind-bombing and air defense radars, all of which operate in a few narrow frequency bands. The USSR is capable of increasing its spread of frequencies and of developing anti-jamming devices, but through 1962 Soviet defensive electronic systems will probably still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.

TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS

Soviet Ground Forces

119. There has been an extensive program over the past several years to reorganize and modernize the Soviet ground forces to meet the requirements of modern warfare, both nuclear and non-nuclear. More advanced designs of practically all types of equipment in Soviet line divisions have appeared. The fire power of individual units has been increased markedly, additional vehicles (including amphibious

vehicles) have been provided, and communications equipment has been augmented. Our evidence on these developments relates primarily to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, but we believe they are proceeding throughout the Soviet field forces.

120. All these changes are in line with revised Soviet tactical doctrine, which emphasizes the need to supplement standard ground force tactics and training with those designed to meet the conditions of nuclear warfare. This doctrine stresses firepower, mobility and maneuverability, greater initiative, deeper objectives, intensified reconnaissance, and the protection of individuals and units against the effects of atomic and chemical weapons. It also envisages the use of tactical nuclear weapons and guided missiles in support of Soviet field force operations. Thus far, however, both the revised tactical doctrine and the reorganization of ground force elements reflect evolutionary changes without basic alteration in the field force structure.

121. The order of battle of Soviet Army ground forces is still estimated at about 175 line divisions plus supporting units.¹⁷ Present evidence suggests that the actual strengths of comparable units vary widely according to their locations. First category units, with the best equipment and highest manning levels, are believed to be those near the borders of the USSR, with second category units in occupied areas abroad and lowest category units in the interior of the USSR. The average is probably about 70 percent of authorized wartime strength; in border areas actual strength probably exceeds 70 percent, in East Germany and other occupied areas it is 70 percent or slightly less, and in remote interior districts it may be as low as 30 percent. All units probably have a high proportion of authorized officer strength, however, and full equipment is believed to be kept locally available. These peacetime manning practices, together with standard conscription and stockpiling programs, would probably enable all Soviet line divisions to be brought to full strength by M+10 and permit the activation of about 125 additional line divisions by M+30.

122. During 1958–62 further improvements in the firepower and mobility of Soviet ground forces are likely, and there may be further gradual alterations in organization to permit greater dispersion and flexibility of control. Nuclear weapons and guided missiles—with both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads—will probably become available in significant quantities during the period. The USSR will probably employ those weapons for relatively long-range support of tactical operations, however, and conventional field artillery and unguided rockets will continue to provide the major direct fire support for units in close combat. Anti-aircraft artillery, on the other hand, will tend to

¹⁷ For detailed estimates of the strength of Soviet and other Bloc ground forces in line divisions as of mid-1957, see Annex, Table 2. [Footnote is in the original.]

be replaced by guided missiles, first in static defenses within the USSR and later in mobile field force units.

123. *Airborne Forces.* Increasing attention is now being paid to the development of Soviet airborne and air transportable forces, as indicated by: the rapid augmentation of transport capabilities, especially in assault-type helicopters and converted BULL medium bombers; the appearance in 1956 of the CAMP, a twin-turboprop assault transport; the development of a new light-weight self-propelled anti-tank gun for airborne use; and further improvements in personnel and cargo parachutes. The USSR has sizable airborne forces in being, estimated at 10 divisions and a total strength of about 100,000 men. Soviet Aviation of Airborne Troops now comprises approximately 500 twin-engine transports, 180 BULL transports, 140 large helicopters, and 220 large gliders. This strength could be augmented substantially by other military and civil transports.

124. Soviet airlift capabilities will increase considerably during 1958–62, primarily as additional helicopters and transports are introduced. The largest operational Soviet helicopter can now carry 8,800 lbs. (40 men with combat equipment), and by 1961 the USSR could probably have in operation helicopters with payloads up to 30,000 lbs. The BULL will probably be employed as an interim medium transport until late in the period, when it will probably have been completely replaced by the CAMP and possibly other advanced types. Better auxiliary transport will also become available as improved aircraft are introduced into the civil air fleet. New turboprop medium and heavy transports will probably become operational in 1958, and a new four-turbojet transport in 1959.¹⁸

Soviet Air Forces

125. We estimate the over-all actual strength of Soviet military air units in mid-1957 at about 18,000 aircraft.¹⁹ Further modernization of all components of the Soviet air forces will occur during 1958–62, and will include increases in the proportion of jet all-weather fighters, in the numbers of jet medium and heavy bombers, and the emergence of a substantial inflight refueling capability. The present combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is, on the whole, below that of the US. However, the introduction of new aircraft types and the relatively low turnover of personnel will almost certainly raise combat proficiency to a high level by 1962. In the long run, guided missiles will replace manned aircraft within many of the missions performed by the latter, but we doubt that this process will go so far during the period of this estimate as to lead to a major reduction in the numbers of Soviet military aircraft.

¹⁸ For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet transport aircraft, see Annex, Table 8. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁹ For detailed estimates of the strength of Soviet and other Bloc air forces during the period of this estimate, see Annex, Tables 3–5. [Footnote is in the original.]

126. Soviet air capabilities will be augmented by improvements in a wide variety of ground and airborne supporting equipment, especially in the electronics field. There will almost certainly be advances in the performance characteristics of early warning, ground-controlled intercept and airborne intercept radars. The accuracy of navigational and bombing radars will probably be improved. There will probably be significant increases in the quantity and quality of ECM equipment and of ground and airborne communications equipment, including modern high-speed data-handling equipment for air defense. Continued expansion of the network of modern, well-equipped air facilities is also likely.²⁰

127. We estimate the mid-1957 actual strength of Soviet fighter units at approximately 10,000 jet fighters, of which over 3,700 are in Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense with air defense as their sole mission, while the remainder are in tactical and naval units with air defense as one of their missions. At present about 1,300 of these aircraft have at least limited all-weather capabilities; by 1962 all-weather fighters may comprise about 60 percent of total Soviet fighter strength. Future numerical strength will probably not be increased and, primarily because of the influence of guided missile systems, a cutback in the number of Soviet manned interceptors will probably begin late in the period. Other factors which might contribute to a Soviet decision to decrease its numerical strength in manned interceptors include probable increases in the destructive power of individual interceptors, and increased demands on industrial capacity resulting from the advent of more complex fighters.

128. Although the subsonic FRESCO day fighter is now the principal equipment of Soviet fighter forces, the supersonic FARMER day fighter and the all-weather FLASHLIGHT are rapidly being phased into operational units. We estimate that during 1958–62, the USSR will probably introduce new day and all-weather fighter types with considerably improved altitude and speed characteristics though at the expense of combat radius; the 1962 Soviet all-weather fighter will probably be capable of operating at altitudes up to 67,000 feet, and of climbing to 40,000 feet in less than two minutes.²¹

129. Tactical Aviation includes approximately 4,600 jet fighter aircraft and 2,400 jet light bombers. The latter are primarily the obsolescent BEAGLE, with combat radius of approximately 750 n.m. In 1958,

²⁰ For further information, see appropriate sections of SNIE 11–6–57, Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in mid-1960, 15 January 1957 (Limited Distribution), and NIE 11–57, Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through mid-1962, 16 July 1957. [Footnote is in the original.]

²¹ For estimated performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of Soviet fighters, see NIE 11–57, Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through mid-1962, 16 July 1957, Annex B, Tables 1 and 2. However, we now believe it unlikely that the FLASHLIGHT “C,” which is included in these tables, will be placed in operational service. [Footnote is in the original.]

improved jet light bombers will probably be introduced into service, including the USSR's first bombers with supersonic "dash" capabilities.²² Ground attack regiments, formerly equipped with piston aircraft, have been re-equipped with jet fighters, and there is continuing evidence of the employment of jet fighter regiments of Tactical Aviation for both ground support and air defense missions.

130. *Long Range Aviation*. The capabilities of Soviet Long Range Aviation have continued to increase during the past year. Its estimated strength in bomber aircraft has grown from about 1,300 to some 1,500. The number of bomber regiments has also increased, although at a somewhat slower rate than during the preceding year. The trend in training activities during the year is believed to have been toward larger-scale operations and longer-range flights out of home base areas, including flights to potential forward staging bases. Inflight refueling has been under development for both the BISON jet heavy bomber and the BADGER jet medium bomber, apparently using convertible tanker-bomber versions of these aircraft, and is at least in limited use by BISONs assigned to operational units. Finally, there is evidence that the USSR has established nuclear weapons storage facilities in the vicinity of Long Range Aviation bases.

131. Recent evidence indicates that Soviet production of BADGERs, and the number in operational units, are considerably in excess of our previous expectations. We now estimate that there were about 850 BADGERs in Long Range Aviation units as of mid-1957, and on the basis of current evidence we believe BADGER strength will continue to increase during the next year or two. At the same time, the USSR apparently continues to employ the BULL piston medium bomber for training, reconnaissance, bombing, and other purposes, and it is being phased out of Long Range Aviation at a slower rate than formerly estimated. We do not now expect BULLs to be entirely phased out until about 1960. Thereafter, there will probably be some decline in jet medium bomber strength in Long Range Aviation as a result of the increased availability of heavy bombers, the assignment of more medium bombers to naval and probably to tactical aviation, and the advent of significantly advanced delivery systems, including longer range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface guided missiles. The BADGER will remain the primary medium bomber through 1962, although by mid-1961 a new medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capabilities may be introduced.²³

²² For estimated performance and dates of operational availability of Soviet light bombers, see Annex, Table 7. [Footnote is in the original.]

²³ For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet long-range bombers, together with estimated dates of operational availability, see Annex, Table 6. [Footnote is in the original.]

132. In mid-1956, the USSR apparently settled on an improved production model of the BISON jet heavy bomber, with a new bombing-navigation system as well as provision for inflight refueling. Considering the somewhat better performance characteristics of the BISON, its greater development potential, and the development of an inflight refueling capability, the USSR may have decided to place greater emphasis on the BISON than on the BEAR. We therefore believe that the BISON will probably comprise the greater proportion of Soviet strength in heavy bombers in the later years of this period. A BISON with additional improvement in performance could probably be operational in 1959.

133. No positive evidence of Soviet research specifically directed toward nuclear propelled aircraft has been obtained. However, we estimate that:

a. The Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion program is probably now engaged in development and testing of reactor components and sub systems.

b. A reactor system suitable for nuclear propulsion of subsonic aircraft could probably be available to the Soviets in 1962. It is possible that the USSR could for propaganda purposes fly an experimental aircraft powered in part by nuclear power at an earlier date.

134. To employ its long-range bomber force most advantageously, especially for intercontinental operations, the USSR would require a substantial inflight refueling capability. Refueling is particularly desirable for jet heavy bombers; for example, one refueling by a compatible tanker could approximately double the area of the continental US that could be reached by the BISON on a two-way mission from bases in the Chukotski area. BADGER coverage of US targets on one-way missions could also be increased by refueling. Refueling for the BEAR, while less essential than for the jet bombers, could increase its coverage of US targets from interior bases in the USSR. The USSR could employ turbo-prop heavy bombers in the tanker role. Aircraft configured specifically as tankers might also appear as the period advances. But on the basis of present evidence, we believe most of the tankers in Soviet Long Range Aviation during the period are likely to be convertible jet tanker-bombers, and that the bulk of these will probably be in the heavy category. The use of convertible tanker-bombers would permit greater flexibility in the employment of Long Range Aviation.

135. While evidence is inadequate to establish precisely the total size of the Soviet heavy bomber force, we have unusually good evidence on the one plant known to be producing BISON jet heavy bombers, which indicates a cumulative BISON production of 65 by mid-1957. Evidence on BEAR turboprop heavy bomber production is

less extensive but indicates about 50 produced. On this basis, about 50 BISONs and 40 BEARs would have been available for operational units as of 1 July. If this is in fact the case, both BISON and BEAR production have fallen short of our estimate of last year.

136. Beyond this point of good evidence, however, there is an area of considerable uncertainty, particularly with regard to the BISON program. There is some evidence suggesting that as many as 90 BISONs may have been in operational units as of mid-1957. This would mean that the rate of BISON production has increased considerably since late 1956, and that an additional unknown aircraft plant has entered the BISON program, although we have almost no evidence to support this. It is similarly possible that BEAR production could have increased to an extent sufficient to provide about 60 in operational units, though we also lack good evidence. Indeed, there is evidence that additional plants estimated to be capable of producing heavy bombers are either continuing in the BADGER program or are preparing to produce transport or tanker aircraft.

137. If recent heavy bomber production has in fact been as low as the preponderance of evidence indicates, a partial explanation may lie in the field of technical problems. For example, it is possible that larger-scale production has been delayed pending the availability of higher-thrust engines or other developments expected to improve performance characteristics. But we would believe it more likely that Soviet planners have deliberately decided on a relatively modest heavy bomber program. In our view, such a Soviet decision would probably have been based on such judgments as the unlikelihood of general war during the next few years, the great expense of a large-scale heavy bomber program, the existence of a reliable jet medium bomber force with one-way intercontinental capabilities for interim use in emergency, and the expectation that new and improved intercontinental delivery systems will become available in a few years. On the other hand, if heavy bomber production has reached the higher levels mentioned in paragraph 136, it would indicate greater Soviet emphasis on the heavy bomber weapon system for intercontinental attack.

138. We have noted statements of Khrushchev stressing his view of the declining importance of manned fighter and bomber aircraft as contrasted with guided missiles. If these views had been contained solely in statements beamed to the outside world they could be dismissed as mere propaganda. It is hard, however, to interpret their inclusion in the Soviet press, with the resulting advertisement to the Russian people, unless they were intended to prepare the Russian people for some de-emphasis on the heavy bomber, or to cover up delays in production

which might have been occasioned by difficulties experienced with the heavy bomber production. We cannot disregard, however, the possible conclusion that such statements are a deliberate effort to discredit and degrade the effectiveness of US retaliatory forces in the eyes of the Soviet people as well as the Western powers, and to exploit to the fullest extent the psychological advantage gained by recent Soviet missile/satellite advances.

139. In any event, we believe that the USSR will retain a strong long-range bomber force, including both medium and heavy bombers, at least until it has acquired a substantial nuclear delivery capability with more advanced weapon systems. However, it is difficult to predict with assurance how large the USSR will desire this force to be, particularly in heavy bombers. The estimate of heavy bomber and tanker production, particularly for the period 1959–62, presents unusual difficulties. Future Soviet policy in these respects is still shrouded in doubt. In view of this uncertainty we have expressed below our estimates of Soviet long-range bomber/tanker strength in terms of ranges.

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION
(Estimated Strength in Operational Units)^{1 2 3}

See qualifications in paragraphs 135–139

	<u>Mid-1957</u>	<u>Mid-1958</u>	<u>Mid-1959</u>	<u>Mid-1960</u>	<u>Mid-1961</u>	<u>Mid-1962</u>
HEAVY BOMB- ERS AND TANKERS	90–150	150–250	250–450	400–600	400–600	400–600
MEDIUM BOMB- ERS AND TANKERS						
Jet	850	1000–1050	1000–1100	1000–1100	950–1100	900–1000
Piston	550	350	150	—	—	—
TOTALS	1500–1550	1500–1650	1400–1700	1400–1700	1350–1700	1300–1600

¹ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the USSR would regard it as essential to have a more substantial intercontinental attack capability, providing for greater strategic flexibility and a much larger capability for re-attack—in short, a force which would provide the Soviets a greater chance of success in general war—while they are working to acquire an additional nuclear delivery capability with new weapon systems, including long-range missiles. He therefore believes that the strengths estimated above would all be bomber aircraft and that additional aircraft will be in operational units as tankers as follows:

	<i>Mid-1957</i>	<i>Mid-1958</i>	<i>Mid-1959</i>	<i>Mid-1960</i>	<i>Mid-1961</i>	<i>Mid-1962</i>
TANKERS	0	50–100	150–200	300–350	300–500	300–500

² The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believe that the above projected future strength of the heavy bombers is contrary to the available evidence and foreseeable trends. Past estimates predicted an extensive production program of heavy bombers. This program has failed to develop as had been anticipated. Despite this the present estimate still implies an extensive program even though reduced below previous estimates. Even the lower figures of the table would require an increase of heavy bomber production which is not yet evident nor indicated by trends. In regard to total numerical strength, the upper range of figures implies a continued build-up of total strength which is in seeming contradiction to the indicated trends and to the judgment expressed in paragraph 135. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believe that the composition of the Soviet Long-Range Aviation will change with the introduction of higher performance bombers and possibly tanker aircraft. However, they believe that the total numerical strength will show no further increase but on the contrary will probably decrease, as indicated by the lower range of figures.

³ The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that while the Soviets will certainly maintain a substantial heavy bomber force during the period of build-up of new intercontinental delivery systems, the heavy bombers/tankers available in operational units through mid-1958 will almost certainly approximate the lower range estimated in the above table. [All footnote in the table are in the original.]

Soviet Naval Forces

140. During the postwar years Soviet naval forces have been greatly strengthened by an intensive building program, concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine force is by far the largest in the world; over half its present strength consists of long-range craft, of which a significant and increasing proportion are of postwar design and construction. We estimate main Soviet naval strength in mid-1957 at 28 cruisers, 158 destroyers, 82 escort vessels, and about 475 submarines. These totals include vessels of postwar design numbering 15 light cruisers, 92 fleet destroyers, 82 escort vessels, about 250 long-range submarines (“Z” and “W” classes) and about 40 medium-range submarines (“Q” class).²⁴

141. Several important developments are likely in Soviet naval forces during 1958–62 as a result of changing weapon systems and new concepts of naval warfare. These will probably include the application of nuclear propulsion to naval vessels and use of both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Although we have no firm evidence that the

²⁴ Detailed estimates of Soviet naval strength by major type and fleet area are given in Annex, Table 9. [Footnote is in the original.]

USSR has a nuclear-powered submarine, we believe that a program for its development has reached an advanced stage and we estimate that a reactor could be available for installation in 1957. Development of nuclear power plants for cruisers may follow the operational testing of a nuclear-powered icebreaker, which will probably occur in late 1958 or early 1959. We believe the USSR is presently capable of adapting nuclear warheads to torpedoes and depth charges.

142. Although the evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet guided missile submarines is not conclusive, we believe that the USSR will construct or convert submarines for surface-to-surface guided missile launching. Converted boats with topside missile stowage could already be in operation. Twenty submarines with topside missile stowage could be converted by the end of 1958, and by mid-1962 the USSR may have a total of about 30 guided missile submarines built on basically new designs, including boats with nuclear or other improved propulsion systems. Air defense missile systems for surface vessels, also capable of modification for shore bombardment purposes, could probably begin to be available in 1958; the unfinished hulls of six cruisers, which have been in Soviet shipyards since the cessation of the cruiser construction program several years ago, may be completed with guided missile armament.

143. The operating efficiency of Soviet naval forces, while still below that of the US Navy in some fields, is quite high and will continue to improve. The submarine force is undergoing intensified training, particularly in long-range operations. The principal weaknesses of the USSR as a naval power will continue to derive from the wide separation of its sea frontiers and its inability to control the sea routes between these areas, although improvements in inland waterways will increase its ability to interchange smaller vessels including submarines. The lack of adequate supply lines to its Northern and Far Eastern fleet areas and the land-locked position of its fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas are additional handicaps.

144. *Submarine Construction.* The Soviets will probably continue to place primary emphasis on submarines in their naval construction program. Since 1950 the Soviets have built about 300 submarines of postwar design. It is estimated that about 50 boats, "W" and "Q" class, will be built during 1957. We estimate that the total number of Soviet submarines of all types at the end of 1957 will be about 500. Throughout the period of the estimate we believe that the production of medium-range submarines will continue at about the present rate of 20 per year. The most recent evidence indicates that the program for production of "W" class conventional propulsion long-range submarines has been curtailed and may possibly be terminated this year. The

Soviets will retain their capability for submarine production however, and we believe that after an interim period for changeover and development of prototypes, series construction of new long-range types will be resumed. This procedure would be parallel to that followed in the period 1949–51 in the changeover to the “W,” “Z,” and “Q” classes.

144a. We estimate that the USSR could now have a prototype nuclear-powered submarine, and that they may develop other improvements in propulsion design during the period. The Soviets also could produce a new type of submarine specifically designed for guided missile firing. Although they have adequate fissionable material and the over-all technological potential to produce larger numbers of the new types, we believe that their program will be of the magnitude indicated unless they adopt less sophisticated designs for reasons of urgency. Subject to successful development of prototypes, we believe the Soviets could build, within the period, about 70 submarines with advanced weapon systems and improved propulsion, about 20 of which probably would be nuclear powered. Considering such factors as the decommissioning of obsolete boats and the development of new propulsion and weapon systems, we estimate that the total force will approximate 560 submarines by mid-1962.

145. *Naval Aviation.* Soviet Naval Aviation, comprising nearly 20 percent of total Soviet air strength, is now the second largest naval air force in the world. It is engaged in a concentrated training program which stresses coordinated action between its land-based aircraft and naval vessels (both surface and submarines), offensive action against enemy naval forces, and air defense. During this period, its strength will probably be increased and its modernization will continue. There is no evidence of intention to build aircraft carriers. Improved light bombers and all-weather fighters will probably be introduced. Long-range maritime reconnaissance and attack capabilities should be improved materially by increases in the number of jet and piston medium bombers allocated to Naval Aviation, and by the probable availability of air-to-surface guided missiles for attack against ships.

TRENDS IN SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES

146. For reasons which have been set forth elsewhere in this estimate we believe that the Soviet leaders wish to avoid an all-out nuclear exchange with the US. We have also pointed out that they almost certainly consider that any general war with the US would involve such an exchange. Consequently, we think that a key element of Soviet strategy in any war, whether with the US or with another nation, would be to attempt to keep the conflict limited in geographic scope. The Soviets would probably also prefer that nuclear weapons not be used, at least

in a war commencing during the next year or two, since they probably think that their relative capabilities would be greater if the local war were fought with conventional weapons only. However, they probably consider that such a limitation would be impossible in many circumstances.

147. The number and variety of conceivable local wars is so great as to preclude any attempt to consider in this estimate the manner in which the Soviets might conduct them. We therefore confine ourselves to one aspect only of Soviet military strategy—that for the initial phase of general war. Even though the Soviets almost certainly desire to avoid such a war, and probably believe that their increasing nuclear capabilities powerfully deter the US from initiating it, they cannot ignore the possibility that general war may occur, and their planners must prepare for it.

Soviet Strategy for the Initial Phase of General War

148. General war might grow out of local war, or directly out of a situation of intense international crisis, or it might (though we think this highly unlikely) be initiated in a period of comparative international calm. We believe that the Soviets recognize the advantages that would accrue to the side that struck the first blow in any all-out nuclear exchange. Therefore we believe that, whenever the Soviet leaders decided that the likelihood of general war had reached a certain point, they would themselves initiate it by strategic nuclear attacks.²⁵ The primary objective of such attacks would be to destroy or neutralize Western nuclear retaliatory capabilities, both in the continental US and overseas. Consistent with this assignment of first priority, the USSR

²⁵ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the USSR would avoid initiation of nuclear attacks and would seek to achieve its objectives by limited or local war if military action became necessary. The Soviet leaders would attempt to secure a limitation on the use of nuclear weapons prior to hostilities or to conduct hostilities under conditions which would limit or preclude the use of nuclear weapons.

It has been estimated in paras. 90 and 91 that the Soviets would not be confident that they would not receive unacceptable damage in an all-out nuclear exchange and that they would not deliberately initiate general war or undertake courses of action gravely risking general war. Moreover they are probably confident that the US would be similarly deterred except under extreme provocation.

Consistent with these judgments, the Soviet leaders, before making a decision to initiate nuclear attacks, would have to judge that their own deterrent capabilities were no longer effective and that their gains from an all-out nuclear attack would outweigh their losses. Paramount in such calculations would be survival of the state without which any gain would be meaningless.

It follows that the Soviet leaders would launch a nuclear attack against the US only if it offered the only hope of survival. Such a situation would occur only if the Soviet leaders came to believe that the US was irrevocably committed to launching an all-out nuclear attack against the USSR. [Footnote is in the original.]

would probably also seek to destroy other key US war-making capabilities. At the same time, the USSR would make a maximum air defense effort against those Western nuclear striking forces which had escaped the initial Soviet attacks.

149. During any local war or intense international crisis it is virtually certain that the USSR (as well as the US) would prepare against the possibility of a greatly broadened conflict. These preparations would almost certainly include some redeployment of forces, mobilization of additional strength, civil defense precautions, and the like. However, the USSR would not want to push preparations so far as to convince the US that general war was imminent, lest this lead the US to strike the first all-out nuclear blow. This factor would constitute a limitation on the degree of Soviet preparation.

150. Another major limitation on Soviet preparations for general war would lie in the importance of achieving surprise. The necessity of attempting to neutralize Western nuclear retaliatory capabilities would make surprise in the initial nuclear attack a key element of Soviet strategy. While the USSR could not count upon achieving surprise against all Western nuclear capabilities, both within the US and elsewhere, it would almost certainly attempt to do so to the fullest extent possible. Thus, if the Soviets decided to begin the general war themselves, they would try to avoid compromising the element of surprise in their initial nuclear attack by observable preparations.

151. The foregoing considerations lead us to believe that the outbreak of general war would find the Soviets at a stage of military readiness beyond that of ordinary peace-time, but short of what their planners might believe best for the most rapid exertion of the total military effort. The actual state of readiness would depend on the development of the particular situation and on the Soviet calculation of the risks involved, and is impossible to predict in advance.

152. The Soviet leaders would probably launch an attack by ground and tactical air forces against Western Europe in order to prevent NATO mobilization, deployment, and counter-attack. We believe that the USSR would plan to commit its ready forces to an offensive, especially in Western Germany, as soon as possible consistent with maintaining surprise for the initial assault against the US, US and allied nuclear bases overseas, and carrier task forces. Under favorable circumstances from the Soviet point of view, advances against NATO could be initiated concurrently, i.e., at the moment the West obtained warning of the Soviet strategic attack. The Soviets would probably also regard an attack to seize the Turkish Straits as of early high priority, but we believe that they would probably delay initiation of other major

campaigns in the Middle and Far East until they could assess the results of the initial nuclear exchange.²⁶

153. In the naval field, Soviet objectives would be: to prevent NATO carrier strikes and submarine-launched missile attacks on Bloc targets as part of the highest priority effort to neutralize US nuclear capabilities; subsequently, to interdict US reinforcement of overseas areas and to isolate the European theater.

Strategic Attack Capabilities

154. Soviet capabilities for strategic air attack will improve during the period of the estimate, as the Soviet stockpile of nuclear bombs and the number of high-performance long-range bombers grow. Present Soviet capabilities for attack on the continental US are restricted by the relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers, the status of support facilities at Arctic bases, and the lack as yet of a substantial inflight refueling capability. We estimate, however, that during the period of this estimate, the capacity of Soviet forward base areas could be increased sufficiently to permit the staging of the entire estimated long-range bomber and tanker force. Moreover, the USSR will be capable of launching increasing numbers of heavy bombers from interior bases on two-way missions against the US.

155. Soviet planners would attempt to distribute their initial attacks in such a way as to achieve the optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas where US and Allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities were deployed. Nearly all available Soviet heavy bombers and many medium bombers would almost certainly be used against the continental US in an attempt to destroy or neutralize US retaliatory capabilities and other key elements of US war-making capabilities. Light bombers could be employed in initial attacks against overseas targets within their range.

²⁶ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that any Soviet delay in initiating operations in the Middle and Far East would be minimal, and, if it occurred, would be occasioned primarily by a desire to place maximum logistic, combat, and manpower support behind operations in the NATO area. The Soviets possess adequate ground, naval, and tactical air forces to support simultaneous offensives on several fronts. The difficulty in shifting forces over long lines of communication (which presumably would be disrupted) to or from the Middle and Far East obviates the value of waiting to assess the results of a nuclear exchange. Under the assumed conditions of an all-out nuclear war, the Soviets would have to commit forces to an attack on Western retaliatory bases in the Middle and Far East. Hence, surprise would already have been minimized by preparations for and execution of such attacks. Immediate launching of combined arms operations into Western territory in these two areas would best exploit any surprise attained in initial long-range attacks. Moreover, such operations would make it difficult for the West to attack Bloc forces without also damaging Western civil populations and military forces. Conversely, any delay would provide the West with opportunities to build-up and re-attack the Bloc from these areas and would expose Bloc forces to Western retaliation in their homeland. [Footnote is in the original.]

156. The scale and timing of attack with bomber aircraft would also depend upon the availability and effectiveness of other delivery systems which will probably become available as the period progresses. At present the USSR is probably capable of employing small numbers of both bomber-launched air-to-surface missiles and submarine-launched surface-to-surface missiles against targets in the continental US. These weapons, together with ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles with ranges up to about 700 n.m., could also be employed in initial attacks on Western nuclear striking forces deployed on the periphery of the Bloc. As the period advances, the numbers and types of offensive missiles available to Soviet forces will increase, and by mid-1962, Soviet guided missile capabilities for strategic attack could probably include more effective air-to-surface and submarine-launched missiles as well as IRBMs and ICBMs. Soviet planners would probably recognize that long-range ballistic missiles could impose maximum surprise and difficulty of interception, but also that during this period the accuracy and payload capacity of such missiles will be inferior to those of manned aircraft of comparable ranges. The large-scale use of missile-launching submarines in an initial attack would probably be precluded by the risk of premature disclosure of Soviet intent.

157. *Air Defense Capabilities.*²⁷ Although the effectiveness of Soviet defenses against nuclear attack would depend in large measure upon the success of an initial assault on Western nuclear delivery capabilities, the USSR's large air defense forces would be used to reduce the effectiveness of counterattack by Western forces. All Bloc forces with capabilities for air defense are integrated into an over-all active air defense system, which places primary emphasis on providing defense in depth for key administrative, industrial, and military centers within the USSR. Large passive defense organizations contribute to the Bloc's readiness for air defense, but we believe the general population is inadequately prepared against large-scale nuclear attack.

158. Principal current weaknesses of Bloc air defenses include the limited all-weather fighter capability, the low traffic-handling capabilities of communications and control components, the probable inadequacy of radar height-finding capabilities at high altitudes in certain areas, inadequate low altitude radar coverage, and the limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas. Bloc air defenses are most highly concentrated in the European USSR (east to a line roughly from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspian Sea), East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East, with some concentrations at specific locations elsewhere. The

²⁷ For a detailed estimate on this subject, see NIE 11-57, Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through Mid-1962, 16 July 1957. [Footnote is in the original.]

approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily-defended area in the Bloc. Moscow's defenses are estimated to have a high capability to engage large-scale attack at altitudes up to 60,000 feet under all weather conditions, but they probably remain vulnerable to low altitude attack.

159. In general Bloc air defense capabilities would be as follows:

a. Against penetrations conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes between about 5,000 and 35,000 feet, the capabilities of the system would be greatest. Above 35,000 feet they would begin to diminish and above 45,000 feet would fall off markedly. At altitudes below 5,000 feet they would also be progressively reduced.

b. Against penetrations conducted at night and under poor visibility conditions, the capabilities of the system would be considerably reduced.

c. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuver, decoys and electronic countermeasures, the capabilities of the system would be diminished through disruption and saturation.

160. Over the next five years there will be significant improvements in the performance characteristics of most Soviet air defense equipment, including fighters, radars, and communications and control equipments. Air defense guided missile and unguided rocket capabilities will increase. These developments will considerably improve Bloc capabilities for all-weather defense against manned aircraft and cruise-type missiles. Nevertheless, at the end of the period, warning times available to Bloc targets in border areas will probably be deficient for fighter interceptors and marginal for surface-to-air missile defenses against the highest performance Western aircraft and cruise-type missiles. The Bloc will also continue to have difficulty in opposing very low altitude attack, air defense electronic systems will still be subject to disruption, and the USSR will probably not have in operation a weapon system capable of successfully intercepting ballistic missiles.

161. *Offensive Capabilities in Western Europe.* The 22 Soviet line divisions in East Germany, together with forces available in adjacent areas, could initiate an attack without reinforcement by major units. To augment the strength of the ground attack and to seize bridgeheads and other key objectives in NATO territory, the USSR could mount initial airborne operations from within Soviet territory. We estimate that in the European area, the Soviet airlift capacity is sufficient for troops and light equipment equivalent to 4–5 divisions (of 7,500 men each) in a one-day operation, and 8–9 divisions in a five-day operation, using half the civil and military transport aircraft normally in that area. Airlift operations on this scale would be limited to the radius of the smaller aircraft employed (i.e. about 550 n.m.).

162. Air support of tactical operations in Western Europe could be provided by about 1,600 jet light bombers stationed in Eastern Europe and Western USSR, as well as more than 4,500 tactical jet fighters stationed in these areas. However, the dual missions of tactical fighter units and the probable assignment of a considerable number to air defense would limit the availability of fighter aircraft for tactical support in the initial phase of the land campaign. Ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons could now be available for the support of offensive operations, and their availability will almost certainly increase as the period advances.

163. *Offensive Capabilities in the Far East.* The USSR has about 30 line divisions in the Far East, together with nearly 3,500 aircraft and a sizable naval force. Stockpiles of supplies are probably sufficient, not only for the initiation of operations, but also for a considerable period of combat. Soviet forces in the Far East could, alone or in conjunction with Chinese Communist and North Korean forces, renew hostilities in Korea. They could probably launch an operation against Japan with an airborne force equivalent to 3 divisions in a one-day operation, and up to 5 divisions in a five-day operation. An initial seaborne attack for the purpose of seizing port facilities could be undertaken by lightly-equipped troops landed from a heterogeneous group of ships and craft. Balanced forces equivalent to 5–6 divisions could be embarked in a follow-up operation and landed through the port facilities seized. The same technique could be employed in other areas of the Far East within range of land-based aircraft. Airborne and amphibious attacks on a small scale could also be launched against Alaska.

164. *Capabilities for Naval Warfare.* At the present time the capabilities of Soviet naval forces include: extensive submarine operations along most of the world's strategic sea lanes, employing conventional and possibly nuclear torpedoes and mines; attacks against US and Allied carrier task forces by submarines and shore-based naval aircraft, some of which could probably be equipped with air-to-surface missiles; operations in Bloc coastal areas by surface units and supporting shore-based aircraft, primarily to deny Western access and to protect the seaward flanks of ground campaigns; attacks against port facilities which would be used by US overseas reinforcements, employing shore-based aircraft, surface forces and submarines, some of which could probably employ surface-to-surface missiles. In short, we estimate that the USSR has an extensive capability to interfere seriously with US and Allied sea communications in the event of war.

165. Soviet capabilities for naval warfare will continue to increase, especially with the probable advent of nuclear-powered submarines, increases in over-all submarine strength, increasing capabilities to

employ guided missiles and nuclear weapons for both offensive and defensive purposes, and increasing naval air reconnaissance and attack capabilities. Soviet naval forces will remain capable of lifting balanced forces of considerable strength, but the landing of heavy supporting elements of such forces will be contingent upon the seizure of adequate port facilities.

V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES

166. The trend toward redefinition of intra-Bloc relationships consequent upon the death of Stalin has continued; it eventuated in the Polish crisis and the Hungarian revolt of late 1956. The special position of Yugoslavia, the emergence of a semi-independent Communist regime in Poland, and Communist China's growing power and doctrinal influence have, in effect, broken Moscow's onetime monopoly of Communist thought and power. The USSR's reluctant acceptance of these developments may signify a belief that greater toleration of local variations is the best way to preserve and strengthen the Bloc. However, alarmed by developments in Poland and Hungary, the USSR has moved to preserve the status quo in the orthodox Satellites and, in its repression of the Hungarian uprising, has demonstrated that it is determined to retain its hegemony in Eastern Europe.

167. The strong identity of interest among various Bloc regimes, their dependence upon Soviet aid and support, and the USSR's overwhelming military power will tend to maintain the essential solidarity of the Bloc over at least the next five years. But the underlying forces of change released by developments since Stalin's death will continue to operate, creating further instability in the states of Eastern Europe and in their relations with the USSR. The growth of Chinese Communist power and influence will also create problems as well as benefits for Moscow. Thus, additional changes in the pattern of intra-Bloc relationships are likely in the period ahead.

Soviet Policy Toward the Satellites

168. The Soviet leaders are still confronted in Eastern Europe with a problem partly of their own creation. Moscow appears to have decided that the best way to encourage the long-run development of a sounder Soviet-Satellite relationship was to move away from the rigidity of Stalinist policy and, in its stead, to give limited play to national sentiments and local peculiarities within the various Satellites. But this policy set in motion forces which tended to defeat the basic objective, the strengthening of the Bloc. The over-all liberalization of policy, together with the rapprochement with Tito and the Soviet XXth Party Congress, led to rising Satellite unrest, which threatened Soviet control.

169. Prior to the Hungarian revolution and the Polish coup, the Soviet leaders clearly underestimated the strength of forces within the Satellites seeking reform and change. Moscow apparently did not recognize or seriously attempt to cope with Satellite ferment evoked by the denunciation of Stalinism at the XXth Party Congress, until June, when the riots in Poznan (and the Polish regime's disagreement with Moscow over the causes of the riots) demonstrated the dangers of loosening the reins. But the damage had already been done in the two Satellites where nationalism was strongest and where party factionalism was most disruptive. Faced in the fall with a new and defiant regime in Poland and a popular revolt in Hungary, the USSR was forced into unwelcome decisions, adopting a policy of accommodation in the former and of repression in the latter.

170. The reason for the differing Soviet treatment of Poland and Hungary lay in the USSR's determination to preserve Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and to keep the states of that area in the Soviet Bloc. When Hungary suddenly declared its neutrality and its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet leaders felt compelled to intervene in the only way they could, through military action. In Poland the USSR was reassured by Gomulka's promises that Poland would remain in the Bloc. Thus, though disliking the Gomulka regime, the USSR concluded that it was more tolerable than the political risks involved in a military attempt to unseat it.

171. In the light of the Hungarian and Polish crises, the USSR now seems determined to go slow in any further evolution of its relationships with the Satellites and, above all, to avoid if possible any repetition of the Hungarian or Polish experiences. It has shifted its emphasis toward attempts to combat the influence of those forces—principally nationalism, anti-Sovietism, and economic distress—which have been responsible for most of the Satellite ferment. Major reliance will still be placed on Satellite parties that will subject themselves—voluntarily, if possible—to Soviet ideology, Soviet directives concerning foreign and defense policies and Soviet leadership in general. In exchange for their fealty, the orthodox Satellite leaders can anticipate some Soviet economic aid, perhaps a measure of internal autonomy, occasional grants of recognition and prestige, and support for their own power positions and party policies.

172. Although the security of the Satellite system is thus uppermost in their minds—with measures to insure this security given first priority—the Soviet leaders do not seem to view a return to Stalinist severity and conformity as either necessary or desirable; they may even regard it as infeasible. There is unlikely to be any Soviet attempt to resume the previous degree of economic exploitation of the area.

The Soviets appear willing to tolerate certain differences among the Satellites and to tailor their policy to meet varying Satellite requirements. They apparently still believe that if some concessions to autonomy are gradually and judiciously meted out, the Satellite peoples will eventually become reconciled to a close relationship with the USSR.

173. Czechoslovakia, economically the most successful and politically the most stable of the Satellites, appears to be Moscow's favorite, and may be intended to serve as a model for the others. Czech party leaders have been relatively successful in utilizing the threat of Soviet intervention as a means of suppressing popular ferment, while at the same time pointing to economic and political improvements since the death of Stalin. The arguments appear to have persuaded the population not to jeopardize its relatively favorable status by precipitate action.

174. Hungary presents the Soviet Union with numerous practical problems. To accomplish its primary goal of restoring Hungary as quickly as possible to orthodox Satellite status, Moscow has encouraged the Soviet installed regime to combine severe political repression with limited economic bribery. There appear to be no suitable alternatives to this tactic. Both repression and bribery, however, are probably scheduled to diminish with time and accomplishment.

175. Soviet policy toward East Germany seems motivated primarily by the same considerations which underlie the USSR's rigid opposition to German reunification (see para. 231, Chapter VI). Aware of the unpopularity of the Communist regime in the GDR, the USSR is fearful that any relaxation of tight controls would stimulate the growth of pressures for reunification and promote increasing unrest or even a popular revolt in this highly sensitive area. Therefore, little liberalization has been attempted and Moscow has re-endorsed Ulbricht's repressive policies. The USSR probably feels that it has no alternative but to support the doctrinaire, Stalinist East German regime.

176. The reluctant Soviet acceptance of the "new" Poland now appears to be a long-range adjustment rather than a temporary accommodation. Tenseness in Soviet-Polish relations has abated since 1956, in large part because the Gomulka regime has restrained anti-Soviet and anti-Communist popular sentiments and has removed the immediate threat to the party's position. Concurrently, direct Soviet press attacks on Polish liberals have ceased and the strength of the pro-Soviet (Natolin) faction in the Polish party has diminished. The Soviet leaders retain a large arsenal of political, economic, and military weapons with which to exert pressure on the Gomulka regime or ultimately to destroy it, although they cannot be certain that pressures will always prove effective or that their use would not, in fact, boomerang.

177. Soviet military leaders almost certainly feel that the lines of communication through Poland to their 22 divisions in East Germany are insecure. Politically, Moscow must also be concerned over the dangerous influence of the Polish experiment on the remainder of the Bloc. It has attempted to offset this by insisting on doctrinal conformity in the other Satellites. It has also sought to minimize Poland's unique status by granting paper concessions to the orthodox Satellites—such as status of forces agreements—which parallel some of the actual privileges obtained by Poland. Nevertheless, the continuation of the Gomulka regime will at a minimum prove embarrassing to Moscow and will probably aggravate the USSR's problems in the other Satellites.

178. Current Soviet policy toward Poland thus represents a calculated risk. The Soviet leaders still do not view the risk as sufficiently dangerous to justify military action. Moreover, Moscow probably hopes that the risk will diminish with time and that Poland will gradually prove more susceptible to Soviet pressures.

179. The ability of the Soviet Union successfully to handle the increasingly complex issues associated with its presence in Eastern Europe—at a time when its own internal policies and its relations with Communist China are also changing—is by no means certain. Popular dissatisfaction, party factionalism, intellectual ferment, and chronic economic difficulties in the Satellites all appear to be long-range problems and probably are now causing great concern in Moscow. Varying Chinese, Polish, and Yugoslav “roads to socialism,” Soviet vacillations and purges, growing contacts with the West—all combined with the very real popular pressures from within—will probably continue to stimulate at least the desire for reform and change.

180. The current Soviet effort to minimize ferment, while simultaneously attempting to control the general movement for change through limited concessions, will probably prevent further explosions and national Communist “coups” but it does not appear to offer a lasting solution. Should essential Soviet control over the Satellites not be seriously threatened and should Poland remain in a state of semi-orthodoxy and dependence on the USSR, Moscow might in time be willing to allow a greater development toward autonomy in other Satellites. It might consider that evolution toward a grouping of semi-independent Eastern European states (still closely allied to Moscow) would quiet Satellite unrest and thus serve long-term Soviet aims.

181. On the other hand, should essential Soviet control over the area appear to be seriously threatened, and should Poland move notably farther away from orthodoxy, pressures in Moscow for a reversion to a harsher policy would probably grow. In the event of another Satellite

revolt or the attempt of any Satellite regime to secede from the socialist camp, the Soviet leaders would almost certainly decide to intervene militarily. This, in turn, would probably lead to the conclusion that the post-Stalin Satellite policies in general were a failure and that a return to more repressive policies offered the best means of coping with the problems in Eastern Europe.

Soviet Policy Toward Yugoslavia

182. Moscow's more flexible post-Stalin policies toward the Satellites may have been influenced by its apparently strong desire for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Efforts to accomplish this—most notable since the spring of 1955—have not been uniformly successful; in fact, Soviet-Yugoslav relations descended to a name-calling stage during the winter of 1956–1957. But the present Soviet leaders apparently believe that the split with Yugoslavia was one of Stalin's major policy failures and that, on balance, the prospective gains from a rapprochement outweigh the possible dangers. Moscow's immediate objective is probably to re-establish close party, state and ideological relations with Belgrade and, concomitantly, to encourage a weakening of Yugoslavia's ties with the West; the ultimate objective is to bring Yugoslavia back into the Bloc. For its part, Yugoslavia almost certainly desires to avoid compromising its independence but wishes to maintain close relations with the Bloc. As long as Belgrade assesses Soviet policies favorably, we believe that Yugoslavia will maintain its rapprochement with the USSR and may gradually move toward a somewhat closer alignment within limits which would safeguard its independence.

Sino-Soviet Relations

183. Communist China's stature in the Bloc has continued to grow. Peiping last fall backed the Soviet intervention in Hungary and generally supported the Soviet attempt to preserve Bloc solidarity. Earlier, however, it probably exercised a moderating influence in the dispute between Moscow and the Gomulka regime. Communist China's use of its influence in this manner was presumably motivated in large part by Peiping's desire to maintain the strength of the Bloc and to assert its right to a major voice in Bloc affairs. Further, Peiping has clearly indicated that its ideological pronouncements are intended to represent "original" and significant contributions to Marxism-Leninism, a contention which is probably of concern to Moscow. The ideological and political leadership of the Bloc can no longer be said to rest solely with the Soviet Union.

184. Moscow's willingness to allow Peiping a share in the ideological leadership of the Bloc and to acquiesce in Peiping's increased

role in Bloc affairs is probably based to a large extent on the absence of any practical alternative. In Soviet eyes, any heavy pressure on Peiping, such as threats to reduce economic or military aid, would almost certainly put an undesirable strain on Sino-Soviet ties. Therefore, despite anxiety, and probable subtle attempts to insure Peiping's basic conformity and to minimize its growing influence and assertiveness, the Soviet leaders will probably accept Peiping's increased stature with outward grace. Khrushchev has already admitted that Peiping too can be a fount of Communist wisdom. For its part, Peiping will probably continue to acknowledge publicly the USSR's leadership of the camp and its dependence on Soviet assistance and advice.

185. Though new points of friction will probably arise in the course of the next several years, differences will almost certainly be minor when compared to the basic points of agreement. In addition to ideological bonds, the USSR and Communist China share hostility to the US and are linked by the belief that concerted political and economic activities are mutually advantageous. Further, Communist China's manpower and strategic location and the USSR's military, industrial, and technical capabilities have served to create an interdependence fully appreciated in both capitals.

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Soviet View of the World Situation

186. In none of the many changes that have taken place since the death of Stalin has there been any suggestion that the USSR is abandoning its basic attitudes and aims. The outlook of the present Soviet leaders remains fundamentally conditioned by their concept of irreconcilable conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. They have shown no diminution of vigor in their search for ultimate victory, though their views as to the best policies and tactics for winning it have undergone important change.

187. In looking at the world situation from this viewpoint of conflict, the Soviet leaders display much confidence in the prospects of the Communist side. They show pride in the USSR's achievements over the last four decades and appear convinced of the over-all strength of their present position in the world. Despite their setbacks in Eastern Europe, and the manifold internal problems which beset them, the new leaders seem confident of their ability to cope with these problems and to continue the growth of Soviet strength and the expansion of Soviet influence.

188. At the same time the USSR's post-Stalin leaders, especially Khrushchev, appear flexible and pragmatic in their appraisal of the factors at play in the world situation and of their impact on Soviet prospects. In particular, they seem to have a healthy respect for the strength of the US as the principal source of opposition to their ambitions and a keen awareness of those gaps which still separate Soviet from US power. Khrushchev himself clearly regards it as one of the primary Soviet objectives to outstrip the US. Indeed the Soviet leaders may tend to assess the strength of the Western powers as greater than it often appears to us in the West. They almost certainly still regard the US as having superior capabilities to wage nuclear war, and they may overestimate the unity of the Western coalition.

189. Given this respect for Western power, the Soviet leadership is highly unlikely to believe that the present situation would be altered to Soviet advantage by resort to general war. In fact its own growing appreciation of the destructive potentialities of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems, as the USSR itself develops such capabilities, has almost certainly had a major impact on Soviet thinking as to the risks of nuclear war. Doctrinal acknowledgment of a modified outlook toward war occurred at the XXth Party Congress, which abandoned the thesis of the inevitability of war between the Communist and capitalist worlds.

190. In our view the Soviet Union, except in the case of an unforeseen technological breakthrough which gives high promise of victory without unacceptable losses, will not deliberately initiate general war during the next five years. At the same time the Soviet leaders, despite their suspicions of US intentions, are probably confident that their own growing nuclear capabilities will deter the US from embarking on this course. Consequently they must regard miscalculation as the most likely way in which general war would occur.

191. For the same reasons which inhibit it from deliberately initiating general war the USSR will almost certainly seek to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would involve serious risk of general war. During any international crisis the Soviet calculation of this risk will be of paramount importance. We think that the Soviet leaders estimate that because of Soviet nuclear capabilities the US is becoming increasingly disinclined to engage in an all-out nuclear exchange. Consequently the Soviet leaders may believe that they can pursue certain aggressive courses of action, extending even to local war, with less risk of general war than the same courses would previously have involved. In general, therefore, we believe that insofar as Soviet courses of action are restrained by fear of the US resorting to general

war, these restraints will tend to diminish during the period of this estimate.²⁸

192. We cannot confidently estimate how the Soviets will calculate the risk in various contingencies during the period of this estimate. We believe they would consider that open attacks by Soviet forces across the frontiers of non-Communist states would in most areas involve risk of general war. The Soviet assessment of the degree of risk would depend on the particular frontier crossed, the magnitude of the issues at stake, and the whole complex of attendant circumstances.

193. Whether or not the Soviets actually use armed force during the period of this estimate, it is clear that the latent threat of Communist military strength will remain a basic element in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. At times the Soviet leaders will probably bring this threat into the open, by menacing words or harsh diplomatic exchanges. They may go considerably further in certain situations—e.g., by supporting indigenous Communist forces in local military action, or even sending Soviet “volunteers,” if opportunities should occur which did not seem to involve serious risk of large-scale conflict, or if they judged that confusion and division rather than a strong Western reaction would result. But we remain convinced that the USSR will not desire to let any crisis develop to the point of seriously risking general war.

194. Since the Soviets believe in irreconcilable conflict between themselves and the West, their major policy decisions will always be affected to a great degree by their calculation of the risks of war. In the present phase this calculation almost certainly causes them to prefer non-military means of achieving their objectives. But we believe that they also see many intrinsic advantages in a comparatively peaceful course. Viewed in retrospect, it would seem that when the post-Stalin leaders reassessed the situation bequeathed to them by Stalin they came to two basic conclusions: (a) that, on the whole, Soviet foreign policies had reached a point of diminishing returns; and (b) that these policies involved needless risks for the returns realized. To limit these risks and open new opportunities for enhancing the Soviet position, they apparently decided on a number of major policy shifts.

195. As reflected in the main characteristics of post-Stalin foreign policy, these opportunities must have appeared to the present leadership to lie broadly in two fields. First, concerned over the impetus to

²⁸ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does *not* agree with the estimate that the restraints on Soviet courses of action imposed by fear of the US resorting to general war will *tend to diminish* during the period of this estimate because of an *increasing* disinclination by the US to engage in an all-out nuclear exchange. See footnote to paragraph 2, Summary Estimate, page 1. [Footnote is in the original.]

Western strength and unity provided by Stalin's postwar policies, they have hoped through a less rigid and hostile posture to dispel the image of aggressive Soviet intentions and thus complicate Western efforts to maintain and develop a position of anti-Communist strength. In this connection the Soviet leaders must consider the extent to which new aggressive moves might compromise this hope.

196. Second, they saw in support of the nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, with their largely anti-Western bias, major opportunities to weaken and divide the Western powers, and to substitute Communist influence for that of the West. They look upon the upsurge of nationalism in Asia and Africa as a fulfillment of Lenin's prophecy that these areas would prove to be the Achilles heel of the imperialist Western powers. Moreover, they probably expect that the revolution of rising popular expectations in all underdeveloped areas will far outrun the possibilities of fulfillment, thus enhancing the attractiveness of Communist methods and creating local instability which the Communists can exploit.

197. However, the purge of June 1957 revealed that there had by no means been unanimous Presidium agreement over many aspects of post-Stalin foreign as well as domestic policy. Molotov in particular has been blamed for opposing certain doctrinal innovations, the Austrian peace treaty, the rapprochement with Belgrade, high level goodwill visits abroad, and normalization of relations with Japan. Some latent opposition to present policies undoubtedly remains in the Soviet hierarchy, and may again come to the fore in event of a crisis, but the June purge seems to confirm the ascendancy of Khrushchev's policy line.

198. Khrushchev and his colleagues probably regard the present world situation as highly fluid and credit this fluidity largely to their own actions. They are probably pleased with the situation in Asia and the Middle East in particular, and look upon it as ripe to develop further in their favor. Though concerned over the risks inherent in a confrontation of Western and Soviet interests in such areas, they probably see possibilities of major gains through continuation of their present policies, at minimum cost to themselves. Moreover, Soviet behavior in international affairs, now that the Stalinist isolation of the USSR has ended, has become subject to a momentum of its own—broadened diplomatic relations, technical and cultural exchanges, and expanded trade and aid programs—which are not only projecting a different image of the USSR to the outside world but are giving the Soviet people themselves a less distorted image of the world at large. These factors will tend to prevent any sudden reversal of Soviet external policy. Under these circumstances we see the Soviet leadership as likely to continue its present policies for some time.

General Aspects of the Co-existence Policy

199. Viewed in the above context, we see the present phase of Soviet external policy as one designed to achieve certain important though limited objectives, while avoiding any substantial risks of nuclear war and providing time for the further forced draft growth of Soviet power. These objectives are: (a) to impress the world with Soviet military strength and national power, while at the same time creating a general sense of Soviet peacefulness and respectability which will further blur the image of an aggressive USSR; (b) to cause a retraction and decline of Western power, especially withdrawal of the US from its bases around the Bloc; and (c) to hasten the ejection of Western influence from Asia and Africa, while expanding Soviet influence in these areas.

200. A hallmark of present Soviet policy is its tactical flexibility in execution, in contrast to the heavy-handedness of Stalin's time. The pragmatic approach of Khrushchev and his fondness for experimentation suggest that this will continue at least so long as he remains in power. The present leadership, for example, shows fewer doctrinal preconceptions as to tactics, and greater willingness to modify doctrine to meet the exigencies of the time. In this category fall the ostensible acceptance of other roads to socialism and the concept, endorsed by the XXth Party Congress, that neutralist though non-Communist governments can also serve Soviet purposes. This concept has found particular application in Soviet efforts to encourage neutralism in the Afro-Asian area.

201. The significance of these doctrinal and tactical developments is very great. The advance of Communism is designed to occur by gradual stages instead of by convulsive upheavals. Thus the USSR has not recently pursued with its old vigor the forcible absorption and Communization of other states; it even manages to pose, convincingly to some, as the champion of national independence. The lines which divide the Communist from the non-Communist world have become somewhat blurred. The result is that when crises occur (e.g. in Egypt, Jordan, Syria), the underlying issues between the Bloc and the West do not stand out with the clarity that was evident, for example, in the Korean situation.

202. We believe that the Soviet leaders foresee the likelihood of further crises as the interests of the two great power groupings clash in such areas as the Middle East. With respect to Soviet behavior in such crisis situations, Khrushchev's boldness and apparent impetuosity give cause for concern. But the practicality of Khrushchev, his absorption with the USSR's manifold internal problems, and the Soviet desire to avoid undue risks of nuclear war will probably militate against hasty decisions in foreign affairs.

203. Whatever their flexibility, moreover, the present Soviet leaders apparently see no need to make concessions on the most important issues dividing East and West. They appear determined, for example, not to relinquish any territory now under Communist control. Similarly, on such issues as German reunification and disarmament, we think that there will be little give in Soviet policy during the period of this estimate.

204. *Techniques of "Peaceful Co-existence."* In line with its new tactical flexibility, the USSR will continue to place heavy reliance on such conventional methods of international intercourse as high level goodwill visits, broadened diplomatic contacts, promotion of cultural and other exchanges, expanded foreign trade, long-term credits and technical assistance, and arms aid. Non-Communist governments will continue to be cultivated in an attempt to create an identity of interests between them and the USSR and to inculcate the image of the USSR as a respectable, peace-loving state. Following traditional Soviet practice, the USSR's extensive propaganda apparatus as well as the network of front organizations and Free World Communist parties will also be used to this end. A particular technique of increasing significance, is the Soviet capability and intention to enter international air routes. With few reciprocal concessions the Soviets can thus demonstrate their technological prowess to Free World countries, particularly in underdeveloped areas.

205. By such means the USSR will continue to stress a number of already well-established diplomatic and propaganda themes. Playing upon growing concern over avoiding nuclear war, it will contrast the USSR's role as the foremost protagonist of peace and disarmament with the aggressive intentions of the US. Another major theme is to portray the USSR as the chief supporter of the emerging former colonial countries, willing to help them "without strings attached," as opposed to US efforts to force these countries into anti-Communist alliances and continued US identification with the colonial powers. The USSR, through stressing peaceful Soviet intentions, is also seeking to convey the thesis that Communist-Free World collaboration is now possible in a wide variety of fields.

206. Despite the USSR's emphasis on "peaceful co-existence," its continued hostility toward the West implies the continuation in varying intensity, of more aggressive cold war tactics wherever the prospective gains appear to outweigh any damage to the over-all "co-existence" line. Savage propaganda attacks on capitalism, imperialism, and the West, especially the US, are likely to recur. The USSR will almost certainly also use subversion and infiltration to achieve local Communist goals in situations susceptible to advantageous handling along these

lines. These techniques reflect the continuity of Soviet attitudes from the Stalin through the post-Stalin era, and there is little reason to expect their disappearance. Finally, the Soviets have recently laid a good deal of public stress on their growing nuclear capabilities, and we think they will increasingly use the latent threat of their military strength as an instrument of policy.

207. *Policy Toward the Underdeveloped Areas—Trade and Aid.* As previously suggested, one of the principal characteristics of current Soviet policy is its stress on underdeveloped countries, in an effort to estrange them from the West and to lay the groundwork for growing Soviet influence. In the needs of the new and underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa for help and guidance in industrialization the USSR sees opportunities for influencing these states by providing assistance and encouraging them to employ Communist techniques. Therefore one of its principal weapons has been the so-called “trade and aid” campaign, of offering both arms and technical and economic aid on liberal credit terms. Not only do such efforts serve specific Soviet objectives vis-a-vis the underdeveloped countries, but they contribute to the desired image of the USSR as a respectable and economically advanced member of the international community.

208. By mid-1957 the USSR and its satellites had agreed to extend some \$1.15 billion in economic credits for this purpose, the bulk of which will be drawn upon over a period of several years. In addition arms of an estimated value of some \$350 million had been delivered, probably on credit, to Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan. In return the Bloc has been willing to accept otherwise largely unsaleable raw material surpluses, an appealing feature to underdeveloped countries. Bloc trade agreements with Free World nations rose from 113 in effect at the end of 1953 to 212 by mid-1957, the largest part of this rise representing trade agreements with underdeveloped countries. Between 1954 and 1956 Bloc trade with underdeveloped countries rose 70 percent. Technical assistance, though still small in comparison with that of the West, continues to rise; during the first half of 1957, some 2,000 Bloc technicians are estimated to have been in 19 underdeveloped countries for a month or more, compared to an estimated 1,400 in 1956.

209. The volume of Bloc trade with the underdeveloped areas as a whole is still insignificant compared with that of the West, and the technical and economic assistance which the Bloc has thus far supplied is also relatively very small. Both trade and aid have had a highly significant impact, however, partly because they represent a new departure in Bloc policy, vigorously followed up, and partly because they have tended to be concentrated in certain areas (Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia) where they loom large in the economies concerned.

210. The Soviet leaders are probably pleased with what they regard as their success to date with this policy and will almost certainly intensify their efforts in this field. The USSR has the economic resources for a considerable expansion in its trade and aid campaign, while its extensive stocks of obsolescent arms will permit it to capitalize further on the desires of many underdeveloped countries to strengthen themselves vis-a-vis their neighbors. In areas where they expect local governments to be receptive, as in the Middle East and South Asia, the Soviets will probably continue to supply arms as a means of exacerbating local tensions and creating opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence.

211. *Relations with Free World Communist Parties.* Soviet policy toward the Communist parties in Free World countries has been adjusted to the requirements of the “peaceful co-existence” line. Moscow continues to allow them somewhat greater autonomy and local tactical flexibility than was permitted under Stalin, though it has sought to retain its essential control. The over-all tactic set down for the Free World parties, as reiterated at the XXth Party Congress, remains that of advancing Communist interests primarily by parliamentary means, if possible in collaboration with non-Communist parties, rather than through violent struggle.

212. Such developments as the denigration of Stalin, the Hungarian revolt, and ostensible Soviet acceptance of “many paths to Socialism” (as in Poland and Yugoslavia) have caused confusion and division in many foreign Communist parties and led to some defections. To date, however, these parties apparently continue to accept Moscow’s leadership and will probably continue to do so for some time to come. Some foreign Communist parties may adopt more of a national Communist character than is considered desirable by Moscow, but the essential solidarity of the international Communist movement appears unlikely to be seriously shaken, at least in the short run.

213. *Soviet Policy on Disarmament.* Active exploitation of the disarmament issue is one of the key aspects of present Soviet external policy. The USSR clearly regards this issue not only as an essential part of its pose of “peaceful co-existence” but, even more important, as a possible means of neutralizing Western nuclear striking power and inducing its withdrawal from around the periphery of the Bloc. It is probably also concerned over the potential threat to its position in the Satellites from US and NATO power in Europe. For these reasons the USSR has tended to concentrate on such disarmament proposals as nuclear test suspension, a ban on use of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals from Europe. By its maneuvers on such issues the USSR clearly hopes to encourage the relaxation of Western defense efforts, help undermine NATO and create divisions among its partners, and above all create a climate inhibiting Western use of

nuclear weapons. In addition the USSR is probably concerned about the enormous cost of its military establishment and would welcome a measure of disarmament which would permit some diversion of resources to meet other pressing needs. It may also have some concern over the possible development of nuclear capabilities by "fourth countries," particularly in Europe. However, we do not believe that either of these concerns would be compelling in Soviet thinking.

214. The Soviet leaders, no doubt pleased with the impact to date of their disarmament maneuvers, will continue to give the appearance of a flexible and constructive attitude in an effort to mobilize world opinion in their favor. They will lay further stress on simple proposals, calculated largely for their propaganda appeal, such as ending tests or banning the use of nuclear weapons. They clearly hope to broaden the UN discussions to include other powers, as also serving their ends. Further vague proposals designed to appear as attempts to meet the Western position are likely. The USSR may even make some further unilateral gestures at disarmament, perhaps the sloughing off of certain marginal forces, provided this seems desirable for other reasons.

215. While the USSR will thus rely largely on diplomatic and propaganda exploitation of the disarmament issue, it probably feels that some form of limited international agreement would reinforce its pose as the strongest exponent of disarmament, stimulate further relaxation of Western defense efforts, and inhibit the use of nuclear weapons. In Soviet eyes the preferred form of agreement would be a loosely drawn mutual pledge without significant inspection features. But the Soviet leaders undoubtedly recognize that they must pay some price for such an agreement in terms of inspection and controls. In our view they would be willing to accept limited inspection arrangements to detect violation of a nuclear test ban, and a minimal number of fixed observation posts in connection with any agreed arms reductions. Their interest in inducing a US troop withdrawal from Europe would probably lead them to go even further in allowing mutual inspection in Europe.

216. But the USSR clearly regards the present Western disarmament proposals as heavily loaded in favor of the West. In particular it will almost certainly continue to reject comprehensive inspection and controls. As is amply indicated by their repeated denunciation of such proposals as elaborate intelligence gathering schemes, the Soviet leaders react suspiciously and defensively to these proposals as Western efforts to pry into Soviet weaknesses and to interfere with Soviet efforts to maintain a controlled society. In our view this deepseated distrust of the West and Soviet preoccupation with security will long remain a bar to any but the most limited inspection and controls. With equal suspicion, they almost certainly will reject any cut-off of nuclear weapons

production as a Western attempt to condemn them to a permanent position of inferiority. Finally, the USSR does not as yet seem to regard itself as under any compulsion to reach an early agreement, since it sees that other factors are already leading to some degree of Western disarmament. It is also probably confident that growing Soviet capabilities and the pressure of world public opinion will eventually induce the Western powers to settle for less in the way of controls and inspection than they presently demand.

217. *Soviet Policy in the UN.* The Soviet leaders regard the UN and its various organs and specialized agencies as important forums for their “co-existence” policy in all its aspects. They have evinced growing awareness that when acting jointly with the Asian-African bloc, the Soviet bloc can frustrate Western policies or proposals, and they may even hope for UN endorsement of Soviet policies on certain issues. We believe that in the period of this estimate the USSR will seek to exploit the possibilities inherent in this situation and to this end will maintain and probably increase its activities in the UN and the specialized agencies.

Soviet Policy in Particular Areas

218. *The Middle East.* The USSR clearly regards the chief immediate prospects for expanding its influence as lying in the Middle East. The events of the past two years—the growing estrangement from the West of Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, and the Anglo-French invasion at Suez—have almost certainly appeared to the USSR as offering further opportunities for substantial gain.

219. We consider that the USSR’s aims in the Middle East are to eliminate Western bases and influence, to attain a position from which it could deny oil to the West, and ultimately to establish dominance in the area. The USSR is shrewdly supporting Arab nationalism against the West and is carefully avoiding an appearance of seeking undue political influence of its own; it is careful of Arab sensibilities and is soft-pedaling subversive activities aimed at promoting Communist regimes. Thus the short run Soviet emphasis will be on promoting neutralism and undermining the position of the West. The USSR will probably attempt to bring the Arab states gradually within the Soviet sphere of influence, but it is unlikely, over the next few years at least, to install Communist regimes.

220. The USSR appears to be carrying out a flexible and opportunistic policy of limited risk in the Middle East. It can be relied on to continue its attempts to capitalize on such disruptive forces in the area as Nasser’s ambitions for Arab hegemony, Yemeni designs on the Aden Protectorate, the leftist coup in Syria, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, on which it is taking an increasingly pro-Arab position. It will provide

further aid and support to Egypt and Syria in their attempts to undermine other Arab regimes. Above all, the USSR will seek to exploit the Arab-Israeli dispute, as the one issue on which Arabs are united and which can serve as a counter to Western efforts to unite the area against the Communist threat.

221. The USSR can be expected to continue to assert a right to a direct voice in the affairs of the area and to propose four-power or other negotiations to that end. It will also use the regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen as indirect instruments of its policy in the area. The USSR might seek bases in one or more of these countries if opportunities offer; in any event the construction of installations, including port facilities, in the area for the operation and maintenance of Soviet-made armaments creates facilities which could be used on short notice by the USSR. In addition it will continue its attempts to promote good relations with other states of the area. Renewed trade and aid, technical assistance and in some cases arms offers are likely. When local issues such as the revolt in Oman can be exploited, the USSR will do so.

222. But in pursuing the above policies, the USSR will be conscious of the extent to which vital Western interests are involved in the area, and in particular of expressed US determination to protect these interests. It will be concerned lest the further crises which will almost certainly develop in the area lead to local conflict between Western and Soviet-backed power or even between the great powers themselves, with resultant risks of general war. We believe that the conduct of the Soviet leaders in any such crises will depend directly upon the Western reaction they expect. They have already shown that they will not hesitate to provide arms and advisors or to adopt a threatening pose. In certain situations they might employ limited numbers of "volunteers." But the USSR must recognize the geographic factors which make it difficult to intervene militarily in the Middle East without violating the boundaries of US and UK allies. We believe that they will not desire to let any crisis or local outbreak reach such proportions as to involve serious risks of general war.

223. *South Asia and the Far East.* In these areas Soviet policy will probably remain focussed on promoting neutralism and reducing Western influence through trade and aid, goodwill visits, cultural and other exchanges, political support for popular nationalist causes, and a variety of other means. The USSR can be expected to concentrate further on India and Japan as the pivotal non-Communist nations in this area. It will almost certainly capitalize on India's growing economic difficulties and on the deep antagonisms between India and Pakistan through additional offers of assistance to India. Renewed Soviet arms offers are also likely to take advantage of India's concern over US military aid to Pakistan.

224. With respect to Japan, the “normalization of relations” will continue, with the objective of encouraging Japan to assume a more independent attitude at the expense of its ties with the US. Moscow and Peiping may make further limited concessions to Japan for this purpose. They are probably confident that Japan’s critical foreign trade needs will impel it to seek increased Sino-Soviet Bloc trade and that the domestic political forces at work in Japan are already gradually leading it toward a more independent foreign policy.

225. The USSR probably regards Southeast Asia as primarily a Chinese Communist area of influence. However, the Soviets will continue to stress their willingness to assist the countries of this area with long-term credits, technical aid, and purchases of their raw materials, while touting the value of Communist methods as the best way to achieve the economic development which these states desperately seek. The USSR will utilize still strong anti-colonial sentiments in these areas to stimulate and exploit differences with the Western powers.

226. Since 1954 the USSR has devoted special efforts to strengthening its influence in Afghanistan, perhaps initially because of fear that the Afghans would join the Baghdad Pact. We do not believe that the USSR intends to go so far as to convert Afghanistan into a satellite, primarily because such a move would alarm the non-Communist world and probably could be accomplished only through the use of Soviet military force. It is seeking instead to establish Afghan economic and military dependence on the USSR.

227. *Africa*. As part of its effort in the underdeveloped areas, the USSR will almost certainly increase its activities in Africa during the next five years. It is already trying to develop diplomatic and economic relations with the newly independent states of Morocco, Tunisia and Ghana, and is devoting somewhat greater efforts to Libya and the Sudan. It has offered trade, aid, technical assistance and, in some cases, arms. We do not believe that the USSR will during the period of this estimate undertake serious commitments or become deeply involved in areas of Africa far removed from the center of Soviet power. Instead, it will probably confine itself to the establishment of its diplomatic and economic presence on the continent, to some limited encouragement of nationalist and anti-colonial movements, and to an attempt to end the exclusiveness of Western influence in most of the area.

228. Up to the present the USSR has been cautious in its support of Arab nationalism in North Africa against the French. If a settlement of the Algerian conflict does not occur fairly soon, however, we believe that the Soviets will probably become more active and outspoken in

this respect, though it is likely that material support will be rendered through Egypt rather than directly.

229. *Western Europe.* Post-Stalin Soviet policy toward Western Europe appears to be strategically defensive in character, aimed more at protecting the USSR's position in Eastern Europe than at expanding Soviet influence beyond its present frontiers. Though the USSR obviously does not intend to neglect Western Europe, it probably considers that its opportunities for maneuver are limited at present, and is concentrating its efforts on more vulnerable areas.

230. The chief Soviet objective in Western Europe is to weaken and divide the NATO powers, and above all to induce a withdrawal of US military strength. Soviet disarmament policy and its attendant propaganda is directed largely at this target. The USSR will also continue to promote the concept of a detente in Western Europe, via some form of European security treaty which would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Indeed the USSR probably expects simply through its policy of "peaceful co-existence" and relaxed tensions to secure a reduction in NATO unity and arms outlays. Special attention will also be paid to exploiting differences among the NATO powers as well as weaknesses in individual countries.

231. We believe that the USSR will remain adamant on German reunification despite its recognition that its immovable stand on this issue limits its maneuverability in Western Europe. In our view the Soviet leaders are still acutely concerned over the potential threat of a revived and nationalistic Germany, backed by the US in seeking the recovery of its eastern territories. In Soviet eyes the continued division of Germany, with the USSR holding 18,000,000 East Germans as hostages, is the best means of limiting this threat. The Soviets are highly unlikely to believe that any formula for reunification will offer adequate guarantees against a reunified Germany's tacit or open alliance with the West. In addition, besides East Germany's military value to them, they are probably fearful of the impact that loss of their East German satellite would have on their position elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

232. *Latin America.* This area has also been the target of Bloc diplomatic, economic, and cultural activity in an attempt to promote trade and other contacts and encourage friction with the US. Further efforts in this direction are likely, as well as continued local Communist Party and front group activity to promote anti-US sentiments and to obstruct Latin American cooperation with the US.

Annex

TABLE 1—ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL, MID-1957¹

	ARMY GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCES (Including Naval Aviation)	NAVAL FORCES	SUBORDINA- TION UNKNOWN ⁷	SECURITY FORCES	TOTALS (Excluding Security)
USSR (total)	2,650,000	825,000 ²	725,000 ³	75,000	400,000	4,275,000
EE Satellites (total)	950,000	96,000	37,700		293,000	1,083,700
Albania	30,000	1,500	800		10,000	32,300
Bulgaria	110,000	16,000	6,200		30,000	132,200
Czechoslovakia	170,000	23,000			45,000	193,000
East Germany	100,000	8,000	11,000		45,000	119,000
Hungary	75,000				20,000	75,000
Poland	250,000	34,000 ⁵	10,500		65,000	296,500
Rumania	215,000	13,500	9,200		78,000	237,700
Communist Asia (total)	3,164,000	107,250	52,300		610,000	3,323,550
Communist China	2,548,000	87,000 ⁶	43,300		500,000	2,678,300
North Korea	348,000	20,000	7,000			375,000
Viet Minh	268,000	250	2,000		110,000	270,250
BLOC TOTALS	6,764,000	1,028,250	815,000	75,000	1,303,000	8,682,250

¹Figures in this table are based on estimated order of battle. Estimates of this type yield approximate rather than precise measures of actual strength at any given time, and can lag considerably behind changes in actual strength. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²For purposes of this table, an estimated 110,000 Naval Aviation personnel are included in total Soviet air forces personnel strength.

³Does not include MVD naval forces, which for purposes of this table are carried in Soviet security forces total.

⁴Believed temporarily disbanded.

⁵Includes 2,000 naval air.

⁶Includes 8,000 naval air.

⁷Air defense control and warning (AC and W) personnel. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that of the total of about 75,000 Soviet AC and W personnel, 55,000 are in the air forces, 15,000 are in the ground forces; and 5,000 are in the naval forces. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that of the 75,000 AC and W personnel, 60,000 are in the ground forces and the remainder in aviation units.

TABLE 2—ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES IN LINE DIVISIONS, MID-1957

Country	Mechanized Divisions											
	Rifle Divisions			Tank Divisions			Cavalry Divisions			Airborne Divisions		
	No.	T/O	Actual ¹	No.	T/O	Actual ¹	No.	T/O	Actual ¹	No.	T/O	Actual ¹
USSR ²	90	13,335	8,850	55	15,415	9,800	20	13,670	8,900	10	9,000	7,000
Communist China	115	18,200	15,000				3	7,850	6,000	3	5,900	4,000
										3	8,300	7,000
East Germany	5	11,500	8,000				2	11,500	8,000			
Poland	12	11,500	8,000	6	14,000	10,000						
Bulgaria	9	11,500	5,500									
Czechoslovakia	8	11,500	8,000	4	14,000	8,000	2	11,500	7,000	1	6,000	4,000
Hungary ⁴												
Rumania	12	11,500	8,000	1	14,000	8,500	1	11,500	9,000			
North Korea	18	10,600	9,500									
Viet Minh	14	12,600	10,900									
TOTAL	283			66			28			3		
										14		
												394 ⁵

¹Actual strengths of divisions vary. The figures shown represent estimated averages. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Estimated dispositions of Soviet line divisions: Occupied Europe, 32; Northwestern USSR, 13; Western USSR, 47; Southwestern USSR, 18; Southern USSR, 24; Central USSR, 10; Soviet Far East, 31.

³In addition, Soviet ground forces are estimated to include 20 artillery divisions, 80 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 120 separate brigades.

⁴No effective combat units.

⁵Estimated breakdown by major groupings: USSR, 175; Communist China, 124; European Satellites, 63; North Korea and Viet Minh, 32.

TABLE 3—ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC AIR UNITS, MID-1957–MID-1962

FIGHTER	USSR	MID-1957		MID-1958		MID-1959		MID-1960		MID-1961		MID-1962	
		E.E. SAT	CCAF, NVAF, NKAF	E.E. SAT	CCAF, NVAF, NKAF	E.E. SAT	CCAF, NVAF, NKAF	E.E. SAT	CCAF, NVAF, NKAF	E.E. SAT	CCAF, NVAF, NKAF	E.E. SAT	CCAF, NVAF, NKAF
Jet (Day)	8,640	2,045	1,700	7,800	6,850	5,800	2,850	2,350	4,850	4,150	2,700	2,100	
Jet (A/W) ¹	1,320	65	30	2,350	3,300	4,350	350	270	5,350	5,850	710	740	
Prop	—	90	35	—	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	
ATTACK													
Jet (Ftrs.)	270	25	220	—	—	—	—	80	—	—	—	—	
Prop	—	750	140	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
LIGHT BOMBER													
Jet	3,020	150	510	3,100	3,100	3,100	230	870	3,050	2,950	230	890	
Prop	—	—	210	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
MEDIUM BOMBER ^{2,3}													
Jet	900	—	—	1,150	1,250	1,250	—	50	1,200–1,300	1,150–1,250	—	60	
Prop	585	—	20	440	290	140	—	50	140	140	—	60	
HEAVY BOMBER ³													
Jet Turboprop	90–150	—	—	150–250	250–450	400–600	—	—	400–600	400–600	—	—	
TANKERS ⁴	(Included in estimated numbers of Soviet heavy bombers and jet medium bombers; see paras. 133 and 135)												
TRANSPORT													
Jet (Med.)	—	—	—	5	10	20	—	—	20	20	—	—	
Prop (Lt.)	1,760	110	190	1,350	1,300	1,200	120	330	1,100	1,000	110	330	
Prop (Med.)	180	—	—	200	340	390	—	10	530	660	—	20	

TABLE 4—ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE, MID-1957

	Eastern Europe ¹	North- western USSR ²	West- ern USSR ³	West Central USSR ⁴	Cau- casus USSR ⁵	East Central USSR ⁶	Far East USSR ⁷	Total
FIGHTER								
Jet (Day)	950	1,320	2,055	1,340	1,160	460	1,455	8,740
Jet (A/W)	80	220	320	260	150	50	240	1,320
ATTACK								
Jet (Ftr.)	115	—	40	—	75	40	—	270
LIGHT BOMBER								
Jet	240	455	1,195	190	245	80	615	3,020
MEDIUM BOMBER ⁸								
Jet	—	125	650	20	—	—	100	895
Prop	—	25	220	140	40	—	160	585
HEAVY BOMBER								
(By far the largest proportion of heavy bombers are in the Western and West Central USSR; a smaller number are in the Far East.)								
TRANSPORT								
Jet	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Prop (Lt.)	115	145	480	385	65	60	510	1,760
Prop (Med.)	—	30	135	—	—	—	15	180

TABLE 4—Continued

	Eastern Europe ¹	Northwestern USSR ²	Western USSR ³	West Central USSR ⁴	Caucasus USSR ⁵	East Central USSR ⁶	Far East USSR ⁷	Total
HELICOPTER								
Large	5	45	85	70	—	—	80	285
RECONNAISSANCE								
Jet (Ftr.)	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	50
Jet (Lt. Bmr.)	40	80	170	20	40	20	125	495
Prop (Seaplane)	—	35	10	—	25	—	80	150
UTILITY/LIAISON								
Jet (Ftr.)	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	10
Jet (Lt. Bmr.)	—	20	20	—	—	—	25	65
Prop (Misc.)	—	—	—	—	—	—	60	60
TOTAL (rounded)	1,600	2,500	5,400	2,450	1,800	710	3,475	17,900

¹E. Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Northern, and Leningrad.

³Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa.

⁴Moscow, South Ural, Volga, Votonezh, and Ural MD's.

⁵North Caucasus and Transcaucasus MD's.

⁶Turkestan and Siberian MD's.

⁷Far East and Transbalkal MD's.

⁸Includes medium bombers assigned to Naval Aviation.

TABLE 5—ESTIMATED SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS, MID-1957

	TACTICAL AVIATION	FIGHTER AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE	LONG- RANGE AVIATION	NAVAL AVIATION	AVIATION OF AIRBORNE TROOPS	TOTAL
FIGHTER						
Jet (Day)	3,900	3,175	—	1,665	—	8,740
Jet (A / W)	430	600	—	290	—	1,320
ATTACK						
Jet (Ftr)	270	—	—	—	—	270
LIGHT BOMBER						
Jet	2,425	—	—	595	—	3,020
MEDIUM BOMBER						
Jet	—	—	850	45	—	895
Prop	—	—	550	25	—	575
HEAVY BOMBER ¹						
Jet Turboprop	—	—	90–150	—	—	90–150
TRANSPORT						
Jet	—	—	—	—	—	—
Prop (Lt. & Small)	780	95	230	150	505	1,760
Prop (Med.)	—	—	—	—	180	180

TABLE 5—Continued

	TACTICAL AVIATION	FIGHTER AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE	LONG- RANGE AVIATION	NAVAL AVIATION	AVIATION OF AIRBORNE TROOPS	TOTAL
HELICOPTERS						
Large	50	—	—	90	145	285
RECONNAISSANCE						
Jet (Ftr.)	50	—	—	—	—	50
Jet (Lt. Bmr.)	385	—	—	110	—	495
Prop (Seaplane)	—	—	—	150	—	150
UTILITY/LIAISON						
Jet (Ftr.)	10	—	—	—	—	10
Jet (Lt. Bmr.)	5	—	—	60	—	65
Jet (Misc.)	60	—	—	—	—	60
TOTAL AIRCRAFT	8,365	3,870	17,020–17,080	3,180	830	17,965–18,025

¹See the footnotes to the Table, page 33, by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. [Footnote is in the original. Reference is to the table following paragraph 139.]

TABLE 6—ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec)

Combat Radius/Range (n.m.)	BULL	MODIFIED BULL	BADGER	BADGER	1958 ⁷		1960 ⁷		1961 MB-61 ²
					BADGER	BISON	BISON	BISON	
a. 25,000 lb. bombload	—	—	—	—	—	2,350/4,500	2,450/4,700	2,650/5,100	—
one refuel ¹	—	—	—	—	—	3,200/6,000	3,300/6,300	3,600/6,900	—
b. 10,000 lb bombload	1,700/3,100	2,000/3,600	1,500/2,800	1,650/3,200	1,650/3,200	2,550/5,000	2,650/5,200	2,900/5,600	⁶
one refuel ¹	2,300/4,200	2,700/4,900	2,000/3,800	2,200/4,300	2,200/4,300	3,450/6,700	3,600/7,000	3,900/7,500	⁵
c. 3,300 lb. bombload	1,950/3,500	2,300/4,100	1,700/3,300	1,850/3,600	1,850/3,600	2,600/5,200	2,750/5,500	3,000/5,900	1,750/3,400 ⁴
one refuel ¹	2,650/4,700	3,100/5,500	2,300/4,400	2,450/4,900	2,450/4,900	3,550/7,000	3,750/7,400	4,050/7,900	2,350/4,600 ⁴
Speed/Altitude (kts./ft.)									
a. Max. speed at optimum altitude (kts./ft.) ⁶	350/30,000	360/30,000	550/13,200	555/14,000	555/14,000	530/18,000	535/18,800	535/18,800	1,085/35,000 ⁵
b. Target speed/target altitude (kts./ft.) ⁶	310/30,000	340/35,000	475/40,300	475/41,900	475/41,900	460/40,000	460/42,400	460/42,400	865/47,000 ⁶
Combat Ceiling (ft.) ⁶	36,500	37,500	45,000	46,000	46,000	43,000	45,500	45,500	57,500 ⁶

¹Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximately 35 percent increase in radius/range. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Predicted jet medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capability.

³Capable of carrying 11,000 pound, 100 n.m. ASM.

⁴Includes 500 n.m. "dash."

⁵For 3,300 lb. bombload.

⁶For 10,000 lb. bombload unless otherwise indicated.

⁷The increased performance indicated for the 1958 BADGER and the 1960 BISON is based upon an estimate of normally expected improvement during the period through 1960.

TABLE 6 (continued)—ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE

(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)

<u>Combat Radius/ Range (n.m.)</u>	MODIFIED					1958 ⁸		1958 ¹		1960 ⁸	BEAR	1961
	BULL	BULL	BADGER	BADGER	BISON	BISON	BISON	BISON	BISON	BISON		MB-61 ²
a. 25,000 lb. bombload one refuel ¹	—	—	—	—	2,600/4,900	2,750/5,200	2,950/5,600	3,750/7,100	—	—	—	—
b. 10,000 lb bombload one refuel ¹	1,800/3,300	2,150/4,000	1,600/3,100	1,800/3,400	2,800/5,500	3,000/5,800	3,200/6,300	4,200/8,100	4	—	—	4
c. 3,300 lb. bombload one refuel ¹	2,400/4,500	2,900/5,400	2,150/4,200	2,400/4,600	3,800/7,400	4,000/7,800	4,300/8,500	5,750/—	4	—	—	4
	2,050/3,700	2,450/4,600	1,800/3,600	2,000/3,900	2,950/5,800	3,100/6,100	3,300/6,600	4,400/8,700	1,950/3,800 ⁵	—	—	1,950/3,800 ⁵
	2,750/5,000	3,350/6,200	2,450/4,800	2,650/5,200	3,950/7,800	4,150/8,200	4,450/8,900	6,100/—	2,650/5,100 ⁵	—	—	2,650/5,100 ⁵
<u>Speed/Altitude (kts./ ft.)</u>												
a. Max. speed at optimum altitude (kts./ft.) ⁷	350/30,000	360/30,000	550/13,200	555/14,000	530/18,000	540/18,800	540/18,800	495/21,600	1,085/35,000 ⁶	—	—	—
b. Target speed/target altitude (kts./ft.) ⁷	310/30,000	340/35,000	475/40,800	475/42,300	460/40,900	460/43,400	460/43,400	410/41,900	865/47,000 ⁶	—	—	—

(Continued)

TABLE 6—Continued

	BULL	MODIFIED BULL	BADGER	1958 ⁸ BADGER	BISON	1958 ¹ BISON	1960 ⁸ BISON	BEAR	1961 MB-61 ²
<u>Combat Ceiling (ft.)</u> ⁷	36,500	37,500	45,400	46,700	44,000	46,500	46,500	41,200	57,500 ⁶
<u>Terminal Target Altitude (ft.)</u> ³									
a. 25,000 lb. bombload	—	—	—	—	52,500	54,200	54,200	48,200	—
b. 10,000 lb bombload	41,500	42,500	50,000	52,500	54,200	55,800	55,800	50,000	61,000
c. 3,300 lb. bombload	42,000	43,000	51,500	54,300	54,800	56,500	56,500	51,000	62,500

¹Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximately 35 percent increases in radius/range. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bombload aboard. No range figure is associated with this altitude.

³Predicted jet medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capability.

⁴Capable of carrying 11,000 pound, 100 n.m. range ASM.

⁵Includes 500 n.m. "dash."

⁶For 3,300 lb. bombload.

⁷For 10,000 lb. bombload unless otherwise indicated.

⁸The increased performance indicated for the 1958 BADGER and the 1960 BISON is based upon an estimate of normally expected improvement during the period through 1960.

TABLE 7—ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LIGHT BOMBER AIRCRAFT
(OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE)

	1950	1951	1954	1951	1958 MADGE ¹ (Turboprop)	1958 Supersonic Tactical
	BEAGLE	MADGE ¹	BEAGLE	BOSUN		
Combat Radius/Range (n.m.)	735/1,400	580/1,450	745/1,400	765/1,510	790/1,980	900 ² /1,600 ³
Bombload (lbs.)	4,400	5,000	4,400	4,400	4,400	6,600
Maximum speed at optimum alt. (kts./ft.)	460/15,000	165/SL	480/19,000	475/15,000	270/5,000	Mach 1.23/35,000
Target speed/target alt. (kts./ft.)	385/39,000	110/5,000	395/42,200	400/35,100	—	Mach 1.06/43,000
Combat Ceiling (ft.)	43,800	19,700	46,900	43,000	22,000	57,300

¹May also be used in antisubmarine warfare. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Includes 50 n.m. "dash" radius.

³Includes 100 n.m. "dash."

TABLE 8—ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with Mil-C-5011A Spec)

		1957 CON- VERTED								
		1937 CAB	1947 COACH	1955 CRATE	1956 CAMEL	BULL	1958 CAMP	1958 TU-114	1958 CAT or COOT ²	1959 COOKER
Power Plants										
Number		2	2	2	2	4	2	4	4	4
Type		Piston	Piston	Piston	Turbojet	Piston	Turboprop	Turboprop	Turboprop	Turbojet
Combat Radius/ Range (naut. miles.)		810/1,525	665/1,335	750/1,570	950/2,040	1,670/3,150	730/1,440	2,500/5,200	1,000/2,200	1,800/3,800
Payload										
Passengers or Troops or		15	18	18	50	—	—	180	100	135
Cargo (lbs.)		20	21	21	60	42	80	220	145	175
Speed/Opt. Alt. ¹ (Kts./Ft.)		3,850	5,000	4,600	23,000	25,700	20,000	38,000	25,000	45,000
Cruise Speed/Alt. ³ (Kts./Ft.)		165/5,000	238/15,000	238/15,000	580/SL	300/20,000	280/17,000	500/20,000	450/20,000	535/20,000
Service Ceiling		115/10,000	165/10,000	160/10,000	430/32,800	198/10,000	230/15,000	505/20,000	325/25,000	425/33,000
Remarks:		16,600	26,500	26,500	37,100	39,550	31,000	40,000	35,000	50,000
	Soviet Version of DC-3				Transport Version of Badger	Transport Version of Bull	Assault Transport	Transport Version of Bear		

¹Normal rated power. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Constant altitude mission.

³Believed to be competitive designs; only one may be produced.

TABLE 9—ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL VESSELS, END-1957—MID-1962

YEAR	End-1957						End-58			End-60			End-61		Mid-62
FLEET AREA	North-ern		Black Sea		Pacific		Total All Fleets			TOTAL ALL FLEETS					
	Baltic														
COUNTRY	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR
MAJOR SURFACE VESSELS ¹	USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR	Satel- USSR
Heavy Cruisers	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	1	1
Old Heavy Cruisers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	5	5
Light Cruisers	5	0	6	5	0	4	1	20	0	1	19	19	19	15	15
Old Light Cruisers	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	2	2	2
Guided Missile Cruisers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	6	10	10
Destroyers	57	1	31	31	1	40	4	159	2	4	168	176	169	158	155
Old Destroyers	1	1	3	2	4	2	0	8	5	0	11	14	26	41	44
Guided Missile Destroyers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	8	12
Escort Vessels	23	2	16	22	0	31	2	92	2	2	104	116	128	140	146
TOTAL	89	4	56	63	5	79	7	287	9	7	311	338	360	380	390

(Continued)

TABLE 9—Continued

YEAR	End-1957						End-58						End-60		End-61		Mid-62
	North-ern			Pacific			Total All Fleets			TOTAL ALL FLEETS							
FLEET AREA	Baltic		Black Sea		USSR		Com-munist China		Satel-lites		Com-munist China		USSR		USSR		Satel-lites & Com-munist China
COUNTRY	USSR		USSR		USSR		USSR		USSR		USSR		USSR		USSR		
SUBMARINES ²																	
Postwar	57	0	100	60	0	35	2	252	0	2	242	242	242	242	242	242	28
Long-Range ¹																	
Other Long-Range ⁴	5	0	13	0	0	2	4	20	0	4	15	10	5	0	0	0	2
Old Long-Range	8	0	17	6	0	9	0	40	0	0	37	39	34	29	27	2	2
Guided Missile	0	0	7	0	0	3	0	10	0	0	20	20	20	20	20	20	0
(Converted, top-side stowage)																	
New Types ⁵	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	11	29	55	70	0	0
Postwar	49	0	0	0	0	0	0	49	0	0	69	89	109	129	139	0	0
Medium-Range ³																	
Other	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	8	6	4	3	2	0	0
Medium-Range ⁴																	
Old Medium-Range	2	3	0	4	3	10	4	16	6	4	15	13	6	6	6	3	3
(Continued)																	

(Continued)

YEAR	End-1957					End-58	End-59	End-60	End-61	Mid-62
FLEET AREA	North-ern		Black Sea	Pacific	Total All Fleets		TOTAL ALL FLEETS			
COUNTRY	Satel-lites	USSR	Satel-lites	USSR	China	Com-munist	Satel-lites	USSR	USSR	Satel-lites & Com-munist
Short Range	25	6	0	9	0	19	4	53	6	4
Old Short-Range	7	0	0	10	3	18	1	35	3	1
TOTAL	161	9	138	89	6	96	15	484	15	15
								488	503	512
								48	46	40
								15	11	16
								541	562	48

¹In addition to the major surface vessels shown, we estimate that in mid-1957 there were 1,760 minor surface vessels in Soviet service, and 475 in the Satellites and Communist China. Minor surface vessels include amphibious, minewarfare, and patrol vessels. "Old" surface ships are those more than 20 years old. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²For a discussion of the factors which may affect future Soviet submarine construction and strength, see DISCUSSION, paragraphs 144 and 144a. "Old" submarines are those 15-20 years old.

³Conventional submarines of post-World War II design and construction, including W and Z-class long-range and Q-class medium-range.

⁴Submarines older than post-World War II but less than 14 years old.

⁵Of these 70 new type submarines, the following tentative estimate is made of the possible types: 10 nuclear-powered, 10 nuclear-powered guided missile, 20 conventional-powered guided missile, and 30 submarines of improved design.

TABLE 10—ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT
FLEETS MID-1957 and MID-1962
(Ocean-going vessels, 1,000 GRT and up)

	MID-1957			
	NON-TANKER		TANKER	
	No.	GRT	No.	GRT
USSR	690	2,317,996	85	475,126
SATELLITES	113	428,879	3	18,444
COMMUNIST CHINA	106	268,860	10	13,834
TOTAL	909	3,015,735	98	507,404

	MID-1962			
	NON-TANKER		TANKER	
	No.	GRT	No.	GRT
USSR	882	3,122,000	154	1,071,000
SATELLITES	164	643,000	11	98,000
COMMUNIST CHINA	132	354,000	19	47,000
TOTAL	1,178	4,119,000	184	1,216,000

134. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–4–58

Washington, December 23, 1958

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¹ Source: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963. Top Secret; the Annex is Secret. 82 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files. Supersedes NIE 11–4–57.

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1958–1963

THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal political situation, economic developments, military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through about 1963.²

SUMMARY ESTIMATE

1. New tendencies have appeared on the Soviet political scene during the past year. Externally, the lines of conflict with the West have been drawn more sharply once again, and "reduction of tensions" no longer is the major theme of Soviet foreign policy. Internally there has been both in the USSR and in the Bloc an attempt to consolidate and stabilize, to check the pace of change, to curb the expectations and discipline the unruly tendencies aroused among the people by the milder policies of the post-Stalin years. There has been a return to a certain rigor in policy and in ideology. Nevertheless, the changes which affected almost every aspect of Soviet internal and external policy in the years after Stalin's death have for the most part not been reversed. The flexibility and pragmatism of the current leadership continues; innovations in policy may still be forthcoming, particularly in internal affairs.

Trends in Foreign Policy

2. During the course of the last year there has been a distinctly hardening tone in Soviet foreign policy. It is true that many of the new features introduced after the death of Stalin remain in force. The claim to be pursuing policies in the interest of establishing "peaceful coexistence" is still made; programs of cultural exchange and generally freer contact with the outside world have been continued. Nevertheless, a new militancy and assertiveness in Soviet policy has emerged more and more clearly. This has been most strikingly manifest in the Quemoy and Middle East crises, and in the developing crisis over Berlin.

3. The Soviet leaders probably decided that the special emphasis they had given to "peaceful coexistence" and easing of tensions had out-lived its usefulness. It had not had the anticipated effect of weakening Western alliances. Some features of the relaxation line—the new approach to Yugoslavia, the repudiation of Stalin, and the leeway given for some national autonomy in the Satellites—proved dangerous to

² "The reference to a five-year period is approximate. The economic calculations carry through 1965, to conform to the Soviet Seven-Year Plan; some of the political judgments, on the other hand, pertain to periods of less than five years. [Footnote is in the original.]

Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. A return to a harder course probably seemed desirable on these grounds alone. But at the same time, it appeared justified by the Soviet leaders' belief that, in power terms, there had been an enhancement of the Bloc's position and a decline in that of the West. This belief probably was based in the first place on Soviet weapons advances and scientific achievements. There was also a feeling that the outlook was good for new advances in Bloc economic strength after a period of some difficulty in 1956–1957, while at the same time Western economies were believed to be showing symptoms of economic crisis. Then, too, the Soviet leaders considered that Communist influence was generally growing stronger in underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, while Western influence continued to decline. The confidence of the Soviet leaders that they were entering upon a promising phase in the "struggle against imperialism" has been articulated in a new doctrine, namely, that an irrevocable shift in the relation of forces in the world has taken place to the advantage of the Communist Bloc.

4. This more confident and militant attitude on the part of the Soviet leadership does not mean that it has revised its attitude toward war as an instrument of policy. We continue to believe that the Soviet leaders have no intention of deliberately initiating general war and still wish to avoid serious risks of such a war. They almost certainly believe that, even with the acquisition of long-range missiles capable of striking the US, the scale of damage they would suffer in a general nuclear war would threaten the survival of their regime and society. Moreover, they regard the final victory of Communism as inevitable, and to be achieved mainly through political forms of struggle. The maintenance and further strengthening of great military power is primarily intended to deter a resort to force by the "imperialist" enemy, and to count as a weighty factor in persuading him to submit peacefully to a succession of political reverses as the revolutionary tide advances. Situations might arise, however, in which the Soviets would judge that military force could be used without unacceptable risk or that an imminent threat left them with no recourse but to initiate military action.

5. Currently, while the Soviets still wish to avoid serious risks of general war, they probably believe that the Bloc can increase its pressure on the West and can exploit local situations more vigorously, perhaps even through the use of Bloc armed force, without incurring the same degree of risk as they would have previously. While we have always considered it possible that Bloc forces would be used in overt local aggression if this could be done without much risk of serious involvement with Western forces, we do not believe that the likelihood of such aggression has increased. The Soviets may even believe that the West, also conscious of Soviet gains in military power, will be more

and more disinclined to react vigorously. Consequently, they now seem disposed to test Western firmness and probe for weaknesses in the hope that some key position may be abandoned without serious resistance, or that the Western alliance will split over some such issue.

6. In employing pressures against the West, the Soviet leadership doubtless intends to proceed with care. But its preoccupation with calculations of power, and its evident confidence in the strength of the Communist position, may lead it to underestimate dangers. We believe that if the current attitude of the Communist leaders persists, the danger of war arising from miscalculations will be increased.

7. The USSR has directed a major effort over the last several years toward underdeveloped countries. Its trade and aid programs, propaganda and cultural offensives are intended to displace Western influence, and to orient the policies of such states increasingly toward the Communist Bloc. The Soviet leaders believe that if they can associate the aspirations of underdeveloped peoples with their own cause they can increasingly constrict the political maneuverability of their main enemies, the Western Powers. We believe that the Soviet leaders will continue to regard the effort to develop Communist influence in underdeveloped countries as a major facet of their policy. The USSR's targets among the underdeveloped countries may shift considerably, in accordance with changing opportunities and local setbacks. In those countries where its efforts are most successful, the USSR may increasingly be tempted to support local communists in attempts to seize power. But the Soviets would carefully weigh such gains against the harmful consequences such a policy would inevitably evoke elsewhere. They will probably generally maintain the pose of peaceful cooperation. Since the claim to a "peace-loving" policy is one of the principal elements of the Soviet appeal to the neutralist states, the desire to sustain the plausibility of this claim will impose some restraint on the hard and uncompromising tone of Soviet policy toward the West.

8. The major Soviet effort to extend influence in underdeveloped areas has been made in the Middle East, where the West has important economic and strategic interests. The USSR will continue its policy of economic and military aid to Arab states, hoping to deepen the conflict of Arab nationalism with the West. The initial aim of this policy is to displace Western and increase Soviet influence, and to make Western access to the resources of the area precarious. The Soviet leaders probably also contemplate the eventual achievement of a long-sought Russian goal—land access to the strategic areas of the Middle East. To this end, they will continue to encourage and support such movements as that for an independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state and for a pro-Communist government in Iraq, and will also continue pressures against Iran and Turkey.

9. The Soviets also hope that radical anti-Western nationalism in the Middle East can eventually be given a revolutionary turn toward Communism. While they probably intend for the present to support Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement, they regard him as a "bourgeois nationalist" whose role is a transitory one. Given a favorable opportunity in some Arab country, they may encourage local Communists to capture the nationalist movement and attempt a seizure of power. An open conflict between Soviet revolutionary policy and Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement may occur during the period of this estimate.

10. In South Asia and the Far East, Soviet and Chinese Communist policy will probably continue to emphasize governmental contacts, supported by programs of economic aid and cultural exchange and an active propaganda, with a view to encouraging neutralist policies and where possible openly anti-Western ones. Short of a favorable opportunity to establish Communist power in a key country, the Chinese and Soviets will probably continue to put their main reliance on diplomatic action intended to influence governments rather than to overthrow them, and if possible to associate them with the Bloc against the Western Powers. As regards Africa and Latin America, the Soviet Government apparently views with optimism its prospects for successful diplomatic and economic penetration and, in keeping with a current trend, can be expected to intensify its efforts in these areas.

11. Soviet policy in Europe appears to be aimed more at consolidating the USSR's position in Eastern Europe than at an early expansion of Soviet power beyond the frontiers of the bloc. Soviet policy toward Western Europe is concerned mainly with breaking up the NATO political and military alliance and the defense structure located in that area. This is the main purpose of their maneuvers and proposals aimed at achieving "European security." Apart from the ever-present aim of creating discord among the NATO allies, the more immediate Soviet objectives are to prevent an increase of West German military strength and to prevent the establishment of additional missile bases in Western Europe.

12. The current Soviet diplomatic offensive over the status of Berlin is the most striking example of Khrushchev's activist foreign policy. It appears designed to strengthen the East German regime as well as to stimulate a more receptive atmosphere for other Soviet proposals on Germany and to create divisions among the NATO allies. The Soviet leaders probably intend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct Soviet and East German maneuvering in a manner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of the West, or of inclinations to compromise

on major issues. Nevertheless, they have already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, with considerable chance of miscalculation by one or both sides. We do not believe that the Soviets intend to modify the main lines of their policy on the German problem as a whole, but will continue to insist on maintaining the present division of Germany. They regard the preservation of Communist control in East Germany as essential to the maintenance of Communist power in Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole. They hope to consolidate their control of that area and to force Western recognition of the legitimacy and permanence of the Communist regimes there.

13. Soviet disarmament policy, which has at times shown some flexibility, is designed at a minimum to earn credit for the USSR as the leading proponent of "peace." Actual Soviet proposals are aimed mainly at the withdrawal of US military power from Western Europe and other bases, and also at discrediting and inhibiting US reliance on nuclear weapons. While it is possible that the USSR would accept some limitations on its own military posture in order to further these objectives, the Soviets would almost certainly not consent to any very extensive scheme for mutually inspected disarmament. We believe that there is little likelihood that the Soviets will desire a broad disarmament agreement strongly enough to move their policy significantly in the direction of the positions now held by the Western Powers.

Intra-Bloc Relations

14. In the last year a major effort has been undertaken to consolidate the unity of Bloc states. The conference of Communist parties in November 1957 launched the so-called antirevisionist campaign in order to curb deviationist tendencies which threatened in 1956 to eliminate Soviet influence from Poland and Hungary. The latter regime is again effectively under Moscow's control and the Gomulka government in Poland, while still preserving Party autonomy and some degree of independence in its internal policy, is showing itself more deferential to Soviet guidance. As compared with Stalin's methods, Moscow's authority in the Satellites will continue to be exercised discreetly out of deference to national sensitivities. In the very long run, we believe there will be a tendency for direct Soviet control over these states to be diluted. Popular dissatisfaction will remain widespread in Eastern Europe, but we believe that the recurrence of popular revolt or of an attempt by a Satellite Communist Party to defy Moscow on vital issues is unlikely at least over the next few years.

15. The scale of China's power and the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has long been organizationally independent of the USSR has made the Sino-Soviet relationship more nearly one of equality. The parallelism of material, strategic, and ideological interests will continue to weigh decisively in favor of cementing the alliance of the

two countries, even though frictions over a variety of questions—ideological issues, economic and military support by the USSR to China, competition for influence in other Communist parties—may from time to time make the relationship a sensitive and difficult one. We believe that Communist China will attain over the next several years an increasing influence on general Bloc policy and Communist ideology. However, so long as the struggle against the Western Powers remains the principal concern of both regimes, there is unlikely to be any serious split between them.

Soviet Internal Political Situation

16. Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet regime does not seem likely to be seriously challenged so long as his health remains vigorous. In the absence of such a challenge, or of any major setback to his policies, he does not seem likely to attempt a return to the terroristic methods of dictatorship employed by Stalin. He appears to recognize that the abandonment of such methods has improved the political climate within the country. Nevertheless, the regime is now again emphasizing its vigilance against dissenters, and would probably not hesitate to use more severely repressive measures if it judged this to be necessary. We believe that, even though the regime continues to alienate many, especially among intellectuals and the youth, it has gained wider acceptance among the population generally. This is due mainly to the relaxation of police terror, to improvements in material standards, and to pride in the power, world position, scientific and economic achievements of the Soviet state.

17. We believe that, although there will be differences within the Soviet leadership over certain issues of policy, and discontents within some groups of the population, the regime will seldom be constrained in major foreign policy decisions by concern for internal political weaknesses. Should Khrushchev die, there would probably again be a period of confused jockeying for the leadership. It is unlikely that this would basically affect the continuity of the regime's policies or its ability to carry them out, but such a period might diminish the authority of the Soviet Party within the Bloc and lead to divisions within and among Communist Parties. Over the very long run, loss of belief in the ideological doctrine the regime imposes, and the increasing influence of professional elements who are not ideologically inclined, may moderate the Soviet outlook. At present, however, we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally.

Trends in the Soviet Economy

18. Soviet economic policy continues to aim primarily at a rapid expansion of the economic bases of national power. We believe that

the goals laid down in the new Seven-Year Plan, which begins in 1959, are in the main feasible, except for those in agriculture, and that the USSR's gross national product (GNP) will grow at an average annual rate of about six percent during the plan period. Assuming that the US maintains an average rate of growth of about 3.5 percent per year, Soviet GNP in 1965 will be, in dollar terms, about half that of the US, as compared with about 40 percent at present. Despite the smaller size of its economy, the dollar value of the USSR's defense expenditure is about equal to that of the US. Our estimates of the probable trend of military expenditures indicate that by 1963 these will be 45–50 percent greater than in 1957. Since growth of GNP in this period is estimated at 45 percent, the defense burden may thus be slightly heavier in 1963 than at present. Despite this, we estimate that Soviet industrial production will grow over the new plan period at an average annual rate of about nine percent, and that per capita consumption will be about one-third higher in 1965 than it was in 1957.

19. Beyond what they contribute to Soviet military power, the achievements of the Soviet economy have become a vitally important element in the impact which Soviet policy has on the world situation. First is the direct politico-economic impact, arising from the ability of the USSR to initiate and support programs of economic aid or credit to foreign countries, to import goods from countries which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find markets, and to export various materials in quantities which (if the Soviet leaders so desired) could disrupt previously existing patterns of world trade. In this connection, manipulation of prices is a key weapon of the USSR. Second is the political and psychological effect on underdeveloped countries of the successful and rapid economic development achieved by Soviet and Chinese methods. The Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders attach great importance to the possibility of convincing these countries that only by adopting Communist methods and accepting Communist assistance can they too achieve rapid economic growth. Third is the economic impact in a narrower sense, arising inevitably from the appearance in the world of a great new producing and trading unit, the influence of which could not fail to be great even if it were not deliberately used for political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In all three ways the Soviet economy will present a growing challenge to the Western world.

Developments Affecting the Soviet Military Posture

20. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to believe that they must have a large and diversified military establishment, designed to meet contingencies up to and including general war. Thus they will at all times maintain substantial forces-in-being. Meanwhile, they will press ahead with research and development programs in order to

acquire additional capabilities with advanced weapon systems, and if possible to achieve clear military superiority over the US.

21. The present Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile could include weapons in a range of yields from about 2 KT to about 8 MT. The USSR probably possesses sufficient nuclear weapons to support a major attack by its long-range striking forces, but the supply of fissionable materials is probably insufficient for large-scale allocation of such weapons to air defense and tactical uses as well. Since we estimate a substantial and high priority Soviet program for the expansion of fissionable material production and considerable further improvement in nuclear weapons technology, we believe that current limitations will ease during 1959–1963.

22. The principal Soviet military component presently capable of long-range nuclear attack is Long Range Aviation, with about 1,450 bombers (including some convertible tanker-bombers), among which are about 950 jet medium bombers and about 100 to 125 jet and turbo-prop heavy bombers. This force—best suited for attacking targets in Eurasia and its periphery—is capable of large-scale attacks against the US only through the extensive use of medium bombers on one-way missions. While the size of the long-range bomber force will probably decline gradually, Soviet long-range striking capabilities will increase markedly as the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows, improved bombers are introduced, the readiness and proficiency of the bomber force increases, and especially as the Soviet capacity to deliver nuclear weapons by missiles expands.³

23. The USSR will rely increasingly upon missiles as nuclear delivery systems during 1959–1963. Present operational weapons include ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges up to 700 and probably 1,100 nautical miles (n.m.), as well as bomber-launched air-to-surface missiles suitable for use against ships and certain other targets. A few conventional submarines have probably been converted to employ 200 n.m. cruise-type missiles. The USSR will probably achieve a first

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, does not concur in the last sentence of this paragraph. He agrees that Soviet long-range striking capabilities will increase markedly but believes that this increase cannot be attributed to the introduction of improved bombers of the types and within the strength levels estimated, or to continued training of bomber crews. In his view, the estimated acquisition by the USSR of a substantial ICBM capability, along with the anticipated increase in the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile, are factors which far outweigh comparatively routine improvements in the existing force. Therefore, he believes that the last sentence of this paragraph should read as follows: "The Soviets can be expected to introduce improved bombers and to increase the readiness and proficiency of Long Range Aviation units, but the size of this force and its significance in a long-range attack role will gradually decline during the period. Nonetheless, Soviet long-range striking capabilities will increase markedly as the Soviet missile delivery capability expands and as the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows." [Footnote is in the original.]

operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs of 5,500 n.m. range at some time during 1959. While it is possible that a limited capability with comparatively unproven ICBMs might have been established in 1958, we believe this to be unlikely. We believe that Soviet planners intend to acquire a sizeable ICBM capability as soon as practicable.

24. Air defense capabilities will increase through improvements in the performance characteristics of weapons and equipment, a higher proportion of all-weather fighters, further incorporation of guided missiles in the defenses of numerous targets, and especially through wide employment of semiautomatic air defense control. But the Soviets will continue to have difficulty in opposing very low altitude attack, the air defense system will still be subject to disruption and saturation, and the problem of warning time will become more critical. The USSR will probably not have a weapon system with even limited effectiveness against ballistic missiles until 1963 or later.

25. The ground forces, estimated to have 67 mechanized or motorized rifle divisions, 75 rifle divisions, 23 tank divisions, and 10 airborne divisions, have been extensively modernized and reorganized, in accordance with revised Soviet tactical doctrine which supplements standard tactics and training with those designed for conditions of nuclear warfare. These forces are closely supported by tactical aviation consisting of fighters trained in the ground attack role (in addition to their air defense role) and light and medium bombers trained in ground support bombing techniques. With appropriate air and naval support, Soviet ground forces are capable of conducting large-scale operations on several fronts into peripheral areas, separately or concurrently. The increasing availability of nuclear weapons and guided missiles during 1959–1963 will bring further evolutionary changes, but probably no major alterations in size or deployment of forces. Tactical and naval air units, some of which have already received jet medium bombers, will probably receive new supersonic fighters and bombers. Increasing attention is being paid to the development of airborne forces and air transport capabilities.

26. The present Soviet force of about 440 submarines includes about 260 long-range craft of postwar design and construction. A recent slowdown in construction probably reflects a shift to new types, including nuclear-powered submarines and submarines designed specifically to employ guided missiles. A submarine-launched ballistic missile system with a missile range of about 1,000 n.m. will probably be available for first operational use in 1961–1963. Construction of conventional submarines will probably continue, but the greater complexity of nuclear-powered and missile submarines will probably result in a total annual production rate considerably below the high levels of recent years.

27. *Space Programs.* We believe that the USSR is presently capable of orbiting earth satellites weighing on the order of 5,000 pounds, of launching lunar probes and satellites, and of launching planetary probes to Mars and Venus. Its space program could also include: surveillance satellites and recoverable aeromedical satellites (1958–1959); “soft landings” by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earth satellites (1959–1960); a manned glide-type high altitude research vehicle (1960–1961); earth satellites weighing as much as 25,000 pounds and manned circumlunar flights (1961–1962). While each of these individual achievements appears feasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that the USSR could accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified. If the Soviets desire to do so, an earth satellite could be launched from the territory of Communist China within the next year or so.

Soviet Scientific Achievements

28. The USSR’s achievements during the last year, including earth satellite launchings, weapons development, and the scale of its efforts in the IGY program, have strikingly demonstrated that the USSR has acquired a scientific establishment of the first rank. As a result of a sustained effort over the last three decades, the number of graduates in scientific and technical disciplines has steadily increased, research facilities have been greatly expanded, and the quality of Soviet scientific training has improved. Soviet scientists have made marked progress in many areas of fundamental and applied research and in some fields rank among the best in the world. We believe that significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur in the future with greater frequency than in the past.

DISCUSSION

I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Ascendancy of Khrushchev

29. Khrushchev’s position as the dominating figure on the Soviet scene appears to be well established. There does not appear to be any other leader or any group able or willing seriously to challenge his position. The Twenty-First Party Congress, scheduled for January 1959, may install still more of his followers in the highest Party organs and further dramatize his personal and ideological authority. Thus, it is likely to be Khrushchev who will preside over the Soviet regime throughout the period of this estimate, assuming that he retains his health and vigor. However, Khrushchev’s policies will probably continue to arouse concern among certain elements of the Party, and an attempt to reduce his authority cannot be entirely excluded.

30. Although he is in a sense Stalin's heir, Khrushchev will almost certainly not rule as Stalin ruled. The style of his leadership is characteristic of his own personality, and is reflected in a suitable myth: the new leader is a gregarious man of the people, and remains "close to the masses;" he is a rough and practical-minded man, but his political judgment is unerring, and like Lenin he commands the Party by the persuasive force of his arguments rather than by the fear he inspires. This image probably reflects the manner in which Khrushchev prefers to rule; he fancies himself as the popular boss-persuader. His method of leadership is also consistent with the needs of the post-Stalin period. Consequently, he will be disposed to avoid the use of terror as a main instrument of rule, though the police will be kept strong and employed as necessary. Errors in judgment, even opposition on some issues, will not generally be treated as political crimes. The Central Committee and Party Congresses will probably continue to meet regularly. There will be greater representation of outlying regions at the center, and more concern displayed for local interests. In short, the consolidation of Khrushchev's power will probably not mean a return to dictatorship of the Stalinist type.

31. Moreover, there will continue to be pressures on Khrushchev which will work to limit his exercise of dictatorial power. Since his authority, unlike Stalin's, does not rest on the use of terror, Khrushchev must to a far greater degree seek to win and hold the support of groups within the Party apparatus. Inner Party maneuverings are complicated by the fact that greater account must be taken of popular sentiment than was true under Stalin; Khrushchev's position in particular is exposed because he is identified with economic and social programs which have stimulated popular desires for further material improvement and he is thus personally accountable for maintaining a good record of performance in relation to promises. At some point within the period of this estimate Khrushchev may face the dilemma either of tolerating radically opposing views within the leadership, thus imperiling his control, or of attempting to suppress opposition tendencies, at the cost of a return to terror. If, although we think it unlikely, a serious challenge to Khrushchev's personal position should arise, not all of the allies and associates who supported him during his rise to power would necessarily remain loyal to him.

32. The ebullient personality of Khrushchev has been considered by some observers as likely to give Soviet foreign and domestic policy an erratic and unstable course. We think this is unlikely. His public manner is probably in large part that of the conscious actor-politician, intended to confound his opponents and to impart vigor to the execution of his policies. His advocacy of certain unexpected departures in Soviet policies in recent years was probably not unrelated to efforts to

steal a march on his competitors in the succession struggle. We think that the substance, as distinguished from the style, of Soviet policy is likely to be little affected by Khrushchev's idiosyncrasies.

Role of the Party

33. The victory of Khrushchev has been paralleled by an increasing use of the Party apparatus in all aspects of control and administration. At the top, in the Party Presidium, the majority now consists of Khrushchev's followers who were elevated from the Secretariat and of important regional Party secretaries; the former overwhelming representation of men in leading government positions has been drastically reduced.⁴ Party personalities either preside over or play important roles in the regional economic councils which now administer the economy in place of the former central ministries. Local Party secretaries have also been brought into the district military councils, giving the Party a closer hold on military administration. In rural areas measures have been taken to give the local Party more effective control over agriculture.

34. This increased role of the Party at all levels of administration was probably intended in part to insure Khrushchev's firm control over the country, since the Party apparatus was his principal instrument of power. But the reforms in industry and agriculture which he has sponsored in recent years—all involving decentralization and a fuller reliance on local initiative—have also made closer Party supervision more necessary in order to combat local violations of the Party's economic directives. Under Khrushchev much more will depend on morale and discipline within the Party at local levels than has been the case in the past.

35. The increase in authority of the Party apparatus has taken place at the expense of the various interest groupings which compete for place and influence behind the façade of totalitarian Party unity. The professional military opposes the system of political commissars and, despite Zhukov's removal for attempting to reduce Party control over the armed forces, this attitude will persist. Government administrators and economic managers will continue to resent what they regard as the bungling interference of Party hacks in their technical spheres. Intellectuals—writers, artists, scientists, students—will continue to press for a greater area of freedom and a loosening of the Party's ideological strait-jacket. While each of these groups has a stake in the success and prosperity of the Soviet state, each has also professional interests to further. One purpose of Khrushchev in elevating the Party

⁴ At present, 11 of the 14 full members of the Party's Presidium hold key posts in the Party apparatus (including 9 of the 10 secretaries), and only 3 other than Khrushchev himself hold leading governmental positions. By contrast, at the time of Malenkov's removal in 1955, of the 9 full members of the Presidium 8 were in leading governmental positions, and only Khrushchev was a full time official in the Party apparatus. [Footnote is in the original.]

apparatus is to prevent the hardening of these professional interests into self-contained, autonomous groups which might ultimately have independent political importance.

36. It has been suggested by some Western observers that, as the Soviet economy matures and becomes more complex, as the needs of society come to be met by more specialized administrative skills, as education is extended and diversified, the totalitarian character of the regime will be diluted. The dictator or the Party as the single focus of power, it has been argued, will give way to autonomy in areas of less immediate political significance. Even in the political field, institutional arrangements will have to be found for representing many diverse interest groups: it was possible to see signs of such a tendency in the post-Stalin period of confusion occasioned by the succession struggle. On occasion, the Central Committee of the Party became an arena of political decision with factional and policy differences represented within it. In the post-Stalin period the rulers have also seemed to think it necessary to take account of public opinion generally in framing their policies. Such tendencies to dilute arbitrary power and to broaden participation in policymaking beyond the narrow circle of the Party Presidium may reappear at the time of Khrushchev's death or at some other period of weakened authority. For the present, however, Khrushchev's restoration of one-man leadership, and his manner of achieving it through the Party apparatus, has maintained Soviet society firmly in the totalitarian mold.

Issues in Soviet Politics

37. This development does not mean that there will not continue to be group pressures and much pulling and hauling over issues of policy. Even under one-man leadership the normal play of politics is not adjourned, though it may become less visible. There are a number of issues over which lines are likely to be drawn behind the façade of unity. For example, whatever the degree of its practical success, the economic reorganization scheme is laden with political significance. It calls for the removal of a host of bureaucrats from Moscow to the provinces, a fate little relished by the migrants. The reorganization could lead to a regionalism which would be a new source of tension, although the revitalized Party must, in Khrushchev's calculation, serve as the cement which binds the periphery to the center. This reorganization, like the ideologically controversial measures Khrushchev has sponsored in agriculture, has yet to be fully proved in practice. Khrushchev may yet be driven to some agile maneuvering to defend his innovations.

38. Also among the issues likely to affect inner Party politics are those related to Soviet economic growth. The growth achieved may not be high enough to attain all the goals—high rates of investment, increase in agricultural output, rising living standards, modern armaments—which now have priority in Party programs. Cutting

back on any of these objectives could lead to dispute. The leaders of the armed forces, for example, would not willingly accept either a substantial cut in the military budget or reduced investment for industries of military significance. The Party apparatus itself, influenced by the lower ranks where there is direct contact with popular pressures, would be reluctant to sacrifice prospective gains in living standards. Failure to achieve satisfactory rates of growth could produce resistance to further outlays in foreign aid or bring into question Khrushchev's economic reorganization.

39. There are likewise some purely political issues which may have divisive effects. The Soviet ruling groups would be reluctant to see a return to the systematic use of terror. The question of the control of the secret police is of widespread concern and would become paramount in case Khrushchev's mastery were ever placed in doubt. There must be some in positions of influence who are concerned with what seems to them the downgrading of Soviet authority in the Bloc, as represented by toleration of the Gomulka regime in Poland and the increasing weight of China in ideological and policy matters. There may be others who question Khrushchev's policy of alliance with "national liberation movements" in underdeveloped areas on the ground that such a policy increases the danger of war arising from clashes with Western interests, and involves support of bourgeois movements which cannot be used to promote Communism.

40. Khrushchev's late arrival at supreme power (he is now 64) will make the prospect of a new succession struggle a lively, if seldom discussed, factor in inner Party maneuverings. As he grows older it will be difficult to separate policy issues like those discussed above from the succession question. Thus major tensions will probably continue to be present within the Soviet body politic despite the stabilization of power at the top, and these will from time to time affect the face which Soviet policy presents to the outside world.

Attitudes in Soviet Society

41. The post-Stalin leadership set out to effect a basic improvement in the attitude of the Soviet people toward the regime. The relaxation of police terror and the greater attention to living standards served this end. The greatest material gains so far have been made by the peasantry, but a continuing improvement of urban standards over the next few years, particularly in housing, is also promised. In terms of its standing with the population as a whole, the regime is probably stronger now than it was five years ago. We believe that the measures which have produced this improvement will be continued.

42. Soviet society continues nevertheless to be marked by substantial areas of discontent. There exists, and will probably continue to exist,

considerable disaffection among intellectuals, particularly among Soviet writers and university students. It is significant because it touches a highly vulnerable area, the regime's ideological authority. Intellectuals are aware of the discrepancies between the Marxist-Leninist ideal and Soviet reality and they also resent the regime's encroachments on private life and professional interests. They doubt that adequate safeguards exist to prevent the repetition of Stalinist terror. They feel contempt for Party careerists. They resent restrictions on travel abroad, and limitations on access to Western publications and broadcasts. These discontents do not take the form of active opposition but are limited for the most part to a retreat into an inner world so as to minimize the degree of involvement with the Party and the state.

43. There continues also to be dissidence among some national minorities. The peoples of the old Baltic states harbor vigorous Russophobe feelings. They feel strongly that they are exploited and that their homelands lag far behind their prewar cultural and living standards. A considerable residue of anti-Russian sentiment is also to be found in the western Ukraine, as well as in Georgia, where the downgrading of Stalin and the loss of its former privileged status also rankle. It seems probable, furthermore, that many of the two million Jews in the Soviet Union would like to emigrate. Because many Jews hold key professional positions and have connections abroad, the regime probably regards them as a continuing security problem.

44. We do not believe that any of the discontents and tensions described above are likely to have major political significance during the period of this estimate, although they will place restrictions on the regime's ability to mobilize the population for its own purposes. The regime will deal with them by its well-practiced methods of concession and suppression. Moreover, its success in identifying with itself the sense of national pride and power, extending even to chauvinism, is a formidable asset with which to counter discontent. The Soviet people are well aware that under Communist rule Russia has been transformed from a backward, agrarian, defeated nation into the world's second most powerful state, perhaps, they would like to believe, the most powerful. The Russian tradition takes it for granted that government is by nature tyrannical, arbitrary, and exacting. If it fulfills the aspiration to national power, it can be forgiven much.

The Longer View

45. Have the processes of change which have operated so broadly and visibly in Soviet society since the death of Stalin opened up perspectives for more fundamental change in the long run? It seems undeniable that such a possibility exists. One source of such change could be a failure by the totalitarian Party repeatedly to renew its vitality; this might result in a dilution of its monopoly of power in favor of other

interest groups upon which the functioning of the society will increasingly depend as its industrialization proceeds. Another could be inability of the Party to maintain its intellectual and ideological authority as awareness of the gap between reality and ideology increases, a process which will be accelerated as contacts with the West are extended. We consider that the effect of factors like these cannot now be reckoned to have any assured outcome. At present, we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally.

II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

General

46. The performance of the Soviet economy has become a vitally important element in the impact which Soviet policy has on the world situation. This importance derives from an extraordinary record of growth over the last decade, a growth which is certain to continue at a rate faster than that of the US economy. The strength of the Soviet economy has provided a foundation of great national power for Soviet policy, first and foremost military power: the USSR has had available the means to maintain military programs and to develop advanced weapons on a scale which no other state except the US can undertake.

47. However, apart from its function as a basis for Soviet military power, there are three other ways in which the impact of the Soviet economy on the world situation is already observable to a greater or lesser degree, and is certain to increase. First is the direct politico-economic impact, arising from the ability of the USSR to initiate and support programs of economic aid or credit to foreign countries, to import goods from countries which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find markets, and to export various materials in quantities which (if the Soviet leaders so desired) could disrupt previously existing patterns of world trade. In this connection, manipulation of prices is a key weapon of the USSR. Second is the political and psychological effect on underdeveloped countries, achieved through the exhibition of successful and rapid economic development by Communist methods, and through the encouragement of such countries to do likewise under Soviet advice—the Soviet leaders attach great importance to this aspect. Third is the economic impact in a narrower sense, arising inevitably from the appearance in the world of a great new producing and trading unit, the influence of which could not fail to be great even if it were not deliberately used for political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In all three ways the Soviet economy will present a growing challenge to the Western world.

Shifts in Economic Policy

48. Soviet economic policy continues to be marked by a spirit of innovation and experimentation. With the announcement early in 1958 of the program to abolish the Machine Tractor Stations, the present leadership added another to the series of major measures of change it has undertaken in recent years. Most of the steps taken, in particular the reorganization scheme of 1957 involving the dissolution of central ministries and their replacement by 104 regional economic councils, have figured as issues in the political struggle for Stalin's succession. Khrushchev's rise to power was probably due at least in part to his initiative in sponsoring novel measures to cope with the problems of economic policy with which the regime found itself confronted at Stalin's death.

49. These problems arose in part because of the great growth and increasing complexity of the Soviet economic system and the failure of the Soviet leadership to adapt its planning and control mechanisms to these developments. Difficulties were aggravated during Stalin's later years by his unwillingness to countenance any departures from the pattern of economic policy laid down during the early Five-Year Plans. Concentration on heavy industry led to imbalances in the economy; agriculture and housing were denied investment and generally neglected. When the Soviet leaders turned to reforming measures after 1953, the problems which immediately confronted them included the increased complexity of planning and administration as industrial output became more varied and specialized, the need to employ labor and material resources more efficiently as these came to be more fully utilized, higher investment requirements to maintain gains in output, and the necessity to provide greater material incentives in order to improve labor discipline and obtain higher labor productivity.

50. The attack on these problems has involved a variety of measures over the last five years. First, there was a change in the political atmosphere—the easing of police terror and penalties for economic dereliction. The intention was to improve the conditions for managerial initiative in enterprises and to aid the campaign for faster growth of labor productivity. Second, changes in investment priorities were made in order to alleviate the desperate situation in housing, to lift agricultural output out of its stagnation, and to overcome the failure of basic materials output to keep pace with the requirements of fabricating industry. These changes also reflected the regime's desire to improve living conditions, in the expectation that political and economic benefits would flow from improved attitudes on the part of the Soviet population. Finally, in 1957–1958, the regime undertook a sweeping reform of economic administration in an effort to overcome the impediments

which bureaucracy had come to put in the way of efficient operation of the economy.

51. The economic reorganization scheme has been described as a decentralization plan, but it was this in only a limited sense. There never was any intention to weaken the basic apparatus of centralized planning or to give up the political determination of economic priorities in favor of decision-making at lower levels according to economic criteria alone. The plan aimed at eliminating the top-heavy vertical administration of the Moscow industrial ministries. It was hoped that this would result in a more efficient response to central plan directives. The theory was that, by allowing a greater degree of local initiative and by placing the administrators in the regions close to the enterprises they were supervising, the implementing of decisions would be more realistic and less wasteful.

52. The results obtained thus far probably have included some gains of the kind anticipated—better use of local resources, fuller use of transportation facilities, less delay on routine decisions. But the new system contains dangers of its own, which have been heavily attacked in the Soviet press under the name of “localism.” To the extent that freedom to dispose of resources locally has been allowed it has been difficult to prevent decisions from being taken in local rather than national interests. There evidently has been a tendency, aside from some cases of outright corruption, for the local authorities to divert resources to plans of their own for the greater development of their regions, sometimes to the neglect of centrally imposed plans and priorities. The chronic problem of obtaining conformity to economic goals imposed by political fiat from the center, with little regard for local desires or the economic criteria which appeal to the managers of enterprises, seems to persist. We believe, therefore, that the regime will continue to experiment with new techniques of economic planning and administration.

53. The Soviet leadership under Khrushchev seems confident nevertheless that it has already overcome the difficulties which emerged in 1956 when cumulative mistakes in planning caused shortages in basic materials and forced abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The regime has announced a new Seven-Year Plan which again sets ambitious goals. It reaffirms the traditional emphases upon the rapid growth of heavy industry, and upon maintaining large military programs. But the Plan also provides for other key programs to which the regime has committed itself in recent years. The Soviet leaders intend to go forward with increasing living standards. Programs of lesser cost will include maintaining Soviet power in Eastern Europe by supporting the Satellite economies as needed, assisting the industrialization of Communist China, and backing up Soviet political objectives in underdeveloped countries with trade and aid programs. The main

question affecting Soviet economic policy over the next five years is whether these multiple priorities, all of which bear on the competitive struggle with the West in which the Soviet leaders see themselves involved, can be met simultaneously. On the whole, we believe that the Seven-Year Plan production goals are feasible, except in agriculture, but that their achievement will impose considerable strains on the economy, and that some programs may have to be modified as the plan period proceeds.

Prospects for Economic Growth


54. The Soviet economy will grow less rapidly during the next seven years than it did during the last seven. Soviet gross national product (GNP) increased at an average annual rate close to 7 percent from 1950 to 1955, and at about 6.5 percent from 1955 to 1957. This slight slackening in the rate of growth obscures a decline in the growth of industrial production from an annual rate of about 11 percent to about 9 percent, and a nearly offsetting acceleration in the growth of agriculture. Because of favorable weather and a large agricultural output the rate of growth of GNP in 1958 has apparently again risen somewhat. Over the period 1958–1965 we believe that GNP will probably grow at an average annual rate of about 6 percent. At this figure, assuming that the US achieves an average annual rate of 3.5 percent,⁵ Soviet GNP in 1965 will be, in dollar terms, about half that of the US, as compared with about 40 percent of US GNP at present.

55. As Soviet GNP continues to gain in size relative to US GNP, the differences between Soviet and US use of national product will continue to be marked. With a GNP only about two-fifths the size of US GNP, the dollar value of Soviet defense expenditure is approximately equal to that of the US.⁶ Soviet investment, in dollar values currently around two-thirds as great as US investment, will grow more rapidly than Soviet GNP during the next seven years, and will approach still closer the absolute size of US investment. Investment in industry alone was about 90 percent of US investment in industry (manufacturing, mining, and utilities) in 1957. The dollar value of Soviet total consumption is less than one-third that of the US. Soviet consumption, on the other hand, will increase at a slower rate than total GNP during the 1958–1965 period, thus becoming a smaller share of the latter. (See graph below.)

⁵ This projected rate of the US is approximately midway between the postwar rate and the long run trend. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ The dollar value referred to here was derived by valuing manpower at appropriate US pay rates and other items of military significance at comparable US costs. [Footnote is in the original.]

**SOVIET CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT, AND DEFENSE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF US, 1957**
(Measured in Comparable Prices)



56. The slightly reduced pace of Soviet economic growth anticipated in this estimate reflects increasing difficulties in obtaining labor, material, and machinery. The economy may be better able to cope with such difficulties as a result of recent changes in the planning, organization, and implementation of economic activity, but the benefits from these changes will be offset by other factors. Agriculture will tend to grow more slowly following the period of sharp output gains of 1954–1958. Industrial growth will be affected by rising investment requirements per unit of additional output and by continuing difficulties in supplying adequate quantities of key material inputs, especially ferrous metals. In addition, there will be a reduced rate of growth of the labor force, owing to the growing impact of the decline in the birth rate during World War II, at a time when the introduction of a shorter work week in industry may increase the need for new industrial workers.

Trends in Defense Expenditures⁷

57. Our estimates of the probable trend of military expenditures through 1963 indicate a defense allocation in that year approximately

⁷ Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures are subject to a wider margin of error than other statistical estimates in this section and should therefore be used with greater caution. [Footnote is in the original.]

45–50 percent greater than the 1957 level. Achievement of the estimated 45 percent growth in Soviet GNP would mean that the defense burden, taken in the aggregate, would be slightly heavier in 1963 than at present, though still not as heavy as in the years immediately prior to 1957. Defense requirements will impose burdensome claims upon various types of resources needed for investment and economic growth.

58. Most of the increase in defense expenditures will result from increasing allocations to more costly aircraft, to guided missiles, military research and development, and nuclear weapons. These programs together probably account for about one-third of total expenditures at present. By 1963 they are expected to require about twice as much in resources as at present and to account for about 45 percent of total defense programs.

59. Soviet defense expenditures in recent years, when converted into dollar values, appear to be of roughly the same magnitude as US defense expenditures. As stated above, the USSR, with a much smaller GNP than the US, produces military goods and services with a dollar value roughly the same. It is able to do this primarily because in the USSR military end-items are less expensive, relative to consumption items, than they are in the US, and because the average level of real pay and subsistence provided Soviet military personnel is much lower than in the US.

Industrial Prospects

60. The eventual aim of overtaking US industry in per capita production continues to dominate Soviet planning for industry. Shifts in the allocation of resources during the period 1953–1955 in support of the economic innovations of the post-Stalin regime—first Malenkov's broad consumer goods program and then Khrushchev's agricultural consumer goods and housing programs—contributed to a moderate decrease in the rate of growth of heavy industry. Heavy industry was expected to benefit, however, from a new program of automation and re-equipment and from changes in industrial management, planning and control, introduced during this period. But by 1956 the failure to provide sufficient new capacity in the raw materials industries caused a severe shortage of industrial raw materials, particularly steel, coal, and cement.

61. The leadership's response to this situation during the last two years has been to abandon the Sixth Five-Year Plan, cut back industrial output goals for 1957 and subsequently for 1958, and to order the formulation of a new Seven-Year Plan for the period 1959–1965. It also launched a remedial investment program which was to increase capacity in raw materials industries while still maintaining

ambitious programs in agriculture and housing. The reorganization plan of July 1957, as already indicated, was also intended to insure a better utilization of materials by permitting greater leeway for local decisions.

62. Industrial growth was claimed by the Soviets to be 10 percent for 1957 and for the first three quarters of 1958, and while this claim was probably somewhat overstated, it indicates that the reduced goals of 7.0 and 7.5 percent for these years were set too low. These rates of increase, however, obscure the continuing poor performance of some basic industries, particularly ferrous metallurgy. Moreover, in spite of the remedial investment program, additions to production capacity in these industries continued to fall short of planned goals in 1957, and probably in 1958 also. Production goals for 1965 in the basic materials industries indicate that they must continue to receive priority treatment if planned rates of increases are to be achieved. Substantial overfulfillment of presently planned goals in these industries, although not likely to occur, would be necessary to approach the 11 percent annual increases in industrial production which we believe were achieved during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–1955). However, we believe that the 8.7 percent average annual rate of growth given in the present version of the New Seven-Year Plan is feasible. (See table below for a list of some Soviet industrial output goals.)

63. One of the factors affecting future industrial growth will be the impact of raw material constraints on the machinery and metal fabricating sector. Despite the current effort being directed into raw materials it is expected that the rate of growth of metals will fall from the 10.5 percent annual average of the past seven years to about 8 or 9 percent per year for the period 1958–1965. This slower growth of metals output will have a restraining effect on the growth of the machinery and metal fabricating sector. Even so, the Seven-Year Plan targets in many of the metals industries are impressive even in terms of past Soviet accomplishments. The announced 1965 goal for steel, stated as 86 to 91 million tons, suggests uncertainty as to what can be achieved in this industry. Even the lower figure represents an increase of 31 million tons over the present level of output, as compared with a gain of 24 million tons in 1951–1958.

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1957-1965

Product	Unit ¹	US-USSR Outputs in 1957			USSR 1965 Goals
		US	USSR ²	USSR as Percent of US	
Electric Power	Billion KWH	754	210	28	500-520
Crude Oil	Million Tons	354	98	28	230-240
Coal	Million Tons	469	463	99	596-609
Crude Steel	Million Tons	102	51	50	86-91
Primary Copper	Thousand Tons	1,319	440	33	946
Primary Aluminum	Thousand Tons	1,500	550	37	1,830
Cement	Million Tons	50	29	58	75-81
Machine Tools	Thousand Units	62	130	210	140-200
Generators for Steam & Hydraulic Turbines	Million KW	10.8	5.6	52	17.5-18.4
Commercial Vehicles	Thousand Units	1,100	382	35	750-856 ³
Sulfuric Acid	Thousand Tons (100%)	14,700	4,569	31	10,176 ⁴
Cotton Fabrics	Million Meters	8,748	5,600	64	7,700-8,000
Leather Footwear	Million Pairs	594	315	53	515
Washing Machines	Thousand Units	3,589	377	10	4,048

¹All tonnage figures in metric tons. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Except for primary aluminum and copper, which are estimated, the production data are based on official Soviet announcements and are accepted as valid.

³Includes automobiles.

⁴Since no official goal has been published, this figure represents our estimate.

64. The slower natural increase of the labor force during the period of this estimate may also be a limiting factor on the rate of Soviet industrial growth. Population increase and a continuation of past school programs would provide an estimated increase of only about seven million men in the total civilian labor force over the next seven years. The Seven-Year Plan requires an increase of about 11 million men in the nonagricultural labor force. Moreover, the regime is heavily committed to reduce hours of work and has reaffirmed such an intention in its Seven-Year Plan announcement. The goals for gains in productivity reflect the regime's recognition that the labor supply is now a limitation on the rate of economic expansion. One of the aims of current programs in agriculture is clearly to increase productivity in this area so as to permit the release of workers to industry. Moreover, recent and prospective changes in the educational system are in part designed to free additional young people for employment in industry; these changes might release as many as one million to the nonagricultural labor force over the seven-year period.

Agricultural Prospects

65. In the years 1954–1958 agriculture—which had remained largely stagnant during Stalin's last years—underwent rapid development. This was due both to the programs for cultivating the new lands and planting corn, and to other less spectacular but no less important measures such as increased farm supplies and greater financial incentives. In the new lands the weather was better than average. No slackening of attention is apparent in the Seven-Year Plan and the relatively high levels of agricultural investments of the last several years are scheduled to continue. However, the growth rate gains in agricultural output of recent years cannot be maintained. Total acreage is expected to increase during the next seven years at a rate only about one-fourth of the earlier period. Most of the future increase will have to come from increased production per unit of land. This is more difficult to achieve, particularly since the unfavorable effect of indiscriminate acreage expansion will manifest itself. Nevertheless, the existing potential is by no means exhausted, and a number of measures such as soil improvement will be undertaken.

66. Recent organizational changes and better prices in agriculture probably have softened the critical attitude of the peasant toward the regime, as have other earlier measures which were focused upon tax, product procurement, and income conditions in agriculture. State control over agricultural activity, however, has not been weakened. The central organs continue to determine state procurement goals even though the enterprise manager in Soviet agriculture is likely to exercise more choice over what and how he will produce. Collective farm

control over most of the machinery formerly under the MTS may also prove of some significance in increasing output by eliminating conflict between the collective farm chairman and the MTS director concerning day-to-day operations of the collective farm. Proposals have also been advanced recently to introduce more rigorous cost accountability on the collective farms. If carried out, these procedures, taken in conjunction with the gradual introduction of a guaranteed cash wage, will increase the efficiency of collective farm operations, and perhaps permit the release of farm workers to industry. Moreover, the improvement in peasant attitudes brought about by the abolition of the MTS and the effect of 1958 reforms in raising the income of the poorer collective farms will probably have a positive effect on peasant work habits.

67. The Seven-Year Plan carries an unrealistic goal of a 70 percent increase in agriculture. We believe that the actual increase will be less than half of this. Dissatisfaction with the progress of agriculture is likely to lead the regime to continue its experimenting in the agricultural field.

Trends in Consumption

68. The Soviet consumer will not enjoy as rapid an increase in overall consumption during the next seven years as he did during the last seven, when per capita consumption increased by approximately 40 percent. This will be true despite recently announced programs to provide more meat, milk, housing, furniture, and clothing. But per capita consumption is still likely to be as much as one-third higher in 1965 than it was in 1957, with some qualitative improvement in consumer goods. However, except probably in milk production, the USSR will not succeed in its announced effort to match US per capita consumption of meat and other selected food products in the time periods set. Even if it is able to do so eventually, other areas of consumption, such as consumer durable goods and housing, will continue to lag far behind US levels.

69. The increase in the level of consumption anticipated in this estimate should be adequate to keep the population reasonably well satisfied with the regime's efforts to provide higher living standards. The regime will continue to exploit the propaganda value of rising consumption levels. The dollar value of Soviet total consumption is less than one-third that of US consumption, and on a per capita basis only about one-fourth that of the US. The Soviet consumer occupies only about one-fifth the housing space enjoyed by the US consumer. Khrushchev's much publicized housing program will continue to receive a rising share of investment for the next two years and then may level off at a volume of construction which should

provide an increase of about one-third in per capita living space over the next seven years.

70. The post-Stalin leadership has sought to make the most out of increases in consumption by selectively raising the money incomes of particular groups in the population while holding retail prices relatively stable. Although both rural and urban workers have received increases of approximately 18 percent, in total real income during the period 1953–1957, rural workers gained relative to urban workers during the earlier part of the period and urban workers received the greater share of their increase during the latter part of the period. In industry, wages and salaries have been adjusted with the aim of relating incomes more closely to productivity in different occupations and in different industries. Continuation of this policy during the period of this estimate should bring considerable improvement to the Soviet wage structure.

Foreign Trade

71. Soviet foreign trade policy will continue to subordinate short-run economic gains to the furtherance of national political objectives. Trade will continue to be utilized in an effort to strengthen Satellite ties with the Soviet Union, to provide capital goods for Chinese Communist industrialization, and to promote Soviet relationships with underdeveloped non-Bloc countries. Trade with the industrialized countries of the non-Bloc world will probably grow somewhat, and economic considerations will be the governing factor affecting such trade.

72. The maintenance of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the alliance with Communist China, as well as trade policy toward the underdeveloped areas, will require exports of raw materials and capital equipment which otherwise would be used by the USSR to further its own economic growth, but the burden imposed upon the domestic economy by this policy will not affect significantly the planned rate of Soviet internal economic growth. On the other hand, internal forces affecting domestic growth will provide incentive for an increase of Soviet trade with the West, although such trade will continue to account for only about one-fourth of total Soviet foreign trade. The aggregate impact of Soviet foreign trade upon the domestic economy is slight because exports and imports together amount to only approximately eight billion dollars or less than five percent of Soviet GNP. However, the export of scarce resources or the import of advanced design machinery and equipment for use as prototypes can be of greater significance to the economy than the total value of foreign trade would suggest.

73. Future developments in Soviet-Satellite trade will be influenced by the outcome of recent attempts to increase intra-Bloc

economic integration and specialization but the effect will probably not be large. Although Bloc economic integration is expected to increase, the benefits will be of greater importance to the smaller Satellite economies than to the USSR. The Soviet Union imports machinery from the Satellites, though the contribution to the Soviet economy of machinery imports from the Satellites will continue to be offset by the necessity of exporting scarce Soviet raw materials. The Soviet export surplus in its trade with the European Satellites will be reduced if repayments of credits granted to Satellite countries, scheduled to begin in 1960, are carried out.

III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

74. The USSR has for many years placed great emphasis on science and technology with a view to creating a corps of superior personnel and building a scientific establishment adequate to support its aspirations to national power. Soviet scientific effort has been focused preponderantly on the building of a strong industrial base and the development of modern weapons. As a consequence, the USSR's achievements in areas of critical military and industrial significance are comparable to, and in some cases exceed, those of the US. During the past year, the Soviet Union has strikingly demonstrated to the world its maturity in science and technology. Earth satellite launchings, striking progress in weapons development, and fundamental research of military and economic significance attest to a rapidly increasing Soviet capability which presents a growing challenge to the Western World.

75. We believe that the rate of advance of Soviet science is accelerating in consequence of the building over the past three decades of a broad scientific and technical foundation. During this period, the number of graduates of scientific and technical curricula has constantly increased, research facilities have been greatly expanded, and the quality of Soviet scientific training has improved. The size of the Soviet research and development effort, in absolute terms, has been smaller than that of the US. However, the Soviet effort has been far more highly concentrated on fields related to national power, while research in consumer products has been proportionately much less. Soviet expenditures on science and technology are increasing yearly and probably permit full utilization of new personnel and facilities. Consequently, significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur in the future with greater frequency than in the past.

76. The reorganization of economic administration in 1957 has probably been accompanied by improved planning and coordination of science, especially in the formulation of long-range and nationwide scientific policies. New scientific coordinating bodies have been

established with authority to cut across administrative barriers, and planning is being centralized under the State Planning Committee, which heretofore has had only a passive role in science planning. Scientists are being given more voice in planning and Soviet policies in science and technology are likely to reflect their point of view more fully. Concurrently with the centralization of planning and coordination, operational authority over research is being decentralized and directors of institutes are being given more administrative authority.

77. Applied research will continue to receive great emphasis in the USSR, although the importance of adequate fundamental research is well understood at the planning level. Highest priority will continue to be accorded to military-industrial research and development, but the rapid expansion of Soviet scientific resources will now permit greater flexibility. Greater individual initiative within assigned tasks of research will probably be encouraged, basic research in new fields undertaken, and somewhat more scientific and technical effort allocated to the consumer sector of the economy.

Scientific Manpower, Training and Facilities

78. The number of scientifically and technically trained people in the Soviet Union has increased approximately three-fold in the postwar period. We estimate that as of mid-1958, about 1,625,000 graduates of university level scientific and technical curricula are actually employed in all scientific and technical fields, about 15 percent more than in the US. Although US graduations in scientific and technical fields are expected to increase, the USSR will continue to enjoy a numerical advantage. Based on current trends, by 1963 the USSR will probably have nearly 35 percent more graduates employed in scientific and technical work than the US, as indicated by the accompanying table.⁸ It should be noted that the bulk of Soviet numerical superiority will continue to derive from graduates employed in industrial and agricultural production. The number of Soviet scientists engaged in research and teaching in the physical sciences has remained substantially smaller than in the US, and is perhaps half the US total at present. However, Soviet emphasis on research in military and basic industrial fields probably results in a near numerical equality between the two countries in scientific manpower devoted to these critical activities.

⁸ Such numerical comparisons provide only a rough measure of relative scientific and technical strength, since: (a) the professional categories are not precisely equivalent in the two countries; (b) the figures do not reflect the broader US supply of scientific and technical personnel who hold no degrees; and (c) they give no weight to qualitative differences in training and experience. [Footnote is in the original and repeated in table title that follows.]

COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS, USSR AND US⁸
(in thousands)

Estimated Numbers of Graduates of Higher Educational Institutions
Employed in Scientific and Technical Fields*

	Mid-1958		Mid-1963	
	USSR	US	USSR	US
Engineering	856	500	1,227	630
Agricultural Sciences	228	163	368	183
Health Sciences	382	452	448	492
Physical Sciences	108	184	144	276
Biological Sciences	52	80	79	112
Total	1,626	1,379	2,266	1,693

Estimated Numbers of Soviet Kandidats and American Ph.D.'s in
Scientific and Technical Fields**

	Mid-1958	
	USSR	US
Engineering	27	6
Agricultural Sciences	8	5
Health Sciences	17	1
Physical Sciences	18	34
Biological Sciences	8	18
Total	78	64

*Estimates of the current total of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to be correct within plus or minus 10 percent. The probable error of certain groups, however, may exceed this amount. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

**In the physical sciences, engineering, and the health sciences, the quality of the Kandidat degree is roughly equivalent to or slightly below that of the US Ph.D. In agricultural and biological sciences it is closer to that of a US Master's degree.

79. In the postwar period the quality of Soviet scientific training has been high. Engineering training, while not as broad as that given an engineer in the West, is good within the particular field of specialization. Some deficiencies continue in the practical and experimental aspects of training, particularly in some fields of biology and engineering. Recent changes in higher school curricula, intended to overcome these deficiencies, include requirements for more laboratory and independent experimental work outside the classroom, as well as a plan to allow superior students to follow individual study schedules. The USSR is not as well supplied as the Western industrial nations

with nonprofessional technicians, mechanics, and maintenance men. Shortages of skilled technicians will persist, but the number available should increase significantly as a result of the high proportion of scientific and technical subjects in the lower grades and the current emphasis on specialized training after lower school.

80. Soviet scientific facilities, in terms of financial support, organizational direction, and number and quality of laboratories, are generally adequate for the utilization of scientific talent. In a few fields the USSR has facilities which are comparable, if not superior, to corresponding installations in the West. The continued expansion of these facilities, as well as a Soviet attempt to establish a broader geographic base for research activities, is indicated by the establishment of new scientific centers in Siberia. Announced plans call for completion in 1960 of a new "scientific city" near Novosibirsk, consisting of 13 research institutes and a university now under construction. Another center near Irkutsk, consisting of eight research institutes, is scheduled for completion in 1965. The regime is making a major effort to attract competent scientific personnel to the new centers by creating favorable living conditions, establishing excellent research facilities, and assigning certain eminent scientists to these locations.

81. Some shortages of complex research instruments are believed to exist, particularly in low priority fields, but they probably do not significantly hamper research programs of major importance. For example, although the US has a considerably larger number of high speed electronic computers than the USSR, the number of computer hours actually utilized for high priority research is probably nearly the same since Soviet computers are not called upon to serve routine business and government functions. Although Soviet-produced equipment is often the equal of foreign-produced equipment and occasionally its superior, the USSR will probably continue to import equipment for reasons of expediency. During the next five years the USSR will continue to improve its capabilities in scientific instrumentation. Increasing numbers of highly qualified engineers will probably be made available for the development and production of scientific equipment, and an increasing amount of equipment will reflect original design concepts. However, we believe that the West will continue to lead in the development of scientific equipment except in fields given very high priority by the Soviets.

82. The Satellites have made significant scientific contributions to Soviet technological development in only a few areas, principally in optics, electrical measuring instruments, communications equipment, synthetic fibers and pharmaceuticals. We expect an increase in Soviet use of Satellite resources in some basic theoretical and experimental fields. The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) recently

expanded the scope of its activities to include greater coordination and exchange in research and development activities. CEMA member-nations are assigned major research, development, and production responsibilities for the entire Soviet Bloc in specified fields.

83. The USSR has become progressively less dependent on Western research and development. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders have adopted a policy of acknowledging foreign achievement and encouraging maximum use of foreign experience. The USSR presently has an outstanding program for collection and dissemination of scientific and technical information. The All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Academy of Sciences publishes and circulates extensive abstracts of foreign journals and, at least in high priority fields, Soviet scientists have access to the full range of scientific research published throughout the world. Evidence of Soviet work on such new methods as machine translation, data searching, and data processing suggests that Soviet information handling facilities probably will improve during this period.

84. The Soviets have evidently profited from espionage in a few key fields. However, on an over-all basis the performance of Soviet science—especially the number of original concepts and discoveries—reinforces our belief that the aggregate contribution of espionage to Soviet scientific progress has been far less important than the USSR's own achievements.

85. The USSR is clearly anxious to take advantage of the possibilities in international scientific exchange. Soviet participation in international scientific meetings and conferences has increased markedly during the last year, primarily in connection with the International Geophysical Year (IGY), but involving other scientific fields as well. The Soviet IGY program has been well-executed and comparable to the US program in scope. For the most part, the Soviets probably will live up to their agreements to exchange IGY information, but are likely to withhold the results of related investigations outside the formal IGY program. They are believed to have withheld considerable data derived from their earth satellites. The USSR probably will continue its active participation in the various international committees and organizations which are planning to extend programs begun under the IGY.

Soviet Capabilities in Major Scientific Fields

86. The USSR's achievements during the last year, including earth satellite launchings, weapons development, and the magnitude of its efforts in the IGY program, provide impressive evidence of the present high level of Soviet scientific capability. Animated by a spirit of intense competition with the US, Soviet scientists have made striking progress over the last year in many areas of fundamental and applied research.

In mathematics, many fields of physics, and a few fields of chemistry, fundamental research appears to be comparable in quality to that performed in leading nations of the West. In some fields, Soviet scientists are among the best in the world; their potential for wholly new discoveries must be considered equal to that of Western scientists.

87. *Space program.*⁹ The establishment of the Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications, announced by the USSR in April 1955, indicated the existence of a program with manned interplanetary travel as its stated ultimate objective. The program is supported by extensive Soviet research efforts in a number of related fields, including rocket propulsion, electronics, meteorology, space medicine, astrobiology, astrophysics, and geophysics. Activities to the present appear to be directed toward the collection of scientific data and experience to provide the basis for future space programs, and to advance basic knowledge in the above fields. Since some satellite vehicles have probably employed basic ICBM hardware and some future space vehicles may also utilize ICBM components, the two programs are to some extent complementary.

88. Soviet successes with ballistic missiles and earth satellites point to a considerable capability for early accomplishments in space. We believe that the USSR is presently capable of orbiting earth satellites weighing on the order of 5,000 pounds, of launching lunar probes and satellites and of launching planetary probes to Mars and Venus. Its space program could also include: surveillance satellites and recoverable aeromedical satellites (1958–1959); “soft landings” by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earth satellites (1959–1960); a manned glide-type high altitude research vehicle (1960–1961); earth satellites weighing as much as 25,000 pounds and manned circumlunar flights (1961–1962). While each individual achievement appears feasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that the USSR could accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified.

89. Communist China has announced its intention to launch an earth satellite, and there are indications that Chinese personnel are studying rocket technology with Soviet assistance. The Chinese would value highly the political and propaganda gains resulting from a launching, and we believe that an attempt in China is a possibility within the next year or so. Using Soviet equipment, and with Soviet direction throughout the project, the Chinese Communists could probably perform a successful earth satellite launching in about one or two

⁹ For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet space program, see NIE 11–5–58, “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,” 19 August 1958 (TOP SECRET). [Footnote is in the original.]

years after initiation of the project. The USSR itself probably has the capability, with about six months' preparation, to place an earth satellite in orbit from Chinese territory. There is as yet, however, no firm evidence of the initiation of any projects to launch earth satellites from the territory of Communist China.

90. *Nonmilitary applications of atomic energy.* There is evidence of a further reduction in the ambitious Soviet nuclear power program announced in February 1956 as part of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. At that time, the USSR set a mid-1960 goal of 2,000–2,500 megawatts of nuclear-electric generating capacity. However, a Soviet reply to a UN questionnaire in March 1957 described a program which could produce a total capacity of about 1,400 megawatts by that date. Recent statements by Soviet officials indicate a planned capacity of about 700 megawatts in mid-1960. We estimate that an additional 200 megawatts or more could be obtained from dual-purpose reactors installed at plutonium production sites, giving the USSR a total of at least 900 megawatts by mid-1960 if the latest plans materialize. Continued references to the 2,000–2,500 megawatt goal by leading Soviet authorities indicate that the progressive decrease in nuclear generating capacity planned for 1960 reflects a slippage in Soviet plans rather than a reduction in the Soviet nuclear power program. The USSR is conducting extensive research on controlled thermonuclear reactions.

91. Soviet employment of radioactive isotopes and radiological techniques in medical, chemical, metallurgical, biological, and agricultural research lags behind that of the US by up to five years. While the USSR has been actively employing these means in research investigations, little originality has been displayed and only recently has the quality of this type of research shown improvement.

92. Despite this lag, the USSR has initiated a sizable technical assistance program in nuclear energy within the Bloc and has offered aid in this field to a number of non-Bloc countries. To encourage collaboration among nuclear scientists within the Bloc, the USSR established in 1956 a Joint Nuclear Research Institute near Moscow. Although the USSR is a member of International Atomic Energy Agency, its attitude toward the agency has been passive. Future Soviet activities outside of the Sino-Soviet Bloc probably will continue to be largely limited to unilateral offers of aid to non-Bloc nations. However, visits by Soviet scientists to Western nations and Soviet participation in international conferences may be increased.

93. *Physics and mathematics.* Some Soviet scientists in the various fields of physics and mathematics are the equals of those in the leading nations of the West. Greatest capabilities are exhibited in theoretical mathematics and physics, high-energy nuclear physics, low temperature physics, solid state physics, and acoustics. Research during this

period will probably stress a number of studies related to the Soviet missile and space programs, and will also include theoretical antigravity investigations, work in plasma physics, and elaboration of present theories of ion, photon, and free radical propulsion. Of great aid to research in physics and mathematics is the considerable Soviet capability in the design, development and application of computers with larger memory capacity and increased operation speeds, as well as small computers suitable for mass production and usable in small computation centers.

94. *Geophysics.* Soviet performance in the geophysical sciences is believed to be generally equal to that of the US, and superior in some fields, particularly polar geophysics. The large and comprehensive Soviet IGY program is expected to have a considerable effect on the development of geophysics in the USSR. The orbiting of earth satellites carrying heavy payloads of complex instrumentation probably has already given the USSR a lead in these methods of upper atmosphere and space research. The USSR probably will make advances comparable to those of the US in meteorology and oceanography. It will probably continue to be among the world leaders in seismology, gravimetry, geomagnetism and geoelectricity, and will add to its already considerable achievement in permafrost research and geochemical prospecting.

95. *Chemistry and metallurgy.* The USSR lags behind the US in the magnitude and level of research effort in most fields of chemistry and metallurgy; however, Soviet research in certain areas continues to be of high caliber. A major strength will continue to be in the theoretical aspects of some fields of chemistry. There will probably be a major expansion of all chemical research, with particular emphasis on fields where the West now leads, such as in petrochemicals, new plastic materials, and synthetic fibers. In metallurgy, research will be especially pushed in the high temperature field and in those areas of metallurgy related to solid state physics, particularly in semiconductors and thermoelectric power generation.

96. *Medical sciences.* With some exceptions, Soviet medical research is still behind that of the US. Soviet research assets, however, are expanding rapidly and will continue to be concentrated in areas of high economic and military priority. The Soviets are conducting an advanced program in space medicine and astrobiology. The availability of rocket vehicles and effective propulsion systems has enabled the Soviets to use animals to test life-sustaining systems in space and under space equivalent conditions to a greater degree than has been possible in the US. We believe that they lead the US in rocket flight physiology, studies of possible forms of life on other planets, and in the techniques and equipment for recovery of test subjects from extreme altitudes. However, there are no indications that they have conducted prolonged

space equivalent work similar to the US manned balloon experiments. The USSR will expand its intensive research program in the control of human behavior, especially in conditioning techniques. In addition, the Soviets will probably maintain their lead in research on the effects of radiation on the nervous system. It is possible that they will attain the lead in the study of the effects of cosmic radiation on organisms.

97. *Biological and agricultural sciences.* There has been a notable improvement in the quality of Soviet research in certain areas of the biological and agricultural sciences. Except in a few specific fields, however, the USSR still lags behind most Western countries in these sciences. Although Lysenko retains some limited political support, ideological theories are probably no longer permitted to interfere with sound research in biology and agriculture, and Soviet genetics research should improve markedly. We believe that agricultural research and development will receive increasing support, which should assist the Soviet effort to increase food supplies.

98. *Industrial technology.* For the immediate future, we estimate that the general level of Soviet industrial technology will remain below that of the US. However, the most modern Soviet plants are already on a par with those in the US, and the average level of heavy industrial technology will probably improve. Striking progress has been made over the last few years in the theory and practice of automation. Additional semiautomatic and possibly fully automatic production lines will be established during the period of this estimate. There will probably be increased emphasis on engineering process research and on shortening the lead times necessary to bring developed items into production. However, research and technology in consumer goods fields will continue to lag far behind that of the US.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

SOVIET MILITARY THINKING AND POLICY

Major Objectives of Military Policy

99. Soviet military thinking and policy since the end of World War II, and particularly since the death of Stalin, have been strongly influenced by a growing appreciation of the devastation inherent in nuclear war and of the threat to the USSR's objectives and security posed by Western nuclear capabilities. The Soviet leaders have made strong efforts to build a substantial offensive nuclear capability of their own and to improve their air defenses; indeed, to build up a broad range of offensive and defensive capabilities, both nuclear and nonnuclear. At the same time, Soviet political activity has aimed at reducing the

military and political usefulness of US nuclear capabilities by attempting to make US overseas bases untenable and to increase the inhibitions attached to any use of nuclear weapons.

100. We believe that despite these efforts the Soviet leaders appreciate that if they launched a general war at present, even with surprise nuclear attacks, the USSR would suffer unacceptable damage from US nuclear retaliation. On the other hand, they are probably confident that their own nuclear capabilities, even though not as great as those of the US, have grown to the point where they constitute a powerful military deterrent to the US. It is therefore probable that in the Soviet view both sides are now militarily deterred from deliberately initiating an all-out nuclear war or from reacting to any crisis in a manner which would gravely risk such a war, unless vital national interests at home or abroad were considered to be in jeopardy.

101. The Soviets probably see this situation as a great improvement over the relation of forces which existed some years ago. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviet leaders will continue to seek ways to achieve, if possible, a clear military superiority over the US. To this end they will continue their intensive weapons research and development, particularly in such fields as long-range missiles, aircraft and missile-launching submarines capable of attacking the continental US, air defense weapons and associated equipment. But despite further improvement in Soviet capabilities over the next five years, we believe that the USSR will still not become confident that it can attack the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return. This judgment assumes the maintenance and improvement of US armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough of major military significance.

102. While strengthening their capability for waging general war, the Soviets will endeavor to maintain forces which they consider adequate to insure military superiority in situations short of general war. To the extent that Western inhibitions against vigorous reaction in local situations are increased by the USSR's growing capability for general war, superiority in forces for local conflict will enable the Soviets to exert greater political pressure in local situations, and even give them greater freedom to use force in such situations. In sum, the Soviet leaders will view large deterrent and other military capabilities as an essential support to their foreign policy and to the USSR's status as a leading world power.

Soviet Attitudes Toward Limited and General War

103. As indicated elsewhere (Chapter VI, paragraphs 224–227) we believe that the Soviet leaders do not at present intend to pursue their objectives by employing their own forces in warfare, limited or general.

But they will also recognize that, particularly in consequence of the policies they are pursuing to compel a retraction of Western power by political means, situations might arise in which the use of force on a local scale would seem essential to one side or the other. In such situations the Soviets would prefer to provide logistic and other support for local operations in which only non-Soviet forces participated directly. Their objectives in such operations would be limited, and they would seek to avoid direct Soviet involvement, to limit the geographic area of engagement, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by either side.

104. Soviet planners probably consider, however, that such limitations might be impossible in some instances, and that encounters between their own and Western forces might result. They would prefer to minimize the amount of force employed in such situations, in order to limit the scale of conflict and the degree of their own involvement as much as possible. For example, they would almost certainly wish to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. In deciding whether to employ their own forces in any particular local situation the Soviets would have to balance the risk of provoking a train of counteractions, possibly leading to general war, against the stakes involved in the area of local conflict. They probably believe that the West's military posture and doctrine rest increasingly upon the use of nuclear weapons, even in limited wars. But they probably also view their own nuclear deterrent capabilities as already having raised the threshold at which the West would react in such a manner.

105. It is impossible to forecast how the Soviets would behave in all the situations of local conflict which might arise. Despite the confidence they evidently now have in the power of their own deterrent, we believe that they would handle such situations with the greatest caution. They would realize that the dangers of miscalculation would mount as each side increased the scale of its involvement. Therefore we believe that the Soviets would seek to prevent any crisis from developing in such a way as to leave themselves only a choice between accepting a serious reverse and taking action which would substantially increase the likelihood of general war. The Soviet leaders would almost certainly not decide to precipitate general war unless they concluded that conceding a position to the West would sooner or later threaten the survival of their regime.

106. We believe that the Soviets recognize that very great advantages would accrue to the side striking the first blow in an all-out nuclear war, and that therefore, in the event that they decided on general war, they would themselves initiate it by strategic nuclear attacks. The primary objective of such attacks would be to destroy or neutralize Western nuclear retaliatory capabilities—or at any rate to achieve the maximum possible reduction in the weight of Western retaliation that

would have to be met by Soviet air defenses. To an extent consistent with this first priority, other key US war-making capabilities would probably also be attacked.

107. The outbreak of general war would probably find the USSR at a state of military readiness beyond that of ordinary peacetime, but short of what Soviet planners might believe best for the most rapid exertion of their total military effort. During any local war or crisis which they viewed as likely to become increasingly serious, Soviet planners would almost certainly prepare against the possibility of a general conflict. However, they would not want to push preparations so far as to convince the US that general war was imminent, lest this lead the US to strike the first all-out nuclear blow. The probability of increased Western readiness during a crisis, together with the normally widespread deployment of Western nuclear striking forces in the US and overseas, would make it doubtful that the Soviets could count on achieving surprise against all of these forces, but they would almost certainly attempt to do so.

108. Soviet recognition of the importance of surprise in modern military operations has been reflected in articles and statements over the last few years, but it is evident that Soviet military theoreticians do not regard surprise as the decisive factor in the outcome of a major war between great powers. In fact, they hold that in such a war the strategic attack capabilities of both sides might expend themselves and leave eventual victory to the side with the greatest residual strength, capacity for recovery, and ability to occupy territory. They visualize an important role for their ground, tactical air, and naval forces in a general war, which in their view would probably become a protracted war of attrition.¹⁰

109. In the event of general war, Soviet ground, tactical air, and naval forces would probably be launched in major campaigns against Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, in order to defeat those Western forces within reach and to seize military objectives in those areas as well as their industrial and economic resources. The USSR would probably plan to commit its ready forces to an offensive against NATO, especially through Western Germany, as soon as possible consistent with its attempt to achieve surprise for its initial assaults against the US, overseas US and allied nuclear bases, and naval striking forces. Campaigns in other areas would be of lesser priority, but we believe

¹⁰ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that as written this paragraph does not correctly reflect the Soviet judgment of the role of surprise in a general war. He believes it is evident that Soviet military theoreticians consider surprise probably would be the decisive factor in the outcome of a war between great powers. [Footnote is in the original.]

that in a general war situation they would probably be initiated with little delay.

110. In addition to participation in initial strategic attacks and support of other major Soviet campaigns, the major offensive effort of the Soviet Navy in general war would be the worldwide interdiction of Western sea communications and reinforcement, intended to isolate overseas theaters from the US. The major defensive effort of Soviet naval forces would be to prevent Western carrier strikes and submarine-launched missile attacks against Bloc targets.

Policy on Size and Types of Forces

111. In assessing the size and types of military forces which would best fulfill their major objectives, the Soviets will almost certainly continue to believe that they must keep a large and diversified military establishment, designed to meet various contingencies, up to and including general war. While they will work to acquire additional capabilities with advanced weapon systems, they will at all times maintain substantial forces-in-being. Nevertheless, there will be increasing competition among military requirements of different types, and between military requirements and the demands of highly important nonmilitary programs, resulting in part from the cost and complexity of new weapons and equipment. In deciding whether to produce complex new weapon systems in quantity, the USSR will probably apply increasingly severe tests as to whether these would add greatly to current capabilities or tend significantly to alter the world balance of forces, and as to whether costs were justified by likely periods of use before obsolescence. There may therefore be a growing tendency in some fields to make do with existing equipment until significantly advanced weapons can be acquired.

112. We also believe that for several years the Soviet leaders have been interested in finding ways to reduce the number of men under arms. The reasons for doing this will continue to apply, and in the future may become more compelling. An important factor will be the pressure imposed by a shortage of manpower for the rapidly growing Soviet economy (see Chapter II, paragraph 64). Other reasons include the desire for economies in order to ease the burden of increasing costs of new equipment, and the propaganda value of force reductions. The importance of the last of these factors has been evident in the USSR's well-publicized announcements of military personnel cuts over the last three years. Reductions amounting to over 1.8 million men in the 1955-1957 period have been claimed, and in January 1958 a further planned reduction of 300,000 men was announced, bringing the total to more than 2.1 millions.

113. On the basis of Soviet conscription trends, published labor statistics, and other indirect data, we believe that there has in fact been a substantial reduction in the number of men in service since the peak reached during the Korean War. A considerable portion of this reduction apparently occurred prior to the first Soviet announcement of cuts in 1955. Reductions are known to have been made in nonessential supporting and administrative elements. It is probable that other reductions were accomplished by cutting down the strength of certain units and by the transfer of labor troops from military to nonmilitary status. On the other hand, we have acquired no evidence of the deactivation of any major units and we are fairly certain that most of the units withdrawn from satellite areas in recent years were merely moved to locations within the USSR.

114. The evidence suggests that in their announcements the Soviets took propaganda advantage of fairly substantial reductions made after the Korean War, and that additional reductions were in fact begun but were delayed or cancelled entirely. The apparent failure to carry out the announced cuts may have been due in part to increased tension in the satellites, and in the world situation generally, beginning in the fall of 1956. It may also have resulted in part from Soviet discovery that reductions in some elements were to a large extent offset by the increased need for technically-qualified personnel to serve new and more complex equipment.

115. On the basis of available order-of-battle information, we estimate present Soviet military manpower strength at somewhat more than 4 million men, of whom about 2,650,000 are in ground force units, about 835,000 are in the air forces (including about 110,000 naval aviation personnel), about 765,000 are in naval units, and about 75,000 are in air defense control and warning. In addition, we carry about 400,000 men in border guard and internal security forces.¹¹ While there has been no reliable evidence of reductions over the last year, we do not exclude the possibility that the Soviet leaders believe that some additional cuts can be made without danger to Soviet security. But we think it unlikely that in the present state of the Bloc's relations with the West further reductions of substantial size would be made.

116. *Military policy toward other bloc nations.* The Soviet leaders view the East European area as vital to the military posture of the USSR, both as an extension of the defense perimeter of the homeland and as a base for offensive power; Communist China and North Korea similarly

¹¹ For more detailed estimates of the personnel strength of Soviet and other Bloc forces, see Annex, Tables 1 and 2; it should be understood that these figures are only approximate and that there is considerable uncertainty inherent in this type of estimate. [Footnote is in the original.]

strengthen the strategic position of the USSR. The Soviets will therefore continue to provide substantial military aid to the Satellite and Chinese Communist military establishments, including weapons, equipment, and training assistance. They will continue their efforts under the Warsaw Pact to develop and maintain reliable and effective forces in the East European Satellites, but they probably do not contemplate any significant expansion of these forces. It is unlikely that Soviet planners would count on East European forces in general to make an important contribution to Soviet military operations, except perhaps in air defense and in maintaining security for lines of communication.

117. The Soviets probably regard the increasing military capabilities of Communist China with mixed feelings. While Chinese military strength is a valuable addition to the power of the Communist Bloc, as this strength grows it will also give China increasing weight within the Bloc. It will be many years before the Chinese have a large and modern arms industry of their own, a development the Soviets might view with misgivings in any case, and in the interim the Chinese will press for Soviet aid to effect a costly modernization of their forces. We believe that the Soviets will probably try to restrain the pace of Chinese military development in order to prevent the Chinese from achieving too large a degree of military independence. But they will probably also feel that they have no choice but to support such development. It is probable therefore that they will continue to assist the Chinese in developing and producing certain types of modern equipment. They will also probably begin to supply such Soviet-made weapons as jet medium bombers, advanced fighters and guided missiles for air defense, and possibly short-range missiles for offensive use as well. The USSR would probably retain control over any nuclear weapons based in the territory of Communist China or other Bloc nations.

SPECIAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS

Nuclear Weapons

118. The USSR is known to have conducted more than 70 nuclear tests since August 1949 in its program to develop a variety of nuclear weapons. Two test series were conducted during 1958. In the first series, 13 tests were conducted at two widely separated proving grounds during the three months preceding the USSR's announcement of a unilateral test suspension on 31 March 1958. The Soviets resumed testing in a second series which began in September 1958. Explosions in the latest series have included two of about seven megatons, about twice the yield of the largest Soviet explosion detected previously. The latest two tests were of low yield and were conducted in the general vicinity of Kapustin Yar. From the present technical evaluation of the 1958 tests, it appears that the Soviets made further advances in the development

of high yield weapons suitable for use in bombs or missile warheads. They also apparently sought to improve low yield weapons from the standpoint of size and economy of fissionable materials, probably in order to meet air defense as well as other requirements.

119. We estimate that at present the Soviet stockpile could include nuclear weapons in a range of yields from about 2 KT to about 8 MT; we do not exclude the possibility that untested bombs with yields of as much as 20 MT could be in stockpile on an emergency or provisional basis.¹² We have insufficient evidence to support a firm estimate of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons in the Soviet stockpile. There is, however, considerable evidence from the Soviet nuclear test program and from other intelligence sources, providing indications as to what types of weapons the USSR may be stockpiling and on what delivery systems it contemplates. Based on an analysis of various factors involved, we believe that:

(a) nuclear weapons, including high-yield weapons suitable for bomber delivery, are now widely deployed to Long Range Aviation units, and the Soviets will seek to provide such weapons for all bombers of this component which are designated for weapons delivery;

(b) nuclear warheads are being and will be produced in numbers sufficient to equip substantially all operational submarine-launched missiles; and ground-launched ballistic missiles of 700 n.m. range and greater;

(c) Soviet doctrine contemplates the tactical use of nuclear weapons by ground, tactical air, and naval forces, and some such weapons are probably now available for this purpose;

(d) the Soviets' emphasis on air defense will lead them to provide nuclear warheads for some proportion of their surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, but a sizable allocation for such purposes has probably not yet been made.

120. Considering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR probably possesses sufficient nuclear weapons to support a major attack by its long-range striking forces, but that current stockpiles are probably insufficient for large-scale allocation to air defense and tactical use. We estimate a substantial and high priority Soviet program for the expansion of fissionable material production through the period of this estimate, and we believe that the USSR is capable of considerable further improvement in nuclear

¹² For a detailed estimate of the present and future Soviet nuclear weapons development potential, see NIE 11-2-58, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program," 14 January 1958 (Limited Distribution). See also the forthcoming NIE 11-2-59. [Footnote is in the original.]

weapons technology. Thus, by the end of the period the current limitation on the allocation of nuclear materials to air defense and tactical operations will have eased, although even then and for a longer period, limitations imposed by the availability of fissionable materials will still be felt.¹³

121. Prior to its suspension of testing in March 1958, the USSR had probably developed types of nuclear weapons which could meet most of its major requirements for such weapons. However, strong technical motivations have continued to exist for further testing, for example in the categories of lighter-weight, more efficient warheads for air defense and other purposes, higher yield warheads, and antimissile defense techniques. The USSR's reasons for conducting nuclear tests in the fall of 1958 probably included the desire to fulfill technical requirements and, to a lesser extent, the desire to create a situation in which there would be increased world pressure for a ban on further testing. Considering the achievements of the Soviet nuclear test program to date and the broader advantages the USSR may feel it can achieve by negotiating a multilateral test cessation, we believe that technical requirements alone would not prevent the USSR from joining in a test ban. We also believe that if an agreed ban with a suitable control system were negotiated, the Soviets would be unlikely to attempt to carry out a concealed test or abrogate the agreement, at least for some time, but would incorporate into their weapons program such refinements as could be achieved without new test explosions.

122. Although we do not know the Soviet estimate of minimum stockpile requirements for fissionable materials, we doubt that such requirements have been met and we know that production facilities are expanding. Therefore, while the USSR might enter negotiations on cessation of weapons material production, we believe it would neither unilaterally cease such production nor agree to mutual cessation in the near future.

Guided Missiles

123. The USSR continues to press ahead with an extensive research and development program embracing all major categories of guided missiles. Soviet achievements in surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have been especially impressive, and substantial success has also been

¹³For estimates of present and future cumulative availability of fissionable material in the USSR, see NIE 11-2-58. For theoretical ranges of mixed nuclear weapon stockpiles, as well as illustrative stockpiles showing reasonable maximum and minimum limits for certain categories of weapons, see the Supplement to NIE 11-2-58, "Possible Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Material to Weapons Stockpiles," 1958-1962, 30 September 1958 (Limited Distribution). [Footnote is in the original.]

achieved in developing surface-to-air missiles. While available evidence is not sufficient to indicate comparable emphasis and success in other Soviet missile programs, we believe the USSR now has a variety of missile systems available for operational use. It is capable of developing advanced systems in all categories during the period of this estimate, and the experience it has already acquired in missile production, troop training, logistics, and deployment procedures will facilitate the expansion of its operational capabilities.¹⁴

124. On the basis of considerable evidence concerning the research and development program, we believe that for several years the USSR has had available for operational use surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with maximum ranges of about 100 n.m., 200 n.m., 350 n.m., and 700 n.m. It has also been developing and probably now has available for operational use a ballistic missile of 1,100 n.m. maximum range. In addition, a very short range antitank missile is probably now operational.

125. *Intercontinental ballistic missile.* Since the completion of NIE 11–5–58, we have conducted an intensive re-examination of the Soviet ICBM test firing program and its implications. On the basis of sufficient intelligence coverage to establish with a high degree of confidence the number of Soviet ICBM test firings, it is clear that over the past year this number has not been as great as we had anticipated. Nevertheless, considering the Soviets' progress in the whole field of missiles and the capabilities demonstrated in their ICBM, earth satellite, and other ballistic missile launchings, we continue to estimate that the USSR will probably achieve a first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs at some time during the year 1959. While it is possible that a limited capability with comparatively unproven ICBMs might have been established in 1958, we believe this to be unlikely.¹⁵

126. When it first becomes operational, the Soviet ICBM system will probably be capable of delivering a nuclear payload to a maximum range of about 5,500 n.m., with an accuracy (CEP) of about 5 n.m.

¹⁴ For an extended discussion of the USSR's guided missile development program, and of factors likely to affect its acquisition of substantial operational capabilities, see NIE 11–5–58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," 19 August 1958 (TOP SECRET). [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁵ NOTE: Some statements by high Soviet officials during the past year have indicated that the USSR already possessed, or at least wished us to think it possessed, a considerable operational ICBM capability. Such a capability cannot be ruled out as impossible if the Soviets have had a test philosophy involving fewer long-range tests and more reliance upon component tests at Kapustin Yar than we think likely. Such a philosophy would run greater risks of failure and provide less assurance of accuracy and reliability but also (if all went well) much more rapid achievement of operational capability. The Soviets may have believed the political and psychological value of ICBMs is so great as to justify extreme measures to attain a substantial and early deployment. [Footnote is in the original.]

and a reliability of about 50 percent after launching. (Some additional percentage of missiles, which we are unable to estimate, would prove unserviceable before launching.) We estimate that the Soviet ICBM is designed to carry a nuclear payload of about 2,000 pounds, although there is a possibility that it is designed to carry about 5,000 pounds. Reliability will probably be considerably improved by the early 1960's. At the beginning of the period 1962–1966, the CEP could be about 3 n.m. with radio command/inertial guidance, and could be reduced to about 2 n.m. later in that period. In 1960–1963, an all-inertial system with a CEP of 3–5 n.m. will probably be available.

127. For air defense, the USSR now has available two different types of surface-to-air missiles, one of which is employed in the fixed missile complex around Moscow and the other of which is probably suitable for employment with the Moscow system or with a semi mobile system. These missiles have greatest effectiveness against aircraft at altitudes of 30,000 to 60,000 feet; they are relatively short range (15–30 n.m.) and almost certainly neither is effective at very low altitudes (below about 1,500 feet). During 1959–1961, surface-to-air systems with increased range and improved high and low altitude capabilities will probably become operational for defense of fixed targets, field forces, and naval vessels. Short-range air-to-air missiles (up to 6 n.m.) suitable for employment with currently operational Soviet fighter aircraft types are probably also available, and a longer-range missile (15–20 n.m.) will probably be developed by 1960. In 1963–1966 the USSR will probably achieve a first operational capability with a surface-to-air system of limited effectiveness against ICBMs and possibly against IRBMs.

128. For employment by submarines, the USSR probably now has available a subsonic cruise-type missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheads against land targets within about 200 n.m. of the launching submarine. These missiles could be launched by a submarine only after surfacing. In 1961–1963 the USSR will probably have available for first operational use a submarine-launched ballistic missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheads from a submerged submarine to a range of about 1,000 n.m. It is also possible that the USSR will develop a 1,000 n.m. cruise-type system for first operational use in 1960.

129. A Soviet air-to-surface missile system is now capable of carrying nuclear warheads at subsonic speed to a range of about 55 n.m. against ships and other targets clearly definable on radar. The USSR will probably have operational in 1960–1961 a supersonic air-to-surface missile with a range of at least 100 n.m., suitable for employment against a wide variety of targets.

Chemical and Biological Warfare

130. Current Soviet tactical doctrine recognizes the potentialities of CW and BW as useful complements to other weapons. Soviet military forces receive thorough training in the offensive use of CW as well as in defense against it. A stockpile of CW agents is believed to be maintained at the World War II level and may have been increased. It probably consists of the nerve agents, principally Tabun (GA) and in lesser quantity Sarin (GB), as well as standard agents such as mustard. A nerve agent of the "V" type, far more persistent and toxic than the "G" agents, may have been in production in the USSR since 1956. Research is probably also under way in the field of nonlethal, incapacitating agents.

131. The Soviets possess standard munitions, for the dissemination of toxic agents by artillery shells, and it is probable that a supply of such munitions is normally carried by artillery units. CW agent dispersion by bombs and aircraft spray is also contemplated. Improved aerosol-producing devices necessary to the effective employment of "V" agents are believed to be under development. It is also possible that CW warheads have been developed for certain types of guided missiles.

132. The existence of an active Soviet BW research and development program has been confirmed, through identification of a research center and field test site as well as through extensive Soviet literature applicable to this subject. While most known Soviet research is also applicable to public health problems, we believe the Soviet program includes research on antipersonnel, antilivestock, and possibly anti-crop agents. There is no evidence of the existence of a mass-production facility for BW agents, but existing plants for the production of biologicals, together with other laboratories, could easily produce BW agents in quantities sufficient for clandestine employment and probably for larger-scale use.

133. In the field of defense against BW and CW, present Soviet capabilities are at least comparable to those of the major Western nations, and in the case of CW are probably superior. Soviet troops are well-equipped with satisfactory CW defense items, many of which are also suitable for use in defense against BW. The current issue gas mask affords adequate protection against inhalation of known toxic agents, and articles of protective clothing issued to all troops afford protection against toxic agent spray and area contamination. Extensive programs continue to indoctrinate the civilian populace as well as military personnel in defensive techniques.

Electromagnetic Warfare

134. We believe that at present the USSR has an appreciable capability for jamming Western radars at frequencies up to 10,000 mc/s and

possibly higher, and especially for jamming at lower frequencies normally used in Western long-range radio communications. The Soviets are now producing magnetrons and traveling wave tubes suitable for jamming in the microwave frequencies, and research in this field is continuing. They are also currently employing passive detection equipment believed capable of detecting signals from the very low frequencies up into the microwave spectrum. By 1963, the USSR will have in operational use equipment capable of jamming at frequencies from 10 kc/s through 36,000 mc/s, including all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment.

135. In recent months a trend toward greater frequency diversification in Soviet radar and radio equipment has appeared, in contrast to the earlier concentration of frequencies in a few narrow bands. The USSR is capable of further increasing the spread of frequencies employed and of developing improved antijamming techniques, but through 1963 Soviet electronic systems will probably still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.

STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET FORCES

136. *High command.* Top control over all administrative and operational activity in the Soviet military establishment is vested in a single authority, the Minister of Defense. Directly under the Minister of Defense is a single general staff, organized along functional lines into operations, intelligence, communications, military transportation, organization and mobilization, historical, and topographical sections. The major administrative elements of the Soviet armed forces include the chief directorates of ground, air, air defense, and naval forces, each headed by a commander-in-chief who reports directly to the Minister of Defense. Operational control flows in a direct chain of command from the Minister of Defense to the commanders of the major operational elements: military districts, groups of forces, naval fleets, air defense forces, Long Range Aviation, and possibly airborne forces.

137. Despite extreme centralization of responsibility, the Soviet command system retains sufficient flexibility to effect integrated employment of all types of forces in either large- or small-scale operations. Constant attention to new requirements will bring about significant changes in armament and some realignment among components, but we anticipate no radical alteration of the Soviet high command structure in the near future. In the following paragraphs, the different types of Soviet forces are discussed in terms of their capabilities to perform those military missions which we believe would be assigned by the Soviet high command, i.e., long-range attack, air defense, major land campaigns, and naval warfare.

Long-Range Striking Forces

138. Since the end of World War II the USSR has devoted a major effort to the development of nuclear striking forces capable of attacking distant military, industrial, and other targets, not only in and near Eurasia but in North America as well. This effort has been dictated by the fact that the US, itself possessed of long-range striking forces, lay beyond the range of traditional Soviet military power. The principal component of Soviet military strength presently capable of long-range nuclear attack is Long Range Aviation, equipped with medium and heavy bombers. The medium bombers of Naval and Tactical Aviation, as well as the light bombers of these components, contribute to the Soviet capability for attack on targets in Eurasia and its periphery. Ground-launched and submarine-launched guided missiles probably now supplement the bomber capability.

139. *Long-range bombers.* We estimate the strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation, as of 1 October 1958, at approximately 1,450 bombers, including about 400 obsolete BULL piston medium bombers, about 950 BADGER jet medium bombers, and about 100 to 125 BISON jet and BEAR turboprop heavy bombers. At least one-fourth of the BISON and BADGER regiments in this force have some aircraft of these types which are convertible tanker-bombers. Medium bombers have also been supplied to other components—there are now about 250 BADGERS and a few BULLs in Naval Aviation units and about 100 BADGERS in Tactical Aviation units.

140. The capabilities of Long Range Aviation have been markedly increased in the last five years, through the introduction of large numbers of modern aircraft, more realistic and larger-scale training exercises, improvement of potential staging bases in the Arctic, development of inflight refueling, and improvement of electronic equipment for ECM, bombing, navigation and other purposes. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been identified at many Long Range Aviation home bases, and we believe that nuclear bombs are now the primary weapons of this force. A few BADGER units of both Long Range and Naval Aviation are probably now trained and equipped to employ air-to-surface missiles suitable for use against ships and other well-defined targets.

141. Despite these improvements Soviet Long Range Aviation still consists primarily of medium bombers, best suited for operations against targets in Eurasia and its periphery, and capable of attacking the continental US only through extensive use of one-way missions. The history of the Soviet heavy bomber program leads us to believe that despite the efforts devoted to developing the BISON and BEAR, Soviet planners probably decided within the last year or two to forego a rapid build-up with present heavy bomber models. This decision may have

been reached as a result of one or more of the following factors: dissatisfaction with the performance of BISON and BEAR; progress in developing new or improved bombers; confidence in Soviet ability to acquire an ICBM capability at an early date. Contributing to the decision may have been a Soviet belief that the USSR's medium bomber force, together with a small heavy bomber capability, is at least temporarily acceptable as a deterrent force, and for use against the US should general war occur.

142. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to strive for technological superiority over the US in intercontinental weapon systems. Presumably they set great store by the ICBM as posing an entirely new type of threat. But Soviet military planners almost certainly feel that even though they have good prospects of acquiring a substantial long-range striking capability with missiles, manned bombers will still be required. Manned bombers, especially advanced types, will provide the Soviets with flexibility and diversification of attack capabilities, and will remain particularly applicable for attacks on small, hardened targets, damage assessment, and reconnaissance. We therefore believe that the USSR will retain a large force of long-range bombers throughout the period of this estimate, although its size will probably decline gradually. Its inflight refueling techniques will probably be improved and extended to a larger part of the force; however, there is no present evidence of the development of an aircraft specifically for use as a tanker. Improved electronic and other supporting equipment will probably be provided. Air-to-surface missile launching capabilities will probably be augmented as more effective missiles are developed.

143. Future projections of the strength and composition of Soviet Long Range Aviation are complicated by the fact that at present the entire Soviet medium and heavy bomber industry is in a state of transition, involving considerably less current production than a year or two ago. Production at BADGER plants now appears to be tapering off, although it will probably be sufficient to provide moderate further increases in the jet medium bomber force. The one identified BISON plant, at Moscow, has continued to produce aircraft of this type at a low and uneven rate, while its design bureau has been working to develop a new type of large bomber. A total of about a dozen BISONs have been completed since April 1958, bringing cumulative production to about 100 aircraft. While considerably less evidence is available on BEAR production, we believe it unlikely that any new BEAR bombers have been produced for well over a year, or that more than 50 to 60 were produced altogether. In the interim, the one identified producer has probably been overhauling existing BEARs, modifying some aircraft of this type for transport use, and building a few new transports of the CLEAT type (similar to the BEAR). Despite the decline in long-range

bomber production, the USSR's plant capacity suitable for production of large aircraft has been considerably enlarged over the last few years, and there is some evidence to suggest that several plants are preparing to produce large bombers or transports.

144. Research and development in new bomber types has continued and we believe that it will be intensively pursued throughout the period of this estimate. Considering the demonstrated level of Soviet technology in such fields as aircraft propulsion and aerodynamics, and the normal development of these capabilities, we have estimated that within the next few years the USSR could probably place into operational units: (a) improved versions of the BISON and BADGER, at any time; (b) a new subsonic heavy bomber with range and other performance characteristics somewhat better than those of an improved BISON, in 1959 or 1960; (c) a new medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capabilities and a range approximating that of an improved BADGER, in 1960 or 1961.

145. Since none of these aircraft types would add substantially to Soviet capabilities for two-way intercontinental operations, we have reasoned that the USSR might proceed directly to more advanced types, such as a heavy bomber powered by high-energy chemical fuel, capable of supersonic speed and high altitude, or possibly a subsonic nuclear-powered aircraft capable of long endurance, even at low altitudes. We continue to estimate that some aircraft of either or both these types could probably be in operational units by mid-1963. We also believe that within the next few years the USSR could fly an airborne nuclear testbed, with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrust during some phase of the flight.¹⁶ The attainment of a nuclear propulsion system for operational use in *supersonic* aircraft would probably require a long test and development program extending beyond the period of this estimate.¹⁷

146. Recent evidence of Soviet developmental efforts includes the observation at Moscow of a new bomber, designated BOUNDER, of large size and heavy weight, with a modified delta-wing configuration apparently designed for supersonic flight. With the limited information available, it has not been possible to determine the BOUNDER's

¹⁶The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the USSR could fly such a testbed during 1959. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that an aircraft nuclear propulsion system could now be undergoing flight tests in a prototype airframe. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁷See SNIE 11–58, "Possible Soviet Long Range Bomber Development, 1958–1962," 4 March 1958 (SECRET), and SNIE 11–7–58, "Strength and Composition of the Soviet Long Range Bomber Force," 5 June 1958 (TOP SECRET). For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet long-range bombers for operational use to 1961, see Annex, Table 6. [Footnote is in the original.]

intended mission, but we believe it could represent a significant step forward in Soviet bomber design. Preliminary analysis indicates BOUNDER to be powered by four turbojet engines. The use of conventional fuels would give it a range marginal for intercontinental bombing. The possibility for development of BOUNDER with a more advanced propulsion system exists, and the design intent for a nuclear-powered vehicle cannot be excluded at this time. However, present information is inadequate to permit an estimate of BOUNDER's probable development.

147. Our evidence also continues to support the existence of one or more other prototypes of new or improved long-range bombers. Past experience cautions that existing prototypes may represent competitive designs. The Soviets may not yet have evaluated such prototypes in relation to each other or to their missile programs. Such evaluation will have an important bearing on the future strength and composition of Long Range Aviation.

148. We continue to project Soviet heavy bomber and tanker strength for mid-1960 as lying within the range of 100 to 200 aircraft. The high side reflects a Soviet option to produce additional aircraft of BISON and perhaps BEAR types, and perhaps to introduce a few of a new heavy bomber into operational units. The low side reflects their option to forego a further build-up in heavy bombers through mid-1960, relying primarily on their one-way medium bomber capability against the US for at least a little longer. Our estimates of trends in Long Range Aviation beyond 1960 are more uncertain, but reflect our belief that the USSR will probably introduce new or improved intercontinental bombers during the period of this estimate. Should Soviet planners desire a large force of heavy bombers and tankers, there is no question that they could have five or six hundred BISONs, BEARS, and new heavy bombers in units by mid-1963. As indicated in the table below, however, it seems to us more likely that the heavy bomber and tanker force will remain considerably smaller than this—say, about two or three hundred, including some of new types.

149. *Intercontinental ballistic missiles.* We believe that Soviet planners intend to acquire a sizable ICBM operational capability at the earliest practicable date. However, we have insufficient evidence to judge the magnitude and pace of a Soviet program to produce and deploy ICBMs. Considerable preparations for a build-up of operational ICBM capabilities could already have been made without detection by intelligence, as implied by Khrushchev's recent statement that the production of ICBMs has been "successfully set up." In the light of such indirect evidence as exists, we have considered those factors which would affect an operational ICBM build-up, including the Soviet capacity to produce missiles and associated equipment, and concurrently to complete launching facilities, establish logistic lines, and train operational units.

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION
(Estimated Strength in Operational Units)

	1 Oct 58	Mid-1959	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963
HEAVY BOMBERS AND TANKERS	100–125	100–150	100–200	150–250	200–300	200–300
MEDIUM BOMBERS AND TANKERS						
Jet	950	1,025	1,100	1,100	900	800
Piston	400	300	150	—	—	—
TOTALS	1,450– 1,475	1,425– 1,475	1,350– 1,450	1,250– 1,350	1,100– 1,200	1,000– 1,100

150. Taking into account the complexities of the tasks which would have to be accomplished, we believe that the Soviets could achieve an operational capability with 500 ICBMs¹⁸ about three years after first operational capability date. Based on our estimate that a first operational capability will probably be achieved in 1959, we therefore believe that a capability with 500 ICBMs could be achieved some time in 1962. With overriding priority and exceptional success in the test and production program, this capability might be achieved in as little as two years after first operational capability date, i.e., some time in 1961. Assuming a build-up in three years from first operational capability to a capability with 500 ICBMs, a capability with 100 ICBMs¹⁹ would be achieved in about a year and a half; assuming a two year build-up, 100 would be achieved in about a year. The achievement of operational capabilities such as these within the time periods estimated would require an extremely high order of planning and accomplishment, and would also require an increase in the average rate of ICBM firings for test and training purposes.

151. There is evidence that mobility is an important consideration in Soviet ballistic missile development generally. For an ICBM system a degree of mobility could be obtained by use of rail transport to previously prepared launching sites, some of which would have only a minimum of

¹⁸ These numbers of ICBMs are selected arbitrarily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet production and deployment capacity; they do not represent an estimate of the probable Soviet requirement or stockpile. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁹ These numbers of ICBMs are selected arbitrarily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet production and deployment capacity; they do not represent an estimate of the probable Soviet requirement or stockpile. [Footnote is in the original.]

fixed equipment. This would provide flexibility and security through the use of relatively simple alternate launching sites which would be difficult to identify and locate. Our estimate of the Soviet capacity to acquire ICBM operational capabilities, given in the preceding paragraph, applies to either a rail-transportable system or a system of moderately hardened fixed launching sites, or a combination of the two.

152. *Other long-range ballistic missiles.* The Soviets probably consider ballistic missiles of 700 and 1,100 n.m. maximum range as contributing primarily to their capabilities to deliver nuclear payloads on distant, fixed targets in Eurasia and its periphery, although shorter-range ballistic missiles could also be employed for this purpose within their range. We estimate that nuclear warheads would be provided for virtually all missiles of 700 and 1,100 n.m. range, but we do not exclude the possibility of CW use in some 700 n.m. missiles. On the basis of available intelligence, we cannot judge the present scale of production and we have not identified any units equipped with these missiles. It is possible that at present the USSR has only a very limited capability to employ them in military operations. But considering such factors as estimated Soviet requirements, nuclear materials availability, and experience in shorter range missiles, we believe that the USSR may now have an operational capability with as many as several hundred ballistic missiles of 700 n.m. range, and with a few 1,100 nm. missiles.

153. The wide availability of medium and light bombers capable of reaching Eurasian targets probably reduces Soviet requirements for missiles of these ranges. Since the 700-mile missile has probably been operational since 1956, we believe that the Soviets may meet their requirements for this missile early in the period of this estimate. A build-up in 1,100 n.m. missiles would take longer. Missiles of these types are probably designed for road or rail mobility. They are probably not deployed in Satellite areas at present, but some operational units may exist within the USSR.

154. *Missile-launching submarines.* A few conventional submarines have probably been converted for topside stowage and launching of 200 n.m. cruise-type missiles. The Soviets could convert a large number of existing submarines, but the problems involved lead us to believe that such conversion is not likely to be large-scale. A total of about 20 long-range submarines could be converted within 4–6 months of a decision to do so. The USSR is probably also developing one or more new types of missile-launching submarines, designed for internal missile stowage. These types will probably include ballistic missile submarines for first operational use in 1961–1963, and possibly cruise-type missile submarines at an earlier date. If the latter are in fact developed and constructed, the USSR may have about 35 submarines, some nuclear and some conventional-powered, equipped for internal missile stowage by mid-1963.

155. *Capabilities for long-range attack.* Present Soviet capabilities for attack on the continental US are limited by the relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers, the requirement to stage most bombers through forward bases in the Arctic, and the lack of a substantial inflight refueling capability. Nevertheless; by employing their entire heavy bomber force, many of their medium bombers, and their small submarine-launched missile capability, the Soviets could mount large-scale initial nuclear attacks against retaliatory strengths and other war-making capabilities in North America. The actual weight of attack launched against the US would depend upon the Soviet judgment as to the optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas where US and Allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and other essential targets are located. Against those Western capabilities deployed on the periphery of the Bloc, the Soviets could employ medium bombers, light bombers, and ballistic missiles with ranges up to 700 and probably 1,100 n.m. Bombs and air-to-surface missiles could be employed against Western naval forces possessing nuclear strike capabilities. All Western targets of importance in North America and overseas, as well as major naval operating areas, are within range of one or more of the Soviet weapon systems described above, although most of the Soviet bombers would have to be dispatched on one-way missions to reach targets in the continental US.

156. Soviet long-range striking capabilities will increase markedly as the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows, improved bombers are introduced, the readiness and proficiency of the bomber force increases, and especially as the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons by guided missiles expands.²⁰ The USSR will rely increasingly upon missiles as long-range delivery systems as the period advances. While Soviet planners almost certainly recognize that ballistic missiles can impose maximum surprise and difficulty of interception, they probably consider that for some years the accuracy and payload capacity of such missiles will be inferior to those of manned aircraft of comparable ranges. We therefore believe that through the period of this estimate, Soviet long-range striking capabilities will lie primarily in a mixed force of manned bombers (probably equipped increasingly with air-to-surface missiles) and ballistic missiles. The Soviets may consider that ballistic missiles can best be employed to neutralize Western retaliatory and other capabilities temporarily in an initial blow, relying upon bombers for follow-up attacks of maximum weight. In any event, effective Soviet employment of long-range striking capabilities against Western

²⁰ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, does not concur in this sentence. See his footnote to paragraph 22 of The Summary. [Footnote is in the original.]

retaliatory and other essential targets will still face great difficulties of timing and distribution of attack against widely deployed, mobile, and ready Western strengths. The USSR's missile-carrying submarines will contribute further to its capabilities, but the scale of their use in an initial attack would depend upon the Soviet judgment of the risk of premature disclosure of intent.

Air Defense Forces

157. All Bloc forces useful for air defense are organized for participation in an integrated system which places primary emphasis on providing defense in depth for key administrative, industrial, and military centers within the USSR. We believe that air defense will continue to be given high priority.

158. *Air defense weapons.* The principal current weapon system for defense of Sino-Soviet Bloc targets against high-altitude attack is the high-performance jet fighter, of which there are over 14,000 in operational units throughout the Bloc. More than 10,000 of these fighters are in Soviet units, about 4,200 of them in units whose sole mission is air defense and the remainder in units with air defense as one of their primary missions. The principal day fighter in Soviet forces is the subsonic FRESCO, although about 1,200 supersonic FARMER day fighters were in units as of 1 October 1958. Also in service are the FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter, as well as the FRESCO "D" and FARMER "B" with limited all-weather capabilities, but their introduction has proceeded at a relatively slow pace. Total Soviet strength in the FLASHLIGHT and FRESCO "D" types was about 1,730 as of 1 October 1958, with some FARMER "B" types also in operational units.

159. Most Bloc jet fighters in operational units have combat ceilings of 50,000–55,000 feet; FARMER and certain FRESCO versions probably have combat ceilings on the order of 60,000 feet. During 1959–1963 the USSR will probably introduce new day and all-weather fighter types, whose characteristics will emphasize speed and altitude at the expense of combat radius. By 1962 the latest operational Soviet fighters will probably be capable of operating at altitudes up to 67,000 feet, and of climbing to 40,000 feet in less than two minutes.²¹ Air-to-air missiles are probably now available to improve the kill capabilities of Soviet interceptors, although we have no evidence that they have as yet been supplied to operational units. Total numerical strength in fighters will probably decrease after another year or two, because of the growing destructive power of individual interceptors, greater demands on industrial capacity resulting from the advent of more complex fighters,

²¹ For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet fighter aircraft, see Annex, Table 9. [Footnote is in the original.]

and the increasing availability and capabilities of surface-to-air missile systems.

160. Surface-to-air missiles designed for optimum effectiveness at altitudes of 30,000–60,000 feet and probably having limited effectiveness at 80,000 feet are now in operation in a dense and costly complex of 56 sites around Moscow. This complex, which could include a limited number of missiles with nuclear warheads, can probably direct a very high rate of fire against multiple targets under all weather conditions. It is probably ineffective against very low altitude attack, however. We believe the USSR may have altered an earlier intention to install a somewhat similar surface-to-air missile complex around Leningrad, and that the missile defenses of this and other critical Soviet targets will employ systems with greater flexibility and less cost than that at Moscow. There is now some evidence of the installation of surface-to-air missile sites in a few other key areas, such as Baku. We believe that more such sites will be built through the period of this estimate as improved systems for both high and low altitude defense become available, and that surface-to-air missiles will be provided for numerous Soviet fixed targets as well as field forces and naval vessels. Surface-to-air defenses in key areas will probably become effective both at very low altitudes and up to 90,000 feet during the period.

161. The Soviets continue to employ antiaircraft guns for defense of field forces and fixed targets, including airfields. More than 25,000 light and medium antiaircraft guns are believed to be available to Soviet forces at present; in addition, about 5,000 are available to East European forces and nearly 4,000 to Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Large numbers of automatic antiaircraft machine guns are also available to field forces. As suitable surface-to-air missiles become available in quantity, a large portion of the medium and some light antiaircraft guns will probably be phased out of the air defenses of static targets in the USSR.

162. *Air defense radar and control equipment.* Radar coverage now extends over the entire USSR and East European Satellite area, except for certain inland portions of central and eastern Siberia; coverage also extends along the entire coastal region of Communist China. The long-standing gaps in radar coverage in the Soviet Arctic are now believed to have been filled, although this deployment is probably not as extensive as in many other areas. About 1,200 heavy prime radars, primarily of the TOKEN type, and about 3,000 light auxiliary radars are employed in various combinations at about 1,700 radar sites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Under average conditions, TOKEN radars can probably detect jet medium bomber aircraft, penetrating at altitudes up to their combat ceilings, at distances between about 80 and about 180 n.m. from radar sites. New radars of much higher quality,

including radars capable of more accurate height-finding, are already in service and will probably be widely deployed during 1959–1963.²²

163. For several years the Soviets have been developing computers and other components suitable for data-handling use. The use of such equipment will have a marked effect in increasing traffic-handling capabilities, reducing system reaction time, and improving coordination within the Soviet air defense system. For example, it is expected that data-handling equipment will increase the traffic capacity of each Soviet radar reporting site to at least 20 simultaneous tracks. We believe that an air defense system with some semiautomatic features, including a data-link system for vectoring interceptors, is being widely deployed in western USSR in association with early warning and GCI sites. This system is believed to be similar in concept to the US SAGE system, but less complex. It will probably come into use throughout the USSR and East Europe within a few years. The Soviets are also introducing a new IFF system which will probably be fully operational by 1960.

164. *Air defense concentrations.* The areas of highest concentration of Bloc air defense weapons and associated equipment include that portion of European USSR from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspian Sea, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East. High defense concentrations are also found at some specific locations outside these areas, such as Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and Khabarovsk. The approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily defended of these areas, including (in addition to the surface-to-air missile complex mentioned above) about 1,100 day and 275 all-weather fighters as well as about 700 antiaircraft guns. We believe the Moscow defenses are a unique case, dictated by the importance of that area to the USSR.

165. *Passive defense.* Large passive defense organizations contribute to the air defense readiness of both military personnel and the civilian population. Civil defense training is a normal part of the program of DOSAAF, the Soviet paramilitary mass organization whose recruitment has been stepped up markedly in recent years. The incorporation of air raid shelters into newly constructed buildings is a program of long standing in the USSR. This program probably now affords some degree of shelter for roughly one-sixth of the urban population of the USSR, and this proportion will probably rise considerably during the period to 1963. Although most existing shelters were not designed for protection against blast from nuclear weapons, some newer building shelters are of heavier construction. It is probable that up-to-date protection is

²² Estimated performance characteristics of Soviet early warning and ground-controlled intercept radars are given in Annex, Table 10. [Footnote is in the original.]

available to selected elements of the government, but the general population is inadequately prepared against large-scale nuclear attack.

166. *Air defense capabilities.* Present Soviet air defense capabilities against attack by aircraft and cruise-type missiles can be summarized in general terms as follows:

(a) Against penetrations conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes between about 5,000 feet and about 45,000 feet, capabilities are greatest.

(b) At altitudes above about 45,000 feet, capabilities would decrease progressively as altitude increased, except in the limited areas equipped with surface-to-air missiles where capabilities would be unimpaired to at least 60,000 feet.

(c) At altitudes below about 5,000 feet, capabilities would decrease progressively as altitude decreased, and would probably be seriously reduced at altitudes below about 1,500 feet.

(d) Against penetrations conducted at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the capabilities of the system would be greatly reduced because of the limited availability of all-weather fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

(e) Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers, decoys, and electronic countermeasures, the capabilities of the system would be diminished through disruption and saturation.

167. The amount of warning time available significantly affects the capabilities of air defenses in various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets in the interior more than one hour's warning of attacks made with present Western bomber types. The more limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily-defended targets in such areas. As the speeds of Western delivery vehicles increase, the problem of warning time will become more critical, despite probable Soviet employment of picket ships, airborne radar and other extensions of warning capabilities.

168. Over-all Bloc capabilities against aircraft and cruise-type missiles will increase, however, through improvements in the performance characteristics of most Soviet air defense equipment and especially through the wide employment of semiautomatic air defense control. Air defense guided missile capabilities will increase. Higher-performance fighters will be employed, and the proportion of all weather fighters in Soviet forces may increase to about 60 percent. But the Soviets will continue to have difficulty in opposing very low altitude attack and air defense electronic systems will still be subject to disruption and saturation. The USSR will probably not have an operational weapon system

with even limited effectiveness against ballistic missiles until the very end of this period or later.

Ground Forces and Tactical Air Forces

169. The Soviet ground forces represent the largest part of the Soviet military establishment and are closely supported by tactical aviation, consisting of fighters trained in the ground attack role (in addition to their air defense role) and light and medium bombers trained in ground support bombing techniques. These forces are well-balanced, ably led, and equipped for the most part with excellent materiel of modern design. Units are distributed among 17 military districts in the USSR and three groups of forces in the European Satellites. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany, the western and southern border regions of the USSR, and the Maritime area of the Soviet Far East. Stockpiles maintained in these areas are believed sufficient to support large-scale ground combat operations for several months without replenishment from current production.

170. The order of battle of Soviet Army ground forces is estimated at about 175 line divisions plus supporting units. These divisions probably average about 70 percent of authorized wartime strength, although the manning level in some interior districts may be as low as 30 percent. All units probably have a high proportion of authorized officer strength, however, and full equipment is believed to be kept locally available. These peacetime manning practices, together with standard conscription and stockpiling programs, would probably enable all Soviet line divisions to be brought to full strength by M+10. Conversion to a war footing could be executed rapidly, and about 125 additional line divisions could be mobilized by M+30.

171. There has been an extensive program over the last several years to modernize and reorganize the Soviet ground forces to meet the requirements of modern warfare. More advanced designs of practically all types of equipment have appeared. The firepower of individual units has been increased markedly, additional vehicles (including amphibious vehicles) have been provided, and communications equipment has been augmented.

172. A reorganization in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, during 1957 produced a new type of Soviet line division—the motorized rifle division—which appears well-adapted for fast, hard-hitting action. The mechanized divisions were converted to the new motorized type by removing heavy tank and assault gun units, and the rifle divisions were converted by addition of medium tanks, armored personnel carriers and rocket launcher. During the same period a resubordination of divisions resulted in the creation of “tank armies” composed exclusively of tank divisions to provide for rapid, deep exploitation

in enemy rear areas. The other units remain grouped into “combined arms” armies, now composed of motorized rifle and tank divisions. We believe that similar developments have been under way since 1956 throughout the Soviet ground forces.

173. These changes are in line with revised Soviet tactical doctrine which emphasizes the need to supplement standard ground force tactics and training in order to meet the conditions of nuclear warfare. New doctrine stresses firepower, mobility and maneuverability, greater initiative, deeper objectives, intensified reconnaissance and the protection of individuals and units against the effects of atomic and chemical weapons. It also envisages the tactical use of nuclear weapons in support of Soviet field force operations.

174. Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges of 100 n.m., 200 n.m., and 350 n.m. have probably been available for operational use since 1954. We believe these missile types are intended for mobile use in support of field forces, and for attacking fixed targets such as air bases. Depending upon operational considerations and the availability of nuclear warhead materials, nuclear, HE, or CW warheads could be employed. We have only a small amount of evidence of military units equipped to launch ballistic missiles, and it is possible that at present the Soviet capability to employ them in military operations is quite small. On the other hand, the Soviets have had experience in producing missiles in the 100–350 n.m. range class, probably have an extensive production capacity, and have had ample time to train troops in their use. Very recent evidence indicates that Soviet missile units equipped with 100 n.m. missiles may have been deployed to East Germany. It is possible therefore, that the USSR’s present operational capability in the 100–350 n.m. range class comprises as many as several thousand missiles, although in view of other Soviet requirements for nuclear materials it is unlikely that many would be equipped with nuclear warheads at present. Missiles of these types may now be held in the high command reserve, but as their availability increases they will probably be organically assigned to field armies. Some 700 n.m. missiles may also be allocated to the support of Soviet field forces.

175. Air support for ground operations is provided mainly by Tactical Aviation, the largest single component of the Soviet air forces. Its units are assigned to the military districts and groups of forces. Tactical Aviation has acquired at least some nuclear delivery capability. It is now equipped (as of 1 October 1958) with jet aircraft estimated to include about 4,700 fighters and 2,800 light bombers. The fighter units are predominantly equipped with FAGOTs and FRESCOs; however, the more advanced FARMER day fighter and FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter are also in service. Tactical bomber units are still equipped with the obsolescent BEAGLE, although a few units have received BADGER

jet medium bombers. Prototypes of several new fighter types and two new jet light bombers have been displayed since 1956, but none of these aircraft has been identified in an operational unit.

176. The increasing availability of nuclear weapons and guided missiles during 1959–1963 will bring further changes in equipment and organization of Soviet ground and tactical air forces and a steady improvement in their capabilities. We believe that these changes will be evolutionary in nature, and do not anticipate any major alterations in size or deployment. While nuclear weapons and guided missiles probably will be used in support of tactical operations, conventional field artillery and unguided rockets will continue to provide the major direct fire support for units in close combat. Tactical Aviation will probably receive new supersonic fighters and bombers, but both fighters and bombers are expected to decline in numbers as increasing reliance is placed on guided missiles.

177. The USSR has sizable airborne forces, estimated at 10 divisions and a total strength of about 100,000 men. Airborne troops are well-equipped, but the air transport component has lagged far behind combat air units in the Soviet aircraft re-equipment program. Aviation of Airborne Troops now comprises approximately 500 light transports of the CAB, COACH, and CRATE types, 200 BULL medium bombers converted to transport use, 200 helicopters and 200 gliders. This strength could be augmented substantially by other military and civil transports.

178. The appearance of new transports and air-transportable equipment indicates that the USSR is now paying increasing attention to the development of its airborne forces. Soviet airlift capabilities will probably increase considerably during 1959–1963 as additional helicopters and transports are introduced. The BULL will probably be employed as an interim medium transport until late in the period, when it will have been replaced by the CAMP twin-turboprop assault transport (which has, however, not yet appeared in units) and possibly other advanced types. Better auxiliary transport will also become available as improved aircraft are introduced into civil aviation. In 1957, a number of new transports were displayed, including the CAT and COOT turboprop medium transports, a four turbojet transport designated COOKER, and a turboprop heavy transport, the CLEAT. Of these aircraft, only the COOT is now in service, and there is some evidence that technical difficulties have caused the transport program to proceed more slowly than previously estimated.²³

²³ For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet transport aircraft, see Annex, Table 8. [Footnote is in the original.]

Capabilities for Major Land Campaigns

179. Soviet ground forces are capable of conducting large-scale operations on several fronts into peripheral areas, separately or concurrently. These operations could be supported by the large available air forces, but the high priority assigned to air defense would limit the availability of fighter aircraft for such support operations in the initial phase of a general war. Surface naval vessels, naval aircraft and submarines would be available for operations in Bloc coastal areas in support of ground campaigns. The logistic environment is an important limitation on these capabilities, and the capacities of military transportation systems have been considered in the following estimates of Soviet offensive capabilities against selected land areas. These estimates do not take into account the effects of an initial nuclear exchange, of direct Western opposition to advancing Soviet forces, or of Western interdiction of essential logistic lines. Moreover, these are not estimates of the numbers of divisions the USSR would consider it tactically feasible or necessary to employ in the areas discussed.

180. *Against Western Europe and Scandinavia.* Without prior build-up, Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland could initiate an offensive campaign into Western Europe with 22 line divisions, half tank and half motorized, supported by about 1,400 tactical aircraft. To augment the strength of the initial attacks, a maximum simultaneous airlift of two lightly-equipped airborne divisions of 7,500 men each could be mounted by Aviation of Airborne Troops based in Western USSR. If approximately one-half of the civil transport aircraft normally in the area also participated in the airlift, the equivalent of an additional 2–3 divisions could be lifted in a one-day operation. However, we doubt that the Soviets would risk loss of strategic surprise by assembling such a large number of civil aircraft prior to an initial attack. In addition to airborne reinforcements, a maximum of four divisions could be lifted in merchant ships across the Baltic Sea. Air reinforcement could be drawn from the nearly 2,000 aircraft of Tactical Aviation units in Western USSR, and ground reinforcements from the 56 divisions in Western USSR could be brought up rapidly. Lines of communication through the northern satellites are estimated to be capable of supporting a theoretical logistic maximum of about 160 divisions.

181. Soviet campaigns to seize Norway and Sweden could be launched from northwestern USSR through Finland and from west central Europe through Denmark. Forces immediately available in northwestern USSR consist of nine line divisions and about 2,600 tactical and naval aircraft. Operations against Norway would be limited logistically in the north to four divisions over Finnish land routes plus one waterborne division, and in the south to a maximum of five divisions waterlifted from Denmark. If Sweden were also attacked, as many as six

additional divisions could be moved across Finland and a maximum of nine divisions could be ferried from Denmark to southern Sweden. Additional reinforcements might be water-lifted across the Baltic from the USSR to Sweden, and airborne forces could be used in securing debarkation facilities.

182. *Against Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East.* Forces available for operations in this area include 44 line divisions and 2,750 tactical and naval aircraft in southern and southwestern USSR. For operations west of the Black Sea, lines of communication would be adequate to support as many as 10 divisions against Greece or as many as 16 against Turkey, but not more than a total of 22 could be supported concurrently. At most, 14 of these divisions could be supported in an extension of this campaign into northwestern Anatolia, while seven divisions from the Caucasus could move against eastern Turkey. Three additional divisions could be water-lifted to the northern Turkish coast, provided that port facilities could be secured. One or two airborne divisions could be employed in the area. Lines of communication could support a force of 15–20 divisions in offensive operations against Iran.

183. *In the Far East.* The USSR has 31 line divisions, approximately 2,350 tactical and naval aircraft and sizable naval forces available in this area. These forces could renew hostilities in Korea, either alone or in conjunction with North Korean and Chinese forces. One airborne division could be employed against Japan. A seaborne force equivalent to three lightly-equipped divisions could be launched against Japan, using a mixed group of ships and other craft. Provided port facilities could be secured, fully-equipped forces equivalent to 5–6 divisions could be landed almost immediately in a follow-up operation. The same technique could be used in other areas of the Far East within range of land based aircraft. Adverse climate, terrain and logistic environment would probably limit operations in Alaska to one airborne division and a seaborne force of about 6,000 troops.

Naval Forces

184. During the postwar years, Soviet naval forces have been greatly strengthened by an intensive building program concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The Soviet submarine force is the largest ever assembled by any single power; over half of its present strength consists of long-range craft of postwar design and construction. Due to a recent slow-down in the naval construction program, which included a temporary halt in submarine production, there has been little quantitative change in Soviet naval forces since last year. We estimate Soviet naval strength as of 1 October 1958 at 28 cruisers, about 140 destroyers and 80 destroyer escorts, and about 440 submarines. These totals include vessels of postwar design numbering 20 light cruisers, 110 fleet destroyers, 80 destroyer escorts, about 260

long-range submarines (18 "Z," 4 "F," and 237 "W" class) and about 35 medium range submarines ("Q" class). They are grouped in four major forces: the Northern Fleet, located in the Barents Sea area; the Baltic Fleet; the Black Sea Fleet; and the Pacific Fleet, concentrated largely at Vladivostok.

185. The surface forces are supported by Soviet Naval Aviation, which comprises more than 15 percent of total Soviet air strength and is now the second largest naval air force in the world. Approximately 3,200 aircraft are assigned to the Soviet fleets, including about 1,750 fighters, 600 jet light bombers, 250 jet medium bombers and nearly 700 miscellaneous types. The combat aircraft are the same types as are assigned to Tactical Aviation: FAGOTs, FRESCO, FARMERs, FLASHLIGHTs, BEAGLEs, and BADGERs. We believe that selected naval bomber units have been assigned an atomic delivery role and there is evidence of a developing air-to-surface missile capability in naval BADGER units. Lack of aircraft carriers limits the operational effectiveness of Soviet Naval Aviation to the combat radius of its shore-based aircraft.

186. The operating efficiency and equipment of Soviet naval forces, while still below US standards in some fields, are quite high and will continue to improve. The great increase in world-wide unidentified submarine contacts in recent years probably reflects the intensified training of the Soviet submarine force, particularly in long-range operations. In the naval weapons field, in addition to the development of submarine-launched guided missiles, the Soviets have vigorously pushed the production of more effective mines with magnetic, acoustic and pressure actuated firing devices. We estimate that the USSR has stockpiled mines of advanced types as well as conventional mines. It is technically capable of adapting nuclear warheads to mines, torpedoes and depth charges. Nuclear tests in the Novaya Zemlya area have probably included the testing of naval weapons. The Soviet Navy has become increasingly aware of its initial failure to keep pace with the rapid postwar technological advances in antisubmarine warfare. In recent years there has been a steady improvement in its ASW tactics and equipment and a major effort has been made in the construction of escort ships in order to overcome this deficiency. The Soviet Navy is also quite limited as to amphibious capability. To meet the lift requirements of divisional-size units the USSR would have to rely almost exclusively upon merchant ships.

187. Several important developments in Soviet naval forces are likely during 1959–1963 as a result of changing weapon systems and new concepts of naval warfare. In addition to conversion of some submarines for the launching of surface-to-surface missiles, new submarines specifically designed for this purpose probably will enter service. Some Soviet cruisers and destroyers will probably be equipped with

dual-purpose surface-to-air/surface-to-surface missiles. Nuclear propulsion will be applied to submarines, and improvements in submarine hull design are expected early in the period. We believe that antisonar coatings have probably been applied to some Soviet submarines. To meet the threat from US missile-launching submarines, the USSR probably will continue to emphasize improvement of its anti-submarine warfare capability. This could include construction of new and better antisubmarine vessels including "killer" submarines, use of specialized aircraft and helicopters, development of improved detection systems (both sonar and radar) and more sophisticated antisubmarine weapons including guided missiles. Naval Aviation will probably receive aircraft of improved performance as they become available, as well as improved air-to-surface missiles.

188. *Submarine construction.* The USSR will probably continue to place primary emphasis on submarines in its naval construction program. Since 1950 the Soviets have built about 290 submarines of the medium-range "Q" class and the long-range "W" and "Z" classes.²⁴ Construction of "Z" class submarines ended in 1955, but the "W" class and "Q" class programs continued into 1957. Their termination probably marked the initiation of new submarine programs. A new class of conventionally-powered long-range submarine has been in production at Leningrad since the beginning of 1958. This class (designated "F") is apparently a torpedo-attack type, larger than the "Z" class and with improved sonar. Four "F" class submarines are believed to have reached operational status. Additional submarine programs believed to be under way include a nuclear-propelled type and submarines specifically designed to employ guided missiles.

189. Although the evidence is not firm, we believe that the USSR may already have commissioned one or more nuclear-powered submarines. Soviet capabilities in this field have been indicated by the development of the icebreaker *Lenin*, which will probably become operational in 1959. The *Lenin* is powered by three nuclear reactors of a type which would be suitable, with some redesign, for use in a submarine. We estimate that by mid-1963 the USSR will have about 25 nuclear-powered submarines.

190. Construction of conventional submarines will probably continue but, because of the greater complexity of nuclear-powered and missile submarines, annual submarine production almost certainly will not reach the high levels of recent years. Considering such factors as the decommissioning of obsolete boats, the possible conversion of some additional submarines to missile use, and the development of new

²⁴ For estimated characteristics and performance of these submarines, see Annex, Table 12. [Footnote is in the original.]

propulsion and weapons systems, we estimate that the total force will approximate 470 submarines in mid-1963.

191. *Capabilities for naval warfare.* A grave threat to Allied naval forces and merchant shipping is posed by the Soviet submarine force, which is about eight times the size of the submarine force with which Germany entered World War II. In the event of war, Soviet submarines could conduct intensive operations against Allied sea communications in most of the vital ocean areas of the world. Mining could be undertaken on a large scale and would constitute a serious threat to Allied sea communications. This threat is greatest in waters relatively close to Soviet-controlled air and naval bases, but Soviet submarines provide a distant minelaying potential of major proportions. Soviet Naval Aviation could attack Allied naval forces, shipping and port facilities within range using bombs, mines, torpedoes and air-to-surface missiles. Soviet Long Range Aviation probably would also conduct attacks on naval targets, but its participation at the outset of a war presumably would be limited to missions of the highest priority. Although the primary threat to Allied naval forces in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the peripheral seas of Eurasia would come from Soviet submarines and aircraft, the surface navy would play a role in preventing attacking forces from operating with impunity close to Soviet shores. Naval exercises of the last several years, stressing defense of the sea approaches to the USSR, indicate a strong defensive capability in the fleet operating areas.

192. The Northern Fleet, with more than 100 long-range submarines and direct access to the open Atlantic, is considered the most formidable of the Soviet fleets. Northern Fleet submarines could deliver attacks throughout the North Atlantic and the large "Z" class submarines could operate in the Caribbean. Soviet seizure of Norway would greatly extend the submarine and air offensive capability of this force. The geographic position of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets limits their offensive capabilities. Seizure of the Baltic exits would allow the Baltic Fleet submarine force to join in the interdiction of Allied sea communications in the North Atlantic and would increase the potential of Baltic Fleet surface forces for operations in the North and Norwegian Seas. Similarly, seizure of the Turkish Straits would permit submarines of the Black Sea Fleet to range throughout the Mediterranean and threaten Allied sea communications in that area. Submarines from both the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets might also be deployed outside of home waters prior to the initiation of hostilities. Aircraft and submarines of the Soviet Pacific Fleet could attack Allied sea communications in the North Pacific and adjacent Far Eastern waters from the outset of hostilities.

193. The capabilities of Soviet naval forces will improve steadily throughout this period with the acquisition of more advanced

submarines, aircraft, and naval weapons. The principal weaknesses of the USSR as a naval power will continue to derive from the wide separation of its sea frontiers and its inability to control the sea routes between these areas, although improvements in inland waterways will increase its ability to interchange smaller vessels including submarines. The lack of adequate supply lines to its Northern and Far Eastern fleet areas and the land-locked position of its fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas are additional handicaps.

V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES

194. The USSR's relations with other Bloc states continue to be of pressing concern to the Soviet leaders. During the past year Moscow has moved energetically to repair the damage done to its political control and ideological authority by developments of the last several years. To this end, it sponsored an international Communist conference—heralded as the most significant in more than 20 years—broke the three-year old rapprochement with Yugoslavia, ordered the execution of Imre Nagy, held a dual CEMA and Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, and began publication of an international Communist periodical designed to replace the defunct Cominform journal. The Moscow conference of Communist parties in November 1957 produced a codification of nine fundamental Marxist-Leninist "laws" to which all true (Soviet-oriented) "socialist" states must adhere. It was the signal for an intensified drive against "revisionism" calculated to inhibit departures from the approved norms by member parties, especially those which might be infected by the spirit of nationalism.

195. These efforts have been intended to cope with what has become one of the fundamental problems in the Communist world: how to preserve ideological conformity and political unity. The Communist parties in the various states are confronted with quite diverse local conditions in "building socialism;" they are tempted to resort to practical expedients which have no counterpart in Soviet experience and require ideological justification in terms close to "deviationism." In addition, as parties now possessing state power they are bound to think in terms of their own state interests, not always identical with those of the Soviet state, and to show some deference to the national sensitivities of their peoples. Consequently, there are present within the Communist parties elements and factions which harbor latent or open resentment of Moscow's domination, and they are strengthened by the knowledge that within the general population anti-Soviet sentiment continues to be vigorous and widespread.

196. The tradition of the Communist movement took little account of localist proclivities or the autonomy of national parties; it was

“internationalist” and centralist. This tendency was enormously reinforced during the period of Stalin’s ascendancy. He rose to undisputed mastery of the Soviet party at a time when other Communist parties were weak and had little prospects of attaining power. His organizational controls, his unquestioned ideological authority made him as much the absolute dictator over them as he was in the USSR itself. Only the Chinese Communists, isolated in the interior reaches of China, established organizational and even some degree of ideological autonomy. In the postwar period, after the Communist parties gained power in Eastern Europe and China, Stalin had become a towering historic figure in the Marxist-Leninist hierarchy. Even where Moscow had other and more direct means of control over Satellite parties, its authority rested to a considerable degree on the magic of Stalin’s name and myth. Only the Yugoslavs challenged his authority and survived the assault of the whole Communist world, though they had to pay the price of exclusion. The Chinese, although able to go their own way, nevertheless accepted the ideological authority of Stalin.

197. Stalin’s death left a legacy in Eastern Europe of inefficient maladjusted economies and of hatred for Soviet domination; Moscow’s ideological and organizational control was crippled. The confusions resulting from divisions within the Soviet leadership, Moscow’s modification of Stalin’s oppressive controls and policies, the attempts to redefine ideological positions under new conditions, and the partial repudiation of Stalin himself contributed to factionalism in the Eastern European parties and facilitated the overt expression of latent popular hostility to Soviet domination. Communist China, which initially at least appeared to view with sympathy the desire of some Satellite regimes for greater local autonomy, emerged as a second ideological center within the Bloc. Since the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, the Communist leaders of all Bloc states, including especially the Chinese, have presumably recognized that the interests of all in the struggle against the non-Communist world depend upon preserving unity on essential issues. In Communist terms a necessary means of enforcing such unity is conformity to ideological programs. This was the point of the 12-party pronouncement of November 1957 and subsequent insistence on ideological conformity.

198. On the surface, unity has been restored and the leading position of the USSR has been re-emphasized. But the unity of ideological program was achieved by collective discussion in which at least some of the parties evidently played an independent role, however heavy may have been the weight of Soviet views in the final outcome. We believe that the front of unity—both ideologically and in terms of state policy on the international stage—will be effectively preserved for some time. But over a longer period the divergence of state interests and the need

to develop policies in accordance with local conditions and nationalist sentiments will tend increasingly to dilute Moscow's control over the Communist Bloc.

Relations with the Satellites

199. The Soviet approach to the European Satellites during the past year represents, in essence, an attempt to synthesize the post-Stalin trend toward greater autonomy with the post-1956 efforts to re-establish the stability of the Bloc structure. While this has meant renewed emphasis on Soviet hegemony, it has not led to a general resumption of police terror, nor has it involved an abandonment of Soviet economic aid and equitable trade relations. Further, the Soviet leaders—though now playing down the possibility of “many roads to socialism”—still concede limited freedom of action to Satellite leaders and tolerate certain divergences—in the case of Poland substantial ones—based on differing internal conditions.

200. The Soviet leaders thus appear to retain their belief that Stalinist methods were inefficient and dangerous; even if they should want to return to Stalinist policies toward the Eastern European Satellites, the example of Communist China's relative independence and the special position of Poland would make such a move exceedingly difficult. The Soviet leaders still have not discovered any definitive answers to the basic questions concerning intra-Bloc relations: How best to reconcile the contradictions between a policy toward Eastern Europe which is at once “soft” (designed to insure the Satellites economic and political growth) and “hard” (intended to guarantee stability and Soviet overlordship); and how best to adjust to the changes since 1953 in the USSR's position as Bloc leader.

201. With the exception of Gomulka in Poland, and possibly Kadar in Hungary, all of the Satellite leaders have responded with vigor to the Soviet call for ideological conformity and fealty to the USSR. Needing no encouragement to combat “revisionist” trends, they have been able to thwart those elements which have sought basic reforms. Moreover, their efforts to assure internal security have been successful; there has been no serious threat to the stability of any of these regimes during the past year.

202. Popular hostility to the Communist system and to the USSR has probably not been reduced, however, although there may have been some diminution in public resentment in countries where there has been a gradual improvement in living standards. Popular unrest does not appear to be an immediate problem except in Poland, where it still could lead to strikes and riots, and in East Germany, where continuing emigration to West Germany reflects active discontent and remains a seemingly insoluble problem.

203. *Prospects.* A continuation of the current pattern of Soviet policy toward the Satellites for the next few years is probable so long as outside events or developments within the Satellites themselves do not force a change. In general, the USSR is likely to limit its direct interference in Satellite affairs as much as it believes feasible, striving to give these regimes the appearance of full sovereignty. Most of the orthodox Satellite leaders will probably be allowed to exercise day-to-day control over internal affairs, provided they retain control over their own parties and conform to Soviet-established guidelines. The fact that these leaders depend on Soviet support for their position and share many of the same interests tends to reduce the risk for the USSR in such a policy. The apparent right of Bloc leaders to speak relatively freely and frankly to the Soviets about their own problems and about intra-Bloc economic affairs will probably be maintained, although this right is undoubtedly viewed in Moscow solely as a consultative one. The renewed Soviet effort to push Bloc economic integration and to achieve a better division of labor will receive continuing emphasis. But past resistance to this program, based on the national economic interests of the individual Satellites, has been stubborn and persistent and will almost certainly not be eliminated over the next few years.

204. We believe that the recurrence of popular revolt or of an attempt by a Satellite Communist party to defy Moscow on vital issues is unlikely at least over the next few years. Such developments are possible, however, and even probable if Soviet policies should again become indecisive, or if, because of Soviet internal or foreign policy considerations, controls should be significantly relaxed. In the event of a rebellion in the Satellites beyond the capacity of the local regime to repress, the Soviet leaders would almost certainly intervene militarily. Soviet reaction to an attempt of a Satellite to secede from the Bloc would probably be the same. In the event of another Satellite party “coup” like that in Poland—aimed at greater autonomy rather than secession—the Soviet response would be dependent on the particular local and international circumstances of the moment. One of the aims of the current “antirevisionist” campaign is to prevent any disaffected inner party faction from organizing a challenge to the official leadership.

205. We believe that the Soviet Union will almost certainly maintain or increase its efforts to reduce or eliminate the distinctive features of the Polish regime. But, since Gomulka would almost certainly resist pressures on any fundamental aspects of his policies and would have the support of the Polish people in doing so, we think that the Soviet approach will be cautious. If moderate pressure proves ineffective, however, the USSR might work for Gomulka’s ouster. Even in this case, we think that the USSR would resort to military intervention only if

developments in Poland were likely to jeopardize the political or military security of the Bloc.²⁵

206. Concerning East Germany, the Soviet leaders will almost certainly continue their campaign to build up the GDR as an ostensibly sovereign power. Internally, the political and economic weakness of the East German regime will continue to pose major problems for the Soviets. Attempts to give greater stability to the GDR through more liberal internal policies would involve political risk and would probably require greater economic subsidy from the Soviet Union, something the Soviet leaders would be reluctant to give. On the other hand, turning up the screws to enforce popular submissiveness and to make the GDR more economically self-dependent has led to the mass flight of key professionals, and may lead to other serious losses. Thus the Soviet tactical approach to the GDR regime will probably continue to show signs of vacillation and uncertainty.

Bloc Relations with Yugoslavia

207. Concern over their position as Bloc leader and prime center of Communist doctrine, and fear that the acceptance of Yugoslavia as a non-Bloc Communist power was at least potentially a serious danger to that position, were probably the principal causes of the Soviet leaders' decision to break off the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The Soviet effort to re-establish close relations with Tito in the summer and early fall of 1957 was aimed at inducing Yugoslavia to identify itself with the Soviet camp. When it became clear—as it evidently did at the International Communist conference in Moscow in November 1957—that Tito was unwilling to so align himself on Soviet terms, the break in the rapprochement was probably inevitable. The appearance of the “revisionist” Yugoslav Party program the following spring probably only helped to shape the nature and timing of the subsequent Soviet campaign.

208. For the foreseeable future, the USSR is unlikely to attempt any essentially new approach to its Yugoslav problem. The tenor of the Bloc anti-Yugoslav campaign, however, will probably vary somewhat with time and place, the greatest weight being given to it by Albania, Bulgaria, and Communist China. Moscow evidently does not intend to resume the program of development credits for Yugoslavia and will probably also hamper the normal flow of trade from time to time, while denying that these measures are intended as economic sanctions. Though it wishes to exert pressure on Yugoslavia in order to discourage independence-minded and revisionist elements in Poland and the other European Satellites, it is fearful that dramatic anti-Yugoslav measures

²⁵ See NIE 12.6-58: “The Outlook in Poland,” dated 16 September 1958. [Footnote is in the original.]

would do real harm to Soviet relations with the uncommitted nations. However, the USSR will continue its attempts to discredit Yugoslav foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, and will try to link Tito with the colonial powers in the minds of Afro-Asian leaders.

Relations with Communist China

209. Communist China over the past several years has emerged as a nearly-equal partner of the USSR within the Communist world. The preponderant influence is still in Moscow, but this appears to operate through discussion and persuasion rather than by the exercise of authority or control. The foundations of the alliance remain unimpaired: a common ideology, which charts the broad course of domestic developments and posits hostility toward the capitalist enemy; a mutual dependence, economic and military in the case of China, political and strategic in the case of the USSR; and a shared realization that any major disruption of the alliance would probably have catastrophic effects on the future of the entire Communist movement. We thus believe that the bases for the Sino-Soviet partnership are compelling, that the two regimes will remain closely allied over the period of this estimate, and, indeed, that neither regime is likely to believe that it could afford a break even if serious divergencies arose.

210. We also believe, however, that there are certain differences between them which have perforce led to compromises or which have been glossed over. Such divergences are more likely to grow than to diminish over the next few years and we believe that because of them, and because of its growing power and prestige, the Peiping regime poses a potential threat to the kind of Sino-Soviet Bloc which the Soviet leaders would like to envisage for the future. Although the USSR will retain its senior position, it is possible that the process of reconciling differences between the two may increasingly involve compromises on the part of the USSR, with corresponding adjustments in Soviet policy.

211. Possible Chinese Communist differences with the USSR in policy or tactical approach—but not ultimate goals—have included the doctrinal innovations of 1956 and 1957 concerning the “100 flowers” concept and the possibility of “contradictions” between the party and the masses; and the apparent sentiment in 1956 that the USSR had overplayed its role of Bloc leader and was, in fact, guilty of “great power chauvinism.” At present Peiping and Moscow may view relations with the West somewhat differently; the Chinese Communists appear to be more militant than the Soviets and less fearful of the consequences of a “high risk” policy. In addition, there have been differences at least in propaganda emphasis concerning various international questions.

212. In the future, areas of friction may arise from the general question of Communist China’s influence as an ideological and political force within the Bloc as a whole. The unprecedented Chinese organization

of "communes" must be a development ideologically embarrassing to the Soviets, since it implies that the Chinese are advancing toward Communism more rapidly than the Soviets themselves. There may also be Soviet concern over a Chinese tendency toward "adventurism" in pushing for Communist advances, and over the role to be played by Communist China in those areas of the Far East where it has independent interests. Thus far these matters do not seem to have occasioned serious difficulty, although even if they had every effort would certainly be made to conceal the fact. Peiping has been in the forefront in proclaiming Soviet leadership of the Bloc, the USSR has acknowledged Communist China's high place in Bloc councils and its ability to make independent contributions to Marxism-Leninism, and to date Sino-Soviet interests in the Far East apparently have not clashed.

213. Problems associated with Sino-Soviet economic and military relations could also lead to friction. However, Soviet aid programs have apparently gone forward on the planned scale, and there is no evidence that the Chinese have sought more aid than they are getting; Peiping's desire for more assistance probably has been counterbalanced by its wish to limit the degree of its economic dependence. The question of nuclear weapons may be a delicate one; the Chinese have presumably sought them from the USSR, or will do so. The USSR is probably reluctant to supply them because of unfavorable repercussions on the Soviet disarmament position, the attendant loss of Soviet leverage over Communist China, and the potential military risks involved. We believe that nuclear weapons have not been given to China, but that the Soviets may make them available in the future under some form of Soviet control.

214. In sum, we believe that Communist China will attain over the next several years an increasing influence on general Bloc policy and Communist ideology. The Soviet leaders themselves are almost certainly aware of this likelihood and probably view it with concern. Moscow will wish to retain its pre-eminent position in the Bloc and, to the extent that it fears the eventual emergence of an actual rival, will attempt cautiously to minimize Peiping's influence within the Bloc. On the other hand, Peiping's growing stature strengthens the Bloc both internally and externally and in this respect is welcome in Moscow. Moreover, both partners recognize the importance of solidarity to overall Communist objectives and realize that mutual adjustments are inevitable consequences of the alliance.

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction—The Current Conduct of Soviet Policy

216. Soviet foreign policy, over the more than five years since Stalin's death and increasingly since the consolidation of Khrushchhev's

personal power, has acquired certain characteristics which are important to note in gauging the threat posed to US security. Though they relate more to manner than to content, these characteristics taken together are revealing as to the development of Soviet policy in recent years, and as to the changing assumptions about the world situation which underlie it.

217. Most striking perhaps has been the fact that the conduct of Soviet foreign policy has shown itself more energetic, assertive, and rapid both in response and in seizing the initiative. In part, of course, this reflects the impress of Khrushchev's personal style of leadership, in part also Soviet consciousness of the USSR's growing military and economic power. But it also reflects the Soviet belief, first, that a more dynamic posture would be effective in the present world situation, and second, that the main struggle with the West lies at present in the world political arena, rather than at the military frontiers between the power blocs. Soviet policy has come to employ its propaganda weapons with greater aggressiveness and shrewdness, attempting to build the image of a "peace-loving" yet formidable power, confident that by so doing it can effectively alter the alignment of political forces in the world.

218. Tactical and ideological flexibility has become another hallmark of current Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet leaders have shown themselves willing to entertain a variety of new policies without regard to positions taken up earlier and have accommodated ideology more and more to the changing requirements of policy. Thus in 1956, in support of the tactics of peaceful coexistence, they undertook a major revision in Communist doctrine: they found that war with capitalist states was no longer "fatally inevitable." They also found it expedient to abandon Stalin's rigid division of the world into the socialist camp and the capitalist encirclement; instead of assuming that all countries beyond the Bloc were tools of world imperialism, they came to discriminate various shades of political alignment, even among allies of the US.

219. There has also been an extension of the scope of Soviet foreign policy. There are no longer any neglected areas in the world as there were in Stalin's time. Since 1955 the Soviet leaders have taken major initiatives in the Middle East, and have become far more active in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet press frequently tells its readers that no longer can any issue in the world be resolved without taking account of Soviet views. Doubtless there is an element of propaganda bravado for domestic consumption in this, but it also reflects an increasing disposition to regard the USSR as now one of two great world powers, and therefore entitled to have global concerns. In situations of crisis everywhere there has been a tendency to put forward the Soviet view assertively and to refer to the factor of Soviet military power in a more blunt fashion.

220. Finally, Soviet conduct is marked by an apparently high and genuine confidence. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that, despite the many and serious problems which face them, the movement of events increasingly justifies their long-held hopes for the ultimate triumph of "world socialism" under Soviet leadership and tutelage. This mood probably reflects satisfaction with Soviet economic and scientific advances, and with the growth of Soviet military power, as well as gratification over the sharpening difficulties for Western interests in certain areas of the world. While we do not conclude that the Soviet leaders are so overconfident that they would be tempted to incautious behavior, this is one of the hazards which might attend any striking new advance of Communist power or reversal for the West.

Current Soviet Objectives and Main Lines of Policy

221. How do the Soviet leaders view the outlook over the next several years and what are the immediate objectives which they consider feasible to pursue in moving toward an expansion of Communist power? In broad terms, they probably believe that there is an accelerating trend toward enhancement of the world power position of the Communist Bloc and a corresponding decline in that of the US and its allied states. This is the traditional view which springs from Marxism-Leninism, but which they will see as confirmed recently by their own gains in economic power, their weapons advances, and the sharp political disturbances in the non-Communist world. At the same time, they appear to believe that the strength of the Western states continues to be formidable and that it should not be frontally challenged.

222. Consequently, the main strategy of Communist policy continues to be that of reducing the Western power position by gradualist means and enhancing that of the Bloc. The Soviet leaders probably list their principal objectives over the next few years as follows: (a) reinforcing the unity of the Communist Bloc and pushing rapidly its growth in military and economic power; (b) encouraging political divisions within the non-Communist world, particularly with a view to isolating the US and constricting the deployment of its military power and the extent of its political influence; (c) seizing whatever opportunities may offer for alignment of non-Communist states with the Bloc, and, where expedient, for outright territorial expansion of Communist power.

223. The means which the Soviet leaders intend to employ in pursuing these objectives are various. As indicated, they will of course push the actual expansion of their own economic and military power base as rapidly as they can. They see this as the foundation of their policy. But they will also use all the means at their command to make it widely believed that Communist power is great and growing, that in some important respects it already outpaces the West, and that the future belongs to their kind of society and their power system. To project

this image of themselves and of the world situation they will press the programs they have developed in recent years: an active diplomacy, a large-scale propaganda effort, trade and aid, and cultural exchanges.

224. *Attitude toward war.* We believe that at least for the period of this estimate the Soviet leaders will continue to put their main reliance in the struggle with the West on such political weapons. Despite the continuing growth of their military power, in particular their acquisition of growing capabilities for nuclear attack on the US, we continue to believe that they will not deliberately initiate general war. They will probably estimate that even with a lead in long-range missiles, they could not be certain of winning a general war, and that the scale of damage in such a war would threaten the survival of their society.

225. In the Soviet conception, military power should be used in the first instance and by preference as a political weapon. The enemy should be maneuvered into such a vulnerable military-political situation that he forfeits key positions without military resistance. Actual use of military power is envisaged only if there is confidence both that the gains will outweigh the losses, and that the risks are acceptable. Therefore, the immediate question posed by the growth of Soviet military power is whether the Soviets will be increasingly tempted over the next several years to use the threat of their military power more overtly and boldly as a means of pressure on the West.

226. Another serious question arises from the increasingly aggressive conduct of Soviet foreign policy on the one hand and the continuing growth of Soviet military power on the other: will the Soviets employ their own or other forces controlled by them in local military actions, estimating that the US will be deterred from making an adequate military response by fear of general war or of adverse political consequences?

227. National Estimates have stated consistently over the last several years that the Soviet leaders would try to avoid general war and that they would seek to avoid situations which in their view involved serious risk of general war. We believe that this estimate can be reaffirmed. However, we also believe that the Soviet judgment with respect to the kind of situations which do involve serious risk may be changing. The advance of their own military power, together with the growing political vulnerability of key Western positions, will probably lead the Soviet leaders to increase their general pressure on the West and to exploit local situations more vigorously. While we have always considered it possible that Bloc forces would be used in overt local aggression if this could be done without much risk of serious involvement with Western forces, we do not believe that the likelihood of such aggression has increased. However, we do believe that the Soviets will combat more actively than hitherto the presence of Western influence in

contested areas, relying upon threats to prevent the West from taking counteraction to preserve its influence. In this sense, we believe that there is currently a tendency on the part of the Soviets to view the risks of a more aggressive policy as less serious than in the past. This tendency could be reversed as a result of Western actions or as the result of a change in the Soviet leadership. But so long as this tendency persists we believe that the danger of war by miscalculation will be increased. At present, we believe that this danger is somewhat greater than our estimates in recent years have indicated.

228. *A posture for "peace."* Even if Soviet political warfare does become more vigorous and increasing pressure is applied against the West, Soviet policy will continue to garb itself with the slogans of "peace." It will not go over to an overtly and frankly aggressive posture. Rather it will continue to present itself as still striving for "peaceful coexistence" and as leading the "struggle for peace." The Soviet leaders recognize that the world-wide fear of war is so intense that great political strength is added to that side in the power struggle which can capture the force of this sentiment, and thus align large bodies of opinion with its own cause. Identification of the USSR with hopes for peace and the US with war and aggression will remain a principal aim of Soviet propaganda strategy.

229. To some extent, the desire to maintain the plausibility of this posture imposes inhibitions on the use of force; this is one reason for regarding open aggression by Bloc forces across state frontiers as unlikely. In general, Soviet leaders, believing they can continue to reap rewards with their "coexistence" tactics with little risk, are likely to view open military aggression as politically undesirable and unnecessary. Instead it will be their aim to create, mainly by political means, situations in which the West must either concede a Communist advance or resort to the use of force under unfavorable circumstances. Western concessions could then be construed by Soviet propaganda as bowing to the Soviet deterrent. If the West elected to use force, it would be compelled to do so under political and perhaps military handicaps. In either case, the Soviets would expect to intensify divisions within free world alliances and to align the uncommitted more closely with the Communist camp.

230. The Soviets will probably continue also to display an apparent readiness to engage in direct negotiations to settle outstanding issues. Proposals for high level talks will probably be renewed at any juncture the Soviet leaders find favorable to themselves. They will regard such meetings as primarily of a demonstrative character, intended not to result in freely negotiated settlements, but rather to force the Western Powers under pressure of world opinion to accede to Soviet-proposed formulas. They will attempt to pose the alternatives of "peaceful

coexistence” on the one hand, or of tensions bringing a rising danger of nuclear war on the other, hoping by occasional measured reminders of the latter to stimulate acceptance of the former on Soviet terms.

231. *The underdeveloped countries in Soviet strategy.* The effort to align the USSR in apparent support of broadly held popular aspirations takes its most general form, other than in peace propaganda, in identification with various “national liberation movements.” People in underdeveloped countries are being told that the USSR champions peace, progress, and national independence, while the West stands for war, reaction, and colonialism. Moscow clearly sees the underdeveloped countries—with their weak economic and political systems, strong nationalist and anticolonialist sentiments, neutralist tendencies, and resentment at past and present domination by Western European countries—as the most susceptible ground for expansion of Soviet influence at Western expense. It is this calculation which underlay the Soviet attack in recent years on Western interests in the colonies and former colonial countries of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

232. In part this campaign is intended to deny resources and bases in these areas to Western use. But the Communists have apparently come to believe also that it is precisely in underdeveloped and colonial areas that the best prospects for Communist advances now lie. At a minimum, they hope to bring national movements and states in these areas under Soviet diplomatic and economic influence. By thus entering into what in current Soviet parlance is called the “zone of peace” these peoples would enhance the weight of the Bloc in the world political balance. At a maximum, the Soviet leaders hope that anti-Western national movements can with native Communist participation be given a gradually more radical complexion, a process which would result ultimately in the establishment of Communist or Communist-controlled parties in power. They anticipate that rising expectations in these areas will far outrun the possibilities of fulfillment, thus giving the Communists a chance to seize the revolutionary initiative. We believe that the effort to capture a dominant position in underdeveloped areas of the world will continue through the period of this estimate to be one of the main preoccupations of Soviet policy.

233. The USSR’s targets among the underdeveloped countries may shift considerably during the period under consideration, in accordance with changing opportunities and local Communist successes and reverses. Frictions between Moscow and Afro-Asians will tend to arise in many countries—as they have already arisen in some instances—as the first bloom of friendly cooperation wears off. Moreover, the basic rationale for Moscow’s present collaboration with most Afro-Asian countries—their common anti-Western orientation—may even be somewhat eroded as some of the current points of difference

between the rising nations and the former imperial powers diminish. At the same time, Moscow will seek out new areas for the expansion of its political and economic influence, particularly in Latin America and Africa. In those countries where its efforts are most successful, the USSR may increasingly be tempted to resort to more direct means, that is, support of local Communists in attempts to seize power. But the Soviets would carefully weigh such gains against the harmful consequences such a policy would inevitably evoke elsewhere.

234. *Trade and aid.* Soviet trade and aid programs are the economic adjunct to the strategy of penetration in underdeveloped areas. The underdeveloped countries, many of which are also politically uncommitted, are generally receptive to Soviet offers of aid and offer the prospect of high political gains in return for comparatively small economic investment. Rather than being widely dispersed, aid has been concentrated on countries which are especially susceptible to Soviet influence and also in most cases are of political or strategic interest to the West.

235. From January 1954 to June 1958 the USSR extended approximately \$1.2 billion in credits to underdeveloped countries in the free world, of which \$300 million has already been used. Credits and grants by other Bloc countries bring the total to more than \$2 billion, of which \$1.3 billion has been obligated and \$740 million has been expended. About three-fifths of the total Bloc credits expended have been in the form of arms deliveries to Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. These same countries plus Ceylon, India, Burma, and Cambodia have received the major part of the economic aid. During the first half of 1958 there were at one time or another an estimated 3,700 Bloc technicians (including military specialists, totaling about one-third of this number) in 17 underdeveloped countries, representing an increase of more than 50 percent over the preceding six months. In magnitude these programs are relatively small compared with Western efforts on a global basis, and the burden they impose on the Soviet economy is slight, annual expenditures thus far being only a few tenths of one percent of Soviet national product.

236. *Attitude toward the UN.* To the extent that the Soviets succeed in gaining influence over the policies of underdeveloped and neutralist countries, and as the number of Afro-Asian members increases, the UN will become a more attractive forum for them. They probably expect ultimately to find issues on which they can align majorities against the US and obtain endorsement of Soviet policies. They calculate that such a demonstrative isolation of the US would disturb US-allied relations and curtail US influence in many areas. If the UN then became an issue in US domestic politics, the repercussions abroad would compound the Soviet advantage. We believe that the Soviets consider the chances for

political warfare victories within the UN framework to be sufficiently promising so that they will continue to give that body major attention.

237. *Disarmament.* The Soviet leaders evidently believe that by showing an active interest in disarmament they can enhance their claim to leading in the cause of peace. More specifically, they hope to neutralize Western nuclear striking power by intensifying the stigma attached to nuclear weapons and thus inhibiting their actual or threatened use by the West. They may also believe that disarmament negotiations can help to reduce the chances of nuclear war. They will almost certainly, when circumstances seem to them appropriate, press for a continuation of such negotiations.

238. It is possible that the Soviets will conclude limited agreements in the field of disarmament, even if these involve some limitations on their own military capabilities, in order to gain what they would consider to be a net advantage. Probably they have not yet resolved on the precise shape of agreements which would meet this prescription. We believe that their deep suspicion of the West and their aversion to extensive inspection in the USSR will forbid their acceptance of any truly comprehensive disarmament scheme, and will make negotiations on even the most limited measures highly complicated and drawn out.

Soviet Policy in Particular Areas

239. *The Middle East.* This area has offered since 1955 the most striking example of the attempt by Soviet policy to support anticolonialism and nationalist movements against Western interests and influence. The USSR did not create the Arab nationalist movement, but in providing the political backing of a great power, together with substantial military and economic assistance, it has enormously increased the power and effectiveness of the movement.

240. The immediate Soviet aim is to deny this area to the West and to expand Soviet influence there, rather than to gain direct control of it. If Soviet policy can deepen the conflict between Arab nationalism and the West to the point of irreconcilability, several results follow: closer association of Arab states with the Bloc tends to alter the world political alignment in the latter's favor; Western military bases in the Arab states are eliminated; Western control of the oil resources becomes tenuous. Consequently, we believe that Soviet policy will continue to present itself in the Middle East as the friend and supporter of Arab nationalism in the latter's struggle against Western "imperialism," and more particularly, will for the present support Nasser as leader of the Arab nationalist movement. Further military and economic assistance will be made available to the United Arab Republic; UAR positions on Jordan, Lebanon, the Aden Protectorate, and other trouble spots involving Arab-Western conflict will be supported in Soviet propaganda and in the UN.

241. The Soviet leaders probably believe that at some stage the Arab nationalist movement can be given a revolutionary turn toward Communism and brought under Soviet control. They believe that a sharpening of the Arabs' conflict with the West, to which their propaganda and Communist subversive elements in the area can contribute, will facilitate this development. To the extent that such a revolutionary turn towards Communism actually takes place, the basic incompatibility of Soviet aims with those of the present leaders of Arab nationalism, whom the Communists regard as "bourgeois nationalists" playing a transient historical role, will emerge. Communist penetration and subversion of the nationalist movement may occur unevenly in different Arab countries and the Soviets may at some point be tempted to abandon their restraint and encourage a Communist takeover in some key Arab state, provided they consider the stakes high enough to compensate for the resulting damage to Moscow's relations with other Afro-Asian neutrals.

242. Insofar as Western influence is eliminated from the area the Soviets will seek to reduce Nasser's pretensions and to make him increasingly their prisoner. They will try to deny him the opportunity to pursue a truly neutralist policy in which he tries to keep lines open to both power blocs. They will seek to displace his influence over other Arab states with their own and to prevent the consolidation of Arab unity under his aegis. They will oppose his suppression of local Communist parties and try to bring these into the open as leaders of the nationalist movement. There are already some signs, in Iraq for example, that the Soviets are opposing Nasser's leadership of the Arab nationalist movement in these ways. We believe, however, that they will be extremely cautious in their efforts to undermine Nasser and, before moving openly against him, will await a time when they believe that the local Communists have captured control of the mass movement or when Nasser has so isolated himself from the West that he can no longer hope to get its support against the Soviets and the Communists. An open conflict between Nasserism and Communist expansionism seems unlikely in the immediate future, but it might develop during the period of this estimate.

243. The Soviet leaders must be aware that the Western Powers are bound to attach the highest importance to the protection of their interests in the Middle East. How do they evaluate the possibility that their pledges of support to the leaders of the Arab nationalism, who cannot be fully controlled by them, may entrain the USSR in situations of great risk? Developments in the area over the past few years have probably led Moscow to place considerable confidence in the growing effectiveness of a Soviet deterrent against Western use of force to overthrow an Arab government friendly to the USSR. The Soviet leaders

probably also believe that the Western Powers in most instances would be restrained from such action by the unfavorable political reactions that would follow, both in the area and in the neutralist countries throughout Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, the intervention of the US and UK in Lebanon and Jordan demonstrated that there are circumstances in which Western powers would be willing to use military force. If the Western Powers became involved in conflict in the area, the Soviet leaders would probably not engage Soviet forces openly or take other actions which involved in their view serious risk of expanding hostilities. However, we believe that the Middle East is one of the areas where the danger of war by miscalculation has increased.

244. While Soviet policy in the Middle East is not aimed primarily at military gains, the Soviet leaders probably view the developing situation there as offering opportunities to build potential military assets. They undoubtedly calculate that in the event of Soviet military operations in this area they would benefit from their earlier peacetime introduction of military technicians, Soviet type weapons, fuel and materiel, from their increased capabilities for espionage and subversion, and from the improvements which have been made in local airfields, harbors and other facilities. The Soviet leaders probably also contemplate the eventual achievement of a long-sought Russian goal—land access to the strategic areas of the Middle East. To this end, they will continue to encourage and support such movements as that for an independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state and for a pro-Communist government in Iraq, and will also continue pressures against Iran and Turkey.

245. *Asia.* The USSR will probably rely on its current policies—propaganda about the successes of Communism, support of national independence against Western imperialism, and offers of trade, aid, and cultural exchange—to sustain and deepen neutralism, promote pro-Soviet alignments, and gradually to erode Western influence in Asia. Further increase in the strength of the Communist parties in Indonesia and India might induce the Soviet leaders to switch to open support of them, but it is more likely, in the case of India at least, that for the next several years Soviet policy will find greater advantage in cultivating the existing governments. In Asia, it is probably these two countries which are of primary interest to Communist policy at present.

246. Policy toward Japan will probably continue along the routine line laid down over the last several years—propaganda to stimulate Japanese neutralism, disturb Japanese-American relations, and maintain pressure for denial of bases to the US. The Soviet leaders probably do not believe that they have the means to alter the situation in Japan in any important way for the present. Likewise, they probably regard the situation in Korea as stalemated, although they will continue to agitate for withdrawal of US forces.

247. Soviet policy in Southeast Asia appears to operate jointly with that of Communist China on the principle of shared influence. The Soviets will probably continue to give primary emphasis to cultivating closer relations with neutralist governments in the area. They will maintain their effort to disrupt SEATO and to align uncommitted states with the Sino-Soviet Bloc on all broad international issues. They will also stress their willingness to extend economic aid to the Southeast Asian states and will tout the value of Communist methods as the best way to achieve the economic development these countries so desperately seek. However, we believe that, should favorable opportunities arise and should they estimate that the gains would outweigh the losses, the two Communist powers might support a local Communist party in an attempt to seize power. At present, Indonesia or Laos seem the most likely places for such a development eventually to occur.

248. *Africa.* As part of its effort in the underdeveloped areas, the USSR will almost certainly increase its activities in Africa during the next five years. It is already developing diplomatic and economic relations with the newly independent states of Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana, and is devoting somewhat greater efforts to Libya and the Sudan. It has offered trade, aid, technical assistance and, in some cases, arms. Although Soviet policy is somewhat constrained by the desire not to appear to compete too obviously with Nasser in the primarily Arab and Moslem areas in which he hopes to extend his influence, the USSR will almost certainly expand its efforts to establish its diplomatic and economic presence on the continent, to encourage nationalist and anticolonial movements, and to attempt to end the exclusiveness of Western influence in most of the area.

249. Up to the present the USSR has followed a policy of restraint toward North Africa, largely out of regard for Soviet relations with France and for the position of the French Communist Party. At some point, however, the USSR may abandon this policy. Internal developments in France or in Algeria might convince the Soviet leaders that they would gain more from open support of North African nationalism. In any case, material support may be given to the Algerian nationalists, though probably through Egypt rather than directly. Arms and economic aid offers will probably be pressed on the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments.

250. *Western Europe.* Current Soviet policy in Europe appears to be aimed more at consolidating the USSR's position in Eastern Europe than at an early expansion of Soviet power beyond the present frontiers of the Bloc. In order to achieve greater security for Communist control of Eastern Europe, as well as to weaken the position of Western Europe, the Soviets are bound to regard the dissolution of the NATO alliance and the withdrawal of US military power from Europe as

basic objectives of their policy. These are the main purposes of all their maneuvers and proposals aimed at achieving "European security." The more immediate Soviet objectives are to prevent an increase in West German military strength and the establishment of additional missile bases in Western Europe. Soviet disarmament policy and its attendant propaganda is directed largely at these targets. Moreover, the Soviet policies in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, apart from their intrinsic importance, are themselves calculated to impose material and political losses on Western Europe and to encourage divisions there.

251. The current Soviet diplomatic offensive over the status of Berlin is the most striking example of Khrushchev's activist foreign policy. The Soviet leader must be aware that there is virtually no point of controversy between East and West on which the West has so thoroughly committed itself, and that there can scarcely be a more dangerous international issue to push to the point of crisis. In raising the issue, the Soviets have had in mind the achievement of a number of major objectives. They seek to compel the Western Powers to deal with East Germany and thus to accord at least tacit recognition to the GDR. This in turn would constitute an important step toward a ratification of the status quo in Eastern Europe, a development which the Soviets have long sought. Further, the removal of the Western presence from Berlin would permit the Soviets to handle the escapee problem and generally to reinforce the internal security of their East German Satellite. They probably further calculate that the Berlin initiative, even if only partially successful, will stimulate a more receptive atmosphere for other Soviet proposals on Germany, particularly disengagement and peace treaty negotiations. In addition, the Soviets probably expect that a serious Western retreat on Berlin would bring into question for many West Germans the desirability of the NATO alliance.

252. It is not clear why the Soviets have chosen the present moment to raise the Berlin issue, but their action is certainly in accord with the generally hardening tone of their foreign policy. This in turn is related to their growing conviction, manifest over the last year or so, that their relative power position has improved. They are presumably acting on the assumption that what they describe as "a shift in the relation of forces in the world arena" in their favor gives them an opportunity to test the solidarity of the Western Alliance over a major issue. The Soviet leaders probably intend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct Soviet and East German maneuvering in a manner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of the West, or of inclinations to compromise on major issues. Nevertheless, they have

already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, with considerable chance of miscalculation by one or both sides.

253. We do not believe that the raising of the Berlin issue signalizes a Soviet willingness to move toward a settlement of the German problem as a whole on other than Soviet terms. We foresee no change at present in the USSR's adamant opposition to German reunification despite the handicaps this imposes on Soviet maneuverability in Western Europe. The Soviet leaders cannot contemplate abandonment of East Germany because of the threat which would probably develop to their whole position in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland. Over the longer run, a major political change in West Germany, such as might develop after the death of Chancellor Adenauer, could lead to a new and seemingly more flexible Soviet and East German approach to Bonn and to the reunification problem. The Soviets probably believe that a period of political uncertainty would ensue, and that party realignments would give them new opportunities to promote West Germany's separation from NATO and the withdrawal of Allied military forces, to achieve international recognition of East Germany, and eventually a reunification scheme acceptable to the USSR.

254. Moscow probably has come to view the Communist Parties in Western Europe more as a vehicle for propaganda and agitation than as the basis for revolutionary action, at least for the next several years. While the long-range subversive and political potential of these Parties will be cultivated, their present role is mainly to support Soviet foreign policy objectives, such as arousing popular concern against West German nuclear armament and the stationing of missiles in Europe.

255. *Latin America.* The trend noticeable in the last year of increased Soviet attention to Latin America will continue during the coming five years. The USSR apparently estimates that current economic and political differences between the US and Latin America and the elements of political instability in certain countries provide a promising opportunity to expand Soviet influence. In the immediate future, Moscow will concentrate on broadening its diplomatic and cultural relations and on trade or economic assistance offers in selective, politically sensitive situations in order to expand Soviet influence on the governmental level and to facilitate both the overt and the subversive activities of local Communists. The most significant recent Soviet economic moves in Latin America have been the conclusion in October 1958 of a \$100 million credit to Argentina for the purchase of Soviet petroleum equipment (the largest Soviet credit offer extended to any non-Communist country outside the Afro-Asian Bloc), large-scale Soviet purchases of Uruguayan wool, and the conclusion of a barter deal with Brazil.

Annex

Tables of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Forces

TABLE 1—ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1 OCTOBER 1958¹

	ARMY GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCES (Including Naval Aviation)	NAVAL FORCES	AIR DEFENSE CONTROL AND WARNING	MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES	TOTALS (Excluding Security)
USSR (Rounded totals)	2,650,000 ²	835,000 ^{2,3}	765,000 ^{2,4}	75,000	400,000	4,325,000
EE Satellites (Rounded totals)	880,000	100,000	40,000	—	300,000	1,020,000
Albania	25,000	1,500	900	—	10,000	27,400
Bulgaria	110,000	16,000	6,200	—	30,000	132,200
Czechoslovakia	170,000	23,000	—	—	45,000	193,000
East Germany	75,000	8,000	12,000	—	45,000	95,000
Hungary	100,000	5,500	—	—	35,000	105,500
Poland	200,000	34,000 ⁶	12,000	—	45,000	246,000
Rumania	200,000	13,500	9,200	—	60,000	222,700

	ARMY GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCES (Including Naval Aviation)	NAVAL FORCES	AIR DEFENSE CONTROL AND WARNING	MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES	TOTALS (Excluding Security)
Communist Asia (Rounded totals)	3,230,000	105,000	55,000	—	35,000	3,390,000
Communist China	2,625,000	87,000 ⁵	48,000	—	—	2,760,000
North Korea	334,000	20,000	7,000	—	—	361,000
North Vietnam	270,000	250	2,000	—	35,000	272,250
BLOC TOTALS (Rounded)	6,750,000	1,050,000	850,000	75,000	750,000	8,725,000

¹Figures in this table are based on estimated order of battle. Estimates of this type yield approximate rather than precise measures of strength at any given time, and can lag considerably behind changes in actual strength. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²These figures do not include ground, naval, and air forces personnel permanently assigned to the air defense forces (PVO) with aircraft control and warning as their primary duty.

³For purposes of this table, an estimated 110,000 Naval Aviation personnel are included in total Soviet air forces personnel strength.

⁴Does not include KGB naval forces which in this table are carried in Soviet security forces total.

⁵Includes 2,000 naval air.

⁶Includes 8,000 naval air.

TABLE 2—ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES IN LINE DIVISIONS, 1 OCTOBER 1958¹

Country	Rifle Divisions			Mechanized Divisions			Motorized Rifle Divisions			Tank Divisions			Airborne Divisions			Total No.
	No.	TOE	Actual	No.	TOE	Actual	No.	TOE	Actual	No.	TOE	Actual	No.	TOE	Actual	
USSR ²	75	13,335	8,850	40	15,415	9,800	27	13,150	9,300	23	10,630	8,300	10	9,000	7,000	175 ³
Communist China	114	17,600	15,000							3	7,850	6,000	3	8,300	7,000	123 ⁴
East Germany							5	12,500	6,000	2	10,500	6,000				7
Poland	5	11,500	8,000	7	14,000	10,000				2	11,500	7,000				14
Bulgaria	9	11,500	5,500													9
Czechoslovakia	8	11,500	7,000	4	14,000	8,000				2	11,500	7,000	1	6,000	4,000	15
Hungary ⁵																0
Rumania	12	11,500	8,000	1	14,000	8,500				1	11,500	9,000				14
North Korea	18	10,700	9,600													18
North Vietnam	14	12,640	10,250													14
TOTAL	255			52			32			33			14			389 ⁶

¹Actual strengths of divisions vary. The figures shown represent estimated averages. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Additional Soviet combat units are estimated to include 20 artillery divisions, 80 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 120 separate brigades.

³Estimated dispositions of Soviet line divisions: Occupied Europe, 25; Northwestern USSR, 9; Western USSR, 56; Southwestern USSR, 20; Southern USSR, 24; Central USSR, 10; Soviet Far East, 31.

⁴The total of Chinese Communist divisions includes 3 small cavalry divisions.

⁵The Hungarian Armed Forces not now considered to be effective; ground force in process of formation will amount to some 4 divisions.

⁶Estimated breakdown by major groupings: USSR, 175; Communist China, 123; European Satellites, 59; North Korea and North Vietnam, 32.

[Omitted here is Table 3.]

TABLE 4—ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY ROLE, 1 OCTOBER 1958

	Eastern EUROPE ¹	North- Western		Western USSR ³	West Central USSR ⁴		Caucasus USSR ⁵		East Central USSR ⁶		Far East USSR ⁷		Total
		USSR ²			USSR ⁴		USSR ⁵		USSR ⁶		USSR ⁷		
FIGHTER													
Jet (Day)	810	1,215		2,035	1,375		1,050		535		1,405		8,415
Jet (A/W)	145	255		425	290		240		105		270		1,730
ATTACK													
Jet (Ftr)	90	—		75	—		75		85		—		325
LIGHT BOMBER													
Jet	230	375		1,145	235		290		80		520		2,875
MEDIUM BOMBER ⁸													
Jet	—	230		787	104		15		—		189		1,325
Prop	—	18		159	134		42		—		82		435
HEAVY BOMBER	—	—		40 to 50	50 to 60		—		—		10 to 15		100 to 125
TRANSPORT													
Jet	—	—		—	—		—		—		—		—
Prop (Lt)	110	180		415	375		75		40		485		1,670
Prop (Med)	—	30		130	—		—		—		30		190
HELICOPTER													
Light	20	45		100	100		5		5		80		355
Medium	—	—		—	10		—		—		—		10

(Continued)

TABLE 4—Continued

	Eastern EUROPE ¹	North- Western USSR ²	Western USSR ³	West Central USSR ⁴	Caucasus USSR ⁵	East Central USSR ⁶	Far East USSR ⁷	Total
RECONNAISSANCE								
Jet (Ftr)	45	—	5	—	5	10	—	65
Jet (Lt Bmr)	55	90	160	20	40	30	95	490
Prop (Seaplane)	—	50	10	—	25	—	60	145
UTILITY/LIAISON								
Jet (Lt Bmr)	50	20	30	—	—	—	30	130
Prop (Misc)	40	—	25	10	15	55	—	145
TRAINER								
Jet (Ftr).	110	117	175	106	80	36	141	765
ROUNDED								
TOTALS	1,700	2,600	5,700	2,800	2,000	1,000	3,400	19,200

¹East Germany, Poland, Hungary. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]²Northern and Leningrad MD's.³Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa MD's.⁴Moscow, Volga, Voronezh, and Ural MD's.⁵North Caucasus and Transcaucasus MD's.⁶Turkestan and Siberian MD's.⁷Far East and Transbalkal MD's.⁸Includes medium bombers assigned to Naval and Tactical Aviation.

TABLE 5—ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS,
1 OCTOBER 1958

FIGHTER	TACTICAL AVIATION	FIGHTER AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE	LONG- RANGE AVIATION	NAVAL AVIATION	AVIATION OF AIRBORNE TROOPS	TOTAL
Jet (Day)	3,260	3,700	—	1,455	—	8,415
Jet (A/W)	665	750	—	315	—	1,730
ATTACK						
Jet (Ftr)	325	—	—	—	—	325
LIGHT BOMBER						
Jet	2,390	—	—	485	—	2,875
MED. JET BOMBER and TANKER	115	—	960	250	—	1,325
MEDIUM BOMBER						
Prop	—	—	420	15	—	435
HEAVY BOMBER and TANKER	—	—	100 to 125	—	—	100 to 125
TRANSPORT						
Prop (Lt)	730	110	225	140	465	1,670
Prop (Med)	—	—	—	—	190	190
HELICOPTER						
Light	80	—	—	90	185	355
Medium	—	—	—	—	10	10

(Continued)

TABLE 5—Continued

	TACTICAL AVIATION	FIGHTER AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE	LONG- RANGE AVIATION	NAVAL AVIATION	AVIATION OF AIRBORNE TROOPS	TOTAL
RECONNAISSANCE						
Jet (Ftr)	65	—	—	—	—	65
Jet (Lt Bmr)	410	—	—	80	—	490
Prop (Seapin)	—	—	—	145	—	145
UTILITY/LIAISON						
Jet (Ftr)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jet (Lt Bmr)	50	—	—	80	—	130
Prop (Misc)	145	—	—	—	—	145
TRAINER						
Jet (Ftr)	365	280	—	120	—	765
ROUNDED						
TOTALS	8,600	4,850	1,700	3,200	850	19,200

TABLE 6—ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBERS
For Operational Use to 1961

(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)

	CURRENT MODELS				POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ¹			
	BULL	BADGER	BISON	BEAR	BADGER 1958 ³	BISON 1958 ³	BISON 1960 ³	MB 1960-61 ⁴
Combat Radius/Range (nm)								
a. 25,000 lb. bombload	—	—	2600/4900	3750/7100	—	2750/5200	9050/5600	—
one refuel ²	—	—	3500/6600	5100	—	3700/7000	3950/7500	—
b. 10,000 lb. bombload	1800/3300	1600/3100	2800/5500	4200/8100	1800/3400	3000/5800	3200/6300	⁶
one refuel ²	2400/4500	2300/4200	3650/7400	5750	2400/4600	4000/7800	4300/8500	⁵
c. 3,300 lb. bombload	2050/3700	1800/3600	2950/5800	4400/8700	2000/3900	3100/6100	3300/6600	1950/3800 ⁶
one refuel ²	2750/5000	2500/4800	3700/7800	6100	2650/5200	4150/8200	4450/8900	2650/5100 ⁶
Speed/Altitude (kts./ft.)								
a. Maximum speed at optimum altitude ¹	350/30,000	550/13,200	530/18,000	495/21,600	555/14,000	540/18,800	540/18,800	1085/35,000 ⁸
b. Target speed target altitude ¹	310/30,000	475/40,800	460/40,900	410/41,900	475/42,300	460/43,400	460/43,400	865/47,000 ⁴

(Continued)

TABLE 6—Continued

	CURRENT MODELS				POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ¹			
	BULL	BADGER	BISON	BEAR	BADGER 1958 ³	BISON 1958 ³	BISON 1960 ³	MB 1960–61 ⁴
Combat Ceiling (ft.) ¹	36,500	45,400	44,000	41,200	46,700	46,500	46,500	57,500 ⁸
Terminal Target Altitude (ft.) ⁹								
a. 25,000 lb. bombload	—	—	52,500	48,200	—	54,200	54,200	—
b. 10,000 lb. bombload	41,500	50,000	54,200	50,000	52,500	55,800	55,800	61,000
c. 3,300 lb. bombload	42,000	51,500	54,800	51,000	54,300	56,500	56,500	62,500

¹Additional possible developments during the period of this estimate, for which no detailed performance characteristics have been estimated, are mentioned in the Discussion, Chapter IV, paragraph 144. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximately 30–40 percent increase in radius/range.

³Future improvements of BISON and BADGER aircraft are based on normal expected improvements through the 1960 period; in particular, replacement of the present 18,000 lb. thrust engines with those having a thrust of about 20,500 lbs.

⁴Jet medium bomber with supersonic “dash” capability.

⁵Capable of carrying 100 n.m. range ASM, of approximately 11,000 lb. gross weight.

⁶Includes 500 n.m. “dash” at Mach 1.5.

⁷For 10,000 lb. bombload unless otherwise indicated.

⁸For 3,300 lb. bombload.

⁹Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bombload aboard. No range figure is associated with this altitude.

TABLE 7—ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LIGHT BOMBERS

	1959					
	1950 BEAGLE	1951 MADGE ¹	1954 BEAGLE	1951 BOSUN	MADGE (Turboprop)	SUPERSONIC ⁴ Tactical
Combat Radius/Range (n.m.)	735/1,400	580/1,450	745/1,400	765/1,510	950/2,200	900 ² /1,600 ³
Bombload (lbs)	4,400	3,000	4,400	4,400	4,400	6,600
Maximum Speed at Optimum Altitude (Kts/ft)	460/15,000	165/SL	480/9,000	475/15,000	270/5,000	705 (Mach 1.23) /35,000
Target Speed/Target Altitude (Kts/ft)	385/39,000	110/5,000	395/42,200	400/35,100	—	610 (Mach 1.06) /43,300
Combat Ceiling	43,800	20,200	46,900	39,500	22,000	49,400 (or 57,300 with afterburning)

¹May also be used in antisubmarine warfare. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Includes 50 n.m. supersonic dash.

³Includes 100 n.m. supersonic dash.

⁴Expected to become operational in the 1958–1963 period.

TABLE 8—ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec)

AIRCRAFT	CAB	COACH	CRATE	CAMEL	BULL	COOT	CAMP	CLEAT	COOKER	CAT	TURBOJET
Operational	1937	1947	1955	1956	TYPE	1958	1959	1959	1959	1959	1960
Date					1956						
Soviet	L1-2	Il-12	Il-14	Tu-104		Il-18		Tu-114	Tu-110	An-10	
Designation						(Moskva)		(Rossiya)		(Ukraina)	
Power Plants											
Number	2	2	2	2	4	4	2	4	4	4	4
Type	Piston	Piston	Piston	Turbojet	Piston	Turboprop	Turboprop	Turboprop	Turbojet	Turboprop	Turbojet
Combat	530/	665/	710/	900/	1670/	1500/	730/	2500/	1400/	665/	1800/
Radius/	1215	1335	1560	2050	3150	2800	1440	5200	2900	1300	3800
Range (n.m.)											
Payload											
Troops or	20	21	21	60	42	110	80	230	125	125	185
Passengers or	15	18	18	50	—	75	—	120	78	84	100
Cargo (lbs)	3300	5000	4600	23,000	25,700	27,000	20,000	55,000	30,000	30,000	45,000
Speed/Op. Alt. ¹	165/	220/	231/	580/SL	300/	410/	280/	500/	550/	400/	535/
(Kts/ft)	5000	10,000	10,000		20,000	27,000	17,000	20,000	13,750	28,000	20,000
Cruise Speed/	130/	165/	140/	430/	198/	315/	230/	400/	425/	300/	425/
Alt. ² (Kts/ft)	13,000	10,000	10,000	32,800	10,000	25,000	15,000	25,000	33,000	25,000	33,000
Service Ceiling	16,600	26,599	24,000	37,700	39,550	30,000	31,000	40,000	43,000	33,400	50,000
Remarks	Soviet version of DC-2			Transport design based on BADGER	Transport version of BULL		Assault Transport called Whale by Soviets	New transport based on BEAR			Proto-type not observed

¹Normal rated power. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Constant altitude mission.

TABLE 9—ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET JET FIGHTERS¹
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil C-5011A Spec. except that fuel reserves are reduced to permit a maximum of 20 minutes endurance at sea level and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius)

Operational	FAGOT	FRESCO	FRESCO	FRESCO	FARMER	FLASH-	FACE-	All-	FITTER ⁶	All-	All-
	Day	A, B Day	C Day	D ⁴ All-	Day	LIGHTA	PLATE ⁵	weather	Day	weather ³	weather
	fighter	fighters	fighter	fighter	fighter	All-weather	Day	fighter	fighter	fighter	fighter
	Current	Current	Current	Current	Current	Current	fighter	1958	1958	1959	1962
Maximum Speed (Kts)											
Sea level	580	615	635	635	680	610	700	690	800	825	800
35,000 ft	530	550	570	570	735	540	885	860	1,185	1,150	1,440
40,000 ft	525	545	570	570	725	535	850	—	1,150	—	—
Combat Ceiling (ft) ²	51,100	55,100	59,000	58,700	61,100	49,300	61,300	60,000	60,400	62,000	67,000
with external fuel	50,800	53,400	58,600	58,300	59,700	48,700	59,100	60,000	58,300	62,000	67,000
Combat Radius (n. m.)	290	450	380	380	290	450	215	250	140	130	200
with external fuel	490	700	640	640	655	530	610	675	480	440	—
Time to climb to ²											
40,000 ft (mins.)	7.6	7.3	4.7	4.7	2.6	7.8	3.8 ²	2.6	3.5 ²	2.2	1.7
with external fuel	8.8	10.6	6.8	6.8	7.9	8.4	6.3 ²	—	5.6 ²	5.1 ⁴	—

(Continued)

TABLE 9—Continued

	FAGOT	FRESCO A, B Day fighters	FRESCO C Day fighter	FRESCO D ⁴ All- weather fighter	FARMER Day fighter	FLASH- LIGHTA All-weather fighter	FACE- PLATE ⁵ Day fighter	All- weather fighter	FITTER ⁶ Day fighter	All- weather ³ fighter	All- weather fighter
Operational	Current	Current	Current	Current	Current	Current	1958	1958	1958	1959	1962
Armament	2 × 23mm 1 × 37mm	2 × 23mm 1 × 37mm	2 × 23mm 1 × 37mm	3 × 23mm	2 × 23mm 1 × 37mm	2 × 37mm and 76 × 55mm or 4 × 325mm	3 × 23mm and 76 × 55mm 2 × 325mm	2 × 30mm and 76 × 55mm 4 × 325mm	2 × 30mm and 76 × 55mm or 2 × 325mm	2 × 30mm and 38 × 55mm 2 × 220mm	—
Guns											
Rockets											
Guided Missiles											

¹Unless otherwise noted, performance figures are calculated with internal fuel only. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²Highest altitude at which aircraft can climb at the rate of 500 feet per minute with maximum power.

³Data shown at gross take-off weight with maximum power unless otherwise noted.

⁴FRESCO D and E have a limited all-weather capability (i.e., equipped with search radar, but without tracking capability). The E version, however, has no afterburner and has about the same performance as the A and B.

⁵FISHBED, the delta-wing version of FACEPLATE, is believed to have similar performance characteristics.

⁶FISHPOT, the delta-wing version of FITTER, is believed to have performance characteristics somewhat inferior to FITTER's. However, it is estimated that the USSR will continue to develop and improve FISHPOT as an all-weather fighter for first operational use in 1959. FISHPOT appears compatible with installation of a search-track radar.

⁷Military power (without afterburning).

TABLE 10—ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET
EARLY WARNING AND GCI RADARS

Type	Year in Service	Frequency (mcs.)	EARLY WARNING RADAR			GROUND CONTROL INTER- CEPT RADAR		
			Detection Range (n.m.)		Altitude	Tracking Range (n.m.)		Altitude
			Medium Bomber	Fighter	Cover- age (ft.)	Medium Bomber	Fighter	Coverage
DUMBO	Current	70-75	50-140	35-85	70,000	50-110	40-75	60,000
TOKEN	Current	2700-3100	80-180	70-100	60,000	80-110	50-70	80,000
TOKEN/ROCK CAKE	Current	2700-3100/ 2615-2630						
KNIFE REST	Current	70-85	50-140	35-85	75,000			
GAGE	Current	2700-2800	160	100-160	80,000			
GAGE/PATTY CAKE	Current	2700-2800/ S-Band				70-90	40-60	80,000

(Continued)

TABLE 10—Continued

		EARLY WARNING RADAR			GROUND CONTROL INTER-CEPT RADAR			
Type	Year in Service	Frequency (mcs.)	Detection Range (n.m.)		Altitude Cover- age (ft.)	Tracking Range (n.m.)		Altitude Coverage
			Medium Bomber	Fighter		Medium Bomber	Fighter	
BIG MESH								
S-Band	Current	2700-3130	170-210	100-120	80,000	100-120	80-90	80,000
L-Band		550-600	170-210	100-120	80,000			
STRIKE OUT	Current	2700-3100	170-210	100-120	80,000			
STRIKE OUT / ROCK CAKE	Current	2700-3100				100-120	80-90	80,000
New Type	1960	up to 3000	250	100-160	100,000	150	—	100,000
New Type	1965	up to 3000	300	—	100,000	250	—	100,000

Notes:

1. All radars listed as currently operational are believed to have height-finding capabilities, with the exception of GAGE and STRIKE OUT when used in an early warning role.
2. With the exception of DUMBO, all of these radars are believed to be equipped with antijamming devices.
3. All of these current types are believed to be mobile except for the DUMBO, the GAGE and the GAGE-PATTY CAKE combination.

TABLE 11—ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL SHIPS 1 OCTOBER 1958—MID-1963

YEAR	1 October 1958						Mid-1959		Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963					
	Baltic		Northern		Black Sea		Pacific		Total All Fleets		Total All Fleets						
FLEET AREA	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	China	USSR	Sat.	USSR	USSR					
COUNTRY	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	China	USSR	Sat.	USSR	USSR	Sat. & Com. China				
Major Surface Ships ¹																	
Heavy Cruisers	2	—	—	—	2	—	2	—	6	—	—	5	3	1	1	—	
Old Heavy Cruisers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	5	5	—	
Light Cruisers	5	—	6	—	5	—	4	—	20	—	—	19	19	19	19	18	—
Old Light Cruisers	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	2	2	2	—
Guided Missile Cruisers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	3	6	9	—
Destroyers	41	3	33	—	26	1	36	4	136	4	4	145	135	120	120	118	3
Old Destroyers	3	1	1	—	3	4	—	—	7	5	—	7	17	32	32	34	10
Guided Missile Destroyers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	10	16	22	—
Escorts	12	2	10	—	16	1	34	4	81	3	4	86	91	96	101	106	7
Total	64	6	59	—	53	6	76	8	252	12	8	267	275	288	302	313	20

(Continued)

TABLE 11—(Continued)

YEAR FLEET AREA COUNTRY	1 October 1958						Mid-1959						Mid-1962						Mid-1963	
	Baltic		Northern		Black Sea		Pacific		Total All Fleets				Total All Fleets				Total All Fleets			
	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.		
Submarines ³ (Continued)	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.	USSR	Sat.		
Medium Range New Const. ²	33	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	33	—	—	—	38	43	43	43	43	—		
Other Medium Range ⁶	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	8	—	4	7	5	3	2	—	—	—		
Old Medium Range	2	1	—	—	3	—	2	—	7	1	—	7	6	6	6	8	1	1		
Short Range ⁶	26	6	—	—	5	3	19	4	50	9	4	47	47	47	42	33	13	13		
Old Short Range	3	0	3	—	13	3	12	1	31	6	1	29	21	12	12	19	6	6		
Total	123	7	137	—	83	6	100	20	443	16	20	448	452	452	463	469	52	52		

¹In addition to the major surface ships shown, we estimate in mid-1958 there were 1,980 minor surface ships in the Soviet service, and 599 in the Satellites and Communist China. Minor surface ships include amphibious, mine warfare, and patrol ships. "Old" surface ships are those more than 20 years old. [All footnotes in the table are in the original.]

²"Old" submarines are those 14–20 years old.

³Conventional submarines of post-World War II design and construction, including "W," "Z," and, "P" Class long range, "Q" Class medium range, and a new medium range submarine.

⁴New Soviet submarine programs now under way will probably include ballistic missile submarine systems, and possibly also submarines designed for internal stowage of cruise-type missiles. While there is little evidence on the progress of such programs, the figures given here take account of both possibilities. For further information as to types, see Chapter IV, paragraph 154.

⁵Submarines older than post-World War II but less than 14 years old.

TABLE 12—ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET
"Z," "W" AND "Q" CLASS SUBMARINES

Class	Length/ Beam (ft)	Displace- ment (tons) Surfaced/ Submerged	Diving Limit (ft)	Arma- ment Torpedo/ Mine	Performance—Speed (Kts)/Endurance (n.m.)			Operation Radii* n.m./days on station
						Surfaced	Snorkeling	Sub- merged
"Z" (Long range)	290/26	1950/2290	650	24/48	Maximum	16/6900	11/7100	17/8.5
					Cruising	10/17,200	8/12,400	3/108
"W" (Long range)	240/22	1300/146	650	14/26	Maximum	15/6000	11/5100	16/8
					Cruising	10/12,000	8/8300	4/144
"Q" (Med. range)	165/17	400/465	450	8/12	Maximum	16/1700	12/1300	15/7.5
					Cruising	4/4600	8/2500	4/144

*These radii are based upon the following arbitrary patrol conditions: Each day of transit consists of 12 hours of surface running at 10 knots during hours of twilight and darkness and 12 hours of snorkel running during the day at 8 knots. Fuel consumption on station is based upon submerged running at 3 knots with sufficient snorkeling to maintain batteries. [Footnote is in the original.]

TABLE 13—ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETS MID-1958 AND MID-1963
(Ocean-going vessels, 1,000 GRT and up)

		Mid-1958						Mid-1963					
		Non-tanker			Tanker			Non-tanker			Tanker		
	No.	GRT	DWT	No.	GRT	DWT		No.	GRT	DWT	No.	GRT	DWT
USSR	707	2,426,308	3,089,535	95	546,768	816,039		972	3,701,620	4,657,880	141	915,718	1,369,634
EE	120	493,271	682,961	5	31,872	48,355		171	707,471	961,421	13	110,930	166,942
China	120	313,941	350,357	8	11,394	13,821		146	398,903	477,797	17	44,694	57,821
Total	947	3,233,520	4,122,853	108	590,034	878,215		1,289	4,807,994	6,097,078	171	1,071,342	1,594,397

135. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 9, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
Major Eisenhower

General Twining opened by telling the President of the visit of General Norstad, who had been in Washington for the week end. The purpose of his trip had been to testify before the Mahon Subcommittee (Defense) of the House Appropriations Committee. On Saturday morning General Norstad met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subject at that time had been the current U.S. position on contingency plans for Berlin, which General Norstad had thought was very fine. To this the President added Secretary Dulles had had a successful trip to Europe and had reported that the French are taking a much more positive view on the Berlin question. (The Secretary had pointed out, however, that despite their resolution, the French have very little capability available in Europe itself.)

General Twining then mentioned the idea of a military representative to the tripartite meetings which are being held in Washington between Alaphand, Caccia and Murphy. (These are being held in response to De Gaulle's desire for tripartite discussions within NATO.) Specifically, Admiral Dennison had been present at the first meeting, held recently, to brief on the subject of the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to terminate this procedure of providing a military representative at first chance, fearing that too many political problems will be pushed off on the military. General Twining promised that he would see Mr. Murphy on the subject. He added, however, that at the meeting between Secretary Dulles and General De Gaulle it had been helpful to the Secretary to be able to state that we provided a military representation to this tripartite meeting. General Twining believes that he has now arrived at an estimate of what De Gaulle wants. Primarily, he desires to have a veto over the use of our Strategic Air Command.

* * *

General Twining then brought up the matter of personnel changes in Europe. General Norstad had voiced the desire to remain in his present job to the end of this Administration; specifically, he feels he should

¹ Source: Senior military personnel appointments, publicizing defense efforts; Congressional hearings. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on February 10.

wait until after the 1960 election. General Norstad had pointed out that he desires to retire rather than continue on active duty, since his investment in the European job is so heavy as to practically cut him off from any terms of reference of a job in the U.S.

The President was in general agreement with General Norstad's desires, although he feels that late summer of 1960 would be a preferable time for the switch. He stated that he would like to make the change about three or four months before the end of the Administration. He would like General Norstad to remain on active duty after his return to the U.S.; but he fully realizes the difficulty in readjusting from a position of SACEUR to any other. He asked General Twining to request General Norstad to come and visit him next time he is in Washington.

As to the timing of a departure by General Norstad, the President sees no problem. General Schuyler's changeover will occur in June 1959. His replacement will eventually become SACEUR. This will make June 1960 the first time in which General Schuyler's replacement could take over from General Norstad, since it would require at least a year for an officer in the Chief of Staff position to "sell himself" to the European nations. The President pointed out that he had followed this procedure with General Gruenther, and that only in the case of General Ridgway had an officer been sent in from another area to take over that command.

General Twining then stated that General Norstad would favor General Taylor as his replacement, although they all realize that General Taylor has completed his tour as Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense thinks it unwise to appoint him for a third term. Accordingly, General Twining feels that General Taylor could take over the position of Deputy CINCEUR, now held by General Palmer. On this the President reviewed some names of officers he would nominate for this position. He agrees with the difficulties in the appointment of General Taylor, but feels (and General Twining agrees) that the officer should come from the Army. Specifically, the President mentioned General Decker, General Davidson, and General Lemnitzer. In response to General Twining's statement that General Lemnitzer is slated to be Chief of Staff, the President answered that that officer should be groomed for General Twining's position, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some discussion of individual officer qualifications then followed, with General Twining expressing the view that if SACEUR is to be an Army officer, then the position of Deputy CINCEUR, presently held by General Palmer, should be held by an Air Force officer. He also stated that General Norstad is making every effort to consolidate some Army headquarters in Europe. To this the President responded with enthusiasm.

The President then brought up the matter of a recent Air Force promotion list which had been sent to his desk. The promotion of the five officers involved (to three star general) would have resulted in exceeding current vacancies; however, the recommendation had included no notation to that effect.

As a corollary to this matter, the President expressed the opinion that there are too many high ranking slots in all three Services. He told the story of a colonel in North Africa who had recommended his own promotion to brigadier general on the basis that he could not do his job as a colonel. When informed that he could then be sent home, the officer changed his mind. Further, the President pointed out that he had been a three-star general with a five-star British admiral under his command.

General Twining stated that they are working on a study in this connection and will make recommendations in the near future. He recognized that the President had normally been prompt in signing promotions, and had recommended in the strongest terms that under such circumstances any promotion should be accompanied by an analysis of the necessity for exceeding the quotas and a complete presentation for the President. General Twining had stated that the President should not be hit cold on these matters. The President admitted that he had been somewhat shocked by the fact that there had been no indication on this promotion list that the quotas had been exceeded.

* * *

The President now brought up the matter of publicity in connection with our defense posture. Specifically, he has been advised by General Persons that the American public should know more about missiles and armaments. In order to give proper publicity in this matter, General Persons feels that we should do something a little different. Speeches are inadequate. Accordingly, it has been recommended that the President make a trip to a Strategic Air Command base, to Cape Canaveral, and to a NIKE site, and at each location, he should make an appearance to the press and attempt to give some understanding of what our defense structure is all about. Accordingly, he requests a restudy of our public information policies on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine what type of facts the President might give out under these circumstances.

General Twining, while he expressed approval of this scheme, pointed out that facts and logic are often wasted when the opposition employs tactics similar to those of Senator Symington on the matter of airborne alert. While testifying before Congress, General Twining had been asked by Senator Symington how many aircraft were on airborne alert that particular day. There had been a recent exercise which involved an airborne alert in SAC, but that exercise having been terminated, General Twining so advised Senator Symington. As a result, Senator Symington had made a great issue of this matter to the effect that

it is a shame that none of our aircraft are on airborne alert and blamed the budget for this deplorable fact. Senator Bush had also expressed shock. When General Twining mentioned this later to General Power, he learned that Senator Symington had telephoned General Power that morning and asked how many aircraft were on airborne alert. General Power had given him the facts. As the result, General Twining has received a volume of mail, and in his answers, has cleared the record. In General Twining's view, we have no need for an airborne alert and our capability to respond with SAC on fifteen minutes warning is adequate for our military posture. General Twining then proceeded to describe the tendency on the part of some people to discount everything but relative ICBM capabilities. He pointed out that our Air Force is four times the size of that of the Soviets and ten times as good. It does execute airborne alert exercises from time to time to keep the Soviets uncertain. General Twining expressed admiration for the performance of the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before Congress.

The President stated that he had spoken before about self-appointed military experts. He is considering another statement about neurotics—either honest or dishonest neurotics—who are so fearful that they advocate taking the entire SAC into the air and keeping it there. He conceded that these people realized the aircraft must come down occasionally to gas up. General Twining expressed the view that the public must realize that the USSR has a capability to hit the U.S. and to live with this realization. It is a hard fact of life. The President agreed except that he pointed out that our estimates for the last four years have included the Soviet capability to destroy the U.S. 100%. This was first based on one-way bomber missions and is now based on the ICBM. He reiterated his stand for a reasonably adequate program.

General Twining continued the discussion on enemy capabilities by stating that in his testimony before Congress he personally admitted that he had previously fought for more bombers. He had been concerned over the Soviet capability to build BISONS and BEARS. However, as it had turned out, the Soviets had not built these aircraft and now possess only 100–115 heavy bombers. He had further pointed out to Congress that missiles are only as good as their launching sites. We have not as yet obtained any hard intelligence on any launching sites in the Soviet Union.

The President and General Twining then reviewed the concept of a trip by the President to SAC, to a NIKE site, and to Cape Canaveral, and to issue statements at each location. General Twining stated he would open a study on what might be said at these locations. In this connection, he made mention of the successful flight of the TITAN on February third, adding that this is the first missile which had been successful on its first launching. The President observed that manufacturers in Denver had predicted this.

General Twining then completed his report on the Congressional hearings by describing the question on the subject of the missile gap. When asked how to remedy the missile gap, he had answered that we should merely produce lots of big ATLAS missiles. However, he does not advocate this: The ATLAS is not the weapon that we would ultimately like, and, therefore, large quantities of this weapon would be obsolete soon. He does not believe the USSR is in a mood for general war, particularly in view of the pride that they take in having rebuilt their cities from World War II. He repeated the desires on the part of fearful people, stating that if we bought everything they advocated we would wind up spending \$70 billion for defense alone. Finally, he had suggested to the Congress that they employ the word "operational" when discussing missile sites. He pointed out that there is no glamor to the subject of base building, only to the production of missiles. The President suggested we might mention to the Congress that every missile site near a city makes that city a prime target. General Twining now reiterated his admiration for the performance of the Secretary of Defense before these hearings. In this connection, the President expressed the view that Secretary McElroy, while he should not be made to look too partisan, possesses talents which are such that he should not be lost to Government service when this particular job is terminated.

* * *

As a matter of interest, General Twining then mentioned the attitude of the Congress relative to jurisdiction, which had caused considerable disturbance for a couple of days during the hearings. Primarily, Congress fears that the Executive is taking over prerogatives which are provided theoretically by the Constitution to them. In particular, the prerogative of raising and maintaining "armies." The main problem is that of personnel strengths of the Army, the Marines, and the Reserve components. In the course of these discussions, General Twining mentioned that the Secretary of Defense had been grilled extensively. Finally, he had stated flatly that he did not pretend to be a lawyer, but that whatever the President had done in this matter he concurred in and thought it was right. Although the President had not been aware that the prerogatives question had been a major issue recently, he was quite familiar with the pattern. The Army, Marines, and Reserve components would be, in his view, the only logical areas in which the politicians would be concerned, primarily because these are the areas in which the Administration is cutting back. When an installation is cut out it does injury to some locality.

This resulted in some discussion of the motives of individual Congressmen, particularly in the matter of interfering with Administration plans for projected force structures. In this connection, General Twining mentioned that Representative Arends had come and

hit hard on the side of the Administration, stating that it is not the function of the Congress to interfere in military strategy. Even Mr. Vinson had added some words of help in this regard. Here the President stated that he was not overly concerned with this particular item since he felt he could handle it. He digressed to point up that in the matters of housing and depressed areas, where the Congress appears determined to expend large sums in excess of those recommended, he must win. If not, he fears the most serious consequences to the value of the dollar. He pointed out an article he had read today in the New York Times financial section which indicated a movement of U.S. capital overseas which is reaching the proportion of a "flight from the dollar." Apparently private investors are convinced that the Europeans are building a more viable economy than ours and will overtake us.

* * *

General Twining then mentioned a matter pertaining to command structure of Unified Commands. In the old law the term "operational control" had been employed, implying only the vaguest type of command. The new law has undergone a change in wording which now substitutes the term "operational command." In the course of the proceedings, the term of operational command had been defined the same as the old operational control. Based on this, the Marines have complained to the Congress about the definition of operational command as employed by the Department of Defense, and which, by the President's desires, gives the Unified Commanders complete command responsibility except for technical administrative matters. In the course of the hearings, Mr. Vinson had asked General Twining for the Department of Defense definition. General Twining had explained the difference. Mr. Vinson had then requested that the new definition be incorporated into the Congressional Record. This has been done. In this matter, the President stated he was not concerned, for he is the Commander-in-Chief and can construe the wording as he sees fit. He can be called to account for this matter only by the courts.

* * *

As General Twining was departing, the President asked that he take a check into the matter of comparative grades and position vacancies among the three Services. This had come to the President's attention primarily through briefings that had been held by the Navy requesting new legislation to overcome their rather considerable World War II hump. He cited certain cases with relation to promotion inequities within and among Services. General Twining said he would check into the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

John S.D. Eisenhower

136. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 12, 1959, 10:40 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
Secretary Quarles
General Twining
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

The President called this meeting to discuss the 1968 projection of our atomic weapons requirements. In particular, he is concerned, in making our long-term estimates, over the use of the actual term “requirements.” He feels that when we deal with numbers in these circumstances we should call them “estimates under bad conditions.”

The President stated that he is not addressing right now the matter of \$145 million for a plutonium reactor with a convertible feature. We are far enough down the road now that he is not going to fight that project. He dislikes, however, the process in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff state so-called “requirements” to the Congress, causing the figures so listed to practically govern our future actions.

The President emphasized that in this meeting he is merely desirous of expressing his doubts and is not issuing a directive. He fears that we have developed a shibboleth which we are then required to live by. In short, we are not being governed by common sense.

Mr. McElroy agreed that the difference between “requirement” and “estimate” is a technical question. However, the President pointed out that the use of the term “requirement” invites demagogues to treat these figures with the sanctity of the psalms and parables.

Mr. McElroy expressed general agreement with this approach and pointed out that the figures ultimately used in this connection were greatly reduced from the original service submissions and were indeed considerably reduced from the requirements as stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President, however, continued by recalling to mind a graph on our 1968 atomic weapons figures which indicated a stockpile which he considered astronomical. These figures as the President recalled, would be attained by July 1, 1958, if a certain new plant were installed. Without that plant, the figures would be reached by January 1, 1969. Some of these days, in his view, we are going to realize how ridiculous we have been and at that time we will try to retrench. In particular, the President

¹ Source: Projected nuclear weapons requirements for 1968. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

pointed out that the Executive Branch itself has been fairly sensible, but has been pushed by demagogues and special interests.

The President expressed understanding of the problems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in testifying before a hostile Congress. He agreed with Mr. McElroy that the best way for a hostile Congress under these circumstances to attack the Administration is to attack it for not fulfilling its military requirements. Mr. McElroy pointed out that the concept of efficiency in government represents the "hard sell" rather than the "easy sell."

Mr. Quarles then offered certain background in this area. He stated that the Department of Defense had resisted the AEC on the matter of forecast of requirements so far in advance as ten years. The AEC feels, however, that it is necessary to forecast requirements this far in order to plan efficiently the construction of our production capacity. Mr. Quarles and Admiral Radford had taken the initial position that our plutonium supply is adequate. However, this position had been overtaken by service requirements for the DAVY CROCKETT and for small nuclear warheads for air defense. These two programs require much plutonium. The second position then taken by Mr. Quarles and Admiral Radford had been that a certain amount of additional plutonium was needed, but not in large quantity since we would have the opportunity to increase efficiency by continued testing. Upon the implementation of the current test suspension, the Department of Defense could not see any further position beyond that of moderate increases in plutonium.

Mr. McElroy then outlined the tack which the Department of Defense follows on these matters. Since the estimated requirements of the Department of Defense always exceed the amount of available plutonium by large amounts, the Secretary of Defense had estimated that in order to obtain a small bite we must raise our estimated requirements considerably. He pointed out the relationship between requirements and time. If we are given a few more years, our annual production can be considerably reduced. He added, however, he realizes that the term "requirements" is a poor word.

The President again focused on the term "requirements" with a thought that the number of weapons actually *required* in 1968 is probably required in 1961. Therefore, a statement of figures as 1968 requirements would invite an emergency mobilization in order to produce them quickly.

Mr. Quarles, in this connection, pointed out that the progression from 1963 to 1968 does not represent significant increase in the number of weapons or in yield; what it does represent is an increase in tactical weapons. This progression is more expensive in terms of plutonium. He admits we would like to reach these levels in 1963 but reasonable production rates require a stretch-out to 1968.

In connection with small weapons, Mr. Quarles continued, the military has stated before Congress that we need a figure much higher than that submitted by the Department of Defense. This has made the Joint Committee highly critical of us.

The President again repeated his concern with the impact on Congress. If we state that we have a requirement now which will not become available until 1968, Congress will be tempted to spend \$20 billion this year in this field alone. The President understands the need for small weapons in air defense and missile defense, although he pointed out that the three scientists who had visited him the day before (Drs. Land, Purcell and Killian) had shown less enthusiasm than he has heard at other times in this area. The President continued that when we come to supplying small yield weapons for the Infantry and the Marines we are getting in to the area of marginal utility. He does not visualize great stockpiles of these weapons around the periphery of the USSR. He pointed out further that our total current megaton capability is estimated so high that if we should employ this quantity of atomic weapons, the fallout from our own weapons could destroy our own country, and indeed the entire Northern Hemisphere. He further expressed the view that we are taking council of our fears. He reiterated that we should push atomic weapons for air defense but be more moderate in development of tactical atomic weapons. He suggested that we indoctrinate ourselves that there is such a thing as common sense. Mr. McElroy agreed and stated that the Department of Defense had fought this line of reasoning when they cut service requests.

The discussion then turned to the subject of military experts, with the President expressing the view that if you try to fight a war with a Board of Political Directors, you will soon find all military commanders being told by Congress exactly what they need. Mr. McElroy also pointed out the number of military “experts” available in Congress. The President illustrated the types of difficulties under which the military works in wartime, citing anecdotes from his own experiences in the Operations Division of the War Department right after Pearl Harbor.

John S.D. Eisenhower

137. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100-59

Washington, February 17, 1959

Estimate of the World Situation

[Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. 17 pages of source text not declassified.]

138. Memorandum From Gray to McElroy¹

Washington, February 18, 1959

SUBJECT

Defense Presentations to the President

Pursuant to the understanding reached during discussions with you, Mr. Quarles, and General Twining on February 6, I plan to schedule a series of special meetings with the President which will be devoted to a discussion of major policy questions with respect to military missions and related weapons systems. Attendance at such meetings will be restricted to the following:

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence—*for item 1 only*

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
(Dr. Killian)

Special Assistant to the Presidential for National Security Affairs
(Mr. Gray)

White House Staff Secretary (General Goodpaster)
Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Major Eisenhower)
Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Mr. Lay)

¹ Source: Proposes series of meetings with Eisenhower to discuss policy related to military missions and weapons systems. Top Secret; Restricted Handling. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

These meetings will be held in the Cabinet Room.

The following four major areas will be considered in these special meetings:

(1) Strategic nuclear striking force requirements and capabilities, including the "optimum mix" both of weapons systems and of targets. (References: NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1994, 2009)

(2) Continental defense against aircraft and missiles (excluding antisubmarine warfare). (References: NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2009)

(3) Control of the seas, with particular reference to antisubmarine warfare. (References: Report by the Panel on Antisubmarine Warfare of the President's Science Advisory Committee dated December 1, 1958; Study being prepared for the President by the Comparative Evaluations Group, pursuant to NSC 5815)

(4) Tactical forces and requirements for tactical weapons systems. (References: Paragraph 14, NSC 5810/1; NSC Action No. 1934)

I must say to you that as to the fourth area, I myself am not satisfied with the description of it and it may be that we should talk further about the scope and nature of this part of the overall study. However, I feel that it should be included and it seems to me that the kinds of questions asked with respect to it are appropriate.

A useful procedure might be for you to have prepared a concise discussion paper on each topic which could be circulated in advance on an "Eyes Only" basis, one copy each, to those who will attend the special meetings. Any further reproduction and circulation would be subject to your determination. I should hope you would identify major issues and cast them in a form appropriate for discussion and consideration by the President. It would seem probable that major national security policy issues identified during these discussions would later be taken to the National Security Council.

I am attaching a list of some of the kinds of policy questions which might be considered. I shall be glad to discuss with you further, as necessary, the scope of coverage of the four topics.

It would be helpful if you could indicate feasible target dates for each topic.

I wish to confirm the withdrawal of the request contained in my memorandum of January 17, 1959, subject, "Presentation to the National Security Council on Aircraft Programs," inasmuch as its purpose will be served by the plan above set forth.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated

Questions for Consideration

1. *Strategic Nuclear Striking Force*

a. What will be the effect of the appraisal of the relative merits of alternative target systems, directed by NSC Action No. 2009, upon the size and composition of the striking force?

b. In the light of the appraisal referred to in *a* above, what is the most desirable mix of missile systems from the point of view of our optimum strategic nuclear striking capacity on the one hand, and from the point of view of the greatest degree of invulnerability on the other hand, and can these be easily reconciled?

c. Is there a valid requirement to develop another generation of strategic bombers, taking into account the probable capabilities of enemy defenses and the problems of maintaining such aircraft in an alert status?

d. Would it be desirable to extend the effectiveness of POLARIS missiles by adapting them for use on surface vessels, and on land bases, assuming the development of an appropriate mobile launching unit?

e. Should further priority be given to MINUTE MAN by the earlier establishment of a production capability and by seeking to afford it more mobility? What effect would further emphasis on MINUTE MAN have on the TITAN and ATLAS missiles program?

f. What is the proper balance between procurement of additional retaliatory weapons and expenditures to protect those now available against surprise attack?

2. *Continental Defense*

a. What are the best means for defending the striking force? What mixture of active defenses, hardening, dispersal, and quick reaction leads to the greatest certainty of survival for the striking force? How does this best mix change with Soviet capabilities?

b. Assuming that point defenses will be required, what areas are to be protected—SAC bases or urban industrial areas, or both?

c. In the light of the changing nature of the Soviet attack capability, how should air defenses be allocated as between the manned bomber threat and the ballistic missile threat?

d. Are our present programs for early warning against aircraft and missiles adequate to the changing threat? Will our communications

have the certainty and reliability to insure that all forces can respond when warning is received?

e. What facilities have we now for determining that our bases are under attack? What facilities for disseminating this information?

f. Will the concept of perimeter, area and point defense continue to have validity in the 1960–65 period?

g. What is an appropriate balance between manned interceptors, interceptor missiles and ground-to-air missiles?

h. To what extent do our present continental defenses meet the threat of missiles launched from submarines? What measures have promise to be effective against this threat?

i. Is there a need for more centralized management of the various aspects of continental air defense?

3. *Control of the Seas—Antisubmarine Warfare*

a. In what ways can our present ASW capability be improved?

b. Should further emphasis be placed on methods for broad ocean surveillance?

c. Is the effort currently being devoted to ASW commensurate with the threat:

(1) against the continental U.S.?

(2) against task forces and against shipping?

d. Is there a need for more effective, centralized direction of the ASW effort?

4. *Tactical Forces*

a. In the event of general war involving a nuclear exchange, is it assumed that there will be a requirement for further deployment of ground forces overseas? If so, can the probable requirements be determined?

b. Taking into account our commitments and the nature of the threat with respect to hostilities short of general war, do our tactical forces have adequate mobility, flexibility and readiness? Should this requirement have priority over mobilization reserves for general war?

c. Do present programs provide aircraft and weapons wholly appropriate to such tactical combat?

d. Is there a need for so many different tactical weapons (i.e., the 280-mm gun, the 8-inch howitzer, the 155-mm howitzer, HONEST JOHN, LITTLE JOHN, LACROSSE, SERGEANT)?

e. Is there an element of overlap between the Army's growing arsenal of short-range missiles and the Air Force's tactical aircraft; and if so, is this desirable?

f. What will be the requirement for small nuclear weapons to equip ground forces? Can this requirement be met by our programmed production capabilities?

g. Is there an appropriate balance between the amount of resources being devoted to BW–CW procurement and those devoted to research?

139. Briefing Note for the February 26 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 25, 1959

SUBJECT

Port Security (NSC Meeting, 2/26/59)

1. The next item for consideration is a report to the Council in response to an NSC Action of 2/19/58 in connection with the approval of U.S. Policy on Continental Defense. At that time, Treasury and Justice were requested to seek new legislation, and draft a new Executive Order. The objective was to increase the effectiveness of that portion of the Port Security Program which provides for the exclusion of subversives from employment on U.S. merchant vessels, and from restricted port areas and waterfront facilities.

2. For reasons which Treasury and Justice may wish to elaborate upon today, they have recommended against the obtaining of legislation and the issuance of the Executive Order called for in the previous NSC Action.

3. The considerations which prompted the Council's action of a year ago were as follows:

a. Under a present law passed in 1950, the President is empowered to adopt measures and issue regulations for the protection of vessels, ports, and waterfront facilities against sabotage and other subversive acts.

b. Pursuant to the 1950 statute, Executive Order 10173 was issued, providing in effect that no person shall be employed as a seaman on a U.S. merchant vessel, nor shall any person be given access to a restricted waterfront facility unless the Commandant of the Coast Guard is satisfied that such persons are not security risks. This Executive Order is still in effect.

c. By 1956, the Coast Guard had checked hundreds of thousands of seamen and dockworkers against U.S. agency files, with the result that

¹Source: Port security. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

the Commandant denied seamen's papers and dockworkers cards to over 3000 individuals (some 400 of whom the FBI had listed for possible detention in the event of a wartime emergency).

d. In 1956, a Federal Circuit Court ruled (*Parker v. Lester*) that the denial and revocation procedures followed by the Coast Guard under the Executive Order failed to meet the constitutional requirements of due process, including the right to confront and cross-examine Government witnesses. The Commandant of the Coast Guard was ordered by the Court to issue seamen's papers, forthwith, to those persons previously denied them. As of 6/30/58, the Commandant had complied with the Court order by granting applications of over 300 persons whom he had previously denied papers because he considered them to be security risks.

e. Treasury previously pointed out several practical problems posed by the Federal Court ruling, including the following: (1) the Commandant of the Coast Guard is compelled by Court order to take action contrary to that required of him under the present Executive Order, (2) it may not be possible to produce certain confidential informants as witnesses in hearings to revoke the papers of a subversive, and (3) witnesses who might be available for testimony are scattered, and funds for witness fees are lacking. (As of 6/30/58, Coast Guard had revoked papers in 2 cases; hearings were pending in 4 cases; the availability of witnesses who could appear to testify was being examined in 65 cases; witnesses were unavailable in 4 cases; data and witnesses were considered to be insufficient at this time in 99 cases; and 105 cases remained to be processed with a view to determining whether hearings should be instituted).

4. Against this background, the Council adopted and the President approved, as part of U.S. Continental Defense Policy (NSC 5802/1), a Port Security section which provides that the various measures for the protection of U.S. ports and vessels shall include: "such exclusion of subversives from vessels and waterfront facilities as is feasible, having due regard for legal procedures and rights". Based on that policy, Treasury submitted and the President approved on 4/21/58 the details of an overall Port Security program which includes a screening program under which the Coast Guard will (a) request FBI name and fingerprint checks of applicants for seamen's papers and dockworkers' cards, (b) keep a list of the persons on whom derogatory information is obtained, and (c) on a *selective* basis, hold hearings to revoke the papers and cards of persons considered to be security risks, in those cases where action can be taken with a reasonable probability of success, in accordance with procedures acceptable to the courts.

5. Meanwhile, Treasury and Justice were asked to propose legislation, and draft an Executive Order, to strengthen the approved Port Security screening program. As reflected in the Justice transmittal which has been circulated to the Council, both Treasury and Justice recommend against seeking additional legislation in this field because it would not stand the test of constitutionality and would raise "broader issues" which might reduce the effectiveness of the program. With respect to the drafting of the Executive Order called for by the NSC

Action, Treasury proposed an amendment to the present Order which would require the Coast Guard to observe due process in the holding of revocation hearings; however, Justice recommends to the Council that an Executive Order not be issued "pending legislative and judicial developments with respect to other personnel security programs". In discussions at the Planning Board, and in conversations which I have had with the Attorney General, it has been indicated that Justice is primarily concerned over the prospect that new legislation or Executive Order provisions which would open up the issue of the right to confront witnesses and thereby prejudice the outcome of present Court proceedings involving the Industrial Security Program.

6. Both of the NSC's Internal Security Committees (which are represented here today) have submitted views on the position taken by Treasury and Justice. *The IIC* has stated that (a) it is concerned over the apparent trend toward backing away from various security programs as a result of recent court decisions, (b) in spite of the difficulties presented by those decisions, the Executive Branch should nevertheless do all that it can to preserve necessary security procedures, (c) the Port Security Program is but one of the security programs considered necessary to protect essential industry and other facilities, and (d) it is necessary to take a long, hard look at what appears to be a softening of our attitude toward necessary security measures, and an aggressive policy should be followed to implement them within the framework of constitutional requirements. *The ICIS* has advised that (a) it does not object to holding a new Executive Order in abeyance, on the understanding that the Coast Guard is presently proceeding under discretionary authority to proceed in selective cases against seamen and dockworkers on whom there is derogatory information, and (b) although proposed legislation is necessary in the countering of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons and other subversive activities, it is recognized that the necessary legal procedures must meet constitutional issues already passed on by the courts.

7. Based on all of the above considerations, the Planning Board recommends that the Council adopt and the President approve the following action:

1. Agree that the submission of the draft legislation and Executive Order called for in NSC Action 1862-f be held in abeyance by Treasury and Justice pending the "legislative and judicial developments with respect to other personnel security programs" referred to in the Justice memorandum which was circulated to the NSC on 1/7/59.

2. Note that the Treasury Department will continue to implement, to the best of its ability, the provisions of Par. 19 of NSC 5802/1, and of Par. 8 of the Port Security program approved by the President on 4/21/58, concerning the exclusion of subversives from vessels, ports and waterfront facilities.

3. Note that, although recent court decisions make it impossible to carry out certain internal security programs effectively, it is nevertheless important that the responsible agencies of the Executive Branch make every effort to implement necessary internal security measures within the framework of constitutional requirements.

8. CALL ON the Attorney General.

9. CALL ON the Acting Chairman of the IIC, Mr. Al Belmont, Assistant to the Director, FBI.

10. CALL ON the Chairman of ICIS, Mr. Walter Yeagley, Assistant to the Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division.

Attachment

Letter From Rogers to Gray

Washington, February 25, 1959

Dear Mr. Gray:

I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, following the discussions of the Port Security Screening Program in Secretary Anderson's Office.

Sincerely,

/s/ William P. Rogers
Attorney General

Attachment

Letter From Rogers to Stans

Washington, February 25, 1959

Dear Mr. Stans:

Under date of November 24, 1958, I returned, without my approval, a proposed Executive Order entitled, "Amending Regulations Relating to the Protection and Security of Vessels, Harbors, Ports and Waterfront Facilities." In doing so I recommended that further consideration of this proposed Order or any other order proposing changes

in the Port Security Program be held in abeyance pending legislative and judicial developments with respect to other personnel security programs.

The problem of strengthening the Port Security Program has been re-examined within this Department and has been the subject of a discussion with the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Treasury. The proposed Executive Order, by conforming the provisions of Executive Order 10173 to the program conducted by Treasury under that Order subsequent to the Ninth Circuit decision in *Parker v. Lester*, would have served to eliminate a dilemma which has faced the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in that the Commandant has been forbidden by court order from discharging fully his responsibilities under Executive Order 10173. However, it is agreed that the proposed Order would not have enabled Treasury to conduct a more effective screening of merchant mariners and dock workers than that currently being conducted under the limitations imposed by court decision. It is also agreed that because of the problem of confrontation it does not appear possible at the present time to strengthen the Port Security Screening Program either by legislation or executive order.

Final resolution of the issue of confrontation in one Personnel Security Program will logically lead to insistence, judicial or otherwise, that the same rule be applied in the other programs. Since the Port Security Screening Program involves persons who are neither employees of the United States nor employees of contractors of the United States, it would appear that security interests would be better served if this issue were to be considered in connection with the more critical Federal Employees or Industrial Personnel Security Programs. As a practical matter it appears that some resolution of the confrontation issue may be fast approaching. Already a number of bills have been introduced this session of Congress relating to various aspects of Personnel Security Programs and the Supreme Court is expected to hear argument during March on the case of *Greene v. McElroy* which will test the validity of the Industrial Personnel Security Program.

Sincerely,

Attorney General

140. Memorandum of Discussion at the 397th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 26, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 397th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 26, 1959

Present at the 397th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense; and Mr. John S. Patterson for the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Item 1); the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Item 1) and the Attorney General (Item 2). Also attending the meeting were Mr. Alan N. Belmont for the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (for Item 2); the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Item 2); the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Admiral Arleigh Burke for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Chairman, Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here is agenda item 1.]

2. PORT SECURITY

(NSC 5802/1; NSC 5819, part 9; NSC Action No. 1862-*f*; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 7 and January 26, 1959)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background of the problem and referred to a letter from the Attorney General to the Director, Bureau of the Budget dated February 25, 1959 which was handed out by Mr. Lay. (Copies of the briefing note, portions of which Mr. Gray used at the Council meeting, as well as copies of the Attorney General's

¹ Source: Agenda item 2: Port Security. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

letter are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and are also attached to this Memorandum). After summarizing the views of the two Internal Security Committees (the IIC and the ICIS) and after reading the Council action proposed by the NSC Planning Board, Mr. Gray suggested that the Council hear from the Attorney General.

Apropos of the adverse effect on the Port Security program of decisions of the lower courts, the President asked whether any thought had been given to taking such decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court or were we proposing to give up the fight in the face of the Circuit Court decision? The Attorney General replied that there was already a case, that of *Greene v. McElroy*, on this subject which would be argued before the Supreme Court in March and which the Attorney General hoped would have the effect of clarification.

The President then asked specifically why the decision in *Parker v. Lester* had not been taken to the Supreme Court. The Attorney General replied that this case had not been considered to be a good one for a test. He added that the Department of Justice also felt that we should give very serious consideration to what Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), had said about the apparent trend toward backing away from various security programs as a result of recent court decisions. There might indeed be something of a tendency to beat a retreat in the face of difficulties posed by the courts. While there might be some things that we could do in a positive way to arrest this trend, there was not much hope of significant action until the case of *Greene v. McElroy* was finally decided by the Supreme Court in March, particularly the issue of confrontation of witnesses by the accused.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the Acting Chairman of the IIC, Mr. Alan Belmont and the Chairman of the ICIS, Mr. Yeagley, were present in the room and might wish to say a few words. Mr. Belmont pointed out that the concern of the IIC had been expressed in its memorandum of January 26, 1959 to the Executive Secretary. He would, however, like to pin point the problem in order to illustrate it for the Council. Mr. Belmont then supplied figures to show that 357 individuals who had been barred, prior to the *Parker v. Lester* decision, from the waterfronts have since succeeded in obtaining their papers. The records of the FBI indicated that these individuals were very dangerous to the national security and included saboteurs whom we would feel compelled to "pick up" in case of war.

The President said that it did not seem reasonable to him that the U.S. should be so confoundedly limited by its Constitution in trying to keep out such undesirables as these. The Attorney General agreed with the President's point but repeated that we should know better how to proceed after the case of *Greene v. McElroy* had been decided.

Mr. Yeagley said that he had nothing to add on the subject beyond what had been contained in the memorandum of the ICIS to the Executive Secretary dated January 26, 1959.

Mr. Gray commented that all of us shared with the President a certain sense of frustration between the two horns of the dilemma but he too put hope in the outcome of the *Greene v. McElroy* case. If the decision of the Supreme Court should be adverse, he wondered whether new legislation might help to remedy the internal security situation. The Attorney General replied that if the decision of the Supreme Court in *Greene v. McElroy* went the wrong way, new legislation was not likely to help any.

The President inquired whether the subversive people we were talking about were all citizens of the U.S. The Attorney General replied that in most cases he understood that they were. The President added that if they were not citizens they could presumably be deported. The Attorney General agreed but again pointed out that most of them were citizens and added that we faced the same problem in industrial security programs that we were facing in the matter of the Port Security program. Mr. Gray suggested that the Council take another look at the problem after the Supreme Court decision. The President concluded the discussion by stating that if he had his way, the retreat would be a slow one if the decision of the Supreme Court were unfavorable in the case of *Greene v. McElroy*.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of the report by the Department of Justice on the implementation of NSC Action No. 1862-*f* (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 7), the views of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (transmitted by the reference memoranda of January 26), the letter from the Attorney General to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, on the subject, dated February 25, 1959 (circulated at the meeting), and the discussion in the Planning Board (presented orally at the meeting by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).

b. Agreed that the submission of the draft legislation and Executive Order called for in NSC Action 1862-*f* should be held in abeyance pending the "legislative and judicial developments with respect to other personnel security programs" referred to in the memorandum by the Department of Justice enclosed with the reference memorandum of January 7 and the letter from the Attorney General to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, dated February 25, 1959.

c. Noted that the Treasury Department will nevertheless continue to implement, so far as possible, the provisions of paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1, and of paragraph 8 of the Port Security program approved by the President on April 21, 1958, relating to the exclusion of subversives from vessels, ports and waterfront facilities.

d. Noted that, although recent court decisions make it impossible to carry out certain internal security programs effectively, it is nevertheless important that the responsible agencies of the Executive Branch

make every effort to implement necessary internal security measures within the framework of constitutional requirements.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General for appropriate implementation, and to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for information and guidance.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

141. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Herter¹

Washington, March 2, 1959

[First page missing from microfiche.]

say he will leave the actual putting into operation of this scheme to his successor and the Secy agreed saying President only had another year and a half in office and might consider this something not necessarily to do himself but to leave to his successor. Secy said he just wanted to let CAH know about his concern on this matter.

CAH said he was sorry he missed the Secy's earlier call and understood Secy had reached Mr. Merchant. Secy said he was just checking in on the Soviet response. CAH reported on President's latest message to Macmillan and said the reference to Dieffenbacher sitting in with President and Macmillan had been knocked out at suggestion of Mr. Merchant. Secy thought this was good; said he thinks Macmillan cherishes the sort of tete-a-tete relationship with the President and the Secy and would not like the idea.

Discussed Secy's health.

¹ Source: Proposed Office of Executive Management. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

142. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Anderson and Herter¹

Washington, March 3, 1959

[Omitted here is a record of another conversation.]

5:00—Secy Anderson telephoned to say he understood CAH is lunching with Arthur Fleming on the organization plan. He just wanted to be sure CAH is aware of Secy Dulles' deep concern about it, as his own is; he thinks it would be a very bad mistake. CAH said he does know how Secy Dulles feels and discussed it with him only yesterday. Secy dwells particularly on the political weakness in it. Anderson said he had told the President about the lunch (although he himself can't come) and that he had grave misgivings, and Pres. has said he would not want to do it unless it is the right thing to do. In any event, he just wanted to be sure CAH was aware of Secy Dulles' feeling about it.

[Omitted here is a record of another conversation.]

¹ Source: Executive branch reorganization plan. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

143. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 3, 1959

SUBJECT

NSC 5904

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5904, NSC 5410/1, NSC 5810/1

B. NSC Action No. 2039

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the reference report (NSC 5904) are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, March 5, 1959.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Transmits JCS views on NSC 5904. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum From Burke to McElroy

Washington, March 2, 1959

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904)(C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft statement of policy, subject as above, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, for consideration by the NSC at its meeting on Thursday, 5 March 1959.

2. Subject to the comments contained in Appendix "A" hereto, it is recommended that you concur in the draft of NSC 5904 to supersede NSC 5410/1.

3. Additional information considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be suitable for your talking purpose, with regard to paragraph 15 on pages 4 and 5 of NSC 5904, is contained in Appendix "B" hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

Appendix A

Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, undated

COMMENTS ON NSC 5904

1. *Reference Paragraph 2—Page 1.* Support the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REASON: U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. It must be presumed that the Chinese Communists will be in any general war as an active ally of the USSR, or will be a power center capable of assuming world leadership when the U.S. and the USSR have so weakened themselves that they cannot maintain their power positions. It is improbable that any of the

other Bloc nations could maintain a non-belligerent status in a general war. Therefore, the qualifying phrases as applied to subparagraphs 2 *b*, *c* and *d* are misleading. Furthermore, these phrases are inconsistent with the Heading of Section A of the paper.

2. *Reference Paragraph 6—Page 2.* Support Defense, Treasury and Joint Chiefs of Staff views.

REASON: The phrases recommended for deletion are unnecessary and in the context of the paragraph weaken the guidance the paper is developed to provide. It is almost a certainty that the USSR and Communist China will be in a war together; therefore, the phrase is unnecessary in 6 *b*. In *c* and *d* the phrase is redundant in view of the limiting words “requisite”, “selected” and “as necessary” already in the paragraph.

3. *Reference Paragraph 7—Page 2.* Support Defense, Treasury and Joint Chiefs of Staff views, and delete.

REASON: The paragraph is inappropriate in the present paper. It might be proper and desirable in a paper dealing with pre-war preparations. The subject paper (NSC 5904) deals with war situations. Under war conditions, an attempt by Government departments and agencies to carry out the policy stated in this paragraph would divert effort and resources from the vital active military role. While the United States must be able to absorb and recover from a nuclear onslaught, to adopt this paragraph as a wartime philosophy would in effect channel U.S. resources and efforts to activities that cannot win the war. The first two words of the first U.S. general war objectives are “to prevail.” This is defined as “to win mastery,” “to triumph,” “to succeed,” and “to predominate.” This objective cannot be attained by the policy stated in paragraph 7.

4. *Reference subject, Section “B”—Page 4.* Support the JCS view.

REASON: The majority view would restrict limited war policy to Soviet satellite states. Neither the recent U.S. action in Lebanon nor the British, French, Israeli venture into Egypt involved a satellite state. Therefore, it would appear that if the United States is to have a policy for limited war, it should permit policy guidance for any limited war situation and not be restricted to Soviet satellites.

5. *Reference paragraph 13, page 4.* Delete.

REASON: While this is a valid statement, it does not materially contribute to the policy statement. Moreover, it does not properly belong under “Objectives.”

6. *Reference paragraph 15, pages 4 and 5.*

- a.* Delete the JCS proposed wording in lines 1 and 2 of paragraph 15.
- b.* Support the position of the JCS Alternative.

REASON: The phrase recommended for deletion is redundant. At the same time it can be interpreted to mean that political and military factors are not all examined and weighed in every decision to commit United States forces to war.

The proposed JCS Alternative is the only one of the three proposals that is consistent with the remainder of the paragraph.

The danger of general war being initiated by the USSR is present in any conflict in which the United States or its Free World allies are involved. Therefore, this risk must have been assessed and accepted before any U.S. forces are committed to war in support of U.S. national objectives. It is impossible to know what U.S. action would cause the USSR to enter the conflict and thus broaden it into general war. Since a policy to provide guidance to the departments and agencies of the Government of the United States must have a reasonably finite foundation, it cannot be based upon an unknown.

Further, including in a policy statement the thought that the United States, to avoid a general war with the USSR, would revise downward or would abandon part or all of the political and/or military objectives for which it was then engaged in a war with a country other than the USSR could lead to fatal consequences in terms of the U.S. national existence, since it would:

- a.* Foster indecision in the planning of political and military actions and in the utilization of the U.S. armed forces in war in support of these plans;
- b.* Place the decision of war or peace completely in the hands of the USSR regardless of the importance of that decision to the United States;
- c.* Open the way to a series of political-military defeats like Korea and Vietnam;
- d.* Seriously, if not fatally, weaken the U.S. position as leader of the Free World; and, as a consequence,
- e.* Destroy the world-wide systems of military alliances so painfully erected by the United States.

Appendix B

Talking Points Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, undated

Policy Guidance

Recognizing that the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is the best means to keep such hostilities from broadening into general war and that any decision to commit U.S. forces to war would be taken only after consideration of all factors, including probable Soviet reaction, the United States should

utilize all requisite force to attain its objectives, opposing the aggression with clear determination despite the risk of general war. If during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives.

144. Notes by Killian for Presentation to the President¹

Washington, March 4, 1959

In some respects, the analysis we present to you is a follow-up on the report that the Technological Capabilities Panel made in 1955—the report in which we recommended that our ballistic missile program be given top national priority.

The preparation of the analysis which Dr. McMillan is going to present to you was initially prompted by a technical appraisal which the Science Advisory Committee has been making of our anti-ballistic missile program, including the technical aspects of early warning. Among the conclusions reached by the Panel studying this complex technical problem are the following:

“1. The Nike-Zeus system cannot be a factor in protecting the retaliatory force before 1964 or 1965.

“2. In general the tactics of dispersal, hardening, concealment through mobility, and quick reaction upon early warning, all seem more certainly effective, and more inexpensively effective, than active defenses, for protecting the retaliatory force. Furthermore, these tactics are available and can be implemented to an effective degree relatively soon.

“3. The Panel believes that these ‘passive’ tactics should be considered as the basic anti-missile defenses for both the aircraft and the missiles of the U.S. retaliatory force. We urge in the strongest terms that they be exploited more fully, and more rapidly than present plans call for.”

The analysis also reflects our interest in techniques and principles for achieving a greater degree of stability in our deterrent position in a period when possible uncertainty in intelligence and in estimates of relative strength, together with rapid technological change tend to augment the uncertainties in our deterrence. Of course, one of the

¹ Source: Anti-missile program and maintaining deterrence. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

major factors introducing a greater degree of instability is the possibility of impending achievement by the USSR of a substantial ICBM capability.

I would stress that the material which we present represents an analysis of one part of our military problem. It is the opinion of the Science Advisory Committee, however, that this analysis, limited as it is, presents certain principles and concepts which appropriately can be weighed anew along with the many other factors involved in formulating military policy. In making this analysis we have been concerned with measures which increase the sureness of our retaliatory power. It is not our purpose to suggest increases in our military budget, even though we recognize the large budgetary implications involved. It is our purpose to suggest that we need to give higher priority to certain kinds of military programs. This could be achieved by reducing the emphasis on certain other programs, or if that is not possible alternately by increased expenditure. I suggest further that any implications for our military budget or for our military policy which may be inherent in this presentation have to do mainly with the future, not necessarily with the present.

In the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1955, we presented a time-table which identified a transitional period reflecting our military position relative to that of the Soviet Union when we might find our position changing from one of very great offensive advantage to one in which our situation would be relatively less advantageous.

The report described the effects of this period as follows:

"Deterrent effect of U.S. power dangerously lessened if Soviet production of multimegaton weapons and an adequate... delivery capability is achieved prior to the development of an adequate U.S. warning and defense system and before we have achieved a reduction of the vulnerability of our strategic delivery systems. Under these conditions, Soviet possession of such weapons and delivery capabilities would place the U.S. in danger of surprise attack and possible defeat.

"The situation might develop as early as 1958. If we permit our military position to worsen to this extent, we will be in a poor position to ward off Russian political and diplomatic moves or to make such moves of our own.

"The intercontinental ballistic missile can profoundly affect the military posture of either country with respect to Period III... If the U.S. were to achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, it could maintain [a]² position of advantage... so long as the Soviets did not have this missile capability. If the Russians achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, they might gain a comparable position of advantage."

² Brackets are in the original.

It was suggested that this period might be followed by another when both the U.S. and Russia would be in a position in which neither country could derive a winning advantage because each country will possess enough multimegaton weapons and adequate means of delivery, either by conventional or more sophisticated methods, through the defenses then existing.

While we do not suggest that either of these periods exactly fits our present situation, we do emphasize that the impending advent of substantial ballistic missiles capability raises again with greater urgency the question.

In concluding this introduction, may I also note that the views on hardening and on dealing with the problem of instability and uncertainty reflected in this analysis have been consistently held by your Science Advisory Committee and emphasized in all of its reports beginning with the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1955. We would stress again the great importance of achieving a secure—and sure—retaliatory capability.

145. Presentation by McMillan to Eisenhower¹

Washington, March 4, 1959

*An Analysis of Technical Factors in the Strategic Posture of the
United States—1956–64*

What I have to present is an analysis—illustrated with charts—relating to our strategic posture over the next few years.

The particular material we will see today has developed out of a study by the Panel of the Science Advisory Committee concerned with anti-ballistic missiles, a study of the technical possibilities for defending our striking force. I think you will see, however, that what we have to say falls into the pattern of earlier conclusions of the Science Advisory Committee about the influence of continuing technological change upon our strategic position, and about the steps we must take to keep technically abreast of this change.

In looking at ways of defending the striking force, the anti-missile Panel was forced to consider two related, but nevertheless distinct,

¹ Source: “An Analysis of Technical Factors in the Strategic Posture of the United States—1955–64.” Top Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

questions. We have organized our presentation around these two questions.

The first question is: what array of targets does the continental United States present to the Soviet attacker, and how much force would the attacker need to destroy or neutralize these targets? This is a natural question to ask in examining the defense of the striking force. An answer to the question would show the extent to which defensive measures might be useful in increasing the enemy's force requirements against us. Indeed, one would like to find, or to bring about by defensive measures, that the attack the enemy would need to destroy our striking force is much larger than any attack he could possibly mount. In such a case, one could be fairly sure, without further study, that an enemy aware of the circumstances would not attempt an attack except under extreme provocation.

Should it appear, in looking at force requirements, that the enemy might possibly have a force large enough for a completely destructive attack against our strategic bases, then one must probe more deeply into the situation. This possibility raises the second question: what retaliatory force can we muster even if our bases are attacked with the enemy's best capabilities? A later part of our discussion is devoted to this second question.

For the purpose of our discussion, it has been necessary to prepare charts illustrating both some facts and some estimates we have made. It is in the nature of such graphic presentations that they tend to make all data look like fact—even mere estimates—by emphasizing exact numerical values. We ask you to bear with us in this, because we do not wish to present our charts as exactly descriptive of the strategic position of the United States. Rather, we wish to use them as a basis for discussing some uncertainties in that strategic position. Perhaps our main message is that, because of changing technical factors, the strategic position of the United States is now subject to a range of uncertainty and that this uncertainty can lead to a condition of instability internationally. We hope we can also show that there are some relatively simple things that this country can do to reduce uncertainty and increase stability.

We can turn now to the first of our two questions—how much force would the Soviets need to destroy as completely as possible the ability of the continental United States to mount retaliation? The first chart sets a scale by picturing something of the range covered by recent and current intelligence estimates. Specifically, the numbers on the vertical scale represent operational intercontinental ballistic missiles—missiles produced, deployed, and supported by trained troops with the necessary logistics. The dots show specific capabilities discussed in recent intelligence estimates. The August, 1958, national estimate, for example,

grants the Soviets the capability to begin deployment during 1959, to reach 100 missiles one year later, and to reach 500 a year after that. The estimates are not committal as to when, during 1959, one should reckon the starting date. A supplement to this August estimate was issued in November, emphasizing that dates about a year later than the original ones seemed more probable for the Soviet capability to reach 100 and 500 respectively. This supplement also emphasized the difficulties the Soviets might encounter in reaching even these objectives. What has been drawn on this chart are then two curves which include between them something of the range of possibilities allowed by the August and November estimates. They picture, of course, a range of estimates; not the whole range allowed by the published NIE. They illustrate one of the variable factors that enter into an examination of the strategic situation. These same curves have been repeated on some of the subsequent charts.

The second chart, plotted to the same scale, shows for comparison the present United States intercontinental missile programs. As you well know, these have proceeded rapidly in the recent past, and operational intercontinental missiles will begin to appear in 1959. Present programs terminate in early 1964 with 180 Atlas and Titan missiles on site, and nine Polaris submarines capable of carrying a total of 144 missiles. All 144 Polaris missiles have been shown, even though, typically not more than half of them will be at sea at one time.

We turn specifically now to the question of the force needed by the Soviets to attack us. The third chart shows, against the background of the intelligence estimates, an estimate of the number of aiming points we present in the continental United States, and an estimate of the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles the Soviets would need against them. The lower curve counts the targets the Soviets would have to attack in order to destroy or neutralize:

1. all SAC air bases in the United States,
2. key air defense installations in the United States,
3. all missile bases in the United States.

This curve begins with about 40 targets at the present time and grows to about 140 as we add SAC bases, missile bases, and air defense control centers.

The blue curve above estimates the number of Soviet missiles needed to attack these targets. In addition to these missiles, the Soviets would probably wish to bring over some aircraft in a follow-up blow, but at no time would he need more than *[text not declassified]* over the United States to complete the destruction of all strategic targets.

The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles here estimated as his needs makes generous allowance for unreliability and aiming error

in his missiles. It is assumed that these missiles are only 60% reliable with an aiming error—CEP—of 3-1/3 miles. Thus, five missiles are directed at each SAC base, and up to 30 missiles at each hardened missile site. Fifty to 100 attacking missiles are allotted to installations other than bases of retaliatory force, e.g., air defense and communication centers. It is felt that an attack by even half this many missiles could deal us a destructive blow.

Using this generous basis of estimate, the chart shows the Soviet needing 200 missiles to attack us in 1959. The figure then increases with time as we activate more SAC bases, add SAGE centers, and later add missile sites to our target system.

One cannot, from this chart, draw with certainty the conclusion he would like to draw—namely that the Soviet force will always be inadequate for a decisive attack against our continental forces.

This is a rather weak conclusion—the conclusion that one can't conclude—and is not the primary reason for setting up this chart. Rather, we would like to pursue the argument on force requirements beyond this point, in order to illustrate some of the technical possibilities. We would like to discuss here how to get out of the red.

In looking at defense against ballistic missiles, our Panel was impressed by the relative simplicity and effectiveness of certain passive means available to our striking forces. For example, using the kind of missile postulated for the construction of this chart, the Soviet attacker needs five missiles to be certain of destroying an array of SAC aircraft on the ground or a cluster of three Atlas missiles of the early type. These are targets which can be destroyed by a one megaton bomb burst, 3-1/2 miles away. If these targets are sheltered to withstand 100 pounds per square inch of blast pressure, a one megaton bomb would need to burst within $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile. Correspondingly, the Soviet would need almost 200 of the missiles postulated to be certain of destruction—in other words, he wouldn't even attempt direct destruction with such a missile. He would have to await a better missile, or resort to artillery tactics and pin his target down until he can kill it with his aircraft. Even pinning his target down would cost him 20 to 40 missiles, in place of his original five.

It has seemed to the Panel that there are no technical reasons why this tactic of hardening cannot be used as a means for greatly increasing the enemy's force requirements against us. If we could harden effectively overnight, for instance, the Soviets would now, in 1959, need something more than 1000 missiles to neutralize our SAC.

In terms of an example more practical than hardening overnight, the overlay shows an estimate of the effect on the Soviets force requirements of what appears to be a reasonable series of steps for sheltering of SAC aircraft and further dispersal and hardening of missile sites.

To develop this rapidly rising curve of Soviet needs, it was assumed that some construction could begin at SAC bases late in fiscal 1960; this then first bears fruit in calendar 1961. Also in 1961, our present Atlas and Titan programs begin to add to the target system bases hardened in differing degrees. Here it has been assumed that about 1/3 of the Titan missiles—all of which are expected to be hardened to 100 pounds of blast—would be deployed to individual aiming points, rather than sited in groups of three. It has also been assumed that the Atlas missiles—now expected to appear in groups of three hardened to 25 pounds—would either be deployed to individual sites or else hardened to 100 pounds. We have just heard that Defense has been examining the possibility of further dispersal within present programs, and we are encouraged.

There isn't room on the chart to show the full effect of a program of this kind; and certainly not room to show the effect of a more ambitious program of sheltering and dispersal. What has been shown is in fact a conservative estimate of the effect of the program I have described. It shows the steps toward stability which even a relatively simple program of passive protection can bring about. Until such time as the Soviets have a highly advanced missile, one hardened aiming point added to our target system costs the Soviets from 10 to 20, or even many more, missiles to negate. This factor applies to every missile of ours we can add to the system.

In sum, with respect to the question of force requirements, we find the situation now unclear. There seems to be no technical obstacle to creating a picture both more clear and more favorable; indeed, this appears possible by steps relatively much simpler than the creation of new weapons systems.

We can turn now to the second question—what kind of retaliatory force can we get off against the USSR if he does elect to attack us? We have prepared a chart which attempts to answer this question under different assumptions about the size of the Soviet attack.

You will observe that this chart, except in its reference to Polaris missiles, is directed specifically to the state of affairs in the continental United States. It is recognized that the United States does have elements of force elsewhere in the world that could, potentially, contribute further retaliation. However, virtually all of these forces are within the reach of Soviet tactical air and missiles. The intelligence has been clear for sometime that the Soviets have a tactical air force and tactical missiles adequate to cope with any targets we may present to them. There is no basis for assuming that this circumstance will change under our present programs.

In the presence of this Soviet superiority in the tactical theater, if we are to make our overseas forces effective when the Soviets initiate

intercontinental war, we must achieve, between our continental and our overseas forces, a very high degree of coordination. In fact, the technical conditions imposed upon us in this situation seem much more stringent than those imposed upon the Soviets if they choose to negate our efforts by careful coordination of their own attack.

We can see no technical obstacles to prevent the Soviets from attaining the kind of coordination they would need. Therefore, in fixing our attention in the next chart upon forces in the continental United States, plus Polaris, we feel that we are not presenting an inaccurate description of our whole strategic position.

Two different estimates are here shown of the retaliatory force which we might be able to mount after a Soviet attack upon us. In presenting these estimates I must emphasize how many assumptions one must make to arrive at them, and how difficult it is to verify these assumptions. For example—how does one know how fast SAC can take off aircraft in 1961? We have access to, and have used, the figures they have developed for planning purposes, but there is no possibility of testing these against fact. Similarly, we have had to postulate a rate of arrival for an initial salvo of Soviet missiles. So as not to be guilty of painting too black a picture, we have assumed for this chart a rather ragged initial salvo against SAC—a full hour's duration for the attack, with three quarters of the attack arriving in the first half of the hour.

The estimates given on the chart then correspond to attacks based on the two curves projecting Soviet capabilities as displayed earlier. That is, the upper curve in this chart assumes that the Soviet missile force builds up with time in the manner of the smaller intelligence estimate and the lower curve assumes an attack based on the larger intelligence estimate. Thus, for example, in mid 1961, an attack by 100 Soviet missiles allows us the upper estimate of retaliation, an attack by 500 missiles, the lower estimate.

It will be helpful first to examine the effect upon our *strategic aircraft* of a Soviet attack; the important relations are best displayed by looking first at the lower blue curve.

Prior to mid 1959, the intelligence estimate allows the Soviets no significant force of missiles. Therefore, during this period the Soviets first blow upon the continental United States would be an attack by aircraft and something like two hours warning would be available to all SAC bases. During 1959 then, the curve of aircraft available follows SAC's present estimates of the number of aircraft they will have available in two hours. The rise in the curve reflects SAC's expectations for improving readiness. By the end of 1959 the intelligence estimate allows the Soviets a significant force of missiles and an attack under these conditions would take its toll of our aircraft. This curve reaches its minimum during 1961, at a time when the Soviets are estimated to

have about 500 missiles and before our Ballistic Missile Early Warning System is in full operation. Thereafter, the curve rises again under the assumptions that the BMEWS system will be installed as scheduled, and will be operational.

The smaller intelligence estimates of November lead to the upper estimate of aircraft available. Here, because until 1961 there is no significant force of Soviet missiles, the upper curve continues to follow SAC's present estimates of the number of aircraft to be available in two hours. The continued rise in the curve reflects SAC's expectations for improving readiness.

After January 1961, the Soviet missiles begin to take their toll, while, on our side, BMEWS is going into operation.

So far we have been discussing the force of aircraft which we could mount in retaliation. As our missile forces build up, they contribute to the picture, as shown on the overlay. Following the lower curve, we find a final total of about 70 missiles surviving and available for retaliation. These correspond to that half of the Polaris force which, because it is at sea, escapes attack.

Under the lighter Soviet attack of the upper curve, a fraction of the hardened Titan missiles also are likely to survive attack. This fraction diminishes as the forces available to the Soviets increase.

We find, in the end of the period, a retaliatory force estimated at about 700 bomb carriers. Such a force is not to be dismissed lightly, but we must recognize that there are many factors which can influence the actual size of this force and cause it to differ from these estimates. We will want to discuss some of these factors, not with the aim of degrading these curves to a more gloomy picture of our condition, but in order to illustrate our main thesis.

As we said at the start, our main thesis is this: that our true strategic position is unclear, and that our estimates of it are set about by doubts. Our actual position is greatly sensitive to factors over which we have no control, necessarily then our estimates of this position are sensitive to the assumptions we make about these factors.

We feel that there are several things further that this country can do to remedy the situation, but before discussing solutions, I would like further to explore the anatomy of the problem.

What are the main sources of uncertainty in our situation as illustrated by these charts?

First, we are greatly dependent upon warning and upon decisive and impressively rapid response thereto.

Every blue aircraft on this chart is one that took off after a decision that attack was imminent or that war was unavoidable. When the real attack comes, every minute of indecision costs us about 40 bombing

aircraft; five minutes of indecision cost us 200 bombing aircraft; every SAC base covered with snow costs us about one aircraft per minute. A complete failure of BMEWS—perhaps because of jamming or spoofing—would cost us about 450 bombers.

It is worth noting also that, especially in the early period, as we respond to the immediate warning that an attack is in progress, those aircraft which escape destruction do so by winning a race against the attacker. The force that escapes, therefore, is not exactly of our choosing, but is selected by the fortunes of war. It may not therefore conform in its structure to a pre-determined war plan; it may have to be regrouped and re-directed to targets for which it is adequate, according to information and a plan developed during the attack.

It may be felt that the emphasis in this chart upon warning is unrealistic because the chart assumes an attack which, apart from the last minute warning we get from BMEWS or a bomb burst, takes us completely by surprise. But the situation postulated here is really quite otherwise. In fact, this chart assumes a great deal of strategic warning; indeed a background of international tensions so ominous that the United States has undertaken to bring the whole of SAC to a peak of readiness. There remains only enough equivocation in the picture of Soviet intent to keep us hopeful that war can be avoided. In such a situation, we cannot respond freely to possible false alarms, lest we on the one hand fall victim to a feint and get caught on the ground after our forces are recalled, or on the other hand provoke an otherwise avoidable attack upon us. We must then await a clearly overt act by the Soviets to remove our doubts. This act could be the penetration of BMEWS, or the burst of a bomb on one of our bases. In sum, the assumptions here about our readiness seem to be favorable to us rather than otherwise.

A *second* important feature of our position is that we are greatly sensitive to the mass, coordination, and technical excellence of a Soviet missile attack. Sensitivity to mass hardly needs more emphasis than the difference between the upper and lower curves already gives it. Let us also recognize that the lower curve does not call for a Soviet attack as large as the national estimates leave room for. Sensitivity to coordination prevails throughout the period.

To see the sensitivity of these estimates to the coordination of the Soviet attack, we have tried to estimate what would happen to our aircraft if the Soviets mounted a *perfectly* coordinated missile attack—by perfectly coordinated, I mean an attack in which 100 to 300 missiles arrived in the first five minutes. In mid 1960, the lower blue curve would be depressed to about 130 aircraft. In mid 1961 it would go virtually to zero. In late 1963, even with the full operation of BMEWS, the curve would go to less than 200. At the other extreme, of course, in a

ragged and very poorly timed attack we could expect to get off almost all of our available aircraft—from 300 to 800 bombers.

The disparity between these two extremes is impressive. This disparity is the measure of our sensitivity. Whatever one's private judgment about where, between these extremes, reality lies, it is clearly evident that a tremendous premium is being offered to the Soviets for skill in coordinating their forces. Again, we can find no basic technical reasons for assuming that the Soviets cannot reach a high degree of coordination, particularly in the initial salvo of an attack for which they had long prepared.

Sensitivity to technical excellence is similar to sensitivity to coordination. If the Soviet missile had a one mile aiming error, rather than the two to three miles assumed in constructing the chart, we would get off less than 400 aircraft in 1963.

A *third* important feature of our position as shown by this chart is that the bulk, if not the total, of our potential retaliation is borne by aircraft. We know that the USSR has an extensive and improving air defense system. We must assume that this system will in time include nuclear weapons. It is difficult to know exactly how effective this system will be against our aircraft, and even more difficult to guess how effective the Soviets *think* it will be. Therefore, it is hard to know exactly how impressed the Soviet planner will be with our ability to do him retaliatory damage.

It is fairly certain, however, that if we are to do him much damage with our aircraft it will be because we have been able to get off a fairly large and well coordinated attack. One need not count the trees in order to see the outline of the forest: we are not only dependent upon aircraft for the bulk of our retaliation, but also we are dependent upon their ability to survive as a coordinated military unit.

In mentioning these sources of uncertainty, we are not calling into question the value to the United States of current programs to provide warning of attack and to accelerate reaction to that warning. Indeed, the discussion of the uncertainties should serve to emphasize the presently supreme value of these measures. But, as long as the success of these measures is sensitive to factors over which the United States has little control, it is in the nature of the measures themselves to create a condition of instability. For in relying upon warning and rapid response, we offer to pay a great premium to the Soviets—in fact, either to ourselves or to the Soviets—for haste in reacting to a threat.

To restore stability one needs certainty. To create certainty, one needs a retaliation which is inevitable, is inevitably decisive, and is clearly recognizable as such by a potential attacker. In the long run, to do this requires a force which is large enough, is so secure against attack that it neither provokes attack nor need react in haste, and is insensitive to defensive action.

The United States is, of course, building the foundation for such a retaliatory force through its missile programs. It seems to us, in fact, on technical grounds, that a force of the right kind of missiles, adequately dispersed and protected by sheltering or mobility, can always be relied on as a prime deterrent: it is relatively insensitive to attack and to defensive action, and is therefore able to react deliberately and—if in sufficient force—decisively.

In the meantime, major reliance must remain upon aircraft. Here we feel that there are some further simple steps that the United States can take to increase the certainty of its retaliation.

First, we have already mentioned the possibility of sheltering aircraft to increase the Soviets' force requirements. Sheltering also increases the survivability of a useful fraction of the force, and decreases dependence upon haste.

Second, we can rather easily do more toward getting, or toward better insuring, warning. It may be possible to hasten the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System; it appears possible, and indeed attractive, also to supplement this radar system with an airborne infra-red system capable of detecting missile launchings. We refer here to a simple system that might be implemented soon—not to more remote satellite-borne system. The United States can also simply, and therefore soon, provide SAC bases and other key centers with automatic bomb alarms tied together by communications to warn all bases immediately and certainly when any one base is attacked. This could be a very simple system indeed. It appears that it could be available by the end of fiscal 1960; there is no funded program for such a system at the present time.

The Panel also recognizes the value of more certain strategic warning and would encourage any steps in this direction.

Third, we can increase the ability of SAC to take off rapidly by the simple step of providing more runways.

Such further measures as these just mentioned pay off well. In talking earlier of hardening, for example, we noted that each hardened aiming point, when added to our target system, costs the Soviet from 10 to 20 or more missiles to negate. This rate of exchange would apply, for example, to every new missile that we could add to the force in a hardened configuration.

We can also estimate the effect of better warning in the same terms used to develop the present chart. For example, and to set the scale, in 1963 the difference between having a fully functioning BMEWS system—as postulated for the chart—and no such system, is about 450 aircraft. A similar difference prevails on the lower curve as early as 1961. Presence of an infra-red system alternative and supplementary to BMEWS is therefore insurance for a precious possession. It also insures against under-shooting BMEWS on low angle trajectories. Furthermore, since an infra-red system is alerted by launchings,

rather than by penetration during flight, it can be expected to speed up our responses; if for example it added ten minutes to our warning time in mid 1961, this would be worth 120 aircraft. A similar value attaches to a bomb alarm system in this period. Either type of warning would have a much greater effect were we to assume a more sharply timed Soviet attack.

Doubling SAC's take-off rate would add 100 or more aircraft in 1961, perhaps 50 in 1963, under the attack postulated for this chart. It could have more value in a more highly coordinated attack, and it is always insurance against damage to, or accidental clogging of, runways.

To summarize our views then:

We feel that it is very clear, and for good technical reasons, that the most effective way for the United States now to invest its resources in military measures is to proceed in the direction of hardening, dispersal, and increasing dependence upon protected forces of intercontinental ballistic missiles. For the near future we must also look to further measures for the protection of our aircraft. There are programs now in the Department of Defense aimed at increasing our security, which simply do not attack the heart of the problem as we see it. We have raised questions about some of these programs in an earlier discussion of technical factors relating to the Defense budget. We feel that if some of these programs were given their proper emphasis, most of the steps that we have here emphasized as important could be implemented effectively and without adding to the Defense budget.

146. Briefing Note for the March 5 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 2, 1959

*MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES,
1958–1963
AND
ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION*

In the Planning Board we are now starting upon the annual review of Basic Policy. As a first step, and by way of background, we have been discussing two National Intelligence Estimates—Main Trends in Soviet

¹ Source: NIEs 11–4–58 and 100–59. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963 (NIE 11–4–58) and Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100–59).

This morning Mr. Allen Dulles is going to summarize the two estimates for the Council, after which there will be an opportunity for questions and discussion. No policy issues are being put forward for decision at this time.

(CALL ON: ALLEN DULLES)

(Note: To the extent that Allen Dulles does not cover or adequately highlight them, you may wish to mention the following 5 points which were identified in the P/B)

The Planning Board noted five respects in which the estimate of the world situation this year differs from last year's:

1. More emphasis on Soviet Bloc confidence.
2. Decline of Communist influence in Western Europe.
3. Strengthened cohesion of NATO.
4. The restoration of faith as to U.S. leadership, in Western opinion.
5. The lack of Communist success with immediate objectives in under-developed areas.

It was noted that these developments of 1958 seem to look favorable when compared to the rather gloomy developments of 1957. However, it was pointed out that the East-West struggle continues and indeed during 1958 "took on a somewhat more ominous character."

(Para 6, NIE 100–59)

(Note: If adequate Council discussion is not generated, you may wish to mention some of the following issues which were identified at the P/B.)

The Planning Board identified five longer-range developments which it thought should be called to the Council's attention:

1. The rise in scale and intensity of the Soviet threat: the new confidence of the Soviet leaders; a more assertive and challenging policy; the continuing increase in military power; and an already powerful economy, growing faster than ours
 2. The continuing chance of general war occurring through misinterpretation of the opponent's acts in a major international crisis
 3. The growing challenge to the West of the Soviet increased emphasis on trade and aid, and particularly the impact upon under-developed countries
 4. The long-range implications of the growing strength of Communist China
 5. The conclusion on the part of some members of the intelligence community (although, of course, there is a split) that "the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas, and probably feel somewhat freer to encourage or instigate armed conflict in those areas, although probably not initially with overt Soviet forces."
- (Para 16, NIE 100–59)

147. Briefing Note for the March 5 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, March 4, 1959

NSC 5904

At its meeting on January 22, the Council discussed NSC 5401/1, “U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc”, in the light of a series of questions sent forward by the Planning Board. With the guidance from the Council discussion, the Planning Board has drafted a new statement of policy, NSC 5904, which is before you today. The new paper is entitled, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War”, and is divided into two separate sections: a first section (Section A) deals with *general war*; then, because some Planning Board members felt that the paper should also give policy guidance for *limited war*, a second section (Section B) was written addressed to other kinds of war than *general war*.

Taking up Section A, then, there was general agreement as to the first objective.

(READ Para 1)

There was also agreement as to the second objective and the policy guidance to carry it out, insofar as the USSR is concerned.

(READ Para 2a with last 2 lines,
Para 6a with last line)

There was a split as to whether the same objective and guidance that apply to the USSR should automatically apply to Communist China; the European Bloc countries, such as Albania or Poland; and the non-European Bloc countries, such as North Viet Nam, North Korea or Outer Mongolia. As indicated by the bracketed clauses in Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 6, some members of the Planning Board believed that the guidance should apply to those other Bloc countries only if they were “involved in the hostilities.”

Other members of the Planning Board pointed out the difficulty of determining whether a Bloc country was “involved in the hostilities” once general war was upon us. There was a strong feeling that whether or not we were “at war” with Country A or Country B in the classical sense would be academic; and that the purpose of the policy guidance

¹ Source: NSC 5904. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

was to authorize, in advance, the use of requisite military force against selected targets in the country or countries listed.

(CALL ON: GOVERNOR HERTER
GENERAL TWINING
SECRETARY McELROY
and attempt to resolve splits)

The objective in Paragraph 3 follows generally the language of the old paper except that the language “over their own peoples” is an addition.

(READ Para 3)

The objective in Para. 4 is the same as in the old paper except that the word “effective” before allies has been omitted.

(READ Para 4)

Paragraph 5 is now and provides:

(READ Para 5)

The other split in Section A is a proposal by State and OCDM for a Paragraph 7 of the Policy Guidance to read:

(READ Para 7)

The remainder of the Planning Board felt that guidance on developing a recovery capacity was out of place in a paper on policy in the event of general war, that is, after general war has started, and believed that the proposal should be advanced in connection with the review of Basic National Security Policy.

(CALL ON: GOVERNOR HERTER
GOVERNOR HOEGH)

Paragraph 8 is new.

(READ Para 8)

There are four paragraphs (Paras 9–12) on Post-War Objectives. These are necessarily stated in the most general terms, but could serve as a basis for forward planning by the responsible agencies.

Turning next to Section B, the majority of the Planning Board would entitle the section, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War with a Sino-Soviet Bloc State (or States) Other Than the USSR.” I call particular attention to the footnote at the bottom of page 4 which reads:

(READ Footnote)

The JCS propose a different title, on the grounds that Section B should cover *any* limited war and not be restricted to limited war with a Sino-Soviet Bloc state. I shall later call on General Twining to explain their position.

In their written comments, the JCS withdraw their proposal for a Paragraph 13.

There is agreement on the rather general objective in Paragraph 14:
(READ Para 14)

There is also agreement on the first part of the Policy Guidance in Paragraph 15, the JCS in their written comments having withdrawn the bracketed phrase.

(READ first 3 sentences, Para 15)

A real difference of opinion developed as to our policy after U.S. forces are once committed, as indicated in the splits at the end of Paragraph 15 (Page 5). The majority proposal is:

(READ Majority Proposal)

The JCS have an alternative which would say:

(READ JCS Alternative)

Defense proposed still a third alternative, which I shall ask Mr. McElroy to explain in a moment. Since the paper was written, the JCS have prepared language for a fourth alternative (Appendix B, JCS comments). But first let us hear an explanation of the JCS splits, beginning with the title.

(CALL ON: GENERAL TWINING
GOVERNOR HERTER
SECRETARY McELROY)

148. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 9, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster (for discussion of airborne alert exercise)
Major Eisenhower

General Twining initially brought up the question of the proposed airborne alert exercise to be executed by the Strategic Air Command. This would be directed primarily toward the testing of procedures for airborne alert and would be done on a relatively modest basis. The Secretary of Defense approves of the conducting of such an exercise.

¹ Source: SAC airborne alert exercise; JCS support for Mutual Security Program; Berlin; JCS-Congressional relationship. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

The President had certain reservations with respect to this exercise, primarily in the light of the possibility that it might be construed as developing a continuing requirement. Therefore, representatives from the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC will meet with the President this afternoon at 2:30 for a complete briefing on this question.

* * *

The President then brought up with General Twining a report which the President had seen in the newspapers relative to a written submission by the individual service chiefs concerning their additional needs at this time. This causes the President considerable concern in that he views this Congressional inquiry as a potential threat to a full promulgation of the mutual security program. He asked General Twining why it is not possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to speak out in more positive terms in favor of the mutual security program in order to keep our overall security needs in perspective. The discussions of individual service needs, without a positive support of the mutual security problem would destroy the perspective of our overall requirements.

General Twining expressed complete agreement with this viewpoint and told the President that he would bring this up with the Joint Chiefs in his meeting with them this afternoon. He expressed concern over the fact that the Chiefs of Staff are being required to appear before the Senate Military Preparedness Committee as a corporate body.

General Twining then informed the President that some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Twining does not concur) fear that we are not going far enough in responding to the Berlin crisis. Some of the Chiefs have recommended actions which General Twining considers provocative. The Joint Chiefs are going to see the Secretary of Defense prior to testifying before Congress and will benefit from his guidance at that time. General Twining remarked that Secretary McElroy's views on this matter are identical to those of the President.

The President then stressed the necessity to avoid over-reacting. In so doing we give the Soviets ammunition. The President stressed the view that Khrushchev desires only to upset the United States. He expressed once again his view that we must address this problem in terms, not of six months, but of forty years. During this time the Soviets will attempt continually to throw us off balance. First, they will hit the situation in Berlin. They will then go to Iraq, then to Iran, and then will attempt to worry us over the situation of the Kurds. They would like us to go frantic everytime they stir up difficulties in these areas. The President feels that we should stand on our program which we consider to be adequate. This program is based primarily on deterrence, our air power, our missiles, and our allies. We maintain at the same time the capability to deal with brush fire actions. The

President admitted that we may miscalculate and become involved in a general war. However, he questioned the effectiveness of any crash military measures to alleviate this current Berlin situation. He feels the measure of raising the levels of Army forces in Europe by 10,000 over that currently planned is useless, except perhaps as a psychological measure. He feels that this is primarily going to give General Taylor ammunition for avoiding his programmed cut of 30,000. General Twining confirmed that General Taylor desires to keep those 10,000 men in Europe.

General Twining then referred again to the nature of the hearings. The President instructed him to caution the Joint Chiefs that the military in this country is a tool and not a policy-making body; the Joint Chiefs are not responsible for high-level political decisions. General Twining agreed, and again expressed his displeasure at the idea of the Joint Chiefs being called as a corporate body to testify before Senator Johnson's Committee. He is certain that Senator Johnson's lawyer will ask policy type questions of the Joint Chiefs. He went on to say that he has his own lawyers working on the legality of the Joint Chiefs being called as a body before Congress. Legally, the Joint Chiefs as a body are required to advise only the President and the Secretary of Defense. General Twining is perfectly willing to walk out of the meeting; however, he has discussed the matter with his own lawyers and has concluded that it is necessary to respond to this call to appear before the Johnson Committee. The Joint Chiefs will not discuss military planning or any other matters which are not Congressional prerogatives. He said again that Secretary McElroy is going to have a talk to the Joint Chiefs, while remarking that this procedure has not been uniformly successful in the past.

As the meeting was coming to a close, the President philosophized briefly on the difficulties of a democracy running a military establishment in peacetime. He reiterated his conviction of the value of mutual security and expressed as his greatest cause of concern the prospect that the Congress will twist the testimony of the Joint Chiefs as a pretext for cutting this vital program.

John S.D. Eisenhower

149. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 9, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
Secretary Quarles
Secretary Murphy
General Twining
General LeMay
General Loper
General Persons
General Goodpaster
General Starbird
Mr. Vance
Major Eisenhower
Colonel Brown (briefer)
Lieut. Colonel Meade (briefer)

The first part of this meeting was comprised of a briefing on the airborne alert exercises entitled Headstart I and Headstart II. The first of these exercises had been conducted between September and December 1958. The essence of the briefing was as follows:

1. Security of the Strategic Air Command from attack may be attained by any one of a combination of the four following measures:

- (a) Ground alert
- (b) Dispersal
- (c) Hardening
- (d) Airborne alert

2. Headstart I had maintained an aircraft airborne for twenty-four hours a day. This had involved four B-52 flights per day, each aircraft carrying two atomic weapons. Each aircraft had received one refueling during the time of flight. The exercise had been based off Loring Air Force Base, and the route chosen had been such that each aircraft would have been effective for an attack on the Soviet Union during most of its route.

3. Headstart I, as an exercise, had been considered 92.5% effective. It had indicated the following conclusions:

- (a) Airborne alert is feasible.
- (b) It is possible to attain increased alert status with the same number of personnel.
- (c) It is possible to increase combat efficiency.

¹ Source: SAC airborne alert exercises. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

(d) It is possible to maintain aircraft in the air for twenty-four hours a day.

(e) The operation of KC-135s at accelerated rates is feasible.

(f) Command control and weapons safety were proven to be effective.

(g) By conducting lengthy fights at optimum altitude, the B-52 had reached greater efficiency levels cost-wise.

4. The following were not achieved by Headstart I:

(a) Determination of the maximum capability for airborne alert.

(b) Determination of the supply support required.

(c) Adequate crew training.

(d) Firm cost data.

5. Further exercises would accomplish the following:

(a) Determine the maximum capability for airborne alert.

(b) Develop new concepts of operation.

(c) Achieve a greater degree of crew training.

(d) Achieve better cost data.

6. Headstart II, if approved, would be conducted along the following lines:

(a) The test would be conducted over a four-month period, from March to June. In March, there would be eight B-52s and twelve KC-135s aloft per day; in April there would be eleven B-52s and seventeen KC-135s; in May and June, sixteen B-52s and twenty-four KC-135s.

(b) The objectives of Headstart II would be to further investigate manpower and cost figures, to develop an optimum ground and airborne alert ratio, to develop a manning doctrine, to refine maintenance data, to improve operational readiness, and to improve methods of positive control.

(c) To attain these objectives, the problems of maintenance, material, real facilities, fiscal matters, and operations would be emphasized. The cost of Headstart II would be \$20 million over costs for ground alert during this period.

(d) The following flight patterns would be followed:

(1) The 28th Bomb Wing, located at Ellsworth Air Force Base would send one sortie at 2000 hours daily. Its route, generally in the Eastern United States and Canada, would involve support by KC-135s from Loring Air Force Base. Canada has granted overflight permission.

(2) The 92nd Bomb Wing, located at Fairchild Air Force Base, would send three sorties at 1700 hours daily and three sorties at 2300 hours daily. These aircraft would be in the air for twenty-four hours and would receive two refuelings. This route would involve a flight from Fairchild to Kodiak Island in the Aleutians as the initial leg of the journey.

(3) The 4238th Strategic Wing at Barksdale Air Force Base would conduct an exercise involving one of the B-52 squadrons. This would involve one sortie daily, which would receive two refuelings from Westover Air Force Base.

(e) This exercise would be conducted under current manning levels.

7. The briefer then requested approval of the conducting of Headstart II.

* * * *

In discussing the briefing, the President questioned the proposed direction of flight of the 92nd Bomb Wing from Fairchild toward the Aleutians (Headstart II). This, he feels, is a bad direction since it is heading directly toward the USSR. General LeMay said this can be easily fixed. He pointed out that this flight is not within known Soviet radar range nor within an area where Soviet reconnaissance aircraft might be operating. However, Secretary McElroy and Secretary Quarles were of the view that this route should be pulled back closer to the American Continent, and the promise to do so satisfied the President.

The President then questioned the matter of the flight routes. In view of the fact that for a certain portion of each sortie an aircraft would be incapable of diversion to strike the USSR, it appeared to him that our overall capability during this ineffective period would be lessened. He asked why we do not shorten these routes to eliminate the ineffective time. General LeMay answered that the purpose of this exercise is to determine the best flight time. If we do not stretch these flights to the maximum, it will not be possible to determine the optimum. To this Colonel Brown added that the efficiency of the B-52 is increased due to increased length of time in the air. This fact is the result of the greater proportion of time at optimum altitudes per flight. General Lemay also added that another purpose of this test was to determine data on metal fatigue. These answers appeared to satisfy the President.

The President then questioned the effect of this exercise on the calendar life of the aircraft involved. Mr. McElroy added that we will probably discard most of these aircraft before they are worn out.

The President inquired of General LeMay whether provisions are made for the crew to be rested while airborne, and General LeMay answered in the affirmative. The crew is organized so as to allow adequate rest.

The President now turned to a political question which is of some concern to him. In the light of the pressures from Congress to maintain an "air-borne alert," the President dislikes that name. He is concerned

over the possibility that once this exercise is conducted, it will establish a requirement for its continuance; and the implication will be that at the end of the test we will no longer be alert. The President pointed out his mentioning in press conference that a continuous airborne alert may become essential during certain phases of the missile age, but it is *not* essential now. He therefore desires that a training name be placed on this exercise, in order to alleviate the effect of possible leaks. A training name would emphasize that we are only preparing to do what we need to do in the future. Mr. McElroy pointed out that this will go under the code name of Headstart II; but this did not satisfy the President in itself. He desired that we have a name in case we are asked for a description of this exercise. Mr. McElroy voiced his agreement that there is no current military need for an airborne alert.

(The President then digressed for a moment to tell of an episode reported by Macmillan on his recent trip to Moscow. Khrushchev had apparently dropped the thought that the Soviets have no interest in small bombs. Further, their large bombs have now been developed satisfactorily and they have adequate weapons in the megaton class in their stockpiles. Consequently, the Soviets claim they have little interest in conducting tests and are actually shutting down some nuclear reactors. Mr. Quarles stated that recent Soviet tests have verified that their main interest lies in large bombs.)

In conclusion, the President approved the conducting of exercise Headstart II. In describing this operation, he directed that it be called "advance training" rather than an "airborne alert exercise." Further, he understood that the route of the 92nd Bomb Wing from Fairchild to the Aleutians would be modified so as to avoid frightening the Soviets in the event they picked it up.

* * * *

The President then questioned Secretary Murphy about political aspects of this exercise with the Canadians. Mr. Murphy pointed out that although the Canadians had granted permission for overflights, they had done so in a somewhat negative fashion. They had denied having a right to withdraw their approval for such an exercise if it involved the efficiency of SAC. However, they had expressed some fears and had desired no publicity and no tie-in to Berlin. They also expressed the view that in the light of their cooperation in military matters, the United States should see fit to improve its cooperation with them on the matter of oil quotas. According to Mr. McElroy, the military side of the Canadian Government seems easier about this exercise than the civilian side. (General LeMay here indicated that the Canadian Government has been briefed on this exercise.) In connection with the oil quotas, however, the Canadians are, at the appropriate time, going to "explode."

This latter fact diverted the discussion briefly to the matter of oil quotas. The President expressed the desire that advanced information be delivered to Diefenbaker on this subject. He pointed out that these oil quotas are not injurious to Canada. It is important that the Canadian Government know this in the light of the quid pro quo (which approaches blackmail) which they are apparently attempting to implement in this matter.

Mr. Murphy confirmed that the planned oil quotas will result rather favorably for the Canadians; it will be the Venezuelans who will be hurt. Here Mr. Quarles stated that Canada's fears are not for the present but for the future. Mr. Murphy agreed, stating that the principle of a quota is what disturbs the Canadians. They have announced that any restriction on oil imports from Canada will create such surplus in their Western Provinces as to necessitate their constructing a pipeline from West to East. This the President considers highly undesirable. Accordingly, he requested Secretary Quarles to get together with Secretary Seaton to devise some scheme to insure that it does not become necessary for Canada to build a pipeline. He feels that such construction would be a waste of resources and should be avoided. He further requested Mr. Murphy to designate an official to visit Diefenbaker as a personal representative of the President to explain the real facts of the oil import quotas.

* * * *

The President then brought the meeting back to the subject of Headstart II with a warning that if this exercise is leaked, it will probably have to be stopped, due primarily to the political impact in Canada and other nations. General LeMay pointed out here that the only thing new in this exercise is the regularity of dispatch of the aircraft, but the President pointed further to the magnitude and scope of this exercise.

Mr. Murphy pointed out a peculiarity of the Canadian requirements. Whereas the clearance of these flights is normally on a service-to-service basis (USAF to RCAF), the Canadians have specified that the RCAF is responsible for obtaining "ministerial clearance." Secretary Quarles expressed considerable doubt as to the significance of this wording. He does not feel that the Canadians are going to require any exceptional clearance for this exercise. General LeMay concurred in Mr. Quarles' view, stating that the other test had required no change from normal clearance procedures. The President remarked that the greatest danger to the entire exercise lay with the politicians—in this case the Canadian politicians.

John S.D. Eisenhower

150. Memorandum From Gray to Quarles¹

Washington, March 12, 1959

SUBJECT

Defense Presentations to the President

REFERENCE

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject as above from the Chairman, JCS dated 21 February 1959 (Attached)

1. In my conversation with you and General Twining yesterday I failed to remind you of the suggestion that I made in my memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated February 19, 1959, that there be prepared a concise discussion paper on each study area which could be circulated in advance on an "Eyes Only" basis. I expressed the hope that the major issues could be identified and cast in a form appropriate for discussion and consideration by the President. I also suggested the kinds of policy questions which might be covered in such a discussion paper.

I raise this in connection with the first study area to be presented which we agreed would be "Control of the Seas with Particular Reference to Antisubmarine Warfare." I am aware that we are planning to present the Comparative Evaluations Group study but I would also hope that there might be related to this presentation the pertinent results of the report by the Panel on Antisubmarine Warfare of the President's Science Advisory Committee dated December 1, 1958. Moreover, it seems to me that in preparation for such meetings we should have a discussion paper with some advance circulation. Therefore, the schedule of the meetings might well depend on the circulation of such a paper. I should appreciate a word from you on this matter.

In this connection I am prompted to observe that you may wish to include in the overall presentation to the President some of the problems which should be discussed in the broader subject of "Control of the Seas."

2. We agreed that the presentation on "Tactical Forces and Requirements for Tactical Weapons Systems," could be made about the middle of April. Again, I feel that a discussion paper could be useful. I think we also agreed that this presentation might perhaps serve only to open issues for later study.

¹ Source: Question of defense presentations to the President on military missions and weapon systems. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

3. With respect to the study on “Continental Defense Against Aircraft and Missiles (excluding antisubmarine warfare)”, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a schedule date of about 15 August. We agreed that it would be desirable to advance this date if possible and that you and General Twining would keep under study the possibility of such a change.

4. With respect to the fourth study, “Strategic Nuclear Striking Force Requirements and Capabilities” including the “optimum mix” both of weapons systems and targets, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had indicated that the staff of the NESC had been assigned this project with a due date of 31 October 1959 followed by comments by the JCS, the presentation being ready by about December 1, 1959. I think we all agreed that whereas it is vital that adequate time be allowed for the study, it was desirable to try to advance each of the dates. It was my understanding that General Twining will talk to General Hickey in this connection.

I return herewith General Twining’s memorandum.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Incl-Memo for SecDef
frm Chairman, JCS
dtd 21Feb59 subj as above.

151. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, April 21, 1959

SUBJECT

Status of Military Mobilization Base Program

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5810/1
- B. NSC Action No. 2019

The enclosed memorandum on the subject from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2019–b–(1)

¹Source: Transmits a memorandum from Quarles to the NSC on “Status of Military Mobilization Base Program.” Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5810, 5906.

and –(2), is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum From Quarles to Lay

SUBJECT

Status of Military Mobilization Base Program (U)

NSC Action No. 2019 requires that the Department of Defense report to the National Security Council on developments in the review of its Mobilization Base planning concepts.

In reference to paragraph *b*–(1) of NSC Action No. 2019, the Department of Defense is now reviewing the validity of the assumption of a mobilization period of six months prior to D-Day. The results of this review will be incorporated into our recommendations to be made in connection with the current review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1).

In reference to paragraph *b*–(2), the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, has just completed the first in a series of hazard probability studies for use in identifying logistics problems which might reasonably be predicted in connection with the initial phase of a General War. These studies constitute an important initial step in giving us a capability for taking bomb damage into account in future mobilization base planning.

/s/ Donald A. Quarles
Deputy

152. Memorandum of Discussion of the 403d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, April 23, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 403rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
April 23, 1959

Present at the 403rd NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State (Item 1); the Under Secretary of State (Items 2 and 3); the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Mr. Robert Amory, Central Intelligence Agency; Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs; for Science and Technology; and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here is agenda item 1.]

2. U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

(NSC Actions Nos. 1876 and 2034; SNIE 100-10-58; SNIE 100-3-59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 17, 1959)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the problem of U.S. Military Bases overseas and noted that the last time the Departments of State and Defense had reported to the Council on various U.S. Bases (January 15), they had covered everything except our bases in Brazil, the Caribbean area, and the Philippines. He understood that the Secretaries of State and Defense were now prepared to render a supplementary report covering these areas.

The report was summarized for the Council by General Twining who indicated that the Memorandum addressed to the Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense on these bases showed no apparent adverse factors sufficient to over-ride the desirability of continuing to maintain these bases and their facilities. However, the Secretaries of

¹ Source: Agenda item 2: U.S. Overseas Military Bases. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

State and Defense in their Memorandum did indicate that it would be desirable to review carefully U.S. military requirements prior to renewing the existing agreements with Brazil and the Dominican Republic. It was likewise indicated that certain facilities in the Philippines and Caribbean areas could probably be released because there was no clear military need for them. Similarly, with respect to the Philippines it was planned that areas no longer required by U.S. forces would be released during the current negotiations.

Secretary Dillon, who had taken the place of Secretary Herter at the beginning of discussion of this item, said that the State Department had found this review of our base requirements a very useful exercise indeed. In the course of the review, it had become obvious that the State Department lacked important information on a number of bases. Accordingly, the Department was instructing the appropriate embassies and legations to report regularly on U.S. bases within their jurisdiction.

The Vice President inquired specifically about the U.S. base at Guantánomo Bay in Cuba. He wondered whether it might not be a good idea for us to withdraw from this base in view of Fidel Castro's suggestions and the rash statements which he had been making in criticism of the U.S. The Vice President said that he did not imagine that the Guantánomo base was very important to U.S. security.

General Twining replied that on the contrary this base was considered the key to the whole military defense of the Caribbean. We should certainly not abandon the base at Guantánomo Bay if we could avoid doing so.

Mr. Gray then raised the question originally posed by the President as to the necessity for the U.S. to continue to maintain base facilities at Sangley Point in the Philippines. General Twining replied that the Department of Defense had a report in response to the President's question which they would send to General Goodpaster. The President said that it would be sufficient for this report to come to him and that it need not be brought up in the Council.

Mr. Gray then inquired about the report requested by the President with respect to the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations on Okinawa in a single area. General Twining said that this problem was still under active consideration in the Defense Department and that a report on it would be forthcoming soon.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1876, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 17, 1959.

b. Noted an oral report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that:

(1) A report was being submitted to the President pursuant to NSC Action No. 2034-c-(1), stating that the Sangley Point naval base in the Philippines was still considered militarily important.

(2) The study as to the feasibility of concentrating U.S. military installations in Okinawa in a single area was being actively conducted by the Department of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 2034-c-(2).

NOTE

Immediately preceding the above regular meeting, the President held a special NSC meeting to note and discuss two studies analyzing possible contingencies relating to the maintenance of Western access to Berlin.

S. Everett Gleason

153. Letter From Herter to McElroy¹

Washington, April 25, 1959

Dear Neil:

On February 26, 1959, Deputy Secretary Quarles and I agreed that Assistant Secretaries Irwin of Defense and Smith of State would consult together on the problems of US strategy raised in Secretary Dulles' letter of January 24, 1959 before the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1, "Basic National Security Policy", were taken up by the NSC Planning Board in the 1959 annual review of that paper.

In the course of a preliminary discussion on April 16 Mr. Irwin suggested to Mr. Smith that it would be helpful if this Department could provide a brief statement of foreign policy requirements bearing upon military strategy. I am accordingly sending you the enclosed paper.

I recognize that there are various considerations in addition to those of foreign policy that must bear upon the formulation of our military strategy. I hope, however, that the enclosed paper will be of assistance to your Department in its re-examination of the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

/S/ Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Transmits a paper on foreign policy considerations bearing on military strategy. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Enclosure

Staff Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, April 24, 1959

Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing upon US Strategy

US strategy should serve our national policy objectives of maintaining the cohesion of the Free World and influencing the policies of the Communist empire in directions compatible with US national security interests. From the point of view of foreign policy this requires:

1. *An evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an acceptable doctrine for its use.* This capability is the primary requirement. Its existence does not, however, solve all problems. We need to reassure our allies that this capability would be used only in defense of vital interests and that its use would be consistent with their continued survival.

2. *An evident, adequate and flexible capability for military operations short of general war and an acceptable doctrine for its use against the range of possible Communist aggressions.* This requirement is of increasing importance. As Soviet nuclear capability grows, so does Free World and Communist questioning that the US would use its strategic nuclear capability in any situation that did not clearly and imminently endanger vital US security interests. Deterrence of Communist limited aggression, and Free World confidence that such aggression will be deterred, will depend more and more on the strengthening of US limited war capability. The present degree of US reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose disturbs large segments of the Free World and impedes the fulfillment of our national policy objective of maintaining the cohesion of the Free World. We need from the point of view of foreign policy a capability and a doctrine that are flexible enough to enable us to deter and to defeat limited Communist aggression in ways that are acceptable to Free World public opinion and that minimize the danger of expanding local war into general war.

The foregoing generalizations apply to the deterrence and defeat of three categories of Communist aggression as follows:

1. *Substantial Soviet aggression against the NATO area* would mean general war.

2. *Overt Soviet non-nuclear aggression against non-NATO areas.* For deterrent purposes we must retain the threat of nuclear response. In the event of such aggression, however, it would be preferable if our initial response were non-nuclear. Should the USSR persist in its aggression,

limited and local use of nuclear weapons against military targets would be acceptable from the foreign policy point of view.

3. *All other kinds of Communist aggression.* For deterrent purposes we should not explicitly deny ourselves the use of nuclear weapons. It should, on the other hand, be evident to the Free World that we are not overly dependent on these weapons for deterrence or actual military operations. In the event of such aggression, recourse to the use of nuclear weapons would, in most situations, have highly adverse consequences from the foreign policy point of view. We should, therefore, plan and be prepared for a non-nuclear response in these situations. The use of nuclear weapons should be regarded as a last resort.

154. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, May 4, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. Harr
General Goodpaster

Mr. Harr said he had asked to see the President because the changes incident to Mr. Herter's assuming the Secretaryship of State provided a point in time for review of OCB affairs. A key question is that of State's chairmanship of the Board. He recalled that this question had been considered with the President, at several times in the past, and that because of this consideration the President had appointed Mr. Herter as Chairman not ex officio but as an individual. The points of concern are first as to State Department domination and lack of impartiality in the conduct of the affairs of the Board (the consequence of which is that other agencies tend to "dry up"), and second that it has been difficult in the past achieving a proper coordination of Mutual Security affairs by the Board with the Board's chairman being the number two man and the Mutual Security coordinator being the number three man in the State Department hierarchy. With these two posts now reversed, it seems even less likely that effective coordination will be achieved.

¹ Source: Relationship of State and OCB. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on May 5.

The President spoke at some length on his concept of State Department primacy in matters of foreign policy, indicating that the other departments have more the role of instruments of policy. He recalled that the OCB had been set up to follow through on NSC policies once established—to assure coordinated operations and also the carrying out of policy decisions. The President also noted that the OCB, having taken over from the PSB, is concerned with psychological questions and efforts. In pushing these, he recognized that they verge on foreign policy at times.

As to the Chairmanship, the President said that the only other possibility that came to his mind was that of having Gordon Gray chair the OCB. He would have objectivity and could review its actions from the standpoint of policy considerations. The President then asked me for my view on the matter, and I told him that the essential point, in my opinion, was to establish the need for objectivity as well as the relationship of the Board to the Mutual Security Program; I also mentioned that there is some possibility that the OCB mechanism may lose its steam, and that consequently a push to keep up its vitality would be valuable.

I also commented that there is some natural overlapping between foreign policy, which the President views as the affair of the State Department, and security policy, with which the OCB is more directly concerned. Some would feel that the State Department itself is an instrument of security policy, charged with the narrow function of diplomatic activity. This may be extreme view, but the opposite—that any matter that can be classed as foreign policy is primarily the business of the State Department, even though it affects security—is also an extreme view. The President pointed out that the State Department is more than a diplomatic instrument. The Secretary advises him and formulates matters for his consideration. After further discussion he agreed that there was a considerable area of overlap.

The President said he would talk to Mr. Herter about this. Later in the morning he did so.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

155. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, May 4, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
General Goodpaster

The President said he had asked Secretary Herter to come over in order to talk about the set-up for the OCB. Mr. Harr had been in earlier in the morning, expressing essentially a concern that the OCB should not run out of steam, and that the shifts of top State personnel should not contribute to such a process. The President said he had given some consideration as to whether it would be of value to have Gordon Gray chair the Board, but had thought that it would not, largely because Mr. Gray is already carrying a maximum load. There are two questions that need consideration, however. The first is the reversal of the relationship of the Chairman of the Board to the Coordinator of Mutual Security incident to Dillon's becoming Under Secretary and Murphy as the Board Chairman, being the No. 3 man in the State Department. The second is that there be no loss of enthusiasm for the OCB operations, and that the Chairmanship not be over slaughtered by the changed arrangements. The President thought that this should be taken up in the letter of appointment of the new Chairman. He also asked Mr. Herter to make sure that Mr. Dillon maintains in Mutual Security operations a responsive regard for OCB activity.

Mr. Herter said that a lot of the difficulty is that the powers of the OCB are limited to recommendation alone. This is especially true in carrying out NSC policies. On the side of psychological activities, there is need for initiative and suggestions of a specific character. With regard to Mutual Security, his effort had been to keep the OCB away from the assertion of operating jurisdiction, especially on day to day and specific country decisions.

The President added that we have had one idea from the start with the OCB, and that is that it should press and prod the responsible agencies into action. The President said he did not think that Murphy would be guilty of any errors of decision or blundering in the OCB; he implied some question as to whether Murphy would use the machinery vigorously enough, however. Mr. Herter thought that Mr. Murphy would be very valuable in the OCB because of the tremendous experience and detailed knowledge that he possesses over a very broad field of

¹ Source: Department of State-OCB relationship, nuclear test ban negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

international affairs. He said he would be happy to talk to Mr. Harr. The President said that would be fine, and also suggested that Mr. Herter might have a luncheon with Dillon, Murphy and Harr present so that everything could be fully understood.

Secretary Herter next mentioned the issues that still remain regarding next steps by the United States on nuclear test suspension negotiations. He said he thought this could be worked out with Mr. McCone, and he would plan to bring in a very brief statement of the remaining issues at the meeting planned the following day with the President. He stressed the importance of trying to get the Soviets to go along with us on a few jointly conducted underground tests, the purpose of which would be to gain additional scientific (seismographic) data. The President agreed with this.

The President suggested that Mr. Herter might wish to have a special little luncheon for Sir Winston Churchill, on Tuesday or Wednesday. He said he would ask Mr. Churchill at once as to his desires. (Subsequently he informed Mr. Herter that Sir Winston preferred not to go out for luncheons.)

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

156. Briefing Note for the 405th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, May 6, 1959

SUBJECT

Port Security (Proposed Revisions of Par. 19 of NSC 5802/1 and Par. 33-*b* of NSC 5808/1)

1. The first item for consideration by the Council grows out of recommendations made to the Planning Board by the State member, who proposed that revisions be made in our Port Security policies and programs, with a view to permitting freer access to U.S. ports by Soviet Bloc and other flag vessels which are presently denied entry to our ports in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

¹Source: Port security program. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

2. The Port Security Program which is currently in operation under responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Coast Guard is governed by the following:

a. U.S. Policy on Continental Defense, in Par. 19 on the subject of Port Security, calls for measures to be applied by Treasury to protect U.S. port areas against sabotage, espionage and clandestine introduction of *persons* and *things* inimical to U.S. security, including measures, on a selective basis as appropriate, for (1) the denial of entry to vessels, and (2) the boarding, searching and surveillance of vessels (NSC 5802/1, Par. 19, p. 2). State and Treasury, propose that the Port Security paragraph of Continental Defense Policy be revised by deleting provisions for the denial, boarding, searching, and surveillance of Bloc vessels. The majority of the Planning Board recommend that Par. 19 of Continental Defense Policy should *not* be revised at this time, and the JCS, and IIC and ICIS, excepting the State member, concur in this view.

b. U.S. Policy Toward Poland also deals with Port Security in Par. 33 which provides that Polish flag vessels are to be treated in the same manner as Soviet Bloc flag vessels, *except* that Polish flag passenger vessels may enter at New York, and Polish flag cargo vessels may be permitted entry at designated U.S. ports for the specific purpose of taking on cargo for Poland under U.S.-Polish economic arrangements (NSC 5808/1, Par. 33, p. 11). All members of the Planning Board recommend that this policy be revised so as to permit Polish cargo vessels to enter designated U.S. ports for purposes of normal trade, not necessarily limited to the taking on of cargoes under a U.S.-Polish economic agreement. The JCS *do not* concur.

c. Pursuant to NSC Action, Treasury submitted a detailed Port Security Program to carry out the previously mentioned policies governing the denial and control of Sino-Soviet Bloc and Polish vessels. This program *prescribes* specific measures to be taken by Treasury and Coast Guard, with respect to: (1) the *admission of Polish vessels at designated ports*, after boarding and search, when taking on cargo under an economic agreement, and Polish passenger vessels at New York after boarding and search; (2) the *denial of entry to Sino-Soviet bloc flag vessels*, and any other flag vessel which is suspected of being under Bloc control; and (3) the *boarding and search of other flag vessels* which are suspected of being under Bloc control or which have touched at a Bloc port during the preceding four months. It is also provided that any vessel otherwise excludable from U.S. ports under this policy may be admitted under circumstances as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. (It should be noted that this Presidentially approved program would in effect be rescinded should there be approval of the State-Treasury proposal to amend present policy by eliminating requirements for the denial, boarding, search, and surveillance of Bloc and other suspect vessels.)

3. *In support of the State-Treasury proposal* The following points were advanced: to revise the Port Security provisions of Par. 19 of Continental Defense Policy, are the points made in the State Department

memorandum previously circulated to the Council. The State position was summed up at the Planning Board as follows:

a. The risk of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into U.S. ports via merchant vessels is less than it once might have been, in view of developments which have taken place subsequent to the adoption of the Port Security Program during the Korean crisis.

b. Some of the broader objectives of over-all national security policy, particularly with respect to increased peaceful trade with the Soviet Bloc, are being made difficult of achievement as the result of our present Port Security Policy which should, therefore, be relaxed.

c. Although internal security is an important element of national security, it is but one segment of over-all policy and must be viewed in focus.

4. *Considerations in opposition* to the State-Treasury proposal were raised in the Planning Board discussion as follows:

a. No basis has been produced for considering that there has been any reduction in the threat of clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons via vessels entering U.S. ports—a threat which is recognized in our present Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1, Par. 44).

b. Rescission of the present denial policy and removal of the requirement for the boarding and searching of suspect vessels, will withdraw our only defense (the Commandant of the Coast Guard states that it is a minimum defense) which we now have against the destruction of U.S. ports by means of nuclear weapons clandestinely introduced via vessels. If the policy is revoked, the Coast Guard would not feel justified in continuing harbor patrols.

c. In view of the forthcoming international conferences it is argued that this is probably not a propitious time for the United States to indicate a relaxation of policy toward the Soviet Bloc by removing Port Security controls.

5. CALL ON: Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Chairman, IIC (Mr. J. Edgar Hoover)
Chairman, ICIS (Mr. J. Walter Yeagley).

6. With regard to the proposed change in our Polish policy, I am committed to inform the Council as to the following: Subsequent to agreeing on this recommendation, Commerce directed to the Planning Board's attention a CIA report to the effect that a number of vessels flying the Polish flag are actually under the joint ownership and control of Poland and the Government of Communist China. Commerce believed that this situation would make more difficult the enforcement of Export Control and Foreign Assets Control regulations. Treasury and State, however, have informed the Planning Board that (1) these controls rest on authorities other than Port Security denial policy, (2) any Chinese Communist-owned vessels entering U.S. ports would be controlled under the Trading with the Enemy Act which prevents trade or financial transactions in which Communist China has any beneficial interest,

and (3) State will warn the Poles that action will be taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act if any ship in which Communist China has ownership or interest visits U.S. ports. (In any case, the Council's attention is invited to the fact that the Port Security restrictions on Polish vessels, as now set forth in our Polish policy, would become inoperative if approval is given to the State-Treasury proposal to drop our present Port denial program.)

157. Memorandum of Discussion at the 405th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, May 7, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 405th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 7, 1959

Present at the 405th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Donald A. Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 5); Frederick Mueller for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 5). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Item 1); the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Item 1); the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Jernegan) (Item 5); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General Curtis E. LeMay for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Foreign Economic Policy, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Port Security; Agenda item 5: Overseas Internal Security Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on May 8.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *PORT SECURITY: Proposed Revision of Paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 on Continental Defense and Paragraph 33–b of NSC 5808/1 on Poland* (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5808/1; NSC 5819, Part 9; NSC Action No. 2051; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 8, 21 and 22, 1959)

Mr. Gordon Gray briefed the Council in detail concerning the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting, and another is attached to this Memorandum.)

Mr. Gray then called on the Secretary of State for comment. Secretary Herter observed that two separate problems were involved in the Port Security problem; the first related to Polish ships and the Second to other Soviet Bloc ships. He indicated that in the case of Polish ships, State considered it of very great importance, in terms of increased peaceful trade and in terms of effecting reciprocal arrangements with Poland, that the U.S. liberalize its policy on the number of Polish vessels permitted entry into the U.S. and on the kind of cargo such vessels were permitted to carry. He said that in the case of Soviet ships, State was very conscious of the threats to our internal security which were inherent in the visits of such vessels to our shores. As regards the threat of clandestine entry of nuclear weapons, however, it was his understanding that the intelligence community had reviewed this problem and had come to the conclusion that this was the least likely method that the Soviets would employ for the purpose of introducing nuclear weapons into this country. He observed that introduction by this means would be unlikely not only because of the possibility of detection but also because the vessel carrying such a bomb would be destroyed at the time the weapon was detonated.

Secretary Herter indicated that only this morning the State Department had received a note from the Canadians saying that a Soviet ship was headed for the St. Lawrence Seaway and expressing the hope that the U.S. would not interfere with it.

Secretary Herter indicated that the Department of State recognized that its proposal posed a most serious problem for the Coast Guard, and hoped that it could accomplish its objective without adding greatly to the burdens of that service. To that end, it was hoped that the present situation could remain substantially as it is until the fall with the Treasury Department, in the interim, exercising a degree of flexibility concerning Soviet Bloc ships attempting to enter our ports. It was also hoped that, in exercising its responsibilities for the Port Security Program, the Treasury Department would take into account the foreign policy implications involved. It was the Department of State's thought that the whole matter might subsequently be reviewed

by the Council when we saw the outcome of the upcoming international conferences.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Scribner, emphasized the difficulties encountered by the Treasury Department in implementing the Port Security Program. He said thus far three exceptions had been made as to entry of Soviet Bloc vessels. He noted that the Treasury Department presently had two programs in effect in the Port Security area; the first involved boarding and searching of vessels, the second involved the checking of such vessels after they tied up at the dock for the purpose of processing suspect materials or suspect persons. He indicated that the proposal before the Council did not envisage doing away with the second program pertaining to the processing of persons and materials.

Mr. Scribner concurred in the view that it was unlikely that the Bloc would utilize vessels for the introduction of nuclear weapons when it would be more logical to introduce them by aircraft.

Mr. Scribner asked that the Treasury Department not be given the difficult task of determining, from a foreign policy standpoint, whether a particular ship should be granted or denied entry. He did not feel that the Treasury Department was either prepared or qualified to fulfill such an assignment. He said it was the Treasury Department's view that the present Port Security Program should continue until the fall, at which time it should be re-examined.

Secretary Herter noted that it was present policy to step up exchanges with the Bloc; that the Russians were planning to send larger groups to the U.S.; and that Soviet or other Bloc vessels might be used to bring such groups to this country. Accordingly, the Department of State felt that some additional flexibility should be exercised in arriving at decisions to permit or deny entry to such vessels.

The President thought that the Department of State was asking the Treasury Department to take on a heavy responsibility which it seemed to the President should continue to be the responsibility of the Department of State.

Secretary Herter commented that under existing arrangements, the Secretary of the Treasury was responsible for determining which vessels would be permitted to enter by way of exception to the Port Security Policy, but that the Department of State would be happy to take on as much responsibility in this area as the President wished to assign.

Mr. Scribner, in response to the President's inquiry, explained the consultative procedure which is now in effect whereby the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, determines the circumstances justifying the granting or denial of entry of suspect vessels.

The President observed that it must be most difficult to search effectively a ship for the purpose of determining whether it was carrying

a nuclear weapon. He noted, for example, that the weapon could be located in a false bottom constructed in the ship.

Mr. Scribner concurred with the President's observation, noting that many people think that more safeguarding is being done in this area than is actually the case.

Secretary Quarles indicated the view of the Department of Defense that there was sufficient flexibility in the present Port Security Program; that there was no need for amending the existing policy in that regard. He said that the Department of Defense would defer to the Department of State as to the degree of relaxation which should be exercised with respect to the Polish vessels. While agreeing with the President and with Secretary Scribner that the searches made for clandestine nuclear weapons in such vessels could only be partially effective, Secretary Quarles thought, nonetheless, that they served as a deterrent to attempted introductions through such means.

The Director of the FBI, when called on for comment by the President, indicated that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference concurred in the view that the present Port Security Policy and Program should not be modified until after the completion of the Geneva Conference. *[text not declassified]* Mr. Hoover said that the present policy and program served to some degree as a deterrent to the introduction of nuclear weapons and to the introduction of large numbers of intelligence agents. He emphasized that the present policy included an arrangement which permitted exceptions in particular cases and he concluded that from an internal security point of view, the present policy and program should not be modified at this time.

The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, when called upon by Mr. Gray, concurred in the view that review of existing policy should be deferred until the fall. He added that while it was recognized that there may be over-riding considerations which suggested a liberalization of policy on Polish vessels, it was his view that the Poles, as well as the Soviets, constituted a threat to the U.S.

General LeMay, on behalf of the JCS, noted that no information has been brought to the attention of the JCS which would reflect that there has been a change in the threat since the present Port Security Policy was adopted. It was the JCS view that the Port Security Committee had been working satisfactorily and consequently the present policy should be left as is.

The President asked General LeMay if it was the view of the JCS that the policy as regards the Polish vessels should likewise remain unchanged and General LeMay replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Mueller of the Department of Commerce, directed the Council's attention to the recent CIA report indicating that a number of vessels

flying the Polish flag were actually under the ownership or control of the Government of Communist China. He observed that these Chinese Communist-controlled ships were probably sailing under the Polish flag to deceive the Free World and particularly to deceive the Chinese Nationalists. He said that the Chinese Communists now owned nine or ten such ships and that they propose to achieve ownership of an additional number of such vessels. He thought that this could cause a problem for the U.S. if such vessels appeared in our ports. He also thought that an arrangement of this kind raised serious doubt regarding the honesty and integrity of the Poles.

Mr. Herter indicated that the Department of State has already notified the Polish Government of the U.S. position in this regard. He said that the Poles have been warned that action would be taken against any vessel entering the United States under the Polish flag which was in fact owned by Communist China.

The President asked if one could always prove such ownership, and the Secretary of State indicated this was not always possible. He said that someone would have to give evidence to the Department of State that such Polish flag vessels are actually owned by the Chinese Communists.

The Director of Central Intelligence elaborated on the aforementioned point, as raised by the Department of Commerce, by giving the Council an oral summary of the CIA report which was circulated to the Council on the Chinese Communist vessels. Thereafter, Secretary Herter emphasized that whenever the Department of State received evidence that a Polish flag vessel entering one of our ports was actually owned by the Chinese Communists, such vessel would be excluded.

Mr. Gray indicated that the points raised by the Commerce Department had been discussed by the Planning Board and he briefly summarized that discussion. The President indicated that he was not clear why any change in our present port security program was being suggested at this particular moment and Secretary Herter indicated that this was being done now because of difficulties encountered by the Treasury Department in applying the port security program in particular situations. He indicated that while we were trying to normalize our situation as regards the Poles, based on our policy of increased trade and increased exchanges, the port security program sometimes militated against the accomplishments of those objectives. He cited, by way of example, the case of the Polish ship which carried its passengers to a Canadian port rather than the port of New York, for reasons relating in part to our port security policy.

Mr. Scribner stated that the Treasury Department wished to urge no change in the policy at this time except in the case of the Polish vessels. He wished to make clear, however, that if the policy on Polish vessels were liberalized, such vessels would continue to be boarded

and searched. It was the Treasury Department view that the general port security policy should be continued in its present form rather than to leave it in some indefinite status.

Mr. Hoover, referring to Secretary Herter's comments on the Polish passenger vessel calling at a Canadian port rather than at the port of New York, noted that the vessel in question was the Batory. He said that when the Batory earlier called at our ports, it was used to get Gerhard Eisler out of the country; that when its master defected to the British, he reported that his entire crew was under the direction of the Polish Intelligence Service which, in turn, was supervised by the Soviet Intelligence Service; that the master of the crew had no control over his men except for purposes of operating the ship. [*text not declassified*]

The President asked whether, if the Polish policy were liberalized, such vessels would be limited to our major port areas and whether they would continue to be boarded and searched. Mr. Scribner replied in the affirmative saying that such vessels would only be permitted to enter where we have boarding and searching crews and that they would in fact be boarded and searched. The President asked if they would be permitted entry only at specified ports, and Mr. Scribner replied in the affirmative. [*text not declassified*]

[*text not declassified*]

The President said at this point that the only change being recommended related to a limited increase in the number of Polish vessels with the understanding that those vessels could come in only at specified ports; that they would be boarded and searched; and that they would be permitted to engage in some general trade rather than be limited to carrying only cargo specified by the U.S.-Polish economic agreements. Secretary Herter concurred in the foregoing, stating that the number of ports of entry would not be enlarged. Mr. Scribner confirmed the foregoing, stating that entry would be limited to the ten major port areas.

The President observed that this came down to the matter of our general policy wherein we were trying to get the Poles to feel a little better toward us, and in the process we were trying to drive a wedge between the Poles and the Soviets.

The Vice President observed that underlying another aspect of the proposal was the realization that it would be more profitable for the Poles to bring their vessels here if they could take out cargo additional to that specified in the economic agreements, and that an increase in the number of such vessels entering our ports would make for some increased problems for our security and intelligence services.

The President said he did not believe that by itself an increase in the number of Polish vessels would be critical unless the increase became so great that the Treasury people could not handle the boarding and searching of such vessels and the processing of the people thereon.

The President then asked if the FBI engaged in such searches, and Mr. Scribner replied in the negative. Mr. Scribner added, however, that apart from the boarding and searching, other services engaged in various kinds of personnel processing. Mr. Scribner cited the Immigration Service as an example.

The President thought it best to leave the policy as it was for the moment, except to take a liberalized outlook as to the kind of goods which might be carried in Polish vessels. He thought also that if there was a great increase in the number of such vessels, occasioning problems for the Treasury Department, the Treasury Department could come back and report that fact to the Council.

Secretary Herter inquired whether any internal security problems had been encountered with respect to the several ships which have been permitted entry thus far, and Mr. Hoover responded that in the case of the Polish ships the FBI had found six intelligence agents. He added that in the case of the British, they had reported the discovery of forty such agents.

The Attorney General observed that there was another aspect of the problem which had not as yet been discussed, and he referred specifically to the matter of trying to keep track of the crews of these vessels once the ships had docked at our ports. The President asked if such crews were permitted to go ashore, and the Attorney General replied in the affirmative, noting that it was most difficult, in fact impossible, to surveill all the members of such crews. He noted that other correlative problems arose, such as the question of ascertaining whether defectees were bona fide in character. He said the last mentioned problem sometimes required drawn-out processes in our courts to determine whether they would be sent back to their country of origin. The Attorney General said that he agreed with the suggestion that the present program be continued with a view to re-examining it in the fall.

The President again referred to U.S. attempts to try to open up certain areas with the Poles in an endeavor to drive a wedge between them and the Soviets. He said underlying such efforts was the desire to get some of these countries to appreciate that we have not abandoned them. He noted that these efforts sometimes caused differences between the Soviets and the satellite countries involved, and that we ought to continue to try to exploit such differences. The President did not see, however, why it was necessary to alter the policy under discussion in order to accomplish this purpose.

Secretary Herter referred to our continuing efforts to keep the Poles from complete submission to the Soviets, and he indicated that a number of these efforts were involved in the proposal made to the Council by the Department of State.

The President inquired whether there would be any advantage to telling the Poles that we would permit a specific number of additional

Polish vessels to enter our ports, and by way of example he cited the number six. Secretary Herter thought that this could be done.

The President said he did not wish to give up completely on Poland, though at times, after reading Gomulka's speeches, he wondered what we were accomplishing by our efforts with the Poles.

The Commerce representative, referring to the President's inquiry about increasing the number of Polish vessels by six, asked if it would not be well to limit the number of such vessels on a strict reciprocity basis to the number of U.S. vessels permitted into Polish ports.

Secretary Herter called on Mr. Dillon for comment and Mr. Dillon indicated that the Poles might not be conscious of the fact that they were under limitations insofar as we were concerned. He said that it might complicate things if we were to advise the Poles that they would be permitted to bring in a specified number of additional vessels. Mr. Dillon also commented upon the cargo aspect of the problem, noting that the policy as stated permitted them to take out only such cargo as came under the terms of economic agreements made between the United States and Poland. He said that if we were to suggest that they bring in additional ships but that that cargo be limited to aid-type cargo, we might have a serious problem on our hands.

The Attorney General thought that in view of the comments made by Mr. Dillon it would be best not to change our present policy but possibly to be a bit more flexible, as circumstances permitted.

The President said in the light of the discussion he thought it best to let the present policy and program stand as is for a while, recognizing that there is a procedure available for making limited exceptions in certain instances. Mr. Scribner concurred, suggesting that the matter be re-examined in three months or so.

The Vice President also expressed the view that the present policy should be left unchanged with the understanding that there would be a more liberalized interpretation thereof in terms of the number of Polish ships permitted entry. He thought it best to let the matter be played by ear for the time being rather than to amend our policy.

The President asked if it would be possible or wise to let the Poles know that they are on their honor insofar as we are concerned, and if they violate, as in the matter of Communist-controlled vessels, they will be treated accordingly. Mr. Herter said he thought that this could be done.

Mr. Dillon mentioned that the Moore-McCormack Lines and the Lykes Service were running ships into Poland. Based thereon the Poles had indicated to us that they were considering inaugurating similar service to the United States. In giving this indication Mr. Dillon did not think that the Poles were aware of the port security limitations which we had applied to them. He said there was a danger that if we acquainted the Poles with these limitations, they might prohibit

Moore-McCormack and others from running ships to Poland with the result that this could aggravate the U.S.-Polish situation in terms of economic warfare. Mr. Dillon indicated that the Poles had not made a formal request to establish services similar to Moore-McCormack, but that they had said that, as a matter of reciprocity, they might wish to make an application along these lines at a later time.

Mr. Gordon Gray suggested that in the light of the discussion it appears that there was no need to change the language in the paper under discussion; that it appeared that a limited number of additional Polish vessels could be permitted to enter our major port areas under a liberalized interpretation of the policy; and that if this number exceeded reasonable proportions, the policy could be re-examined.

The President concluded the discussion by noting that if we did not have a better answer than the one proposed, it was best not to make mistakes in a hurry and accordingly we should keep the present policy, utilizing the exception procedure sparingly as regards the entry of Polish vessels.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the recommendations submitted by the NSC Planning Board on the subject, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 8, 1959; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 22, 1959.

b. Agreed that, subject to review following the conclusion of the forthcoming negotiations with the USSR, paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 and paragraph 33 of NSC 5808/1 and the operations of the exceptions procedure thereunder should not be revised; with the understanding, however, that the exceptions procedure for Polish flag vessels may be interpreted liberally unless undue numbers of Polish flag vessels take advantage of such procedure, in which case this procedure shall be subject to review.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5802/1 and NSC 5808/1.

J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on
Internal Security

[Omitted here are agenda items 2-4.]

5. OVERSEAS INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, dated April 2 and December 1, 1958; NSC 5810/1; NSC 5819, Part 2; NSC Action No. 2012; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, dated April 10, 1959).

In making his summary of the report Mr. Harr related the conclusions of the report to certain paragraphs in the Basic National Security Policy. When Mr. Harr had finished the President inquired whether the

NSC Planning Board would take the conclusions of the report into consideration in the course of its review of Basic National Security Policy. Mr. Gray replied that the Planning Board had already considered the matter and would do so further.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated his conviction that the Overseas Internal Security Program had proved extremely useful. The real issue underlying the OCB report was that the International Cooperation Administration people did not like to find themselves in the position of providing arms. [text not declassified] Likewise the Department of Defense and our military people did not want to get into the business of supplying arms to police forces.

Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Defense Department was by no means opposed in principle to providing arms for police purposes but that the Defense Department itself was simply not in a position to do so.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2012–b, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 10, 1959.

b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board is taking the OCB report into account in its current review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1)

S. Everett Gleason

158. Briefing Note for May 13 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, undated

Priorities for Space Programs

On January 22, 1958, the President on the advice of the National Security Council, by NSC Action No. 1846, established the highest priority for certain ballistic missile and space programs. In March 1959, as a result of developments in various satellite programs over the intervening months, the Secretary of Defense recommended certain changes in satellite priorities. These changes are:

1. That the VANGUARD-JUPITER C scientific satellite programs be deleted from the priority list.

¹ Source: Priorities for space programs. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

2. That three other satellite programs be added, notably, SENTRY (Satellite-borne visual and Ferret reconnaissance system); DISCOVERER (Satellite guidance and recovery); and MERCURY (Manned satellite).

In addition, the Secretary of Defense recommended a change in the system whereby he determined satellite priorities, so that in the future changes in priorities for space programs will be made by the President on the advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. The proposed changes were approved by the President on the advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council at its meeting on April 27, 1959.

The purpose of bringing this matter before you this morning is to ask the National Security Council to note these changes and make necessary revisions in the existing NSC statement of policy on the subject (NSC Action No. 1846). The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this proposal.

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 23, 1959

SUBJECT

Strategic Concept and Military Paragraphs of NSC 5810/1

PARTICIPANTS:

State

Secretary Herter
Gerard C. Smith

Defense

Secretary McElroy
John N. Irwin II

Mr. McElroy opened the discussion by saying that he foresaw a time when we would have to change our counterforce strategy. He suggested that this might be some years in the future when the USSR has invulnerable missile sites. They do not have such an invulnerable striking force now and Mr. McElroy is accordingly opposed to a change away from our present counter-force strategy.

On our limited war capability, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that last year's State-Defense limited war study had shown that the US had the capability to handle two limited war situations at the same time. Mr. Smith pointed out that this study had been based on the assumption, insisted upon by the JCS, that only the US would use nuclear weapons in limited war situations.

¹ Source: Strategic concept of basic national security policy. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

Mr. McElroy tentatively suggested that perhaps there should be a new limited war study on a different assumption, although he was not prepared to agree immediately to the launching of such a study. The Secretary of State commented that if such a study were undertaken it might help the Department of Defense if it showed up areas in which our capabilities needed improvement. Mr. Herter spoke of the need for mobility. The Secretary of Defense said the problem of mobility was not so much one of aircraft as of ground facilities at prospective landing points.

There was considerable discussion of the language in paragraph 10a in NSC 5810/1 to the effect that nuclear weapons are to be regarded as conventional weapons from the military point of view. Mr. Smith pointed out that each time a situation had arisen in which the possible use of nuclear weapons had been considered the decision had been against using them. He thought that our weapons systems and force structure had been erected on a fallacy—i.e., that the use of nuclear weapons would be authorized in less than all-out situations.

The Secretary of State pointed out that our existing doctrine might call for the automatic use of nuclear weapons in limited situations. (In that connection, he inquired concerning the status of the advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Irwin said that the papers had recently been sent to State Department for resubmission to the President.) Mr. Herter hoped that the US could develop such forces as would make an automatic nuclear reaction unnecessary. Mr. McElroy expressed agreement with this position and said that paragraph 14 of NSC 5810/1 might well have some change to clarify this point. The Secretary of Defense took the line that it was not so much the language of the basic National Security Policy that mattered; more important thing was that State and Defense had a common understanding of what the language means.

Mr. Smith said that another central point was whether or not massive retaliation could still be relied on to deter all kinds of Communist aggression. He cited the present Berlin situation and possible troubles to come. Mr. McElroy doubted that massive retaliation had lost its effect. Mr. Irwin said that it was the threat of massive retaliation that was now restraining the USSR from turning over its responsibilities re Berlin to the GDR. The Secretary of State indicated a measure of agreement with this assessment.

In a discussion of possible requirements for the use of force in the Middle East, the Secretary of Defense said that we ought to use all force necessary to deal with a specific situation. Mr. Smith identified this as the Radford doctrine and expressed dissent from it.

Mr. Irwin described in general terms Defense thinking re possible limited military operations in the Middle East. Mr. Smith pointed out

that the planning described was inconsistent with the strategic doctrine which had been discussed earlier in the meeting. He felt that this illustrated the difficulty that we were in. We could not even in planning for possible situations follow current doctrine.

Mr. McElroy commented that if there was a "fundamental" line of State Department thought on the strategic concept perhaps it would have to be changed for foreign policy reasons.

Mr. Irwin raised the point that a change in the strategic concept would at bottom be a budget matter. Two other things that would have to be taken into account were the statement of foreign policy requirements which State had provided to Defense and the Gray target mix study which is still to come. Mr. Smith said that in his view the Gray study should come after, not before, a decision on the strategic concept.

Mr. Irwin subsequently commented to Mr. Smith that there were two possibilities with respect to language of NSC 5810/1: (1) there might be some change in the language about nuclear weapons being conventional weapons; (2) there might be some virtue in including a definition of limited war.

On May 25, the Secretary of State commented to Mr. Smith that even if there were no language change in the National Security Policy, State should try to get into the NSC record the State paper on foreign policy requirements and a Department of Defense statement that the currently planned Military Establishment can meet these foreign policy requirements.

160. Presentation by Beale at the 409th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 4, 1959

TRADE POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The broad objective of US foreign economic policy is identical with that of our general foreign policy: to protect and advance the national interest, to improve the security and well-being of the US and its people.

¹ Source: Trade policy and national security. No classification marking. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

This broad objective of our foreign economic policy has three major components. First, to promote the economic strength of the US, second, to promote the economic strength of the rest of the free world, and third, to build and maintain cohesion in the free world.

To achieve these objectives we have followed three basic economic policies: The expansion of trade; the promotion of private investment; and provision of mutual assistance.

During the past 6 years, by building on existing programs and, even more important, by developing new programs designed to meet new needs and changing conditions, there has been created a complex pattern of interrelated programs. Some of them we carry out on our own and others in cooperation with friendly nations. These programs are well suited to the promotion of our basic objectives.

At the present time, however, the achievement of these objectives is endangered from within by the growth of protectionist sentiment and from the outside by the Soviet economic offensive. My purpose this morning is to suggest some of the ways in which protectionism adversely affects our domestic economy, our political-economic relations with our allies and therefore our national security.

I would like to deal first with the general aspects of the problem and then turn to specific illustrations.

Protectionism has certain recognizable benefits. It can assure the survival of a sensitive industry which might otherwise succumb because of its competitive disadvantages. It can provide a blanket for an infant industry during its formative years. It can prevent economic and social disruption in a community dependent on a single industry and without the resources to develop alternative industries.

In spite of these recognizable advantages, however, there are relatively few people who would contend that protectionism provides a basis for a dynamic expanding economy. The reasons are obvious.

Protection discourages the development of new products, new methods of production and distribution, and cost-saving techniques.

Protection reduces our ability to compete with other industrialized economies.

Protection contributes to inflation by raising the costs of the products we buy abroad.

It imperils our export markets by making it more difficult for other countries to earn the dollars they need in order to buy from us. It also endangers those markets by inviting retaliation on the part of other countries.

Protectionist measures inevitably reduce total US output by preventing the shift of domestic resources from less efficient to more efficient industries. By lowering our total national product, such measures

slow down our rate of growth and reduce the resources available for our security needs, including aid to the less developed countries.

Having indicated the effects of protectionist policy on the domestic economy, I would like to indicate briefly the effects on the economies of other countries.

Foreign trade is vitally important to our economy, but even so it constitutes only 4% of our gross national product. In other major industrial countries (such as the UK, West Germany and France) the ratio of exports to gross national product is 3 to 4 times greater. It is 5 to 9 times as great for smaller advanced nations such as Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands. For example, approximately one-half of everything the Netherlands produces is shipped abroad.

Our trade policy is of tremendous concern to all these countries, first because exports play such a major role in their economies and secondly because the United States is a major market for their goods. Both of these reasons explain why any action by the United States which adversely affects sales of their key products, or threatens those sales, is front page news abroad and has a serious effect on our international relations with those countries. This is true even when the action itself does not seem important to us.

I can cite five specific examples of restrictive measures which have adversely affected four important allies. Lead and zinc affecting Canada, cheese affecting the Netherlands, electrical equipment and woolen fabrics affecting the United Kingdom and cotton textiles affecting Japan.

In the case of many less developed countries, one, or a few commodities, comprise the bulk of their exports. For many of these countries the US market is especially important. To illustrate this point, the United States imports

- 2/3 of Chile's copper
- 1/2 of Cuba's sugar
- 1/4 of Indonesia's rubber
- 1/3 of Bolivia's tin
- over 1/2 of Brazil's coffee
- 2/5 of Venezuela's oil
- 2/3 of Peru's lead and zinc.

The ability of the less developed countries to sell their products in the United States affects their ability to import capital goods and other necessary manufactured products.

Therefore, it determines in large measure the basis of their economic growth and their ability to raise standards of living.

The promotion of economic growth in the less developed countries is of course a prime objective of our foreign policy. By this means we hope to help those countries to achieve peace and stability.

Unfortunately their economic health can be seriously damaged by US import restrictions. Our import quotas on petroleum, lead and zinc, and cotton, for example, have had that effect on Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Indonesia, Egypt, the Sudan and other less developed countries.

The Soviet Union, of course, recognizes clearly the major role that trade can play in furthering its objectives. The evidence clearly shows that friendly countries, when denied access to our market, are forced to increase their economic dependence on the Soviet Bloc. As a specific example, after the imposition of restrictions against Uruguayan wool tops in 1953, the Soviet Bloc steadily increased its purchases, and as a result it is now the most important outlet for Uruguayan wool tops. Recently our countervailing duty on wool tops was removed. As you know, our action to impose quotas on lead and zinc was followed by violent anti-American reactions in Peru and there have been sharp reactions in Venezuela to our oil import policy.

In assessing where we stand today it is important, of course, to keep the picture in balance. On the one hand, since 1953 we have pursued an active policy for the promotion of international trade. We have taken part in two successful trade conferences in 1955 and 1956. It is true that many of the tariff concessions we gave at those conferences were small, amounting to no more than a 15% reduction in the existing duty. Nevertheless imports of the products affected by the concessions were valued at approximately \$1 billion. A great deal of attention has been given to escape clause actions that we have found it necessary to take in recent years. Unfortunately little account is taken of the applications that were turned down. Other countries often fail to acknowledge that out of 27 cases in which escape clause action was recommended by the Tariff Commission no action was taken in 19 cases.

On the other side of the balance, there are the various restrictive measures that have been taken. You will note from the chart that since 1953 we have taken restrictive action on 29 commodity groups exported from 45 free world countries.

*NS TAKEN TO RESTRICT IMPORTS, SINCE JANUARY 1, 1953, AND
COMMODITIES AFFECTED*

Commodities Affected (29)	No. of Countries Affected (45)	Type of Action*	Date of Action
Cattle	2	TAR	APR '53
Wool Tops	1	CD	MAY '53 ¹
Butter and/or Butter Oil	5	22	JUL '53
Cheese	8	22	JUL '53
Dried Milk Products	4	22	JUL '53

Commodities Affected (29)	No. of Countries Affected (45)	Type of Action*	Date of Action
Flaxseed and/or Linseed Oil	2	22	JUL '53
Peanuts and/or Peanut oil	6	22	JUL '53
Petroleum (Voluntary Program Mar '54 – Mandatory Program Mar '59)	9	NSA	MAR '54
Rye and Rye Flour	1	22	APR '54
Alsike Clover	1	EC	JUN '54
Watch Movements	5	EC	JUL '54
Fishsticks	1	L	AUG '54
Hardboard	1	AD	AUG '54
Bicycles	8	EC	AUG '55
Cast Iron Soil Pipe	1	AD	OCT '55
Tuna Canned in Brine	3	GR	MAR '56
Toweling	4	EC	JUN '56
Woolens	9	GR	OCT '56
Heavy Electrical Equipment	2	BA	MAR '57
Clothespins	11	EC	NOV '57
Safety Pins	4	EC	NOV '57
Tung Nuts and Oil	4	22	NOV '57
Thermometers	2	EC	APR '58
Small Arms	7	L	JUN '58
Long Staple Cotton	4	22	JUL '58
Rubber Soled Footwear	3	L	SEP '58
Lead	16	EC	OCT '58
Zinc	15	EC	OCT '58
Almonds	1	CD	JAN '59

* EC – Escape Clause
 GR – Invocation of Geneva
 Reservation
 L – Legislation
 22 – Section 22
 CD – Countervailing Duty

AD – Antidumping
 BA – Buy American
 NSA – National Security Amendment
 TAR – Invocation of Trade Agreement
 Reservation

¹ Removed, March, 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]

June 5, 1959

It is statistically impossible to determine precisely how much trade is affected by these restrictions. However, it has been calculated on the basis of the latest figures available, that is for 1957, the trade affected by these restrictions represented about \$2.1 billion or 28% of US imports of competitive items. Out of this total oil products account for approximately \$1.5 billion and the remaining items account for about \$600 million. These figures are subject to a number of qualifications. For one thing the more effective the action in restricting imports the smaller the trade.

You will note from the map that some countries are affected by only one restriction, whereas others are affected by as many as twelve. Venezuela for example, has been affected only by our restrictions of oil imports, but oil directly involves more than 80% of that country's exports to the United States.

I would like to comment briefly on several of the more important cases shown on the chart.

First, *Heavy electrical equipment*—Our decision on the Greer's Ferry case created an uproar in the United Kingdom. One extreme sector of British opinion called for immediate discrimination against purchases in the United States. The British consider the pending OCDM heavy electrical equipment case "the most important subject in economic relations between the United States and the United Kingdom since the institution of the Smoot Hawley Tariff."

Lead and Zinc—When quotas were imposed Australian press and official comments were unusually severe in their criticism. Our action became a major political issue. The case has clearly affected our position in a country which is the southern anchor of our Pacific defense perimeter.

In Canada our lead and zinc action was viewed in the context of a number of other United States policies and actions which have been the source of increasing resentment, such as our restrictions on agricultural imports and our surplus agricultural disposal operations.

Mexican press, labor and management officials were also very critical. Intensely emotional demonstrations and condemnation of the United States occurred in Peru.

Petroleum—The Venezuelans have asked for equal treatment on the grounds that their oil, like Canada's, is vital to the defense and security of the Western Hemisphere. We are worried that the Venezuelans will institute oil pro-rationing and export controls to the disadvantage of US companies. We have to recognize that they may want to change our bilateral trade agreement drastically and possibly abrogate it. Either course of action would seriously hurt our large export sales to Venezuela.

The second chart shows that there are now outstanding 13 requests for restrictions on imports. These represent trade valued at

approximately \$300 million in 1957. They would affect six new countries, in addition to those already affected by previous measures.

This second chart also reflects a trend which is giving other countries great concern. You will note that seven out of the thirteen requests now pending have been made under the national security amendment. There is a strong feeling abroad that domestic industries are seeking to use the national security amendment to achieve protection which they do not think they can obtain by applying under the escape clause.

PENDING PROPOSALS FOR RESTRICTIVE ACTION

Commodities—13	Old Countries Affected—36	New Countries Affected—6	Type of Action Proposed
Hardwood Plywood	10	1	EC
Mink Skins	6		EC
Stainless Steel Flatware	6		EC
Woven Silk Fabrics	6		EC
Red Fescue Seed	4		EC
Long Staple Cotton	4		22
Cobalt	7		NSA
Dental Burrs	4		NSA
Fluorspar	6		NSA
Heavy Electrical Equipment	6		NSA
Steam Turbine Generators	6		NSA
Tungsten	11	4	NSA
Wool Knit Gloves	6	1	NSA

June 5, 1959

No discussion of restrictive measures would be complete, of course, without some mention of so-called "voluntary export controls." These are the measures which other countries, such as Japan and Italy, have taken to restrict their exports to us. They represent a new kind of protectionism—protection in reverse—under which the exporting country limits its exports rather than the importing country its imports. At present, it is estimated, one-half of Japan's exports to the US are subject to some form restriction.

Viewed independently, and in perspective, the specific restrictions imposed in recent years may seem relatively unimportant. Nevertheless, it has been made abundantly clear to us that these restrictions are having an increasingly serious effect upon our ability to achieve our foreign

policy objectives. And it is apparent that the *potential* for harm *greatly* exceeds the harm done thus far. It is possible to identify, as I have done, the cases where individual countries have been adversely affected by restrictions we have imposed. The impact has varied in each case. The cumulative impact has also varied.

We believe that we have reached a point, however, where any action has a disproportionate impact because of the preceding actions, and where the element of fear of the future can be expected to play an increasingly important part in determining foreign reactions to any further restrictive measures we may impose.

At the present time most of the important industrialized countries of the world have overcome, or are about to overcome, the balance of payments difficulties which justified their retention of protective measures following the war. Therefore we can expect to see an expansion of world trade and, consequently, of our own export sales. At the same time the less developed countries of the world are seeking to expand their economies. It is clear, however, that at this juncture the course of future events will be determined almost entirely by what the US does. If we provide the leadership in liberalizing trade, the rest of the free world can be expected to follow our example.

There are a number of critical choices to be made in the immediate future. Regional trading arrangements are proliferating around the world. In Europe the six-country common market is already a going concern. Negotiations are seriously under way toward establishment of a free-trade area of seven other countries in Western Europe—the UK, the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. South America is determined to organize one or more common markets; and Central America is already committed to establishing a customs union.

US policy in the trade field will determine to a very large extent the evolving course of these arrangements—whether they will look *outward* toward the development of a multilateral world trading system, or whether they will look inward in the pursuit of self-sufficiency.

A major test of US policy is pending in the tariff negotiations scheduled to start in September 1960. These negotiations are the result of our initiative. A principal element will be the effort of many countries to negotiate reductions in the common tariff of the European common market. However, some of our European allies have already expressed doubt about the extent to which we will be willing to offer real and meaningful concessions in our own tariff in order to give impetus to the successful conclusion of the world-wide negotiations. The success of these negotiations, therefore, will depend upon us.

Our basic national security interests require that we continue to exercise positive and dynamic leadership not only in political and military fields but also in the economic fields.

That is why the Department of State is convinced that every action we take that adversely affects our ability to maintain a dynamic expanding domestic economy and weakens the ability of our allies to maintain their political and economic stability, has serious implications for our national security.

Let me conclude by saying that, in our judgment, the organizational means are already available through which national security considerations can be brought to bear in the most important cases involving proposals for restrictive measures. This is true in escape clause cases, where the Trade Policy Committee is responsible for advising the President. It is also true in cases arising under the national security amendment to the Trade Agreements Act, which provides that the advice of all interested agencies shall be sought in arriving at a recommended course of action. Measures taken under Section 22 are the most outstanding exception to this generalization. Furthermore, considerations of national security cannot be brought to bear in determining whether restrictive action should be taken in other cases, such as antidumping cases. However, these exceptions do not affect the general conclusion that the existing machinery is generally satisfactory and is working well. It is the Department's view that it would not be desirable, if indeed politically feasible, to attempt to revise existing legislation to insure the inclusion of appropriate provisions permitting national security considerations to be taken into account in all cases involving restrictive action.

I do not mean to suggest that there is no need for action in this field. We are much aware of the need for more information as a basis for policy determinations. As you know, a number of studies are currently underway which will provide an analysis of the causes of recent changes in our foreign trade position. An interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of the Department of Commerce, will search for the answers to a number of pertinent questions. Have advances in productivity in the US lagged behind those occurring elsewhere? Have our major costs increased too rapidly? Have we, through price supports and import restrictions, artificially raised the costs of raw materials to our own manufacturers? Does our domestic tax system militate against investment and technological improvement?

At the initiative of the Department of State the Committee for a National Trade Policy is also devoting special attention to the problem of our foreign trade position.

Increasing protectionism is not the answer to the problem of stimulating advances in productivity. It would insulate domestic industries from pressures to reduce costs and thereby make them less competitive.

Unfortunately, at the present time when an industry is faced with serious injury as a result of imports, there is no alternative but to consider raising duties or imposing quotes. Therefore, the Department of State believes that renewed consideration should be given to sponsoring another avenue of relief through adjustment assistance. This alternative might provide for low-cost loans for modernization and technological improvement, facilities for retraining workers, or conversion to other kinds of manufacture, or even encouragement to relocate factories.

Adjustment assistance is the approach being taken in the European Common Market to deal with the problem of internal adjustments to competition. The British have also embarked on a similar program with respect to their domestic textile industry.

In short, we have to search constantly for new ways to improve the competitive position of our industry through affirmative actions rather than by building a wall against entry of goods from abroad.

Our conclusion is relatively simple. What we do to restrict trade and what other countries fear we may do, will determine to an important extent whether our foreign economic policy measures are successful, and whether we are successful in the economic contest with the Soviet Union.

161. Memorandum of Discussion at the 409th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 4, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 409th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 4, 1959

Present at the 409th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Acting Secretary of Defense (Gates); and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman,

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Effects of U.S. Import Trade Policy on National Security. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 1); the Special Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs (Item 1); the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (W.T.M. Beale) (Item 1); General Thomas D. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. EFFECTS OF U.S. IMPORT TRADE POLICY ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. Gray reminded the Council that the President had recently asked the State Department to prepare for the Council a report on the effects of our trade policy, primarily our import restrictions, on the national security. He then indicated that Mr. Beale, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs would make the presentation.

(A copy of Mr. Beale's report is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting).
(A copy of Mr. Beale's report is also attached hereto).

When Mr. Beale had concluded his report, the President commented that while a number of business interests were seeking import restrictions on a number of products, Mr. Saulnier and the Council of Economic Advisers were reporting to the President such a boom in our U.S. economy that we were actually concerned about a real runaway boom. It therefore seemed a good time for the U.S. to try to develop a better feeling and sentiment about our trade policy insofar as it concerned friendly foreign countries. The President pointed out that no less than eleven foreign countries were affected by our import restrictions on clothespins yet the President believed that all the clothespins in the U.S. were made by six small companies in the State of Maine, employing as the President recalled, only some 260 employees. This kind of situation seemed silly to the President.

The President then observed that meetings have been occurring designed to devise some kind of an adjustment policy which would enable us to find a solution for some of our domestic industries in the face of foreign competition. For example, it might be possible to change from the manufacture of clothespins to the manufacture of baseball bats. Most such suggestions, however, get turned down. Secretary Dillon pointed out certain difficulties which lay in the way of making the kind of adjustments mentioned by the President.

The President next observed that in effect what we have to do is to bribe the Congress by agreeing to the restriction of imports in order to induce Congress to agree to extending the Trade Agreement Acts.

Secretary Anderson commented on an interdepartmental study of our trade policy. He believed that we ought to take a look, industry by industry, to try to calculate the gains and losses in the light of our current trade policy. Once such a painstaking examination had been made, continued Secretary Anderson, there ought to be a broader consideration before the study was made public. Specifically, Secretary Anderson recommended that the findings of the interdepartmental study should be looked at by the National Advisory Council (NAC) in the light of our balance of payments situation and the out-flow of American gold and dollars. There had been a very significant change with respect to our balance of payments situation even since 1956. In most of the highly developed foreign countries at the present time, as well as in a number of less well developed countries, there had ceased to be any such thing as a dollar shortage. Altogether they held some sixteen billions of our dollars at the present time. To these facts must be added commercial balances, the cost to the U.S. of maintaining soldiers and other U.S. Nationals abroad, and payments made abroad by American tourists. The total result was that the U.S. is confronted by a consistent balance of payments running against us. The acid test of a sound economy and of a sound currency as well, was the balance of payments situation. In fact, what we are now tending to do is to have the U.S. finance European exports. These European countries should themselves be urged to take some of the same measures we take to finance our own exports. Secretary Anderson said that he was not really concerned at all at present about encouraging the export of U.S. capital to the Western European countries. They were doing very well. He was, however, concerned about Asia and Africa.

Secretary Anderson went on to say that if the balance of payments disparity continues for any considerable number of years, we in the U.S. would be in for real trouble. We have bitten off rather more obligations than we can chew even in the opinion of some foreign experts. In conclusion, Secretary Anderson repeated his request that the results of the interdepartmental study be examined in the light of our whole policy.

The President inquired whether in effect Secretary Anderson was advocating higher U.S. tariffs. Secretary Anderson replied in the negative but said he was advocating that we cut down on our U.S. expenditures in certain foreign countries.

Mr. Dillon, the Acting Secretary of State, commented that the State Department fully recognized the seriousness of the balance of payments problem. We could not continue running a deficit indefinitely. He also

expressed himself as in close agreement with Secretary Anderson's suggestions as to what to do about the problem. There were, however, still other things that might be done, notably, to increase our own U.S. exports. He added that the State Department was working hard on this objective and had experienced a real measure of success as the published figures would ultimately show. In support of this point, Secretary Dillon cited examples of agreements by foreign countries to permit an increase in the quotas of U.S. exports to these countries. Thus we were getting rid of some of the examples of discrimination against the dollar and Secretary Dillon believed that the effort should continue to have priority status.

Secondly, continued Secretary Dillon, if it was necessary to go still further to solve our problem, we must consider amending our current policy on world-wide procurement, as Secretary Anderson had said. We should perhaps furnish goods rather than dollars because when we furnish dollars to other countries they often use these dollars to purchase goods in Europe rather than to purchase them from the U.S.

Lastly, Secretary Dillon pointed to the problem of U.S. investment in Europe. He believed that some sort of action, other than trade restrictions, might have to be taken to cut down U.S. capital investment in industrialized foreign countries, although not in the underdeveloped countries. These several possible remedies all recommended themselves to Secretary Dillon as being better than resort to further restrictions on the U.S. imports from foreign countries.

Secretary Anderson commented that Secretary Dillon's statements seemed to him to be very fair.

Secretary Strauss stated that in the study that is being made, he agreed on the need for an overall policy review and in that respect the Department of Commerce did not hold views at variance with the views of Secretaries Anderson and Dillon. On the other hand, an overall review could not ignore separate and individual cases, problems, and situations. For example, a certain industry might actually constitute the sole support and living for an entire U.S. community. One could not ignore either the political or the sociological considerations relating to such communities. They are factors to be weighed in looking at individual instances of appeals for restrictions in the import of specific commodities.

The President then referred to the National Security Amendment designations in the Trade Agreements Act. He was sure that in this connection there was one consideration which, while it could not be accurately weighed, was nevertheless of very great importance. This was the consideration of our national defense and the effect of restrictions under the NSA designations on the vitality of our military alliances. In illustration of his point, the President cited what he described as the

near hysteria occasioned in the U.K. by our decisions against importing British electrical equipment. The President believed that trade restrictions which tend to drive away an ally as dependable as Great Britain would do much more harm in the long run to our security than would be done by permitting a U.S. industry to suffer from British competition. Thus, while intangible, this factor must always be weighed in NSA cases. Yet another illustration of the point that he was making, said the President, was represented by the various stages in the development of atomic weapons. In the early stages of this development, there had been very real and very complete cooperation between the British and ourselves. This superb cooperation had now been destroyed by a law which greatly restricted exchange of atomic energy information with the British. The effect of this restriction on the British had been very serious indeed and because of their own contributions in the early stages, they had felt severely let down when the U.S. imposed its restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act. Thus, said the President, we have got to take account of these intangibles as well as of the tangibles and he certainly agreed likewise that the U.S. must increase the volume of its own exports and improve its own competitive position. The President added that every time he declared a restriction on the import of a commodity from abroad, he was occasioned considerable mental anguish even though approval of the restrictive action had been unanimously recommended to him.

With respect to the National Security Amendment, Mr. Gray pointed out that even though Secretary Beale had reported that our organizational arrangements were adequate, there were some of us who were worried about such matters as TVA purchases of electrical equipment. The President replied that the role of such independent agencies as the TVA had bothered the Administration for quite a while inasmuch as the Government could of course not control such agencies and there was doubt about the nature of their relation to the Presidency. In this connection Governor Hoegh commented on the effect of the Buy American Act. The President again expressed himself as puzzled about the relation to the President of such entities as the TVA and the GAO (General Accounting Office) which he added, laughingly, did not seem to have any. Nevertheless, such entities the President thought were rather minor and exceptional causes of friction.

Mr. McCone predicted that the problem of foreign competition with American business was a problem that was going to grow rapidly in the future. The costs of production abroad of competitive products were shockingly lower than costs in the U.S., mostly as a result of cheaper labor costs. Our shipbuilding industry for example has totally lost its foreign markets. The President commented that one reason for this situation was that it had become so easy for a Board of Directors

to think that it can safely pass on added costs to the consuming public. As a result these Boards of Directors soon price their product right out of the market.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. Clarence Randall whether he wished to make any comments. Mr. Randall replied that he certainly did but he would try to spare the President and the Council a lengthy recital of his very strong feelings on the subject. Mr. Randall then expressed himself as very deeply concerned about the erosion of the U.S. trade position. He was convinced that what was really vital above all else was a continuation of the policy of liberalizing trade which the President had proclaimed and stood for since the beginning of his first term. There was another matter which concerned him, said Mr. Randall, and which had not thus far been mentioned in the discussion. This was our obvious and increasing dependence on overseas markets for certain very important raw materials. As for the National Security Amendment, Mr. Randall [illegible in the original] it was never intended to apply other than in a very broad sense. We must therefore continue to look upon its application in the broadest possible sense. The President expressed thorough agreement with Mr. Randall's position on this point.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

b. Noted the President's statement that, in reaching decisions as to restrictions on U.S. imports, one important consideration should be the damage to national security which could result from restrictions which might weaken the ties which bind us to our allies in the collective security effort.

c. Noted the President's agreement that the interdepartmental study of the U.S. competitive position in world markets, being conducted under Department of Commerce auspices, should when completed be referred to the National Advisory Council for consideration of the implications for the U.S. domestic economy and finances as well as the U.S. balance of payments.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for the information and guidance of all departments and agencies.

The action in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

162. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, June 5, 1959

SUBJECT

Strategic Concept and Military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1

PARTICIPANTS:

State

Secretary Herter
Gerard C. Smith

Defense

Secretary McElroy
John N. Irwin II

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by saying that his review of the new language which State had proposed in the Planning Board for the military paragraphs of NSC 5310/1 suggested that the place to make changes was in paragraph 10A rather than paragraph 14. The Secretary of Defense read the State redraft very carefully and expressed a measure of sympathy with the thrust of the proposed changes. He asked whether State would agree to tie a clause on the use of nuclear weapons when required to achieve national objectives to the first sentence of revised paragraph 10A rather than make it a separate sentence as in the State redraft. Secretary Herter agreed that this could be done.

Mr. Irwin said that the proposed change in paragraph 10A could have a great impact on the budget and urged that the results of the Gray target mix study be awaited before making a decision on paragraph 10A.

Secretary McElroy said he assumed that there would be no change in hardware flowing from the proposed change in paragraph 10A as last year's limited war study had shown that our limited war capability was adequate. Mr. Smith reminded Mr. McElroy that that study was based on the assumption that only the US would use nuclear weapons, although a subsequent SNIE on the Quemoy situation cast considerable doubt on that assumption. The Secretary of Defense commented that he could not understand why this unrealistic assumption was used. Both Mr. Smith and Mr. Irwin pointed out that any other assumption would have contradicted the current strategic concept.

The Secretary of Defense then asked whether the proposed change in paragraph 10A would result in budgetary changes in FY 1962. Mr. Smith replied that he thought not in that year but was bound to say that in later years he thought it would. Secretary McElroy indicated concern at this prospect.

¹ Source: Strategic concept and NSC 5810/1. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

The Secretary of State inquired concerning the effect upon our NATO forces of withdrawals for limited military operations in other areas. Secretary McElroy indicated that this was manageable.

There was discussion of certain aspects of the Quemoy situation of last year and of the nature of hostilities in the event of an attack by Communist China. (Reference was made in this connection to the status of the advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons.)

At one point Mr. Irwin said that the two Departments should agree for the present that we want no change in philosophy and, having done so, agree that paragraph 10A be amended to delete the reference to nuclear weapons as conventional weapons. Mr. Smith pointed out that this language change would constitute a fundamental philosophical change.

The group concluded that they would not try to reach any quick decision on revising the military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1.

163. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, June 8, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian said he had asked for the opportunity to place before the President a few of the issues that will arise when the President considers the Defense Department presentation relating to NIKE-HERCULES and BOMARC tomorrow.

He said that as he understands the Defense thinking, it is to continue the NIKE-HERCULES as now programmed, concentrating its use on the defense of cities in the northeastern region of the United States and SAC bases. The prime consideration is that it is a proven weapon now available and already in an operational condition. The BOMARC will not be available until later, particularly the BOMARC B which is the version we are interested in. (It has a low altitude capability and 250-mile range; the BOMARC A does not appear to be worth further consideration.) The

¹ Source: Continental air and missile defense. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Bomarc. Drafted on June 9.

Defense plan will call for a substantial cutting back of the BOMARC program, deploying it on the northern, eastern, and western segments of the perimeter of the United States. A cutback in the SAGE system is also contemplated, with hardening of the control centers retained. There remain significant questions concerning the ground environment for each of the two systems, NIKE–HERCULES and BOMARC.

The use of the term “master plan” for air defense to describe the Defense position is open to question, since this position does not include consideration of other factors in the problem such as the F–108 and other interceptors. If decision is taken to use BOMARC simply on the periphery as indicated above, the question of the F–108 should also be resolved; and there would appear to be strong reason to drop the project, which is a \$5 billion projected program. The relationship of the F–108 to the B–70 should also be considered, inasmuch as the F–108 was being designed to have the dual capability of use for defense or for high performance attack.

Dr. Killian said a further point is that this master plan should in no way interfere with the carrying forward of the comprehensive study of air defense being prepared at the President’s request on the basis of a letter from Gordon Gray.

The President said it is to him an indication of weakness in the top leadership of the Defense Department when a choice between two weapons systems comes to the President for resolution. He felt that this type of problem should be settled in the Defense Department.

Dr. Killian said there are certain other questions involved. Admiral Radford, he understands, feels that the whole air defense program should be cut back in a very major way, using the resources to increase offensive forces. A further question is as to the validity of our estimates of the Soviet aircraft threat, which is evidently considerably smaller than had been estimated at earlier times.

A further issue is the organizational problem. In Dr. Killian’s judgment the operation of the total system of defense missiles, BMEWS, the DEW line, SAGE, etc., will not be effective until NORAD has been made effective. There is need for centralized operational direction to tie all these together. The President strongly agreed, saying that this is the whole theory of the unified commands, and the role of the services should simply be to prepare the forces and turn them over to NORAD for operational employment.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

Enclosure

Washington, undated

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE EVALUATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE PLAN

1. We expect a continued bomber threat.
2. We expect the ballistic missile—ICBM or submarine-launched—to be the increasing and ultimately the principal threat.
3. We recognize we cannot destroy all incoming bombers in a mass attack so we should have enough anti-bomber defense to increase the cost to the enemy and reduce his assurance of success.
4. We should continue to accelerate the development of anti-missile defense to the maximum justifiable extent.
5. We should re-appraise the character of the threat each year and consider defense in the light of the threat as then appraised.
6. We should push the defensive engagement of enemy bombers as far from our borders as possible.
7. We should gradually reduce the number of our interceptor squadrons.
8. We should continue the NIKE on a buy-out basis.
9. We should continue the BOMARC-A now on a buy-out basis; the BOMARC-B on a minimum basis for peripheral deployment.
10. BOMARC should not be deployed in the interior of the continental United States.

Enclosure

Handwritten Note to Goodpaster From the Army Chief of Staff

Washington, May 20, 1959

Gen. Goodpaster,

We were very disturbed to hear the report that Mr. McElroy informed the President that the Stennis action revoking last years authorization for the const. of Hercules sites was *not* in the Bill now before the Senate.

Unfortunately it *is*, as Section 105 therein. As we understand it the President was informed that it was only in the Comm. report and not in the Bill.

Mike Michaelis has sent this attached Memo to Bryce Harlow—

Tick

164. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, June 9, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

The Vice President, Acting Secretary Dillon, Secretary McElroy, Deputy Secretary Gates, Budget Director Stans, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General White, Mr. Holaday, General Persons, Dr. Killian, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said the group had come in to talk about the air defense problem and specifically the issue of the BOMARC and NIKE–HERCULES. He gave the President a paper on basic principles in the evaluation of the continental air defense plan. Before beginning the discussion, he told the President that Defense has decided to procure no fighter aircraft in FY–60. At his request, Mr. Holaday then displayed, on a map of the United States, deployments presently in effect, as previously planned, and as now planned for the NIKE–HERCULES. In addition to deployments presently programmed, a certain number of additional SAC bases are to be protected. He then showed the deployments now proposed for the BOMARC; these lie along the eastern, northern, and western segments of the periphery of the continental United States, with the BOMARC A generally in the northeastern United States and the BOMARC B to be used for the remainder.

The President asked why the BOMARCs along northern sector were not moved further north into Canada. He asked whether the Canadians would like to have them there. Mr. McElroy said he would like to put them there if the Canadians would. General White said he feels that we have pushed the Canadians about as far as we can on bases for military activities. Admiral Burke added there would probably be great resistance by the Canadians to taking these on. The President then spoke, indicating that he does not believe in forcing weapons on other countries. What he wanted to know was whether we had ever asked them “Do you want us to deploy BOMARCS further north so as to give you additional protection?”

Mr. McElroy said that the money implications of the decision being proposed were essentially that there would be a saving of \$75 million from the FY–59 program, \$60 million from the FY–60 program, and \$418 million from the FY–61 and 62 programs. He went on to say that the over-all saving would be in the order of \$1,300,000,000, arising from a reduction of total program from \$3.8 to \$2.5 billion. The

¹ Source: Continental air and missile defense. Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Bomarc. Drafted on June 10.

President said he understood that this action is being proposed on the basis that beyond the programs being recommended additions would not be very useful. Mr. McElroy confirmed this, stating that since we prepared these programs the threat has changed. We now visualize that enemy bombers, if they attack, would do so after we had been hit by long-range missiles.

Dr. Killian asked whether the proposals reflect an acceleration of the BOMARC B program. Mr. Holaday said that they did not because the SAGE system and the bases would not be ready in time. He added that the program includes a recommendation to spend an additional \$250 million to bring the peripheral SAGE areas up to "high grade SAGE" capabilities through the addition of radars, gap fillers, etc. In the interior, SAGE would be cut back to "minimum capability SAGE." Mr. McElroy added that the decision not to deploy the BOMARC in the central areas of the United States reduces the requirement for high-grade SAGE. The minimum that is being proposed is needed to guide interceptors, SAC bombers, etc. He added that the FAA will make use of the minimum SAGE system in its peacetime operations.

Dr. Killian commented that in order to put the BOMARC bases in Canada it would be necessary to extend the SAGE system and the base support structure up into that area. Mr. McElroy said what the Canadians principally need is to modernize the interceptors in their Air Force. The President asked whether we do not think that the BOMARC is an improvement on interceptors—otherwise why would we have gone to the BOMARC. The President asked if the problem of identification had been solved—whether we have perfected the IFF. General White said that we had not, and do not have a solution to the problem. We continue to work on it.

The President asked General Lemnitzer whether he thought this plan was reasonable. General Lemnitzer said that it involved a cut-back in previously planned programs but that he did think it was a reasonable solution to the problem; he commented that the threat is changing as had been previously mentioned.

At this point the President said that he feels there must be one great, over-all operational command to which the air defense weapons, regardless of the service providing them, must be assigned. He said it made little difference to him which service provided the forces; some one commander must be in full control, however. Admiral Burke said that General Partridge has the command but wants a great deal more in resources than can be provided. General White disagreed as to the adequacy of General Partridge's command authority; he commented that he does not believe that General Partridge has the authority he needs. The President stated strongly "then he should have it." Admiral Burke

said that General Partridge has command over the forces but cannot move them about and does not have control of the budget.

The President noted that an additional \$250 million is being proposed for the SAGE system. He asked whether any other additions were being proposed. Mr. McElroy said there is a proposal to put \$150 million additional into NIKE–ZEUS. This would be added to \$300 million now budgeted for research and development on NIKE–ZEUS and \$250 million for “novel” defense means. Mr. McElroy said, in relation to NIKE–ZEUS, that he wants to do anything that makes sense as a defense against missiles. He said the NIKE–HERCULES would have some small capability against a missile similar to the Hound Dog.

The President asked, in light of the foregoing, whether there was any need for any more squadrons of interceptors. General White thought this question should be deferred until the next programming period.

The President then asked if what had been presented to him is the decision of the Defense Department. Mr. McElroy said that it is the best decision in his judgment. He had not been able to get unanimous agreement on it, however. Nevertheless, it had been thoroughly discussed and he was satisfied with it for the present.

The President recalled that the strength of the Soviet Air Forces was apparently greatly overestimated a couple of years ago. Now we are more certain of our estimates, and they are much lower. The bomber threat is therefore not so serious as had been thought. He understood that the Defense proposal involved pushing the NIKE–ZEUS and the SAGE harder, while cutting back in other areas. Mr. McElroy said that there is a change occurring in the balance between Soviet bombers and Soviet missiles and that this change may go either faster or slower than we estimate. Accordingly, it will be necessary to review the situation frequently. The President said he thought that funds in this whole area ought to be made available in a lump sum so that the Secretary of Defense could shift funds as revised estimates are developed. He noted that our program has changed materially between last January and the present. He had the impression that the change in our estimate of Soviet strength has been relatively slight.

Mr. Stans then said he hoped it would remain possible to raise questions regarding the budgetary coverage of these programs for FY–61. Mr. McElroy agreed but said there is one point to be made concerning BOMARC. An alternative considered was to cancel it now. He felt if we do less than is now proposed we should cancel it. The President said he felt that the program should not be expressed in specific sums for specific years. The total program should be expressed instead in terms of trends. Mr. McElroy pointed out that Defense thinking is for

the program to decline from \$900 million in FY-59 to \$619 million in FY-60, and \$500 million in FY-61, these figures representing substantial reductions over previous planning.

Dr. Killian asked whether there has been any thought of giving the NIKE-ZEUS a capability against aircraft. General Lemnitzer said that, within resources available, it has been thought best to concentrate on the main goal, which is anti-missile use. The President said he did not see why a missile that could shoot down another missile could not shoot down an incoming airplane.

Mr. Stans spoke about budgetary trends. Under existing Defense programs, he could foresee budgetary expenditures in the range of \$43½ billion to \$44 billion coming in FY-61. Although reductions in program were being discussed, these were reductions in programs that had not yet been approved by funding, and he was desirous that action should not imply funding approval. He suggested that an over-all study of air defense later this year might result in knocking the BOMARC out entirely, as an item of very low priority. The President commented that the process of concentration upon the things that are most useful might lead us to eliminate a good deal now included in the programs to which Mr. Stans referred.

Dr. Killian said he understood that the current discussion in no way precludes another thoroughgoing look later on, on a more comprehensive basis, including consideration of the F-108, hardening, concealment, and other features. Mr. McElroy said he thinks that the F-108 is a very vulnerable proposition, i.e., he doubts that it can be justified for continuation. He recognized the Air Force might not agree with this and said he is not prejudging the matter at this time.

Mr. Nixon asked whether this presentation would tend to commit the Administration to these air defense programs for FY-61. Mr. Gates said it would be difficult to cancel these programs later this year if the presentation is made as now proposed; therefore this decision does commit us somewhat. General White said that in his opinion this should be a firm decision as of the present, but that each segment would of course be re-examined each fiscal year. Mr. Nixon stressed the need for an "escape hatch" of some kind, perhaps a statement that we are watching developments so as to revise the program from time to time.

The President asked how much the Soviets are exercising their bomber aircraft at the present time. General White said that our information is that they are conducting an extensive training effort. The President said there is reason not to get complacent over the fact that the estimate of Soviet bombers has been cut back.

Mr. McElroy commented that if we were to go out of the BOMARC program, he did not think we could live with the Canadians, who just recently, after long joint discussions, adopted it in preference to interceptors for their air defense. The President asked why we do not give the Canadians the equipment for six or so BOMARC squadrons. General White said instead that he has been thinking of giving them interceptors. The President asked Mr. McElroy to make an approach to the Canadian Defense Minister to see if they would like to have the BOMARCs moved up into Canada.

Mr. McElroy said there would soon be another question on which the group would wish to meet with the President. This is the nuclear powered aircraft. The President said he had the impression from Mr. McCone that the latter thought it should be taken out of Defense for the moment and that no crash program should be attempted. After discussion, Mr. Gates said he thought what Mr. McCone probably had in mind was to take the proposal out of a weapons system approach and put it on a “test bed” basis. There was some uncertainty as to whether Mr. McCone favored accelerating or decelerating the program.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

165. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, June 19, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCE

NSC 5906

The enclosed memorandum from the Acting Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council, concerning paragraph 62 of NSC 5906, is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, June 25, 1959.

¹ Source: Transmits views of NASC on NSC 5906. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Your attention is invited to the statement in the enclosure that, because of the imminent consideration of the subject draft policy, there has only been opportunity for individual members of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to comment without the benefit of discussion at a NASC meeting.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

Enclosure

Memorandum From Phillips to Lay

Washington, June 19, 1959

SUBJECT

Paragraph 62 of Basic National Security Policy 5906

1. The subject draft paragraph supplied with your memorandum of June 3, 1959, was forwarded to those members of the National Aeronautics and Space Council whose departments had not participated in preparation of the draft. It is my understanding that the Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration had participated in its drafting. Because of the imminent consideration of this policy by the NSC, there has only been opportunity for individual members to comment without the benefit of discussion at a NASC meeting.

2. AEC Chairman McCone, NSF Director Waterman, and Messrs. Bronk, Burden, and Rettaliata have concurred in the paragraph with the following exceptions:

a. Both Mr. Burden and Dr. Bronk objected to the bracketed phrase proposed by Budget and Treasury. Mr. Burden was the more eloquent: "I am strongly opposed to the insertion of the phrase, 'in fields where such applications appear to offer advantages over other possible means for achieving required capabilities.' I think that proposals in relation to the military space program should be judged on their merit and not

hampered in their development by a qualifying phrase of this kind in the policy. I feel that there are ample checks and balances for controlling an unrealistically expanded military program in the present setup of the Council. I also feel that the military part of the program is of greatest importance.”

b. Mr. Burden also expressed himself as follows: “I have also been troubled for a long time by the phrase in the present NSC paragraph that the ‘United States is a *recognized leader* in this field.’ It does not seem to me that this is a strong enough. If there are only two major powers in the race, what does a “recognized leader” really mean? I would suggest some language along the following lines:

“The United States should continue actively and with a sense of urgency to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as necessary or desirable to insure the attainment of national objectives and the achievement of scientific, military and political purposes. These programs and the national policy should be designed to secure and maintain a national position of supremacy, or at the minimum, equality, in outer space.”

c. Dr. Waterman has suggested that objectives (1) and (3) read as follows: “(1) A broad-based scientific and technological program for the development and scientific exploitation of space flight and planetary-interplanetary exploration;” and “(3) a civil space program designed to develop and promote the peaceful use of outer space;”

3. The point made by Mr. Burden and repeated in the foregoing item 2-b is so fundamental that it should be discussed at a meeting of the NASC. I suggest therefore, that if this part of the paragraph is approved as now drafted, it be done with the understanding that the NASC will consider this matter at its meeting on June 29 and possibly on June 30.

4. We appreciate the opportunity to make these comments on that portion of the basic national security policy that is of such direct concern to the NASC.

/S/ Franklyn W. Phillips
Acting Secretary

166. Memorandum From the JCS to Secretary of Defense¹

JCSM-239-59

Washington, June 20, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906) (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy on the above subject prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 25 June 1959.

2. The *majority* view submitted by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with specific regard to paragraphs 3, 10, 12, 15 and 16 is attached as Appendix "A". The minority view on these same paragraphs submitted by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force is attached as Appendix "B".

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that you should:

a. Support the Planning Board majority view on the following paragraphs: 5, 13, 17, 42*b*, 43*c*, 44, 57 and 62.

b. Support the Defense-JCS proposal in paragraph 23.

c. Support the Department of State proposal on page 29, paragraph 38 and the majority proposal on page 30, paragraph 38*d*.

d. Support the State-Defense-JCS proposal on paragraph 39.

e. Support State-Defense proposal in paragraph 43*f*.

f. Support the Defense-Treasury-Budget-CEA proposals in paragraph 55.

g. Note the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that paragraph 58 will be the subject of separate NSC action and that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject are in preparation and will be furnished to you by separate memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

¹ Source: Transmits views of JCS on NSC 5906; includes Appendix A and Appendix B. Top Secret. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Appendix A

Paper Prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps

Washington, undated

*VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS; AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS*

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5906) (C)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5906) prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 25 June 1959.

2. In the past, the United States has assumed that possession of the nuclear deterrent would severely curb the scope of USSR military actions in conflict short of general war. This assumption was based on our possession of the sole capability to employ massive nuclear retaliation at a time of our choosing should a situation get out of hand. Even though there may have been questions in the minds of many as to what circumstances would be critical enough to evoke a nuclear reaction from the United States, the United States did have the known capability to employ a nuclear attack without receiving unacceptable damage in return. Possession of this capability gave confidence to our allies and inhibited the USSR. With the removal of this inhibition due to their achievement of a capability to launch a crippling attack against the United States, Soviet actions can be expected to become more aggressive and venturesome, including resort to limited wars of increased scope and severity. On the other hand, our allies have already shown signs of a decreasing confidence in our ability to provide a meaningful security to the Free World. Therefore, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believe that present Basic National Security Policy is not responsive to the present or prospective world situation. They, therefore, hold that the military strategy outlined in NSC 5906 should be changed.

3. U.S. military strategy should be designed to cope with a condition of relative nuclear parity, in which it is recognized that general war will result in mutual devastation. To do so, it must provide not only for an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an acceptable doctrine for its use, but it must also provide an evident, adequate and

flexible capability for military operations short of general war and an acceptable doctrine for the use of that capability against the full range of possible Communist aggressions. The former is a primary requirement, but its existence does not meet the total threat to our security. In a time of relative nuclear parity, the ability to conduct operations short of general war is of increasing importance. The deterrence of limited Communist aggression, and Free World confidence that such aggression will be deterred will depend more and more on the strengthening of U.S. limited war capabilities. The United States should possess a capability and a doctrine which are flexible enough to enable it to deter or to defeat limited Communist aggression with the degree of force necessary to achieve the objectives of the United States at the time. Three issues are fundamental to the necessary revision of our military strategy:

a. Relationship Between Strategy and Policy Objectives. U.S. strategy must serve our national policy objectives of maintaining the cohesion of the Free World and influencing the policies of the Communist Bloc in directions compatible with U.S. security interests. This strategy must also provide definitive terms of reference which will permit a measurement of adequacy of retaliatory and defensive forces, thus facilitating the allocation of resources among the various elements which make up the total U.S. military posture.

b. Nuclear Weapons Policy. Relative nuclear parity has already made the policy of massive retaliation unacceptable as anything but a deterrent to total nuclear warfare. Therefore, the United States can no longer place main reliance on nuclear weapons for other forms of conflict, and must maintain forces capable of reacting to limited aggression with nuclear and/or non-nuclear means, whichever is in the best interests of the U.S. in the situation then existing.

c. Limited War. With regard to limited war, it is necessary that no restriction be placed, by definition, on the locale, intensity, duration, or participants. In effect, limited war is recognized as any armed conflict short of general war.

4. The military elements of national strategy, as outlined in NSC 5906 (majority view), do not provide for the flexibility and range of response essential to U.S. security in a time of relative nuclear parity. Additionally, they do not fulfill the Foreign Policy Requirements considered by the Secretary of State to bear upon U.S. strategy. These elements permit an interpretation which places undue reliance on nuclear weapons to a degree incompatible with the Foreign Policy Requirements. Further, they define limited war in a manner which will prevent the U.S. developing the capabilities necessary to a broad range of response to limited communist aggressions. Modification of certain paragraphs will, however, correct these deficiencies and provide a military strategy which is realistic, and is responsive not only to foreign policy requirements, but also to the threat as discussed in the version of paragraph 3 which is supported by the majority of the NSC Planning Board.

5. In view of these considerations and the additional reasons noted in the Annex hereto, it is recommended that you concur with the changes to paragraphs 10, 12, and 16 of NSC 5906 which have been suggested by the Department of State. It is further recommended that you continue to support the majority proposal for revision of paragraph 3, NSC 5906, and support the version of paragraph 15, NSC 5906 proposed in subparagraph d of the Annex hereto.

Annex to Appendix A

It is recommended that with respect to the following portions of NSC 5906, the Department of Defense adopt the position indicated below:

a. Page 3, Paragraph 3—Continue support of the majority proposal.

REASON: The majority proposal is a clear and complete description of the basic threat. Further, it emphasizes flexibility of the threat posed by the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes, and the dangers of gradual erosion of the Western position.

b. Page 10, Paragraph 10—Support the State-AEC proposal.

REASON: There is currently no definition of general war in the policy. The definition the Department of State proposes to incorporate in paragraph 10 is realistic in a time of relative nuclear parity and will provide the necessary flexibility.

c. Page 11, Paragraph 12—Support State OCDM proposal.

REASON: It is essential that U.S. policy in an era of relative nuclear sufficiency be flexible and provide for the application in each situation of whatever forces and weapons or mix of weapons best serve U.S. interests. The United States must not be programmed into a one weapon military posture which will allow it to respond to limited aggression—be that aggression large or small—only by initiating or threatening to initiate large scale nuclear warfare. The majority proposal with its “main” reliance upon nuclear weapons, regardless of the types of conflict, is inconsistent with the majority proposal on paragraph 3, which recognizes the possibility of serious differences in outlook and policy among Free World nations on the use of nuclear weapons. The present degree of U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly for meeting or deterring limited aggression, disturbs large segments of the Free World and impedes the fulfillment of our national policy objective of maintaining the cohesion of the Free World. This condition further substantiates the need for a more flexible national policy concerning the employment of nuclear weapons.

d. Page 12, Paragraph 15—Delete and substitute:

“15. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason

to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or to take actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby invite destruction. Therefore, in carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop maintain, and secure, as part of its military forces, sufficient nuclear retaliatory capability to reduce the Soviet power complex to impotency. Security of our nuclear retaliatory forces is essential to permit reasonable size and to lessen the need for their immediate or automatic release in order to avoid their destruction. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. The national effort devoted to continental defense should provide for early warning and defense of retaliatory forces. It should also provide a level of defense in vital areas sufficient to require a significant enemy effort to counter it, leaving no single threat totally unopposed."

REASON: The above proposal provides specific terms of reference against which the adequacy of the retaliatory and defensive elements of the deterrent can be measured and will facilitate the difficult decisions concerning the allocation of resources among the various types of forces which make up the total U.S. military posture. Until some rational limit can be placed on the size of the retaliatory force the continued and unlimited expansion of such forces will absorb resources sorely needed to develop other forces designed to provide essential flexibility of response.

e. Page 13, Paragraph 16—Support the State proposal which is reproduced on pages 61 and 62 of the Annex to NSC 5906.

REASON: The State proposal properly emphasizes the increasing importance of further developing and maintaining the capability, including a nuclear capability, to oppose limited aggression. Further, it allows much needed political flexibility in that it does not require in advance that the United States, once committed to action in a limited war, must apply unlimited force to achieve military victory regardless of consequences, but leaves the United States free to fight for a limited objective if such is the best course under the conditions then existing.

Appendix B

Paper Prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Washington, undated

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5906)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force has reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5906) which was prepared by the National Security

Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 25 June 1959.

2. It is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that there has been no change in the international situation since the recent approval of the basic military strategy section contained in NSC 5810/1 which would necessitate any change in the military section of Basic National Security Policy. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force recommends, therefore, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative's proposal for Paragraph 3, the majority view in Paragraphs 10 and 12, and Paragraphs 15 and 16 as they now appear in NSC 5906, are suitable as the basic statement of United States policy. It should be noted that except for minor changes in Paragraph 3, all of these paragraphs are identical with those in the currently approved NSC 5810/1.

3. In reaching this conclusion, the following areas have been especially considered:

a. The basic U.S. security objective should continue to be the maintenance of a position of military strength which will permit aggressive political action to achieve, by peaceful means, U.S. national objectives. The military forces and tasks, and their priorities, necessary to provide the position of strength to permit the exercise of U.S. initiative in world affairs are correctly and adequately described.

b. The over-riding military requirement continues to be the development and maintenance of adequate and safe-guarded strategic military power.

c. Primary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and for selective use in actual conflict, is the keystone of U.S. policy and posture. This concept is the only course of action open to the United States compatible with the economic well-being of the United States and the free world and hence with the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions.

d. With regard to Paragraph 16, it is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that within the total U.S. military forces there must be a capability of deterring or, if necessary, defeating, local aggression with forces able also to contribute in general war. In the opinion of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, the United States has in being and has, in fact, demonstrated that it has forces ready and capable of responding rapidly and flexibly to local aggression and to carry out initial general war tasks.

4. Notwithstanding the existing disagreements regarding military priorities and force structure, I am of the firm conviction that the military strategy as currently expressed in NSC 5810/1 provides suitably flexible, current, adequate and clear policy guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments. It in no way pre-judges military requirements to the detriment of any one Service's ability to carry out its proper responsibilities for the national security. Further, it provides the very basis required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enable them to

carry out their responsibilities to assure the security of the Nation under any and all conditions.

5. It is recommended that the foregoing constitute the basis of the Department of Defense position on NSC 5906 at the National Security Council meeting on 25 June 1959.

167. Briefing Note for the June 25 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 23, 1959

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)

We are now to begin the annual Council review of basic national security policy. In preparing the draft which is before you, the Planning Board first studied and discussed two pertinent National Intelligence Estimates ("Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963", NIE 11–4–58; and "Estimate of the World Situation", NIE 100–59), which have already been discussed by the Council (at its meeting on March 5, 1959, NSC Action No. 2055.)

The Planning Board then had the benefit of comments on the existing basic policy paper (NSC 5810/1) from 22 outside consultants, who met in small groups with the Planning Board in five different meetings. Subsequently, in the light of changes suggested by all the agencies concerned and taking into account the consultants' comments, the Planning Board has rewritten the paper. During the past ten days, 15 of the consultants have come back and gone over the revised draft. I shall summarize their principal comments, where pertinent, as I go through the paper.

I wish to make clear at the outset that there are four paragraphs of existing policy which the Planning Board did not consider: Paragraphs 13 and 14 (reprinted as 15 and 16), which deal with general and limited war; Paragraph 47 (now 58) on the mobilization base; and Paragraph 48 (now 59), which deals with the strategic stockpile. With those four exceptions, the Planning Board has considered every paragraph word

¹ Source: Basic national security policy. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

by word, having devoted all or the major part of 11 meetings to substantive discussion.²

With respect to the language of 13 of the paragraphs as printed in the new draft (Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 11, 14, 21, 22, 24, 50, 53, 56, 60, and 64), the Planning Board recommends no change. Other paragraphs were revised in one respect or another and agreed to at the Planning Board. There are 9 wholly new paragraphs. In 15 of the paragraphs there are splits, in some cases more than one.

I now propose to go through the paper, not dwelling on the unchanged paragraphs, or on the less important agreed revisions, unless someone wishes to raise a question about any one of them.

Paragraph 3 (p. 3), which is split, gives an evaluation of the basic threat to the U.S. from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The majority proposal stresses that the “danger to U.S. security from the Communist threat lies not only in general war or local aggression but [also]³ in the possibility of a future shift in the East-West balance of power” which “could be caused by a gradual erosion of Western positions via means short of force, and over time by a continued growth of over-all Communist strength at a rate significantly greater than that of the West.”⁴

The JCS Planning Board Advisor preferred the language of the old paper, with the slight amendments indicated by the underscoring in the left-hand column.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
ALLEN DULLES
ADMIRAL BURKE)

Paragraph 5 (p. 6) describes the *basic task* for the U.S. in general terms, pointing out the need, among other things, for adequate military strength and civilian preparedness. Treasury and Budget in their split wish to emphasize “while preserving fundamental American values and institutions”. Other Planning Board members felt that this thought was repetitious, being covered generally in Paragraph 1 and specifically in Paragraph 2.

(Call on: SECRETARY SCRIBNER
MR. STANS)

² Includes June 22 meeting with consultants; excludes 5 earlier meetings with consultants and 2 meetings on the NIE's. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ All brackets are in the original, except for those identifying footnotes in the original.

⁴ The majority proposal also points out such factors as the rapidly growing Soviet nuclear capabilities, which have made their leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas; the Soviet regime's ability and willingness to identify itself with political and social discontent, and to exploit instability; and the ability of Communist leadership to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints.

Paragraph 6 (p. 7) summarizes the objectives toward the achievement of which detailed guidance comes later in the paper. The paragraph is virtually unchanged from existing policy save for the addition of subparagraph *b*. However, I should point out that a number of the consultants felt that the U.S. should not *take the initiative* in promoting sound economic growth and acceptable political development in the Free World.

Paragraph 7 (p. 8) is a revision of earlier language which called for presenting the true image of the United States, a concept which had puzzled the consultants.

Paragraph 10 (p. 10) is the general paragraph on deterrence and, as the majority would have it, is unchanged. State and AEC, however, wish to define the term "general war" by adding the words "a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake." Adoption of such a definition would mark a change in present policy which "is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war." (NSC 5904/1, p. 2, footnote)

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
Mr. McCONE)

Paragraph 12-a (p. 11), which deals with the use of nuclear weapons, presents one of the most important splits in the paper. However, in view of its relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, which are the subject of separate treatment, I propose that we do not this morning seek to deal with 12-a.

Paragraph 13 (p. 12) sets forth our policy on chemical and biological weapons. The majority would leave the language of the existing paper unchanged, but Budget and Treasury propose that the President decide on the *stockpiling* of such weapons, as well as their use.

(Call on: MR. STANS
SECRETARY SCRIBNER)

Paragraphs 15 and 16 (pp. 12-14), as I explained at the beginning, were not considered by the Planning Board and are not up for Council consideration today.

Paragraph 17 (p. 14) deals with the "cold war" contribution which the capabilities of U.S. military forces can make. Existing policy is continued, but there is a split in that USIA proposes deleting the clause which uses the term "cold war." It may be noted that Paragraph 9, as agreed to by the Planning Board, would sanction the use of the term "cold war."

(Call on: MR. GEORGE ALLEN)

Paragraph 18 (p. 14) deals with U.S. bases overseas. It omits the reference to the possibility of "a small net expansion" of the base

system, which was written into basic policy last year. The revised language reads:

“The entire overseas base system should continue to be reviewed periodically in order to assure that base requirements are adequately met and are related realistically to developments in weapons technology and other factors.”

The last sentence of Paragraph 18 (which is unchanged) deals with the positioning of IRBM's around the Soviet periphery. While I have not yet discussed this in the Planning Board, I believe that IRBM's should be the subject of a separate paragraph and not included in the paragraph on U.S. overseas bases. I am therefore going to propose to the Council, on my own motion, the following new paragraph:

“18–A. IRBM's will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them, and pressure will not be exerted by the U.S. to persuade reluctant nations to accept them. The determination as to the positioning of additional IRBM's will be made by the President.”

Paragraph 19 (p. 15) treats generally of strengthening the collective defense system. As revised, it contains the new guidance that the U.S. should, as practicable, “induce Western European and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense.”

Paragraph 23 (p. 16) proposes a major change in policy and is split. Present policy provides in essence that the U.S. should seek *to prevent* the development by additional nations of nuclear weapons capabilities (NSC 5810/1, Paragraph 18, p. 7). Some of the consultants felt that such a policy is impractical because, as one of them put it, “the black art is too well known.” The new majority proposal is that the U.S. should seek *to prevent or retard* the development by additional nations of nuclear weapons capabilities; but, failing that, should (1) exchange with, or provide to, selected allies (additional to the U.K.) information on nuclear weapons and (2) even be prepared to make available nuclear weapons themselves to such allies. The Defense-JCS version would sanction exchanging with, or providing to, additional selected allies information on nuclear weapons, but it would not go so far as to be prepared to make *nuclear weapons* available to selected allies. Both proposals would, of course, be subject to obtaining the necessary legislative authority.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
MR. McCONE
SECRETARY McELROY
ADMIRAL BURKE)

Paragraph 24 (p. 16), which is unchanged from present policy, says that the U.S. should consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority.

The consultants were generally of the opinion that our policy should combine the first part of the majority proposal in paragraph 23 with paragraph 24. That is, our attitude toward providing nuclear weapons or weapons information to additional allies should be negative; but if pressed by an ally, such as France, for example, we should consider the matter not on a bilateral basis, but in a NATO context. The Planning Board seemed receptive to such an approach.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
MR. McCONE
SECRETARY McELROY
ADMIRAL BURKE)

Paragraph 25-a (p. 18) is a revised general guidance paragraph on providing military assistance to nations "whose increased ability to defend themselves and to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power is important to the security of the United States."

Paragraph 25-b (p. 19) is new and deals with military aid to *other* nations, including uncommitted nations. It reads:

(Read Paragraph 25-b, p. 19)

Paragraph 25-c (p. 20) is also new and grows out of the OCB conclusions on the overseas internal security program.

Paragraph 26 (p. 20) is a new item of guidance and would encourage, in less developed nations, the participation of indigenous military forces in economic, social, and psychological programs.

Paragraph 28 (p. 21) is the general paragraph on military research and development which is in existing policy, with two new sentences added on nuclear weapons R & D. They read:

(Read Paragraph 28-a, p. 21, last two sentences)

Par 29 [p. 23] is a new paragraph which amplifies and strengthens a similar statement in the old policy [last sentence of old 22]. It takes the position that, given an adequate Free World deterrent posture, the Bloc will place chief reliance on non-military means and that the U.S. should accordingly give increased attention to non-military aspects of the contest. As a result of its discussion with the consultants, the PB decided it would be wise to recognize here that the Soviets also use military assistance, and to include language to reflect this.

Par 30 [p. 23] is a revision of old 22 and 23 which stresses that:

"The ability of the Free World to deal successfully with the competition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc will depend in large measure on demonstrated progress in meeting the political, economic and ideological aspirations of Free World peoples. In the long run, it is in the interest

of the United States and of the Free World that this progress be accompanied by the spread of individual freedoms and the growth of democratic institutions and practices.”

I believe that this is consistent with the discussion last week on military takeovers.

Par 31 [p. 24] involves revisions the most significant of which is the addition of subparagraph *e*. (read subparagraph *e*)

Par 32 [p. 25] represents a somewhat more qualified U.S. attitude toward the use of the UN. [At the beginning of the second sentence, what is now “make effective use” was “make maximum effective use”. In the second sentence, at the bottom of page 25, the parenthetical language has been inserted as a qualification. Finally, the last sentence, a new one, reflects the new voting patterns caused by the entry of many new nations.]

Par 33 [p. 26] has been revised to reflect the improved economic situation in Western Europe. While still strongly supporting European integration, U.S. financial assistance to that end is drastically curtailed. [The FY 1960 Budget called for \$3.5 million for the three continuing programs mentioned in the footnote.]

Par 35 [p. 27] is old 30, considerably revised. Old 30 said that independence of neutral less developed nations from Sino-Soviet control serves U.S. interests; the new language says that such independence “meets the minimum U.S. objective”. There is new language which says to avoid insofar as possible courses of action which appear to reflect more consideration by the United States for neutrals than for friendly nations. Further, there is new language which calls for providing incentives where feasible for the eventual incorporation of less developed nations in effective regional collective defense systems, for encouraging a maximum identification of interests and attitudes between these neutral nations and the U.S. and its allies, and for promoting practical forms of cooperation in non-military fields. A minority of the consultants advocated a still harder line toward neutralist nations.

To here June 2.⁵

Par 36 [p. 28], a new paragraph which would apply world-wide a policy contained in the current Latin America paper (NSC 5902/1), deals with maintaining contact with selected non-Communist opposition elements. I believe that we should add “through appropriate channels”.

⁵ The Council reached this point in its discussion of Basic Policy (Through Para. 35). Discussion on remaining sections of the Basic Policy and Briefing Note will be contained in the subsequent Memorandum. [Footnote is in the original.]

168. Memorandum for the Record¹

S/P-59146

Washington, June 30, 1959, 2:30–5 p.m.

*State-Defense Meeting on Military Paragraphs of NSC 5906**Participants**State*

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Dillon

Assistant Secretary Smith

Mr. Mathews

NSC

Mr. Gray

Defense

Secretary McElroy

Deputy Secretary Gates

Admiral Radford

Mr. Williams

(Note: The first 45 minutes of this meeting were taken up by a Defense briefing on nuclear weapons.)

Secretary McELROY opened the discussion and made the following major points in the course of the meeting:

1. The policy set forth in the current key military paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy is flexible enough to take care of the military situations facing us around the globe. The language might be improved (although any change now would have an unsettling effect on our allies and within State and Defense) but the policy is right. Some of the language changes proposed in the Planning Board seem to have dangerous policy implications.

2. If there really is any question as to our determination to use nuclear weapons in limited war as required, State is fully justified in raising the questions it has and in being worried about our military posture. The President should affirm in the NSC his willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in limited war when necessary.

3. The military cannot support State in the range of commitments it has assumed around the world unless nuclear weapons can be used as needed.

4. Defense is going just as far as it can to adapt nuclear weapons to meet all military needs.

5. The longer a limited war lasts, the greater the danger of general war. We should, therefore, not hesitate to use nuclear weapons promptly to discourage the enemy.

¹ Source: State-Defense meeting on military paragraphs of NSC 5906, use of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy. Prepared on July 1.

6. The Defense position is determined by McElroy, Gates, Twining and Radford, who have the responsibility. The Chiefs who favor a different position will be given an opportunity to present their views in the NSC.

Secretary HERTER made the following major points:

1. There are increasing indications that our allies and the uncommitted countries are not sure that they want our protection if this means nuclear war. One symptom is the trend among some NATO members to seek joint control over the decision to use nuclear weapons in the NATO area; France wants to extend joint (tripartite) control to the whole world.

2. In a situation of US and USSR nuclear sufficiency, we should not automatically use nuclear weapons in limited war. If it proved necessary to use them, we would, of course, do so.

Under Secretary DILLON made the following major points:

1. State's "Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing upon US Strategy" calls for forces with a dual capability, the non-nuclear component of which should be strengthened.

2. He understood the Defense position to be that we must use nuclear weapons to deter and fight limited war or put many more men and resources into our limited war capability. If our present planes can't operate efficiently with iron bombs, we would need a new air force. Our Navy would have to be enlarged to fight without nuclear weapons.

Admiral RADFORD made the following major points:

1. In consequence of a Presidential decision in 1953, our whole military establishment is built on the use of nuclear weapons in any kind of military situation. Our present planes cannot operate efficiently with iron bombs and we have far too few planes to conduct non-nuclear air warfare. Nuclear weapons are essential for anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense.

2. There are, however, practical restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons. There would be no casual use; use would be in accordance with careful prior planning.

3. It would take five years to reconstruct our military establishment to fight limited war without nuclear weapons.

4. The US could not keep its present forces in the West Pacific unless they were armed with and could use nuclear weapons. If we found it necessary to put ground forces in Viet Nam, they would have to have nuclear weapons to keep from being overrun.

5. There is no reason why nuclear weapons can't be used against us in the less developed areas. The Chinese Communists can handle planes that can deliver nuclear weapons.

6. Basic National Security Policy should state that nuclear weapons will be used whenever such use is to our military advantage.

7. The definition of general war in the current strategic concept gives us the opportunity to take advantage of overt Soviet participation in military action against us to launch our strategic power against the USSR (the Admiral attributed this view to the President). If the USSR is willing to fight us openly, it must be ready for general war.

Assistant Secretary SMITH made the following major points:

1. The US-USSR strategic balance has changed since 1953, and decisions made then as to our military posture are not necessarily valid in 1959. It was this consideration which led the President at the conclusion of the 1958 review of Basic National Security Policy to direct that the military paragraphs of that document be kept under continuing review.

2. The definition of general war in the current strategic concept is too restrictive. When rigidly applied as in the State-Defense limited war study of 1958 it results in unrealistic assumptions about the non-use of nuclear weapons by the Communists in limited war. The military have, moreover, found it necessary to disregard the definition in some of their planning for certain contingencies.

3. State is trying to prevent our becoming dependent upon nuclear weapons in almost all kinds of military situations.

Mr. GRAY made the following major points:

1. The basic issues are

a. to what extent should nuclear weapons be used in limited war,
b. what is general war,
c. does local aggression occur only in less developed areas and
d. is the prompt defeat of local aggression by application of the degree of force necessary the best way to avoid general war or are there cases in which a lesser response to restore the *status quo ante* would be the best way to avoid general war.

2. We muddled through the 1958 Quemoy crisis without any clear understanding as to whether and in what circumstances we would use nuclear weapons.

169. Letter From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, July 1, 1959

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Before your meeting with the President tomorrow on military policy, I hope that you will have a chance to read this letter.

I thought yesterday's meeting with Secretary McElroy and Admiral Radford was discouraging. At Geneva, Secretary McElroy seemed sympathetic to the foreign policy considerations that you urged on him. However, Admiral Radford's views seem to have changed Secretary McElroy's mind.

Nothing that I heard at yesterday's meeting led me to doubt the validity of the position that present American military posture and doctrine do not meet the imperative requirements of US foreign policy. It seemed clear to me from the discussion that we do not have a significant limited war capability unless it is assumed that we will automatically use nuclear weapons in almost any kind of military situation. As Admiral Radford made clear, the prospect is for rapidly increasing dependence on nuclear weapons. This means that any limited engagement will likely result in total war. I think you put your finger on a striking fact in pointing out yesterday the anomaly of our planning for the use of weapons having a yield of over 1 megaton for tactical purposes.

Not only is the present military posture incompatible with American foreign policy requirements, but it is also deemed to be wrong by a majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—by those Services which would have to bear the brunt of fighting limited wars. This is not a new conclusion of the Army, the Navy, and the Marines. They argued strongly against the present military doctrine in the NSC last year. Our present military doctrine is also considered to be wrong by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Every officer in the State Department concerned with this problem has been briefed on the proposed State Department position and has endorsed it.

¹ Source: Bureau comments on NSC 5906 and use of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

The following excerpts from Bureau comments are pertinent:

EUR

"EUR strongly supports the Department of State proposal in the annex for revision of paragraph 16 (old paragraph 14), as well as the State-OCDD version of paragraph 12a."

FE

"FE strongly urges NSC adoption of the State-OCDD proposal on paragraph 12a relating to the retention of both a US conventional and nuclear capability to fight limited wars. If our country were ever to lose the freedom to choose the weapons needed to do the job, it could be confronted with a local aggression where it would either have to use weapons so destructive and provocative of counteruse as to risk general war and, in any event, lose the war politically, or, where, knowing the disastrous consequences of thus opposing the aggression, we would be frozen into inaction.

"FE strongly endorses the State Department's proposal for the revision of paragraph 16 as noted in the annex of the draft statement."

AF

"*Paragraph 12a*: The State-OCDD proposal, stressing preparedness for limited war fought with or without nuclear weapons, is essential with reference to Africa.

NEA

"NEA feels strongly, however, that the State proposals in para 10 (definition of general war), para 12a (concerning US preparedness to fight limited war with or without nuclear weapons), and paras 15 and 16 (concerning the maintenance of ready forces with flexibility to fight limited wars of varying natures) are of critical importance for the carrying out of US foreign policy in the NEA area.

ARA

"In particular, we welcome the greater clarity of the document, the somewhat more positive approach to economic questions, and the greater flexibility which adoption of the Department's position on the military portions of the policy would give us with respect to limiting armed conflicts and avoiding having to rely principally on strategic nuclear capabilities to deter local wars."

U/MSC

"U/MSC strongly supports the State position on these paragraphs and wishes to point out in addition that the decision taken on resolving the basic split on the development of a conventional capability by US forces also has definite repercussions in terms of US military assistance policy. If the US is not to develop a conventional capability of its own, we must either take major steps to develop a conventional capability among our allies and rely on them to do the job for us, or adopt the conclusion that any limited war will automatically lead to general nuclear war, in which case the development of foreign forces with a conventional capability is a waste of time and the taxpayer's money, and our allies should be so advised."

IO

"I attach the greatest importance to our proposed Paragraph 16, lest we end up under a nuclear umbrella that protects only bastion America, all other free-world positions having, in the meantime, eroded."

At yesterday's meeting, Admiral Radford expressed some impatience that the State Department was raising the question of the use of nuclear weapons in limited war at this time. You will recall that during last year's review of Basic National Security Policy, Secretary Dulles reluctantly concurred in the language of the existing military paragraphs only on the condition that they would be promptly reviewed by the Departments of State and Defense. The President directed that a review be undertaken.

I think that the issue of the political and military impact of present American military posture and doctrine is a central problem facing the US in its struggle with world communism. Our influence around the world is not as great as it should be. I think it will be less next year and in the years to come unless we get away from "massive retaliation" and the type of Military Establishment which this doctrine is developing. I hope you will stress the urgent need for this policy change on the President tomorrow.

The decision will be a crucial one for American foreign policy in the period ahead.

Respectfully,

Gerard C. Smith

170. Note From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, July 1, 1959

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS GROUP

REFERENCES

- A. NSC Actions Nos. 1833 and 1909
- B. NSC 5815

The President, on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, has this date approved the addition of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the membership of the Comparative Evaluations Group established in accordance with NSC 5815.

Accordingly the enclosed directive, incorporating the above amendment to NSC 5815 approved this date by the President, is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

The enclosed directive is being given special limited distribution, and the contents should be subject to special security precautions, with access thereto limited to those individuals having a strict "need to know" in the performance of their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

¹ Source: Transmits NSC 5908, a directive on establishing the Comparative Evaluations Group. Top Secret; Special Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

Enclosure

National Security Council Directive 5908

NSC 5908

Washington, July 1, 1959

DIRECTIVE
on
COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS GROUP

1. There is hereby established under the National Security Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act, a Comparative Evaluations Group responsible for the preparation of comparative evaluations of U.S. and Soviet capabilities in selected weapons systems.

2. The Comparative Evaluations Group shall consist of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shall serve as Chairman of the Group; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities; the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology; and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

3. The secretariat services for the Group shall be performed by the NSC Representative on Internal Security.

4. The Comparative Evaluations Group shall meet at regular intervals, and not less than every three months.

5. The functions of the Comparative Evaluations Group shall include:

a. Recommending to the President suitable topics in the field of weapons systems for comparative evaluations of U.S. and Soviet capabilities.

b. Determining the scope of each of the studies approved by the President.

c. Determining the procedures to be followed in connection with such studies, including the time limit within which the studies are to be completed and submitted to the President.

6. Oral presentation of such comparative evaluations to the National Security Council or other groups shall be as determined by the President.

7. In view of the sensitive nature of the materials to be included in studies made by the Group, special security precautions shall be applied thereto. Distribution of the studies prepared by the Group shall be limited to two copies—one to be maintained in the files of the National Security Council, the other in the files of the Chairman of the Group.

171. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 2, 1959

SUBJECT

Military Paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy

PARTICIPANTS

The White House
The President
Gordon Gray
General Goodpaster

State Department
Secretary Herter
Gerard C. Smith

Defense Department
Secretary McElroy
Deputy Secretary
Thomas S. Gates, Jr.
Admiral Arthur W. Radford

The President looked at the statement of issues which had been prepared by Gordon Gray, a copy of which is attached. He said it is almost impossible to define general war and limited war. One cannot plan out these things precisely in advance.

Secretary Herter said that just last year Mr. Dulles in going along with the military paragraphs of the Basic National Security Policy paper had urged a restudy because of the State Department's concern that nuclear weapons were to be considered conventional, that any engagement between Soviet and American forces would be total war, and that we seemed to have no leeway in the matter of fighting small engagements without using nuclear weapons.

The President recalled that he, Admiral Radford, and General Taylor had had a long discussion of this matter sometime ago. The President pointed out that the Japanese and Russians in the 30's had had large-scale military engagements without any formal declaration of war. The President speculated that it might be possible for us to have something like three battalions engaged in Iran against Soviet forces without general war. He said, however, if our vital interests became involved, we certainly should use nuclear weapons. Secretary Herter agreed.

The President said that he had tried to find language to meet this problem which he seemed to equate to the problem of how much authority should be delegated to field commanders to use nuclear weapons.

¹ Source: Inconclusive discussion of role of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 13 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

The President said that the crux of the matter was that we just could not deploy ground forces all over the world. Main reliance would have to be placed on nuclear weapons and mobile forces.

The Secretary pointed out the possibility that sometime in the future we might have to introduce forces into Africa, at which time we would not want to use nuclear weapons. He also cited the Lebanon example, where the military had wanted to go ashore with nuclear weapons, but the State Department urged against it.

The President referred to Khrushchev's statement to Harriman recently that if the Chinese tried to take Formosa the Russians would assist them, and that the Russians had already made rockets available to the Chinese which could strike Formosa.

The President speculated that the Soviets are wrestling with the same problem that we are considering this morning.

Returning to the question of when nuclear weapons should be resorted to, the President expressed some puzzlement. He said certainly they should not be resorted to carelessly, but if substantial American troops were involved they should have nuclear weapons handy.

Secretary McElroy then pointed out that General Twining agreed with him (McElroy) that the present policy should be retained. Unless we could use nuclear weapons, we could not participate in limited wars.

The President recalled that during the last war American troops had had available, if necessary, mustard gas, but that it had never been used. He wondered at what point in the spectrum between harassment and limited war we should resort to nuclear weapons. Secretary McElroy then said there were significant budget considerations in the proposed policy changes.

The President then referred to the impossibility of our stationing garrisons all over the world. The President said that Secretary McElroy's point of view was our present policy and it was being implemented. He recalled that when we reduced our forces in Korea, we beefed up the remaining forces with nuclear capability.

Admiral Radford then said that the State Department wanted the military to fight with conventional weapons until it was decided to go to nuclear weapons. "We are past that point", he said. In 1953, we took a crucial decision to convert our present forces to nuclear weapons capability. The fact that they are nuclear capable permits us to use small scale units to do a job which otherwise could only be done with much larger forces.

There was then a discussion about the question of delegation of authority to employ nuclear weapons. The President expressed some concern about the possibility of poor judgment by some local commander.

Secretary Herter referred to the possibility of using tactical weapons in excess of 1 megaton, as reported at last Tuesday's briefing by

Admiral Parker. Admiral Radford then said that Parker's briefing was not very good. He recalled that we are concentrating on small weapons. He said that General Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke had told him that there was no real difference between the State and the Defense language, but that they preferred the State language. Admiral Radford said that the State language would require a US capability to fight a limited war with or without nuclear weapons. He pointed out that the earlier policy on nuclear weapons had already been watered down. Their use now is only authorized to meet national objectives and not military objectives. He said this change fuzzed up the issue.

The President then speculated about what type of force one would have to employ, say, if our intervention in Cuba was requested. He later concluded that no nuclear capability would be required in such case. The President said that he thought we were having difficulty because we were trying to find generalized language to cover a multitude of contingencies.

The President said we need plans to guide the various levels of the military. Certainly our forces need to have nuclear weapons. The real problem was when would the weapons be used.

Admiral Radford said that if there was any chance that our forces would have to fight without nuclear weapons, a whole different force structure would be required.

The President said that he had seen studies indicating that the availability of nuclear weapons does not result in a saving of manpower.

Admiral Radford then went back to the 1953 decision on the "new look".

The President recalled that the pre-Korea military budget had gone down to about \$11 or \$12 billion and that was where he and Louis Johnson differed.

The Secretary then reverted to the Cuban discussion and agreed with the Presidents conclusions.

The President said that we have no lack of conventional weapons. Secretary McElroy pointed out that nuclear weapons were not useful for close-in fighting. It was generally agreed that the Latin American area offered no problem.

The President said what we needed was a meeting of the minds and not fixed slogans. He said all agreed that one should not use a sledge hammer to drive tacks.

Secretary McElroy said that the present language suited him and that any changes would be misinterpreted to suit the preconceptions of various people. He said that unless a policy change was to be made, we should not change the language.

Secretary Gates pointed out that a real policy change is being urged. He would not say that the State Department was urging a new policy change, but some people were.²

The President then reviewed the history of the deployment of nuclear weapons to American forces abroad. He felt that no large forces should be deployed without nuclear weapons. Secretary Herter stated that he had no objection to this conclusion. There was further discussion about the delegation of authority matter.

Secretary Herter then raised the question about the non-nuclear capability our forces would have. He was glad to hear what Secretary McElroy had said that we were continuing to develop better conventional weapons.

The President said that perhaps some slight change in words was needed, but he did not know. He repeated that “formed units” must have defensive nuclear capability. Both Secretary McElroy and Admiral Radford jumped in to make sure by “defensive” the President did not mean to rule out weapons systems to take out strike bases deep in China.

Mr. Gray said that the State Department wanted to increase our limited war capability. The President stated his understanding that we had a good conventional capability. Secretary McElroy said that that was true in cases involving ranges up to 2,000 yards. In the case of 15–20 miles, we will lack conventional fire power. The President asked him if we had thrown away all of our artillery. Secretary McElroy indicated that this would be the case soon. The President expressed some doubt as to the wisdom of this course. The President pointed out that we may be called on for aid by the OAS. He felt that with one present-day American division with its conventional arms, it could handle any Western Hemisphere problem. He recognized that we are in a transitional stage, pointing out that the day of very small nuclear weapons was not very far away. When one gets down to .02 kiloton weapons, the distinction we are talking about now would no longer have reality.

Mr. Gray said that the proponents of a policy change wanted to change the emphasis somewhat away from strategic bombing capability. The President expressed the belief that our military units should be given good training in conventional weapons. He stated that it had taken years for the cross-bow to become obsolete. We should organize our forces to use the weapons we have.

There was more discussion of the delegation problem.

Secretary Herter then read an excerpt from the Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements which proposes that nuclear weapons

² At a meeting after the President's meeting between McElroy, Radford, Gates, Gray and Smith, Smith made it quite plain that the State Department was proposing a real change. [Footnote is in the original.]

should be used in limited hostilities, but only as a last resort. The President expressed the opinion that State was perhaps over-cautious. He also felt that the matter of word changes in Basic Policy was not important.

The question was raised as to the possibility of limited war in Europe. Mr. Gray suggested that there was some opinion in the State Department that this was possible. Secretary Herter said, "yes, that only recently Mr. Murphy had said that he thought there could be limited hostilities over Berlin with the matter being referred to the UN. The President said that that would only be a barroom brawl. There was then some discussion as to whether there could be a limited war with China.

Secretary Gates then said some people were concerned that the emphasis on strategic retaliatory forces would squeeze out funds for and interest in conventional weapons.

Admiral Radford pointed out that never before in peace time did we have such large forces for Latin America type of operations.

The President pointed out that if the Soviets wanted to take Europe they would have to blast out positions with nuclear weapons, in which event the size of our forces there would not make much difference.

Secretary McElroy said that his discussions with the military commanders indicated that they feared that nuclear weapons would not be used.

The President then gave an analogy of the use of a pistol in retaliation for an attack by a hoodlum in the street. One is justified in using the pistol if one's life is really endangered, but not if the circumstances indicate that no such danger exists.

The President said we cannot organize now for the situations that may take place in 1965. We should go carefully and wisely. We should try to use the necessary degree of force without starting a war.

Secretary Herter said that he agreed that if it was essential we should use nuclear weapons. He pointed out, however, how fearful world opinion was of any use of nuclear weapons. The President expressed the view that world opinion was wrong.

The President then speculated that a very low yield nuclear weapon would not be worth its cost and that if we used nuclear weapons we should use large enough ones to do the job.

Mr. Smith then pointed out that one matter had not been mentioned. All of our assumptions about the use of nuclear weapons in limited war start with the proposition that they will not be used against us. Admiral Radford and Secretary McElroy denied this with some heat. It was pointed out that the limited war study of 1958 had made this assumption and that the Joint Chiefs had refused to study limited war with the State Department on any other basis. Mr. Gordon Gray confirmed accuracy of this. Admiral Radford said the military actually were prepared for two way use of nuclear weapons in limited war.

There was some discussion about the 1958 assumptions and no clear conclusion as to their validity. Certainly SAC would have to be kept on a complete alert during any such period.

The meeting then broke up without any conclusion.

172. Memorandum From Robert Johnson to the NSC Planning Board¹

Washington, July 6, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5906

B. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, June 29, 1959

The enclosed tentative State Department proposal for revision of pars. 23–b and 24 of NSC 5906, prepared for possible submission at the National Security Council Meeting on Thursday, July 9, 1959, is transmitted herewith for the information and use of the Planning Board Representatives in briefing their principals for the Council Meeting.

Robert H. Johnson

Acting Director

Policy Coordinating Secretariat

Enclosure

Draft Department of State Proposal

Washington, undated

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5906)

TENTATIVE STATE PROPOSAL

Delete par. 23–b (of Majority Proposal) and par. 24 and substitute:

a. Add “production” before “capabilities”

b. If, however, it becomes clear that present efforts to achieve agreed international controls affecting nuclear weapons development

¹ Source: Transmits State Department proposed revision of paragraphs 23–b and 24 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series.

will not succeed, or if there is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union is permitting or contributing to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by Bloc countries, the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them of appropriate information, materials, or nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.

c. In anticipation of the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by such allies, the U.S. should now urgently consider within the Executive Branch plans for the development of [a]² multi-[lateral control] national (for example, [a] NATO) arrangements [nuclear weapons authority which would] for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons, [in accordance with NATO policy and plans for defense of NATO areas].

d. [The U.S. should seek] Legislation should be sought when and as necessary for *b* and *c* above.

² All brackets are in the original.

173. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, July 6, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5906

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 19, 1959

A memorandum from the Acting Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council, setting forth comments on paragraph 62 of NSC 5906 provided by certain members of the NASC, were transmitted to the National Security Council by the reference memorandum of June 19, 1959.

The attached memorandum from the Acting Secretary, NASC, containing a summary of the discussion on paragraph 62 of NSC 5906

¹ Source: Transmits summary of NASC discussion of paragraph 62 of NSC 5906 on military exploitation of space programs. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series.

that took place at the June 29, 1959, informal meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its further consideration of NSC 5906.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

Enclosure

Memorandum From Phillips to Lay

Washington, July 2, 1959

SUBJECT

Paragraph 62 of the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)

REFERENCE

Memorandum from NASC Acting Secretary dated 19 June 1959

1. Comments on the subject paragraph provided by certain members of the National Aeronautics and Space Council were forwarded to you with reference memorandum.

2. Following is a summary of the discussion on the subject paragraph that took place at the June 29, 1959 informal meeting of the NASC:

The explanation given as the basis for the Budget and Treasury proposal represented by the bracketed phrase was that it presents a position previously stated by the Department of Defense as noted in the last paragraph, item 6 of the NASC minutes for the April 27, 1959 meeting. There was discussion to the effect that, although this is an accurate statement of Defense position, including it in the policy seems inappropriate. Alternate wording for the phrase was proposed as follows:

(2) A military space program designed to exploit the application of advancing space technology whenever that exploitation will sensibly extend U.S. military capabilities;

It was the consensus that this wording appeared to be a reasonable compromise, and that it should be forwarded to the NSC for their consideration. There was further discussion of the first sentence in the paragraph, in particular the phrase, "to insure that the U.S. is a recognized leader in this field." It was proposed that the following be substituted for the first sentence:

The U.S. should continue actively and with a sense of urgency to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space capabilities as needed to insure the attainment of national objectives in scientific, military and political areas. These programs should be designed to secure and maintain for the U.S. a position of supremacy in outer space activities without requiring that the U.S. be the leader in every phase of space exploitation.

Discussion of this point resulted in agreement that the sense of the first sentence of the paragraph as proposed by NSC is that the U.S. should be at least on a par with the USSR, but not necessarily ahead. There was no agreement on re-phrasing this sentence to further clarify this point.

/S/ Franklyn W. Phillips
Acting Secretary

174. Memorandum of Conversation with the President¹

Washington, July 7, 1959, 12:10 p.m.

PRESENT

Bryce Harlow
General Goodpaster
Gordon Gray

I first informed the President that Mr. McElroy had asked whether Admiral Radford might attend the meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, July 9. I indicated to the President that I had some question about the wisdom of this course. The President felt to the contrary; that inasmuch as Mr. McElroy had made Admiral Radford his Military Advisor during the absence of General Twining; and if Mr. McElroy wished him present, he should be allowed to attend.

¹ Source: President's approval of attached guidelines for Harlow's discussion with Jackson on Congressional hearings on the NSC. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos. Drafted on July 8.

Mr. Harlow and I then discussed with the President the situation appertaining to the Jackson Committee investigation. The President approved the guidelines, attached, as a basis for Mr. Harlow's discussion with Senator Jackson.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by the NSC

Washington, July 6, 1959

PROPOSED GUIDELINES

1. The proposed study would not involve a Congressional investigation of the National Security Council.

2. The Executive Branch personnel would not be asked to testify with respect to the substantive consideration of matters by the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery. The operating Departments of Government would provide any testimony about their policies or activities and without reference to substantive consideration of such matters by the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery.

3. Study of the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery would be limited to matters involving composition, organization and procedures. Executive Branch officials would be authorized to make full disclosure as to such matters subject to appropriate security safeguards in case of classified projects.

4. Any testimony by present or former Government officials regarding the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery would be taken in Executive session. Consideration of the publication of such testimony taken in Executive session would be as agreed between the Subcommittee and a representative designated by the President. This Presidential representative would be authorized to attend all hearings of the Subcommittee relating to the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery, and would be provided a transcript of the testimony taken in Executive session as a basis for reaching the decisions as to publication referred to above.

5. It would be understood that the purpose of testimony regarding the composition, organization and procedures of the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery would be for background information in considering various proposals for new legislation. Such testimony would not be intended to generate legislative proposals designed

to delimit the Constitutional privilege of the President to obtain advice through such organization and procedures as he deems appropriate.

175. Memorandum From Gray to Haydn Williams¹

Washington, July 8, 1959

Herewith the Issues for Discussion as presented in the meeting with the President on July 2nd. I have expressed to you my concern that this paper not be widely distributed and you gave me your assurance on this point. Indeed, I would like to understand that after the principals have been briefed, and certainly at the conclusion of the National Security Council meeting, this copy will be destroyed.

The basic of this request is that this paper has no status and was used in a privileged discussion with the President. Furthermore, I have indicated to you that left to my own devices, I would not have framed the issues in quite this way. This statement resulted from efforts to get agreement as to the issues as between State and Defense.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Same letter to: Rear Admiral C O Triebel

Howard C. Furnas

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by the NSC

Washington, undated

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. Have we arrived at the point of general war when sizeable USSR and US forces are directly engaged? Alternatively, do we believe that a situation of general war will exist only when the circumstances indicate that the survival of the US is at stake?

¹ Source: Transmits discussion paper on uses of nuclear weapons in limited war. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Review of Basic National Security Policy.

2. Should the US place main but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons and consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; or should the US develop and maintain flexible and selective capabilities for limited war in order to insure that any significant US participation in limited hostilities would not have to be nuclear?

3. Should it be assumed that local or limited aggression will occur only in the under-developed areas or is it conceivable that a limited war could be fought in developed areas such as non-NATO Europe or Japan? What about Communist China?

4. With respect to local or limited aggression, would US objectives be served by prompt and resolute application of force necessary to defeat such local aggression; or might US interests be served in certain cases by restricting the application of force to that degree necessary to achieve objectives of limiting the area and scope of hostilities and restoring the status quo ante?

It is agreed that with respect to local or limited aggression the use of any US force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.

176. Memorandum From Whisenand to Gray¹

Washington, July 8, 1959

SUBJECT

General Twining's Views on Basic National Security Policy

1. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the attached statement of General Twining's views on the current review of Basic National Security Policy is forwarded for your information and use.

2. The forwarding of this material directly to you has been approved, personally, by General Twining.

James F. Whisenand
Brigadier General, USAF
Spec. Asst. to Chairman, JCS

¹ Source: Transmits Twining's views on basic national security policy. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the JCS

Washington, undated

VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (THESE VIEWS WERE PROVIDED TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON 8 MAY 1959)

1. I would like to dispense with the philosophy which accompanies the arguments that are being advanced for changing our present Basic National Security Policy and deal directly with the consequences and major implications of such changes if they were to be made.

TACTICAL FORCES

2. The first major implication is with respect to limited war situations. We would no longer consider atomic weapons as an integral part of our military establishment, to be used when militarily advantageous to us. Regardless of the military disadvantages, we would attempt to fight on land, at sea, and in the air with conventional forces, and we would use nuclear weapons only as a last resort. This change of policy could have the following consequences:

a. Decision to use nuclear weapons could come too late (in a situation such as an invasion of Formosa).

b. Unacceptably heavy attrition of our limited forces could occur in an attempt to conduct a conventional campaign under conditions which, from a military standpoint, clearly call for the early use of nuclear weapons.

c. The change in policy would leak to the world, and our posture for deterrence of Soviet-inspired local aggression, the world over, would suffer greatly.

3. With respect to watering down our present policy for the use of nuclear weapons when militarily advantageous to us, I would point out that over a period of years we have progressively reduced the size of our military establishment and the number of major combat units in our land, sea and air forces. Every reduction has been justified by the President, by the Secretary of Defense and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of increased firepower inherent in modern weapons. Concurrent with these reductions, and facing a numerically superior enemy on all fronts, we have integrated atomic firepower into our land, sea and air forces under the assumption that this firepower, *while not to be used initially in a limited engagement*, would be immediately responsive to the military situation if required.

4. In fact, all of our forces, strategic and tactical, land, sea and air, are reliant on atomic firepower if they meet serious, sustained

resistance. Under present policy, our forces can enter an engagement against overwhelming numbers of Soviet proxy troops with confidence in the outcome, because the atomic firepower can be used if needed, and can be used before our own forces are decimated. To actually apply the suggested new policy would reduce our tactical flexibility and capability in one stroke to the level which the Soviet Union would like to see. This is not to say that we are completely powerless without nuclear weapons. We have demonstrated twice within the last year that we can react quickly and with effective results in local and limited actions. However, at Lebanon the first unit in the area was a Marine BLT with organic atomic capability, the Sixth Fleet was offshore with atomic capability, and the U.S. Air Force units at Adana had an atomic capability. Similarly, during the Taiwan incident the atomic capability of our deployed tactical forces was always in the background. These two operations might have come off differently, in a tactical sense, short of general war, if the atomic backup had been absent, or if the enemy knew we would hesitate to use it.

5. There are times when political considerations are overriding. There are also times in which military realities must be the basis for political decision. In this case, any serious attempt to change the present policy on the use of nuclear weapons would have to be phased over a period of years, and we would have to be willing to double or triple the budget, over a period of years, to provide any semblance of the limited war combat capability which we possess today.

STRATEGIC FORCES

6. The second major implication bears on our strategic nuclear forces. Under a budgetary and personnel ceiling roughly approximating what we now have, the power of our strategic nuclear forces would progressively decline as “conventional” capability and “limited war” capability, in consonance with the revised policy, demanded more and more of the resources available. This is the specific objective of some elements of the military establishment.

7. Under the assumption of no major increase in available resources, within a few years we could be in the following tragic condition:

a. Having a capability for attacking only a restricted strategic target system, as opposed to Soviet capability to attack thousands of targets, we would have no effective strategic deterrent. We would have little counter-force capability, no strength in foreign policy as engendered by Soviet knowledge of a preemptive capability, and no possible strategic military response to any Soviet action, short of a Soviet-initiated attack on our population centers, and, even in this event, it would be doubtful that a retaliatory capability geared to a few hundred cities could survive to perform its task.

b. Paralleling this decline in the strategic capability we would have increased “limited war” and “conventional” capability to some degree,

but this increase would be insignificant in comparison to opposing Soviet Bloc forces, and would still be far below the requirement for meeting either a Soviet non-nuclear challenge, or limited nuclear challenge, in Europe, in the Far East and in the Middle East.

8. In summary, the net effect of the revisions in the Basic National Security Policy which have been suggested, if actually implemented, would be as follows:

One: Due to the fear of use of nuclear weapons on the part of some elements of the Government, political restrictions on their use would be imposed which would reduce to an unacceptable level the combat capability of our tactical forces, land, sea and air.

Two: Our strategic nuclear capability would decline to relative impotency in the matter of a few years.

Three: The only alternative to these consequences would be a vastly increased budget and personnel ceiling.

9. In my judgment, we should not tamper with the present wording in the military section of the paper. There has been no change in our basic policy of containment and deterrence, and there has been no change in our defense funding policy. The present military section of NSC 5810/1 provides adequate guidance for the development of properly balanced military forces, establishes a reasonable policy for the use of nuclear weapons, and should not be changed.

177. Briefing Note for July 9 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 8, 1959

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)

Today we resume consideration of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906) by taking up the military section, which begins with paragraph 10.

One thing which has given me concern is that nowhere in these paragraphs do we refer specifically to control of the seas, although we do talk about our retaliatory power; general war; local aggression; and continental defense.

¹ Source: NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Paragraph 10 (page 10) is the general paragraph on deterrence and, as the majority would have it, is unchanged. State and AEC, however, define the term “general war” by adding the words “a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake.”

It is my impression that a large part of State’s concern arises out of the strategic concept which was circulated to the Council in March 1957 in connection with the Mobilization Base Planning. In that document general war is defined as:

“A war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States are overtly engaged.”

It would appear that this concern of the State Department could be met by a definition in the Strategic Concept which could describe general war as

“A war in which sizeable numbers of the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States are overtly engaged.”

If this is the case there would appear to be no need to change the existing language of paragraph 10. In such an event the statement in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War” (footnote, page 2), that “U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war”, should be changed to incorporate the new definition.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
SECRETARY McELROY
(MR. McCONE))

Paragraph 12-a (page 11) presents the issue concerning limited war capabilities in conventional terms and also the extent of our reliance on nuclear weapons in limited war. The majority would continue the language of the existing policy paper, which reads in part:

“It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons;” and “to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view. . .”

The State Department has a proposal, in which OCDM joins, to change the policy so that we would

“place main reliance on nuclear weapons in *general war*, remaining prepared to fight *limited war* with or without such weapons.” [Emphasis supplied]²

It is my understanding that State’s interpretation of this language is not that we should be prepared to fight any war short of general war solely without nuclear weapons. I shall ask Secretary Herter to elaborate on this.

²Brackets are in the original, except for those delinating illegible text in the original.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
SECRETARY McELROY)

Paragraph 13 (page 12) sets forth our policy on chemical and biological weapons. The majority would leave the language of the existing paper unchanged, but Budget and Treasury propose that the President decide on the *stockpiling* of such weapons, as well as their use.

It is my understanding that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget feels that we are either spending too much or too little on these weapons, and his effort is to clarify our posture with respect to the employment of such weapons.

(Call on: Mr. STANS)

Paragraphs 15 and 16 (pages 12 to 14) were not considered by the Planning Board. There is no issue in the paper before you on paragraph 15. However the Chiefs of Staff of Army and [illegible in the original]. As to paragraph 16 the issue is posed by the State submission which appears in the Annex on page 61.

There are two issues posed by this paragraph. *First*, shall we consider that the term "limited aggression" (I would hope that we can substitute *limited* aggression for *local* aggression) refers only to conflicts in the less developed areas; or is it conceivable that a limited war could be fought in *developed* areas such as NATO Europe, non-NATO Europe, or Japan? What about Communist China? Could our problem be met by directing our planning against the contingency of limited aggression using the term to refer to conflicts occurring *outside of the NATO area*?

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
SECRETARY McELROY)

The *second* issue in this paragraph is this: With respect to local or limited aggression, (a) would U.S. objectives be served by prompt and resolute application of force necessary to defeat such local aggression; or (b) might U.S. interests be served in certain cases by restricting the application of force to that degree necessary to achieve objectives of limiting the area and scope of hostilities and restoring the *status quo ante*?

It is agreed that with respect to local or limited aggression the use of any U.S. force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.

(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER
SECRETARY McELROY)

Paragraph 17 (page 14) deals with the "cold war" contribution which the capabilities of U.S. military forces can make. USIA proposes deleting the clause which uses the term "cold war". (It may be noted that paragraph 9 sanctions the use of the term "cold war" and is already tentatively agreed to by the Council.)

(Call on: MR. GEORGE ALLEN)

Paragraph 18 (page 14) deals with U.S. bases overseas. It omits the reference to the possibility of “a small net expansion” of the base system, which was written into basic policy last year. The revised language reads:

“The entire overseas base system should continue to be reviewed periodically in order to assure that base requirements are adequately met and are related realistically to developments in weapons technology and other factors.”

The last sentence of paragraph 18 (which is unchanged) deals with the positioning of IRBM’s around the Soviet periphery. While the Planning Board has not as such recommended any change in policy, on my own motion I submit that IRBM’s should be the subject of a separate paragraph and not included in the paragraph on U.S. overseas bases. I therefore propose to the Council the following new paragraph:

“IRBM’s will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them, and pressure will not be exerted by the United States to persuade reluctant nations to accept them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBM’s outside the NATO areas will be subject to approval by the President.”

Paragraph 19 (page 15) treats generally of strengthening the collective defense system. As revised, it contains the new guidance that the United States should, as practicable, “induce Western European and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense.”

Paragraph 20 (page 15) is amended to say that we should educate not only our *allies*, but the *Free World* as a whole as to the importance of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World.

178. Memorandum of Meeting with the President¹

Washington, July 15, 1959

Present:

General Goodpaster

1. I indicated to the President that I wished to talk with him further about paragraph 12 *a* of Basic National Security Policy. I reported that

¹ Source: Discussion of proposed changes to paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Drafted on July 17.

the Planning Board had spent some further time on this paragraph on July 14. I said I felt we were pretty well narrowing the issues down to two questions which I showed him on the attached sheet.

I said that it seemed to me now clear that at the Planning Board level the State Department view was that we do not *now* have an adequate conventional limited war capability and that the State Department effort would be to enlarge our *present* capabilities. I said that one way to "smoke out" this issue would be insert the words "continue to" in the fifth line if the redraft of paragraph 12 *a*, marked "NSC", attached.

I then pointed out to him that the Defense Department felt that the only criteria that should govern the use of nuclear weapons were military criteria and that the Defense Department would want 12 *a* to read: "Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons manifestly not be militarily necessary nor militarily appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives . . ."

The President said that he felt that this definition was too narrow and agreed that the insertion of the word, "deemed" before "appropriate" in the eighth line would more nearly meet his views.

I also pointed out to the President that the JCS had objected to the phrase, "organized units" and had proposed a substitution therefor of the phrase "designated commanders." I suggested to the President that this probably was not quite what he had in mind and offered the language "combatant forces" which he thought well of.

The President expressed his displeasure at not being able to find language which was clear and decisive and would communicate to everyone concerned his clear intention. I pointed out to him that it would be unlikely that he would wish to change this language next year and that a new administration would likely not rush in with major changes in basic policy at the beginning and that therefore we were writing language for the next two or three years, or possibly more. Therefore, it was necessary that the language be clear and definitive and understood and accepted by all.

Attached are redrafts of the paragraph reflecting JCS, Defense and other views.

2. I then said to the President that I had read and considered Mr. C. D. Jackson's letter and that I thought well of his suggestion. I also indicated I felt that he should be present. The President agreed and said he had already written Mr. Jackson a letter agreeing to the meeting, adding a couple of names to the list and saying that the timing would depend only upon whether it was important to have Mr. Herter present.

3. I referred to the conversation I had had with the President on July 13 relative to the Defense Department concern about State Department position papers for the Geneva Conference. I said that I had had a long talk with Mr. Murphy and he had also talked with Mr. McElroy and I felt

that the matter was substantially straightened out. The difficulty had been that the State Department had released to Defense a staff working paper which purported having departmental concurrence, which Mr. Murphy said did not indeed have departmental concurrence. He said some of the individual concurrence shown on the paper had not in fact been given. I said to the President that he need not at the moment concern himself any further with this problem.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Attachment

Washington, undated

1. Do we now have the necessary conventional capabilities for meeting limited war requirements?

(State, Army, Navy say “No”)

2. Will the use of nuclear weapons be based solely on military criteria; that is to say, are there situations where political considerations could override military desirability?

(Defense seems to say “Yes” to the first, “No” to the second)

Attachment

NSC Draft

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should continue to contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor deemed appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed combatant forces will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Attachment**JCS Draft**

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12-a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor militarily appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Attachment**Defense Draft**

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12-a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor militarily appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Attachment**Others Draft**

Washington, July 9, 1959

OTHERS REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. However we should be prepared to cope with situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main elements of Soviet and Chinese Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

179. Briefing Note for the July 16 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 15, 1959

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)

We resume consideration of Basic National Security Policy by taking up NSC 5906 and also a 4-page change sheet which was distributed to you this morning. These changes were made in the Planning Board, taking into account the comments of the Consultants and further consideration by the departments and agencies.

Paragraph 19 (page 15) treats generally of strengthening the collective defense system. As revised, it contains the new guidance that the United States should, as practicable, "induce Western European and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense."

Paragraph 20 (page 15) is amended to say that we should educate not only our *allies*, but the *Free World* a whole as to the importance of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World.

¹ Source: NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Paragraph 23 (page 16), which is split, proposes a major change in policy with respect to the development of nuclear capabilities by additional nations. Present policy provides in essence that the United States should seek *to prevent* the development by additional nations of nuclear weapons capabilities (NSC 5810/1, paragraph 18, page 7). The new majority proposal is that the United States should first seek *to prevent or retard* development by additional nations of nuclear weapons capabilities.

The majority proposal goes on to say:

(Read Revised Para. 25–b)

The Defense-JCS version would not have us seek to prevent or retard the development by additional nations of nuclear weapons; it would sanction exchanging with, or providing to, additional selected allies information on nuclear weapons; but it would not go so far as to be prepared to make *nuclear weapons* themselves available to selected allies. (The Joint Chiefs in their formal comments support this version).

Inescapably related is *paragraph 24* (page 18), [which states present policy to the effect that the United States should consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority.]²

Defense and JCS would leave Paragraph 24 unchanged. The majority, however, views the question with greater urgency and would say in Paragraph 23 c:

(Read Revised Para 23 c)

Paragraph 25–a (page 18) is a revised general guidance paragraph on providing military assistance to nations “whose increased ability to defend themselves and to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power is important to the security of the United States.”

Paragraph 25–b (page 19) is new, and deals with military aid to *other* nations, including uncommitted nations. It reads:

(Read paragraph 25–b, page 19)

Paragraph 25–c (page 20) is also new, and grows out of the OCB conclusions on the overseas internal security program.

Paragraph 26 (page 20) is a new item of guidance and would encourage, in less developed nations, the participation of indigenous military forces in economic, social, and psychological programs.

Paragraph 28 (page 21) is the general paragraph on military research and development which is in existing policy, with two new sentences added on nuclear weapons R & D. They read:

(Read paragraph 28–a, page 21, last two sentences)

We now resume discussion of the political and economic section at the point where we left off at the Council meeting three weeks ago, and take up paragraph 36.

² Brackets are in the original.

Paragraph 36 (page 28) a new paragraph which would apply world-wide a policy contained in the current Latin America paper (NSC 5902/1), deals with maintaining contact with selected non-Communist opposition elements. I believe that we should add “through appropriate channels”.

Paragraph 37 (page 28) seeks to spell out more clearly our general attitude toward newly-emerging nations.

The third sentence is new, and grows out of our delays in the Guinea case. It reads:

(Read third sentence of paragraph 37)

The fourth sentence is new, and applies world-wide a policy idea contained in the Horn of Africa paper (NSC 5903). The sentence here reads:

(Read fourth sentence of paragraph 37)

Paragraph 38 (page 29) is new. The first sentence is agreed. Then we had a split which has since been resolved. At the end of the last sentence of this paragraph, which sentence outlines the factors to be taken into account when the United States is determining an independent course, Defense proposes to add: “recognizing, however, that the United States should not allow the attitudes and emotions of the mother country unduly to influence actions essential to attaining or preserving U.S. objectives in emerging or newly independent countries.”

(Call on: SECRETARY McELROY
SECRETARY HERTER)

Par 39 (p. 31) is old 34, broadened at the suggestion of OCB to include, in subparagraph *b*, U.S. action against non-Communist elements hostile to U.S. interests. State, Defense and JCS want to keep subparagraph *a* as it was in the old paper. Treasury would change the last clause, as indicated in the second bracket.

(Call on Under Secretary Scribner
Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy
Admiral Burke)

Par 41 (p. 32) is new. It recognizes foreign labor’s importance in opposing Communist efforts to control foreign trade unions.

Par 42 (p. 32) is an agreed paragraph on our foreign economic policy except for the last sentence in *b*. Budget and Treasury would like to keep this sentence, which was the second sentence in old 29–*a*. Several of the consultants and most of the PB questioned this sentence. One argument against it was that there is no functional relationship between economic development assistance on the one hand and other economic assistance and military assistance on the other. Another argument against it was that it simply doesn’t happen. Mr. Randall supports the majority.

(Call on Mr. Stans
Under Secretary Scribner
others)

At the bottom of page 33, in the third line of *b*, the PB agreed that "public capital" should be deleted and "such assistance" substituted. If there is no objection, this change will be made.

Paragraphs 43 and 44 (beginning on p. 34) are old 27 extensively reorganized, rewritten, and enlarged. There was a split in 43-*d* which has since been resolved by changing the first sentence. 43-*d* now reads as follows:

"Utilize and support the efforts of Free World international financial institutions to the maximum extent possible to promote economic development and to bring about economic reforms in less developed nations."

There was also a split in *f* which has also been resolved by rewriting the subparagraph. It now reads:

"Make U.S. public capital available in adequate amounts on a long-term basis for the purpose of supplementing the capital available from other sources for sound economic development in less developed areas. U.S. lending agencies should be assured of continuity in order to contribute to this purpose."

Turning to par 44, subparagraph *a* is new, and I would like to read it.
(Read 44-*a*)

In 44-*b* there was a split, but State has withdrawn its objection to the bracketed language. The last sentence in 44-*b* was agreed to by the PB, but I would like to read it because it is new and because it was the result of considerable debate.

(Read last sentence of 44-*b*)

Par 45 (p. 42), is new, and incorporates what is already in the approved economic defense policy (NSC 5704/3).

Par 51 (p. 44) on the conduct of negotiations with the USSR, is largely an updating of old 39, I would, however, call your attention to the last sentence, which has been added for unmistakable clarity: "Agreements affecting strength and deployment of military forces should include provisions for effective safeguards against violations and evasions."

Par 52 (p. 45) is the general paragraph on disarmament contained in existing policy, with a slight clarification at the beginning. The old language reads:

"Safeguarded arms control should be sought with particular urgency, in an effort to reduce the risk of war, etc."

There was a feeling in the P/B that the phrase "particular urgency" might be misinterpreted as applying to the urgency of entering into negotiations, rather than to the urgency of developing arms control measures first and then negotiating. The opening sentence has therefore been revised to read:

"Efforts to develop safeguarded arms control measures should be continued with particular urgency, and agreement thereon sought, in an effort to reduce the risk of war, etc."

No change in policy is intended.

Par 54 (p. 47) contains two new sentences. They are:

(read the last two sentences of 54)

Since the PB prepared this paper, the OCB has been working on the problems connected with U.S. personnel overseas, and pointed out the need for policy guidance on this subject. I agreed, with PB concurrence, to propose a paragraph which would come after 54, to read as follows:

(read 54A from the blue page dated July 7)

180. Memorandum From Haydn Williams to Twining¹

Washington, July 20, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)

1. Secretary McElroy has requested that I bring to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his views regarding the redraft of paragraph 12-*a* of NSC 5906 prepared by Gordon Gray on the basis of oral remarks by the President. The text of this redraft is set forth in the enclosure to this memorandum.

2. Secretary McElroy finds the redraft of paragraph 12-*a* acceptable. However, in view of the widely divergent interpretations placed upon it following its circulation, he has recommended that the following note be made a part of the NSC Record of Action:

“Paragraph 12-*a* of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces.”

3. Defense tabled the above note at last Friday’s Planning Board meeting, at which time it was concurred in by the majority of the Planning Board including State. In tabling this note and accepting the redraft of paragraph 12-*a* at the Planning Board, Defense did so with the understanding that:

a. The first sentence of the redraft applies across the board, i.e., to general *and* limited war.

¹ Source: Possible revisions to paragraph 12-*a* of NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

b. The second sentence of the redraft covers limited war situations in areas where the main Communist power (Sino-Soviet bloc Power) would not be brought to bear: Central and South America, the Caribbean and Africa. In these areas the use of nuclear weapons would be manifestly neither militarily necessary nor politically appropriate. In areas such as the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia, the decision as to the use of nuclear weapons in limited war would be made in the light of the then existing circumstances, including the involvement or non-involvement of main Communist power. In areas where main Communist power would be clearly involved, it is anticipated that nuclear weapons would be used. Such areas would include hostilities on the mainland of China and Korea. The possibility of limited war on the Continent of Europe involving sizable forces of the U.S. and the USSR is ruled out; situations short of limited war such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the U.S. and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept.

c. The third sentence of the redraft provides that in all contingencies covered in sub-paragraph *b* above, deployed U.S. combat units will have a nuclear capability and designated major commanders of such units will be prepared to use this capability when required in defense of their commands.

d. There is no controversy regarding the fourth sentence of the redraft.

The above is based upon our understanding of the President's views and those expressed by Mr. McElroy.

4. Secretary McElroy is interested in discussing the foregoing paragraph with the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the next few days.

/s/ Haydn Williams

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Enclosure

Paragraph Prepared by Gorden Gray

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12-a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

181. Telegram Tocah 162 to Herter in Geneva¹

Washington, July 20, 1959, 9 p.m.

Tocah 162. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Reference: Cahto 154.

At PB meeting Friday Defense member indicated SecDef willing go along with Gray's paragraph 12-a as drafted providing agreement reached on inclusion of following sentence as footnote or in record of action:

"Paragraph 12-a of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of exiting policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces."

Department PB member said proposal probably acceptable to State but would prefer have language above in record of action rather than footnote. Treasury, Budget, OCDM agreed; Chiefs reserved; sentence believed satisfactory because makes no change in substance of Gray S draft paragraph 12-a which we willing accept. Additionally, refers "requirement" for balanced forces which not elsewhere mentioned.

Remaining question merely whether policy is to be considered "change" or "clarification" but since we have already agreed to Gray formula further argumentation this point in NSC would certainly be unproductive. Accordingly I called McElroy and confirmed Department's acceptance of his suggested sentence for inclusion in record of action. When I saw him on Sunday I told him that we felt language represented new policy but if he preferred to call it clarification that would be satisfactory by us as long as it understood that new language as such would henceforth be guiding without reference to superseded languages. This seemed satisfactory to McElroy and unless you have other instructions this is line I intend to take in NSC.

Dillon

¹ Source: Discussion of proposed revisions in NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

182. Telegram Cahto 159 From Herter in Geneva¹

Geneva, July 21, 1959

Cahto 159. For Acting Secretary From the Secretary.

Reference Tocah 162. I endorse the line you proposed in reftel. However there should be further monkeying with the buzz saw at the next NSC meeting or should you in your discretion feel warranted you could convey to NSC following message from me:

QUOTE. Whether proposed changes are considered new policy or clarification of old policy does not strike me as an important distinction. The Council decision being proposed is important, as is evidenced by the unusual amount of top governmental consideration which has been given to it.

My predecessor proposed a change or clarification of our military strategy more than a year ago. He agreed to a continuation of the old language in NSC 5810 on condition that it be immediately subjected to interdepartmental review. It should be recalled that during the 1958 and 1959/NSC discussions the majority of the Joint Chiefs believed that a policy change/clarification was a first importance.

The Department of State submitted to NSC sometime ago a paper on Foreign Policy Requirements to be considered in connection with the development of military strategy. This paper was prepared originally in response to a request by the Department of Defense for foreign policy guidance. My responsibility as Secretary of State will be discharged if the military paragraphs of the basic paper meet these foreign policy requirements. The details of force levels and budget division among the military services is not my business. However, I assume that the "clarification" phrase "and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces" would permit the US to have a military capacity to engage to some significant extent in limited hostilities without the necessity for automatic resort to nuclear weapons.

I understand that there has been some suggestion that opinion in the Department of State is divided on the necessity for and the meaning of the proposed change/clarification in policy. I can assure you that the Department of State is unanimous on the above position and speaks with one voice. UNQUOTE.

Herter

¹ Source: Transmits message to NSC on revisions in NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

183. NASC Paper¹

Washington, July 23, 1959

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5906)

PROPOSED REVISIONS

Page 48, paragraph 55–b:

a. Delete the first sentence of the paragraph (including the split language), and substitute therefor the following:

“The goal of our economic policy is the achievement, within a framework of free competitive enterprise and reasonable price stability, of vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth and progress, including the efficient employment of resources at high levels.”

b. In the first line of subparagraph *b*–(1), substitute the work “could” for the word “would”.

Page 49, paragraph 55–c–(2): Delete the first clause and the footnotes relating thereto, and substitute the following: “Strive for a vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth;”.

Page 50, paragraph 55–d, line 6: Insert the word “reasonable” before the word “price”, and the words “and competitive” after the word “free”.

*PROPOSALS FOR MODIFYING PARAGRAPH 62 OF NSC
5906 PUT FORWARD AT THE INFORMAL MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL*

Pages 54–55:

a. Delete the first sentence of the paragraph and substitute therefor the following:

“The United States should continue actively and with a sense of urgency to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space capabilities as needed to ensure the attainment of national objectives in scientific, military and political areas. These programs should be designed to secure and maintain for the United States a position of supremacy in outer space activities without requiring that the United States be the leader in every phase of space exploitation.”

b. Delete section (2) of the paragraph and substitute therefor the following:

“(2) a military space program designed to exploit the application of advancing space technology whenever that exploitation will sensibly extend U.S. military capabilities;”.

¹ Source: Proposed revisions in NSC 5906. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

184. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, July 27, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

The President greeted General Twining warmly, told him how delighted he is that he is making a good recovery, and welcomed him back to duty. He asked to what extent General Twining had found it possible to keep up with developments while convalescing. General Twining said he had kept up fairly well, having talked frequently with Mr. McElroy and General Picher.

The President said that one matter now current that concerns him very much is a question over basic military concept under discussion in the national security policy paper. It seems that the Army and the Navy want to divert money from our "big deterrent" to small war forces. He recalled that we had had a thorough study of this in 1953, culminating in the so-called "new look". He did not think that we had gone too far in the direction suggested by that study, but Army and Navy seemed to think we had. He said he had developed language which seemed to him to express the position correctly, and there was agreement on this language. Mr. McElroy, however, wants to say that the new language does not in any way change the policy that has been in effect in the Department of Defense, and to this statement the Army and the Navy seemed to be opposed.

General Twining said that the State Department also has asked for substantial increases in conventional forces. The President commented that the State Department has now accepted the language of which he was speaking.

On another subject, the President recalled that, in connection with his reorganization plan of last year, a new procedure for three- and four-star officers had been instituted. He now thought that perhaps there is reason not to apply this procedure to officers who have a purely single service function, such as the Chiefs of Bureaus in the Navy and of Technical Services in the Army. He does not want to put work before the JCS that is simply time consuming or pro forma—on which they have no judgment to contribute. He asked General Twining to give some thought to this matter.

¹ Source: Basic national security policy; Department of Defense reorganization; Net Evaluation Subcommittee. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

General Twining said he wished to raise the question whether the net evaluation subcommittee, which is carrying out a special study this summer, with its regular report deferred until next January, might skip making a full study in mid-year 1960. The President suggested that he talk to Gordon Gray about this. The President commented on a study which he had suggested within recent days—to see what this country would really look like five days or so following nuclear attack. He had suggested that it ought to be conducted by a very small group—say five officers in the grade of Major or Lt. Colonel, plus a representative from OCDM. The task would be not to produce a long dissertation but to use imagination, and by pictures and figures try to convey just what the situation would be.

The President asked General Twining to what extent plans and operations in the Pentagon seemed to have been slowed down by the fire. General Twining said no slow down seems to be noticeable. The President reiterated what he has said on many previous occasions—that he feels there is a lot of unnecessary activity going on in the Pentagon, if one could only get at determining just what could be eliminated.

As the meeting ended the President asked General Twining how he is feeling from the standpoint of energy and personal comfort. General Twining said he is feeling quite good, but that it will be six to eight weeks, the doctors tell him, before he will be really recovered.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

185. Memorandum of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, July 27, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

1. Robert Gray, Secretary to the Cabinet, joined us to discuss the Cabinet paper "Removal of Papers by Retiring Department and Agency Heads" (CP 59–58/4). I pointed out to the President that the paper which he had approved did not specifically advert to classified documents of the National Security Council and that it seemed well to have the covering memorandum make some reference to these

¹Source: Study of aftermath of nuclear war; Wheelus Air Force Base; basic national security policy; Senate consideration of NSC structure. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos.

papers. Thereupon Mr. Robert Gray presented to the President the draft document which is attached to Mr. Lay's copy of this memorandum. The President approved the document and Mr. Robert Gray left the meeting.

2. I then asked the President whether he would be willing to see Mr. Charles A. Haskins for a few minutes at the conclusion of my business with the President to discuss the Jackson Committee study in view of the fact that Mr. Haskins was to be the President's personal representative. I indicated that I felt that it would make Mr. Haskins a more useful representative from the point of view of morale and it seemed to me important for Mr. Haskins to hear from the President the limitations he wished put upon the scope of the study. The President said he would see Mr. Haskins and I added that Mr. Edward McCabe would come in at the same time.

3. I then discussed the draft Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of July 23 with the President and called his attention particularly to item 1c. I indicated that the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization had requested that it participate in any such study. I also pointed out to him that there was a difference of view between Defense and the Bureau of the Budget as to the second sentence in paragraph 1c. Defense wishing it deleted and Budget wishing it retained even though it might be modified in some respects.

The President said that he wanted no "ponderous studies" on this subject and that he wished an examination to be made by capable junior officers. He wasn't even sure that he wished the study to be an NSC undertaking. However, he thought that such a study might be just for the benefit of the members of the National Security Council. He felt that he would like a picture of what the military believes to be the situation after a nuclear exchange. He would like to know what they felt to be the status of our resources, how we would have to use them, and in what way we would have to use them. For example, would our remaining resources be necessary for the purpose of winning the war or would the problem be one of survival.

He then recalled that the request that he had made in the July 23 meeting was that junior staff officers make the study and that the senior officers of the Services should not involve themselves except as they took an interest in what their subordinates were doing. The President felt that he would like to know what really would be the military problem under the conditions of a nuclear exchange and thought it was possible that such a study would show that rather than planning to increase and enlarge the military services in such a situation, quite a different approach might be indicated. He reiterated that perhaps our

whole “mobilization base” thinking for such an emergency is obsolete, adding that a study might suggest an enlargement.

I indicated to the President that we would reflect that he had made a request for a study by junior staff officers with the participation of staff from OCDM. He approved this approach.

4. I then presented the attached draft memorandum to the President for his approval. I reminded him that he had directed that this procedure be followed some weeks ago, but that I had delayed taking action at Mr. Harr’s request until we were nearer the point of having a new Chairman of the OCB. Mr. Harr had felt and I had agreed with him that the letter of appointment to the new Chairman might be used as an occasion to indicate that the action concerning progress reports was not a downgrading of the OCB but rather put a heavier requirement upon the OCB.

I pointed out to the President that the State Department legislation had now been passed by the Congress and he would soon be in a position to appoint Mr. Murphy. The President approved the attached draft.

5. I reported to the President that in connection with current discussions about aid to Libya and certain possible covert actions in that country there had emerged for the first time to my knowledge the fact that the military perhaps did not consider the Wheelus base in Libya an essential base. I said this was not the final position of the JCS but that the Joint Staff had concluded that although the Wheelus base had very important peacetime functions, especially for training, there was no general war role for it. I told the President that I supposed that this was because of the comparative vulnerability of this base to Soviet IRBMs.

The President asked me whether the military wished to abandon it and have the Soviets take it over. I replied that I was sure that the military would not like such a result but that the reexamination was in part forced by an awareness that we probably cannot meet Libyan demands.

I repeated that this was not a final judgment but that I thought that the President ought to know that for the first time questions were being raised about the necessity for the base.

6. I reported to the President with respect to a 5412 activity, which is the subject of a specific memorandum.

7. I then discussed paragraphs 12 *a* and 16 of the Basic Policy paper. As to 12 *a*, I reported to the President that the Secretaries of State and Defense seem now to be in agreement on the version of 12 *a* which is attached, calling his attention to the footnote which would appear in the Record of Actions. I said to the President that we thus had an agreement between the principal department heads but that there was

still some disagreement within the military establishment. I said that I feared, for example, that the Chief of Staff of the Army would not find the footnote compatible to his thinking and that he had tended to interpret the language in paragraph 12 *a* in a way quite different from the interpretation placed upon it by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and by the Secretary of Defense. Thus, I felt that the problem with respect to this paragraph as we would discuss it in the NSC meeting on July 30 would be whether he wished to allow those who found themselves in disagreement, to speak to it, recommending that he do so. The President agreed and said that he would welcome any further comments but he was in accord with my suggestion that this be the last meeting on the subject.

I then showed the President the draft of paragraph 16, which is attached. I pointed out to him that it defined local aggression as conflicts occurring outside of the NATO area.

This draft recognized that the engagement of sizeable US and USSR forces in NATO could not be considered local aggression and that short of such a situation we were reaffirming our commitment to NATO and NATO planning. The President agreed with this saying that in such a situation the decision could not be a unilateral US decision.

I also called the President's attention to the word "balance" in the second line, pointing out that the Defense Department would probably object to it (it having been a State Department submission at the Planning Board) and that I personally would recommend against it in the light of the footnote to paragraph 12 *a*, and also because the reference here was to capability and not to forces. It seemed to me that what we really required was a flexible and selective capability. The President agreed and felt also that in the third line, the word "as" should be changed to "in cases" and the inter-lineation in the attached draft was in his own hand.

8. At this point Mr. McCabe and Mr. Haskins came into the meeting. I introduced Mr. Haskins to the President, pointing out to the President that the subject of the discussion was the Jackson Committee study.

The President began by stating that Mr. Haskins had been designated his representative in accordance with the guidelines agreed upon by the President and Senator Jackson. He then made the following points:

(1) There is a precedent for a Presidential representative to sit in at Congressional hearings in the case of the Immigration Committee, an arrangement which the President had established with General Swing. When that Committee has dealt with special cases (presumably the admission of defectors to this country under the exceptions procedure

of the McCarran-Walter Act), the President's representative has on occasion drawn the line with respect to the scope of Committee questioning, and the Committee has acceded.

(2) Of course, nobody is going to get into the substance of national security matters; that is out of bounds. That would open up the way for Senators to talk to their constituencies and to the press.

(3) The Jackson Committee at first went far afield, but has now decided to limit the inquiry. NSC discussion is advice given to the President and as such it is privileged.

Mr. Gray indicated that it seemed to him that problems with the Jackson Committee could arise in two ways: First would be the question of release of testimony taken in executive session. This matter could be dealt with by use of the Committee transcript, and Mr. Haskins would not be forced to take a position until after consultation with Mr. McCabe and others. The second and more difficult problem involves the issue of whether a question put to a witness involved substantive matter. At this point the President's representative would find it necessary at least to raise a question with the Committee Chairman.

Mr. Haskins then raised with the President the need for a clear understanding of the exact scope of his responsibilities as the President's representative, pointing out that questions might arise as to the interpretation of the agreed guidelines and particularly as to where the line between substance and procedure was to be drawn.

In response the President made the following points:

(1) That of course Mr. Haskins was not going to the Committee just to sit there as an observer; that it was up to Mr. Haskins to raise a warning light and, should the occasion arise, to say, "Now just a minute."

(2) That Mr. Haskins was not to challenge the Chairman of the Committee, but that he was to point out where in his opinion he thought they were getting close to the dividing line.

(3) That it is far better to stop something in advance rather than to let it get into the record and then have to try to take it out of the record later.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

186. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, July 28, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5906

B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 19 and July 6 and 7, 1959

C. NSC Action Nos. 2103, 2105, 2108 and 2110

The enclosed paragraphs 10, 12-*a*, 15, 16 and 62 for NSC 5906 are transmitted herewith as the basis for Council consideration of the subject at its meeting on July 30 in lieu of the corresponding paragraphs of NSC 5906. These paragraphs have been studied further by the NSC Planning Board as directed by the Council in NSC Action Nos. 2105-*c* and 2110-*a* (6) and the Planning Board has revised paragraphs 12-*a*, 16 and 62 in the light of the Council discussion.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

Enclosure

Revised Paragraphs for NSC 5906

Washington, undated

10. [Par. 8 of NSC 5810/1, amended.]² A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power,

¹ Source: Transmits revised paragraphs of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

² All brackets, except those that indicate footnotes in the original, are in the original.

remaining prepared to fight general war, should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, a danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interest: that it will not pay.

12-*a*. [Par. 10-*a* of NSC 5810/1, amended.] It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. Designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.³

15. [Par. 13 of NSC 5810/1, unchanged.] In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

16. [Par. 14 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to

³ Paragraph 12-*a* of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. [Footnote is in the original.]

defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term is used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The possibility of local aggression involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR is ruled out. Incidents in the NATO area such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept.

62. [New] *Outer Space*. The United States should continue actively [and with a sense of urgency]⁴ to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political purposes.

Objectives should include: (1) a broad-based scientific and technological program in space flight and planetary-interplanetary exploration which will extend human knowledge and understanding; (2) a military space program designed to extend U.S. military capabilities through application of advancing space technology, [only in fields where such applications show promise of offering advantages over other possible means for achieving required capabilities];⁵ (3) a civil space program designed to promote the peaceful uses of outer space; and (4) as consistent with U.S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the uses of and activities related to outer space—for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies for military purposes.

⁴ Treasury-Budget propose deletion. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ Budget-Treasury proposal. [Footnote is in the original.]

187. Letter From Furnas to Smith (S/P)¹

Washington, July 30, 1959

Dear Gerry:

The military paragraphs of Basic National Policy were disposed of by the NSC this morning in a way which I think should please you. There was practically nothing new or interesting in the discussion, and the Acting Secretary took the line set forth in the exchange of telegrams you've seen. Paragraph 12–a stood as written with McElroy's note as a footnote. Twining commented that the language is all right with him so long as it is not a change of policy. He said he would have preferred the old but if the new one is agreed to he will not object. Paragraph 16 as agreed to in the Planning Board was amended only slightly and should cause us no serious trouble. Its main feature is that it leaves open the possibility of non-general war engagements between US and USSR forces so long as "sizeable" forces are not involved. Everyone agreed that the determination as to what is a sizeable force must be a question of judgement and needs to be looked at in individual circumstances. The "Radford Doctrine" is now out. Since paragraph 16 as now agreed to invalidates the present strategic concept and is satisfactory to the Department, Mr. Dillon withdrew our proposed definition of general war in paragraph 10.

The problem in the paragraph on enhancing the nuclear capability of selected allies is not yet fully resolved but will probably be settled before the end of the day. Only JCS is opposed to the version you last saw, and I believe they are coming around.

Attached are copies of paragraphs 12–a and 16 as they came out of this morning's meeting.

Sincerely,

Howard Furnas

P.S. Sorry to miss you next week, but I'm off to Georgian Bay. Glad this ball-game didn't go into extra innings. I feel that we just pushed over that winning run in the last of the ninth. Regards, HF.

¹ Source: Transmits approved revised military paragraphs of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

Enclosure

Approved Paragraphs

Washington, undated

12-*a*. [Par. 10-*a* of NSC 5810/1, amended]² It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. Designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the Preseident.³

16. [Par. 14 of NSC 5810/1, amended] Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, forces should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term is used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The possibility of local aggression involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR is ruled out; incidents in the NATO area such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept.

² All brackets, except those indicating footnotes in the original, are in the original.

³ Paragraph 12-*a* of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. [Footnote is in the original.]

188. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting¹

Washington, July 31, 1959, 9–10:40 a.m.

The following were present:

President Eisenhower

Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for Sec. Herter	Gen. Goodpaster
Sec. Anderson	Mr. Robert Gray
Mr. Thomas S. Gates for Sec. McElroy	Mr. Gordon Gray
AG Rogers	Mr. Harr
Mr. Edson O. Sessions for PMG	Mr. Kendall
Summerfield	Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Fred Aandahl for Sec. Seaton	Mr. Morgan
Sec. Mueller	Dr. Pearlberg
Sec. Benson	Maj Eisenhower
Sec. Mitchell	Mr. Stephens—(in part)
Sec. Flemming	Capt Aurand—(in part)
	Mr. Patterson
Director Stans	
Gov. Hoegh	
Mr. John F. Floberg, AEC	
Dr. Raymond J. Saulnier, CEA	
Dr. Arthur Maxwell, Navy	
Dr. James H. Wakelin, Navy	

[Omitted here is the beginning of the minutes.]

Phase IV of OPERATION ALERT, 1959—Gov. Hoegh noted that the President's original suggestion for this fourth phase was for a 10-day "buttoned-up" period in October. Because many of the relocation sites are on college campuses—which would be active in October—and because of the cost involved, Governor Hoegh recommended an alternate procedure. Since, except for its final communications, the new underground facility at High Point will be completed by October, Gov. Hoegh's proposal is that there be a 2-day "familiarization test" of that facility by members of the Cabinet, other agency heads, and some 650 of the 2750 personnel for whom High Point is their emergency duty station.

The President approved the proposal of the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for Phase IV of OPERATION ALERT, 1959 as follows: (a) A familiarization test of the protected facility at High Point from 10:30 A.M., October 19, to 4:00 P.M., October 20; (b) Participation by heads of departments and major agencies plus 25 per cent of the agencies' emergency staffs designated to operate from High Point (of column three of Attachment B to approved Cabinet

¹ Source: Civil defense exercise and planning. Confidential. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Cabinet Secretariat.

Paper 59–98/1); (c) Specific guidelines for Phase IV to be developed by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in consultation with the interested agencies, through the Interagency Test Planning Group.

Funding of the Delegate Agencies' Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization Function—Gov. Hoegh described the manner in which Executive Branch agencies have been buffeted about by conflicting instructions from the House Appropriations Subcommittees—which this year have all but cut out funds for the “delegate agencies”. (Under this “delegate agency” program, for example, the Labor Department prepares emergency manpower plans, HEW would prepare a HEW post-emergency attack health and welfare plan, etc.—this being considered a more proper execution of departmental responsibilities than to have OCDM itself hire new people of its own to do such planning.)

Gov. Hoegh and Sec. Flemming emphasized that this “game” between the Executive and Legislative Branches has this year turned into a “procedural tragedy”.

The President spoke very strongly about the need for enough non-military defense to ensure that our \$40 billion military defense effort is not wasted. The feeling was expressed that the degree of balance between these two aspects of our national security program borders on the ridiculous; the cuts the House has made in *civil* defense could make our *military* defense nearly useless.

The President expressed his strong conviction that civil defense and defense mobilization activities are as vital to the total national security program of the country as is the armor around a tank; convinced that these activities are in effect armor around our nation and our civilization, the President approved Director Hoegh's initiating steps which would: (a) Bring to the attention of the Congressional Leaders the severe cuts made in the delegate agency financing; (b) Have prepared a supplemental appropriation making up the amount cut below the FY 1960 budget request for the delegate agencies, together with a strong transmittal message setting forth the President's views; (c) Enable an Administration-wide effort to be made, through speeches and other public statements by Cabinet and agency heads (except State and Treasury), to bring forcefully to public attention the vital requirement for balance in our national security program, i.e., an effective non-military as well as military defense.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the minutes.]

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

Copy to:

Mrs. Whitman (2)
Mr. Gray
Mr. Minnich

(Note: This account based on Mr. Patterson's summary memorandum prepared for General Persons' information and on the Record of Action.)

189. Memorandum of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, August 3, 1959, 11:10 a.m.

1. I took up with the President the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of July 30, 1959. I reported to him that the Defense Department wished to add some language to paragraph 16 which he approved. I also pointed out that the Defense Department wished to delete the qualifying clause of paragraph 62 *b*. The President instructed me to leave the language as it was written and asked me to remind the Defense Department that this was language that he had suggested in the Council meeting. The President also approved the small change in the language of the Record of Actions which related to paragraph 58 of NSC 5906 (Mobilization Base).

With respect to paragraph 62 on Outer Space, I reported to the President that there was some unhappiness among the operators, including specifically Mr. Harr and the OCB Staff, about the Council action in deleting references to psychological values. The President had said that he had not intended to eliminate psychological factors and thought that the word “political” adequately took care of the situation. However, he said that in order that no one misunderstand he would put a footnote to the word “political” which would read substantially as follows: “The term political includes consideration of psychological factors.”

2. In connection with space problems, I said to the President that I was concerned about the adequacy of our machinery for dealing with some of the very difficult questions which we will be confronted with in the future. I expressed the view that the Space Council could not be as fully effective as some people had hoped. The President reminded me that he had not sought the creation of the Space Council but had been forced to accept it as a compromise with the Democratic leadership. I indicated that it was not clear to me just what space responsibilities the NSC now had. The President agreed that there probably would arise jurisdictional problems and asked me to prepare a directive for his signature which would go to the Space Council and other appropriate agencies under which the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would be made a sitting member of the Space Council and be given the specific responsibility of dealing with problems arising out of either conflict of jurisdiction or lack of clearly defined jurisdiction. The directive would provide

¹ Source: Basic national security policy; Space Council/NSC coordination. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Staff Memos.

that any problems the Special Assistant could not solve with respect to machinery should be taken to the President.

3. I discussed two 5412 matters with the President, which are the subject of a separate memorandum.

4. I presented to the President a draft of a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, JCS, and the Director, OCDM concerning the President's request for a study of the requirements of the mobilization base under conditions of a nuclear exchange. The President approved the memorandum with one editorial change that he made.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Lay

190. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 4, 1959, 11 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Kistiakowsky
Major Eisenhower

The President opened by asking Dr. Kistiakowsky if he had seen the memorandum from Secretary Gates to General Goodpaster, dated July 27th, on the subject of military department contracts for space activities. The President is primarily afraid of the development of "squatters' rights" by the individual services. He has asked Mr. McElroy to take a look at this subject, and also told Mr. McElroy that if Dr. York is not available to advise him, he should contact Dr. Kistiakowsky. He said that even \$500,000 is a lot of money. Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed, and said that the situation is not quite so bad as it looks, since the total funds allowed would be some \$3.5 million, of which \$2.5 million would go to "systems planning" and only \$1.0

¹ Source: Service involvement in space activities; need for single, global military communications system; ICBM basing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

million in new research. He mentioned that he received a memorandum from General Goodpaster on this subject and was putting together his own comments on the individual programs for submission to the President.

* * *

Dr. Kistiakowsky then gave his briefing, which is appended hereto.

The President had the following comments to make with regard to this briefing:

a. He approved the idea of a single global military communications system, as recommended by Dr. Baker. He took note of Dr. Kistiakowsky's statement that close coordination with Dr. York will suffice to convince the Secretary of Defense of the necessity to develop only one new ambitious system of this type.

b. With regard to ICBM bases, the President agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsky that it is possible that our philosophy of high reliability of missiles is not right. He felt it would perhaps be better to produce cheaper missiles and cheaper dispersed and hidden bases with a much lower level of reliability than we now demand. Conceivably, one group could handle one missile; and each missile could have its target predetermined. In this connection, Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that the inspection conducted by General Betts will probably not save much money on the ATLAS and TITAN programs since the 15 squadrons of these are already programmed for long lead-time items. He feels, however, that his inspection of MINUTEMAN would save a lot of gold plating in that vast program. If the MINUTEMAN becomes as complicated as the ATLAS and TITAN systems, its value is lost.

c. With regard to test talks at Geneva, the President recognized that our problems are getting more complex all the time.

d. As a general comment, the President cautioned against a situation whereby we tend to take the sum total of everybody's optimum requirements and thereby break ourselves. He hopes that the studies on targeting which are being conducted will be helpful in this regard. He also expressed satisfaction at Dr. Kistiakowsky's ferreting out of these trouble areas.

John S.D. Eisenhower

191. Presentation by Kistiakowsky to the President¹

Washington, August 4, 1959

MR. PRESIDENT:

With your permission I will report to you on three subjects: the progress in global military communications; the problem of ICBM bases; and the problem of nuclear test suspension negotiations.

I.

As you know, the three Services are involved in planning global communications systems of a most advanced nature which are not closely coordinated. A panel, headed by Dr. W. O. Baker of your Science Advisory Committee, has been looking into the problems of present and future military; communications and especially into the CRITICOMM System. The main emphasis of its findings is that a great deal of improvement is possible with the present type of communications, by making limited technical changes and additions, and simultaneously aiming toward maximum possible sharing of the facilities by the Services. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics also have been emphasizing the advantages which may result from the improvements in present facilities over focusing of attention on the as yet unproven future developments. Due to these efforts, there has been a gratifying improvement in the handling of critical messages. For instance, the median-average-time for handling such messages is down to 13 minutes this June as contrasted with 52 minutes from June to December 1958. [*text not declassified*] It appears, Mr. President, that the concerted efforts to make the best possible use of the present facilities are bearing fruit and further improvements are definitely to be hoped for.

II.

In response to Dr. Killian's memorandum of last winter concerning the cost and complexity of missile bases, the Office of the Secretary of Defense undertook a study of this problem, and General Betts, who conducted the inquiry, just told me informally about his findings. In essence they are these:

The complexity of earliest missile bases will be almost beyond imagination. An example is that under the floor of the Command Post at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, controlling only three Atlas missiles,

¹ Source: Global military communications; ICBM basing; Geneva disarmament negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

there are 30,000 relays. The Air Force, however, has made earnest efforts to reduce the complexity in the design of later squadrons, while at the same time improving dispersion and hardening. The result is that the fully dispersed and hardened squadrons are expected to cost less than the early installations. The high cost and complexity of the early installations must be largely blamed on lack of experience and the speeded up program, which allowed little time for testing of base designs.

Even in the later installations, there appears to remain some gold-plating. Starting now, changes could be profitably made only in Atlas squadrons after the 8th, and in Titan squadrons after the 6th, since the detailed base designs are already too advanced on the others. The OSD has now directed inquiries to the Air Force as to why certain items couldn't be eliminated or a simplified in the late squadrons, but these are not the major items.

The complexity of the ground installations is very largely due to a high degree of automation. This, in turn, is an unavoidable consequence of the requirement to have a 15 minute response time. Unfortunately, nothing much in the way of simplicity is gained by changing from 15 to, say, 20–25 minutes. To simplify base design drastically one needs to go to manual operations, and that probably means 1 to 2 hours response time.

The fully dispersed and hardened squadrons of 9 missiles each are expected to cost in the neighborhood of \$130 million each. The costs may be higher, however, because the estimates of the cost of hook-up and check-out of ground equipment have been rising from 5 to 15 million dollars per squadron and some people are pessimistic enough to think that they may actually turn out to be some \$30 millions. This part of the program may become the time-controlling factor for achieving operational ICBM force, as it is for Thors in England, because of shortage of competent engineers to do the job.

III.

Since July 23, when Mr. Dillon presented to you a plan for changing the objectives of our Geneva negotiations on nuclear test suspension, I have been trying to analyze the technical aspects of the plan and have discussed the matter with selected members of your Science Advisory Committee, including Dr. Killian.

Recently I presented my considerations to Mr. Dillon and with his knowledge would like to present them now to you. Mr. Dillon wished me to tell you that because of the British reaction to his message and the coming end of the Foreign Ministers Conference, the urgency of talking to Gromyko has been reduced.

As you recall, Mr. President, the plan presented by Mr. Dillon involves approaching Gromyko with the proposal that a treaty be

negotiated for the cessation of atmospheric and outer space nuclear tests, with a complete Geneva monitoring system, except for on-site inspections. There is to be also a joint test program to study seismic monitoring, including tests in big holes. Pending the outcome of such study, the parties to the treaty retain freedom of weapons development by means of underground nuclear tests.

A point to note is that purely theoretical considerations about tests in outer space and underground indicate that in both instances evasion could be achieved by the use of elaborate and costly procedures. The plan which proposes a monitored ban on space tests but postpones a ban on underground tests is therefore technically not self-consistent. The plan calls for a billion dollar monitoring organization, which could not be technically justified for monitoring atmospheric tests, and which provides no complete protection against outer space tests. Moreover, it does not prevent weapons development because of uncontrolled underground tests.

The proposal to undertake jointly with the Soviets the study of seismic monitoring and of means to control evasion involving shots in big holes suffers from another technical weakness. It is impossible to predict how long the investigation will take. Intuitively it seems probable that a sort of a race will develop between improved means of detection and of evasion, and so the operation may drag on for years without conclusive results.

One alternative to the State Department plan is to propose cessation of atmospheric tests, but of no others. Since this measure would involve virtually no aspects of arms limitation, and the monitoring of atmospheric tests can be done from outside USSR, technical arguments for a monitoring organization inside USSR would be weak. We might thus lose the advantages of an organization within the USSR and of a beginning toward arms limitation measures.

Another alternative might be to continue with negotiations for a treaty based on the original Geneva monitoring system, insisting on a sufficiently large on-site inspection quota that an adequate deterrent against invasion by underground tests would result, except by the use of the big holes.

Judging by the past Soviet reaction, they are not likely to accept a hundred or so on-site inspections, and hence the result of such a move might be a suspension of negotiations due to their unwillingness to accept reasonably effective monitoring.

However, they might accept. The question as to whether a treaty which may then result would safeguard our security, cannot be answered on a technical basis, although some technical factors have an important bearing on the over-all conclusion.

The treaty would define a monitoring system which would be admittedly not fully effective. Evasion with up to megaton weapons, but at extremely high cost, would be theoretically possible in outer space. For somewhat smaller weapons, and at somewhat lower but still rather high cost, the evasion would also be theoretically possible underground by using large holes. Both techniques would require major development programs on the part of the Soviets to make them practical and detection proof. The underground technique with its large earth-works would be very sensitive to our presently planned advanced reconnaissance systems.

The technical requirements and uncertainties of clandestine testing underground and in outer space, together with the attendant risk of disclosure by the diverse intelligence sources available to the United States, could constitute an adequate deterrent to USSR evasion—particularly if the Soviets conclude that the technical gains possible through continued testing under these conditions are limited. Whether this adds up to an adequate safeguard for us is consequently not a technical question.

These, Mr. President, are the considerations involved, which I thought might be useful to you if the result of the impending discussions with the British is a change in our tactics at the Geneva negotiations.

192. Note From Buford to Martin¹

Washington, August 5, 1959

Following our conversation this morning regarding the attached alternative sentences in paragraph 16 I notified Jimmy Lay that we much preferred the second alternative but would be willing, if there were some strong objection from other quarters, to accept the first alternative. Jimmy informed me then that Gordon Gray had seen the President this morning on some other matter and in the course of their discussion had shown the President the two alternatives. The President indicated that he much preferred the second alternative. Apparently Mr. McElroy was there or came in shortly thereafter and Mr. McElroy agreed with the President's choice. Mr. Lay therefore is circulating an approved Record of Action incorporating the second alternative.

¹ Source: Eisenhower's preferred revision of paragraph 16 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Mr. Lay also told me that Hadyn Williams of Defense was somewhat upset by this development and indicated that he planned to discuss the matter further with Mr. McElroy.

A. Sidney Buford, III

Attachment

Revised Paragraphs

. . . . The possibility that local aggression could occur in the NATO area or elsewhere involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR is ruled out.

Alternate

. . . . Conflicts occurring in the NATO area or elsewhere involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR should not be constructed as local aggression.

193. Memorandum From Boggs to the NSC¹

Washington, August 11, 1959

SUBJECT

Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Space Programs

REFERENCES

- a. NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1941, 1956 and 2103
- b. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 7 and 10, 1959
- c. NSC Action No. 2081

The enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, for recommending revisions in NSC Action No. 2081-*b*, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Tuesday, August 18, 1959.

Marion W. Boggs
Acting Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Transmits Secretary of Defense's paper on ballistic missile and space programs. Top Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles.

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Enclosure

Memorandum From McElroy to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Washington, August 10, 1959

SUBJECT

Priorities for Ballistic Missile and Space Programs

REFERENCES

NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1941, 1956, 2013 and 2081

At the meeting on 18 May 1959 the National Security Council noted, under NSC Action No. 2081, that the President has established the following programs as having the highest priority above all others for research and development and for achieving operational capability; scope of the operational capability to be approved by President:

(Order of listing does not indicate priority of one program over another.)

- (1) ATLAS (ICBM) Weapon System.
- (2) TITAN (ICBM) Weapon System.
- (3) THOR-JUPITER (IRBM) Weapon Systems.
- (4) POLARIS (FBM) Weapon System.
- (5) Antimissile-missile defense weapon system, including active defense and related early warning for defense of the United States proper.

(6) Space programs determined by the President on advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to have objectives having key political, scientific, psychological or military import.

It is believed that the weapon systems and related programs included in the above listing should be re-examined for the following reasons:

(a) The THOR–JUPITER IRBM programs are well advanced and deployment problems appear to be such that the need for a special priority to procure these items no longer exists. The highest Department of Defense priority will meet the needs of the THOR and JUPITER programs.

(b) The MINUTEMAN ICBM weapon system, now in the research and development stage, has progressed sufficiently to justify the assignment of the highest national priority to this weapon system. The assignment of priority is in consideration of the projected military importance of this system and the demonstrated need for this priority to achieve earliest possible operational capability.

(c) It is believed that the intent of the priority on antiballistic missile defense weapon system, including active defense and related early warning for defense of the United States proper, would be more easily realized by defining the programs now being carried out within this area. The present projects now considered to properly belong within the antiballistic missile defense category are:

- (1) NIKE-ZEUS Weapon System
- (2) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) Phase I, including Project DEW DROP

In view of the above, the following recommendations are presented:

- (a) Delete the THOR-JUPITER (IRBM) Weapon Systems
- (b) Delete the antimissile-missile defense weapon system, including active defense and related early warning for defense of the United States proper
- (c) Add the MINUTEMAN (ICBM) Weapon System (now in research development)
- (d) Add NIKE-ZEUS Weapon System
- (e) Add Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) Phase I, including Project DEW DROP

Attached is a brief description of each project recommended for inclusion in the national priority list.

/s/ Neil McElroy

Attachment 1

Washington, undated

MINUTEMAN (ICBM) WEAPON SYSTEM

The MINUTEMAN program is an Air Force development to provide a second generation intercontinental ballistic missile using 3-stage solid propellant propulsion to deliver thermonuclear warheads on targets up to 6500 nautical miles from launch points.

This project is now in advanced research and development and is approaching component final design. The decision for production and deployment has not been made.

Attachment 2

Washington, undated

NIKE-ZEUS WEAPON SYSTEM

The NIKE-ZEUS is being developed by the Army to provide a defense against all forms of the ballistic missile threat out to a range of 75 nautical miles. An early system demonstration against simulated targets up to 130,000 feet altitude is scheduled during 1961 at the White Sands Missile Range, with full system capability demonstration against actual ballistic missile targets up to 500,000 feet altitude in 1962.

The engineering design of the system is essentially complete and major components are now being fabricated or installed for tests. The decision for production and deployment of this system has not been made.

Attachment 3

Washington, undated

BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (BMEWS) PHASE I, INCLUDING PROJECT DEW DROP

BMEWS is an Air Force project to provide a ballistic missile early warning system with radars to be located at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and a site in the United Kingdom. The system is designed to give warning of a mass ballistic missile attack on the North American continent.

Site I at Thule, Greenland is more than 50% complete. Construction at Site 2 at Clear, Alaska will begin this summer. Negotiations for Site 3 in the United Kingdom will begin in August 1959.

Site 1 will be operational in September 1960, Site 2 in September 1961, and Site 3 approximately 36 months after completion of negotiations with the United Kingdom.

The Air Force Project DEW DROP is a 630 mile long Tropospheric Forward Scatter Communications System which will link the BMEWS station at Thule, Greenland with Cape Dyer, Baffin Island and existing rearward communications to the United States.

The equipment for DEW DROP is already installed and is under final test. The system will be operational in December 1959.

194. Memorandum From Twining to the JCS¹

CM-386-59

Washington, August 24, 1959

SUBJECT

Target Coordination and Associated Problems

REFERENCE

CM-380-59, dated 17 August 1959

1. In reference memorandum I indicated to the Secretary of Defense that he would be advised of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matters discussed in the memorandum.

2. In order to expedite resolution of several issues related to targeting which are hampering current planning, there is provided in the attachment hereto a list of the specific questions for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. I am of the opinion that additional elaborate and time-consuming studies on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not necessary to the resolution of most of the questions set forth in the attachment. Accordingly, I recommend:

a. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the Secretary of Defense their views on the questions posed in the following numbered paragraphs of the attachment by 15 September 1959: Paragraphs 1 *c*, 1 *d*, 2 *a*, 2 *b*, 2 *c*, 2 *d*, 2 *e*, 2 *j*, 2 *k*, 3 *a* and 3 *b*.

b. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the Secretary of Defense their views on the remaining paragraphs by 1 December 1959.

N.F. Twining

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Washington, undated

*SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED WITH REGARD TO
TARGET COORDINATION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS*

1. Strategic Targeting Policy:

a. What should be our policy for development of a national strategic target system?

¹ Source: Target coordination. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files, CJCS 381 (1957-1959).

b. What categories of targets should be included in the national strategic target system?

c. What agency should apply our strategic targeting policy, develop the national strategic target system, and keep it up-to-date?

d. What agency should review the national strategic target system for consistency with policy and approve it as a basis for further analysis?

2. Integrated Operational Plan:

a. Do we need a single integrated operational plan for attack of the national strategic target system?

b. If we do need a single integrated operational plan for strategic attack, what agency should develop this plan? What agencies should review it and approve it?

c. Should any force without an all-weather capability be allocated strategic targets? If so, under what conditions?

d. Should our aircraft carrier forces be relieved of responsibility for H-hour coverage of targets on the national strategic target list?

e. If the attack carrier forces were to be relieved of this responsibility, how should their nuclear attack mission be stated?

f. Is there an immediate need for the establishment of a Unified Strategic Command?

g. If the answer to the above question is negative, is a Unified Strategic Command viewed as desirable for the more distant future?

h. If a Unified Strategic Command is not established in the proximate future, is there a requirement for the integration of operational plans for the employment of POLARIS submarines with CINCSAC's operational plan?

i. If so, how should this be accomplished?

j. Does the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization need policy control of an agency capable of operational analysis and war gaming of operational plans?

k. If so, what agency should perform this function for the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

3. Operational Control of Atomic Strike Forces:

a. As a general policy, should unified commanders having an area responsibility be responsible for H-hour attack of targets on the national strategic target list?

b. Should the operation of the Joint War Room Annexes and the Joint Coordination Centers be continued?

c. Should any additional measures be taken to improve the coordination of forces operating under the operational control of the various commanders?

195. Cabinet Paper¹

C-59-78/2

Washington, September 10, 1959

Proposed Policy on Strategic Materials

For consideration by the Cabinet, attached is a revised brief and Cabinet paper prepared by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization following discussions with the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Administrator, General Services Administration; and the Civil and Defense Mobilization Board.

This paper constitutes the proposed Administration position on stockpile disposals and contains six specific recommendations.

Principal changes include rewording of Recommendation 2 and deletion of Recommendation 6 from the August 20 paper.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization staff report (classified SECRET), and Defense Mobilization Order V-7, entitled "General Policies for the Stockpile of Strategic and Critical Materials," should be removed from the August 20 paper and attached to the revised version.

In considering the attached recommendations, the attention of Cabinet members is called to CP-58-78/1.

Robert Gray*Secretary to the Cabinet***Attachment****Paper Prepared by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization**

CP-59-78/3

Washington, September 30, 1959

THE CABINET***POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO STOCKPILING****Problem:*

Various questions have arisen on strategic materials policy. What should continue to be the basis of stockpiling in the light of the prospective needs and supply capabilities for materials in national emergencies? What should be done about disposal of excess stocks of materials? Should surplus inventories be channeled to Government users, such as

¹ Source: Proposed policy on strategic materials. R-Privileged. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series.

the Bureau of the Mint and arsenals? What preference should be given to disposals from the Defense Production Act inventory? Should a more intensive effort be made to cancel contracts for delivery of materials in excess of stockpile objectives?

Discussion:

1. *Character of the Strategic Stockpile*

The *strategic stockpile* has been accumulated as an industrial materials inventory for meeting military, defense-supporting and essential civilian needs. It contains raw and semi-processed forms of minerals, metals, industrial oils, fibers and certain other materials such as crude natural rubber that are basic to manufacturing. It is not an end-product stockpile to be used directly by ultimate consumers.

2. *History of the Strategic Stockpile*

The *strategic stockpile* originated because of experience of the U.S. in relying on foreign sources of supply for materials that are indispensable to meeting military and other essential needs of the U.S. in time of emergency. The U.S., despite its enormous productive capacity, is seriously deficient in some raw materials. This problem of dependence is recognized in the first section of the postwar Stock Piling Act passed in 1946.

The U.S. is completely dependent on foreign areas for one-third of the 75 materials on the current stockpile list. It is completely self-sufficient in peacetime in only 3 of the materials. These are molybdenum, magnesium and vanadium. In other cases, the U.S. has varying degrees of foreign dependence.

The strategic stockpile as originally established under the Stock Piling Act was on a 5-year basis and had only one set of objectives which assumed partial dependence on foreign sources.

In 1954 following a review by a Cabinet Committee on Mineral Policy, long-term objectives were added which completely discounted for a 5-year period the supplies originating beyond North America and comparably accessible areas. In the same year, the one-year rule was introduced which provided that when a metal or mineral is declared to be strategic and critical the long-term stockpile objective shall not be less than 1 year's normal U.S. use.

Also in 1954 the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act was passed which provided for accelerated barter of agricultural commodities for strategic materials on the assumption that it is better to have non-deteriorating materials with low storage costs than to retain surplus agricultural commodities that are subject to deterioration and have high storage costs.

Early in 1956, all cash purchasing for the strategic stockpile was cut back to meeting needs for a 3-year emergency period, but minimum and long-term objectives were kept on a 5-year basis.

On June 30 last year, the planning period for all stockpile objectives was reduced from 5 years to 3 years. This cutback followed an extensive review by the Special Stockpile Advisory Committee (Pettibone Committee) and by the Executive Branch.

3. Basis of the Strategic Stockpile Objectives

Strategic stockpile objectives generally represent estimated deficits of materials for an emergency period after taking account of the availability of materials from domestic production and imports under emergency conditions.

Requirements are computed to reflect military, defense supporting and essential civilian needs of the U.S. in emergencies. An allowance may be made for exports where the U.S. is the essential source of supply. For example, in molybdenum the U.S. produces most of the total world supply. Therefore, our allies would be dependent on the U.S. for this material.

Estimates of supplies for the emergency period are based on the world-wide availability of materials and the vulnerability of the sources of supply under emergency conditions. Discounts are applied to reflect the risks involved internally in supply countries, the risks of concentration of the source, the risks of overseas shipping and the vulnerability of domestic sources to destruction.

The difference between the requirements estimate and supply estimate is the deficit to be met by stockpiling, unless other measures provide a better solution.

Stockpile objectives are computed at two levels: the basic objective level, which assumes partial dependence on areas beyond North America and comparably accessible areas, and the maximum objective level, which provides a higher degree of security by completely discounting sources beyond North America and comparably accessible areas.

Cash procurement for the strategic stockpile is generally limited to meeting the basic objectives. Only 3 relatively minor materials are now included in the procurement program. These are jewel bearings, diamond dies and amosite asbestos.

4. Requirements for Strategic Materials and Over-all Status of Government Inventories

The grand total requirements for strategic materials would amount to about \$15 billion for a 3-year emergency, or about \$5 billion per year, at December 31, 1958 prices. This requirement is somewhat below the over-all industrial potential of the U.S.

Domestic production would be relied upon to provide considerably more than half the total supply of strategic materials required. This estimate allows for possible loss of the production base where there is

extreme concentration of capacity but does not yet include allowances otherwise for massive nuclear damage.

Imports of strategic materials from nearby areas would be relied upon to provide \$2.3 billion in materials in the 3-year emergency.

After allowing for U.S. production and nearby imports (excluding overseas sources), about \$4 billion in strategic materials would need to be supplied by the strategic stockpile.

Total Government inventories of strategic materials amounted to about \$7.2 billion on December 31, 1958, valued at market prices as of that date. The composition of the inventory was as follows, in millions of dollars:

Stockpile-Grade Materials Having Objectives

Strategic stockpile	\$5,777
Defense Production Act inventory	632
Supplemental stockpile	327
Commodity Credit Corp. inventory (obtained by barter)	245
Tin inventory (residual from Texas smelter)	9
Department of the Interior inventory (domestic purchases)	13
<i>Materials Not Meeting Specifications or Having Objectives</i>	170
	<hr/> \$7,173

The total quantity of strategic materials *on order* for all Government programs, including barter, was about \$865 million on December 31.

Thus the total market value of materials *on hand or on order* was about \$8 billion or about twice the total of the present maximum stockpile objectives.

In view of this status of the strategic materials programs, the two chief problems now relate to (1) the size and character of the stockpile needed in the light of present-day conditions and (2) policy on disposal of materials that are not needed. These problems and collateral policy problems are discussed below.

Recommendations:

Recommendation #1. Determination of Strategic Stockpile Objectives

Determine stockpile objectives on the basis of time required for supplies of materials in a national emergency to match essential needs of the emergency. Until such time as the essential needs of the nation after a nuclear attack (including reconstruction) can be determined by a pending OCDM study, the period of emergency used as a basis for planning will be limited to a maximum of three years; provided that, until such determination is made, the maximum

objective shall not be less than six months' usage by industry in the United States in periods of active demand.

Defense Mobilization Order V-7, issued on June 30, 1958, provided for reducing all stockpile objectives from a 5-year to a 3-year basis. The period applies to various national emergencies during which deficiencies of the supply of basic materials for industry may occur. This action was taken after a review by the Pettibone Committee, Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee, Defense Mobilization Board and National Security Council. The period is being restudied by the National Security Council and is subject to change. Pending a determination of needs after a nuclear attack on the U.S., the planning period would be limited to 3 years, but a shorter period would be used where an analysis would lead to the conclusion that supplies could feasibly match requirements in less than 3 years. (Some of the stockpile objectives currently assume a deficit of supply only over a period of 6 months to 2 years until capacity can be restored to adequate levels or alternate materials can be utilized.)

The recommendation also recognizes that a deficit of materials supply may occur after a nuclear attack on the U.S. Such a deficit, of course, could never be larger than the consuming capacity of industry as rehabilitated and would need to take into account also rehabilitated supply capacity. After a devastating attack, some stockpiles of basic industrial materials in or near consuming areas doubtless would be needed. Generally stockpile objectives established for an emergency short of an attack on the U.S. would be adequate for an emergency after an attack. In some cases, however, the objectives calculated to meet the first contingency are so small that their adequacy for the second contingency may be questionable. The recommendation provides, therefore, that until the needs after a nuclear attack, including those for reconstruction, have been determined, the maximum objectives shall be not less than 6 months' usage of the materials by industry in periods of active demand. This level of the maximum objectives would not require any new purchases but would require retaining some materials that otherwise would be regarded as surplus.

"In establishing requirements of specification-grade nondeteriorating materials, which are mostly metals and minerals, consideration may be given to such factors as increasing essentiality in the light of technological change, special usefulness for reconstruction after a nuclear attack, depletion of reserves, and other pertinent factors."

Recommendation #2. Disposal of Excesses

"Dispose of excesses whenever possible under the following conditions: (a) approval of Departments of Interior, Commerce, State, Agriculture, Defense, and other agencies concerned, (b) appropriate consultation with the industries concerned, (c) avoidance of serious disruption to usual markets

of producers, processors, and consumers, (d) avoidance of adverse effects on international interests of the U.S., and (e) preference to disposal of excess materials from DPA inventories. Generally expedite disposals of excess materials that deteriorate, that are likely to become obsolete, or that do not meet quality standards."

The Stock Piling Act requires that disposals of materials from the stockpile shall give due consideration to protection against disruption of usual markets, and current policy requires that similar protection be provided for disposals from the Defense Production Act inventory. Current policy also requires that disposals shall not adversely affect the international interests of the U.S. Continuation of these policies is recommended.

Expeditious disposal would be favored for (1) materials that are subject to deterioration or obsolescence, (2) nonspecification-grade materials and (3) materials that do not have stockpile objectives. In the case of deteriorating materials, measures other than stockpiling, such as research to develop readily-available substitutes, should be emphasized for meeting emergency needs. Materials that are not directly applicable to objectives also should be available disposal.

Recommendation #3. New Legislation

At appropriate time submit proposed legislation, subject to interagency clearance, to achieve better coordination and management of the diverse stockpile programs.

The Stock Piling Act has not been revised since its enactment in 1946. Meanwhile other stockpile legislation has been added piecemeal. It is believed that a general revision of the legislation should be submitted to recognize changed conditions, especially the greater domestic hazard resulting from nuclear warfare, and to coordinate the various enactments relating to the strategic stockpile, Defense Production Act inventory, supplemental stockpile, and the residual tin inventory accumulated from the operation of the Texas City tin smelter. Proposed legislation has already been partly cleared with agencies concerned. This proposed legislation should be completed and submitted to Congress.

Recommendation #4. Relationships Between Disposals and Barter

Continue using barter to obtain materials within strategic stockpile objectives. Consider establishing more definite standards for determining when to barter for materials beyond maximum objectives. Avoid simultaneous barter and sale of identical materials.

Barter should continue to be used to reduce the Government's cash outlays for the strategic stockpile. Beyond that, there is a need for coordinating barter acquisition policy with disposal policy for strategic

materials. Should the Government, for example, barter for more metallurgical manganese or sell a part of the inventory already on hand?

Recommendation #5. Government Use of Excess Materials

Require Government organizations which use strategic materials directly to use excess inventories when this would be consistent with the over-all disposal policy and in the best interest of the Government.

Channeling of excess strategic materials to Government agencies, such as the Bureau of the Mint, Atomic Energy Commission and arsenals, which are direct users of such materials should be authorized when feasible and consistent with general disposal policy. Required use of the materials in prime contracts and especially in subcontracts, however, is considered to be inadvisable because the quantities on individual contracts would be small and probably would add to the cost of the contracts by departing from normal supply channels, introduce uncertainty that the precise qualities of materials needed could be obtained readily, and unjustifiably complicate the bookkeeping involved. Also such required use would have substantially the same effect as an outright disposal.

Recommendation #6. Cancellation of Commitments

Continue to seek mutually satisfactory cancellation of contracts to deliver excess materials and include possible cancellation by payment of above-market premiums specified in the contracts. This would include payments to contractors on account of anticipated net profits. Negotiations to that end should be conducted in the light of over-all interests of the Government and in the light of possible contract adjustments through cash payment, payment in kind, or barter of excess property.

Current policy authorizing cancellation of deliveries in excess of objectives has functioned satisfactorily, but very little more can be accomplished by further negotiation unless some additional incentives are included.

Implementation: If approved, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will initiate actions, in cooperation with the agencies concerned, to carry out the above recommendations.

Concurrences: Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, BoB, GSA, and all members of the Civil and Defense Mobilization Board concur in the Recommendations as amended.

Attachments: OCDM staff paper on "The Program for Strategic Materials".

196. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting¹

Washington, September 11, 1959, 9—10:40 a.m.

The following were present

President Eisenhower

Mr. Douglas Dillon for Sec. Herter

Mr. Fred Scribner for Sec. Anderson

Sec. McElroy

AG Rogers

PMG Summerfield

Sec. Seaton

Sec. Benson

Sec. Mitchell

Sec. Mueller

Sec. Flemming

Gov. Hoegh

Director Stans, BoB

Mr. Ralph Reid

Dr. Saulnier, CEA

Mr. John A. McCone, AEC

Mr. George Allen, USIA

Mr. J. Roy Price, OCDM (part time)

Mr. Russell H. Hughes (part time)

Mr. Emil W. Reutzel (part time)

Mr. Wm. McC. Martin, FRS

Mr. Bradford Morse, VA (part time)

Mr. Norman Mason, HHFA

Dr. Hugh Dryden, NASA (part time)

Gen. Persons

Major Eisenhower

Mr. Merriam

Mr. Morgan

Mrs. Wheaton

Mr. Harr

Mr. Harlow

Mr. Siciliano

Mr. Kendall

Mr. Gordon Gray

Mr. Robert Gray

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Dr. Paarlberg

Mr. Minnich

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

Stockpiling—Gov. Hoegh went over the Cabinet paper, pointing out the history of stockpiling and outlining the current situation as regards excesses. He explained that the excess resulted from the reduced goals as a result of the three-year concept, the change in strategical concepts, the expansion of some sources of supply, and obsolescence of some materials; of a slightly different nature were the excesses resulting from operations under P.L. 480. He presented several charts giving the quantitative status of selected materials. He pointed out that at present there are over \$7 billion worth of materials in the stockpile, of which \$3.76 billion were for filling established objectives; the remainder is excess.

¹ Source: Approval of policy on stockpiling. Confidential. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series.

Under the proposed plan, \$4.22 billion worth would constitute objectives, leaving an excess of \$2.95 billion.

Gov. Hoegh repeatedly emphasized that disposal of excesses would be undertaken only if the market conditions for the item were satisfactory and if disposal would not adversely affect our foreign relations. He made clear that it is proposed at this time to sell only natural rubber. There will be further interagency discussions prior to any disposal of aluminum. As regards other minerals, the market is not in satisfactory condition at this time.

Gov. Hoegh also stressed the importance of pressing again next year the general legislation which would eliminate the requirement for a six-month waiting period prior to any disposal.

Gov. Hoegh then went over the specific recommendations in the Cabinet Paper. Following this, Sec. Benson inquired whether the three-year requirement was based on estimates of need in an all out war. Gov. Hoegh said the basis was that of a three-year period of emergency, not necessarily related to the duration of any potential war. The President added a word about his own concern with having resources at hand for accomplishing recovery in the event of nuclear attack.

Mr. Stans highly recommended approval since the paper contained all the needed safeguards.

Mr. McElroy suggested that the paper be amended to eliminate the requirement that all the agencies approve each disposal action—something that would be pretty cumbersome. The President said that concurrence rather than approval would be satisfactory but that specific agreement seemed to be needed. Mr. Flemming concurred with the President's view.

Dr. Flemming inquired whether Sec. Mitchell should be consulted because of the relationship of any strike. Sec. Mitchell indicated that satisfactory arrangements for this were already established.

The paper was approved.

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

Copy to:

Mrs. Whitman (2)

Mr. Minnich

197. Memorandum From Allen Dulles to Eisenhower¹

Washington, September 12, 1959

SUBJECT

Soviet Guided Missile Estimate

1. The United States Intelligence Board has this week brought up to date its estimate as to the current status of the Soviet Guided Missile Program. I enclose a copy for your information.

2. In the course of its review the Board made use of a panel of distinguished military and civilian experts involved in our own Guided Missile Program. Their findings and recommendations are also attached.

3. It occurred to me that you might find this latest thinking of ours of use in preparation for your forthcoming talks with Chairman Khrushchev.

Allen W. Dulles

Director

Enclosure

Memorandum From Hyland to Allen Dulles

Washington, August 25, 1959

SUBJECT

Report of DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program

1. This Panel, consisting of the below membership and meeting at your request, has reviewed available evidence relating to the Soviet ICBM program. We have also reviewed the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) report on this subject, dated 21 August 1959 and have discussed their report with the (GMAIC) members.

Mr. L.A. Hyland, Chairman
Mr. Charles R. Irvine
Major General John B. Medaris
Dr. William J. Perry
Dr. W.H. Pickering

¹ Source: Transmits report on Soviet guided missile estimate. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, CIA.

Rear Admiral W.F. Raborn
Major General Osmond J. Ritland
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon

2. Based on the foregoing, this Panel has arrived at the following conclusions:

a. Evidence acquired, primarily at the TYURA TAM missile test range, indicates the Soviets are following an orderly, and effective ICBM program, and intend to acquire a substantial capability at the earliest reasonable date. We believe the Soviets are now testing the initial complete system capable of the intercontinental range required by their needs. Although there is only indirect evidence of KAPUSTIN YAR support to this program, it is considered reasonable that the ranges have been mutually supporting with respect to component testing and shared experience.

b. The Panel believes that a Soviet IOC capability with a very few operational missiles (10)² is at least imminent. This number of missiles, however, represents only a highly limited capability, and an operational capability sufficient to assure the application of effective force in the international field (100 missiles) will probably not be available until late 1960 or later. It is also believed that the Soviet determination as to their balanced needs may result in a deployment of not more than 400 to 500 ICBM's which could be attained by the latter part of 1962. The Panel no longer believes that this latter capability will be obtained in two years after IOC, as the evidence is now firm that the Soviets are not engaged in a "crash" program.

c. Regarding the characteristics of the ICBM at IOC, the Panel finds the subject thoroughly discussed in the GMAIC report and, on most points, generally valid. Two additive statements to the GMAIC report are submitted, however, and in one instance, the Panel favors the minority statement, as follows:

(1) In the area of system mobility vs fixed sites, we find the GMAIC statement well considered. We believe further that whatever the operational launching mode, the Soviet railroad will play a central role in the operational deployment and usage of ICBMs.

(2) The Panel considers the determination of the CEP to be extremely important, but does not find hard evidence to substantiate the CEP figures in the GMAIC report. Recent successes in the U.S. program indicate that achievement of CEPs considerably better than 3 n.m. theoretical and 5 n.m. operational may not be as difficult a problem as initially believed. Recognizing the difficulties of equating U.S.

² There is no evidence to support or deny the present availability of ten IOC missiles. However, the test program observations support the judgment that the ten IOC missile availability is imminent and that the probable production buildup to an accumulation of 100 is reasonable by late 1960 or later. [Footnote is in the original.]

accuracies with Soviet capabilities, the Panel believes the statement should be: "The operational CEP of the Soviet ICBM at IOC will not be worse than 5 n.m. and may very well be better."

(3) Available evidence does not adequately support a probability of more than one basic type ICBM currently being flight tested at TYURA TAM. Variations noted in current test programs could well be achieved through relatively minor modifications. Such changes would also be sufficient to accommodate specific special missions, such as certain space requirements. The current missile should be capable of delivering a warhead of at least 6000 pounds to a range of about 5500 n.m., or with warhead reduced to the order of 3000 pounds could achieve 7500 n.m. range.

d. Positive evidence relative to Soviet ICBM production facilities or operational deployment sites continues to be missing. The Panel believes that intelligence on the status of the Soviet program requires these inputs if it is to be as precise as national security demands. Recognizing that these types of data have not been accumulated on other types of offensive missiles either, some adjudged to have been operational for several years, the Panel giving consideration to collection means available to the U.S. finds this situation alarming.

e. The Panel can see no indications that the Soviet space program has interfered with their ICBM program, nor vice versa. The Panel considers that the Soviet facilities are probably adequate to handle both programs even under a program more accelerated than observed heretofore. While the Soviet space program, observed to the current time, appears to have utilized considerable ICBM hardware, there appears to be no deficiency in reserve missiles or equipment.

3. Available intelligence information continued to be inadequate for assessing the Soviet ICBM threat. We therefore strongly recommend that:

a. All collection concepts capable of providing data on the status of Soviet ICBM accuracy, deployment and production be vigorously pursued.

b. Continued effort be directed toward determining Soviet ICBM characteristics by directing specific attention to the acquisition of readable telemetry data prior to first stage burnout and to the intercepts of the ICBM beacon prior to final burnout. Additional collection should be directed to the reentry phase including the type of nosecone, fuzing and arming techniques, and possible use of penetration aids.

c. Present ELINT capabilities be augmented by passive tracking capabilities such as interferometer techniques.

d. [*text not declassified*] activities be directed toward acquiring data concerning ICBM deployment, production rates and goals, and future ICBM design concepts.

L.A. Hyland
Chairman

198. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, September 16, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy
General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy first discussed with the President a draft memorandum on space and satellite activities that General Randall had sent to me. After discussion, the President indicated his approval of the memo, on the basis of assurances given to him by Mr. McElroy. Mr. McElroy said that Defense is negotiating to turn AMBA over to some agency other than the Army—probably NASA—since it is getting so expensive to support. The President said that the assignments called for in the draft memorandum must be “mutually exclusive,” i.e., when one service has the assignment the others will not duplicate its project. The President asked if all solid propellant work is being assigned to one service. Mr. McElroy said that the advanced research is being done in ARPA, with applications in each of the services. The President asked how Mr. McElroy now feels about the Minuteman project. Mr. McElroy said that Defense feels very good about it, expecting to have operational missiles delivered in FY-63. He commented that our scientists are now expecting that both we and the Russians will achieve increased accuracy. As a result, we must give more consideration to dispersion and mobility, perhaps putting the Minuteman on rail-road firing platforms. The President thought there would be great savings if we can get out of the hardening of missile sites. Mr. McElroy said Defense is going some distance in that direction already, cutting down its hardening to twenty-five pounds to the square inch overpressure rather than one-hundred pounds. The President added that the Titan may be becoming unnecessary. Mr. McElroy said it provides a better booster for missiles of very long range. If our scientists do not see a way of attaining extremely large thrust with solid fuels, there will remain a need for high-grade liquid rockets—undoubtedly using storable propellants.

The President then turned to our financial situation. He said it is getting quite serious, and some would in fact call it desperate. Within a few days we will be paying 5% for six-months' short-term bills. This situation could be eased by printing additional money, but this would make further inflation inevitable. It was a terrible blow to the nation's

¹ Source: Ballistic missiles; budget problems. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on September 18.

welfare that the Congress did not pass the interest legislation proposed. The bankers, some of whom initially opposed the legislation, are now seeing the significance of the situation, are terribly worried, and will be put to work on the Congress at once. He did not rule out the possibility of calling a special session once this additional process had been advanced. Under present trends in FY–60, we are running at an annual rate \$1.9 billion over our estimates, with but a one-half billion dollar increase in our income. An announcement at this time that we expect a deficit this year would really “blow the top” off the money market.

The President thought Mr. McElroy should go to work on the target of reducing military and civilian personnel in the armed forces. He said Mr. McElroy will have to be emphatic in holding the line, and that he will support him.

Mr. McElroy said that major actions are already being taken in the Pentagon along these lines. The Air Force has recommended reducing its own strength by 20,000 military personnel and 7000 civilian personnel. The F–108 project is expected to be cancelled within thirty days. Mr. McElroy said Defense is cutting down on its total outlays, and also on what is being spent overseas.

The President commented in this connection that he is holding \$50 million out of the medical research appropriations from the Public Health appropriation. Mr. McElroy said that he feels Defense has gotten hold of its expenditure rate and is now keeping books on this for the first time. He credited Mr. McNeil with this work, and said that Mr. McNeil had deeply appreciated the nice letter the President sent him accepting his resignation. The President recalled that Mr. McNeil had resisted this type of financial control for several years.

The President said he wanted someone to advise Governor Brucker that, with regard to the new construction starts, we should take our time over preparatory work, and not jump into their initiation. He asked me to be in touch with General Bragdon to get a list of the 67 new starts with the object of working on this right in the White House.

The President said he thought that in General Lemnitzer Mr. McElroy had a very excellent man who would do everything possible to carry out Mr. McElroy's desires. Mr. McElroy said that General Twining continues to wish to withdraw in about mid-year 1960. He said he had asked General Twining if he thought General Lemnitzer would be ready to take on his assignment, and General Twining enthusiastically said he would.

Mr. McElroy then discussed briefly his own personal situation, which requires that a change be made before too long.

Reverting to the subject of the budget, Mr. McElroy said that the Defense Department had taken some medicine and must take a good

deal more. The regrettable thing is that many of the actions now being taken could have been taken a year ago with no or little damage. He thought by hard work we could hold to the present rate of spending but felt that to go below it would be "murder." Because of the gradual increase in unit costs as well as the reduction in credits from MSP, a level budget really is a requirement to cut back. The President said every time he receives a survey of the financial picture it presents the situation in blacker colors. The defeat on the long-term interest rates really hurts us in attempting to put our national debt on a longer term basis. He repeated the sentiment on this is now turning and that bankers are getting worried. Mr. McElroy said that while it is a rough thing to state, we may in fact need a little "shake out" in some of the present industrial excitement to slow things down. The President said that commercial banks are now dumping their government bonds in order to get money for term lending at high rates. He could not imagine anything more contrary to the nation's interest.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

199. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, September 21, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5906/1

B. NSC Action No. 2114-c

The enclosed draft revision of paragraph 59 (Mobilization Base) of NSC 5906/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of a draft submitted by the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization after review of current mobilization base policy pursuant to NSC Action No. 2114-c, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 1, 1959.

¹ Source: Transmits draft revision of paragraph 59 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Also enclosed for consideration by the Council at this meeting is a draft revision of paragraph 64-*f* of NSC 5906/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of its review of the Mobilization Base paragraph.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Enclosure

Draft Revision

Washington, August 29, 1959

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

59. *Mobilization Base*.² The mobilization base consists of the military logistics base and the civilian readiness base and should emphasize those elements that will increase U.S. D-Day readiness and capability.

a. Military Logistics Base.³ The military logistics base should be designed to provide for the forces and the logistic requirements of: (a) cold war (b) opposition to local aggression, and (c) general war. The general objective of the military logistics base is to achieve a degree of war readiness which will provide for meeting foreseeable military contingencies. The highest priority will be placed upon achieving and

²“For planning purposes, the mobilization base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs.

“Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels; state of training; modernization of equipment; mobilization materiel reserves and facilities; continuity of government; civil defense plans and preparedness measures; psychological preparedness of the people; international agreements; planning with industry; dispersion; and stand-by legislation and controls.”

(This is the definition of the term “Mobilization Base” adopted by NSC Action No. 1756, subsequently approved by the President.) [Footnote is in the original.]

³The military logistics base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to the military effort in order to meet foreseeable wartime needs. [Footnote is in the original.]

maintaining optimum readiness for the active forces. To achieve this objective, implementation of the military logistics base planning, in addition to providing for a continuing deterrent (including force and equipment modernization), should be sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of the following:

- (1) Cold war including periods of heightened tension.
- (2) Opposition to local aggression, in accordance with paragraphs 12-a and 16 above, by:

- (a) U.S. active forces, supplemented as necessary, without degrading the general war posture to a militarily unacceptable degree.
- (b) Allied forces, to the extent it is essential they be provided support for combat operations from U.S. resources.

Planning for [illegible in the original] opposition to local aggression will include arrangements for the timely provision of personnel same as and combat essential materiel to insure the continued maintenance of an acceptable general war posture.

(3) General War:

- (a) The active forces as of D-Day.
- (b) The selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission.
- (c) Additional forces necessary for continued support and reconstitution of forces required to achieve national objectives.

Planning for general war will include appropriate consideration of nuclear damage.

b. Civilian Readiness Base. The general objective of the civilian readiness base is to provide for the mobilization and management, for war and survival purposes, of all resources and productive capacity not under military control which can be made available to meet essential military and civilian requirements in any international emergency affecting U.S. national security interests. In developing this base, emphasis will be placed upon meeting the following goals:

- (1) Support of the military logistics base, as set forth in *a* above.
- (2) Implementation of the national policies set forth in paragraphs 58 (Civil Defense), 60 (Strategic Stockpiling) and 64-g (Manpower).
- (3) Maximum feasible support from U.S. trade and other economic policies for both the cold war efforts of the United States and the war-time readiness posture of U.S. industry and that of our allies.
- (4) Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of (measures) essential
- (5) Develop plans essential to recovery in the event of general war.

STATE-OCDM-COMMERCE

to national survival and to retain a capacity for quick recovery in the event of general war.

BUDGET-TREASURY

to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government.

64. *f.* Develop and maintain suitably-screened, organized and trained reserve forces of the size necessary to support the military logistics base (Par. 59–*a*).

200. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, September 29, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5906/1

B. NSC Action No. 2114–c

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 21, 1959

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the enclosure to the reference memorandum of September 21, are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Wednesday, September 30, 1959.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

¹Source: Transmits the views of the JCS on proposed revisions to paragraphs 59 and 64–f of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Twining to McElroy

Washington, September 28, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy—Mobilization Base (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed revisions of paragraphs 59 and 64-*f* of NSC 5906/1 (Basic National Security Policy) submitted by the NSC Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 1 October 1959.

2. It is their view that the proposed revisions are militarily acceptable, except:

a. The subparagraph following paragraph 59 *a* (2) (b). Change to read as follows:

“Planning for *cold war and* opposition to local aggression will include . . . general war posture.”

REASON: The requirements for cold war, as well as those for opposition to local aggression, may affect the posture for general war. This rewording will preserve the intent of this paragraph as contained in the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 24 August 1959, to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum, JCSM-357-59, dated 31 August 1959.

b. Paragraph 59 b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no comment on the divergencies.

REASON: Consideration of the two divergencies in this paragraph will require a decision as to what proportion of its national resources the United States will allocate to Civil Defense. The present divergencies of wording appear to be largely a question of semantics. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are interested in the protection and recovery of the nation should it be subjected to an attack, and therefore any wording which would indicate a policy of at least minimum protection of the civilian population and the eventual recovery of the country is satisfactory to them.

3. It is recommended that the above form the basis of your views before the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

201. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, September 29, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy; Revision of Paragraph 59 (Mobilization Base)

Discussion:

On October 1 the NSC will consider this subject which was deferred during the basic policy review to allow Defense and OCDM additional time to work out an agreed draft revision. The proposed new mobilization base policy would replace a policy in existence since 1957. The main purpose of the changes is to carry out the instructions of the President, who last December asked Defense and OCDM to inject more realism into mobilization planning. He suggested that in view of the likely character of general nuclear war, it is unrealistic to expect, and to plan for, (1) the availability of a six-month period for civilian and military buildup between the beginning of mobilization and the outbreak of hostilities, and (2) a World War II type buildup of forces.

The new policy contains three important changes:

1. *The M + 6 months concept is abandoned.* The new policy does away with the M + 6 months concept and calls for planning for a military logistics and civilian readiness base flexible enough to meet any foreseeable military contingencies, placing the emphasis upon optimum readiness and capability for active forces. The new policy is expected to result in planning involving (a) a somewhat shorter time period than six months for achieving military readiness, and (b) force levels of lesser magnitude, particularly for non-active forces. The exact details of time periods and planned force structures are not yet known and will depend upon the planning experiences of the next few months. It would be unfortunate, however, if Council approval of the new concept were to be interpreted as agreement to further reductions in present U.S. ground force strength.

2. *Planning for general war will now take into account estimates of damage from nuclear attack both on the U.S. and on U.S. forces abroad.* Previously, this problem had been ignored in mobilization base planning because of the difficulty of making such estimates and of factoring them into plans.

3. *The new policy distinguishes between requirements for general war, and those for limited war.* The previous concept was that readiness for general war would automatically satisfy the requirements for limited war because the latter would require only a small portion of the general war resources. The new policy recognizes that there must be separate

¹ Source: Recommends State Department position on paragraph 59 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

readiness planning for limited war because different weapons, combinations of forces, etc., will be involved.

The new policy states the purpose of civilian readiness to be to support the essential military and civilian requirements in an emergency. Subparagraph *b. (3)* is of particular importance to the Department. It is intended to point up the relationship between U.S. trade and economic policies and the civilian readiness base, and to emphasize that such matters as the strength of our alliances and the wartime readiness of our allies' industries, as well as our own, are affected by U.S. tariff policies, import quotas, etc.

The difference of view on page 4 concerns the degree to which planning should include measures essential to *recovery* of the nation after general war, in addition to measures essential for survival. Budget and Treasury believe the explicit mention of recovery will result in greater expenditures (e.g. for stockpiling of industrial and other items) than would be the case under a policy such as the existing one where only survival is named as an objective. OCDM, supported by State and Commerce, considers it appropriate to include *recovery* because that objective is part of OCDM's responsibility, and because recovery must be an integral part of the U.S. objective of survival in general war.

The proposed change in paragraph 64 *f* is to be consistent with new paragraph 59.

Conclusion:

While the Department has no direct responsibility for mobilization planning, the degree of U.S. military and civilian readiness for an international emergency possibly leading to hostilities would exercise considerable influence upon foreign policy alternatives which might be available to the U.S. The new concept appears to be more realistic and workable than the old and should result in more effective measures to improve the readiness posture of the U.S. It also takes account of the importance of planning for a limited war readiness and capability.

Recommendation:

That you concur in the revised paragraph, supporting OCDM in its split with Budget-Treasury.

Concurrence:

E—Mr. Fuqua (in draft)

202. Briefing Note for October 1 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, September 29, 1959

MOBILIZATION BASE

Our first item, Mr. President, is a new mobilization base paragraph for the basic national security policy. When the Council wound up its basic policy discussions in July, this was one of the two paragraphs left in their old form for further work by the agencies. The other one concerned stockpiling, and the PB hopes to be able to present a revision of that paragraph to the Council soon.

In reading this revision of the mobilization base paragraph, you may have noticed that it has been changed considerably in *form*. It is now divided into two sections, one on what is called the “military logistics base” and one on what is called the “civilian readiness base.” This change in form reflects, I believe, the fact that the term “mobilization base” no longer means what it used to. Before the Korean War, the term referred to a foundation on which expansion could take place after general war began. Accordingly, “mobilization base” still suggests all kind of World War II thinking. The PB considered this semantic problem, but decided not to propose a new term at this time.

Turning to the substance of the paper, I should first like to highlight for you the changes in subparagraph *a*, the military section. The first one is the abandonment of the M-plus-6-months concept. This is the second time in the last 2½ years that mobilization base thinking has undergone a drastic change, with all that such a change means for procurement, reserves, industrial planning and so forth. In early 1957 we went from a concept of M-plus-36-months to one of M-plus-6. This substantial step was reflected in our 1957 Basic National Security Policy statement. Defense *now* feels that planning should not envisage a 6-month mobilization, but rather one of smaller proportions. For that reason, the old M-plus-6 language has been dropped, and the more flexible language in 3(c) at the top of page 3 substituted. Paragraph 64–f also has been appropriately revised. The second change in the military section involved the insertion of the sentence on nuclear damage just above the middle of page 3. Although this represents a change in the basic policy paragraph, it is not new policy since it reflects the President’s decision made last December (Action 2019–*b*). A third change does not clearly come through in the text. It consists of Defense’s intention to make separate analyses of general war needs and local war needs. You may know that it has always been assumed in the past that preparation

¹ Source: Mobilization base paragraph of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

for general war would serve also to meet the needs of local war. Now this assumption will no longer be made, and a separate analysis of local war needs will be conducted.

Before we turn to subparagraph-*b*, I want to mention the JCS proposal to add three words to the last sentence on page 2. They would have it read: "Planning for *cold war and* opposition to local aggression will include . . ." Is there any objection?

Are there any other comments on this military logistics base section?

In subparagraph-*b*, the only substantial change proposed is that of going beyond *survival* to plan for *recovery*. Here we have a split, which is shown on page 4. OCDM, State, and Commerce would like to speak of "national survival and recovery," whereas Budget and Treasury would like to retain the language in the old paper, which uses the phrase "survival as a nation." The JCS have made a comment to this effect:

Consideration of this split will require a decision as to what proportion of its national resources the United States will allocate to Civil Defense. The present-language difference appears to be largely a question of semantics. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are interested in the protection and recovery of the nation should it be subjected to an attack, and therefore any wording which would indicate a policy of at least minimum protection of the civilian population and the eventual recovery of the country is satisfactory to them.

Dr. Saulnier is unable to be here today, but he has sent me the following comment:

"I prefer the State-OCDM-Commerce language because it makes quite explicit the need for readiness measures essential to recovery, as well as to survival during the attack. We should take the measures that are truly needed to effect recovery from an attack. Actually, recovery would seem to be implied by the word "survival," so that either alternative could be employed, but I would prefer the more explicit form."

In the absence of Mr. McCone, who is overseas, the AEC informs me that it has no comment on this or any other part of the paper.

CALL ON: Mr. Patterson
Mr. Staats
Secretary Herter
Mr. Scribner
Secretary Mueller
General Twining

In connection with this question of survival and recovery, you will recall that the President recently asked for an informal study by staff officers in Defense and OCDM on the wartime situation which would probably exist following a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the USSR. (Action 2110-*c*)

203. Memorandum of Discussion at the 420th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 1, 1959

SUBJECTDiscussion at the 420th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
October 1, 1959

Present at the 420th NSC Meeting were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Acting Secretary of Defense (Gates); and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary or the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget (Staats); the Attorney General (Item 1); and the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; from the Department of State—the Under Secretary of State (Dillon), Assistant Secretary Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary G. Lewis Jones, and Messrs. Armin Meyer and Howard Furnas; from the Department of Defense Assistant Secretary E. Perkins McGuire and Assistant Secretary John N. Irwin II; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

(NSC 5906/1; NSC Action No. 2114–c; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 21 and 29, 1959)

Mr. Gray said the first item on the agenda was a new mobilization base paragraph for Basic National Security Policy. Some members of the Council might form the impression that the divergence of view reflected in the draft paragraph was a matter of semantics only; actually hidden behind the language differences were policy differences involving billions of dollars. He hoped the Council would discuss the issues which he would point out, and would not devote much time to redrafting the language of the paragraph.

Mr. Gray then began reading his Briefing Note (a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy of which is attached

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Basic National Security Policy. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

to this Memorandum). After Mr. Gray had referred to the sentence in the draft mobilization paragraph dealing with planning ("Planning for opposition to local aggression will include arrangements for the timely provision of personnel and combat essential materiel to insure the continued maintenance of an acceptable general war posture.") and had indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed adding the words "cold war and" before "opposition", Mr. Allen said he would like to find out more about the meaning of "cold war planning", especially as it concerned the timely provision of personnel. Mr. Gray said one illustration of cold war planning was the use made of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets in the cold war. General Twining pointed out that the Lebanon operation was another example of cold war use of military force.

Mr. Gray then completed the reading of his Briefing Note and made some additional comments regarding the "split" between State, Commerce, and OCDM on the one hand and Budget and Treasury on the other. He said it would be possible for the US to develop a high state of readiness for (1) survival (2) survival and rehabilitation, (3) survival, rehabilitation and recovery, (4) survival, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction. Readiness for category (4) would permit stockpiling of anything anyone could think of. Perhaps the niceties of language did not sufficiently emphasize the "split", which he hoped he had not characterized unfairly.

Secretary Herter felt the problem was largely a matter of semantics, involving the difficulty of finding the right language. Providing for recovery was a matter of degree; and the degree was a pragmatic question affected by budgetary and other considerations, including the question of who stockpiles recovery items. Secretary Herter then said his experience in State government led him to raise another question, i.e., the relation of the National Guard to mobilization. He was unable to see where the National Guard fitted into the mobilization policy except in connection with minimum civilian needs and recovery. The principal function of the National Guard as a disciplined group would be to help salvage civilian resources. He wondered how the present concept of the National Guard conformed to a national point of view under nuclear war conditions. State Governors had often suggested that the National Guard be organized in regional commands on the ground that nuclear war would not follow State lines. Of course, the Guard could be "federalized", i.e., placed under Federal jurisdiction. The US was now spending large sums to provide the National Guard with modern war equipment which it might not need if it performed a recovery role. Secretary Herter confessed that he was thoroughly confused as to the National Guard's function in survival and recovery.

Mr. Gates said the old mobilization base plan provided for forty to sixty National Guard divisions integrated with the Army. Some vestiges of this kind of thinking still remained in the military services. In

a new mobilization policy it would be desirable to be specific about National Guard functions. However, the practical problem was a political one; neither the National Guard nor the Army would agree to the proposition that the Guard should become a militia to enforce martial law under conditions of nuclear attack on the US. Mr. Gates, on the contrary, was sure the National Guard would become just such a militia. Enforcement of martial law had been openly adopted as a mission for the National Guard in Canada. Our dilemma is that we know what the role of the National Guard will be in nuclear war, but we can't put it down on paper.

Secretary Herter wondered whether the issue should not be met head on. Mr. Gates said that in any future war our mobilization base will be what we have in readiness on the day of the attack. Nevertheless, Congress continues to legislate for the National Guard on a different basis. It would be more realistic to assume that in the event of nuclear war, the National Guard will be federalized and will enforce martial law. Secretary Herter felt it was foolish for the Federal Government to provide the National Guard with expensive equipment which it might never use.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the draft mobilization paragraph, under the heading "general war," referred to active forces, selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission, and additional forces. Mr. Gates said the issues raised by the language of the paragraph were not identical with National Guard issues. Mr. Gray suggested that the draft paragraph might perhaps make it clear that planning is under way and direct the responsible agencies to submit proposals which would be specific as to recovery stockpiles. Not much progress would be made by leaving fuzzy language in the paragraph.

The Attorney General thought that since the Government could not continue after a nuclear attack unless the country recovered from the attack, there was little difference between the alternative versions of the draft paragraph. Secretary Mueller said Mr. Gray's suggestion would allow for greater flexibility. Mr. Gates agreed that the paragraph could be completely "open-ended."

Mr. Scribner thought that if the language of present policy were changed, the change would indicate to those Government officials who desire an expansion of the mobilization base that expansion is possible. The Attorney General felt that if the purpose of the draft paragraph was to give a signal to the staffs of the various agencies, the signal should be given in more precise terms. Mr. Gray suggested the Council might regard the draft paragraph as a paragraph for planning purposes and ask Defense and OCDM to submit the programs contemplated.

Mr. Patterson said the draft paragraph, if adopted, would be authority to develop proposals for consideration through the budgetary

process. He felt the mobilization pattern had been set in US Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904/1) and in the Strategic Stockpiling question considered by the Cabinet. It was difficult to define the terms, but survival and recovery were recognized as essential objectives. Language which did not include both these terms could carry the implication that no measures for recovery would be included in the mobilization base. He felt the NSC would not wish to be put in the position of hamstringing recovery.

Mr. Staats said the Bureau of the Budget was concerned lest the language proposed by State, OCDM, and Commerce in the draft paragraph indicate to some that large recovery stockpiles would be established. If the mobilization base paragraph was being formulated for the first time Budget would not feel so strongly, but in contrast to existing policy the State-OCDM-Commerce proposal placed undue emphasis on recovery. Mobilization planning was covered by existing law and policy. Stockpiling had been considered by the Cabinet, which had directed a further study. He would prefer to postpone further consideration of this paragraph until the stockpiling study was completed, at which time the Council would be in a better position to judge the implications of the proposed policy language. The State-OCDM-Commerce proposal prejudged the stockpiling study and might also require a change in the law, since it went beyond the language of the OCDM statute.

Mr. Patterson felt it would be undesirable to postpone a policy decision on mobilization pending the outcome of a study of one phase of stockpiling, which would require nine months or a year. Such a postponement would put the brakes on progress and planning. He wondered what harm there would be in adopting a mobilization paragraph which would merely provide the opportunity for mobilization programs to be considered on their merits in the normal process of government.

Secretary Herter asked whether assumptions for the study called for by NSC Action 2110-c (the wartime situation which would probably exist following a nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR) had been worked out. Mr. Patterson answered in the affirmative. Secretary Herter said he seemed to recall that Dr. Kistiakowsky thought there were no agreed assumptions as to the extent of nuclear damage.

Mr. Gray believed the Net Evaluation study provided as satisfactory a crystal ball on damage as anyone was likely to find. He suggested amendment of the draft paragraph by striking the words "maintenance in a high state of readiness."

Mr. Scribner said measures essential to survival as a nation ought to be kept in a high state of readiness. No one objected to recovery; the question was whether scarce resources could best be used for defense

or for recovery. He suggested a subparagraph on survival and a separate subparagraph on recovery.

Mr. Gates suggested the word “plans” might be used instead of “measures.” Mr. Gray said this wording would enable OCDM to move ahead. The Attorney General confessed that all the drafting proposals so far advanced seemed to him to have exactly the same meaning.

Secretary Herter said the words “develop and maintain” were of key importance; these words meant that whatever plan is developed goes immediately into force.

At Mr. Gray’s suggestion, Mr. Scribner restated his proposal as follows: “(4) Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of measures essential to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government (5) Development of plans essential to national recovery in the event of general war.”

Mr. Patterson asked what was meant by “minimum civilian needs.” Mr. Gray said OCDM had been operating under this phrase for several years. Mr. Patterson said that under the formula “minimum civilian needs” there was nothing to prevent the minimum being reduced. Mr. Gray wondered whether OCDM wanted to do anything it could not do under the Treasury proposal. He suggested that the Treasury language might be adopted while sympathy might be extended to OCDM.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the draft revision of paragraphs contained in NSC 5906/1, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 21, 1959; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 29, 1959:

(1) Paragraph 59 (Mobilization Base), prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of a draft submitted by the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization after review of current mobilization base policy pursuant to NSC Action No. 2114-c.

(2) Paragraph 64-f (Manpower), prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of its review of the Mobilization Base paragraph.

b. Adopted as a recommendation to the President the revisions of paragraphs 59 and 64-f of NSC 5906/1 enclosed with the reference memorandum of September 21, 1959, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 2, subparagraph 59-a-(2):* In the last sentence of this subparagraph, insert the words “cold war and” between “Planning for” and “opposition”.

(2) *Page 4, subparagraph 59-b-(4):* Include the Budget-Treasury version in the right column, delete the State-OCDM-Commerce version in the left column, and add the following subparagraph (5):

“(5) Development of plans essential to national recovery in the event of general war.”

c. Agreed to recommend to the President that the following be presented to the Council at the earliest practicable date: A report by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization presenting a general description of the anticipated effect on the current mobilization base program of the policy on the "Civilian Readiness Base" contained in the above-mentioned paragraph 59-*b* of NSC 5906/1.

NOTE: The actions in *b* and *c* above subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.

The revisions of paragraphs 59 and 64-*f* of NSC 5906/1, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of that paper.

The recommendation in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

204. Memorandum of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, October 12, 1959, 10 a.m.

1. I first discussed the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of 1 October. I reported to the President that Secretary of State Herter presided in the absence of the Vice President. I discussed the action on the new mobilization base paragraph which had been agreed upon in the Council and recommended for his approval. I pointed out to him that the new paragraph is divided into two sections: one is what is called "Military Logistics Base" and one on what is called the "Civilian Readiness Base." As far as the Military Logistics Base was concerned, the M-6 months concept has been abandoned and the period will be something shorter. Also, the military section involves the addition of a directive on nuclear damage. Finally, the new language, although not explicit, reflects the fact that Defense and JCS have accepted a new approach and will make separate analyses of general war needs and local war needs. I reminded the President that in the past the JCS had taken the position that preparation for general war would serve also to meet the needs of local war.

With respect to Civilian Readiness, I pointed out to the President that the policy now would require a high state of readiness of measures

¹ Source: Mobilization base, Service roles and missions, international information activities report, long-range planning, VOA broadcasting, organization for space activities, future NSC activities, and Berlin. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President. Drafted October 14.

for survival, specifically including minimum civilian needs and continuity of Government. With respect to recovery in the event of general war, the policy would direct planning towards this end. I pointed out to the President that no one at the moment was quite sure about the extent and nature of recovery measures and the Council had not felt it prudent to direct that these be maintained in a high state of readiness. I also pointed out to the President that the action called for a report from OCDM as to what the planning would involve so that the President could then have a judgment as to what measures should be directed. The President said he thoroughly agreed with this approach.

With respect to the request that OCDM make this report, I indicated to the President that the Draft Record also requested Defense to report on the general effect of the changes in the military section. I indicated that I was encountering considerable resistance from Defense and JCS to the inclusion of this request in the Record of Actions largely at least on the ground that it was not specifically agreed upon in the Council meeting although I had indicated an intention to call for a report. I said that the JCS particularly felt that too many requests for studies were being levied upon them by the NSC. I told the President that I was in negotiation with respect to the inclusion of this request for a study, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with General Twining, and that I would include it if I could get their agreement; otherwise, we would approach the problem in a different way.

In this connection I told the President that we were having considerable difficulty in getting ahead with some of the studies which had been requested. For example, I reported that the Maritime Study had come back without the factoring-in of nuclear damage and that I had declined to accept the report for the Council.

The President then said that with respect to our problems for the future, perhaps he would get Secretary McElroy and the Chiefs to go again to some point removed from Washington and their staffs, to discuss the question of where we were really going with respect to our military establishment. He wonders whether we're facing up realistically to the problems ahead and said that he was not too impressed with the continuation of our thinking on the basis of roles and missions for particular services. I indicated to the President that I thought the Chiefs were working very hard at their problems despite their fundamental differences and the President agreed, saying that he thought that this was about the best set of Chiefs of Staff that he had had in his administration.

We discussed then some of the fundamental differences such as those deriving from the question of "how much is enough" of retaliatory capability.

2. I then reported to the President on the new policy for Finland.

3. I reported to the President that I had done nothing with respect to recruiting members or staff for the new committee to review the report of the old President's Committee on International Information Activities because Mr. Sigurd Larman had been out of the country and was due back only that day. However, I had arranged for quarters and financing. The President said he continued to think well of having Mr. Larman as the Chairman and authorized me to explore the matter with Mr. Larman, agreeing, if necessary, to write him a letter.

4. I then again discussed with the President the proposal of the Institute for Defense Analysis to broaden its interests and capabilities to include economic, social and political fields so that it might be in a position to make studies for the government in non-military fields just as it had done on weapons systems. I reported to the President that except for OCDM the departments represented on the Council took a rather negative view of the IDA proposal. I said to the President that I was reopening the question because I was still convinced that in some way we should try to do long-range planning, or at least thinking, in economic and political fields as well as in the military field and, I did not think we had adequately faced up to the problem. Furthermore, I reported that there was developing in many quarters an interest in such a thing and described to him as an example, the proposed University of Chicago group under the leadership of Dr. Bothwell and I said that something similar was going on at Ohio State University and other places.

The President then said that this was the kind of thing that he was now thinking about for his National Goals Commission for which, of course, he had been unable to get financing. I suggested to the President that there might be a possibility of combining the National Goals Commission with the kind of proposal that was coming out of IDA and the University of Chicago with the purpose of obtaining financing. For example, Dr. Bothwell had indicated that the Foundations would look favorably upon his proposal if they were satisfied with respect to leadership and also with respect to some sort of sponsorship or interest on the part of the Federal Government. The President seemed interested in this approach and I offered to discuss it with General Persons.

5. I then reported to the President on my discussions with Secretary Herter and with Mr. George Allen with respect to the objectivity of the Voice of America broadcasting in relation to the President's discussion with Premier Khrushchev about jamming. I said that Mr. Allen agreed with the prescription but felt he still had some problems which he would like discussed with the President. As an example, he did not know quite what to do with a situation as was involved in Mr. Walter Robertson's speech to the United Nations concerning Communist China, which was made of course as an official representative of the U.S. This was not

propaganda cooked up by USIA but simply the reporting of an event. However, Premier Khrushchev would probably take offense at it. The President observed that he could see some of the difficulties but wondered whether the Voice of America could not simply forego broadcasting this particular item to the Soviet Union but proceed with broadcasts to the Far East and Asia, for example.

6. I reported to the President that I detected mounting unrest not only in Government but out of Government, about our organization for space activities. I said that there was not only an inherent friction between the military establishment and the space agency which would always derive from jurisdictional problems but there was beginning to be thoughtful concern from outside of Government. As an example, I described the visit of Mr. Ralph Davies from the Management Consultant firm of Klein and Saks, who offered the services of his firm in developing a most effective organization within government. I acknowledged to the President that this matter was not precisely within my charter. However, I said it seemed to me that this was becoming a very important problem and one which would get increasing visibility.

The President said that he had always felt that the emphasis on space should be on peaceful uses and that the Defense interest should develop only when a specific military application was clearly discernible. I said that there was a question of whether the Army Ballistics Missile Agency should stay under the Army or be transferred to the Space Agency. The President indicated that his personal view was that it should be so transferred and that Mr. McElroy had demonstrated an interest in this matter by memorandum just before he left on his current trip.

I asked the President if he had anything specifically before him on the general problem and he indicated that he did not. I then agreed to discuss it with General Goodpaster.

7. I then said to the President that I would like to talk to him for a few minutes about the posture, character and activities of the National Security Council in the next 15 months. I said that perhaps the problem might be stated in an over-simplified way: as to whether the Council should be an active or a passive body. I said to the President that I wished to take the liberty of observing that for my own part I was eager to serve him in any way he found my services useful; that I was not interested in being a custodian or a caretaker. I said that with respect to what is now being called "The Thaw" might require many revisions of many papers if the thaw was really meaningful or if it was not, in the nature of the things we may have very little paper work to do in the next 15 months. In the last months of the Administration there would probably be little in the way of development of new policies and we would probably find ourselves running out of backlog. At this point the President interrupted to say that he did not think that the thaw really

was a thaw and that he immediately saw no basis for contemplating serious changes in our overall policies.

I then said to the President that he many times had indicated his impatience with too many papers and too much fussing with language. He replied that General Cutler had never been able to bring himself to present matters to the Council for discussion but preferred the academic approach of wrestling with language. He said that what he would like to do in the next 15 months would be to spend the time of the Council in discussing the major problems facing the Government. I then said that I would like to make three points: First, there would continue to be some policy papers, which the President acknowledged. Second, that it was important that the discussion topics be dealt with in some sort of framework or the meetings would be incoherent and range over too wide a variety of problems without being productive. I reminded the President of the meeting following his stag dinner on September 10 in which the discussion was disorganized and diffuse. He agreed, saying that unless there were some guidelines the Council would find itself discussing the World Series. Finally, I pointed out to him that in some important matters there had been what I called "exclusions" that is to say, that he had expressly not wished the Council to deal with certain matters.

I referred first to disarmament and said that I acknowledged that the Council should probably not discuss disarmament until the Coolidge Report is completed but at that time I thought the Council should get into this field. Second, I pointed to discussions for preparation for Summit meetings which had not really been discussed in the Council. I reminded him of the old Summit Committee which had not really ever been active. Third, I pointed out that the Council had really never gotten into serious consideration of all the problems relating to NATO. With respect to the latter the President said that this would be a very real problem for us in the months ahead because of the necessity of U.S. troop reduction.

At this point the President said that he was still thinking about the Berlin and German situation. He said that if we make the assumption that East and West Germany are not to be reunited in a decade, which appeared to him to be the only assumption that can be made, then what is our solution for Berlin? He felt that we might get something which Chancellor Adenauer could live with. The President felt that we should continue to maintain such forces in Berlin as an indication that our position has not changed at all. In any event, he felt that this might be a topic of fruitful discussion.

The President then said he did not wish to think in terms of any exclusions in the months ahead and that the Council should discuss every problem of consequence which was in its field of interest.

The President then said that he looked upon the Council and its machinery for the next few months as follows: First, he would like to keep the OCB and the Planning Board active in their respective roles. As for the OCB he wanted it to continue to study and review progress under our policies and to make a decision whether to recommend any change in the policies. On the other hand, he wished to keep OCB paper work at a minimum and OCB reports at a minimum, consistent with the guidelines he had previously established.

As far as the Council itself, and the Planning Board are concerned he would like to devote a major portion of the time to an identification on what is going on and what we should be doing about it and a discussion of these problems.

He felt that we should spend more time in discussion, and with respect to many topics discussed there need not necessarily be a Record of Actions.

For example, he cited the changing face of war and what that means to us now and in the future.

He said we were not adequately thinking of the great problem of the U.S. in sustaining itself in the free world which must grow in morale and economic strength.

He said that we must address ourselves to those countries on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass which the USSR can destroy without war.

He said that with respect to whether the Council should be active or passive he had never allowed any of the members of the Council an excuse to be away from the meetings. This was one reason why he attended meetings regularly himself. If we were to drift toward attendance by deputies and under secretaries there would be no point in his participating. He therefore continued to think of the Council as an active vigorous body and not as a passive one.

I then summed up to the President, saying that on the basis of this discussion, it seemed to me that we would be dealing in the Council for the next few months with three main types of items: First, of course, would be the necessary new policy papers or revised policy papers. Second, the Council would devote itself more to the discussion of major problems and policies which might or might not result in a Record of Actions. Third, out of the Council meetings in the next 15 months would come some policy decisions but that there would also come, what the President has frequently referred to as "legacies of thought" for the next Administration.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

205. Memorandum of Discussion at the 421st NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 15, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 421st Meeting (Special) of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 15, 1959

Present at the 421st (Special) Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense (Gates); and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget (Staats). Also attending the meeting were the Members of the Comparative Evaluation Group (Mr. Gerard C. Smith for the Under Secretary of State; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Hull); the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); Vice Admiral John H. Sides, USN, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; Lt. General Earl W. Barnes, USAF (Ret.), Central Intelligence Agency; J. Patrick Coyne, Secretary, Comparative Evaluations Group; Brig. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Richard Dubois, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group; Colonel Earle MacFarland, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency; Major John Eisenhower, Assistant White House Staff Secretary; and Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC.

For a summary and discussion of the main points taken at the meeting see the File on COMPARATIVE EVALUATION GROUP in Mr. Lay's Safe (3rd Report) and the following Record of Actions.

1. COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS GROUP

(NSC Action No. 2004; Note following the Record of Actions for the 404th NSC Meeting; NSC 5908)

Noted and discussed the third report of the Comparative Evaluations Group, pursuant to NSC 5908, as presented orally at the meeting by the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Comparative Evaluations Group; Agenda item 2: Outer Space Science and Technology; Agenda item 3: History of the Development of Long-Range Guided Missiles Weapons Systems. Top Secret. Extracts—3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

2. OUTER SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Noted the President's request that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, with the participation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other interested departments and agencies, arrange for the preparation of a study, to be presented to a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the National Aeronautics and Space Council, appraising the relative capabilities of the United States and the USSR in the field of outer space science and technology.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President as of October 26, 1959, transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Administrator, NASA, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate implementation.

3. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE GUIDED MISSILES WEAPONS SYSTEMS

a. Noted the President's request that the Secretary of Defense arrange for the preparation for the President during the next three months of a factual history of the development by the United States of long-range guided missiles weapons systems (including ICBMs, IRBMs, fleet ballistic missiles, and aerodynamic long-range missiles).

b. Noted the President's request that the Director of Central Intelligence arrange for the preparation for the President of a history of the development by the USSR of long-range guided missiles weapons systems, complementary to the study referred to in *a* above.

NOTE: The action in *a* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

206. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, October 21, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Glennan, Dr. Dryden, Mr. Horner, General Persons, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Secretary McElroy, Secretary Gates, Dr. York, General Twining, Mr. Staats, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. McCabe, General Goodpaster

Dr. Glennan said the group had come in to discuss the transfer of ABMA to NASA. Underlying considerations were that there is not a clear military requirement for a super-booster, whereas in the field of space activities there is a need to go ahead with the development, and the program should be based on a single super-booster. At the present time there are two programs each of about \$3/4 billion total. If these are put together the total cost would be between \$3/4 billion and \$1 billion, rather than a billion and a half. Mr. McElroy said this matter has been thoroughly discussed in Defense. The President asked whether Governor Brucker had been in these discussions. In this connection he said he had no doubt that Brucker was ready to carry on loyally once a decision was made. Mr. McElroy said that the Army is now out of the space business, and is well resigned to an alternative use of ABMA. There were two options—to turn it over to NASA or to the Air Force. The JCS have looked at the problem and have concluded that it would be better to retain the agency in the Department of Defense. The office of the Secretary of Defense, however, favors a transfer to NASA.

The President asked how ABMA would handle the Pershing missile if this change were made. Mr. McElroy said that the Army can handle the Pershing missile other than at ABMA. Mr. McElroy said there are two questions. First there was now a divided project for a super-booster, and this should be consolidated. Second, there is the question whether ABMA should go to NASA or elsewhere. On these, he thought that the big booster responsibility should be shifted to NASA and that the ABMA group should be shifted to NASA to work on it. The President said he saw no sense in Defense having a super-booster project. Defense should take advantage of the NASA work. In fact, he saw no problem in this except the possibility of a morale problem at ABMA. Mr. McElroy commented on one further point. Over the years he said the U.S. has given fluctuating support to science. He acknowledged they had also given fluctuating support to defense. However, the

¹ Source: Transfer of ABMA to NASA. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on October 23.

Defense people thought there is better assurance of public support for a large booster project over the years if it is put in Defense than if it goes into a civilian agency. The President did not give very much weight to this consideration.

The President then commented that this shift will force us to focus on the development of a super-booster, which to him is the key to a leading position in space activities. Dr. Glennan commented that there will still be need for interim vehicles and for collateral NASA activities. He commented that if ABMA is transferred, with a \$140 million budget for FY-61, he could foresee saving approximately half of this out of the consolidated activity. The President said that a caustic budget review of space activities is required. The question is one of priorities. He thought the super-booster is the key to successful competition and we should concentrate on that. He recalled his principle of attacking one enemy or one principal objective at a time. The NASA budget must go through the whole process of review. He recognized that there are of course many things—instruments, payloads, etc.—which must be brought along in order to make effective use of the booster when available.

Dr. Glennan then presented the gist of the Defense/NASA proposal on the transfer (as set out in the joint letter of himself and Mr. McElroy to the President).

The President said that this field breaks into three main elements in his view. The first is that we must get what Defense really needs in space; this is mandatory. The second is that we should make a real advance in space so that the United States does not have to be ashamed no matter what other countries do; this is where the super-booster is needed. The third is that we should have an orderly, progressive scientific program, well balanced with other scientific endeavors. He thought that these efforts should be carried out in agreement between DOD and NASA, efficiently and wisely. To this end he thought this transfer was a good one to make. He thought, however, that there is need for Defense and NASA to do a real job with ABMA and the Army in order to get them to understand the reasons for the transfer, and not only accept it but support it.

Mr. McElroy said there will not be a perfect meeting of the minds. He anticipated that Congress will bring out whatever dissent exists. The President said he is more interested in good working relations between NASA and Defense. NASA can do a fine job of service to Defense, as NACA did before it. He stressed that this must be carried down and explained to the people really involved, however. He then raised the question whether the transfer should be announced at once or whether some time should be spent explaining it to the people involved. Dr. York commented that there had been so many leaks on the matter that an announcement seemed imperative.

Secretary Gates repeated that there would be controversy over this in the testimony given to the Congress. The President intervened at this point saying it never would have occurred to him in his military service, once a decision had been made by higher authority, to make public his personal convictions where they differed from this decision. He said he would like to see the next Quantico Conference devoted to loyalty—to the principle that when a decision is made all join in carrying it out. Mr. Gates said that many people in the military service think that there will be a requirement on the part of Defense for a super-booster and would like to keep an “in-house” capability for the production of such a booster in the Defense Department.

Dr. Glennan said he saw two problems in making an announcement—the first pertaining to the group at Huntsville and the second to the Congress. The President said that Congress will not have the courage to get into this matter if there is not too much dissension within Defense. He then outlined the kind of announcement he had in mind—stressing his admiration for the fine performance of ABMA, its tremendous accomplishments under Army aegis, and the need for bringing this talent to bear on a consolidated super-booster program. He asked for a draft announcement along these lines to be furnished to him for release later in the day at Augusta.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

207. Memorandum From Gates and Glennan to Eisenhower¹

Washington, October 21, 1959

SUBJECT

Responsibility and Organization for Certain Space Activities

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have agreed upon, and recommend to the President, certain actions designed to clarify responsibilities, improve coordination, and enhance the national space effort. The actions recommended below are consistent

¹ Source: Responsibility and organization for certain space activities: transfer of ABMA to NASA. No classification marking. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

with the steps taken by the Secretary of Defense to clarify responsibilities and assignments in the field of military space applications within the Department of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator have agreed upon and recommend to the President the following actions:

A. The assignment to NASA of sole responsibility for the development of new space booster vehicle systems of very high thrust. Both the DOD and NASA will continue with a coordinated program for the development of space vehicles based on the current ICBM and IRBM missiles and growth versions of those missiles.

B. The transfer from the Department of the Army to NASA of the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, including its personnel and such facilities and equipment which are presently assigned and required for the future use of NASA at the transferred activity, and such other personnel, facilities and equipment for administrative and technical support of the transferred activity as may be agreed upon.

C. The provision by the Army to NASA of such administrative services as may be agreed upon to effect a smooth transition of management and funding responsibility of the transferred activity.

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA are in agreement on the following:

1. The nation requires and must build at least one super booster and responsibility for this activity should be vested in one agency. There is, at present, no clear military requirement for super boosters, although there is a real possibility that the future will bring military weapons systems requirements. However, there is a definite need for super boosters for civilian space exploration purposes, both manned and unmanned. Accordingly, it is agreed that the responsibility for the super booster program should be vested in NASA. It is agreed that the recommendations to center this function in NASA and to transfer the Development Operations Division of ABMA to NASA are independent of any decisions on whether either or both of the super booster systems currently under development are continued in their presently conceived form.

2. The transfer of the Development Operations Division of ABMA shall include transfer of responsibility for Saturn, together with 1960 funds allocated for the project, and transfer to the NASA 1961 budget of such amounts as may be approved for this project in the 1961 Department of Defense budget.

3. In carrying out its responsibilities, NASA will keep the Department of Defense thoroughly and completely informed on its booster program and will be fully responsive to specific requirements of the Department of Defense for the development of super boosters for future military missions as requested by the Secretary of Defense.

4. It is NASA's intent to center at the transferred activity the bulk of its space booster vehicle systems work, including an appropriate research and development effort, and ultimately, substantial responsibility for NASA launch operations.

5. It is agreed that NASA will provide support to the Department of Defense and military services at the transferred activity in the same manner as it now does at all other field centers.

6. The management and employment of the transferred activity will be the responsibility of NASA, and no commitment is possible with respect to levels of staffing or funding for the operation. NASA, however, will make every possible effort within its responsibilities and resources to utilize the capabilities of the Development Operations Division of ABMA.

7. The transfer of personnel, facilities, and equipment will be on a nonreimbursable basis.

8. The Department of the Army will provide and maintain on a reimbursable basis station-wide services as required by NASA within the Redstone Arsenal complex.

9. NASA will provide for continuation, transfer, or phasing out of military projects under way at the transferred activity as may be requested and to the extent funded by the Department of Defense, and will undertake at the transferred activity such additional military projects as may be agreed upon by NASA and the Department of Defense.

10. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and NASA, recognizing the value to the nation's space program of maintaining at a high level the present competence of ABMA, will cooperate to preserve the continuity of the technical and administrative leadership of the group.

11. The detailed implementation of the actions proposed will be accomplished through the subsequent negotiation of cooperative agreements between the Department of Defense and NASA.

The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA have reached agreement and recommend approval of the above actions in the firm belief that the national space effort requires a strong civilian agency and program and a strong military space effort by the Department of Defense, and clear lines of responsibility and authority if the U.S. is to employ its best efforts in the exploration of outer space and to assure the defense of the nation.

If the President approves the recommended actions set forth in A, B, and C above, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA will proceed immediately to form the necessary staff teams to develop the required implementing documents.

T. Keith Glennan
Administrator, NASA

Thomas S. Gates
Acting Secretary of Defense

208. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, October 29, 1959

SUBJECT

Force Cuts Discussion with DOD on October 24, 1959

I have read the memorandum of the conversation which you had on October 24 with Secretaries Anderson, McElroy and Gates about the possibility of force cuts abroad.

Having given a good deal of attention for some years to the subject matter of that conversation, I thought that a few observations might be of some use.

I gather that the real argument for force withdrawals is based on economic pressures and that the military arguments given are more or less rationalizations. If economic factors require us to weaken American military influence abroad, I think it is most important that we not fool ourselves by rationalizing such retraction as being warranted by the military situation.

Secretary McElroy is reported as having commented “. . . that as long as the US was committed to the principle that any war with the Soviet Union was general war, the need for NATO defenses diminished.”

You are aware that the principle relied on by Secretary McElroy has in the past several years come under increasingly heavy fire. Almost two years ago Foster Dulles on a number of occasions told the Secretary of Defense and the President that he believed this principle was obsolescent and that we should be developing a new strategic concept and military posture to implement it.

The drift of Secretary McElroy's thinking seems to be that it is in the US security interest to more and more depend on the total war nuclear deterrent. For example, Secretary McElroy is reported as saying that there is a need to modify the shield and sword concept.

This can only mean that he favors a modification in the direction of the “trip-wire” concept which requires fewer conventional forces and places a heavier deterrent burden on the general war strategic bombing capability. The NATO military authorities believe just the opposite. They are pressing for a buildup of the shield forces.

This problem is directly related to your efforts during the past year to reduce America's dependence on the total war threat and to restore some balance in our military establishment. As a result of your efforts,

¹ Source: Effect of force cuts on foreign and defense policy. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy.

a small advance in this direction was made in Basic National Security policy this year. I believe that any move which will increase our dependence on the strategic bombing deterrent would be contrary to the new emphasis on maintaining balanced forces which the President approved only a few months ago.

I am struck by the likely effect of the force cuts on our limited war capability. Irwin touched on a very sore point indeed in stating "by moving air strength out of Europe, we would limit US capability for responses to problems in the Middle East, and in the Far East would reduce flexibility to meet local situations there." Such limitation is completely at odds with the policy which you have urged many times of beefing up our capability to meet limited situations.

I think there is a good deal of sense in Irwin's point that there is a degree of "schizophrenia in at one and the same time moving in the direction of nuclear test suspension and pursuing a trend toward increased development and dependence on nuclear weapons as a result of budgetary and balance of payment pressures."

The statement on page 7 of the report referring to "our growing dependence on nuclear weapons in limited war situations" seems to fly in the face of the recent Presidential decision calling for greater "balance" in our military establishment.

There is no comfort in Secretary McElroy's stated belief that in a limited war situation the "use of tactical nuclear weapons would not necessarily start a general nuclear war." If there is even a 50-50 chance that their use would start a general nuclear war, I would think that they would be completely ruled out as limited war weapons by the dictates of common sense.

I share Tom Gates' expressed feeling that perhaps the courageous thing to do would be to raise taxes rather than permit budget considerations to reduce our military power.

There seems to me to be no greater problem facing this Government than whether or not to warp our military doctrine and stunt our military establishment to meet temporary economic pressures. We face the alternative of whether to run an *uncertain* risk of some loss of confidence in the dollar or the *certain* risk of loss of confidence in America's determination to make common cause with its allies and maintain a rational and credible deterrent to communist aggression. If this happens, the standing of the American dollar and a great deal more besides will inevitably be prejudiced.

I hope that you will urge this line vigorously upon the President. It seems especially important that American military influence abroad not be reduced at this time of pre-Berlin negotiation and post-Khrushchev visit.

209. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, October 29, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5906/1

B. NSC Action No. 2114-*d*

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 8, 1959

The enclosed memorandum by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council of the proposed revision of paragraph 60 (Strategic Stockpiling) of NSC 5906/1 prepared on the basis of the "Proposed Policy on Strategic Materials" approved by the President in the Cabinet Meeting of September 11, 1959. The enclosed revision is a substitution for that transmitted by Reference C, prepared in the light of comments by the NSC Planning Board.

It is requested that each member of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, indicate his action with respect to the enclosed proposed revision of paragraph 60 of NSC 5906/1, by completing and returning the enclosed memorandum form.²

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Transmits for comment OCDM memorandum on paragraph 60 of NSC 5906 on strategic stockpiling. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

² Memorandum form not enclosed with this copy. [Footnote is in the original.]

Enclosure

Memorandum From Hoegh to Lay

Washington, October 28, 1959

SUBJECT

Policy on Strategic Materials

The following language is recommended for inclusion as Paragraph 60 of the Basic National Security Policy:

A stockpile of strategic and critical materials as authorized under P.L. 520, 79th Congress, should be maintained. Objectives for the strategic stockpile should be determined on the basis of the time required for supplies of materials in a national emergency to match essential needs of the emergency. Pending a determination of the essential needs of the nation after a nuclear attack (including reconstruction), the planning period should be limited to a maximum of three years, provided that until such determination is made the "maximum objective *should* not be less than six months usage by the U.S. industry in periods of active demand.

The suggested language is in accord with the policy on strategic materials approved by the President following the Cabinet meeting of September 11, 1959.

/s/ Leo A. Hoegh

210. Memorandum of Discussion at the 422d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 29, 1959

SUBJECT

422nd NSC Meeting, Thursday, October 29, 1959

Present at the 422nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense (Gates); and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security; Agenda item 4: U.S. Overseas Military Bases; Agenda item 5: Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1959, The USIA Program (NSC 5912). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Scribner); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 3). Also attending the meeting were the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the U.S. Representative to NATO (W. Randolph Burgess); the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy); the Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Frederic Bundy, U.S. Information Agency; the Executive Secretary, NSC; Mr. Robert H. Johnson, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY*

The Director of Central Intelligence began his briefing by stating that during the past week—on the 22nd and 25th—two ballistic missiles had been launched from Tyura Tam which had gone 4700 nautical miles landing in a new impact area in the Pacific 700 miles from Midway. He reminded the Council that sometime back there had been two other “long” shots into this same area. He was inclined to credit Khrushchev’s statement that these earlier shots had been overshots. The two recent shots, however, had landed in the new impact area as planned. Using a map he indicated the course of these missiles and the location of the impact area. He reminded the Council that in an earlier briefing he had described this impact area and the heavily instrumented vessels which the Soviets had positioned in this area for detection purposes.

In the case of each of these last two shots the vehicle had been sighted during the terminal part of its flight by American observers from a nearby island. The first of them had also been seen from American aircraft; monitoring of the count-down had given us sufficient time to get planes in the air. There were no reports as yet as to whether the second shot had been observed from U.S. aircraft. Preparation for these two launchings had been long and elaborate. They may have had something to do with the Russian space program—for example, with the development of a recoverable nose cone. The missiles had had a lower trajectory than they were capable of. If the trajectory had been raised, they could have gone farther; the Russians in future shots may therefore have problems in avoiding coming too close to Midway.

The Director indicated that the scientific office of CIA had been analyzing the Soviet moon photograph. The photograph was probably

genuine, and, if so, represented a technical feat of singular importance. The Russians had had to overcome great technical problems in controlling from such a great distance the equipment which took the picture and transmitted it back to the earth. The photographs were being studied further. If the Russians should make the film available, more careful analysis would be possible.

[Omitted here are agenda items 2 and 3.]

4. U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

(NSC Actions Nos. 1876, 2034 and 2070; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 14 and March 17, 1958)

At the end of the discussion of Moroccan bases, the President referred to the study by the late Frank Nash of U.S. overseas bases. He said that he believed that the base system should be looked at by an official who would go and study it every six months. He felt that we had our heads in the sand on the bases—the foreign countries concerned were excited about national aspirations and sovereignty and we were in the position of being blackmailed. He noted that only this morning, in connection with the paper on Libya, it had been indicated that we were likely to have trouble at Wheelus. He thought that the base agreements which had been made ten years ago were beginning to be outmoded. We could not continue to depend on these facilities on the same basis as in the past. He was tired, he said, of repetitions of formal studies, but he wanted someone to go off and look at the base situation and then to come back and report. Responding to the President's point, Secretary Gates said that he would have someone look again at the Nash Report. Secretary Herter suggested that anyone who went overseas to survey U.S. bases should include the Prime Minister of Morocco in his consultations.

The National Security Council:

Noted the President's request that the Secretary of Defense designate an official to re-examine the U.S. overseas military base system and review the findings and recommendations thereon contained in the Report to the President by the late Mr. Frank C. Nash (enclosure to the reference memorandum of January 14, 1958), reporting the results of such re-examination and review to the President within six months.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

5. STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AS OF JUNE 30, 1959: THE USIA PROGRAM (NSC 5912)

Mr. Allen began his briefing by pointing out that the activity in which USIA was engaged was really an additional aspect of the conduct of our foreign relations. It had very recently been added as an activity of governments. Traditionally, communications between countries had

been on a government-to-government basis. If a diplomat appealed to the people of a country over the heads of the leaders, he would, in the past, have been rapped over the knuckles. Now, however, practically all governments were speaking directly to the peoples of other countries. This sort of activity was growing very rapidly. Mr. Allen stated that some of those who were involved in this aspect of the conduct of our foreign relations had to remind themselves of the relatively small part that it still played in the conduct of those relations. Diplomacy was still the most important means by which nations spoke to each other. However, even those activities that were primarily important as communication between governments, such as the President's trip to Europe, had an important aspect of communication with peoples as well. For example, one important aspect of the President's trip to Europe was his appearance on television with Prime Minister Macmillan. This appearance had been credited with having an important effect upon the outcome of the British elections.

Mr. Allen then displayed a chart organized on the basis of media and showing the share of the Communist World, the Free World, and the U.S. in the output of the various means of international communication. He noted that 600 million books each year crossed international boundaries either through direct export or through publication by one country in another. Of this world total 25 per cent was Communist, 75 per cent Free World. The U.S. accounted for 17 per cent of the world total and USIA inspired publication of 3 per cent of that total. USIA last year published 17 million books of which 9.5 million were in foreign languages and 7.5 million in English. Mr. Allen displayed examples of the books published under USIA auspices in foreign languages. He said that these books fell into two main categories: those dealing with Americanism and those which were anti-Communist. In most cases USIA inspires publication either by agreeing in advance to buy a certain number of copies or by paying for translation and helping the publisher obtain copyright privileges. He also displayed student editions which were sold for as little as ten or fifteen cents. He said that the U.S. had often been rawhided on the grounds that the Communists were flooding world markets with literature while the U.S. was doing nothing. However, in some cases the U.S. had flooded the market to such an extent and put the price so low that the value of a book as paper was greater than its value as literature. Thus a book published in India in the Gujarati language had been distributed in quantities that were greater than the traffic would bear and as a result copies had turned up in the paper pulp shops in Bombay.

Turning to the press, Mr. Allen pointed out that one million words a day crossed international boundaries of which 30 per cent were Communist and 70 per cent Free World. One-half of the total was accounted for by the U.S. and five per cent, or 50,000 words per day,

was accounted for by USIA. He noted that there were 10,000 hours of international broadcasting every week of which 25 percent were Communist and 75 per cent Free World. USIA accounted for 6 per cent. Referring next to motion pictures, he stated that 2700 feature films are produced each year of which 12 per cent are Communist and 88 per cent Free World. The U.S. accounted for 10 per cent. USIA produced no feature films, only documentaries.

Mr. Allen then went on to state that exhibitions were often the most effective way of reaching people. As an example, he pointed out that, when he first went to Belgrade as Ambassador, Tito had just broken with the Kremlin and had been afraid to show any sympathy with the U.S. The Yugoslavs would not go to the USIA Library. However, USIA had had a display window on the main street which was changed each week. When the people of Belgrade promenaded on this street every evening, the area around the USIA window was mobbed. Mr. Allen also noted that the Moscow Exhibition had been the most spectacular single incident involving USIA programs during the last year; it had been attended by three million Russians. He noted the role of the performing arts in USIA programs and called attention to programs for sending American athletes and lecturers abroad.

He pointed out that the people-to-people program provided a means through which the American people could make contacts with people with similar interests in other countries. He noted that the business community was now getting into this program in a big way. He suggested that official visits were one of the most important ways of communicating with peoples and in this connection mentioned the impact of the Vice President's visit to the USSR on the Russian people. He again emphasized the impact of the President's trip to Europe on European peoples and went on to point out that in the history of the U.S. no President had visited the area of Asia and the Middle East where one-half the population of the world lives. He noted the speculation in the press that the President might make a trip to this part of the world. He stated that, if the President should make such a trip, it would greatly overshadow USIA efforts in its impact upon the peoples of this area in addition, of course, to its importance in providing opportunities for communication between the President and the leaders of countries in the area.

Mr. Allen suggested that the American people and other peoples of the world were alert to propaganda. In the light of this alertness USIA could take two approaches to its job. It might conceal itself as much as possible, making use of local publications, the furnishing of background information to local newspapers and similar activities. Often this was the most effective way of doing the job. On the other hand, Mr. Allen felt that the main effort should be to make the label "USIA" something not to be ashamed of—something to be respected. He believed that our efforts should be directed toward creating a situation

where people would say “This is the American Government speaking and therefore what is said is correct, is true.” We should concentrate more and more on creating an atmosphere where we would not be ashamed, but would actually be proud, of USIA. This atmosphere, he indicated, already exists in some places. For example, he pointed out that a newspaper publisher in Bombay had indicated to him that he considered material more, rather than less, reliable when it bore the USIS label. If we took this course, Mr. Allen suggested, it would tend to get USIA increasingly out of gray or covert operations. USIA would then not have to be continually withdrawing from positions or having to explain embarrassing situations. Other agencies of the government, he felt, could handle covert activities.

Mr. Allen said that the business community was becoming more interested in building a better impression overseas and that Mr. Clarence Randall as well as Mr. White of Republic Steel had been very helpful in this respect. However, there was still considerable resistance in the business community based upon the view that business should not become involved in working hand-in-glove with the government overseas. For example, Mr. Humphrey of U.S. Rubber argued that American business overseas was highly regarded and that if the government got us into trouble overseas, it was up to the government to get us out of trouble. Mr. Humphrey did not want business tarnished with anything looking like government propaganda. However, some business leaders were working to get the business community to recognize that their overseas operations sink or swim with the U.S. posture overseas. The business Council for International Understanding, which was to meet on Friday, had been helpful in developing people-to-people projects.

Mr. Allen then referred to Voice of America construction activities. He stated that the principal construction underway was the big facility being built on the East Coast of the U.S. When this facility was completed, we would be able to send a strong signal abroad even if our installations abroad were knocked out. Next in importance to this East Coast facility was the important relay base we were building on the West Coast of Africa in Liberia. Liberia actually welcomed this facility. Mr. Allen noted that in some areas of the world listening to short-wave broadcasts was on the decline as local stations were developed, but in an area like Africa, where people were just acquiring enough money to be able to afford to buy radios, short-wave broadcasting was of increasing importance. In this connection he pointed out that Phillips had sold three thousand radio sets during the month of July in the Belgian Congo and that 90 per cent of these had been bought by Africans.

Finally, Mr. Allen stated that those who were engaged in the USIA type of activity realize that sometimes the best policy is to keep quiet.

For example, the State Department had a year ago set up a group to do something about Antarctica. This group had decided that a conference should be called of the eleven nations that had worked in Antarctica during the Geophysical Year in order to develop a formula for continued international cooperation. When the State Department note had been sent to the eleven nations, there had been talk within USIA of putting it on VOA and exploiting it heavily. Mr. Allen, however, had taken a contrary position. He had felt that if we had started bragging, our action would have been viewed as a propaganda stunt rather than as a real effort to get agreement and therefore that we would have prejudiced the changes of getting an agreement. He noted that there was now a real possibility of getting a solid agreement on Antarctica.

The President concluded the meeting by telling the Council a story. He said that a wealthy friend of his, who had recently died, had told him when he was 75 years old that he could not remember any time during the 75 years when he had learned anything while talking.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral presentation on the status of the U.S. Information Agency Program, by the Director, U.S. Information Agency, based upon Part 5 of NSC 5912 and recent developments.

Robert H. Johnson

211. Memorandum From Lay to Holders of NSC 5912¹

Washington, October 30, 1959

The enclosed Part 1 (The Military Program) is transmitted herewith for insertion in NSC 5912.

Part 1 has been given a special limited distribution, and access to it should be on a strict need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Transmits Part 1 of NSC 5912, Defense Department report on "Status of United States Military Programs as of 30 June 1959." Top Secret; Restricted Data. Extracts—12 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5912.

Enclosure

Department of Defense Report to the NSC

NSC 5912

Washington, October 26, 1959

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT
TO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON
STATUS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS
AS OF 30 JUNE 1959

THE MILITARY PROGRAM
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*NSC 5912, PART 1, THE MILITARY PROGRAM**I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY PROGRAM.*

The basic national objective of the United States is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. The primary threat to fulfillment of this objective is that posed by an aggressive and deeply hostile International Communism. All elements of U.S. national power must be resolutely directed toward meeting this Communist challenge.

The objectives of the U.S. military programs, in support of the basic national objective and in light of the primary threat, are to provide:

An effective nuclear retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate action.

An adequate continental defense system.

Highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces, with the capability to respond selectively and flexibly to local aggression, using all weapons (including nuclear weapons), as required to achieve national objectives, and to carry out general war tasks.

A capability of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications.

A cold war contribution of U.S. military power to reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural measures.

*II. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND
POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY
COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN
NSC 5810/1.*

Through FY 1960, the nuclear strike forces of the United States will continue to provide a capability to inflict such loss and damage upon an enemy as to achieve a significant margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit the United States and its Allies to prevail in general war. Despite continued improvement in the quality and posture of the nuclear retaliatory forces of the United States and its Allies, as presently programmed, and within current expectation for Fiscal Years 1961 and 1962, Soviet technological advances will probably continue to diminish the present margin of U.S. military superiority. By the end of FY 1962 with a continuance of present trends and programs on both sides, and with no major technological break-throughs on either side in the intervening years, the most probable position will be that each side will possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions. While operational factors which apply in the initial action may lead to advantage for either side, an advantage, possibly conclusive, will accrue to the side taking the initiative.

Additional improvements have been made in North American defense during FY 1959, particularly in the areas of warning and defense against the air breathing threat; however, concurrent Soviet offensive improvements have made any relative U.S. gain questionable. The North American defense system is not capable of preventing an attack which could seriously damage the United States although it should significantly degrade any such attack and it does complicate seriously the attackers' problems.

The ready forces of the United States are capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression and to meet the initial requirements of general war. However, while the over-all nuclear posture of all Services has improved, modernization of non-nuclear fire support has not kept pace. The scope and timing of response to local aggression would be limited by a number of factors, including: the nature and location of the aggression, the degree to which maldeployment for initial tasks of general war could be accepted, the availability of transportation, and whether or not nuclear weapons are to be employed. The over-all military capabilities of our Allies to support U.S. and collective defense organization strategic concepts possibly increased in the Far East during FY 1959, but probably decreased on balance in the Middle East and has not significantly changed in Europe. The capabilities of our Allies to assist in coping with local aggression vary from country to country. With few exceptions, the capabilities of our Allies to assist in coping with local aggression in other than their own general area are very limited.

The United States and its Allies are capable of controlling essential air communications except on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc. Extreme difficulty will be incurred in controlling essential sea areas until such time as the Soviet submarine capability is reduced to manageable proportions. The mining, mine countermeasures and harbor defense programs continue to be only partially satisfactory.

The military forces, as the largest segment of U.S. population abroad, are capable of significant reinforcement of overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technical and cultural measures to achieve national objectives. Although this capability has not been fully exploited, increased emphasis has been given to cold war activities and the U.S. position has thus been strengthened in several areas.

A. AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATORY CAPABILITY,
ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED AND READY FOR IMMEDIATE
ACTION.

The *Strategic Air Command* (SAC) has primary responsibility for nuclear retaliation and is charged with exploiting U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected

targets and target systems at the outbreak of hostilities. Total SAC force has been reduced from 44 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 5 reconn.) wings of bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at end FY 1958 to 43 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 4 reconn.) wings at end FY 1959, one medium reconnaissance wing having been inactivated. Programmed changes during FY 1960 will result in the inactivation of another medium reconnaissance wing and activation of one strategic missile wing, retaining the total of 43 wings (comprised of 12 heavy, 27 medium, 3 reconn. and one strategic missile wings).

Combat capability of SAC heavy bomber wings increased during FY 1959 as two more B-30 wings converted to B-52s, bringing total to 9 equipped² B-52 wings. Two more redesignated wings are in process of being equipped with B-52s. By end FY 1960, 11 wings will be fully converted to B-52s, and one additional wing will be in the process of converting from B-47 medium bombers to B-52s. While combat capability of SAC heavy bombers is improving through introduction of new equipment, the B-47 medium bomber fleet is approaching obsolescence. These aircraft, which make up the bulk of the bomber force and have now been in service about 7 years, have recently undergone a major safety-of-flight structural reinforcement to extend their usefulness.

As the Soviet delivery capability increases, the vulnerability of SAC bases and in turn, the SAC nuclear retaliatory forces within and outside the United States, continues to be a matter of great concern. To reduce vulnerability, SAC dispersal and alert programs are being implemented. The status of these programs is:

1. *Heavy bomber dispersal.* Although there is a goal to have no more than one heavy bomber squadron on any one base, 33 squadrons are presently located on 18 bases. By end FY 1960, 36 squadrons are programmed to be dispersed on 27 bases, i.e., three bases each with three squadrons, three bases each with two squadrons, and 21 bases each with one squadron. (See Dispersal map, Sec. VIII).

2. *Medium bomber dispersal.* At present, there are 28 wings on 18 bases. At end FY 1960, 27 wings are programmed to be located at 18 bases (nine bases each with two wings, and nine bases each with one wing).

3. *Alert.* As of 30 June 1959, 268 bombers with associated tankers were on continuous 15-minute alert. By end FY 1960, approximately 335 SAC bombers with associated tankers are expected to be on continuous 15-minute alert. A test of the airborne alert concept was completed on 30 June 1959 and the results are being evaluated.

²Note: An "equipped" unit possesses 50% or more of authorized number of aircraft. [Footnote is in the original.]

The first *ATLAS intercontinental ballistic missile complex*, at Vandenburg AFB, initially programmed to be operational in June 1959, is now scheduled to be operational before the end of October 1959. A second complex for the first squadron is programmed to become operational before the end of CY 1959. The second *ATLAS* squadron, programmed for Warren AFB, is scheduled to become operational prior to the end of FY 1960. The research and development programs for the *TITAN* and *MINUTEMAN* are progressing satisfactorily. The first *TITAN* squadron is programmed by the Air Force to be operational by end FY 1961 and the first *MINUTEMAN* squadron during FY 1963.

Supplementing the SAC retaliatory capabilities are the *USAF tactical nuclear strike forces*. In the *Pacific*, these forces consist of 3 wings of tactical fighters, one wing of tactical bombers and 2 squadrons of *MATADOR* tactical missiles, all to continue in the program during FY 1960. In the United Kingdom, Europe and the Middle East, tactical nuclear strike forces consist of 6 tactical fighter wings permanently deployed plus 4 squadrons on continuous rotation from the United States; one wing of tactical bombers, and 3 squadrons of tactical missiles (2 *MATADOR* and one *MACE*). The tactical nuclear strike units in these areas are programmed to remain unchanged during FY 1960 except for converting one of the 2 *MATADOR* squadrons to *MACE* missiles. Nuclear-capable tactical air forces in the United States, capable of augmenting forces overseas, consist of 6 tactical fighter wing equivalents which continue in the program through FY 1960. One bomber wing and 6 tactical fighter wings were inactivated during FY 1959.

Continuing progress is being made in providing the above delivery systems with weapons and warheads having improved weight to yield ratios. Continuing dispersal of nuclear weapons to combat units in the field has improved greatly the operational readiness of our offensive forces. This action, coupled with streamlining of our release procedures, has reduced substantially the reaction time of these forces to counter enemy aggression. However, due to political denial of storage rights in certain countries, weapons allocated to some combat units are not immediately available to those units. Action is continuing to obtain the authority for dispersal of nuclear weapons to those additional countries.

Certain *major U.S. Navy forces*, with the primary mission of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications, possess a significant nuclear retaliatory strike capability. This capability is primarily in the attack carrier striking forces with a secondary capability in missile delivery from surface ships and submarines. There are 14 attack carriers (including 2 new carriers in “shakedown” status) and 16 associated carrier air groups of which 4 to 5 attack carriers with their attached air groups are normally in position to strike assigned targets. Deliveries of new jet aircraft and modernization and new construction

of attack aircraft carriers have materially increased the Navy's nuclear weapon delivery capability. The 4 CVA 59 (FORRESTAL) class carriers have markedly increased this capability in fleet operations. Included in the naval forces are *Marine Corps forces* which contribute to the over-all nuclear retaliatory capability. This includes one Marine aircraft wing in the Pacific (2/3 wing in 7th Fleet and 1/3 wing in other Pacific areas). One Marine division in the Pacific (2/3 division in 7th Fleet and 1/3 in other Pacific areas) and one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) with Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean can contribute to a nuclear retaliatory capability when deployed into position. Two Marine aircraft wings and 1-8/9 divisions, all nuclear capable, located within CONUS are available for augmenting overseas forces. Fleet Marine Force troops reinforcing the division in the Pacific had both 8" howitzer and HONEST JOHN equipment while the BLT with the Sixth Fleet was reinforced by an 8" howitzer unit.

The present *Naval capability for guided missile delivery of nuclear warheads* from surface ships and submarines is represented by the REGULUS I system for which nuclear warheads are stockpiled. REGULUS I system is now installed in 4 submarines and 3 heavy cruisers. There are 11 other submarines equipped with REGULUS radar guidance system (TROUNCE) to provide terminal control of a REGULUS missile launched from either a submarine or cruiser. By end FY 1960, one more submarine will be equipped with REGULUS I system. Normally 1/3 to 1/2 of these ships are deployed and contribute to capabilities of unified commands.

The first 5 *Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines* authorized, for which money was appropriated by Congress, are under construction. Congress appropriated funds for 4 additional FBM submarines in the FY 1959 budget, plus additional funds to lend assurance to the achievement of an effective early operational capability for the POLARIS missile. In December 1958, funds for one of these submarines were released for obligation in FY 1959. Excellent progress has been made in the POLARIS missile development and the system support programs.

Nuclear delivery systems organic to deployed *major U.S. Army forces* contribute to the nuclear retaliatory capability. In Europe, the Army currently maintains 2 REDSTONE missile groups, 8 CORPORAL missile battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN rocket battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN batteries, six 280mm gun battalions (to be reduced to 4 during FY 1960), nine 8-inch howitzer battalions and five 8-inch howitzer batteries. In the Pacific, the Army currently maintains one 280mm gun battalion, one HONEST JOHN battalion, two 8-inch howitzer battalions, three 8-inch howitzer batteries and 3 HONEST JOHN batteries. Nuclear warheads are stored in the immediate vicinity of the above units thereby insuring maximum operational readiness. New weapons design and missile check-out procedures have appreciably reduced

reaction time. Nuclear delivery units in the United States capable of augmenting forces overseas include one medium missile command (HONEST JOHN and CORPORAL), one air transportable missile command (HONEST JOHN) and one REDSTONE missile group. By end FY 1960, eight of the newly developed air transportable LACROSSE missile battalions will be available for U.S. Army forces deployed in CONUS, Europe and Pacific. The planned transition from the liquid-fueled REDSTONE and CORPORAL missiles to solid propellant and all-inertial guidance system for the PERSHING and SERGEANT systems will greatly improve mobility and reaction time. One SERGEANT missile battalion will also be activated during FY 1960. Current developmental progress of the PERSHING missile indicates that it will have an operational capability in FY 1963.

In opposing U.S. retaliatory forces, the *Soviet Bloc air defense* system has the following general capabilities:

1. Capabilities are greatest against penetration conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes between 5,000 feet and about 45,000 feet.

2. At altitudes above about 45,000 feet enemy air defense capabilities decrease progressively as altitude is increased, except in the areas equipped with surface-to-air missiles where capabilities are unimpaired to at least 60,000 feet.

3. At altitudes below about 5,000 feet, enemy capabilities decrease progressively as altitude decreases and are probably seriously reduced at altitudes below about 1,500 feet.

4. Against penetrations conducted at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the capabilities of the enemy system are greatly reduced because of the limited availability of all-weather fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

5. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers, decoys, and electronic countermeasures, the capabilities of the enemy system are diminished through disruption and saturation.

The degree of advantage accruing to the United States and its allies as a result of retaliatory attacks would depend on a number of strategic and operational considerations, to include exercise of initiative, the amount of warning of Soviet attack, the degree of protection, and the mobility or concealment afforded military forces and installations, particularly those from which our retaliatory effort would be launched. It is estimated that enemy losses sustained as a result of a U.S. retaliatory attack would provide a margin of advantage to the United States and its allies which, if exploited in conjunction with other military operations, would assure eventual victory.

B. *HIGHLY MOBILE AND SUITABLY DEPLOYED READY FORCES WITH THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND SELECTIVELY AND FLEXIBLY TO LOCAL AGGRESSION USING ALL WEAPONS (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AS REQUIRED, AND TO CARRY OUT GENERAL WAR TASKS.*

1. *Over-all Capabilities.*

a. *U.S. Army* forces are capable of reacting selectively and flexibly and with appropriate means to situations ranging from local aggression to general war. Integration of organic nuclear delivery systems in the reorganized infantry, armored and airborne divisions has increased the operational capability of the Army to engage in nuclear warfare. The dual capability of individual weapons systems has been improved by a new high explosive warhead for HONEST JOHN rocket, which is now available in limited quantities, and will be further improved by activation of LACROSSE missile battalions scheduled for FY 1960. Introduction of DAVY CROCKETT [*text not declassified*] atomic weapon planned for FY 1961 will further enhance nuclear capabilities of Army forces. Exploitation of the helicopter, together with introduction of self-contained, readily transportable combat units provides an increased degree of flexibility and mobility. The Army considers that principal limitations on effectiveness of Army forces are: insufficient manpower and funds; lack of modernization of non-nuclear weapons and equipment; an insufficiency of combat support and logistic support; lack of forward depots, and insufficiency of adequate high speed troop lift.

b. *Naval.* Highly mobile and strategically deployed ready naval forces have the capability and flexibility to respond selectively and with the degree of force necessary to meet local aggression and to carry out general war tasks. U.S. naval forces have increased their nuclear and non-nuclear capability which adds materially to the effectiveness of the ready forces. The Navy has continued integration of guided missiles weapons systems into fleet operations. BULLPUP air-to-surface missile, a close air support guided missile, is now in the combat inventory of Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in limited quantities. Atlantic Fleet has a limited capability in surface-to-air missiles for fleet air defense with 3 TERRIER equipped ships and the USS GALVESTON now conducting evaluation of TALOS shipboard system. All attack carriers are equipped with SIDEWINDER and some with SPARROW III air-to-air missile squadrons for air defense operations. Included in naval forces are Fleet Marine Force ground and air units with capability to employ nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, either surface or air launched. The vertical assault technique developed by Navy and Marine Corps no longer ties an initial assault to the shore line but permits landing of troops quickly and selectively to points up to 50 miles inland.

Capability to conduct vertical assault operations was increased materially by conversion of 2 CVS's to LPH's, bringing to 3 the number

of interim LPH's available. One of these ships is assigned to Atlantic Fleet and 2 to Pacific Fleet. Two of the LPH's are capable of carrying a fully combat-ready BLT and one helicopter squadron, while one LPH is capable of carrying one-half BLT and one helicopter squadron.

c. *Air Force.* There was a substantial reduction in the number of USAF tactical air wings world-wide during FY 1959. These forces were reduced from a total of 45 wings at end FY 1958 to 35 wings at end FY 1959, and are being reduced further to 34 wings at end FY 1960. *Nevertheless, tactical as well as strategic air units retain a capability to respond effectively to general war or local aggression, resulting from improved nuclear delivery means, decreased reaction time and increased mobility.* However, our present programs do not compensate entirely for future improvements and increase in Soviet capability. The most pressing problems in the tactical area concern the slow rate of aircraft modernization and the need for improved ground environment systems which can control effectively both air defense and tactical air weapon systems in overseas areas.

d. In the succeeding paragraphs the ready forces capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression and general war are treated by geographical areas.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Section II of the report.]

III. EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEM.

A. *OBJECTIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTINENTAL U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAMS (Based on NSC 5802/1).* To be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation. Such preparation requires that the United States achieve and maintain, in collaboration with Canada and other Free World nations, a continental defense readiness and capability which will protect and permit the launching of our nuclear retaliatory forces, even in the event of surprise attack. Such preparation should: (1) Provide warning to alert the nation to impending attack; (2) counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts; (3) prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly restricting U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale; (4) maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology permits and as the nature of the threat changes; (5) provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil population; and (6) include appropriately organizing, protecting, and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival.

B. *ESTIMATED SOVIET THREAT AND CAPABILITIES.*

1. Current Soviet capabilities for full-scale air attack on the continental United States depend mainly on their long range aviation. Although still consisting primarily of medium bombers capable of

attacking the continental United States only through the extensive use of one-way missions, Soviet long range aviation has continued to be improved by the phasing-in of additional jet bombers, more realistic and larger scale training exercises, improvement of potential staging bases in the Arctic, development of in-flight refueling, and improvement of electronic equipment for ECM, bombing, navigation, and other purposes. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been identified at many home bases of the Soviet long range aviation force and it is believed that nuclear bombs are now the primary weapon of this force. The number of aircraft launched against the United States in an initial attack, even under conditions where surprise was a major Soviet consideration, could range in the several hundreds.

2. It is estimated that the USSR is developing and stockpiling a versatile group of nuclear weapons with yields ranging from about 1 KT to about 12 MT.

3. For planning purposes, it should be considered that the Soviets will probably attain an operational capability with ten ICBMs in the first half of 1960, with a possibility of this occurring in the latter part of 1959.

4. The USSR probably now has a limited number of submarines capable of launching subsonic, cruise type missiles with a range of 150-200 nautical miles. These missiles could be launched by a submarine only after surfacing. Additional submarines could be converted to include this capability in four to six months from the time the decision is made to do so. At least 3 Z-Class submarines may have been converted to include a missile capability, possibly of the short range ballistic type.

5. Clandestine attack on the United States by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, could occur against specifically selected targets.

C. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF U.S. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND PROBLEMS. The absolute capability of our forces to defend the United States against air attack by air breathing weapon systems has progressively increased. This over-all increase results from establishment of North American Air Defense Command; installation of additional early warning radar coverage (including full activation of Aleutian extension of Pacific DEW lines); provision of more effective control of the air defense system through automation; increased coverage of the sea surveillance system; and availability of improved weapon systems including those with nuclear warheads. *Although U.S. air defense capabilities have improved during FY 1959, Soviet nuclear weapons development and improved delivery capabilities during same period have made any relative U.S. gain questionable.* Soviets are probably now capable of exploiting weaknesses in our air defense system at very high and low altitudes and of utilizing electronic countermeasures, sabotage, and deception to contribute to their attack. The estimated Soviet initial limited ICBM capability will provide an additional means of exploiting

weaknesses in the continental air defense system. This system cannot be expected to counter completely an all-out attack of the magnitude which the Soviets are capable of launching against the North American continent. *Solutions to the following problems are being pursued on a high priority basis as funding permits:*

1. Procurement, training and retention of the highly skilled personnel required by modern and increasingly complex defense systems.
 2. Detection of airborne vehicles at very high and very low altitudes, and development and availability of weapons which can be effectively used at these altitudes.
 3. Development and implementation of measures to overcome or counteract enemy electronic countermeasures.
 4. Development of a system which can be used in the defense against enemy ballistic missiles.
 5. Development of an effective and integrated sea surveillance system which will provide for detection, identification, and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within missile launching range of the North American continent toward the goal of development of the capability to establish control over the submarine or surface ship prior to the launching of its missile.
 6. Identification and engagement of hostile aircraft as far from our borders as possible.
 7. Means to shorten the long lead time involved in the completion of programmed improvements to the systems.
- [Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

212. Memorandum of Discussion at the 423d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, November 5, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 423rd NSC Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 5, 1959

Present at the 423rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and

¹ Source: Agenda item 4: Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1959: The Atomic Energy Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Scribner); the Acting Attorney General (Walsh) (Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman Atomic Energy Commission (Item 4); and Mr. Philip Ray for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; from the Atomic Energy Commission Brig. General Alfred D. Starbird, Edward J. Block and Bruce Mercer; Howard Furnas, Department of State; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1–3.]

4. *STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AS OF JUNE 30, 1959: THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM*

(NSC 5912; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" transmitting Report by AEC and State on Implementation of NSC 5725/1, dated September 2, 1959)

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board was examining all of the status reports, but had decided that some of them need not be scheduled for Council discussion. However, the Planning Board thought the AEC Report should be discussed by the Council because it deals with one of the major national security programs. Mr. Gray then called on Mr. McCone.

Mr. McCone said he would treat the highlights of the AEC program of \$2-¾ billion, 70–75 per cent of which is designed to meet Defense and military requirements, the balance being intended for peaceful purposes. Turning to uranium procurement and deliveries, Mr. McCone displayed and discussed a chart setting forth estimated uranium deliveries based on domestic, overseas, and Canadian commitments. He indicated that through recent stretch-out agreements with domestic suppliers and the Canadian Government we would be able to reduce our requirements in 1960, 1961 and 1962, increasing them in 1963, 1964 and 1965, thereby substantially decreasing and leveling off appropriations for uranium deliveries. Despite the reduction in uranium procurement, the U-235 production rate would be maintained by the CASCADE improvement program and by a recycling the cost of which would be only half the cost of uranium procurement. Savings between uranium commitments for 1960 as against 1967 would amount

to approximately \$360 million. Mr. McCone believed the present program could adequately meet present military requirements for uranium, but was uncertain about the new requirements which had just been presented by Defense.

Again displaying a chart, Mr. McCone indicated that plutonium production was slightly in excess of requirements now, but that in 1962 we would be short by an insignificant factor in the amount necessary to meet military requirements. He concluded, however, that our plutonium production program was satisfactory and that through improved processes we could produce more plutonium if necessary.

Mr. McCone remarked that our nuclear weapons program had been discussed in detail a few months ago with the President and accordingly would not be covered in detail in his briefing.

Mr. McCone next turned to naval nuclear propulsion. He indicated that by December 31, 1959 we would have one POLARIS and eight other nuclear submarines; by December 31, 1960 we would have five POLARIS and thirteen other nuclear submarines. The GEORGE WASHINGTON, the first POLARIS submarine, will be undergoing sea trials in the near future. The nuclear-powered cruiser LONG BEACH should be operating by the end of 1960, after launching this spring and sea trials in July. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE and the nuclear-powered destroyer BAINBRIDGE should be operating by the latter part of 1961. The naval nuclear propulsion program was summarized as consisting of six land-based prototype reactors, 37 submarines, and 3 surface vessels. Mr. McCone concluded his remarks on maritime nuclear propulsion by indicating that minor modifications in design were being made in the N.S. (Nuclear Ship) SAVANNAH.

In passing, Mr. McCone remarked that we have eight or nine military package power plants in various sizes and types and indicated that they were particularly important in view of their significant contribution to technology.

Mr. McCone then briefly described the PLUTO, ROVER and SNAP devices and the air nuclear propulsion program. He recalled to the President the thermo-couple principle which was embodied in one of the SNAP devices shown to the President, and indicated we were developing more of this type. All of the SNAP devices are being utilized for auxiliary power in space vehicles. A careful review is being made of the SNAP program, which will run to \$300–\$400 million from the point of view of cost and effectiveness as compared to other power sources such as solar heat. PLUTO involved the development of a ram jet to propel low-level unmanned supersonic missiles. Three to four years would be required for the development of this ram jet, but the program offers good prospects. ROVER is a nuclear propulsion system for a space vehicle; again three to four years of development will be required before

its full possibilities are known. Mr. McCone recalled to the President a recent review of the aircraft nuclear propulsion program and indicated that the development rather than the hardware stage of the program is being emphasized as a result of such review. He said we had developed a reactor which would fly a plane, but the reactor would not fly the plane very well. By postponing the hardware stage two or three years, we could probably develop a better reactor for aircraft propulsion. Mr. McCone thought that the Russians were probably coming to a similar conclusion. He noted that the Russians were somewhat evasive in this area, but believed they had been unable to solve the ceramics problem and did not consider it likely they would surprise us with a technical break-through in aircraft nuclear propulsion.

Mr. McCone then turned to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He displayed charts comparing the nuclear power program of the U.S. and the USSR. During his Moscow trip he had learned of various slippages in the Soviet power program and believed that these resulted from Russian awareness of the difficulties and the cost associated with the development of nuclear power. The Soviets are apparently cutting back or slowing down all phases of their power reactor program except for those projects which are already so far advanced in construction that it would be uneconomical to waste the work already done. The Chairman believed that we were well ahead of the Soviets in our domestic power program. He noted in particular that the DRESDEN Reactor was the largest in the world used exclusively for electrical power. When completed, the U.S. power reactor program would have a capacity of approximately one million KWE.

The President said that Khrushchev during his visit here had remarked that the Russians were eliminating a large number of projects in their nuclear power program.

Mr. McCone said the Soviet slow-down did not, however, apply to the peaceful uses research program, which was broadly based and competently staffed. He had been particularly impressed during his trip to the USSR by the ability of the Soviets to manage and direct their technical personnel, to make prompt decisions, and to carry them out very quickly. He cited their completion of construction of the OGRA, a large controlled thermo-nuclear device, within eleven months of the date of initiating design. The AEC was carefully reviewing means of improving U.S. ability to direct its technical effort, a review that might be helpful in other areas such as space.

Mr. McCone concluded his briefing with a discussion of our high energy physics program, an area in which we are well ahead of the Russians. In connection with our four high energy accelerators, Mr. McCone said a careful review was being made of the Stanford accelerator to resolve some technical problems, such as the question of whether the accelerator could withstand earthquakes.

The President asked whether it would not be wise to remove expensive equipment from tunnels in an earthquake area. Mr. McCone said some scientists believed that the tunnel would not be ruptured by an earthquake.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the status of the atomic energy program, by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, based on Part 3 of NSC 5912 and recent developments.

Marion W. Boggs

213. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, November 5, 1959

Dr. Kistiakowsky
General Goodpaster

The President said he had had a question on nuclear weapons testing at his press conference. He had brought out that the problem of atmospheric testing can apparently be managed. The Soviets now seem to be ready to have serious technical discussions concerning inspection of underground testing. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the problem is extremely difficult. The McRae report brings out that there is no immediate need for the resumption of testing, but that over the longer term testing will give valuable progress, the nature of which cannot be estimated now. In his judgment the questions regarding suspension of testing are now a matter of political judgment rather than technical. Although the safety test question had been emphasized a great deal, in actual fact it is not of great importance since the tests may be conducted with zero or essentially zero yield. In addition, there will always be some possibility of nuclear accident, and the problem recently raised is probably not of tremendous importance.

After an explanation of possibilities for nuclear accident by Dr. Kistiakowsky, the President commented that the possibility seemed to

¹ Source: Possibility of suspending nuclear testing; reliance on deterrence; making choices in defense programs; problems with Titan; problems with federally-funded research. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on November 6.

be greater than he had previously realized. He summed up his instructions regarding the safety tests as telling the AEC to go as far as they can without risk of a nuclear explosion. When they reach the point of risk they are to come back to him. He emphasized that they should get on with this testing and not try to get into political questions.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said the President's Science Advisory Committee has put the greatest amount of study to date into military R & D budget. He will be taking up their findings with Dr. York and Secretary McElroy. The group will then be ready to come in and see the President.

The President said he is getting the impression that disarmament is not possible in the nuclear field. Probably we must get better and better weapons of our own in that field. At the same time he thinks that our concept of defending all around the world will not work. It is not practicable and is too great a burden for us. Mr. McElroy is planning to cut 14 air squadrons and 50,000 men in the Air Force. He feels that a new conception of defense is needed involving greater reliance on the deterrent. We must be able to return a tremendous blow. Short of that, a few mobile forces and a few carriers to move out from a central reserve must be provided. He does not think we can have such a thing as a perfect defense. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that without some military concepts, his group finds it impossible to make the judgments which need to be made in the scientific field. He was happy to see that their thinking runs along the line of the President's. The President said our great problem is that our people want to do everything, and to start programs in all directions. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that in the field of strategic attack, for example, if everything were done that is now being planned and programmed we would have a fantastic overkill capability.

Dr. Kistiakowsky next said that there is evident need for a policy statement on space activities, since there is great confusion around the country. The President asked for a draft of a statement that he might make, either at a press conference or otherwise. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he would prepare one.

Dr. Kistiakowsky referred to troubles the Titan program is having. There has been an eight-month flight delay. The program is not in good shape, and the failure is essentially managerial. The Martin Company is spread over too many projects. A group from BMD is now taking over the Denver plant, at least long enough to put it on its feet. He said there is a good chance that they will still catch up with their schedule. The President said this is most surprising to him since the Denver plant was most impressive, and that people (including me) had told him that the Titan was a better missile than the Atlas. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that

it is. The problem is not one of design, but one of management and production.

Dr. Kistiakowsky next said that the Federal Council for Science and Technology is making some progress, putting emphasis for example on oceanography, materials research and the atmospheric sciences. The Council gets agreements in principle, but little then seems to happen. There are obstacles in practice, many of them genuine, since the agencies have their own fields and laws. Progress is very slow and laborious.

The President said that if this situation is due to specific obstacles or attitudes, he will take quick action if the group will simply advise him where action is needed. If on the other hand it is just due to the nature of our enormous federal government, and its built-in bureaucracy, then all he could advise is to keep nagging. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he believes it is almost entirely the latter. He said there is, for example, no uniformity in practices regarding grants and aids to private research. Some grants include provision for construction of facilities; others prohibit this. The President said there would seem to be need for a group, perhaps under Dr. Kistiakowsky, to survey these grants before commitments are made, against such questions as whether adequate talent—both individual competence and numbers of people—exists. In many cases mediocre talent is no good at all. He could take a look at the programs at Defense, at AEC, Agriculture and Public Health Service as a start. A very exact and clear-cut check should be made as to whether talent exists, whether it will have to be robbed from other programs, whether skills are of secondary caliber, etc. Dr. Kistiakowsky mentioned in this connection that he is coming to believe that the real question regarding technical manpower is whether there is in fact a shortage. He knows of great hoarding by industries. Defense contracts in fact encourage this since they are on a straight cost basis. The President asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to give him the questions and suspicions that he has. He said he would be quite ready to get the senior officials of Defense and the AEC in to his office and ask them to explain this.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

214. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, November 17, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Glennan, General Goodpaster

Dr. Glennan said the ABMA transfer is going very well. He is receiving excellent cooperation from the Army and expects to have detailed papers ready before Congress reconvenes. He foresees certain problems when the Congress does reconvene. Although the big booster project is now being cleared up, there is still confusion regarding duality of management of the space program. He then read to the President excerpts from a memorandum on space organization (copy attached).

The President said he regards the space organization as having a major role in proving out what can be done in the field of space boosters. The military forces can then take over developments which they regard as having promising military applications.

The President suggested that Dr. Glennan next take up with the Department of Defense the proposals he had outlined. He said he was not aware of the great confusion to which Dr. Glennan had referred. Dr. Glennan said this is a concept the newspapers are trying to create and the Congress is trying to exploit. The President said it is quite acceptable to him to try to clarify the situation. This effort should not, however, be put on the basis that the Soviets hit the moon or took pictures of it. In his mind the real question is what should we—the United States—do. It seems that everything centers on the development of the big booster. He thought we should take one or two particular projects that we want to carry out and concentrate on those. Dr. Glennan said that the greatest problem is how to get into a real perspective regarding space that makes sense. He thought a Presidential public statement is essential.

The President said that such a statement could be very brief. He would simply state what the law meant to those who proposed it. This could be put into proper language and placed before the American people. As to the budget and the program for space, he said he felt that should be thought out very carefully. He does not like the idea of growing and growing with no foreseeable limit. Instead we should try to find a level that seems about right. Dr. Glennan said that to develop payloads

¹ Source: Transfer of ABMA to NASC; defense budget; reorganization of space activities. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on December 1.

for the Saturn missile will take about three years and will be quite expensive. The building of a booster puts a “hump” in what would otherwise be a steady or level curve. The President said that the field of payloads is not an entirely new one. He did not think that we have to carry on expensive testing of Atlas, Titan, etc., just to hit the moon since these are being well checked out by the military forces. Dr. Glennan said he has one more immediate space shot in view—an attempt to orbit the moon using an Atlas-Able missile. Beyond this all others are scientific shots, for the study, exploration and investigation of space phenomena.

The President then spoke of his desire to see our country put on a sound fiscal basis. Sputnik gave a surge to defense spending from which we have not recovered. He said that if he has to approve another unbalanced budget he would be obliged to regard his Administration as discredited. He thought the key to our space program was the Saturn or the big booster. The job from now on is to develop it at a carefully determined speed, to decide what kind of instrumentation we would like for it to have, to consider how much of this has already been developed and what else is needed. He would concentrate on these tasks.

Referring again to the question of reorganization, Dr. Glennan said his proposal involves certain changes in the law including the elimination of the Space Council, the setting up of a NASA General Advisory Council, and the establishment of a Military Applications Committee, wholly within Defense, in lieu of the existing civilian military liaison committee.

The President recalled that Congress had wanted to put the responsibility directly on the President for deciding what would go into NASA and what into Defense. This part of our job is very much behind us, and it would seem that there is less need for the Space Council and for this activity of the President. He asked Dr. Glennan to try to work the matter out with the Secretary of Defense, and if the latter agreed get the proposal published and on the record.

The President told Dr. Glennan there is one thing he would like very much to see and that would be for Dr. Glennan to put his face sternly against the working of Parkinson’s law, to hold his staff strictly limited to essentials. Dr. Glennan said this is difficult in the case of the ABMA since the Von Braun group increased about 1000 in the last year. He doubted that he could cut it back this year but would do so next year through not putting work there. Finally, Dr. Glennan said he would like to have a new name for the ABMA center. There are not many names of people famous in space activity. He asked whether the President would be favorable to naming it the George C. Marshall Center. The President said that he would, even though there was not much logical connection. Dr. Glennan said the matter would be studied further.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

215. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, November 18, 1959

SUBJECT

Long-Range Security Policy

INTRODUCTION

I believe that an essential element of an effective foreign policy is a respected military force with appropriate strategy for its use.

I am concerned about the damage to our foreign policy to be expected from our likely military posture in years to come if current trends are not changed.

For several years, the Secretary of Defense has indicated in reports to the National Security Council that the US is losing its margin of military superiority over the Soviet Union.² During these same years, however, forward military programs have given no prospect of a change in these trends.

The Department of State for several years has believed that present military policy is wrong. During these years it has tried without success to modify our almost complete dependence on nuclear weapons.

The latest effort was on April 25, 1959, when you submitted to the Secretary of Defense the "Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing Upon US Strategy" [copy attached].³ This statement was later submitted to the NSC as the views of the Department of State. It is generally recognized that these requirements were not met in the military paragraphs of the basic policy paper, approved by the President on August 5, 1959. This basic paper expressly states that military policy was not thereby changed.

The purpose of this memorandum is to focus attention on the impending loss of American military superiority and to urge that a new long-range effort be made to halt present trends.

¹ Source: Long-range security policy; includes two covering memoranda, December 9 and 11. Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548.

² In the Department of Defense status report as of June 30, 1958, it was estimated that "... recent Soviet technological advances and the concurrent quantitative reductions in U.S. forces have combined to diminish that margin of U.S. military superiority. If these trends continue, it is estimated that this superiority will be lost in the foreseeable future."

The latest status report [June 30, 1959] is more specific. "By the end of FY 1962, with a continuance of present trends and programs on both sides, and with no major technological breakthroughs on either side in the intervening years, the most probable position will be that each side will possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions." [Footnote and brackets are in the original.]

³ All brackets are in the original.

I. *THE NEED*

As the nuclear weapons balance between the US and the USSR evens off, it seems that the chances will become smaller that nuclear weapons can be used effectively by the US in wars in the Middle East, Far East and Southeast Asia. Since we did not use nuclear weapons in limited war when we had, in effect, a monopoly, it hardly seems likely that we would use them after losing the monopoly. It also seems quite unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a limited aggression. Under such circumstances, a tacit ban on the first use of nuclear weapons may well come about.

In order to retain military influence around the world at a time when both sides will probably be deterred from using nuclear weapons, we should develop a significant non-nuclear military force while retaining an adequate nuclear retaliatory force for insurance. The existence of a significant non-nuclear military force may also be a necessary condition precedent to getting on with safeguarded nuclear disarmament.

II. *THE CAPABILITY*

It is gradually being recognized that there is no inherent lack of conventional force capability in the free world. American example and strategy have been the key influence in free world military thinking. This example and strategy have not put a premium on conventional force build-up by industrialized countries.

Now, however, the strong economies and reviving peoples of Western Europe have the manpower and the industrial potential to support non-nuclear forces adequate to deter or to hold off a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. The missing element seems to be American leadership and incentive and determination here and abroad to make the necessary effort.

Non-nuclear deterrence of Chinese communist aggression in the Far East is obviously a tougher problem. However, it should be well within the bounds of possibility for the combined beefed-up conventional forces of the US, the UK, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and the free Southeast Asian countries, as well as the present forces of the Chinese Nationalists and the Republic of Korea, to deter or stand off Chinese communist conventional attack.

The Korean war occurred at a time when the US was the only free nation with any real military power. In the coming era, the situation could be far different. We have many allies with large non-nuclear force potential.

III. *THE PROSPECT*

It must be admitted that there would be great difficulty in moving away from our present policy of threatening to use nuclear weapons to

deter any kind of aggression. There still may be substance to the argument that the continuing threat to employ nuclear force keeps down the risk of war. But with each passing month, this nuclear threat becomes less credible and the temptation to the communists to resort to limited force will increase if some supplementary deterrent is not developed.

Certainly it will require a great wrench to our post-war accustomed manner of thinking about the role and nature of forces in free world defense to face a future without leaning so heavily on the crutch of nuclear weapons.

Our great dependence on the nuclear deterrent has lulled Americans into forgetting that in the last analysis their security is no greater than their will to fight for their country. Nuclear weapons have obscured this responsibility. Nuclear weapons have also permitted budgetary rationalizations, which in turn only increased our nuclear dependence.

If we are to affect the trends which the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense find are decreasing our relative military power, we will have to find ways of breaking out of this blind circle. We will have to find the dynamism to support a different military policy. That same new dynamism will be essential if we are to keep freedom alive in the rugged peaceful competition with communism which lies ahead.

In view of our deep commitment to nuclear weapons, it will take a relatively long time to get away from excessive dependence on them. There will be many painful "withdrawal symptoms". But the switch is within the bounds of possibility—and within a reasonable time span. A recent paper prepared at a high level in the Pentagon included the following statement: ". . . it would be at least five to ten years before the U.S. military establishment could be converted to a modern non-nuclear force capable of deterring or fighting a general war."

President Eisenhower's great dedication to the cause of peace and his expressed wish to leave a legacy of constructive thinking for the future may offer the combination necessary to start the turn away from our present military stance. A "respectable" military posture not based almost entirely on the total-war threat might in the long run be of even greater significance for peace than the major efforts which the President is now making in the international political field.

There is still time during the last year of his Administration for a start to be made in a new direction.

IV. CONCLUSION

I recommend that if these views commend themselves, you present them to the President and urge that the Secretary of Defense ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to start a study to estimate the possibilities and cost of developing over the next decade a free world military posture which would reduce present dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Administration could do this without calling into question the present military posture—by addressing its attention to the above-mentioned five to ten year period when new factors will cause and require radical changes in our military posture.

Attachment—

“Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing Upon US Strategy”, dated April 24, 1959 [S/P–59110–1 C]

Enclosure

Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Krebs

Washington, December 9, 1959

The attached memo of November 18 was returned today.

I would much appreciate knowing whether or not the recommendation on page 5 commended itself to the Secretary.

Encl.

Memo, re long-range security policy [S/P–59204–1A]

Enclosure

Memorandum From Krebs to Smith (S/P)

Washington, December 11, 1959

I inquired of the Secretary whether the recommendation at the conclusion of your memorandum of November 18th had commended itself to him. He replied that while he had read the memorandum carefully, he had not yet made up his mind definitely as to the merits of the proposal and would like to think about it a bit more before deciding definitely whether to speak to the President about it.

Max V. Krebs

Attachment:

S/P Memorandum of November 18

216. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Augusta, Georgia, November 18, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining, General White, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General Pate,
General Goodpaster

The President said he had wanted to talk with the Chiefs on the problems of the coming year and specifically on the military program. What he had in mind was an exchange of ideas with them. He commented that he was deeply disappointed in General Taylor's action in putting out a book, but was not going to let that keep him from speaking frankly and meeting both formally and informally with the Chiefs whenever there seemed to be reason to do so.

General Twining said Secretary McElroy had had the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries in to meet with him on his return to Washington the previous Monday. He said the main concern in the Chiefs is that expenditures are increasing for many things that do not give a return in combat capability today. The President said he realized this but felt that our military leaders must from time to time take a new look at things that have become simply a matter of habit. He had two or three specific items in mind. The first of these is the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Admiral Burke said that there would be some advantage to putting the 6th Fleet under SACLANT and deploying it in the Atlantic. There is need, however, to stabilize the situation in Greece, Italy and Turkey, and the 6th Fleet makes a great contribution in this regard. He felt that the fleet units had to be kept fairly well forward so that, when needed for an emergency, we could move them fairly fast into the troubled area. He cited the wholly unsatisfactory British experience and performance at the time of the Suez operation. He added that the fleet does not involve much drain on our dollar reserves.

The President said he is getting extremely annoyed with the Europeans who are tending to lean much too heavily on us. In fact, everyone is relying on us around the world. The British, for example, want us to maintain their interest in Kuwait. He said he saw the use for carriers in peacetime but thought they had no real value in an all-out war. They would be hit in port. Admiral Burke commented that the carriers are moved at odd times, on no fixed schedule, so that an enemy

¹ Source: General discussion of the U.S. military program: force levels, B-70, budget. Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

could never be sure where they were. The President said it would be a simple matter to reconnoiter them.

He went on to say that when we put our forces in Europe in 1951 we said they were being put there temporarily. Since that time, however, our government has taken the stand that we must not pull anything back, that the shock to the Europeans would be too great. Admiral Burke commented that the 6th Fleet also has amphibious lift, which is very expensive to maintain. No one else has it. The British capability is nothing short of pitiful when one considers that this is a type of force they particularly need. The President said the French, Germans and British are all steadily increasing their gold reserves. Their budgets are not being overstrained. In 1951 and 1952 we made sacrifices. It is hard for him to see why they do not now pick up a fair share of the burden. He thought there is no reason we could not cut down the number of our carriers on station. What troubled the President is that, in America's anxiety to make the free world safe, we make ourselves vulnerable to our allies taking advantage of us. There is, of course, no possibility of doing anything suddenly. The Europeans have told their people too long that their safety depends on the U.S. He recalled that de Gaulle said he was unhappy with regard to command arrangements and thought these should be more on a national basis than at present. The President told him that there would then be no reason for U.S. forces to be in Europe. Admiral Burke said he had been meeting with Admiral Lambe of Britain and Admiral Nomy of France. Nomy is in an extremely embarrassing position because he recognizes the logic of collective defense as against the de Gaulle proposals. The President said he had told Admiral Lambe when he saw him that he was asking our people to restudy our naval position in the Mediterranean. Admiral Burke commented that the French naval people want to work closely with us. The President said he is trying to save something in annual costs and simply wanted to know if we had to pull down somewhere what we would then do with the 6th Fleet. He wants the other countries to pick up responsibilities. Admiral Burke mentioned that in this budget the Navy is reducing its strength by fifty destroyers. The President said we tend more and more to get other people into the habit of expecting us to pick up the responsibilities and the costs. We should maintain the reserves for the whole free world, and rely on local people to provide the localized elements of defense, especially on the ground. We should provide air, naval and mobile land forces. In that way we would be putting our strength into the types of forces that give greatest over-all strength. He asked Admiral Burke to make a further study of this matter.

The President next raised with General Lemnitzer the question of the strength of the National Guard and Reserve forces. General

Lemnitzer said that these have been greatly reorganized and tightened up. Paid drill strength has been cut down from 1,254,000 in 1954 to 700,000 at the present time. We have cut down manning levels, knocked out ten divisions, and cut down the number of battle groups in sixteen divisions. We have reduced from 11,000 to 8,800 units. We are giving the National Guard and Reserves more of a civil defense mission. We have just completed this reorganization, and an attempt to make a further change coming at this time would inflame the whole National Guard and Reserve structure. He said that with the six months' training program now in effect, and the elimination of excess units, we now have six good divisions. To attempt to decrease to 630,000 would explode the situation, he felt.

The President said he had recommended a strength of 630,000 for the last several budgets. If we are not careful, we will get into the position of making recommendations simply to fight politicians rather than to solve military problems. He recalled that he had called for State Guards to be established, with the rest of the structure brought under Federal control. This had been bitterly opposed. The biggest mission of the Reserves today is rehabilitation in case disaster should occur through nuclear war. He thought it is wrong to keep the National Guard and the Reserves in an antiquated concept. He realized that he had been defeated by the National Guard and Reserves on this issue, and realized that he would probably be defeated again. General Lemnitzer said it had taken tremendous effort, but he had gotten agreement from the National Guard and Reserves on a 700,000 man force. He said he has resisted pressures for an increase in the strength of units. He has had a restudy of the pentomic division made, under a guideline that he would not approve an increase of even one man in total strength.

The President said he was going to stick with his 630,000 man recommendation. He wants to tailor the force to the real need. He commented that defense will never be as sound on an unstable economy as it will be on a sound one. The Chiefs to him are the hinge between the professional forces and the supporting nation. He referred briefly to the so-called new look concepts, and commented that the old relations between military forces and the nation in time of war are changing. General Lemnitzer said that the National Guard and Reserve units are undoubtedly the best nucleus on which to carry out rehabilitation in case of nuclear attack. He must sell and develop this concept gradually, however. The President commented that we have got to keep our economy expanding through private initiative by three to four percent a year. To do this we must keep our dollar sound. In addition, it is the currency base throughout the world. We must not permit a run on the dollar to develop. Our people must support their military

program by current taxes and not by deficit financing. The result is that we must cut off every unnecessary excrescence. He said he is fighting to get the budget below \$80 billion, which is an enormous figure in his judgment, and he is the first President to have stressed economy in recent years. He said he knows that every man in Defense is concerned regarding our security and safety. Someone must however look at the Defense establishment afresh and restudy its needs, since changes in technology change the needs of defense. He felt we are putting too much money in certain things—particularly the traditional things—and are not giving tough enough restudy aimed at eliminating everything not needed. Some increases are inevitable. For example, there is an increase of \$70 million this year in retired pay. A number of these things add up very quickly. Now the question is how we do what needs to be done within a pattern that will keep our economy healthy and expanding.

The President reiterated that he felt we should go to the 630,000 man National Guard and Reserve force. We should get what we need for the job these forces do. He recognized that the Congress might override him, and recalled that they had overridden him as Chief of Staff in providing retired pay for National Guard and Reserve inactive service. Admiral Burke asked if there is any way to get the states to pick up more of the cost of National Guard forces, and General Lemnitzer said he saw no hope of this. The President said he wanted to have whatever meetings are needed to find a program in which all would believe. Then he thought all should stand and present this to the people, to the Congress, etc. with unity. Each staff must accept this as the view of its own Chief. As to General Taylor's opposition to his policies, he was confident that Taylor would not get enough support to override him. He reiterated that he thinks that the Chiefs must look for every excrescence. He said he is afraid of some of the things we are doing in science, devoting resources to many unnecessary things. He said that whenever the Chiefs want to see him they could do so, and that he had in mind to see them at least once a month. He asked them to continue to work on what they think is right, taking account of the fact that a sound economy and a sound defense are inseparable.

He repeated that he did not favor the 700,000 man program for the National Guard and the Reserves. General Lemnitzer said that one problem in the reduction is that it looks like an arbitrary 10% cut. The President commented that the other services are cutting personnel through a wringer process and that this reflects the results of advances in technology that come from our outlays on science. General Lemnitzer said he has taken a hard look at personnel, which is now stretched to the breaking point, with 40% of the people

overseas. The President commented that he has not pressed the Army for cuts this year. He added that other nations are profiting from the presence of our forces and building up their reserves while we serve as the world's banker.

The President said he realized the problem of the individual Chiefs before Congress. They demand the "personal views" of the Chiefs. General Lemnitzer said they frequently ask what was the original recommendation made by the Chiefs.

The President then turned to the question of the B-70. General White showed charts showing the declining trends in major aspects of the Air Force program. He said the Air Force is cutting personnel and units in order to maintain modernization. The President said that he had approved the B-58 program going ahead at a reduced level as part of our interim defense measures. He said the B-70 left him cold in terms of making military sense. General White conceded that there are great questions involved, but thought we would be going too fast and too far to eliminate it at this time. He said it is the only aircraft left in the Air Force under development. He had dropped the F-108 a short while ago. Both of these were intended to be mach 3, 2,100 mile per hour aircraft. He weighed carefully which one to drop. The primary deterrent to date has been the manned bomber and he did not feel we could rely wholly on missiles, none of which have ever been used in combat, at this time. Unless nuclear testing is resumed, we would find ourselves in the position of never having fired the one weapon we are completely dependent upon. The President said he would have no objection to testing a missile with a live warhead less the nuclear core—the TNT could be fired. General White said that the missiles give the President no options. Bombers could be gotten aloft to await orders, but missiles cannot be called back. Bombers give the enemy a difficult defense problem since he must defend against several kinds of attack. There is also the psychological effect of manning static weapons like the Coast Artillery of olden days, where training was done with the blitz cloth. He said that bombers can be seen by friend and foe alike and that they have a powerful psychological impact. If the Soviets were to produce an aircraft of this kind it would create great problems for us. He said he would beg that the B-70 be carried as a bare minimum research and development program at the level of \$200 million this year. He said this is a very different aircraft from anything that has gone before. It must pass through the heat barrier and the shape of wing and fuselage must be studied out. The President said he understood the Hounddog missile is very successful and that it can be fired from a B-52 several hundred miles away from the target. The B-70 will not be in production before a date eight to ten years from now. He thought that was getting

too far into a period in which the major destruction would come from missiles. He thought we were greatly overinsuring our ability to hit an enemy. There is no uncertainty that we would be able to hit his cities. He asked whether the Soviets would not be able to hit the B-70 with rockets. General White said that they would, but the B-70 would cross radarscopes so fast as to be a difficult target. The President said he was convinced that the age of aircraft for actual use over enemy territory is fast coming to a close. General White thought it would be worth the money to carry on development of this aircraft for a short while, agreeing that it might be dropped later. The President said he finds the missile a cheaper, more effective way of doing the same thing. General White reverted to the premium we gain from having different systems for attack. The President said that in ten years the missile capacity of both countries will be such as to be able to destroy each other many times over. He thought we are going overboard in different ways to do the same thing. General White commented that this is the last aircraft under development in the world and that he would, if it were left in the program, find money somewhere to hang on to it.

The President said that he questions the bomber having a place after we have produced the kind of destructive power that we have. He saw no need for it. General White said he simply wanted to keep it alive for one more year. The President commented that defensive rocketry would be much more effective against the B-70 than against the Titan and Atlas. He commented that the X-15 is under development, and even it could be used to knock out the B-70. He said that we retired the battleship finally long after the contest was over and asked whether we are not trying to hang onto the old forms of warfare too long in a similar way as regards the bomber. General White thought we were looking too far into the future if we did this and the President said he feels he can look that far in recommending it. General White said if the President would allow him to keep it in the program even on a research and development basis, he would put it into the budget and would not accept an increase even if the Congress tried to force it on him. General Lemnitzer said he was appalled at the estimate of \$200 million just to carry on a research and development program. The President asked the other Chiefs for their views. General White, General Pate and General Twining favored continuation of the project. Admiral Burke opposed it. General Lemnitzer favored it as a research and development project which he thought could be a small fraction of \$200 million.

The President reviewed past examples of weapons that had outlived their era and said he thought we were talking about bows and arrows at the time of gunpowder when we spoke of bombers in the missile age.

The big question to him was that we have got to find a defense program now and in the future within a reasonable budget, i.e., within feasible tax levels such that our people will not start evading the taxes and will be able and willing to support on the basis of the present kind of prosperity and present tax rates. He thought the B-70 is a duplication of something we will have otherwise. He said he would take another look at the B-70 proposition. However, in ten years he saw missiles carrying the burden of warfare. He thought that each Chief must look for every possible saving, even dribbles. We must make every effort to stay within a reasonable level defense program.

General White said he thought that perhaps Air Force management has been discredited. Many of the programs approved last year have now been cancelled and are no longer being continued. The President said the question is simply one of success in rocketry. This success has made possible and necessary reductions in aircraft programs. It is a change in our thinking. General White said there is the question of what is the future of the Air Force and of flying. This shift has a great impingement on morale. There is no follow on to the fighter, and no new opportunity for Air Force personnel. A natural extension of Air Force activity would be into space as flying drops off. He wanted the predominant role in space for the Air Force.

The President said he did not know what our needs were going to be in space. He thought that would be going ahead of current plans and problems. At the time these questions arose, we probably will not have air, navy and ground forces. He commented that he is going to make a change in NASA, cutting back military operations in space to strictly defense activities.

General White said he thought the Department of Defense should establish force objectives extending some three years or so into the future as was done in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. The President said that each Service Chief had come down to the meeting with a firm service program. He would like to see the Chiefs come to some basis of principles, give those to the Joint Staff with no other instructions and see what the Joint Staff would develop as to needs. General White thought if this were sent to the Secretary of Defense he should then have the task of making a three-year program and budget.

The President commented that he believes we should have one National War College. He thought that service staff colleges are all right but at war college level we should be talking about the needs of the U.S. and not orienting our thoughts toward services.

In concluding the meeting, the President invited the Chiefs to come in to see him whenever they wished to.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

217. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Augusta, Georgia, November 21, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Gates, Brucker, Francke, Douglas, Dr. York, General Brown, Mr. Logan, General Goodpaster

The President said he had met with the Chiefs of Staff to discuss the military program for fiscal 1961. One question in his mind related to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. He felt that its presence there was largely just a matter of habit. It is no longer the asset it once was to the right flank of the European defense position, because of the advent of long-range thermonuclear missiles. He said he had asked Admiral Burke to take an objective look at this question.

The next item that he had strongly questioned was the B-70. We have the B-58 coming into inventory and various missiles behind it. To put as much into the B-70 project as is proposed and have from it a vehicle nearly ten years from now seemed to him to be a very doubtful proposition. He wondered what the counter measures would be by that time. General White had previously expressed great concern over this, stating that if we drop this weapon we would be standing on our inventory and not going into a new field. The President thought that NACA is conducting forward research in this field, and indicated he did not share General White's concern. Dr. York said he thought the general design of the B-70 aircraft is sound. Technically, it represents a big step forward. For example, there is a change in construction material from aluminum to stainless steel. If we are to go above mach 3, it will be necessary to use steel. For reasons of promoting technical progress, Dr. York said he was inclined to want to go forward with this. Even if there is no good military reason to carry

¹Source: U.S. military program: B-70; national defense system; budget, space activities; missile programs; Panama. No classification marking. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

it forward, there are technical reasons to continue with research and development. Secretary Douglas said he did not know whether, when we get down the road, we will want to drop this or not. He felt it was very important, however, to carry forward development work on advanced aircraft. The program as revised calls for two prototype aircraft. The first could fly in 1962. The President said he understood that research would be concentrated on metals, configuration and engines. Dr. York said Dr. Kistiakowsky had asked him to state as his view that it would be useful to continue the development of this aircraft, but not strictly necessary.

The President said he is not at all interested in building an aircraft for civilian transport purposes. The question remains somewhat unresolved in his mind.

The President then said that anything that weakens our economy weakens our defense. He believes every single individual in defense must weigh expenditures in terms of what they mean in weakening our defense through weakening our economy. He had told the Chiefs of Staff they must look for and weed out every expenditure of half a million dollars or a million dollars that is not strictly necessary. He recognized that it would be possible to ask for a tax increase if greater expenditures were needed. He pointed out, however, that even during the war, when motivation was high, there were gray markets and black markets and that higher taxes would begin a widening pattern of tax evasion.

He called on the Secretaries to formulate a national defense system that all could agree upon and support. Then he said he could insist on economy in every other field of government such as public health and public works.

Regarding the aircraft carrier, he said he would approve a conventional carrier. He thought the carriers had value in the cold war, but not much value in a general war. Dr. York and Mr. Franke said that everyone was agreed that there is no need for a nuclear carrier. The problem is that it is not possible to get a conventional carrier from the Congress.

The President said that the Administration has one more year to get the defense establishment in the best possible shape. He thought the best minds were assembled in the Joint Chiefs and the top leadership, that had ever been there. What he wanted was to get a decision that looked good to all, with all supporting it. There must be no undercover sniping at the program.

Mr. Gates said the Defense group had gone back from their meeting of a day or two earlier and had taken out everything possible, leaving questions on the carrier and the B-70. He is having studies started on continental air defense and on communications and intelligence activities to see if further cuts can be made.

Regarding space activities, the President said he had talked with Dr. Glennan. The significance of the space problem is that it affects the morale of our people. In the field of space there are a certain number of things that affect defense directly. Basically, however, the program is scientific. Dr. Glennan had asked for \$930 million, and he has asked Dr. Glennan to cut this down substantially. While space is important to morale, he asks what would happen to the world's morale if our dollar—the world's banking currency—were to soften. He asked the group to look at every project with a jaundiced eye. He said he did not want to gouge Defense because it is the biggest but thought everyone should be tightening up. He added that if he were convinced of the necessity for additional funds for the nation's security, he would instantly go out and get the additional taxes. Mr. Gates said that on some of these decisions the best that could be done was to make an intelligent guess or gamble. Mr. Douglas added that some people had wanted crash programs on the missile output. Referring again to the B-70, the President said he had asked what the other elements in the military situation would be at the time the B-70 became available. What counter-measures would the Soviets have, for example. On the proposal that the B-70 should be used for reconnaissance he commented that we have an excellent reconnaissance vehicle in work right now. He recognized the validity of General White's statement that we must not put all our eggs in one basket and rely wholly on missiles. He thought we were far from doing so, however.

Mr. Gates mentioned a comparative study that is being made on use of missiles and aircraft. Dr. York pointed out that while there is no doubt about missiles from a technical standpoint, they will not be exercised like aircraft, and the parent units may lose their verve, somewhat as the Coast Artillery did in times past.

The President said that all we really have that is meaningful is a deterrent. If the Soviets think the B-70 is more effective than missiles, then it has value. If they do not, it is valueless. Dr. York said that the concentration the President had just suggested on deterrent value should be stated as basic national policy. The President said that beyond the deterrent we would provide for other things such as the cold war. He thought we would be cutting back our base system greatly in future years. He noted that armament is now in a transitional period and that if we are thinking of something that is not operational for eight years this is not a transitional item but is simply a supplement to the missile force.

The President said that, with regard to atomic weapons, if we use thousands of small weapons we would be in a general war situation, in which the hydrogen weapon would be used, making the smaller ones insignificant. He had no objection to a reasonable number for tactical

use. He commented that he was told a year ago that SAC would not take Navy targeting into account. If we are going to fight a nuclear war, it was clear in his mind that we would attack cities and governmental concentrations. Invariably, the reasoning leads us back to perfecting the deterrent. Mr. Douglas said this emphasizes the importance of an invulnerable missile. The President commented that the capabilities of missiles for destruction are beyond human comprehension. It is very difficult to plan, because our plans are developed out of past experience. Dr. York commented that the total deliverable destructive power is the significant thing and the President agreed.

The President asked whether the Polaris program is progressing as rapidly as it should be to justify the preparations we are making. Are its technical problems solved? Dr. York said that perhaps the first or second submarine will not be operational on the exact date planned. However, by the time we reach the eighth or tenth we will be on schedule. The firing methods are sound, and its range is now being worked up to 1200 miles, employing a large nuclear weapon.

The President next referred to the National Guard and the Reserves and his discussion with General Lemnitzer. The latter had made two points—first that he had finally sold the States and the Guard on a force structure based on a strength of 700,000; he had sold them on the idea that their mission includes local defense and rehabilitation. The Guard units are better than ever before. It will be difficult to stick to the Administration figure of 630,000, but this will be done. General Lemnitzer was fearful that the Administration would be defeated on this and at the same time incur the enmity of Congress and the Guard. Governor Brucker reviewed the decrease in Guard numbers both as to personnel and as to units. Five years ago personnel was 1,100,000. It is now 700,000. Units were cut from 11,000 to 8,800. He said various members of Congress had insisted that they were going to put a floor under the strength of the Guard. The President said the big question is how much to fight for what is thought to be right, or how much to bow to expediency. He realized he would probably be defeated on this point and that Congress would take things out of the program that he wanted and put things in that he did not want. However, he felt that we should stick to what he thought was right.

Governor Brucker said he wanted to push as rapidly as possible the preparations for the Kwajalein tests for the anti-ICBM. Secretary Gates said it would be practical to withdraw seven squadrons of aircraft from NATO (really four, since three are troop carriers not fully committed). The President said there was not time left to put this reduction into the present budget. The State Department must have time to prepare the

ground. He agrees that some of our strength could be withdrawn, but it will take time to turn European thinking around on this.

At the President's request Mr. Douglas presented a brief explanation of the funding of the Atlas and Titan missile programs. The President commented that heavy expenditures are coming at the same time as expenditures on our most costly bombers.

As the meeting ended, the Secretary of the Army reported on the situation in Panama. He said he had met with Mr. Herter and that Mr. Merchant was currently in Panama. There is great bitterness there and the Communists are moving into the troublemaking organizations. The President had two comments. First, he said when the conciliatory approach was adopted, we should have announced it publicly. Second, we have always acknowledged Panama's residual sovereignty and we should have flown Panamanian flags as part of a ceremony rather than opposing this. He said he thought some of our local officials had been too stiff-necked and too legalistic. This was a situation where politeness and courtesy would have been extremely effective.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

218. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, December 3, 1959

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5906/1
- B. NSC Action No. 2114-*d*
- C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 29, 1959
- D. NSC Action No. 2155

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce,

¹Source: Presidential approval of revision of paragraph 60 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, by Memorandum Action (NSC Action No. 2155) concurred in the revision of paragraph 60 (Strategic Stockpiling) of NSC 5906/1, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2114-*d* and transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 29, 1959.

The President has approved as of this date the above action. Revised pages 28-B and 29 of NSC 5906/1, incorporating the approved revision of paragraph 60, are transmitted herewith for substitution in NSC 5906/1. It is requested that the superseded pages be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

219. Memorandum From JCS to Commander in Chief, SAC¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions (S)

1. The President has authorized certain Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands to expend nuclear weapons in defense of the United States, its Territories, possessions and forces when the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision

¹ Source: Instructions for use of nuclear weapons in emergencies. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.

by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead. Such commanders will be called Authorizing Commanders.

2. This authorization by the President is an emergency measure necessitated by recognition of the fact that communications may be disrupted by an attack (as defined in the Enclosure). Each Authorizing Commander must insure that such delegation of authority is not assumed through accident or misinformation. Further, it should be regarded as an authorization effective only until it is possible to communicate with the President or other person empowered to act for him.

3. [*text not declassified*]

4. [*text not declassified*]

a. For the defense of the United States, its Territories, and possessions:

In the United States, its Territories and possessions and in international waters adjacent thereto as defined in Section "A" against attack by sea—(Special Additional Instructions in Section "A" below).

b. For the defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory and in international waters against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned—(Special Additional Instructions in Section "A" below).

c. In the event of nuclear attack upon the United States, in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned—(Special Additional Instructions in Section "B" below).

3. *OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS*. Because of the serious international implications of the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. military forces, it is essential that particularly strict command control and supervision be exercised, and that the use of nuclear weapons be limited to circumstances of grave necessity. [*text not declassified*]

4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES. [*text not declassified*]

[NOTE: Pages 4–6 of source text denied in full.]

Section “B”

*Special Additional Instructions Regarding Retaliation in the
Event of a Nuclear Attack Upon the United States*

1. *PURPOSE.* These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the event of nuclear attack upon the United States in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject, in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory, to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. *POLICY.* In the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States, it is assumed that the President would have approximately the same information as the Department of Defense regarding the strength and character of the attack and the identity of the nation launching it. Retaliation for such attack, therefore, will be on order of the President, except in circumstances where immediate communications have become impossible between the President and responsible officials of the Department of Defense. In such circumstances, [*text not declassified*] applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

3. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. [*text not declassified*]

b. In the event that a nuclear attack has in fact occurred, as authenticated through prescribed procedures as approved by the President, on the United States and it is impossible to communicate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [*text not declassified*].

4. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. [*text not declassified*]

220. Memorandum From JCS to Commander in Chief, Atlantic¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in [text not declassified] (S)

1. The President has authorized certain [text not declassified] to expend nuclear weapons in defense of the United States, its Territories, possessions and forces when the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a [text not declassified].

2. [text not declassified]

3. You have been designated by the President as [text not declassified] in the Enclosure hereto.

4. In regard to the air defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions, the instructions contained herein do not change the authority [text not declassified] pursuant to the "Authorization for the Expenditure of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense" approved by the President 19 April 1956 and the "Policy Statement on Interception and Engagement of Hostile Aircraft" approved 24 September 1952. This authority was implemented in accordance with the revised "Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures", dated 7 December 1956.

[NOTE: Pge 2 of source text denied in full.]

3. *OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS*. Because of the serious international implications of the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. military forces, it is essential that particularly strict command control and supervision be exercised, and that the use of nuclear weapons be limited to circumstances of grave necessity. [text not declassified] In the expenditure of nuclear weapons pursuant to these instructions, the following limitations will be observed.

a. You may expend nuclear weapons [text not declassified].

b. Under this authorization, you may not expend nuclear weapons for [text not declassified].

c. Any expenditure of nuclear weapons pursuant to these instructions [text not declassified].

¹ Source: Instructions for use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.

[NOTE: Pages 4–8 of source text denied in full.]

[*text not declassified*] by all means available to determine if an attack has in fact occurred. In this connection advance action will be taken to identify all possible means of establishing such communications to include means both in [*text not declassified*] and to be prepared to use these means when necessary. Only when you have established by the procedures outlined above that communications are impossible, may you assume that an attack has occurred on the United States.

b. You will bear in mind that the above delegation of authority to expend nuclear weapons is an emergency measure necessitated by recognition of the fact that communications may be disrupted by the attack. It is mandatory to insure that such [*text not declassified*].

Section "C"

Special Additional Instructions Regarding Retaliation in the Event of a Nuclear Attack Upon the United States

1. *PURPOSE*: These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject, in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory, to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. *POLICY*. In the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States, it is assumed that the President would have approximately the same information as the Department of Defense regarding the strength and character of the attack and the identity of the nation launching it. Retaliation for such attack, therefore, will be on [*text not declassified*]. In such circumstances, [*text not declassified*] if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

3. *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES*.

a. [*text not declassified*]

b. In the event that a nuclear attack has in fact occurred on the United States as authenticated by the procedure of paragraph 4. a (2), Section "B", of these instructions, [*text not declassified*].

(1) Comply with applicable international agreements or understandings, if any, in expending nuclear weapons for retaliatory purposes from friendly foreign territory.

(2) Alert your manned retaliatory forces to the fact that they may be recalled prior to their arrival in the target area.

4. *OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS*. The delegation of authority to expend nuclear weapons for [*text not declassified*].

221. Memorandum From JCS to Commander in Chief, Europe¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

[text not declassified]

1. [text not declassified]

2. [text not declassified]

3. [text not declassified]

4. [text not declassified] you are authorized by the President to expend nuclear weapons in the following circumstances in conformity with these instructions:

a. For the defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory and in international waters against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned—(Special Additional Instructions in Section “A” below).

b. In the event of nuclear attack upon the United States, in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned—(Special Additional Instructions in Section “B” below).

3. *OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS*. Because of the serious international implications of the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. military forces, it is essential that particularly strict command control and supervision be exercised, and that the use of nuclear weapons be limited to circumstances of grave necessity. [text not declassified]

[NOTE: Pages 3–6 of source text denied in full.]

[text not declassified]

Section “B”

Special Additional Instructions Regarding Retaliation in the Event of a Nuclear Attack Upon the United States

1. *PURPOSE*. These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject, in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory, to applicable agreements or

¹ Source: Instructions for use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Atomic Weapons, Corr. And Background for Presidential Approval.

understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. *POLICY*. [*text not declassified*] to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

3. *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES*.

a. [*text not declassified*]

b. In the event that a nuclear attack has in fact occurred, as authenticated through prescribed procedures as approved by the President, on the United States [*text not declassified*].

4. *OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS*. [*text not declassified*]

222. Briefing Note for the December 16 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 16, 1959

SUBJECT

Emergency Relocation Plan—NSC
(NSC 5521)

1. The Emergency Relocation Plan for the NSC (NSC 5521, approved by the President on 6–9–55) has been reviewed by the Planning Board, and there has been circulated to the NSC a draft revision of the Plan.

2. The review of the NSC Plan was undertaken on the basis that considerable time had elapsed since its approval in 1955, and because the Cabinet approved on 6–9–59 a new Interim Emergency Relocation Plan which OCDM had proposed for the Executive Branch.

3. The Interim Emergency Relocation Plan approved by the Cabinet provides in essence as follows: (a) of the 58 emergency headquarters sites which had been established by agencies in the 300-mile arc extending from Washington, D. C., 17 of those sites were selected as “hardened sites” for operation during the first 30 days after an attack; (b) of the 17 sites selected, 14 will require improved fallout protection through new construction costing an estimated \$12 million, not including cost of blast protection for the State site at Front Royal for which no cost estimates are available, (c) 3 sites (AEC, Raven Rock, and High Point) are already

¹ Source: Emergency relocation plan, NSC 5521. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

adequately protected; (d) should an attack emergency arise prior to the availability of the hardened sites, the various agencies' relocation staffs will relocate to the OCDM underground facility at High Point, under the "Interim Plan," to carry on essential headquarters functions under the direction of the respective agency heads or officials designated to act for them; and (e) those relocation forces at High Point will include the member and advisory agencies of the NSC (with the exception of Defense and JCS [*text not declassified*])—although Defense will have 3 liaison representatives at High Point under the "Interim Plan").

4. Substantive provisions of the Emergency Relocation Plan for the NSC, which are recommended by the Planning Board, are as follows:

Paragraph 2, page 1, would be revised to reflect that the wartime composition of the NSC would be *statutory members and advisers* with flexibility reserved to the President as to the designation of additional participants in the policy advisory function of the NSC in wartime. There is no change proposed in the presently approved concept that the President would use the NSC as his key policy advisory body under wartime conditions.

The revised language proposed for paragraph 3-*b* reserves complete flexibility as to the relocation site to which the Vice President would proceed (and the Planning Board understands that the emergency relocation site of the Vice President would most likely be one other than that to which the President might proceed).

Paragraph 3-*c* would be revised to reflect that NSC members and advisers would proceed to the relocation sites of their selection; and the footnote to this subparagraph refers to the Cabinet paper which reflects approval of the new Interim Emergency Relocation Plan for the Executive Branch.

Also, under this paragraph, the NSC staff relocation site would be changed [*text not declassified*]. At that site would also be the Planning Board members, advisers, and designated observers, or their alternates. However, the Chairman of the JCS has recently recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the current allocation of 22 spaces for the Planning Board and NSC Staff at the AJCC be withdrawn. If this recommendation is approved by the Secretary of Defense, provision would then have to be made for the NSC Staff and the Planning Board to relocate to the OCDM High Point site.

5. *JCS views*, received just prior to this meeting, take issue with paragraph 3-*d* and 3-*e* of the proposed revision of the NSC Plan under which the NSC Staff and Planning Board members, advisers, and designated observers (or alternates) would relocate to the [*text not declassified*]. In lieu of such provision, the JCS recommend that the Plan call for (a) the NSC Staff to be relocated to the OCDM protected site [*text not declassified*] and (b) the Planning Board members, advisers, and designated observers to relocate to their respective agency sites and remain available on call by the Chairman of the Planning Board at such place as he might

elect. The JCS views are based on the belief that Planning Board members lose much of their value to the Planning Board when separated from their parent agency. (*Observation:* Such reasoning appears appropriate for consideration in the light of such additional factors as (a) the need for continuous integrated functioning of the Planning Board at a single location, and (b) the availability of communications which would keep the Planning Board members in touch with their parent agencies even though assembled at a distant location on a continuing basis.)

6. CALL ON: OCDM—for any comments on the draft NSC Plan from the standpoint of over-all emergency relocation plans for the Executive Branch.

Defense and JCS—for any comments in elaboration of the JCS views [*text not declassified*] by the NSC Staff and Planning Board.

Enclosure

Washington, December 16, 1959

TESTING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING IN A CRISIS BY WARGAMING

Proposal

Apply the principle of wargaming used extensively by the military to a simulated crisis situation which would call into play a whole range of interrelated political, economic and military decision making.

Purpose

1. To illuminate the functioning and interdependence of the NSC and its constituent agencies in the flow of information, Presidential decision-making and resulting operations during a simulated crisis.
2. To test the response to unforeseen Soviet actions.
3. To test the relocation and readiness plans.
4. To develop a technique for rapidly acquainting the next Administration with the character and range of the kinds of decisions they may be called upon to make.

Scope

Wargaming would focus on the problems of: (1) a period of tension leading either to war or relaxation, (2) limited war, (3) general war.

*Structure**(a) Design of the Game*

A technical committee would be set up to design the game calling upon available experienced resources as may be necessary. This committee would set up the conditions under which the game would be played, including such questions as the freedom of the game; the committee would prepare a scenario, choose the umpire, present and discuss the scenario with the participants.

(b) Who Will Play

The U.S. side will consist of the NSC and its constituent agencies. To test the process of decision-making in the U.S. Government, each of the agencies would provide a participating team. Other allied governments could be represented by individual players as seemed desirable. The Soviet side would be represented by one team chosen by the technical committee.

The moves in the game would be prepared in writing by the staffs assigned to the game. The results of the game should be presented in the form of conclusions and evaluations and might be presented in extended briefing to the NSC.

(c) Cover

The game should be played during and under cover of, but not as a part of, a future Operation Alert, thus minimizing problems of “visibility” and public reaction.

223. Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 16, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, December 16, 1959

Present at the 429th NSC Meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Acting Secretary of Defense (Douglas); and the Acting Director, Office of Civil

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Emergency Relocation Plan—National Security Council; Agenda item 4: Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the National Security Council. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—13 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Scribner); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Item 1); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were General Thomas S. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Security Operations Coordination, and for Science and Technology; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *EMERGENCY RELOCATION PLAN—NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL*

(NSC 5521; Cabinet Paper 59-98/1, June 12, 1959; NSC 5917)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 5917. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

In connection with Paragraph 3-(b) of the Briefing Note, Mr. Gray referred to inter-agency disagreement as to whether blast protection was to be provided for the State Department relocation site. Mr. Stans said this issue would shortly be resolved. OCDM would soon submit a request to proceed with construction for blast protection at Front Royal and at that time the Bureau of the Budget proposed to get the interested parties together for a discussion.

After reading the Briefing Note, Mr. Gray made some observations on war-gaming. He said that in the last seven years there had been very little "play of the problem" by the National Security Council in OPERATION ALERT. Indeed in the last two years the Council had not met at all during OPERATION ALERT. For very good reasons, such as security and "cover", the President had dealt with OPERATION ALERT through the Cabinet and had decided not to make it an NSC operation. However, the result is that we have little idea how the NSC mechanism would function under emergency conditions. We have only a limited idea of the role of the Planning Board in an emergency. OPERATION ALERT in the past had been largely a resources exercise and the participants had been resources agencies which did not deal with the kind of problems that would need to be dealt with by the NSC under the Presidential concept of the Council as a war cabinet. The difficulty of visualizing the exact working of relocation had led to the suggestion that national security policy-making in a crisis be tested by war-gaming, as outlined in the attached paper dated December 16, 1959 which had been

placed before the Council. The President, Mr. Gray continued, might or might not want to authorize a war-gaming exercise, but no doubt he would be interested in the views of the Council on the subject. Mr. Gray then summarized the paragraphs of the war-gaming paper dealing with purpose, scope and cover. At the conclusion of his summary, he informed the Council that this problem had been discussed by the Planning Board the day before and that the general feeling of the Board was that it was worth serious consideration and would help answer such questions as, Should Planning Board Members be relocated with their respective agencies or be relocated in a body? Mr. Gray said in the abstract he could support either answer to this question, but felt that a clearer idea could be obtained by war-gaming. In conclusion Mr. Gray suggested that if the Council thought well of the war-gaming proposal, it might wish to await conclusion of the game before recommending to the President changes in the current relocation plan.

Mr. Patterson said he thought a war-gaming exercise would represent a great gain not only to the NSC, but also to other agencies, and noted that OCDM might be taking another look at the OPERATION ALERT exercise. With respect to the issue which had arisen over blast protection at Front Royal, Governor Hoegh intended to confer with the Secretary of State and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at an early date on the principles of blast protection.

Mr. Gray noted that the relocation plans now call for the Secretary of State to be at Front Royal, with other Cabinet Members at various other locations, and asked whether the President in time of emergency would be satisfied to have his principal advisers scattered, in view of transportation difficulties and the danger of repeated attacks. Mr. Gray believed the President might want his principal advisers with him. Concepts of this kind had never really been tested, because relocation heretofore had been based largely on the idea of restoring the country after a nuclear attack. Another concept which might be tested by the war-game would be the condition which would arise if the enemy's first attack were directed solely at our retaliatory capability, with our population left largely intact, followed by an ultimatum which called upon us to surrender or suffer attack on our population centers. Mr. Gray called attention again to the fact that the war-gaming paper proposed that war-gaming take place under cover of, but not as a part of, OPERATION ALERT. Mr. Patterson felt that this was a correct concept.

Secretary Dillon thought it would be desirable to determine whether a study would be advantageous before jumping straight into a war-game. He was very concerned about the question of "visibility" and, on the basis of past experience, he was inclined to be pessimistic about preventing leaks. It would be particularly unfortunate to have the war-game exercise leak if it dealt with the concept last described by

Mr. Gray; that is, a Soviet attack on our retaliatory capability followed by an ultimatum to surrender or suffer attack on population centers. He felt the whole idea of a war-game needed more study and that it would be better not to have such a game until further study was completed. He wondered how much time would be required to conduct the war-game.

Mr. Gray said two successive days would probably be required for the senior participants in the game. All preparations would be made in advance and would not involve the senior participants. The two days would allow for two different assumed situations, one to be covered each day. The President, Mr. Gray continued, had always requested Cabinet Members to be available for participation in OPERATION ALERT, but many members had not found participation possible. If the President decided to have a war-game, he would have to request the senior participants to devote two days to the exercise.

Mr. Patterson pointed out that Secretaries Herter and Mitchell had participated in the last OPERATION ALERT. Mr. Patterson also thought that a better name than war-game should be applied to the exercise.

Mr. Gray said he understood the Joint Chiefs of Staff had participated in OPERATION ALERT largely on the logistic side. General White said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, had participated in other alert exercises. One such exercise, just completed, had involved the Secretary of Defense and the unified commanders.

Secretary Douglas felt that a clearer statement of the questions to be decided in connection with relocation was needed. There were perhaps good reasons for conducting a war-game, but he felt a more detailed proposal was required before the Defense view on the subject could be formulated. Secretary Dillon said his feelings were similar to those of Secretary Douglas.

Mr. Gray asked whether it was not the consensus of the Council that the notion of a war-game to test national security policy-making in a crisis has possibilities, but that the Council wants further information before proceeding.

Mr. Allen, referring to the paper on war-gaming, asked what "freedom of the game" meant? General White said he assumed this phrase referred to whether or not the game was "canned". Mr. Gray confirmed General White's view. General White said he wished to make two additional points. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to participate in any military situation assumed as part of the war-game; and secondly, war-gaming would involve a great many people and a great deal of time. Secretary Dillon said State would have problems as to time and personnel if political decisions were involved in the war-game. Mr. Gray said the war-gaming proposal should be discussed further in the Planning Board. He wished to point out, however, that the war-gaming proposal

had virtues apart from the relocation paper. The concept of how the NSC might be used under emergency conditions was important. The Planning Board should therefore prepare a report identifying and analyzing problems involved in alternative concepts for the use of the NSC organization in wartime. The Vice President agreed with Mr. Gray that war-gaming should be further discussed by the Planning Board. Mr. Gray said he would also like to have NSC 5917 referred back to the Planning Board.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement on the subject contained in NSC 5917, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 16, 1959) and a proposal by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for testing national security policy-making in a crisis by a gaming technique.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare a report identifying and analyzing questions and problems involved in alternative concepts of the use of the NSC organization in wartime.

c. Referred NSC 5917 back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion and the report referred to in *b* above.

[Omitted here are agenda items 2 and 3.]

4. TOPICS FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION OR CONSIDERATION BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Memo for NSC Members and Advisers from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, same subject, dated December 3, 1959; memos for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 14 and 15, 1959)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on each of the topics listed in the NSC Action below and after describing each topic paused to allow opportunity for discussion. (A Copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). With respect to some topics, the Council, without discussion, reached the agreement set forth in the NSC Action below. However, certain other topics elicited discussion as indicated in the following paragraphs.

Cuba. Secretary Dillon said the problem of Cuba was extremely complex and delicate, not only because of action taken with respect to Cuba, but also because of the psychological reaction to any actions which might be taken. Since there had been continuing discussions between the President and the Secretary of State with respect to Cuba, Mr. Dillon believed that the Planning Board should not be hasty about taking up Cuban policy until the President and the Secretary of State returned. In any event, the problem of Cuba should be handled under special security precautions. The Vice President did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels. Congress was an important element in the situation. The Administration

must try to guide Congress and not simply react to proposals which may be made in Congress. He urged that between now and January 6 supplementary studies of U.S. strategy toward Cuba should be undertaken. Mr. Gray said there was disagreement within the Government on the basic approach to the Cuban problem. The Treasury's suggestion for a paper on Cuba had been deliberately provocative, that is, intended to elicit discussion. Mr. Gray felt that certain elements in the State Department, particularly Assistant Secretary Rubottom, opposed Planning Board work on Cuba. The Vice President said that when Congress reconvened there would be a great assault on the Administration's Latin American policy. Heavy criticism of that policy was coming from the Republican as well as the Democratic members of Congress. In his view a discussion of Cuba could not be avoided. The problem would soon have far-flung implications beyond the control of the Department of State; and any tendency of State Department officials to attempt to delay action would not be appropriate. Secretary Dillon said he was concerned that a strong attitude which this Government might assume in order to satisfy public opinion would not achieve basic U.S. objectives with respect to Cuba. The Vice President recalled that some State Department officials had earlier taken the position that we would be able to live with Castro. No doubt radical steps with respect to Cuba would create an adverse reaction throughout Latin America, but we needed to find a few dramatic things to do with respect to the Cuban situation in order to indicate that we would not allow ourselves to be kicked around completely. The Attorney General remarked that his Department could be either tough or lenient with respect to anti-Castro elements operating in Florida. He needed policy guidance, however, before specific instructions could be given to FBI agents in the Miami area. Mr. Gray said that a discussion of Cuba by the Council would not mean that the policy would be rewritten in detail, but only that the problem would be discussed on the basis of a paper prepared by the Planning Board, which would be seized of the problem only for the purpose of preparing a discussion outline. Mr. Scribner said Treasury had suggested the question of Cuba not necessarily for the purpose of changing the policy or interfering with State's conduct of our relations with Cuba, but for the purpose of discussing the problem. Secretary Dillon said he had no objection to a discussion of Cuba, but he thought the matter should be handled as a delicate one without wide dissemination of knowledge that it was being discussed. The Vice President felt that Assistant Secretary Rubottom and the Planning Board could probably agree on what matters it would be appropriate to discuss. He repeated his fear that the problem was getting beyond the normal diplomatic province. Secretary Dillon suggested that the Planning Board might go ahead with the preparation of a Discussion Paper. The Vice President felt this was a good solution and added that we should not advertise the fact that we regard the situation in Cuba as

a crisis situation. The Attorney General indicated that from 30 to 40 FBI agents in the Miami area were spending all their time on Cuban affairs, but were having some difficulties because they did not know whether it was our policy to permit anti-Castro activities to continue in Florida or whether such activities should be stopped. Mr. Dulles felt the question of whether anti-Castro activities should be permitted to continue or should be stopped depended on what the anti-Castro forces were planning. We could not, for example, let the Batista-type elements do whatever they wanted to do. However, a number of things in the covert field could be done which might help the situation in Cuba.

Disarmament. With respect to disarmament, Secretary Dillon remarked that this Government would be faced with decisions earlier than planned. The Secretary of State and Mr. Lloyd had agreed that detailed planning was necessary.

Outer Space. With respect to U.S. policy on Outer Space, the Vice President said he would be very much interested in reading the proposed revision of our Outer Space policy. He felt there would be a great deal of discussion of Outer Space soon after Congress convenes.

The Attorney General felt that the Administration should be prepared to present a good case to Congress, not only on Outer Space, but on other matters also. We should think in terms of a persuasive presentation and not permit various segments of the Administration to appear before Congress and talk in different voices. The Vice President agreed that when the President returned from his trip he will have the greatest prestige of any President since Roosevelt. That prestige, properly used and used positively, could have quite an effect. The Attorney General recalled that before 1956 the Administration had had a liaison group which cleared and coordinated presentations to Congress. The Attorney General felt that sometimes the Administration reacted in a frightened manner to Congressional requests; he believed that such reaction was a poor tactic. The Vice President felt the Administration would need a well-understood, affirmative policy with respect to such things as the National Security Council, Cuban Policy, Outer Space, nuclear testing, disarmament, and nuclear power, all of which would probably be investigated by the Congress next year. Mr. Gray recalled that the Outer Space budget was already set for the next fiscal year and suggested that a summary of this discussion might be communicated to General Persons for legislative liaison purposes. The Acting Director, OCDM, Mr. Patterson, said the subject of legislative liaison was perhaps a proper one for Cabinet consideration. The Vice President noted that the subject would be considered by the Cabinet on Friday.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities. Secretary Dillon remarked that this subject should by all means be studied because of its serious implications.

Nuclear Weapons. Mr. McCone remarked that the question of sharing nuclear weapons with our allies would come up immediately when Congress reconvened because of the State-Defense suggestion that GENIE be used by the U.K. under emergency conditions. The Joint Committee was so concerned about this suggestion that it wanted to have a special session to look into the matter, but was finally persuaded to discuss the problem in regular session. The question of other weapons will no doubt be brought up in a general review of our whole policy on sharing nuclear weapons. Mr. McCone felt that this problem was really one to be handled by State and Defense. It was a difficult one because some members of the Joint Committee had previously stated publicly that our policy on sharing nuclear weapons involved no actual U.K. custody of nuclear weapons; contrary to this view, it now appeared that we were about to turn custody of some weapons over to the U.K. He suggested that sharing of nuclear weapons with allies was a topic deserving urgent consideration by the Council.

Basic Organization of the Government for National Security. The Vice President said one subject was missing from the Planning Board's consolidated list of topics, namely, the question of the basic organization of the Government for national security. After seven years of experience with the National Security Council in this Administration and four years' experience with the OCB, he felt national security organization might be a proper topic for Council consideration. A Council discussion of the subject might also be advantageous because the Council is under study by the Jackson Sub-Committee. The Vice President therefore suggested that, subject to approval by the President, the Council examine the operation of the NSC and OCB machinery and consider suggestions which have been made for changes in the present system.

Africa. Mr. Dulles said he did not see any subject related to Africa in the list of topics. Mr. Gray said the Planning Board was already engaged in revising Africa South of the Sahara (NSC 5818).

Changes in the Character of the Cold War. The Vice President said he had had some very helpful discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence on changes in the character of the Cold War. He wondered whether the Intelligence Community might not be asked to give its reactions on this subject. Secretary Dillon said some very difficult concrete problems had arisen in this field. For example, he had found the Belgians were getting ready to do less rather than more with regard to NATO because of what they regarded as a *detente* in East-West relations. In this connection the Vice President felt it might be useful for us to think of our own attitudes: The question was whether we were going to allow Khrushchev, by talking about peace and co-existence, to silence all criticism of past and present Soviet actions.

Long-Range U.S. Policy toward the USSR and its Satellites. With respect to this subject, the Vice President felt we needed to develop a proper policy line on liberation of the Satellites and on all the concepts which had been talked about when the Administration first came into office and which had been modified some what since. He pointed out that we now rule out revolution but say the satellite peoples should have freedom to choose their governments. He felt this would be a very good subject for Council discussion.

Utilization of Non-Military Technological Advances: International Scientific Cooperation. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he would be happy to prepare terms of reference on utilization of non-military technological advances, but he hoped someone else would prepare the paper. Dr. Kistiakowsky then suggested that the Council might also discuss an intensification of efforts to achieve international scientific cooperation which would enhance our leadership among Free World nations and relax tensions by cooperation with the Soviet Union in certain areas. This topic, of course, had less urgency than some of the others mentioned at this meeting.

U.S. Bases Overseas. The Vice President felt that any new report on U.S. bases overseas should take into account the effect of missile developments through about 1965 on our base system. According to his recollection, the Nash Report had dealt with aircraft and had not taken missiles into account.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject in the light of a list of suggestions by NSC Members and Advisers, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 15, 1959.

b. Agreed, subject to consideration by the President, that:

(1) A Discussion Paper on Cuba should be prepared by the Department of State and discussed in the Planning Board under special security precautions prior to its submission to the NSC.

(2) Discussion of the means by which the U.S. can best obtain the cooperation of De Gaulle in political, economic and military matters should be deferred until after the NATO and Western Summit meetings.

(3) Consideration of a Discussion Paper on the U.S. Attitude toward Nasser and on Poland should be deferred to a later date.

(4) Further discussion of Disarmament should be deferred pending completion of the study in preparation by the Director, Joint Disarmament Study.

(5) The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be asked to undertake the initial review of Economic Defense Policy (NSC 5704/3).

(6) The Planning Board should give further consideration to development of a paper on Long-Range National Strategies.

(7) Consideration of a Discussion Paper on the future of NATO should be deferred until after the NATO meeting.

(8) The Planning Board should develop Discussion Papers on U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities, on Implications of the

Development of Additional World Power Centers, and on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of Delivery Systems.

(9) The Planning Board should undertake the immediate preparation of a Discussion Paper on the Implications of Sharing of Nuclear Weapons with Allies.

(10) The Council should discuss the basic organization of the National Security Council, including the Operations Coordinating Board, by examining how it has operated over the years and recent suggestions for changes in the current organization.

(11) The Planning Board should prepare a Discussion Paper on Effects of Change in the Character of the Cold War.

(12) Consideration of a Discussion Paper on the Economic Threat Posed by the USSR and Communist China should be deferred, pending preparation of a study agreed upon by the Planning Board on an Examination of the Principal Factors affecting the Future Power Positions of the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(13) The NSC Planning Board should prepare Discussion Papers on Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union and the European Satellites and on Long-Range U.S. Policy toward Communist China.

(14) The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be asked to give initial consideration to a Discussion Paper on Trade Competition Between the U.S. and Europe.

(15) The Planning Board should give further consideration to Discussion Papers on Utilization of Non-Military Technological Advances and on International Scientific Cooperation.

c. Noted that:

(1) A proposed revision of Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814/1) is scheduled for consideration at a Joint Meeting of the National Security Council and the National Aeronautics and Space Council on December 29.

(2) The Planning Board is currently reviewing and revising U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara (NSC 5818).

(3) The current review by the Department of Defense of the findings and recommendations of the Nash Report on Overseas Bases, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2142, should provide a basis for Council discussion of U.S. Bases Overseas, with special emphasis on the implications of developments in the missiles field.

NOTE: The above actions (NSC Actions Nos. 2163, 2164, 2165 and 2166) subsequently submitted to and approved by the President.

NSC Action No. 2166-b-(1) subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.

NSC Action No. 2166-b-(5) and -14) subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, CFEP, for appropriate action.

NSC Action No. 2166-c-(3) subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

Marion W. Boggs

224. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–8–59

Washington, December 23, 1959

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

- The probable Soviet ICBM force.
- Medium Range Ballestic Missiles
- Long Range Aviation
- Submarine-launched Missiles

SUBJECT

NIE 11–8–59: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH
MID-1964

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet long-range air and missile weapons systems suitable for strategic attack, through mid-1964.²

FOREWORD

The critical feature of this estimate is our judgment with respect to the force goals of the existing Soviet ICBM program. This judgment is based in part on calculations regarding Soviet ICBM requirements for various defined strategic purposes. These calculations are especially sensitive to possible differences between our assumptions and those actually made by Soviet planners with respect to two important factors:

a. The probable future performance characteristics of the improving Soviet ICBM.

¹ Source: "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964." Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

² "Strategic attack" as used herein is defined as nuclear attack against retaliatory forces and key war-making strengths in North America, as well as US and Allied retaliatory forces at sea and in overseas areas. The weapons systems primarily considered are heavy and medium bombers assigned to Long Range Aviation, related air-to-surface missiles, ground launched missiles with maximum ranges of 700 nautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles. It is recognized that other delivery systems are available for use against targets at sea and overseas. [Footnote is in the original.]

b. The probable future development of the US nuclear retaliatory force.

We have assumed for the Soviet ICBM the performance characteristics estimated for it at various dates in NIE 11-5-59, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," dated 3 November 1959. Soviet planners may expect a better performance, in which case their estimates of the numbers required would be lower than ours. However, we would expect them to use conservative assumptions in making so vital a calculation.

With respect to Soviet targeting, we have assumed that existing approved US military programs will be carried out. Explicit information on these programs is presumably not available to Soviet planners, but we believe that they have enough general information from open sources to be able to estimate them with fair accuracy. These US programs are, of course, subject to change—as is the Soviet ICBM program also. The present Soviet ICBM program, however, must be based on the present Soviet estimate of the probable future development of the target system.

It is beyond the scope of this estimate to consider what political or military courses of action the USSR might adopt if the development of its strategic attack capabilities were to be as estimated herein. Such matters will be considered in the forthcoming NIE 11-4-59, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964."

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Soviet rulers probably regard their present strategic attack forces as capable of devastating US and Allied concentrations of population and industry, but incapable of preventing, by military action, the nuclear devastation of the USSR. (Para. 26)

B. The ICBM presents the best prospect of being able to deliver a heavy weight of attack within the least time after a decision to attack, and thereby to prevent the launching or reduce the weight of a US strategic attack on the USSR. Hence, we believe that the future development of Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will be primarily a function of the development, production, and deployment of ICBMs. Soviet ICBM capabilities will be supplemented by the development of a submarine-launched missile capability and by the maintenance of a substantial long-range bomber capability. (Paras. 30-33)

C. Our analysis shows that a crucial question for this estimate is whether the Soviet rulers would consider it feasible to achieve in 1961, through a rapid deployment of operational ICBMs, such a military, political, and psychological advantage over the US as would enable them to impose their will. After 1961 the numbers of semihardened and hardened US ICBM sites programmed to become operational would result in a steep increase in Soviet ICBM requirements. (Para. 36)

D. On the basis of the estimated reliability and accuracy of the Soviet ICBM, a program to provide 400–500 ICBMs on launcher (540–680 in operational inventory) in mid-1961 would give the USSR a very high assurance of being able to inflict severe damage on SAC operational air bases and unhardened ICBM sites beyond the range of 1,100 n.m. missiles, or considerably less assurance of being able to inflict such damage on hardened ICBM sites as well as unhardened sites and air bases. If the USSR were to exercise this attack capability, it would still have to expect retaliation from bombers then on airborne alert, from all or some of the few semihardened and hardened ICBM sites then operational, and from aircraft carriers and missile-launching submarines then at sea. We believe that Soviet planners would not regard this as a “decisive military superiority,” although it would certainly be a powerful threat with strong psychological and political effects throughout the world.³ (Paras. 35, 39, and Annex A, Para. 2)

E. Such a force goal could be realized in mid-1961 only through a crash program requiring diversion of resources from other programs to which the Soviet rulers have attached great importance, and a level of activity that would tend to stimulate US countermeasures. There is no indication that such a Soviet effort is now underway. We do not believe that the Soviet rulers would make such a heavy investment in a program unlikely to achieve a “decisive military superiority.”⁴ (Para. 40)

F. Every present indication suggests that the Soviet ICBM program, while not a crash program, is designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. The goal of the program is probably an ICBM force as large as Soviet planners deem necessary to provide a substantial deterrent and pre-emptive attack capability. In our view, this would be consistent with the present deliberate and orderly tempo of the Soviet ICBM test-firing program, with current Soviet military doctrine, and with the USSR’s observed policy of maintaining a balance among military capabilities designed to accomplish various missions.⁵ (Para. 41)

G. We conclude that the present Soviet ICBM program would provide on the order of 140–200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. Within this range, there is a difference of view among the members of the United

³The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. For his position, see his footnote following Conclusion H. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. For his position, see his footnote following Conclusion H. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. For his position, see his footnote following Conclusion H. [Footnote is in the original.]

States Intelligence Board. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, estimate that the Soviet program is likely to provide about 140 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as justifying additional effort, estimate that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 is likely to be towards the high side of the 140–200 range. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, also estimates that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 is likely to be towards the high side of this range, but it should be noted that he estimates the characteristics of the Soviet ICBM to be considerably better than those estimated by the majority. All members of the United States Intelligence Board believe a Soviet force of more than 200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 to be unlikely. (Para. 47)

H. The development of the Soviet ICBM force beyond 1961 would be likely to be affected by such considerations as the actual development of the target system to be attacked, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects (on both sides) for an effective anti-ICBM, as well as by the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Any figures for future years should be reviewed in the light of such considerations and of evidence on the actual progress of the Soviet ICBM program. Based on our estimate of the USSR's present program and intentions, we believe that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher is likely to be in the range of 250–350 in mid-1962, and 350–450 in mid-1963.⁶ (Para. 48)

⁶ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. He does not believe that Soviet behavior, as we have observed it, warrants the judgment that their objectives would be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence. At any rate, he does not believe that the economic and physical difficulties involved in attaining "decisive military superiority" would be or are determinative. (See also his footnote to Annex B) Rather, he believes that the Soviet leaders, perceiving the potentialities inherent in ICBMs, are attempting to achieve a capability for decision through exploitation of this force or actual launching, if necessary.

Assuming the improved reliability, accuracy, and war-head of the Soviet ICBM as he estimates them, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the Soviet leaders will assign a high priority to building an ICBM force which would give the USSR a reasonably high assurance of being able to inflict severe damage on SAC operational air bases and at the same time a somewhat lower degree of assurance of similar damage on US ICBM sites. He believes that such an objective could be attained with an operational ICBM force of about 250 (185 on launcher) by mid-1961 and 500 (385 on launcher) by mid-1962. It is generally agreed that the Soviets have both the technical and industrial capability to produce such a force.

I. The USSR will have no serious difficulty in meeting its estimated requirements for 700 n.m. and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles. (Paras. 50–52)

J. On the basis of the foregoing conclusions, our numerical estimates of Soviet medium and heavy bombers in Long Range Aviation units, long and medium-range ballistic missiles, and missile-launching submarines are as shown in the following table:⁷⁸

	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
<i>Bombers</i>					
Heavy	135	150	140	130	120
Medium	1,100	1,050	1,000	900	800
<i>Missiles</i>					
700 n.m.					
In Inventory	250	350	450	450	450
On Launcher	110	150	150	150	150

It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, that Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will have attained a capacity for substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack by mid-1962, but he believes the long range objective of the Soviet ICBM is "decisive military superiority." He does not believe that the Soviets would be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize the possibility of error in their own calculations and acknowledge the possibility of Western pre-emption of their deterrent capabilities. This latter contingency would weight the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, to exploit their capabilities in political offensives. In this event, their estimate of the likelihood of Western "desperate" acts would induce them to attempt attainment of total deterrence, i.e., "decisive military superiority."

In view of the potentialities for military superiority inherent in ICBMs for the period of this estimate, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, concludes that the Soviet program is aimed at attaining an operational inventory of 800 (640 on launcher) by mid-1963 and 1,100 (880 on launcher) by mid-1964.

⁷ DISSENTING VIEWS

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the numbers of heavy bombers and ICBMs estimated, believing they should be:

	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
Heavy bombers	135	150	175	200	200
ICBM					
In Inventory	50	250	500	800	1,100
On Launcher	35	185	385	640	880

⁸ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, does not concur in the numbers of heavy bombers estimated. In his view, future Soviet heavy bomber strength will approximate the following:

	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
Heavy bombers	125	115	100	75	75

	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
1,100 n.m.					
In Inventory	80	160	240	300	300
On Launcher	50	100	100	100	100
ICBM					
In Inventory	50	175–270	325–450	450–560	^a
On Launcher	35	140–200	250–350	350–450	^b
<i>Submarines</i>					
“Z” class ^c	4	4	4	4	4
“G” class ^d	9	15	18	18	18
Nuclear ^e	—	2	6	10	14

EXPLANATORY NOTES

- ^a At least 450, possibly more.
- ^b At least 350, possibly more.
- ^c Each “Z” class submarine would probably carry two missiles.
- ^d Each “G” class submarine would probably carry about five missiles.
- ^e The associated missile may not become available until 1963, in which case the missile used in the “G” class might be used in this submarine. Each submarine would probably carry 6–12.

225. NSC Report¹

NSC 5919 Washington, December 28, 1959

U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CARGO AIR LIFT

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on

U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CARGO AIR LIFT

Reference: NSC Action No. 2151–f–(2)

¹ Source: “U.S. Policy With Respect to the Development of Cargo Air Lift.” Confidential. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board with the participation of representatives of the Departments of Justice and Commerce and the Federal Aviation Agency, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 7, 1960.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate coordinating agencies as follows: the Department of Defense for Paragraph 16, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for Paragraph 17, and the Federal Aviation Agency for Paragraph 18.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

DRAFT STATEMENT
of
U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CARGO AIR LIFT

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is in the [national security]² interest of the United States to have available an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet, which, in time of peace, as well as in a national emergency, could be used to meet a portion of military air cargo requirements. Such a fleet could also serve as an instrument of [other]³ national policies. The United States does not now have such a fleet.

Conditions Which Have Limited the Development of a Modern Civil Air Cargo Fleet

2. In the commercial field, long preoccupation with the more profitable passenger business and with constant passenger aircraft

²Treasury and Budget propose deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

³Treasury and Budget propose deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

modernization has resulted in a lack of emphasis on the development of the cargo business and of uncompromised all-cargo aircraft. As a result, commercial cargo planes are merely improvised modifications of passenger configured aircraft. Adaptation of the present essentially passenger configured aircraft to cargo use results in high operating costs, high handling charges, and inflexibility as to operating bases and facilities.

3. In the last several years the Department of Defense has had a higher priority requirement for the development of convertible (troop-cargo) aircraft than for the development of all-cargo aircraft.

4. The characteristics of uncompromised cargo aircraft are unique and differ importantly from the characteristics of presently available passenger aircraft. This difference is not unlike the difference between busses and trucks, or the difference between Pullman cars and freight cars. What is needed to further the sound growth of air cargo are types of aircraft which would (a) have an intercontinental capability, (b) be capable of operating from relatively small unsophisticated airports, (c) employ a minimum of high cost and high maintenance components, and (d) be capable of being routinely operated at a direct operating cost of 3.5 to 4 cents per ton-mile. This last-named capability would make possible air cargo service to the user at about 10 cents per ton-mile, or something less than one-half the present average rates. At present this is considered to be a very economical air cargo charge. A cargo aircraft currently being produced in Canada represents a major step toward achievement of these characteristics, and U.S. aircraft now under development show even greater promise.

5. Aircraft with the characteristics enumerated above could serve civil and many military uses. With the exception of certain outsized and sensitive cargo, the characteristics of most routine military cargo (dimensions, weight and density) are compatible with those of commercial cargo.

6. The U.S. Government maintains a substantial military cargo airlift capability and has not fully utilized in peacetime available civil cargo airlift. The stated basis for this practice has been that the U.S. commercial cargo airlift capability has not been adequate to meet civil requirements and those military requirements which could be moved by civil aircraft during periods of national emergency. However, in recent years, the Department of Defense has increased its use of the civil air cargo fleet by placing contracts with the civil air carriers (11% of the total MATS air cargo traffic in FY 1959), thereby making a contribution to the continued growth of the air cargo industry.

Conditions Which Would Stimulate the Development of a Modern Civil Air Cargo Fleet

7. The conditions may now exist whereby, with minimum measures of government encouragement, the development of an uncompromised civil air cargo fleet would be given the initial incentive it needs.

8. Some U.S. air cargo operators are buying a Canadian-manufactured all-cargo aircraft of advanced turbo-prop design. Direct operating costs of this aircraft will be approximately 3.5 cents per ton-mile, and user costs, approximately 10 cents per ten-mile. Such costs will be competitive with those of other modes of transportation for many types of cargo and are significantly lower than those for any cargo aircraft currently in production in the United States. The efficiency of this aircraft reflects an important technical advance and the related Canadian government program guaranteeing purchase loans up to 80 percent of the investment (available to U.S. purchasers), constitutes an important financial initiative. The potential air cargo market will be greatly stimulated by the introduction of this aircraft.

9. Many of the commercial advantages to be derived from operation of a modern civil air cargo fleet could be achieved by the procurement and use of this Canadian-manufactured aircraft by U.S. civil airlines. Such procurement and use would accord with the principle of sharing the resources of the United States and Canada on a continental rather than a national basis. On the other hand, stimulation of the cargo aircraft manufacturing industry in the United States would encourage (a) development of more efficient cargo aircraft; and (b) retention of U.S. leadership in civil aircraft production to the extent that is considered desirable.

10. *a.* The progressive transfer of non-hard-core traffic to civil carriers is now underway and will be continued as civil aircraft of modern types (e.g., the DC-7F and the L-1049H) become available. Limiting MATS peacetime operation to that required by the war-time "hard-core"⁴ mission would permit the transfer of additional cargo business to civil carriers and could assist in the development of an uncompromised air cargo fleet. As civil air carriers equip themselves with uncompromised cargo aircraft, this orientation of MATS to the "hard-core" function can be further effected, and increased use can be made of the services of such civil carriers.

b. The foregoing would present no risk to the national security, if coupled with guarantees that the civil air cargo potential, as achieved,

⁴ "Hard-core" requirements are those military requirements which, because of their nature or timing, must move in military aircraft manned by military crews. These "hard-core" requirements include highly sensitive operations from the standpoint of security, importance, and quick reaction, such as deployment of initial elements of strategic and tactical units and emergency positioning of support personnel and equipment in anticipation of maximum effort operations. [Footnote is in the original.]

would be immediately and wholly responsive to national defense needs. A stimulus to the purchase of uncompromised cargo aircraft would be given if such transfer of business were limited to those carriers which demonstrate a willingness and ability to so modernize their cargo fleet. The progressive transfer of MATS business, appropriate reductions in average rates, [and the enactment of legislation offering U.S. guarantee loans for the purchase of new all-cargo aircraft]⁵ in addition to a continued rapid growth of commercial demands for air cargo service, should stimulate development of a modern air cargo fleet.

11. It is the general policy of the Federal Government that it will not carry on any commercial activities to provide a service for its own use if such services can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels.⁶ Exceptions to this policy are permitted for various compelling reasons including national security and "relatively large and disproportionately higher costs." In this connection it should be noted that Congress included in the FY 1960 Appropriation Act a provision that \$85 million of the funds appropriated for MATS would be available only for the procurement of commercial air transportation service (passenger and/or cargo). In denying funds in FY 1960 for procurement of ten jet-powered cargo aircraft for use by MATS, Congress also stated in an official report that "adequate transport capacity for this portion of the MATS mission exists in private commercial aircraft during the present cold war situation, and in the civil reserve air fleet in the event of mobilization".

12. The Government requires the immediate availability of the civil air cargo fleet to assist in meeting military and mobilization requirements in time of war, national emergency, or whenever a military situation requires. There is a strong difference of view within the Executive Branch as to whether the U.S. Government does now have immediate availability of the civil air cargo fleet to meet these requirements and as to whether present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is on call by the Government are adequate.

13. The expansion of a civil air cargo fleet would have the bonus effect of contributing to the fuller utilization of existing U.S. aircraft production capacity to the extent that U.S. (rather than foreign) manufactured aircraft are purchased.

14. The operation, under the U.S. flag, of an uncompromised efficient air cargo fleet would enhance the prestige of the United States, particularly in those overseas areas served by that fleet, and would promote our objective of maintaining U.S. leadership in international civil aviation. Uncompromised cargo aircraft developed for U.S. use

⁵ Treasury and Budget propose deletion. [Footnote and brackets are in the original.]

⁶ See Bureau of Budget Bulletin 60-2, September 21, 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]

would also be useable by indigenous carriers in at least some of the underdeveloped countries. Such aircraft would thus contribute to the implementation of the policy that, as a means of promoting the Free World aviation position in the underdeveloped areas and of neutralizing further Sino-Soviet aviation encroachments in such areas, the United States should encourage the development in the United States and other Free World nations of competitive types of aircraft and aviation equipment suitable for use in underdeveloped areas.⁷

OBJECTIVE

15. A civil air cargo capacity which, together with the military air cargo fleet, is adequate (in quantity and quality), and immediately available, to meet military and mobilization requirements in time of war, national emergency, or whenever a military situation requires.

POLICY GUIDANCE

16. *a.* In the implementation of existing policy which requires that the government divest itself of those activities competitive with private industry, divert progressively and in an orderly manner increasing quantities of non-hard-core Federal cargo airlift traffic from the military cargo fleet to certificated U.S. air carriers⁸ [as civil aircraft, of modern types (e.g., the DC-7F and the L-1049H), become available and can provide civil air cargo capability at reasonable cost⁹].¹⁰ In negotiating contracts for the carriage of MATS non-hard-core cargo by civil air carriers, give preference [to the extent feasible]¹¹ [wherever possible]¹² to those certificated U.S. carriers which demonstrate a willingness and ability to acquire uncompromised cargo aircraft.

b. As civil air carriers equip themselves with uncompromised cargo aircraft, increase the use of such carriers for non-hard-core traffic.

c. Adjust the operations and capability of MATS toward meeting only its wartime "hard-core" mission in accordance with *a* and *b* above. However, at all times:

⁷ See paragraph 31, NSC 5726/1, "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc". [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ A certificated air carrier is an air carrier holding an effective certificate issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board authorizing it to engage in air transportation. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ The Department of Defense has stated that its criteria for determining comparative costs are on the basis of Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 60-2, September 21, 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Budget proposes deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

¹¹ Defense-JCS proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

¹² Treasury, Commerce, Budget, FAA proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

(1) Maintain MATS in a posture adequate to satisfy those wartime military requirements which must be met by military aircraft and those other wartime military requirements which are beyond the capability of civil air carriers; [productively utilize during peacetime the capability so maintained].¹³

(2) Assure that the civil aircraft handling the cargo transferred to the civil air cargo fleet pursuant to *a* and *b* above will be immediately available to meet military and mobilization requirements when necessary.

17. Review the present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is on call by the Government to assure that the civil cargo air fleet is immediately available to meet military and mobilization requirements.

18. If legislation is proposed which would, through purchase loan guarantees, encourage and facilitate the acquisition by U.S. certificated air carriers of uncompromised cargo aircraft produced by U.S. manufacturers, it should contain provisions to ensure the immediate availability of these cargo aircraft to meet military and mobilization requirements.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Lay to All Holders of NSC 5919

Washington, January 28, 1960

As indicated by the second paragraph of the NOTE following NSC Action No. 2181 (adopted by the National Security Council at the 433rd meeting on January 21 and approved by the President on January 26, 1960), this Action obviated the need for a statement of policy on Cargo Air Lift as proposed in NSC 5919, which was accordingly removed from the NSC agenda.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

¹³ Proposed by State, Defense, OCDM, JCS. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

226. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to Dillon¹

Washington, January 5, 1960

SUBJECT

NSC 5919—"U.S. Policy with Respect to the Development of Cargo Airlift"

I. Problem

The subject paper, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is due to be considered by the National Security Council on January 8.

II. Discussion

The policy statement is the result of a request by General Persons of the White House that the NSC undertake to resolve certain differences which have arisen in the past between the Federal Aviation Agency and the Department of the Air Force on where the initiative should rest in the development of aircraft designed exclusively for cargo-lift and on the role of the civil air fleet in the carriage of military cargo.

The draft states that establishment of an effective civil cargo air fleet, which could also serve many military purposes, is desirable. It proposes that as much government cargo as possible be transferred progressively from MATS to certificated civil air carriers, giving preference to those carriers which demonstrate a willingness and ability to acquire aircraft designed for the carriage of cargo. It recommends a review of the civil Reserve Air Fleet system to assure that civil cargo aircraft will be available to the defense establishment when needed.

III. Conclusions

The draft statement is a compromise, but appears to represent an orderly program for the development of a civil air cargo fleet and to provide adequate protection for military interests in a time of emergency. However, a substantial increase in international United States civil air cargo operations substituting for the present MATS may create capacity problems under our bilateral air transport agreements, and to minimize these problems as much as possible the Department should be kept closely informed of each stage of development of the program.

IV. Recommendation

It is recommended that the Department take a secondary role in discussion of the paper, but approve its adoption on the understanding that the Department expects difficulty in overcoming capacity problems which may arise in its full implementation.

¹ Source: Recommends approval of NSC 5919. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

227. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, January 7, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy With Respect to the Development of Cargo Air Lift

REFERENCES

A. NSC Action No. 2151-f-(2)

B. NSC 5919

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5919 are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, January 7, 1960.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency
The Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum From Twining to Gates

Washington, January 7, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy with Respect to the Development of Cargo Air Lift (U) (NSC 5919)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed draft statement of policy, subject as above, scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council on Thursday, 7 January 1960.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the purpose of and the general approach taken in the draft statement.

¹Source: Transmits views of the JCS on NSC 5919. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it mandatory that Military Air Transport Service (MATs) be maintained in a posture adequate to satisfy those wartime military requirements which must be met by military aircraft and those other wartime military requirements which are beyond the capability of civil air carriers.

4. From the viewpoint of economy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to utilize productively that military airlift capability generated by MATs during peacetime.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend a review of the present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is on call to the Government to assure that it is immediately available to meet military requirements.

6. Subject to the comments and recommendations contained in the Appendix hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider NSC 5919 to be an acceptable policy statement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, undated

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON NSC 5919

1. *Paragraph 10–a.* Recommend deletion of parenthetical expression “(e.g., the DC–7F and the L–1049H)” from the first sentence.

REASON: It is not desirable to cite any illustrative examples which, by implication, suggest that the need for a modern cargo transport can be satisfied by aircraft which are essentially converted passenger types.

2. *Paragraph 10–b.* Support the majority view.

REASON: Guaranteed loans may encourage and assist in the development and procurement of new all-cargo aircraft. Such aircraft would benefit both the military and commercial air industry as new types of all-cargo aircraft would include more favorable characteristics (e.g., range, economy of operation and ability to operate from unsophisticated airports) than those available in aircraft now used by civil air carriers for movement of cargo.

3. *Paragraph 16-a.* Support the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REASON: Airlift should only be diverted to certificated air carriers as procurement policies and small business interests permit. Also, there may be instances where it would not be feasible from a military viewpoint to divert traffic even though possible, to certified air carriers as such carriers may not be able to provide the desired or economic service required to meet military requirements.

4. *Paragraph 16-a.* Recommend deletion of parenthetical expression "(e.g., the DC-7F and the L-1049H)" from the first sentence.

REASON: Same as for paragraph 1 above.

5. *Paragraph 16-c-(1).* Support the views of the Department of State, Department of Defense, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REASON: If the MATS operation and capability is adjusted toward meeting its wartime "hard-core" mission considerable airlift no doubt will be transferred to commercial air carriers. The peacetime airlift capability of MATS generated during peacetime should be fully utilized by the Services. It is considered unsound and uneconomical to procure airlift from commercial sources and at the same time not utilize that airlift capability generated in realistic training of the military air transport forces.

6. *Paragraph 16-c-(2).* Recommend paragraph be amended (changes indicated in usual manner):

"(2) Assure, by appropriate contracts and agreements backed by necessary legislation, that the civil aircraft handling the cargo transferred to the civil air cargo fleet pursuant to a and b above will be immediately available to meet military and mobilization requirements when necessary."

REASON: To indicate that written contracts with civil carriers and additional legislation are required to assure the availability of civil carriers at all times.

7. *Paragraph 17.* Recommend paragraph be amended (changes indicated in usual manner):

"17. Review the present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is on call by the Government to assure that the civil-cargo-air fleet is immediately available to meet military and mobilization requirements."

REASON: The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is composed of both civil passenger and cargo aircraft. To conduct a realistic review of present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is on call by the Government it should be examined from the viewpoint of the entire fleet.

8. *Paragraph 18.* Recommend paragraph be amended (changes indicated in usual manner):

~~"18. If legislation is proposed which would, through Legislation~~ *for purchase loan guarantees, which would encourage and facilitate the acquisition by U.S. certificated air carriers of uncompromised cargo aircraft produced by U.S. manufacturers, it should contain provisions to ensure the immediate availability of these cargo aircraft to meet military and mobilization requirements."*

REASON: The changed wording will provide a positive statement and support paragraph 10–*b* as written.

228. Briefing Note for the January 7 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 7, 1960

CARGO AIR LIFT (NSC 5919)

Our first item this morning, Mr. President, is a draft policy paper on the development of cargo air lift.

Last August I was asked to put this subject, which was then at issue between various agencies (notably Defense and FAA), through the NSC machinery and in that way bring it to you for resolution. The paper before you is the product of a number of Planning Board meetings in which Justice, Commerce and FAA participated. Today we have with us for this item the Secretary of Commerce, General Quesada and Chairman Durfee of the CAB.

However, before we go into this paper, the Defense Department has recently submitted to the President a study entitled "The Role of MATS in Peace and War" containing, among other things, a series of recommendations, which, I understand, are not inconsistent with the Defense position in the paper before us, with one possible exception which has to do with whether the Department of Defense will be restricted to the use of *certificated* air carriers for cargo air lift purposes. The Defense Department report, which has been given no distribution up to this time, is not up for consideration by the Council or decision by the President today. However, I believe it will be useful for the Council to know the report's recommendations before it considers the draft policy paper. Therefore, I

¹ Source: Cargo air lift (NSC 5919). Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

have asked the Secretary of Defense to summarize the recommendations which he has submitted to the President in this study.

(PRESENTATION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

The general considerations of this paper state the desirability of an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet, outline the conditions which have *limited* the development of such a fleet, and spell out the conditions which would *stimulate* the development of such a fleet. Briefly, we do not have an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet today for several reasons. In the commercial field, long preoccupation with the more profitable passenger business and with constant passenger aircraft modernization has resulted in a lack of emphasis on the development of the cargo business and of uncompromised all-cargo aircraft. In the last several years the Department of Defense has had a higher priority requirement for the development of convertible (troop-cargo) aircraft than for the development of all-cargo aircraft. Finally, the U.S. Government maintains a substantial military cargo airlift capability and has not fully utilized in peacetime available civil cargo airlift.

The first split occurs in paragraph 1. The majority would say that it is in the *national security* interest of the U.S. to have available an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet, and that such a fleet could also serve as an instrument of other national policies. Treasury and Budget prefer to say simply that such a fleet would be in the interest of the U.S. I understand that there has been some negotiation on this language between General Quesada and Budget and Treasury.

CALL ON GENERAL QUESADA

(others?)

The next split occurs in paragraph 10-*b*, at the top of page 6. The majority believe that a combination of four things would stimulate development of a modern air cargo fleet. These four things are the progressive transfer of MATS business, appropriate reductions in average rates, the enactment of legislation offering U.S. guarantee loans for the purchase of new all-cargo aircraft, and a continued rapid growth of commercial demands for air cargo service. Treasury and Budget propose that the purchase loan guarantee legislation be deleted from the list. It should be noted that this draft policy paper does not recommend a decision to the President on this legislation, which will be coordinated through the usual Budget Bureau process. Normally a question of this kind would not be discussed by the NSC, but the legislation is part of General Quesada's recommended plan for expanding civil cargo air lift. The question, Mr. President, is therefore whether you want to discuss the legislation at this time.

IF PRESIDENT'S ANSWER IS AFFIRMATIVE, CALL ON
SECRETARY SCRIBNER
MR. STANS
MR. QUESADA
SECRETARY MUELLER

Turning to the statement of objective, paragraph 15 on page 9, I should like to read this agreed language.

READ PARAGRAPH 15

The first policy guidance paragraph (par. 16, pages 10–11) is divided into three parts. 16-*a* deals with the first stage of transfer of MATS business to civil carriers. 16-*b* deals with a further transfer as civil carriers equip themselves with uncompromised cargo aircraft. 16-*c* sets limits on the transfer provided for in *a* and *b*.

In the first split in 16-*a*, the majority would make the transfer of MATS cargo business to civil carriers dependent on the availability in the civil fleet of modern types of aircraft, such as DC-7F and L-1049H. The Budget Bureau proposes deletion of this condition on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with the general policy of the Federal Government, referred to in par. 11, not to carry on any commercial activity to provide a service for its own use if such service can be procured from private enterprise. I understand that Budget is now willing to withdraw from proposing the deletion of this condition. The JCS want to delete, here and in paragraph 10-*c*, references to specific aircraft because it is not desirable to site any illustrative examples which, by implication, suggest that the need for a modern cargo transport can be satisfied by aircraft which are essentially converted passenger types. This raises the question as to whether the JCS would support any transfer of business to presently available aircraft.

CALL ON MR. STANS
SECRETARY GATES
GENERAL TWINING
MR. QUESADA

The second split in 16-*a* involves the preference to be given, in contracting out cargo business to the civil carriers, to those carriers which demonstrate a willingness and ability to acquire uncompromised cargo aircraft. Defense and JCS propose that such a preference be given *to the extent feasible*. Treasury, Commerce, Budget and FAA propose stronger wording: that such a preference be given *wherever possible*.

CALL ON SECRETARY GATES
GENERAL TWINING
MR. QUESADA
SECRETARY MUELLER

Turning to 16-*c*, we have another important split. There is agreement on the minimum posture of MATS to be maintained. The split occurs because Defense, JCS, OCSM and State would have MATS "productively utilize during peacetime the capability so maintained". The JCS have made a comment on this, which reads as follows:

If the MATS operation and capability is adjusted toward meeting its wartime "hard-core" mission considerable airlift no doubt will be transferred to commercial air carriers. The peacetime airlift capability of MATS generated during peacetime should be fully utilized by the Services. It is considered unsound and uneconomical to procure airlift from commercial sources and at the same time not utilize that airlift capability generated in realistic training of the military air transport forces.

I believe those opposing this provision fear that it would authorize MATS to continue to carry considerable non-hard-core cargo which would otherwise be transferred to civil carriers under 16-*a* and *b*.

CALL ON SECRETARY GATES
GENERAL TWINING
MR. QUESADA
MR. STANS
(other?)

On paragraph 16-*c*-(2), the JCS want to add the following language: "Assure, by appropriate contracts and agreements backed by necessary legislation, that the civil aircraft" etc. Although I don't believe that there would be any objection to the additional language, the Planning Board proposed that this paragraph be given to Defense for coordination and assumed that Defense would do whatever it felt necessary to implement it.

Paragraph 17, an agreed paragraph, was put in because there is a strong difference of view within the Executive Branch as to whether the Government does now have immediate availability of the civil air cargo fleet to meet military and mobilization requirements and as to whether present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is on call are adequate. The JCS suggest a language change that would make the paragraph applicable to the entire fleet, passenger as well as cargo. Even though this is a paper on cargo air lift, I don't believe there will be any objection to this change.

Paragraph 18 is also an agreed paragraph. As I stated before, this paper does not attempt to recommend a decision on purchase loan guarantee/legislation. This paragraph simply says that, if such legislation is proposed, it should contain provisions to ensure the immediate availability of the cargo aircraft involved. The JCS suggest some

language changes which seem to be purely editorial in nature. Would you care to speak to them, General Twining?

Finally, I would like to call the Council's attention to the unusual proposal for assigning coordinating responsibility. Instead of assigning the whole paper to one agency, Defense would have coordinating responsibility for paragraph 16, OCDM for 17, and FAA for 18.

229. Memorandum of Discussion at the 430th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 7, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 430th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 7, 1960

PRESENT at the 430th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Mr. Livingston T. Merchant for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Fred C. Scribner Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); the Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency (Item 1); and the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; Mr. Howard Sturtz, Central Intelligence Agency (Item 3); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: U.S. policy with respect to the development of cargo air lift. Top Secret. Extracts—10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on January 13.

1. U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CARGO AIR LIFT

(NSC Action No. 2151-f-(2); NSC 5919; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 7, 1960)

Mr. Gray began his presentation of NSC 5919 by referring to a study which the Department of Defense had recently submitted to the President on "The Role of MATS in Peace and War". (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

Mr. Gray said the Defense Department report was not up for consideration by the Council or decision by the President at this meeting, but he felt it would be useful for the Council to hear the report's recommendations before considering NSC 5919. Accordingly, he asked the Secretary of Defense to summarize the recommendations which he had submitted to the President in the Department of Defense study. Secretary Gates said Mr. Douglas would present a summary of the Department of Defense recommendations.

Mr. Douglas said the Defense report on "The Role of MATS in Peace and War" had been a long time in preparation. He then read the first conclusion from the report and all the recommendations as follows:

CONCLUSIONS

"Military Airlift Requirements. The size of MATS and the extent and nature of its operations are keyed to approved military wartime airlift requirements. These requirements break down into (1) critical or hard-core² requirements which because of their nature or the nature of the mission to be supported must move in military operated aircraft, and (2) other essential or civil eligible³ requirements which can move in either military or civil operated aircraft.

"Hard-core requirements are applicable in general war situations as well as situations short of general war. Satisfaction of hard-core requirements (general or limited war) is vital to the successful implementation of military strategy. Therefore, MATS must possess adequate capability at all times to meet these requirements on an effective and timely basis.

"Commercial carriers do not now have adequate air cargo capability to accommodate those approved military requirements which could move during emergencies in commercially operated transport aircraft."

²"Airlift requirements which must move in military aircraft, manned and operated by military crews because of special military considerations, security, or because of limiting physical characteristics such as size or dangerous properties. Included in this category are special military deployments involving nuclear retaliatory forces, the SAC post strike recovery mission, tactical deployments, movement of missiles, special munitions, etc. [Footnote is in the original.]

³"These are the so-called 'civil eligible' requirements. [Footnote is in the original.]

RECOMMENDATIONS

"As a result of the study and conclusions arrived at, actions are being taken within the Department of Defense to carry out the following recommendations:

"1. That MATS be equipped and operated in peacetime to insure its capability to meet approved military hard-core requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met with certainty by commercial carriers on an effective and timely basis.

"2. That the modernization of MATS hard-core military airlift capability be undertaken as a matter of priority to improve airlift effectiveness and achieve operating savings.

"3. That MATS routine channel traffic (regularly scheduled, fixed routes) operations be reduced on an orderly basis consistent with assured commercial airlift capability and economical use of any MATS capacity resulting from necessary training or other operations related to its hard-core requirement.

"4. That as commercial carriers equip themselves with modern, economical long-range cargo aircraft and further orientation of MATS to the hard-core function is effected, increased use should be made of the services of such commercial carriers for routine logistic supply.

"5. That commercial augmentation airlift procurement policies and practices be better adapted to the long-range Department of Defense requirements for effective overseas commercial airlift service so as to encourage and assist in sound economic growth, development, and maintenance of an increased air cargo capability; that there be explored the feasibility of (1) increasing the amount of MATS overseas cargo airlift moving on a common carriage basis in accordance with certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board; (2) entering into longer term contracts for MATS traffic; and (3) giving some preference in the movement of MATS traffic to those commercial carriers (a) who are effectively committed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, or (b) whose facilities and equipment are most advantageous to the emergency needs of the Department of Defense; and that legislation be sought if necessary to permit accomplishment of any of the foregoing considered desirable.

"6. That the Department of Defense participate in and support governmental programs for the development of long-range, economical turbine-powered cargo aircraft for military and civil application.

"7. That the Department of Defense support proposed legislation for the guarantee of loans for the purchase of modern, newly-developed cargo aircraft by commercial carriers.

"8. *a.* That consideration be given to the use of the Air Force Reserve equipped with transport aircraft that might be available from MATS excesses as augmentation forces for MATS in time of emergency.

"*b.* That a study be made to determine the desirability and feasibility of employing the Air National Guard in a transport role.

"9. That the role of CRAF be re-examined with the objective of insuring optimum effectiveness and responsiveness of commercial airlift services to the Department of Defense under all conditions."

After concluding his presentation of the recommendations from the Department of Defense report, Mr. Douglas observed that the draft policy paper (NSC 5919) was consistent with the Defense report, provided the splits in the policy paper were resolved as Defense desired. However, Mr. Douglas was concerned that in the present situation, with MATS not too large and heaving no surplus above the JCS requirements, we not lead the airline industry to expect a rapid decrease in MATS operation or traffic, even though over a period of time MATS traffic could be expected to decrease substantially. The Department of Defense was interested in the development of a good cargo aircraft, but it should be understood that such a modern cargo airplane would not for some years produce a substantial capacity to meet wartime needs.

Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the divergence of views in Paragraph 1 of NSC 5919. Mr. Stans felt this difference could be resolved by deleting the word "security" in the first sentence of Paragraph 1 of NSC 5919 and referring at the end of the paragraph to "instruments of national security and other national policies." This revision would change the emphasis from national security to national interest. Mr. Stans believed General Quesada and the Secretary of the Treasury would be satisfied with this revision. Secretary Gates said he could also accept the change proposed by Mr. Stans.

The President remarked that since he was budget-minded these days he wanted to know a little more about cost factors, particularly the cost of keeping MATS in operation and the cost of moving cargo by means other than MATS. Secretary Gates reported that last year MATS operations had been put on an industrial funding basis; accordingly, MATS was now run as a business enterprise. One feature of the cost factor was the Department of Defense practice of asking for competitive bidding for carrying personnel overseas. Sometimes, the low bids have penalized the "flag" lines. Under a low bid of \$75-80 for a one-way trip across the North Atlantic some lines are losing money. The flag lines and other operators are at odds on this question. The President said if the equipment used were subject to the same inspection and if the pilots had similar certificates, he would be inclined to route the traffic by the cheapest means. General Quesada said the difficulty was that the air transport industry was a regulated industry, which made it monopolistic to a degree. Under the competitive bidding system, the concept of a regulated, monopolistic industry was cast aside. He felt the concept of the air transport industry as a regulated industry should apply to Department of Defense operations. As far as safety was concerned, in his view some operators were approaching conditions which he could not approve. He noted that some companies engage in competitive bidding at a time when they do not have any equipment or pilots, so if they obtain the contract by means of a low bid they have to lease equipment

and hire pilots. As an economic matter, the cut-throat competition does not result in building additional modern airplanes. Pilots and equipment shift from one line to the other with no accumulation of transport assets available to the Department of Defense in an emergency. General Quesada repeated that competitive bidding was destroying the principle of a regulated industry.

Mr. Durfee pointed out that the Civil Aeronautics Board had not taken part in the preparation of the draft policy paper. He referred to Page 10 of the paper, which suggested that the present system of negotiating contracts was to be continued. CAB did not approve of the present system of negotiating contracts, but otherwise had no objection to the paper. The present practice of MATS in awarding business by competitive bidding led to cut-throat competition, which concerned the CAB. One of the largest certificated international air cargo carriers was now on the edge of insolvency due to its competitive bidding practices. Since 1958 FAA, the Department of Defense, and CAB had attempted to solve this problem, but had been unable to do so because CAB has no power to regulate international air rates. If and when CAB obtained the power to regulate international rates, it would probably establish a minimum rate, although Defense has objected to such minimum rates on the grounds that (1) all bids would tend to be at the minimum rate and (2) Defense would then have to choose a carrier to which a contract was to be awarded on some basis other than rates. Mr. Durfee felt that this difficulty could, however, be resolved; but unless CAB obtains the power to fix international rates, the present system of contracts may not assist in the development of a modern cargo aircraft.

Mr. Douglas admitted that the situation was difficult. He would like to see the private air carriers build up an increased capacity. However, he felt that Defense had no alternative to awarding contracts on the basis of the lowest bid. Defense had tried various other systems in awarding contracts and had always run afoul of the Comptroller General. Mr. Douglas then pointed out that the Policy Guidance in NSC 5919 might lead to a possible misunderstanding with respect to certificated carriers. This term could be construed to include only a very few carriers and in this case the increase in cost would be high. The Department of Defense could live with some thirty certificated carriers. Mr. Douglas felt the Department of Defense had made considerable progress in increasing the participation of private airlines in MATS business, inasmuch as 53 per cent of the personnel and 18 per cent of the cargo were now carried under commercial contract. The President asked how much traffic was carried by ship. Mr. Douglas said that in the last two years the Air Force had sent 95 per cent of its personnel and dependents by air, while the Army had sent a smaller number by air. Mr. Douglas pointed out that it cost less to send military personnel and dependents by air than to

pay the cabin rate by ship. The President asked whether cargo moved mostly by air or by ship. Mr. Douglas said most of the cargo moved by ship. Since MATS had been put on an industrial funding basis, a great many items formerly carried by air were no longer so carried. However, the industrial funding basis made the whole MATS operation look like a commercial airline operation. MATS should, by contrast, be building up a war capability. The President agreed that war capability should be the criterion of MATS operation, but noted that wartime requirements were sometimes subject to differing interpretations. He believed, in view of the things which had already been said, that this problem should be solved by locking three or four experts in a room until they arrived at a solution.

General Twining pointed out that General Quesada would soon have to testify before Congressional Committees on his program. General Quesada said the basic question was: What is the role of MATS? In his view the present practices of MATS were in conflict with Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No. 60-2. Interrupting, Mr. Douglas said he could not agree with this observation. General Quesada then read extracts from the Bureau of the Budget Bulletin, and concluded that military personnel were moving over routes which were competitive with commercial air carriers. The President said he saw no objection to this practice if that was the most efficient way to run the Department of Defense. General Quesada said the cost factor as between MATS and the commercial airlines were on different bases. Moreover, when MATS was used to transport personnel and goods that could be carried by commercial lines, it was not engaged in training for war. General Quesada said there were seventy-one certificated carriers, 25 of which were now engaged in litigation. He noted that certification has various meanings. An airline can be certificated for an area, for passengers only, or for cargo only. An airline requires a CAB exemption in order to operate outside the field of its certification. He believed Mr. Douglas' fear that the term "certificated carriers" as used in the paper would cover only a small number of carriers was not justified. The President wondered why the word "certification" had to be used. He thought "certified" would do as well. Mr. Douglas said the Department of Defense was willing to use certificated carriers to carry Defense traffic, but pointed out that some satisfactory carriers would be eliminated by this phrase as defined in NSC 5919, because some satisfactory carriers were not certificated.

The President recalled that at one time, in some operations at least, the Government had a list of qualified bidders. Secretary Gates said there was a list of qualified bidders for most operations except for airline operations. Mr. Stans pointed out that the Department of Defense

had some discretion in awarding contracts for carriage of persons and goods by air. The President remarked that if a list of qualified airline bidders were maintained, account could be taken of the experience factor. General Quesada said some airline companies which submit low bids for Defense business had no planes, no pilots and no money; they had only an idea.

The President felt that if the Government could determine how many persons and how much cargo it wished to move by air, normal commercial competition should result in building the airplanes and putting them into operation. He felt that a good war reserve could not be maintained unless MATS could operate in time of peace. However, he would like to simplify the whole problem. Mr. Stans said economic comparison between MATS operation and "contracting out" was not simple. He suggested that the paper should go back to the Planning Board for resolution in the light of the recommendations in the Department of Defense study. The President said he would like to see the interested parties get together and come up with a single recommendation. He had the impression there was plenty of cargo space on airlines at the present time, and apparently there was a great deal of air freight business.

Secretary Mueller observed that the commercial carriers were not developing uncompromised cargo planes because of the competition from MATS. Secretary Gates thought that an uncompromised air cargo plane might have to be developed by the Government. The President wondered whether it was good business to insist on a completely uncompromised air cargo plane. General Quesada said all aircraft at present had been designed basically for the purpose of carrying passengers. If it were possible to design a cargo plane from the ground up, that is, an uncompromised cargo plane, the cost of carrying cargo by air could be reduced by one-half. The air transport industry was now in the position which the highway transport industry would be in if all cargoes were carried by modified buses rather than by trucks. The President observed that it might be a mistake to design planes solely for the purpose of carrying cargo; he thought perhaps on the analogy of ocean freighters, provision might be made even in a cargo plane for carrying a few passengers.

Mr. Gray felt the Council had drifted into a discussion of technicalities. He believed two questions should now be answered: (1) does the Council want the Planning Board to revise NSC 5919 and (2) what should be done with the Department of Defense report on the role of MATS. The President said the Department of Defense report should be made available to the Planning Board, which should coordinate this report with NSC 5919. He felt we must try to arrive at a better

understanding of what we are trying to do before making any decisions. Secretary Gates said it was desirable to make decisions regarding MATS as early as possible because of the need for testimony on MATS before Congressional Committees. The President wondered whether the Defense report had appeared not because he had requested it, but because Congress was conducting an investigation.

Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraph 18 of NSC 5919 providing that if legislation is proposed which would, through purchase loan guarantees, encourage the acquisition of uncompromised cargo aircraft it should contain provisions to ensure the immediate availability of these cargo aircraft to meet military mobilization requirements. Mr. Stans said the large airlines insisted that they could develop an uncompromised cargo aircraft if they could obtain some of the business now carried by MATS, but the small airlines wanted guaranteed loans. There was thus a difference of opinion in the industry as to whether guaranteed loans were needed. The President said that in the absence of purchase loan guarantees, the business would go entirely to the big airlines. Mr. Douglas believed that the Department of Defense could produce an uncompromised cargo airplane for about \$80 million in development costs. Mr. Stans felt strongly that if the Department of Defense developed an uncompromised cargo airplane, the plane should be turned over to the airlines under a royalty arrangement which would provide for reimbursement of development costs to the Department of Defense. Mr. Douglas said the only reason for Defense development of an uncompromised cargo aircraft was because such an aircraft was needed. General Quesada then expressed the strong conviction that an uncompromised cargo aircraft could be built without cost to the Government. He felt the air transport industry was dynamic and well-financed, and that free enterprise would see to it that an uncompromised airplane was built without cost to the Government, provided the airlines were assured of MATS business. The President said he was almost convinced, but did not wish to adopt a provision which would result in the large airlines obtaining all the business. Perhaps the Small Business Administration could make a small business loan to the smaller companies. Secretary Mueller said the maximum small business loan was \$250,000 which was a small amount in the airline industry, although it might allow a small company to make a start. Mr. Douglas felt that most airlines receiving contracts meet the definition of small business.

General Quesada said he was convinced the air cargo industry had a great potential. Two hundred uncompromised aircraft could reduce the cost of carrying cargo by air by one-half or perhaps even more. At the present time only 4/100 of 1 per cent of the total freight carried was carried by air.

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board would revise NSC 5919 in the light of the discussion and of the Department of Defense report on MATS. The President said the experts should also consult.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 5919; the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 7, 1960); and an oral summary by the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the recommendations contained in a report submitted to the President by the Department of Defense, entitled "The Role of MATS in Peace and War".

b. Referred NSC 5919 to the NSC Planning Board for urgent review in the light of the discussion at the meeting, the above-mentioned Defense report, and further consultation between the agencies primarily interested.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

230. Memorandum From Power (SAC) to White (USAF)¹

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, January 11, 1960

SUBJECT

B-70 Flexibility

1. In furtherance of our recent conversations concerning the flexibility of the B-70 as a weapon system, the following information might be of assistance to you in your future discussions on this subject:

a. The B-70 provides the flexibility inherent in other aircraft to include:

(1) The ability to deliver high yield weapons against pinpoint hardened targets.

(2) The ability to deliver ALBM's.

(3) The ability to utilize currently existing runways suitable for B-52 operations.

¹ Source: B-70 capabilities. No classification marking. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Thomas D. White Papers.

b. Over and above the capabilities possessed by other aircraft the B-70 would be capable of the following:

- (1) High resolution reconnaissance with side-looking radars.
- (2) Airlifting its own ground support equipment by pod, thereby permitting rapid dispersal and operation from other than military sites in times of tension.
- (3) Utilization as a ground alert vehicle with a three-minute reaction time.
- (4) Flight at loitering speeds in an air alert posture with Mach 3 capability for delivery on receipt of go-code.
- (5) Carrying a Class A weapon and escaping from the unrestricted free fall of same.
- (6) Being launched in any number simultaneously from numerous sites throughout the United States and arriving simultaneously at the H hour control line with minor range degradation.
- (7) Providing restrike capability with first-strike aircraft in much less time than any other weapon system that might be available in this time period. In the event multiple restrikes are necessary, this would in effect be the same as increasing the size of the strike force.
- (8) Following the missile strike at such a close time interval that maximum disruption would still exist in the enemy's defenses.
- (9) With the advent of reliable warning, being stationed on overseas reflex bases thereby achieving a capability to strike targets within a minimum time interval and recover to a ZI base unrefueled.

c. Other considerations applicable to the B-70 might be:

- (1) It has been estimated that construction of the B-70 would require the Soviet Union to expend approximately 40 billion dollars in order to acquire the defense environment to counter such a weapon system.
- (2) A modified B-70 might well be utilized as a first-stage launch vehicle for satellites.
- (3) The B-70 by virtue of the advanced technology required for its development and production would serve as a very firm stepping stone to more futuristic space vehicles.

2. As you are well aware, the B-70 type vehicle holds much promise in relation to future commercial developments, however my above comments are in consideration of its strategic offensive application only.

Thomas S. Power
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

231. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, January 14, 1960

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Kistiakowsky, General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky met with the President to take up a number of matters bearing on his function as scientific advisor. These are set forth, together with his discussion thereof, in the attached memorandum.

During the discussion the President expressed general agreement with the views presented by Dr. Kistiakowsky. With regard to the proposal for a satellite telescope for astronomical research, the President said he did not feel this should be a crash program but one to be conducted in a rapid, orderly manner.

In discussion of ballistic missiles, the President stated that he remained of the opinion that careful consideration should be given to putting the Polaris missile on the Navy's ships. If this is not to be done, he has a large question in his mind whether Khrushchev is not right, and whether the day of the surface combatant ship is not, in general, past.

With respect to the GAO report concerning the missile program, the President said it is very important that the Air Force get their answers together and have them immediately available for release when the GAO report is made public.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum Prepared by Kistiakowsky

Washington, January 14, 1960

Notes for Meeting with the President, January 14, 1960

[Omitted here is page 1.]

The remaining items in my report, Mr. President, have to do with military matters.

¹Source: Discussion of issues: Nike-Zeus, Project Corona, Titan, GAO report on management of the missile program, Polaris; includes Kistiakowsky's briefing memorandum. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on January 15.

4. One of the panels of the PSAC made this fall a very thorough study of the *Nike-Zeus AICBM problem*. It confirmed the findings of two independent recent technical studies in DOD and extended the conclusions further. Specifically, they are that the presently conceived Nike-Zeus system, even if it performs according to expectations, is not a worthwhile investment. If it is considered as a defense of missile sites, it turns out to be cheaper to increase our deterrent strength by adding more such sites than by buying Nike-Zeus, the cost factor being very substantial in this case, of the order of 10 to 1. On the other hand, if one thinks of Nike-Zeus as a defense of population, it turns out to be useless because the enemy can kill people by exploding warheads upwind, of the cities out of the range of Nike-Zeus. Hence, only a comprehensive fallout shelter program in conjunction with the Nike-Zeus could achieve this objective. Because of these very thoroughly documented arguments, our Panel recommended against going into production with Nike-Zeus—a recommendation which was accepted by the Secretary of Defense. We urged further research effort on Nike-Zeus in the hope that this weapons system could be dramatically improved. In the Army there seems to be a sharp split on the issue of our recommendations; people lower in the echelons, who have had an opportunity to look into the technical factors involved, agree with our recommendations, but top echelons are most unhappy about them.

5. I should like to tell you now, Mr. President, about the present status of the so-called *Project Corona*. So far it has not functioned, but every successive launch has resulted in some progress, one difficulty after another being eliminated. All of them are of comparatively trivial engineering nature, and there is a substantial degree of optimism that the next launch, which is scheduled for early February, will see a complete technical success of the entire system.

6. You are already aware in a general way, Mr. President, of the difficulties of the *Titan Project*. I have made a considerable effort to analyze these difficulties and have reached the conclusion that the Air Force is completely correct in its evaluation. This is that the missile is soundly engineered and should show the planned performance. On the other hand, the managerial situation at the Martin Company is very bad and the failures of the last eight months can all be traced to human factors: lack of staff training, low competence, lack of adequate instructions. The Air Force, with a little help from me, has put a heavy pressure on the Martin Company to remedy these weaknesses; changes have been made and we have hopes that the program will shortly get going. If this is the case, Titan could still be operational by mid-'61 as planned, but there is little doubt that in Congress a great deal will be made of the present situation by the critics of the Administration.

7. In this connection, I should like to call to your attention a *report by GAO* on the supposed failings of the Air Force in the over-all management of the *missile program*. This report appears to be an extreme and unwise invasion of the Executive Branch of the Government. GAO, under the guise of managerial criticism, condemns the Air Force and the Defense Department for failure to take certain technical decisions and for use of inadequate scientific talent on the program. The report contends that objectives of the program have not been met. The Air Force is taking vigorous actions to counter the report, urging its revision and also preparing a rebuttal, but I am very much afraid that when and if this report is made public, it will provide ammunition to those who choose to attack your Administration irresponsibly.

G.B. Kistiakowsky

232. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100–60

Washington, January 19, 1960

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION²

FOREWORD

Although we have tried in this estimate to take as long a view as possible, we have necessarily left out of account some elements that could drastically alter the course of events. Thus, we have not attempted to assess the likelihood or consequences of revolutionary scientific advances of either military or civilian application. Moreover, we have assessed the East-West struggle on the assumption that no major war takes place, and on the other hand, that there is no agreement for large-scale reduction of military capabilities by the major powers.

¹ Source: "Estimate of the World Situation." Secret; Noform. 20 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.

² While this estimate summarizes our views on the USSR, a fuller treatment of Soviet trends and developments will be contained in NIE 11–4–59, "MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1959–1964." Soviet strategic capabilities, including ICBM buildup, will be covered in NIE 11–8–59, "SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964." Both these estimates will be published in the near future. [Footnote is in the original.]

SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE

1. Over the next decade, we believe that the stature of the USSR and of Communist China in the world will continue to increase markedly, thus posing increasingly serious challenges and a growing menace to the US and the West.³ (*Para. 18*)

2. In the world in general, recent Soviet behavior contributed to a spreading popular impression that the East-West struggle, or cold war, was entering a period of greater movement and fluidity, and that the direction of this movement was toward a diminution of cold war tensions. Viewed objectively and realistically, however, the East-West relationship remains fundamentally hostile. The emerging Soviet ICBM capability, dramatized in the eyes of the world by the Lunik shots, is altering military power relationships. Confidence that the trend of events is in their favor remains a keynote of the behavior of the Soviet leaders, and they assert that the overall growth of their relative power position has now reached the point where major consequences will be manifest on the world scene within the foreseeable future. (*Paras. 13-14*)

3. Our views of Soviet power and policy are fully stated in our forthcoming estimate on this subject. In brief, we believe that:

a. Soviet economic and scientific strength will continue to grow at a rapid rate.

b. The Soviets, despite some force reductions, will maintain a high level of conventional military forces and will greatly increase their long range attack capabilities, above all through a substantial ICBM buildup.

c. In the Soviet view, the emerging standoff of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

d. Soviet foreign policy will remain devoted to the same objectives as heretofore. At least over a five-year period, elements of both a policy of pressure and one of reducing tensions will probably be adopted at

³ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the importance of the ICBM requires that the third sentence of paragraph 2 be inserted in this initial paragraph to read: "In particular, the emerging Soviet ICBM capability, dramatized in the eyes of the world by the Lunik shots, is altering military power relationships." [Footnote is in the original.]

one time or another. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than it is at present. (*Para. 19*)

4. Although the assets of the USSR are formidable, and for the foreseeable future will cause it to gravely threaten US security and that of the Free World generally, some of these assets also contain problems. Chief among these are the Satellite situation, Soviet relations with the underdeveloped areas, and Sino-Soviet relations. In the course of time, it is possible that these problems, coupled with long term evolution within the USSR itself, would limit the effectiveness and even alter the content of Soviet foreign policy. At present, however, we see no basis for estimating that such problems would either diminish Soviet internal power or change the basic objectives of the Soviet leadership. (*Paras. 22–29*)

5. On the Communist Chinese front, tensions have increased in the past year. The Chinese Communists will probably seek to achieve their objectives by political and subversive means with a broad range of tactics, but there are likely to be frequent manifestations of truculence and more, rather than less, of the range of pressures recently exemplified in the Indian border dispute, in Laos, and in Indonesia. (*Paras. 15, 32*)

6. Non-Communist Asia has become somewhat alarmed over Chinese Communist intentions. However, there exists no non-Communist power or grouping of local powers comparable in strength to Communist China. Several individual countries remain particularly vulnerable to Communist influence, and over the next five years there is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in one or another of the countries in the area. US action, however, could in most cases reduce the chance of such a development and in any event could probably prevent any chain reaction if an individual country did go Communist. It is hard to see the situation in the area as a whole improving markedly over this period, and a bellicose Chinese Communist policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities. (*Paras. 31–40*)

7. Western Europe's economic growth and internal political stability are likely to continue satisfactory, although France's political future is somewhat uncertain. The movement towards economic integration continues to have great momentum, despite current difficulties. NATO confronts serious problems, notably France's pressure for increased status, French development of an independent nuclear capability, and

sentiment among the continental countries for some form of European continental military grouping, possibly related to NATO. Over the next few years, we believe that basic military dependence on the US will keep the alliance together. Nevertheless, its effectiveness will probably be somewhat reduced, and this reduction could attain serious proportions if European confidence in the will and ability of the US to protect Europe from the Communist threat should decline markedly. In any event, unless there is a renewed sense of urgency, Western Europe's increased strength will probably not be applied as fully and cohesively as it might be to the key problems now confronting the West, of maintaining an effective military posture and of providing large-scale aid to the underdeveloped countries. (*Paras. 41, 44–45, 49, 54, 59*)

8. In countries of the underdeveloped world, the complex force of nationalism and growing desires for a better life will be powerful factors shaping the course of events. These countries will continue to expect help from the richer countries, and they will be inclined to accept such help regardless of whether it comes from the East or the West. Inasmuch as these countries generally lack the experienced leadership, the stable political and social institutions, and the material resources to cope with their many problems in orderly ways, there will remain the possibility of violent upheavals and local conflicts. While these outbreaks may not stem from the East-West struggle, they can be expected often to involve the interests of the two sides and to afford opportunities for exploitation. Thus, the underdeveloped world will continue to be a principal area of the contest between the Bloc and the West. (*Para. 80*)

9. The outlook in the various underdeveloped areas (apart from non-Communist Asia, covered in Conclusion 6 above) is mixed. The Middle East will remain very unstable. In South Asia, the future of Afghanistan, in particular, is uncertain. While trade and other economic relations with the Bloc will increase in Africa, and there will be many opportunities for the spread of Communist influence, we do not believe that local Communist-controlled groups will become strongly entrenched in power in any country at least over the next few years, given a reasonable degree of effective attention from the West.⁴ (*Paras. 73–76*)

10. In Latin America as a whole, we do look for some expansion in Communist influence over the next few years, although such an expansion will probably not be widespread, especially in view of the possibilities for US action. However, there is a possibility that one or another country, notably Cuba, could fall under Communist control. Moreover,

⁴The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the prospects for Communist groups should be limited further by substituting after "Communist-controlled groups" in the last sentence the words: "will become a major political force in any country. . . ." [Footnote is in the original.]

the Communists or other extremists may achieve such influence that they can put through programs seriously threatening US interests or even security. In any event, the US will be under increasing pressure, and Latin American support for the US, for example in the UN, will almost certainly continue to decline. (*Para.* 79)

11. US policy remains crucial both in itself and for its effect on the rest of the Free World. Indications that the US was not maintaining a firm and effective military and political posture would lead to weakening of the resolve of other free nations. The growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities is creating a serious problem for the US in maintaining among other Free World nations confidence in US willingness to bring its nuclear capabilities to bear as a protection for such nations. A second crucial area affecting US prestige and influence will be that of US economic policy. However much the capacity of other Western nations grows, the Free World will still look to the US for leadership in the problem of channeling Western aid to the “have-not” nations and in the freeing and encouraging of international trade, and will be intensely concerned with the economic policies, both domestic and foreign, adopted by the US. (*Paras.* 82, 84, 86)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

12. The year 1959 saw many events so dramatic and significant as to appear as landmarks in the course of contemporary history. The Lunik shots dramatized the emerging Soviet attainment of an operational ICBM capability and reinforced apprehension in the Free World that the USSR was out-stripping the US. Khrushchev’s visit to the US highlighted a series of top level contacts and negotiations involving the US and the USSR.⁵ Also during the year, publicly aired differences between the USSR and Communist China marred the appearance of unanimity in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. On the Western side, France asserted itself, and the economic resurgence of Western Europe and Japan was manifested most conspicuously by the continuance of a major deficit in the balance of payments of the US. In the underdeveloped areas, events in Cuba, Laos, and Iraq during this year highlighted the continuing East-West conflict for influence, and the danger that some Free World territory may fall under Communist control.

⁵ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would further bring out the significance of the second and third sentences by adding at this point: “The Lunik shots emphasized the continuing Soviet armament effort and the basic aggressiveness of Soviet policy, while Khrushchev’s visit indicated that for the short term, at least, the USSR would carry on the present tactics of detente; as between the two approaches, it may be expected that before long the element of pressure and threat will become more pronounced, perhaps much more so than it is at present.” [Footnote is in the original.]

13. In the world in general, recent Soviet behavior contributed to a spreading popular impression that the East-West struggle, or cold war, was entering a phase of greater movement and fluidity, and that the direction of this movement was towards a diminution of cold war tensions. Moreover, the USSR has gained new outward respectability as shown in the rapid growth of Soviet international contacts and the acceptance and furthering of such contacts by the US and other major Western nations. The rivalry between the US and USSR is increasingly regarded in many quarters as a long drawn-out competition between two super-powers rather than as a currently acute conflict likely to produce a large-scale military clash.

14. Viewed objectively and realistically, however, the East-West relationship remains fundamentally hostile. The Soviet ICBM capability is altering military power relationships and in Soviet eyes operates to enlarge Soviet freedom of action and to widen Soviet influence. The economic growth and scientific progress of the USSR greatly enhance the prestige of communism as a system of social and economic organization. Confidence that the trend of events is in their favor remains a keynote of the behavior of the Soviet leaders, and they assert that the growth of their relative power position has now reached the point where major consequences will be manifest on the world scene within the foreseeable future. Even in the present phase of Soviet conduct, politeness is matched by assertiveness and the appearance of conciliation by an unyielding position on most key issues.

15. On the Communist Chinese front moreover, there is not only no relaxation in the atmosphere of the cold war, but on the contrary an increase of tension. Peiping's thrusting policy and expanding economic and military power, against the background of a troubled internal situation have already excited apprehension throughout Asia and may create recurrent acute pressures and dangers over the next few years.

16. In the world at large competition between the West and the Sino-Soviet Bloc is taking place on a wider stage than in the past, with the secondary actors playing greater parts. The increased economic strength of Japan and of the major nations of Western Europe has altered their relationship to the US and freed them for a greater degree of independent action. In the underdeveloped areas, the Bloc is increasingly involved in Latin America, and both the US and the Bloc are increasing their interest in Africa. The smaller nations in all Free World areas are developing roles of their own. These nations find in the UN in particular a sounding board for their grievances and a forum in which they can band together and assert against the great powers a weight disproportionate to their individual or even collective power status.

17. Finally, there is throughout the underdeveloped world increasing awareness of the enormous problems of creating national stability

and improved conditions of life, and of the impact of basic underlying trends—technological advance, changes in the international trade pattern, and population growth. These problems and trends would of course exist and be a central feature of the world situation if there were no East-West struggle. So far as that struggle is concerned, the underdeveloped countries remain generally uncommitted to one side or the other, and are being more and more influenced by their need for aid and their desire to get as much help as possible whether from the West or the Bloc. However these countries may stand ideologically, such pragmatic neutralism seems certain to find new adherents in Africa and Latin America and to remain firmly entrenched in most of Asia and the Middle East, with the possible exception of countries directly threatened by the USSR or Communist China.

18. In the sections that follow, we are generally far more confident of the description of forces at work than we are of our judgments of outcomes, and we have not elaborated all the repercussions of possible developments mentioned. We do believe, however, that the trends presented in this estimate point with assurance to one overall conclusion, that the stature of the USSR and of Communist China in the world will continue to increase markedly over the next decade, thus posing increasingly serious challenges and a growing menace to the US and the West.

II. POWER TRENDS AND POLICY PROBLEMS OF THE USSR

19. We estimate that:⁶

a. Soviet economic and scientific strength will continue to grow at a rapid rate.

b. The Soviets, despite some force reductions, will maintain a high level of conventional military forces and will greatly increase their long range attack capabilities, above all through a substantial ICBM buildup. However, the Soviet leaders probably do not count upon acquiring, by any particular date, a military advantage so decisive as to permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that they could win a general war without themselves incurring unacceptable damage.⁷

⁶ This paragraph is based on the longer discussion of these matters in the forthcoming NIE 11-4-59, "MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES." [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would revise sentence two as follows: "While the Soviet leaders probably do not count upon acquiring *it* by any particular date, *they are vigorously attempting to acquire* a military advantage so decisive as to permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that they could win a general war without themselves incurring unacceptable damage." [Footnote is in the original.]

c. In the Soviet view, the emerging standoff of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

d. Soviet foreign policy will remain devoted to the same objectives as heretofore. At least over a five-year period, elements of both a policy of pressure and one of reducing tensions will probably be adopted at one time or another. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than it is at present.

e. On Berlin, we believe that, as long as the Soviets are confident that they can make progress towards their aims in Germany by negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access and from making a separate peace treaty with East Germany. If they decide that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin. On disarmament, the Soviets may actually wish to see a freeze or even a cutback in some armaments in order to improve their potentialities for long-run political and economic competition. However, the Soviets consider great military strength as an essential ingredient in the challenge they pose to the non-Communist world. Moreover, the Soviet aversion to extensive foreign controls and inspection in the USSR persists, and will almost certainly exclude anything more than limited agreements.

20. In the pursuit of their objectives the Soviets clearly consider that their military progress is a major direct factor in their growing power position. Moreover, Soviet achievements in the missile and space fields have already gone far to create an image of Soviet superiority in the eyes of much of the world. During the next decade Soviet space efforts

will be considerable, favoring those space systems having the greatest military potential, but designed also to yield the maximum in scientific gains and in propaganda value.

21. Coupled with this power aspect, Soviet economic growth causes communism to appear to much of the underdeveloped world as a successful model for the handling of massive economic problems. Moreover, the Soviets have had considerable success in identifying themselves, through propaganda and diplomatic proposals, with worldwide desires for a lessening of tensions, most notably on the issue of nuclear testing, and to a lesser degree on the disarmament question generally.

22. With such assets, the USSR will for the foreseeable future continue to gravely threaten US security and that of the Free World generally. Yet as the Soviets seek to expand their influence in the world they confront both external and internal problems, which we believe will arise chiefly with respect to the Satellite situation, Soviet relations with the underdeveloped areas, long-term evolution within the USSR itself, and Sino-Soviet relations. While, at present, we see no basis for estimating that such problems would diminish Soviet internal power or change the basic objectives of the Soviet leadership, they could in the course of time limit the effectiveness or even alter the content of Soviet foreign policy.

23. *The Satellite Situation.* The present tendency in Eastern Europe generally is toward a stabilization and consolidation of Communist rule, with Soviet authority in political and ideological questions more firm than at any time since 1956. An increase in the degree of international acceptance of the East German Regime, or any apparent weakening in the position of West Berlin, could further strengthen the Soviet position in the Satellites. In the long run, however, the Satellites will remain one of the critical problems with which the Soviets will have to cope, given the likely continuation of deep-seated antipathy to Soviet domination. During a period of rising popular expectations and greater contacts with the outside world, the Soviets must endeavor to maintain political structures that can, on the one hand, ensure the required degree of Soviet control and, on the other, be operated without excessive friction, and appear to the world as an attractive image of communism in practice.

24. *Soviet Relations with the Underdeveloped Areas.* The total Soviet presence and the Soviet trade and aid programs in these areas will undoubtedly increase in coming years and will offer opportunities for expanding Soviet influence as well as for assisting local Communist elements. Furthermore, the desire of many of the newly created nations for development of military forces offers fertile ground for a form of Communist influence which could lead to serious consequences. On

the other hand, the experience of the last two years suggests that in some areas the honeymoon period that began in 1954 is drawing to a close and that the USSR will encounter problems as its contacts with the underdeveloped world expand. Developments in Burma, for example, have shown that an initial favorable impact may be vitiated by subsequent frictions, while the effect of Communist policy toward Iraq on Soviet-UAR relations has shown the difficulty of supporting regional rivals. Another sign is the disillusionment of some non-Communist students and trainees visiting Russia, both with ideological communism and with the physical and personal aspects of Soviet life.

25. More broadly, the extension of Soviet Bloc trade and aid programs throughout the world increasingly builds up the impression that the USSR can help any nation it wishes—an impression fortified by the Soviets' own boasting of their economic progress. In effect, the USSR now appears to be a "have" nation, and underdeveloped countries will come more and more to consider that the Soviet Union has an obligation to help them. Hence, Soviet efforts to continue their aid program on a highly selective basis will increasingly encounter the political penalties of aid denied or cut down in the face of hopes built up.

26. *Long-term Evolution within the USSR.* Over the next five years we see no prospect of a change in the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally. But popular hopes for a better life are on the rise in the USSR. Some groups seek a greater degree of personal freedom from restrictions and there is a far more universal desire to enjoy more of the economic fruits of Soviet growth. Khrushchev so far has tended to take these sentiments into account and has thus somewhat strengthened the regime. However, looking beyond the next five years, conflicts are likely to arise between the desires of an increasingly significant popular opinion and the ideological impetus and allocation of resources required under a thrusting foreign policy. We do not predict that these conflicts will alter basic Soviet objectives, but their long-run influence could be in the direction of reducing the outward pressure of Soviet policy, particularly if that policy should appear unprofitable.

27. *Sino-Soviet Relations.* Insofar as we can now foresee, the USSR and Communist China will continue to be firmly allied against the West. However, frictions have already arisen over extremist tendencies in Chinese internal policy, over Chinese ideological pretensions, over foreign policy tactics, and probably over whether the USSR should supply nuclear weapons to China. These or other frictions may be magnified in the future. As Communist China progresses and Soviet levers of authority become less effective, Peiping will tend to exercise more

independent judgment on doctrinal and tactical issues, both in domestic and external affairs.

28. Thus, each party to the alliance may come to act more in terms of its view of its own national need and interest. In most cases, the respective views are likely to remain parallel, and on many occasions a forceful Communist Chinese policy may be favorable to Soviet aims. However, if there should be increasing differences over international tactics and policy, as over the Sino-Indian border issue, the Soviets could be considerably embarrassed and their policy impeded.

29. The possibility of tactical or doctrinal differences does not mean that an open Sino-Soviet rupture is in sight. The long range question is not so much one of outright rupture as of growing independence which could produce discord tending to reduce the effectiveness of the alliance in furthering the objectives of both the USSR and Communist China. There will probably be some evidences of such independence over the next five years, although at least for this period both parties will regard the maintenance of the alliance as vital.

III. *THE COMMUNIST CHINESE THREAT TO ASIA*

30. Under the stress of greatly accelerated domestic efforts, including the recently reaffirmed commune program, Communist China clearly faces rough years indeed.⁸ Economic strains and the bitterness generated by vast social changes cannot help but produce an internal climate of great tension, although the regime can probably maintain basic order and prevent major disruptions by a combination of forceful measures and tactical adjustments. Economically, although rapid population growth will absorb much of the increase in agricultural production industrial, growth from the present generally low level will probably continue at rates higher than those of the USSR or any major Western power, or India.

31. Communist China's military capabilities, relative to the rest of Asia, will continue to grow. Over the next five years, Communist China will be producing an increasing portion of its need for conventional military equipment, but will still be heavily dependent on the USSR. Within this same period the USSR may provide limited missile and nuclear weapons support to Communist China, retaining custody of the nuclear components. We have no information indicating that the Chinese Communists have a plutonium production facility presently in operation or under construction, although they are developing

⁸ As to developments in Communist China over the next five years, this section relies principally on NIE 13–59, "COMMUNIST CHINA," dated 28 July 1959. Since the date of that estimate, however, events have pointed even more strongly in the direction of internal stress and external toughness. [Footnote is in the original.]

a raw materials capability and have had considerable basic technical assistance and training from the Soviets. However, assuming that the Chinese Communists have a modest but high priority plutonium production effort underway, they could be in a position as early as 1964 to test a crude nuclear device chiefly of their own development. Even the initial testing of a nuclear device by Communist China would have an important psychological impact, particularly in Asia.

32. The Chinese Communists will probably seek to achieve their objectives by political and subversive means, while not precluding the use of force to exploit targets of opportunity or to respond to situations which they might interpret as a threat to their position in Asia. They will continue to employ a broad range of tactics. Along with occasional manifestations of "Bandung reasonableness," however, the foreign policy of a restive, increasingly powerful, and ideologically extreme Communist China is virtually certain, as recent events have foreshadowed, to include frequent manifestations of truculence and of impatience to emerge as an acknowledged world power. The Offshore Islands situation will not lie quiescent indefinitely, and we shall probably see more, rather than less, of the range of pressures now exemplified on the Indian border, in Laos, and in Indonesia.

33. Over the next several years a number of additional nations, particularly those newly constituted, will probably recognize Communist China. Moreover, if disarmament negotiations are continued or limited agreements are reached, there will be a strong desire among other nations to include Communist China under such agreements. In light of these factors Communist China's admission to the UN will be extremely difficult to prevent.

34. *Non-Communist Asia.* The ruthlessness and aggressiveness of recent Communist Chinese domestic and foreign policies, such as the commune program, Tibet, and the Sino Indian border crisis, have substantially increased apprehensions throughout Asia of Communist Chinese strength and intentions. This increased alarm has produced some strengthening of border security measures and some decrease in regional frictions, and has led some neutralist countries to be more sympathetic to the US.

35. Several individual countries—most notably Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Singapore—remain unstable and particularly vulnerable to Communist influence. Elsewhere the outlook is more hopeful. The succession problems of South Vietnam and Nationalist China can probably be met, although that of the ROK is more doubtful. In Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines, there are indigenous forces that will tend to maintain fair stability.

36. Of the non-Communist countries in the area, Japan alone combines large and growing economic power with a good prospect of

continuing political stability. Having brought its population growth under substantial control, Japan can prosper if it can retain access to US and other Free World markets, and will be in a position to take an increasing role as entrepreneur to the rest of non-Communist Asia. Moreover, given such prosperity, Japan will probably be able to keep local leftists under control. Thus Japan will probably offer to the rest of Asia an example of economic growth and political stability achieved through means other than communism, and will probably continue to identify its interests in international political affairs with those of the West. On the other hand, there is strong domestic pressure in Japan for increased trade and official relations with Communist China; while some expansion in these relations is likely over the next few years, trade levels will probably be limited so long as Japan's Western ties remain strong, and Japan is not likely to take steps that would seriously impair its relations with the US. Japan will probably evidence an increased independence of action in foreign policy. In any event we do not foresee that Japan will develop major military capabilities of its own nor that it would associate itself with any regional military alliance.

37. India, the other potential major power of non-Communist Asia, is now subjected to Chinese Communist pressures such that, even if the present issues were to be resolved, there would be a lasting residue of anti-Chinese and to a lesser extent anti-Communist feeling. India's relations with Pakistan will probably continue to improve, and India will seek to strengthen its northern border defenses and ties. It might also step up efforts to expand its influence in Southeast Asia so as to support non-Communist regimes far more than to date. Although India is not likely to alter its basic neutralist policy or to enter regional alliances, it may look more benevolently on Western policies.

38. Internally India faces many political difficulties, and its economic progress will be slower than that of Communist China. However, if India achieves steady economic growth, it could provide an example in Asia of an underdeveloped country adhering to humane policies and to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in social values. Such growth could only be attained by an effective and sustained effort within India, and would depend heavily also upon foreign aid.

39. *Prospects for the Growth or Containment of Communist Influence.* In general the non-Communist nations of Asia are subject to the same attraction toward pragmatic neutralism as other underdeveloped areas. Communist Chinese pressure could operate to increase neutralist sentiment, but in some circumstances it might have the opposite effect of strengthening orientation toward the West and increasing sympathy with the US.

40. In light of the number of precarious situations cited above, there is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in

one or another of the countries in the area within the next five years. US action, however, could in most cases reduce this chance and in any event could probably prevent any chain reaction if an individual country did go Communist. It is hard to see the situation in the area as a whole improving markedly over this period, and a bellicose Chinese Communist policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities.

IV. THE ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPE

41. Western Europe as a whole is likely to prosper over the next few years, and the economies of most countries, especially the major continental states, are likely to grow at rates only slightly below those of the last five years. Economic efficiency is generally increasing rapidly, and the basic terms of trade with underdeveloped areas are likely to continue favorable to Europe for some time to come. Even the availability of oil is far less uncertain than it was a few years back.

42. The movement toward economic integration will continue to have great momentum. However, the current differences between the Common Market (Six) and the European Free Trade Association (Seven) will be difficult to resolve. If, as seems likely, the Six move ahead rapidly—with increasing political consultation among themselves—then the UK and the rest of the Seven will feel increasing compulsion to reach some sort of accommodation embracing the 13 and perhaps others. However, British viewpoints in particular must undergo marked changes before any type of association becomes possible. Moreover, the strong, though declining, protectionist attitudes of the French and their aspirations to lead the continent will have to be modified. Association could also be prevented by serious French domestic difficulties. A continued split between the groups, with rigid economic divisions forming between them, would have serious consequences for the political cohesiveness of the West.

43. *International Economic Policy and Economic Aid.* The prospect of continued sound economic growth carries with it a substantial Western European capacity to reduce trade barriers and to assist in aid to the underdeveloped areas. A great part of the capacity to render assistance will continue to be exerted, particularly by France, in colonial or recently colonial areas, so long as some form of political tie remains. For more general aid and private investment efforts, West Germany has by far the greatest potential, while the UK effort probably can rise only modestly.

44. NATO. NATO faces a serious problem in maintaining firmness and cohesion. One factor creating this problem is a difference of view on policy toward the USSR. Substantial official and public opinion, particularly in the UK, tends to see little likelihood of Soviet military action

in Europe, and the regard the present prospects of reducing tensions through negotiations as favorable. On the other hand, the Governments of France and West Germany stress the continuing seriousness of the Soviet threat to Europe, and are generally opposed to concessions as a price for reduced tensions. The problem is compounded by anti-German sentiment in the UK.⁹

45. The second potentially divisive factor is the desire on the continent, notably in France, for a greater role and voice in decisions. De Gaulle seeks increased status for France and national control of French forces within NATO. Furthermore, there is some support in France, and to a lesser degree among other continental WEU countries, for the creation in the next few years of some form of European continental military grouping, possibly related to NATO.

46. Basic underlying factors are the impact of Soviet military progress and, in some quarters, growing doubts about the adequacy of the US military posture and the future course of US policy. The Soviet ICBM buildup is in itself almost certain to increase doubt as to whether in fact the US would exert its full weight against Soviet pressures in Europe. The level of trust in US support of NATO is not yet seriously reduced. However, West Germany and Turkey in particular, and to a lesser degree other European NATO members are highly sensitive to any apparent US lack of firmness in East-West negotiations or to any suggestion of a substantial reduction in US forces committed to NATO, as possible indications of gradual US withdrawal.

47. The prosperity of the major NATO countries makes them capable of bearing a larger share of the military load. However, the trend of popular feeling is generally against any increase in defense budgets. Arguments over the soundness of NATO military strategy add to the popular reluctance to support defense spending.

48. In this complex situation, current Soviet emphasis on reducing tensions creates a special problem. To the extent that an impression of detente persists, it will be difficult to prevent cuts in defense budgets, to avoid further serious strains within NATO, and to preserve present NATO force goals or to devise a new strategy commanding broad assent and support. If the pressure motif again becomes dominant in Soviet policy, this would probably tend to strengthen NATO ties and stimulate defense efforts.

49. The course of events in key individual countries could, of course, greatly affect the outcome. In France an Algerian solution is

⁹ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, considers that the last sentence of this paragraph should be eliminated: he believes that anti-German sentiment in the UK is not a significant factor in the differences of view on policy toward the USSR. [Footnote is in the original.]

difficult to foresee except through de Gaulle. His early overthrow or death would probably be followed shortly by a rightist authoritarian regime based on military support. Such a French Government would be likely to pursue policies in Algeria that could seriously injure the West's position in underdeveloped areas. Moreover, the policies of such a regime in this and other respects could well produce critical divisions within France, impede European economic integration, and induce severe strains within NATO and in Franco-US relations. The realities of France's political, economic and military situation would, however, tend to restrain extremist tendencies.

50. If, on the other hand, de Gaulle continues in power and brings off some workable Algerian solution, France would be much strengthened and stabilized. De Gaulle would be likely to press the harder his present efforts to enlarge French influence and, if unsuccessful, would probably act with increasing independence.

51. There are also uncertainties in the prospects for West Germany. Recent events have highlighted the importance of Adenauer's role and the problem of his succession. It appears likely that the CDU will win the 1961 election, and be able to maintain internal stability and economic growth. Adenauer's successors will almost certainly continue the main lines of his foreign policies, although there might be some decline in their devotion to European integration and to close Franco-German rapport.

52. However, West Germany will in any event remain highly sensitive to US policy. Moreover, West Germany's stature within Europe is steadily increasing; militarily, its forces will within a year or so be by far the largest European contribution to the NATO shield in Germany, and its capacity for military production is growing rapidly. If West Germany should come seriously to doubt that the US can and will defend Europe and uphold basic West German national interests, it would be increasingly attracted to schemes for some form of continental military grouping and might hope to become the eventual leader in such a grouping.

53. In any case, some increase in West Germany's assertiveness and independence in foreign policy is probable over the next few years. A West German attempt to resolve the German reunification problem by force is highly unlikely, and only in the event of a serious weakening of the Western alliance might the Federal Republic be likely to seek an accommodation with the USSR. However, if West German policy and opinion were to take on an increasingly nationalistic tone, this might lead to growing distrust both among NATO countries and in the Soviet Bloc, particularly when West German forces have access to nuclear weapons. Thus, NATO relationships could be disturbed, and tensions with the East increased.

54. *Outlook.* Over the next few years, despite these uncertainties, we believe that basic military dependence on the US will hold the NATO

alliance together. Nevertheless its effectiveness will probably be somewhat reduced, and this reduction could attain serious proportions if European confidence in the will and ability of the US to protect Europe from the Communist threat should decline markedly.

55. De Gaulle will probably continue to seek to minimize the degree of integration of NATO forces and to develop France's own nuclear capabilities. However, the achievement of a substantial independent nuclear capability would present enormous economic and technological difficulties for France and would in any event require a period of not less than five years and probably considerably more.

56. In part for this reason, France may at some point solicit the collaboration of West Germany and perhaps of other European NATO countries, in the development of advanced delivery systems and perhaps in the production of nuclear weapons. Adenauer would almost certainly not enter into extensive collaboration under present circumstances. He and his successors would probably adhere to the same position in the future, so long as they were assured of US aid and support and provided also that West German forces could obtain nuclear weapons from the US on acceptable terms. In the latter connection, West Germany and other NATO members are likely in the near future to press for changes in stockpiling arrangements that would provide NATO, WEU, or national participation in control.

57. Apart from the case of France, the independent development of nuclear weapons by West European countries will be inhibited by world opposition to nuclear testing, demonstrated strikingly in the recent UN vote on the French tests, and likely to become increasingly strong whether or not the major powers reach an agreement on the subject. In the face of this opposition, and the costs involved, we now believe that it is an open question whether such countries as Sweden and Switzerland will develop their own weapons. West Germany is unlikely to do so unless denied weapons on acceptable terms by the US, the UK, and France.

58. Over a period of 5–10 years, the emergence of a continental bloc that controlled a substantial nuclear capability and sizable conventional forces, is a possibility. However, any such European turn away from primary dependence on the US would be likely only if European confidence in the US had markedly declined. Moreover, such a union based primarily on West German and French military potential could attain major proportions only under optimum conditions, including at a minimum continued rapid economic progress and internal political stability among the participants.

59. The progress of Western Europe in the past decade, including the stability of West Germany and gradual consolidation of its ties with the West, remains a major gain in the overall Western power position. However, this new strength will probably not be applied as fully and

cohesively as it might be to the key problems now confronting the West, unless there is some return to the sense of urgency that existed when the alliance was formed. Improvements in the present structure of organizations and relationships could be of assistance. In general, however, the Western European public has settled down into a pattern of prosperity in which it will be difficult to arouse great support either for increased defense measures or for large-scale aid to underdeveloped countries.

V. STABILITY IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

A. General Problems

Nationalism and Attitudes Toward The Major Powers

60. Generally speaking, the force of nationalist feeling will remain undiminished in the underdeveloped areas. The nations that came into being soon after World War II, now entering their second decade of existence, are becoming somewhat less strident. On the other hand, the newer nations, and those due to emerge in Africa in the future, will have continuing spasms of extreme nationalism, especially where the break with the colonial power is accompanied by bitterness.

61. It is worth noting that the next decade will see not only the throwing off of almost all remaining colonial ties, but probably some additional adjustments of national units. Many new states have been built on uncertain foundations of national identity (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan, the individual Arab countries). In Africa, where the bulk of the new nations of the 1960's will be, political boundaries bear little relation to tribal or other natural divisions. Moreover, cultural ties, political objectives, and in many cases economic factors often point to wider regional groupings, such as the UAR, Black African federations, and a possible Maghreb grouping in North Africa. The result could be a number of changes in political boundaries, involving partition, some type of federation or both. Such changes would not, however, necessarily reduce the effect of nationalist feeling: at least in the Arab World they could intensify it.

62. The onetime colonial powers are, of course, now largely "ex," save in Africa. Elsewhere in the underdeveloped areas anticolonialism, in its narrow sense of resentment at present or past political domination, is declining and will decline further. The same feelings, however, can be and are applied equally strongly against real or apparent domination in the economic sphere, as illustrated in Latin America. Old-style anticolonialism is being replaced by "have-not vs. have" feelings no less serious and potentially harmful, compounded by regional and color consciousness. For all of these antagonisms, the US is a prime target; if there is any comfort it is that the USSR is becoming more and more tarred with the same brush.

Economic Growth and Aspirations

63. The extent and force of “have-not” feelings are almost certain to be strengthened by the economic course of the underdeveloped areas in the next few years. Even for those nations (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) where something like an economic “take-off” is occurring, the gap between their standards of living and those of the advanced West and the USSR will remain wide. Rapid population growth will greatly contribute to this result, and in other countries that might otherwise appear to be approaching the point of “take-off”—most importantly India—it will probably siphon off a high proportion of potential investment resources into meeting consumption needs. Thus industrial progress could be slowed down and have little effect on popular welfare. With death rates likely to decline more rapidly than birth rates over the next decade, the population problem and its economic impact are likely to become more serious except in a few sparsely settled areas.

64. Moreover, the tremendous dependence of the underdeveloped areas on raw material markets in the West will continue essentially unchanged, and will be an increasingly sore point to local leaders. The best current forecast is that the terms of trade for exporters of agricultural products, and to a lesser extent of industrial raw materials, are likely to remain unfavorable over the next decade in the face of technological substitution and other factors. If so, this will increase pressures on the economic and foreign trade policies of the US and the West, and create both opportunities and pitfalls for the USSR and the Bloc.

65. As to their own hopes for growth, some of the extravagant early expectations of underdeveloped nations with regard to industrialization have by now been dampened by harsh experience and growing realization of the depth and complexity of their problems, and of the need for major social changes before these problems can be effectively tackled. But if the governments of “have-not” nations expect less in the way of visible progress, it does not follow that they will be any less vigorous in their demands upon the “have” nations for capital investment and support. Nor will the pressure on the US and the West be eased much by the fact that the USSR will also be subject to such pressures. The game of balancing economic demands on East and West is one that almost all can play, and most of them will.

Political Stability

66. The problems of developing leadership and effective political systems remain acute throughout the underdeveloped areas. The new nations of Africa appear to be adopting thinly veiled forms of dictatorial control from the outset; in the absence of any military or other trained class, an adequate supply of future leadership is hard to foresee. The longer established nations of Latin America have generally

thrown off military dictatorship in favor of regimes based on middle class support or, in a few cases such as Cuba, on "the street." Between these two, a number of nations in the Far East, South Asia, and Middle East continue to depend heavily on military leadership and influence.

67. Basically, the test of political organization in the eyes of the newer nations is more and more the pragmatic one of whether it appears able to meet their problems of modernization, economic growth, and attaining national power. While democracy as a political theory has wide appeal in terms of its satisfaction of individual aspirations, its appeal is also wrapped up with the image of power and material progress provided by the major Western democracies. On the other side the appeal of communism rests increasingly, at least among leadership groups, on the appearance it presents of a form of organization able to produce rapid progress under conditions similar to those of the underdeveloped countries, as demonstrated in practice by the USSR and Communist China. In general, the traditions of underdeveloped countries and the scope of the problems they confront incline these nations toward the use of state action. The most frequent result in practice will probably continue to be a mixture of native traditions with elements of both systems.

68. Communism has succeeded in some cases in identifying itself with nationalist and anticolonial movements and thus gained strength, particularly in the early stages of new regimes. Local Communists and the international Communist movement will in many areas continue to be able to attract adherents among the frustrated and dissatisfied. However, as Communist strength grows, it tends to arouse resistance among leaders who fear the threat to their own power. The chances of Communist or Communist-dominated governments coming to power will be greatest where strong local Communist groups operate in conditions of serious political, economic, and social instability and dislocation. Such conditions are likely to be widespread in the underdeveloped areas for the foreseeable future.

Local Conflicts

69. There are a great many friction points scattered throughout the world that could produce local conflicts, international or internal, precipitated only secondarily, if at all, by the East-West struggle. The Arab-Israel situation appears the most deep-seated and serious of these; the situation in the Caribbean and Iraq may be even more explosive in the short term. Other possibilities in coming years are Cyprus, Ethiopia-Somalia, Indonesia-West New Guinea, the Pakistan-Afghan tribal areas, and many local situations in Africa and the Arab States.

70. Yet there are factors tending to keep local conflicts from expanding beyond manageable bounds. In most of these cases the forces

locally available will be limited, in light of the difficulties encountered in many underdeveloped nations in developing major military forces, and particularly in becoming proficient with advanced military equipment. Another and more important factor is the growing use and flexibility of UN and other international machinery. The UN seems likely to be increasingly effective in calming situations and facilitating settlements. Moreover, world opinion as experienced in the UN will have to be taken more and more into account by major powers considering intervention in local conflicts.

71. Any spread of nuclear weapons to the underdeveloped areas could, of course, have incalculable consequences for the likelihood and scope of local conflicts. However, we do not believe any of the underdeveloped countries could or would produce its own weapons, even on an initial basis, if for no other reason than expense and prevailing world opposition to nuclear testing. Nor do we believe Western Europe would be a source; the sole possible exception, France supplying Israel, would involve the risk of triggering Soviet nuclear support to the Arab States. Except possibly in such a case, we believe that the Soviets for a variety of reasons would not make nuclear weapons available to underdeveloped countries.

B. Prospects for Particular Areas

72. From these general points, we turn to an appraisal of the prospects for particular areas, taking into account local stages of development and other factors that could operate to affect stability and the chances of Communist success. As noted in Section III, the Far East and Southeast Asia present special cases because of the Chinese Communist threat.

73. *Middle East.* For the short-run, the outlook for Western influence in the Arab World has improved, in large part because Nasser and other Arab nationalist leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the Communist threat.¹⁰ Basic Western interests—access to oil and the maintenance of reasonably stable non-Communist governments—are not incompatible with those of the Arab States themselves. Yet the Arab nations will almost certainly continue to seek economic aid from both sides, and there will remain the possibility of chaotic developments in any one country (Iraq at present) or of conflict between countries. Such developments or a resurgence of the deeply rooted Arab-Israeli conflict would present serious dangers of further Communist inroads. Beyond the Arab World, the situation in Iran is precarious and could turn chaotic. Moreover, continued political instability coupled with Soviet

¹⁰ For a more complete discussion, see the recent NIE 30–59, “MAIN CURRENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD,” dated 25 August 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]

threats or inducements could cause Iran to withdraw from CENTO. All in all, the Middle East will remain very unstable.

74. *South Asia.* In India, moderate political elements will probably be able to maintain control for at least the next few years. However, the departure of Nehru would probably intensify political divisions and might contribute to a decline in the effectiveness of government. Particularly if economic progress diminishes, there is a possibility that Nehru's departure would be followed by such political dislocations as to produce a temporary abandonment of democratic methods, perhaps associated with army participation in the government.

75. Elsewhere in the area, Afghanistan has become deeply involved with the USSR in trade and economic and military aid programs. So long as Western support continues it can probably retain its independence, but even granted such support there is a possibility that it will come under effective Soviet domination within five years or so. Pakistan's military regime can probably keep control and a reasonable degree of stability for some time. Ceylon may emerge under conservative control from its present precarious state, but in any event the outlook is for unstable conditions.

76. *Africa.* Former French North Africa is a special case, with the possibilities ranging from chaos to fairly constructive relationships with France; the economic outlook is generally dim. Those areas of East, Central, and southern Africa which have an acute white settler problem face a grave and increasingly urgent problem of terminating or modifying white control and of forming workable governments. Even if these are solved, the long-term outlook for stability and orderly development is unpromising. Both in these areas and in West Africa, most new nations will turn for aid first to the West and, if unsatisfied, to the Bloc, often with highly unrealistic aspirations and expectations. While trade and other economic relations with the Bloc will increase in Africa and there will be many opportunities for the spread of Communist influence, we do not believe that local Communist-controlled groups will become entrenched in power in any country at least over the next few years, given a reasonable degree of effective attention from the west.¹¹

77. *Latin America.* Latin America's importance in world affairs will grow substantially in coming years. However, even the economic growth of the more advanced countries, much less that of the more backward, will have difficulty in keeping pace with rising popular expectations,

¹¹ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the prospects for Communist groups should be limited further by substituting after "Communist-controlled groups" in the last sentence the words: "will become a major political force in any country. . . ." [Footnote is in the original.]

and in most countries prospects for any substantial improvement are not bright.

78. Communist prospects in Latin America are improving as a result of the area-wide reaction against autocratic or oligarchic rule, the more open political atmosphere, and economic adversity. The major threat of communism lies, as in Cuba at present, in its infiltration of nationalist and revolutionary movements. Soviet Bloc trade and aid programs, and contacts with Communist China, are likely to increase moderately, but will be essentially secondary elements in the Communist threat.

79. In Latin America as a whole we look for some expansion in Communist influence over the next few years, although such an expansion will probably not be widespread, especially in view of the possibilities for US action. However, there is a possibility that one or another country, notably Cuba, could fall under Communist control. Moreover, the Communists or other extremists may achieve such influence that they can put through programs seriously threatening US interests or even security. In any event, the US will be under increasing pressure, and Latin American support for the US, for example in the UN, will almost certainly continue to decline.

80. *Summary.* The complex force of nationalism and growing desires for a better life will be powerful forces shaping the course of events in countries of the underdeveloped world. These countries will continue to expect help from the richer countries, and will be inclined to accept such help, regardless of whether it comes from East or West. Inasmuch as these countries generally lack the experienced leadership, the stable political and social institutions, and the material resources to cope with their many problems in orderly ways, there will remain the possibility of violent upheavals and local conflicts. While these outbreaks may not stem from the East-West struggle, they can be expected often to involve the interests of the two sides and to afford opportunities for exploitation. Thus, the underdeveloped world will continue to be a principal area of the contest between the Bloc and the West.

VI. US INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE

81. Recent Soviet scientific and economic achievements, viewed against a background of steady growth of the relative power position of the USSR, have erased the picture of unique US power that prevailed between World War II and 1957. The immediate consequences, however, have been mitigated by other events. The course of the Lebanon and Quemoy crises, and to a lesser extent of the Berlin issue, has demonstrated to the world that the US remains able and willing to take firm action; the US entry into high-level contacts and negotiations with

the USSR, while viewed in part as the result of Soviet power gains, has generally been welcomed. The President's visits abroad have done much to evidence US concern for peace and for the welfare of both its major allies and underdeveloped nations. On the Bloc side, the external programs of the USSR have met with checks, and the behavior of Communist China has led to wider recognition, especially in Asia, of the value of the US's countervailing power.

82. Yet the future of US prestige is by no means assured. Since the US will still appear as the principal guarantor of the Free World against the power of the USSR and Communist China, indications that the US was not maintaining a firm and effective military and political posture would lead to a weakening of the resolve of other free nations and encourage them to seek various forms of accommodation.

83. The present period of high-level negotiations confronts the US both with opportunities and with problems, in maintaining the firmness and cohesion of its major alliances and in keeping before the world a picture of the US as a nation genuinely seeking honorable adjustments through peaceful means. Though the tendency to judge the US by more exacting standards than the USSR is less widespread than in the past, it remains true that our allies and other major free nations expect from the US a combination of flexibility and firmness that is often not realistically attainable.

84. *Problems of the US Strategic Posture.* The future relationship between the nuclear striking power of the US and that of the USSR is difficult to predict at present, depending as it does on a wide range of technological and policy factors on both sides. In general, however, the growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities is creating a serious problem for the US in maintaining among other Free World nations confidence in US willingness to bring its strategic nuclear capabilities to bear as a protection for such nations. Particularly in Western Europe, there are signs that this confidence has already been shaken.

85. At the same time, despite the acceptance of reliance on nuclear weapons for basic deterrent purposes, there is strong worldwide sentiment against the use of such weapons, particularly in limited conflicts. We believe that our major allies, at least, will probably continue to support the use of Western (essentially US) nuclear weapons in situations of clearly major consequence, such as Bloc invasion of the NATO area. But in situations of apparently lesser consequence, any US use or threat of nuclear weapons will encounter strong opposition from a world opinion that will increasingly include major US allies

in spite of the advantages such opposition might confer on a Bloc aggressor.^{12,13}

86. *US Economic Policy.* Finally, US economic policy should be singled out as a second crucial area affecting US prestige and influence. In international trade and aid, US response to its balance of payments problem will be closely watched. Any drastic US reduction of aid without some compensating action would weaken US influence in the underdeveloped areas, while extensive US protectionist measures would certainly set off a wave of countermeasures. Basically, however much the capacity of other Western nations grows, the Free World will still look to the US for leadership in the problem of channeling Western aid to the “have-not” nations and in the freeing and encouraging of international trade, and will be intensely concerned with the economic policies, both domestic and foreign, adopted by the US.

¹² The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the judgments voiced in the latter portions of this paragraph. He would end the paragraph at the word “consequence” in the second sentence and delete all that follows. Such deletion would eliminate several broad judgments which do not lend themselves to precise interpretation. In particular, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with the judgment that “world opinion” would necessarily be against the use, or threat of use, of US nuclear weapons. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, holds the view that our major allies, at least, will formulate their opinions and make their decisions at the time of aggression and on the basis of the issues then involved. Moreover, there appears to be no present evidence to support the implication that the Free World in general, or the major US allies in particular, would capitulate to the Bloc rather than indorse the use of nuclear weapons. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹³ The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, does not concur with this paragraph as written. He believes the paragraph should be rewritten as follows:

“At the same time, despite the acceptance of reliance on nuclear weapons for basic deterrent purposes, *the world is generally in ignorance of the spectrum of weapon yields and delivery accuracies available. As a result, no mental image other than that of a high-yield bomb detonating over a city is commonly evoked by the word ‘nuclear.’ This factor, intensified by Communist propaganda, has created worldwide sentiment against the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in limited conflicts. We believe that our major allies will almost certainly continue to support the use of Western (essentially US) nuclear weapons in situations of clearly major consequence. But in situations not clearly of major consequence, US use or threat of nuclear weapons would probably result in a wide variation of public and official reactions among the non-Communist nations. Thus there would probably be:*

- a. *Strong protests from peoples and governments with no significant issues at stake.*
- b. *Considerable and vociferous unofficial public opposition from those nations with significant issues at stake.*
- c. *Some opposition and only reluctant acceptance by the governments—including major US allies—of those nations with significant issues at stake. The degree of concern of these governments would depend on the seriousness of the issue to them, their understanding of the military requirement for use of nuclear weapons, their confidence in US ability for discrete usage of nuclear weapons, and their view of the feasibility of alternate solutions.”* [Footnote is in the original.]

233. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, January 19, 1960

SUBJECT

The Role of the Military Air Transport Service in Peace and War

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5919

B. NSC Action No. 2167

The enclosed draft recommendations on the subject, prepared by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, as a revision of the recommendations contained in the Department of Defense report on the subject, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 21, 1960. It is contemplated that the President's decision following such NSC consideration will be subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and will not be circulated as an NSC paper.

The original recommendations contained in the Department of Defense report were read at the 430th NSC Meeting (January 7, 1960) at which NSC 5919 "U.S. Policy with Respect to the Development of Cargo Airlift," was considered.

A copy of the Department of Defense report is being attached to this memorandum, for each of the officials who will be attending the NSC Meeting for this subject on Thursday, January 21, with the exception of those who have previously received a copy.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency
The Chairman, Civil Aeronautics, Board
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Transmits draft recommendations on the role of MATS. Official Use Only. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Enclosure

Draft Recommendations Prepared for the NSC

Washington, undated

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ROLE OF MATS

1. That MATS be equipped and operated in peacetime to insure its capability to meet approved military hard-core² requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met adequately by commercial carriers³ on an effective and timely basis. (It is understood that our hard-core and other military requirements are currently under study in connection with the review of the mobilization base.)

2. That the modernization of MATS hard-core military airlift capability be undertaken in an orderly manner consistent with other military requirements and in keeping with the objectives of par. 1 above.

3. That MATS [routine channel traffic (regularly scheduled, fixed routes) operations]⁴ be reduced on an orderly basis, consistent with assured commercial airlift capability at reasonable cost,⁵ and consistent with economical⁶ and efficient⁷ use, including realistic training, of the MATS capacity resulting from the provisions of par. 1 above.

4. That as commercial carriers make available modern, economical long-range cargo aircraft and as further orientation of MATS to the hard-core function is effected, increased use should be made of the services of such commercial carriers. (It is understood that, for the present, types of aircraft such as the DC-7F and the L-1049H qualify under this paragraph.)

² Airlift requirements which must move in military aircraft, manned and operated by military crews because of special military considerations, security, or because of limiting physical characteristics such as size or dangerous properties. Included in this category are special military deployments involving nuclear retaliatory forces, the SAC post strike recovery mission, tactical deployments, movement of missiles, special munitions, etc. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Wherever used in these recommendations, "commercial carriers" means U.S.-owned commercial carriers. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Budget, Commerce, FAA, and CAB propose deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

⁵ The Department of Defense has stated that its criteria for determining comparative costs are on the basis of Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 60-2, September 21, 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ Defense proposal. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ Budget, Commerce, FAA proposal. [Footnote is in the original.]

5. That, with respect to services overseas and to foreign countries, commercial augmentation airlift procurement policies and practices be better adapted to the long-range Department of Defense requirements, so as to encourage and assist in sound economic growth, development, and maintenance of an increased air cargo capability; that there be explored the feasibility of (1) (a) increasing the amount of MATS cargo airlift moving on a common carriage basis with certificated carriers and supplemental carriers, [and (b) requiring that all cargo [illegible in the original] be so moved;]⁸ (2) entering into longer term contracts for MATS traffic; and (3) giving preference in the movement of MATS traffic to those commercial carriers (a) who are effectively committed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, (b) whose facilities and equipment are most advantageous to the emergency needs of the Department of Defense, or (c) who are demonstrating a willingness and ability to acquire uncompromised cargo aircraft; and that legislation be sought if necessary to permit accomplishment of any of the foregoing considered desirable. (It is understood that this recommendation will be reviewed after receipt of the report by the Air Force as to the feasibility of the steps outlined above.)

6. That since the development of long-range, economical turbine-powered cargo aircraft is essential to MATS modernization and to long-range evolution of a modern civil cargo fleet, suitable arrangements should be made for Defense and industry participation in the costs of such development.

7. That purchase loan guarantee legislation, if proposed, contain provisions to insure the immediate availability of cargo aircraft covered thereby to meet military and mobilization requirements.

8. That consideration be given to equipping certain Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units with transport aircraft that might be available from MATS excesses as augmentation forces for MATS in time of emergency. (It is understood that this recommendation will be reviewed after receipt of the above-mentioned report by the Air Force.)

9. That the role of CRAF be re-examined with the objective of insuring optimum effectiveness and responsiveness of commercial airlift services to the Department of Defense under all conditions.

⁸ Defense proposes deletion. [Footnote and brackets not delineating illegible text are in the original.]

234. Briefing Note for the January 21 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 20, 1960

THE ROLE OF MATS IN PEACE AND WAR

Our first item, Mr. President, concerns the role of MATS. The Council just two weeks ago looked at NSC 5919, a draft policy statement on cargo airlift, and heard a summary of the recommendations in the Defense report to you on “The Role of MATS in Peace and War”. The Council did not adopt NSC 5919, but referred it back to the Planning Board for urgent review in the light of the Defense report.

In the past two weeks I have worked with the agencies primarily interested in an effort to reach agreement on the recommendations in the Defense report, feeling that in that way progress could be made most speedily. The paper before you is the product of a three-hour meeting with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency. It is contemplated that the President’s decision following our discussion today will be subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and will not be circulated as an NSC paper.

Turning to the paper itself, paragraph 1 and 2 are agreed revisions of the earlier recommendations of the Department of Defense.

READ PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2

In paragraph 3, we come to the first split in the paper, at the bottom of page 1. Defense, in its original recommendations, would have provided that the reduction of MATS operations apply only to routine channel traffic, that is, regularly scheduled traffic over fixed routes. The JCS support Defense. Budget, Commerce, FAA and CAB would have the reduction apply to *all* MATS operations.

CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY DOUGLAS
GENERAL WHITE
MR. STANS
SECRETARY MUELLER
MR. QUESADA

Looking now at the first line on page 2, Defense and JSC oppose the inclusion of the first footnote on page 2. Their concurrence was based on a misunderstanding.

The next split is also in paragraph 3, at the top of page 2. There is a difference between those who want *economical* use of remaining

¹ Source: The role of MATS in peace and war. Official Use Only. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

MATS capacity and those who want *efficient* use. JSC supports Defense in wanting the word *economical*.

CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY DOUGLAS
GENERAL WHITE
MR. STANS
SECRETARY MUELLER
MR. QUESADA

The next split occurs in paragraph 4, on the basis of the JCS views just circulated. They would omit the parenthetical sentence on the grounds that civil capacity should not be expanded with converted passenger aircraft. I think that this is an important split because the language is proposed in order to make clear that increased use of commercial carriers does not have to await the development and production of uncompromised cargo aircraft.

Another split occurs in paragraph 5, at the bottom of page 2. This paragraph is concerned with the procurement policies and practices to be followed when commercial airlift services are bought. After a general statement that these procurement policies and practices should be better adapted to long-range Defense requirements, so as to encourage and assist in sound economic growth, development, and maintenance of an increased air cargo capability, there is a list of possibilities whose feasibility is to be explored. The first of these possibilities, (1) (a), is *increasing* the amount of MATS cargo airlift moving on a *common carriage* basis with certificated carriers and supplemental carriers. The second possibility, which is the subject of the split, might be clarified if the language were changed to read “and (b) requiring that all cargo *carried by commercial carriers* be so moved”. This provision would explore the feasibility of eliminating the awarding of contracts on the basis of the lowest competitive bid. Defense objects to listing this possibility as one whose feasibility should be explored.

CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY DOUGLAS
MR. QUESADA
SECRETARY MUELLER
MR. STANS

With regard to paragraph 7, the JCS propose that the words “if proposed” be eliminated. This language was put in because handling of this legislation was being left to the regular Budget Bureau process.

The drafting group considered another recommendation which would have been numbered 10, but decided to delete it from the list because it was not the subject of a recommendation in the Defense report. However, the group agreed that the question be raised as to whether the President should be asked to send a letter to the Secretary of Defense asking that two matters be studied:

1. Whether the guidance set forth in these recommendations with respect to the MATS fleet should be applied as appropriate to the operations of the remainder of the military cargo air fleet.

2. Whether there needs to be further integration of the military airlift capability.

CALL ON MR. STANS

DEPUTY SECRETARY DOUGLAS

Reminder: Turning to one last point, the Department of Defense wants its report on MATS to be released to the public, with the recommendations shown in the form approved by the President. In this connection, I'd like to ask Secretary Douglas whether the second sentence of the first footnote on page 1, which talks about the SAC post-strike recovery mission and other matters, is o.k. from the security point of view for release to the public. Perhaps, if there is any question about this sentence, it could just be deleted from the footnote.

CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY DOUGLAS

Are there any other comments on this question of releasing the MATS report to the public?

235. Memorandum of Discussion at the 433d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 21, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 433rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 21, 1960

Present at the 433rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Mr. James H. Douglas for the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Item 1); Mr. Philip Ray for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were General Thomas D. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special

¹ Source: Agenda item 2: Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security: Soviet Missile Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, and Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.²

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are pages 2–11.]

2. *SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY*

[Omitted here are pages 12–13.]

Mr. Dulles felt the Soviets would want to make a good deal of the two kilometers CEP which they say they have achieved. He thought it was possible that the Soviets intended to support their position in forthcoming diplomatic negotiations by a dramatic demonstration of the long range of their missiles. General White, on the contrary, believed that when the Soviets want to achieve maximum diplomatic impact, they will name the time and the target which they wish to hit, and will attempt to put the missile on the target. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that the 24 hour postponement in the launching of the Soviet missile suggested that the Soviets had fired something new rather than an old-type missile.

Mr. Dulles said he was about to appear before a Congressional Committee and predicted that he would be asked about the Soviet firing. The President said that Mr. Dulles could tell the Committee that the Soviet missile had fallen in the impact area and that it had been seen by our observers in the area. The Attorney General felt Mr. Dulles should emphasize that there is no assurance that the Soviet report of the missile CEP is accurate. Mr. Allen said we should perhaps indicate that since our CEP is two miles, we assume Russian accuracy is about the same. The President felt, on the other hand, that we should give no credence to the announced Russian CEP until the Russians predict the exact spot they intend to hit and allow us to observe the firing.

Mr. McCone asked whether there would be other Soviet missile firings in the Pacific. Mr. Dulles said he assumed the firing just described was one in a series of shots.

The President said that in Congressional testimony it could be said by US officials that the Soviet missile had impacted in the impact

²[text not declassified]

area, but we ought not to betray the extent of our surveillance of the area.

Mr. Dulles then turned to Khrushchev's recent speech before the Supreme Soviet. He said this speech was very important and had been the subject of a careful analysis by CIA. He was inclined to accept Khrushchev's statement on manpower strength and on the reductions in certain hardware production. He was willing to accept tentatively Khrushchev's figure of 3.6 million men under arms in all the Soviet forces, although this figure was less than the figure previously carried in intelligence estimates. CIA had already observed the virtual cessation of bomber production in the USSR and cuts in the production of other weapons, e.g. naval vessels. Incidentally, Mr. Dulles noted that the first reports of Khrushchev's speech had lumped submarines and surface ships together as obsolete. This turned out to be an error in translation. Actually Khrushchev had said only that surface ships were obsolete. Mr. Dulles estimated that the reduction in Soviet armed forces proposed by Khrushchev of 1.2 million could probably be effected within two years, by the fall of 1961 according to Malinovsky. Mr. Dulles felt it made a good deal of sense for the USSR to reduce its forces in view of the possibility of serious competition in 1960 through 1962 between the military on the one hand and the civilian economy on the other as represented by the Seven Year Plan. The USSR needed more manpower for its industrial program. Reduction in military manpower would also result in the reduction of 16–17 billion rubles in the explicit Soviet military budget. Mr. Dulles pointed out, however, that the real military budget, as opposed to the announced military budget, of the USSR was 160+ billion rubles. Mr. Dulles did not believe that the reductions announced in the Khrushchev speech would affect previous estimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities. Apparently the Soviet forces were about to undergo a through reorganization. Khrushchev has become a missile enthusiast and wishes to speed up the rationalization of Soviet forces. He may also wish to fix our attention on the missile field, where he thinks the Soviets have superiority. He apparently wishes to achieve armed forces which will consist of strategic attack and air defense forces armed with missiles, ground forces also armed with missiles and having great airborne capability, and a navy consisting largely of submarines. Mr. Dulles said that Khrushchev may be considering a percentage withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The Khrushchev program of reduction is probably not palatable to the Soviet military and Khrushchev may have had some difficulty getting the military to go along. Evidence of this is the fact that the Chief of Staff and other important military figures did not make speeches before the Supreme Soviet. The demotion of Kirichenko may also have been related to opposition to the Khrushchev military program. Mr.

Dulles concluded by reporting that the tone of Khrushchev's speech reflects the belief that the USSR can overcome capitalism without general war, indicates great reliance on missile forces as a shield behind which communism can compete with the West, and seems to exclude general war as a deliberate Soviet policy.

Mr. Gray asked whether Khrushchev did not express regret that the US military budget provided for no reductions. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative. In response to questions, Mr. Dulles said the published Soviet military budget provided for the expenditure of 96 billion rubles. The President said Khrushchev had told him that Soviet military costs were about half US costs. The President assumed Khrushchev must have been using a four-to-one exchange rate between the dollar and the ruble, which led him to conclude that the Soviets probably have a military budget equivalent to about \$48 billion. Khrushchev had also told him that the Soviet scale of military effort was very close to our scale of effort. Mr. Dulles agreed that the total Soviet military effort was comparable to ours. The Vice President asked what percentage of the Soviet GNP was devoted to military purposes as opposed to the US GNP. Mr. Dulles said the Soviets devoted about twice as much of their GNP to military purposes as we did. The President pointed out, however, that the GNP of the US contained a number of items not included in the Soviet GNP, e.g. advertising.

Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing by reporting on Cuba. He said the Soviet exhibit would move from Mexico City and open in Havana about January 30. It was believed that Mikoyan would open the Soviet exhibit. In any case a Soviet team of about eighty officials would appear in Havana. The exhibit would be tailored to the Cuban situation; only part of the exhibit as it appeared in New York City and Mexico City would be found in Havana. Mr. Dulles noted that the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City were in close contact, probably laying the groundwork for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In connection with a resumption of diplomatic relations, the Soviet Union would probably extend a credit of \$5-6 million to Cuba and would probably press for more trade between the two countries. Mr. Dulles hoped that in the long run the Russian concentration on Cuba would become apparent to the world and that this would be a development favorable to the US.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the recent Soviet test of a missile which impacted in the Pacific; further evaluation of the recent speech by Khrushchev before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; and the planned Soviet exposition in Havana, Cuba.

Marion W. Boggs

236. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, January 21, 1960

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Secretary Douglas, Mr. Farley, General White, General Loper,
Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said the group wanted to take up with the President the question the President had raised about giving [*text not declassified*]. There was agreement not to raise the matter, and to drop the requested authorization.

Mr. Gray next took up the question of the transfer of the [*text not declassified*] weapon [*text not declassified*] in event of emergency. He recalled that the President's action on this proposal had included an authorization for Defense and State to inform Congress as they deemed appropriate. There was concern that, in the discussion of this matter with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the latter might move over into questions of a general character about [*text not declassified*].

General Loper recalled that, in 1957, the Joint Committee raised with him the question of advance authorization, and he told them that a policy decision had been made, which would not, however, become effective until implementing instructions had been approved by the President and issued. After some further discussion I reviewed in chronological detail the history of the development of advance authorizations to date. I recalled to the President the very tight controls he had established on giving any of this information to anyone, and the view he had expressed that arrangements he makes for the [*text not declassified*].

Mr. Gray suggested that Secretary Douglas might get Senator Anderson, Chairman of the JCAE, not to permit this question to be raised or pursued. Mr. Douglas was unenthusiastic that the suggested action would have any useful result. The President thought it might be possible simply to say that the whole emergency [*text not declassified*] in addition, for extremely critical situations, the President has taken such measures as he deems necessary to enable our major forces to defend themselves.

Secretary Herter stayed a few minutes after the others had gone. He showed the President a memorandum proposing that we tell the

¹ Source: Use of nuclear weapons; lend-lease negotiations with the Soviet Union. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on January 25.

Soviets we think the negotiations for a lend-lease settlement should be broken off if they insist on coupling this with questions of trade and credits. The President approved this memorandum.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

237. Briefing Note for February 4 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 3, 1960

Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The first item this morning is the intelligence briefing, which will be devoted principally to a presentation of the new "Estimate of the World Situation" (NIE 100-60, 1/19/60). This estimate, as you know, is prepared every year at this time by the Intelligence Community.

In other years that estimate has been the kick-off, as it were, for our annual review of Basic Policy.

The last review of Basic Policy was begun in February of last year and the new paper, NSC 5906/1, was approved by the President in August. Indeed, certain portions of the paper (relating to stockpiling) were adopted as recently as December 3.

Accordingly, we are not planning to undertake a complete review of the entire basic policy this year.

¹ Source: Presentation of NIE "Estimate of the World Situation." Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

238. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 5, 1960

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Douglas, Generals Cabell, Twining, Dr. York, Mr. Charyk,
Dr. Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

This group met with the President in the Cabinet Room to consider questions relating to military space reconnaissance, surveillance, detection and inspection. Before taking up this subject, General Cabell commented that the intelligence community has as yet not been able to identify the “dark object,” believed to be a Soviet satellite, picked up a few days ago. Dr. York said that it may be a Soviet satellite, but might also be material from a satellite of ours. General Cabell also reported on a recent successful special reconnaissance mission conducted by the British.

[*text not declassified*] He mentioned in particular that this project is planned to terminate with the end of this year, and suggested that this point needs further consideration. He then followed with presentations on the Samos reconnaissance satellite program, which is planned to include both “readout” and recoverable capsule versions. He ended with a description of the Midas early warning satellite.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, as spokesman for Dr. Land, who has taken a great interest in this matter, he would like to voice concern about the “readout” satellite. This is an apparatus of very great complexity. It will be very valuable when obtained, and should be the ultimate objective. It will provide a resolution of 20 feet. Since an interpreter can identify an object about two and one-half times as large as this, it will give an ability to recognize objects of fifty feet in dimension. He thought there would be a danger of putting undue confidence in the readout system, and thought that maximum effort should be put into the recovery system. Dr. York said that about three months ago the Air Force was put on to the recovery system as the top priority effort. The readout system is apparently not interfering with or delaying the development of the recovery system.

Assistant Secretary Charyk then described a possible space surveillance system. This is a project under ARPA which has been assigned to the Air Force. The key element is a space surveillance and control center, into which information is fed from all sources, including the U.S. space tracking network. For the project, consideration is being given

¹ Source: Military space reconnaissance. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on February 8.

to establishment of three very large radars in the U.S. which would give coverage up to a height of 2000 miles against objects with a one square meter cross-section and up to 4000 miles against objects with a ten square meter cross-section. This system is estimated to cost about \$20 million per radar.

The next element in the system is an [*text not declassified*] interceptor satellite system. This is now under consideration—not under development. He described the operation of satellites having such a purpose. In addition, there is some possibility that the Nike-Zeus system could be used to knock down satellites initially at altitudes of 150 miles, perhaps later at altitudes up to 1000 miles. A nuclear weapon explosion would be used to accomplish the destruction.

Dr. Kistiakowsky commented that this proposal raises a difficult policy question—whether we should in fact create a capability to incapacitate satellites. We have supported proposals for the peaceful use of space, utilizing definitions which would permit the use of reconnaissance satellites. Mr. Gray suggested that the emphasis should be on detection and inspection, rather than on shooting satellites down. The Soviets have a great quantity of information about the U.S., and reconnaissance by satellite is not important to them. As previously mentioned in the discussion, it is of tremendous importance to us. Dr. York said it would take about seven years to develop the kind of [*text not declassified*] interceptor satellite that is being discussed. It will cost a very considerable amount of money. If we wish to have this capability, we must start now to develop it, however.

Dr. Kistiakowsky recommended that the project not be advertised publicly. The President agreed and said we should simply state we are investigating outer space. Dr. York said we could simply state that we are working on methods of achieving rendez-vous.

[*text not declassified*]

Secretary Herter said that, in connection with disarmament studies, there is a recommendation to seek an agreement not to use explosives in outer space. He wondered whether inspection can be made as to whether satellites contain explosives. Dr. York said such an inspection could be made on the ground, but could not be made in flight. Mr. Herter asked whether such an inspection on the ground would interfere with our utilization of reconnaissance satellites. Dr. York said we would not be able to keep secret the fact that a satellite is designed for reconnaissance purposes, if it is to be inspected. However, so long as cameras are allowed to be flown in satellites, there will be no problem. [*text not declassified*]

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

239. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–4–59

Washington, February 9, 1960

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND POLICIES 1959–1964

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¹ Source: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959–1964." Top Secret. Extracts—13 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.

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THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal political situation, economic, scientific, and military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet policies and actions over about the next five years.²

SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICY

1. Over the last year Soviet policy toward the West has veered from extreme provocation in connection with the Berlin issue to a warmly expressed willingness to seek new avenues of accommodation through negotiation. We believe that, fundamentally, this change of tone is derived from tactical considerations and that the principal objectives of Soviet policy vis-a-vis the West remain unchanged. The Soviet leaders currently show great confidence that the trend of events, in what they continue to think of as an inevitable struggle with the non-Communist world, is in their favor. Their rate of economic progress, their scientific and space successes, their advances in missile development, their estimate of the political tendencies in the underdeveloped countries (despite setbacks in some areas) all suggest to them a growing shift in world power relations favorable to the Communist cause. These considerations as seen by the Soviet leaders permit their policy to be less rigid than formerly. From the position of strength which they believe they now have they see themselves as able not only to engage the West vigorously on disputed issues when they wish to do so, but also to relax tensions when expedient without any imputation of weakness. They consider themselves able at the same time to pursue their programs of internal development, including the betterment of living standards and the furtherance of rapid economic growth.

2. We believe that, over the next five years, neither a policy single-mindedly directed at eliminating East-West tensions nor a policy of pressure with a steadily belligerent tone is likely to be followed by the USSR. We expect to see elements of both pressure and detente combined and varied as tactical advantage may suggest. For the nearer future the present emphasis on negotiation and accommodation seems

² The reference to a five-year period is approximate. The estimates on the Soviet economy carry through 1965, to conform to the Soviet Seven-Year Plan. Judgments on many other matters pertain to periods of less than five years, and, particularly on political questions, are intended for the most part to apply for the next year or two. [Footnote is in the original.]

likely to continue; later the motif of pressure and struggle will probably reappear. Whatever alternation of emphasis may occur, however, the swings are likely to fall within a range which excludes, on the one hand, the deliberate assumption of serious and uncontrollable risks of general war, and, on the other, abandonment of the concept of continuing struggle between two irreconcilable worlds.

3. Given Khrushchev's unchallenged personal ascendancy, his views are likely to be the primary determinant in Soviet policy for the present. His attitudes are marked on the one hand by a strong sense of the growth of Soviet military and economic power and by a crude and truculent pride in asserting the claims of that power to the world's attention and deference. He has been free in his vigorous use of missile threats. On the other hand, he apparently thinks it possible to win recognition for Soviet views through persuasion rather than by force alone. He clearly understands the horrors of nuclear war and his proclaimed dedication to economic advance appears to be sincere. He probably genuinely believes that the Soviet system can prove its superiority in "peaceful" competition, although he recognizes that Soviet power plays a vital role in this competition. Thus, the contradictory tendencies toward belligerence and accommodation in Soviet policy are probably in some degree a reflection of the attitudes and personality of Khrushchev, and may persist so long as he is the commanding figure on the Soviet scene.

4. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. A period of partial detente presumably serves a number of useful purposes from Moscow's point of view. First, it enables the USSR to ascertain through negotiations what positions the West is now willing to take in view of increasing Soviet strength, and provides a suitable and superficially alluring framework for possible Western concessions. Secondly, even barring specific agreements with the West, Moscow probably views high-level East-West talks as an acknowledgment by the West of the permanence, legitimacy, and equal status of the Communist Bloc. Finally, during such a period of detente the Soviets would hope to improve their relative power position still further, since they would expect Western military programs to be carried on with less urgency.

5. Beyond this phase the outlook is less certain. The main influence shaping Soviet policy is likely to be the Soviet leaders' sense of their improved power position relative to that of the West. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long-range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. At some stage, they will almost certainly wish to test the chances of drawing advantage from this situation if it emerges as they expect. They will still try to win Western

concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than at present. The Soviet leaders may think it possible to undertake more provocative behavior in areas where they are in contention with Western power and influence. In their view, the emerging stand-off of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

6. Although the Soviets have allowed the Berlin crisis to diminish in intensity, the issues involved in it will remain of high concern to their policy. They will continue to seek an arrangement about Germany under which both sides would accept at least tacitly the indefinite division of the country. To this end, they will continue to press for some form of Western recognition for East Germany. They see such a development not only as a contribution to the stability of Communist power in Eastern Europe as a whole, but also as a blow against West Germany's relations with NATO which it is their consistent purpose to undermine. On the Berlin issue itself, we believe that, as long as the Soviets are confident that they can make progress towards their aims in Germany by negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access to Berlin and from making a separate peace treaty with East Germany. If they decide that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin.

7. In the coming phase of negotiation, the Soviets are likely to continue to give priority to disarmament. By taking the initiative in this field they will expect to earn broad political dividends since hopes for peace throughout the world are associated with a desire for disarmament measures. The Soviets may actually wish to see a freeze or even a cutback in some armaments in order to improve their potentialities for long-run political and economic competition, but we do not believe that they are obliged for economic reasons to seek a far-reaching arms reduction agreement. They would probably not even regard such an agreement as desirable since they consider that their great military strength is an essential ingredient in the challenge they pose to the non-Communist world. Moreover the Soviet aversion to extensive foreign

controls and inspection in the USSR persists, and will almost certainly exclude anything more than limited agreements.

8. Even if Soviet policy seeks stabilization in Europe and a reduction of tensions in relations with the Western Powers, it will probably be increasingly active in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviets see in the political ferment in these areas growing opportunities for eliminating Western influence, and ultimately the likelihood of a revolutionary turn which will bring Communist controlled forces to power. The policy of appealing to governments in such areas through trade and aid and other conventional forms of diplomatic influence will probably continue to provide the general framework for Soviet actions. From time to time, however, the Soviets will probably have to decide whether the prospective gains of a local Communist attempt to seize power in one or another country would justify compromising this policy and undertaking the risks and difficulties of supporting revolutionary action. During the period of this estimate there are likely to be cases in which the Soviets will be more disposed than they have recently been to support such militant action by local Communist parties, although they would probably be cautious about involving the Bloc in military support to such action.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE SOVIET POWER POSITION

9. The challenge which the USSR will pose for the West over the next five years will rest upon a continuing growth in the bases of Soviet power—military, economic, and scientific. Advances in these aspects of national power can be expected in a great state which has reached a stage of development in which it can for the first time realize its full potentialities. But this process is accelerated in the USSR by the presence of a political leadership which is single-mindedly committed to the aim of aggrandizing the power of the Communist system. It is always possible that the upward trend in the growth of Soviet power internally could be arrested by the appearance of political instabilities, either within the USSR or in its relations with other Communist states, but at present we see no basis for estimating that this is likely to be the case.

Military Developments

10. The single most important development affecting the structure of Soviet military power during the period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force. Long-range missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the US in nuclear strategic attack capabilities, as it was unable to do with bomber aircraft. Because of the uncertainties, risks, and high economic cost involved in acquiring ICBM capabilities which would permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces

with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that the USSR could win a general war without itself incurring unacceptable damage, we do not believe that the Soviets will attempt to build an ICBM force sufficient for this purpose. Nevertheless, they will probably build a substantial long-range missile force. They will almost certainly wish to have a high degree of deterrence, and beyond this, should deterrence fail, a force offering as much promise of success for a pre-emptive attack, or indeed for a retaliatory attack, as can be bought within acceptable margins of economic cost. Also, and again consistent with acceptable cost, the Soviets will probably build up their planned force rapidly in order to capitalize through political exploitation on their lead over the West in missile development. On the basis of these criteria, we estimate that the probable ICBM program will provide in mid-1961 a number of missiles on launcher on the order of 140 to 200.³ More tentatively, because of technical and political factors which may affect Soviet plans in the interim, we estimate that Soviet ICBMs on launcher are likely to number in the range of 250–350 in mid-1962 and 350–450 in mid-1963.⁴

11. Despite the effort which we estimate that the USSR will make to build long-range attack forces, it will almost certainly not do so at the cost of sacrificing its other military capabilities. The Soviets consider that their military policy requires a range of nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities permitting flexibility in the choice of means and the scale of operations in accordance with the political objectives sought in a particular area. The Soviet leaders probably believe that such varied capabilities become even more important under mutual deterrence from general war when, in their view, pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups even undeclared local wars may be undertaken with greater freedom and pushed further than in the past.⁵ Thus we believe that the Soviets will continue to maintain substantial ground, air, and naval forces, and that to the maximum possible extent these forces will be

³ The views of the members of the USIB vary as to the most probable number within this range. See the statement of their separate views in Note A following this summary. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents from this paragraph. See his statement in Note B following this summary. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, do not concur in the estimate that the USSR probably believes that it can undertake the actions described with greater freedom and can push them further than in the past. Such a Soviet judgment would, in the view of the above members of the USIB, necessarily involve an estimate by the Kremlin that Western—particularly the United States—response to their pressures and probings would lack the vigor necessary to dissuade them. They do not believe that the Soviets will make such an estimate.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would revise the sentence in question as follows: The Soviet leaders probably believe that if *mutual deterrence from general war eventuates*, such capabilities *could* become even more important, when pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups, even undeclared local wars may be undertaken with greater freedom and pushed further than in the past. [Footnote is in the original.]

dual purpose, capable of employing nuclear or nonnuclear weapons, as circumstances dictate.

12. In addition to the buildup of long-range missile capabilities there will be a number of other major developments in the Soviet forces over the period of this estimate. The effectiveness of the air defense system against bomber aircraft will be increased by the new surface-to-air missiles now being installed on a considerable scale for the defense of vital areas, and by additional control and warning systems to improve reaction times. The most significant developments in the ground forces will be the widespread introduction of missiles for tactical use and the achievement of greater mobility resulting from new motorized equipment, transport aircraft, and helicopters. The Soviet Navy will probably continue to give priority attention to the development of submarines, and the buildup of a nuclear-powered and missile-launching submarine force will be the most important addition to Soviet naval capabilities.

Economic Developments

13. Although the continuing rapid expansion of the Soviet economy aimed at in the Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965) will encounter a number of serious problems, we believe that the goal of an 8.6 percent annual increase in industrial output will in the main be achieved. As in the past the plan in agriculture will not be achieved, and net output is likely to rise by about one-fifth in the seven-year period as against a proclaimed goal of about 55–60 percent. The position of the Soviet consumer will continue to improve, though at a somewhat slower rate; consumption goods and services per capita will probably increase about 26 percent during the plan period as compared with a 40 percent gain over the preceding seven years.

14. Even though some goals of the Seven-Year Plan may not be achieved in full, Soviet gross national product (GNP) will probably continue to grow at about 6.0 percent per annum. Such a rate of growth is impressive by any absolute standards and will bring the Soviet economy measurably closer in size and strength to that of the US. Assuming that the US maintains an average annual rate of growth in GNP of about 3.5–4.0 percent, Soviet GNP measured in dollars will increase from about 45 percent that of the US at present to about half that of the US by 1965. However, more important than this rough comparison of the gross size of the two economies is a comparison of the uses to which national resources are put. The smaller Soviet economy has in recent years supported military expenditures which, measured in dollars, were about equal to those of the US. Likewise Soviet investment in the economy as a whole is currently almost equal to that in the US, and Soviet investment in industry may be somewhat greater. As a result of this steady allocation of large resources to growth, by 1965 the absolute annual increment to GNP in the USSR will approach that in the US.

15. The Soviet leaders are aware that sustained and rapid economic growth is an important asset in the world power struggle. It will enable them to carry the burden of competitive armaments more easily. The USSR will be able to enlarge its aid programs, and perhaps ultimately compete in world markets in an important way. This will mean political leverage in many countries. If, in addition, the Soviets can finally raise living standards enough to demonstrate that their system provides for the growth of welfare as well as the expansion of national power, they will expect the influence of communism to spread even more rapidly. The Soviet leaders can be counted on to press the growth of their economy in all ways open to them, including substantial structural reforms when necessary, in order to achieve the political goals which they regard as the real aim of economic policy.

Scientific Developments

16. The achievements of its scientists have become one of the principal instruments of the USSR's prestige and influence, and the Soviet political leadership has been astute in exploiting this fact as a demonstration of the superiority of the Communist system in competition with the West. The Soviet successes arise from a generous commitment of resources over the years to training personnel and providing research facilities, from the fact that the motivations and incentives of scientists in the Soviet environment are high, and especially from the concentration of effort in fields related to national power. The rate of advance of Soviet science appears to be increasing, and the current Seven-Year Plan, which relies heavily on scientific and technological achievements, will provide additional impetus. Thus, significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur with greater frequency than in the past, and over the next several years, the USSR may achieve world leadership in some additional scientific areas. It will probably add a number of "firsts" in prestige fields. In the immediate future, these are most likely to occur in the Soviet space program, but the quality and intensity of research on such problems as controlled thermonuclear reactions and direct conversion of heat to electricity may produce spectacular results in other scientific fields.

Internal Political Developments

17. The outlook on the Soviet internal political scene points to continuing stability. Khrushchev's position as leader has become virtually unassailable, and if he lives, will probably remain so during the period of this estimate. While there may be elements within higher Party circles which mistrust his leadership, it is unlikely that, in the absence of a major failure of his policies, any effective opposition could form. Given Khrushchev's age, however, the prospect of a new succession problem probably already figures in inner Party maneuvering. Khrushchev's

demise is most likely to be followed by another period of "collective leadership" and a phase of contention for the top position. We continue to believe that the Soviet system has an inherent tendency to revert to one-man dictatorship. The inevitable struggles for power which this produces are not likely to menace the stability of the regime, much less alter the nature of its most basic policies. However, the fact of personal government is likely always to affect profoundly the manner and tone of Soviet policy. Thus, Khrushchev's successor might bring to the conduct of Soviet policy features quite different from those characteristic of the present dictator.

18. The years of Khrushchev's rise to power have been marked by a series of reforming changes intended to cope with problems raised by past policies and with new conditions resulting from rapid industrialization and modernization. The relaxation of police terror and a greater concern for living standards, some greater degree of ideological flexibility, wider foreign contacts, a more pragmatic and innovating spirit applied to institutional arrangements—all these are changes of a more than transitory character which, even if there should be some reversion, will have a lasting influence on the future evolution of the Soviet system. Their main effect for the present has been to give the Soviet people a hopeful sense of forward movement, and therefore probably more satisfaction with the regime and its goals than has existed at any time in the Soviet period. But it does not follow that the changes which have taken place so far forecast a more basic evolution away from totalitarian dictatorship. A modern industrial society is not necessarily incompatible with a totalitarian political system, especially in a nation like Russia with a long authoritarian tradition. In any case, for the period of this estimate we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally.

Soviet Relations with Other Communist States

19. The challenge which the USSR presents to the non-Communist world will be much affected by the extent to which Soviet authority over a unified bloc of the Communist states is maintained. In Eastern Europe Soviet authority appears more firmly established than at any time since the events of 1956. Poland's potential instability continues to be an unsettling factor in Eastern Europe, although the disruptive influence of its deviations in internal policy seems to be declining as the Gomulka regime moves toward a tighter discipline. However, there are signs that Communist China is becoming less disposed to accept Soviet guidance in domestic and foreign policy, even though it has outwardly complied on a number of disputed issues in recent months. We believe that the problem of intrabloc harmony is far from being resolved. Disharmony is likely to arise repeatedly with the appearance of new

issues, and in the long run will probably be one of the more critical problems with which the Soviet leaders will have to cope.

20. The main challenge to Soviet authority and unity within the Communist Bloc in the future is likely to come from China. The Sino-Soviet relationship will probably become increasingly complicated and difficult as Chinese power and prestige increase, and as Soviet levers of authority over China become less effective. Frictions have already arisen over extremist tendencies in Chinese internal policy, over Chinese ideological pretensions, over foreign policy tactics, and probably over whether the USSR should supply nuclear weapons to China. These or other frictions may be magnified in the future. The Chinese have always reserved their right to exercise independent judgment on doctrinal and tactical issues. We believe that they will increasingly exercise this right, not only in domestic affairs, where direct Soviet influence has always been minimal, but in external affairs as well. Thus each party to the Sino-Soviet alliance may come to act more in terms of its view of its own national needs and interests. This does not mean, however, that an open rupture is in sight; both parties recognize that their alliance is vital to them in confronting the hostile forces of the non-Communist world.

Note A

Views on the Soviet ICBM Program

We have concluded that the probable Soviet ICBM program would provide on the order of 140–200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. Within this range, the Assistant Chief for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, estimate that the Soviet program is likely to be toward the low side. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as justifying additional effort, estimate that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher is likely to be towards the high side of the 140–200 range.

Note B

Dissent on the Estimate of the Soviet ICBM Program

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not believe that Soviet behavior, as we have observed it, warrants the judgment that their objectives would be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack capability. Rather, he believes that the Soviet rulers are endeavoring to attain at the earliest practicable date a military superiority over the United States which they would consider to be so decisive as to enable them either to force their will on the United States through threat of destruction, or to launch such devastating attacks against the United

States that, at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power would cease to exist. He further believes that such an objective could be attained by the development of their overall military capabilities which would include an operational ICBM force of about 250 (185 on launcher) by mid-1961, 500 (385 on launcher) by mid-1962, and 800 (640 on launcher) by mid-1963. It is generally agreed that the Soviets have both the technical and industrial capability to produce such a force; the physical difficulties thereby entailed will almost certainly not be the limiting factor.

It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, that, while Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will have attained a capacity for substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack by mid-1962 or earlier, the real objective of the Soviet ICBM program is "decisive military superiority." He believes that the Soviets would not be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize the possibility of error in their own calculations and acknowledge the possibility of Western pre-emption of their deterrent capabilities. This latter contingency would weigh the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, to exploit their capabilities in political offensives. In this event, their estimate of the likelihood of Western "desperate" acts would induce them to attempt attainment of total deterrence, i.e. "delusive military superiority."

[Omitted here is the remainder of the estimate.]

240. Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower¹

Washington, February 12, 1960

SUBJECT

Problems involved in the Minuteman Program

This missile is in several respects a more advanced concept than the Polaris missile and, therefore requires considerable development work before it can become operational.

The main technical problems are:

(a) Development of satisfactory solid propellant grains (that for the first stage weighing about 10,000 lbs) for the three stages which will

¹ Source: Problems involved in the Minuteman program. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

stand long term at air launching sites and truck or rail transportation. Also the development of the interior case insulation for the first stage to protect it against heating.

(b) Development of the swivel nozzles for the first-stage engine which will survive the erosive action of hot gases and will control the direction of the thrust.

(c) Development of a miniaturized inertial guidance system which will not only be accurate enough but will remain so after years of sitting in the hardened sites, with the gyroscopes running all the time.

It is my considered opinion that all these problems will be eventually solved.

The provision of more money could speed up the development somewhat, but not much however, because a number of problems must be solved consecutively and because of limitations on the technical talent available.

(d) In a different class is the problem of the correct design of the overall weapon system. It has already been demonstrated that the Minuteman missile can be launched from a hole in the ground ("In-Silo" launch) and this is not of serious concern. However, the planning of the communications and command structure for the Minuteman force is still in preliminary stages and shows a tendency to grow in complexity so that the overall costs of the system tend to increase. Thus a year or two ago the estimate was \$0.5M per missile. The latest figure I heard was \$1.5M per missile and it is likely to inflate further.

G.B. Kistiakowsky

241. Memorandum of Meeting with the President¹

Washington, February 17, 1960, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

General Goodpaster

1. I presented to the President the draft Record of Actions of the Special Meeting of Friday, 12 February. The President approved it with minor amendments to paragraphs 3 and 7. I had called the

¹ Source: Nuclear stockpile levels, possibility of disciplining Taylor. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President. Drafted on February 19.

President's attention to paragraph 3 pointing out to him that the difference between the 75% and 90% assurance of deliverability made a tremendous difference in numbers of weapons required and in force levels required. I therefore wanted him to be fully conscious of what he was doing when he approved the 75% figure. I reminded him that he had withheld final approval of a portion of a Defense recommendation with respect to the atomic stockpile pending the outcome of the study. General Goodpaster explained in more detail the background.

I pointed out that the Hickey presentation indicated that for the 75% capability our forces and stockpile were now adequate, whereas for the 90% capability they were not adequate, and my purpose was to make sure that at some point attention was directed to leveling off in stockpile requirements.

2. I then reported to the President that Deputy Secretary Douglas, after having studied the matter, had informed me that retired officers were exactly like officers on active duty as far as disciplinary action was concerned. I said that as an example if it could be demonstrated that General Maxwell Taylor had committed some offense he would be just like any officer on active duty. I said that I realized that the President would probably not think of moving against General Taylor which would serve to make him a martyr. The President recalled that in earlier administrations action had been taken against military officers simply for being critical of the administration. He referred particularly to General Johnson Hagood. However, he wished to register the information which I had relayed from Deputy Secretary Douglas.

3. I then discussed with the President arrangements for, and the content of, the two meetings to take place on February 18.

4. I then discussed certain 5412 matters with the President which are the subject of a separate memorandum.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

242. Memorandum of Discussion at the 435th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 18, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 435th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
February 18, 1960

Present at the 435th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding (for Item 1); Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State, presiding (for Items 2, 3 and 4); Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense; and Leo A. Hoegh, Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the Council meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Fred Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury, Maurice A. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget; and John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1); Also attending the meeting were General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; General Thomas S. White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; George V. Allen, Director, U.S. Information Agency; Maj. General Wilton B. Persons, The Assistant to the President; Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Karl G. Harr, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination; George B. Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Brig. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary; Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; from the Department of Defense—Dr. Herbert F. York, John N. Irwin, II, Samuel Clements, and Lt.Col. Edward V. Needels; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC; Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

**1. *TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE FOR POSSIBLE USE***
(NSC Action No. 2105-*d*; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 13)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background, recalling the 1950 policy that the US will undertake gas warfare only in retaliation against its use by an enemy and the present policy, dating from 1956,

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Technological Developments in Non-Lethal Weapons and Doctrine for Possible Use. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

that the US will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces, the decision as to the use of such weapons being made by the President. Mr. Gray also referred to the view of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, expressed during the review of Basic Policy in July 1959, that we were spending too much money on chemical and biological weapons if we did not intend to use them and too little money if we did intend to use them. Mr. Gray noted that NSC Action 2105 adopted at that time called for the presentation which was about to be made by Dr. York and General Lemnitzer.

Dr. York said that one of the important fields of chemical and biological warfare was controlled temporary incapacitation. Research and development in this field might open up a new dimension of warfare in which incapacitating agents would be used in situations short of all-out war and in situations where the use of nuclear weapons was not possible or feasible. In the term controlled temporary incapacitation, the word "controlled" meant that the time of onset, the duration and the severity of incapacitation could be regulated; the word "temporary" meant that persons subjected to incapacitating agents would eventually completely recover from the direct effects, although minor indirect effects might persist permanently; the word "incapacitation" referred to a variety of effects including extreme irritation, black-out, lethargy, paralysis, discoordinated actions, temporary illness and lack of a will to fight. Dr. York then displayed a chart on chemical incapacitating agents indicating that tear gas (CN-CS) was available now, an anesthetic agent (SN) which caused temporary paralysis would be available soon and a discoordinating agent (K), which would make a cat afraid of a mouse, would be available in the future. A chart of biological incapacitating agents was displayed indicating that an agent causing Q-fever (OU) was available now and NU (VEE) agent would be available soon. A Rift Valley fever agent (FA) and tailored variants of the other agents would be available in the future. Dr. York then reported with the aid of a chart that chemical incapacitation agents had about the same efficiency in the field as tactical nuclear weapons inasmuch as a 10,000 pound missile, 5 per cent of which was chemical agent, could cover one square mile. It was hoped that by 1965 a 10,000 pound missile could cover 10 square miles. Dr. York displayed charts on technical advances and potentials of biological warfare agents indicating that agent concentration and agent storage (now one year; soon to become 3 years) would soon be improved. Charts also showed that the biological decay rate was several per cent per minute and the efficiency of dissemination of biological agents depended on the fraction of the munitions which consisted of the agent.

Turning to weapons systems Dr. York indicated that biological and chemical agents might be disseminated by means of manned aircraft

sprays, drone aircraft sprays, toxic darts, grenades, tactical rockets, special operations, ballistic missiles, or bomblets prepared for use with aircraft, rockets or ballistic missiles.

The US has a relatively poor posture vis-a-vis the USSR, Dr. York continued, our stockpile of chemical and biological agents being one-fourth that of the USSR. Moreover, most of the Soviet agents are lethal. In addition we have trained in chemical and biological warfare only 1/30 of the troops the USSR has trained and we do less in defense against such agents than the Soviet Union does. In the latter connection Dr. York said that the need for research on defense against chemical and biological agents had been strongly indicated by a recent experiment in which an aircraft flew along a flight line of 230 miles releasing simulated agents. After three days the simulated agents covered 300,000 square miles. If the airplane had released powerful chemical or biological agents instead of the simulant, the area would have sustained casualties of 30 per cent. Dr. York then called on General Lemnitzer to continue the presentation.

General Lemnitzer said that Dr. York had described the characteristics of chemical and biological weapons; he would deal with the doctrinal aspects of these weapons. Chemical and biological agents had been very effectively developed since World War II but the doctrine for their use had not changed very much. General Lemnitzer thought that such agents had a number of advantages. They have important search capabilities for use against dispersed or concealed targets; they are flexible, since they can cause either casualties or incapacitation and the length of the latter can be controlled; coverage of a large area is possible; heavy casualties can be inflicted without physical destruction or property damage. Accordingly, chemical and biological agents might have a great potential in future warfare, especially where friendly civilians may be present in an area occupied by enemy forces. General Lemnitzer said he would give three examples of the possible use of chemical and biological incapacitating agents. The first example concerned trouble in South East Asia. He asked the Council to assume that important areas in North Laos had been seized by Communist forces. The task of friendly forces was to retake key areas, capture or disarm the Communist forces and prevent their re-entry into the country. This assumed situation provided opportunity for the use of NU, which caused a form of encephalitis. A lethal agent could not be used under these conditions because friendly civilians and enemy forces were present in the same area. General Lemnitzer then displayed a map of North Laos showing areas assumed to be held by Communist forces and areas on which bomblets of NU would be dropped or which would be subjected to spray from aircraft. He estimated that two medium bomber loads would incapacitate all the people in the area shown on the map. An entire province of North Laos could be covered by the use of more planes. After this biological

agent had had a chance to take effect (three days), parachutists would be flown in to take over the area.

Turning to Example No. 2, General Lemnitzer asked the Council to assume that the Communists had organized a movement in Panama designed to take over the Panama Canal. Stimulated by Communist agitation, mobs had marched on the Canal and had halted operations at two of the locks. It had been decided to disperse the crowd by ordering helicopters to spread tear gas. All persons subjected to the tear gas would eventually recover after breathing fresh air for a sufficient length of time, but immediately on being subjected to tear gas they would be impelled to seek fresh air in the shortest time possible. One helicopter could cover a circle of a thousand yards in diameter in this manner. The apparatus necessary for this use of chemical agents was under development and would soon be available. This procedure would enable friendly forces to regain and maintain control of the Panama Canal locks without bloodshed.

Example No. 3 concerned the Kuwait area. It was assumed that strong insurgent guerrilla forces had seized the oil facilities in the area and had rounded up as hostages several thousand US and UK civilians. Friendly forces were required to regain control of the area before the oil facilities were destroyed and to recapture the hostages before they were executed. A chemical agent sprayed from an aircraft could within five minutes prostrate all personnel in the area for twelve hours, during which time friendly forces could move in and regain control. 2600 pounds of the agent would cover a square mile and there would be no physical damage.

General Lemnitzer said his examples had been confined to incapacitating agents but lethal agents could be used in the same way. The examples had also been examples of catching the enemy by surprise. He had illustrated only an offensive use of chemical and biological agents; however, before using such agents offensively it was necessary to develop a strong capability to defend against them.

Dr. York, concluding the presentation, said that he had been impressed by the development of possibilities in the field of controlled temporary incapacitation over the last several years. He thought it was possible the researchers were on the trail of something revolutionary. The use of chemical and biological incapacitating agents extended from mild control up to effects comparable to those of tactical atomic weapons. The Defense Department proposed to expand the budget for chemical and biological warfare, which was now \$50 million a year, by a factor of three by 1965.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the Science Advisory Committee about a year ago had looked into the question of chemical and biological warfare and had concluded that research and development in this field should be continued since the prospects were definitely bright. He

reported that he had independently made his own study of incapacitating agents and had come to the same conclusion. The Science Advisory Committee had recommended that research and development in the field be strengthened. The President said he concurred.

Mr. Stans noted that a year ago he had been told that the US had a \$300 million inventory in chemical and biological agents. He wondered whether this inventory was being reevaluated in the light of recent developments. General Lemnitzer thought the inventory referred to by Mr. Stans was an inventory carried over from World War II. There had been little production of chemical and biological agents since World War II. Mr. Stans asked whether he was correct in understanding that there would be no substantial stockpiling of chemical and biological agents during the research and development period. General Lemnitzer confirmed Mr. Stans' understanding. The President said that since chemical and biological agents could be manufactured at a reasonably rapid rate, capacity for manufacturing rather than a stockpile would be needed. Secretary Gates, referring to public and world opinion on the use of chemical and biological weapons, wondered whether such use should not be put in the same category as the use of atomic weapons; that is, use should be made subject to decision by the President. Mr. Gray read Paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 indicating that under present policy Presidential decision is required for the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The President said one great difficulty occurred to him in connection with the use of incapacitating agents. While the use of such agents was a splendid idea, if we tried to use them in a humane manner, our enemy would probably charge us with germ warfare and then would proceed in retaliation to use lethal chemical and biological weapons. He understood that some of these lethal weapons, particularly nerve gas, were quite terrible. Before we used chemical and biological weapons, we would need to have proper defensive equipment. He understood that at the present time US gas masks would not protect against all types of lethal agents. Dr. York said present masks protected against all agents except those absorbed by the skin. He added that we had no protection against bullets and therefore would be in no worse position in chemical warfare than we were in now in other forms of warfare. The President said chemical and biological weapons had considerably less discrimination than a bullet. Dr. York felt that at the very least chemical and biological weapons were no worse than atomic weapons.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that a sharp distinction should be made between chemical warfare and biological warfare. Chemical warfare, e.g., the use of tear gas, had been accepted throughout the world in police actions, but biological warfare had not been so accepted. Mr. Dulles strongly agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsky, saying that we ought to assimilate our use of incapacitating agents to the use of tear gas. He felt we needed some incapacitating agent which we could use respectably.

General Twining agreed with the President that if we began the use of chemical or biological agents, our enemy would retaliate with lethal agents. If we intend to use incapacitating agents we should publicize their non-lethal effects to the greatest possible extent.

At this point the President left the meeting and the remainder of the meeting was presided over by Secretary Herter.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Department of Defense, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2105-*d*, as presented by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

[Omitted here are pages 7-12.]

Marion W. Boggs

243. Memorandum From Burke to Gates¹

Washington, March 12, 1960

SUBJECT

Survivability of soft bases in United States after Russian missile attack

1. There have been quite a few presentations recently concerning the survivability of important soft targets in Continental United States after a Russian ballistic missile attack. These studies are concerned with the number of missiles which Russia would have to have on launchers to destroy a large number of soft targets in the United States. The conclusions are not exactly alike because they are very dependent upon assumptions which include variables such as:

- a. The number of missiles on launchers available to the Russians at various times
- b. CEP—The Probable Circular Error of the missiles
- c. Missile reliability both on launchers and in flight
- d. Whether missile launching submarines would be used
- e. If missile launching submarines are used—how many

¹ Source: Survivability of soft bases in United States after Soviet missile attack. Top Secret. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

f. The degree of destruction which the Soviets might determine they should inflict (estimates range from 70% probability of destroying all soft targets through 90% to 99%)

g. The actual targeting which the Russians might choose, i.e., would they concentrate first on all aircraft bases, next on soft missile sites, and then on hardened missile sites, or would they choose some other order of destruction?

2. Nevertheless, nearly all of the studies show that all soft targets (bases and soft missile sites) could be destroyed by a comparatively few Russian missiles and indicate that our retaliatory capability, when the Russians achieve a significant number of missiles on launchers, is dependent upon getting Polaris submarines and hardened ICBM sites operational as soon as possible—before 1963. These studies show that after some conceivable attacks by the Russians, very few SAC aircraft on United States bases would be available.

3. The presentations indicate that only the capability within the United States is considered, and that the retaliatory capability of the attack carrier striking forces was not included. The exclusion was not because they were unimportant, but because they did not lend themselves readily to mathematical analysis. It is submitted that the Russians, perhaps, would have the same difficulty in correctly appraising the capabilities of such forces. Still the possible actions that are usually recommended are confined to what can be done to achieve a greater retaliatory capability from these forces in the United States after an attack. No statements have been made as to how to increase the retaliatory capabilities which are not subject to Russian ballistic missile attack, i.e., carriers at sea.

4. To get an increase in surviving aircraft at bases in the United States, requires under some circumstances, considerable funds and effort. I believe that we may be overlooking a comparatively inexpensive way of increasing our retaliatory capability during the next few years by increasing the number of attack planes available after an attack by increasing the number of attack carriers at sea.

5. Normally there are about 200 attack aircraft in the 6th and 7th fleets. The carriers and these aircraft are not subject to ballistic missile attack when at sea. If an air attack is launched against any of these carriers we will have considerable warning, much more than any 10 or 15 minutes. This is because timing of an air attack against carriers in an unknown location could not be coordinated with an all-out missile attack for a predetermined specific time.

6. The 200 aircraft mentioned above are near the Soviet Union and, consequently, could attack quickly. There would be attrition in the carrier aircraft during the attacks, of course, but many of them will return to their carriers for use in succeeding attacks. Furthermore, in addition

to the carriers of the 6th and 7th fleets at least an equal number of carriers are available for deployment from United States waters.

7. During the period in which Russia might have a significant ICBM-launching capability and in which we might have neither sufficient numbers of Polaris submarines at sea nor hardened missile sites in the United States, our capability could be significantly increased by increasing the numbers of carriers and carrier aircraft. This could be accomplished by keeping in commission our older attack carriers (those now scheduled to be replaced) and by augmenting the number of attack aircraft. The older carriers kept in commission could continue their usefulness until '63 or '64. When sufficient hardened ICBM and Polaris missiles are operational the attack carrier force could then be returned to present strength.

8. It is recommended, therefore, that consideration be given to increasing the number of carriers and carrier combat aircraft during the next few years if it is determined that an increase in the aircraft surviving capability during this period is necessary.

Arleigh Burke

Note on Op-07 copy:

Please get this to Dr. Kistiakowsky and any other people who can use it.

Note on Op-61 copy:

Please get this to State.

244. Memorandum for the Record of Meeting Between Gates and JCS¹

Washington, March 14, 1960

SUBJECT

Meeting with Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 March 1960

ADM BURKE: The Secretary of Defense is very much concerned about the various presentations that have been given to him on what Russia could do to the United States with missiles on launcher under the most adverse conditions. All of these presentations that I have seen,

¹ Source: Soviet missile capabilities and request for JCS study on U.S. strategic vulnerabilities. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 2 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

and I've seen several of them, pertain only to what would happen against targets in Continental United States. Most of them assume a specific targeting which would be SAC first, then soft missile sites and then hard missile sites. It doesn't take very many missiles under ideal conditions to knock out all of SAC. What these presentations prove is SAC is a useless thing in the missile age, because you can knock out the bases. At the same time, they also prove that until we get POLARIS and hardened sites, within '60 and '61 if Russia did have a significant number of missiles—70, 100, 120, some place along there, if for some reason they did have these missiles on launcher, and if they had a high degree of reliability and other systems, they could knock out most of our retaliatory system in the United States. The cure for that, as I said before, is POLARIS and hardened sites. We don't get any hardened sites until '61. This is all without warning, so the obvious thing to do is push up—accelerate POLARIS, accelerate BMEWS, and SECDEF is considering whether or not to put on an air alert. I think he read that letter on carriers that we wrote on Saturday, and maybe he is considering increasing the number of carriers we have as well as dispersing SAC.

Now, he wants a study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all of this intelligence—a military appraisal of our situation. This means a very important piece of paper because we're going to have to move fast on this thing. Op-06 and Op-92 must get in on this for sure. This problem is going to be turned over to the JSSC. The JSSC will call upon the Service planners.

Here's what I think, and this is from the top of my head. I don't care what you do so long as you follow this. I think you'll agree it's sound. Let's shoot for these things which increase this nation's capital gains, these things which will give us a greater capability and will last for a long time. For example, if you expedite BMEWS, you get BMEWS sooner but you've got a BMEWS for ever and ever. So, let's expedite BMEWS, let's expedite POLARIS. Let us do these things which will increase our military capability over a long period of time. Let us take those things which do not increase our military capability but are only temporary expedients, such things as an air alert where no matter how many air alerts you run today, you're not any better off tomorrow—you've got to run them tomorrow too. Let's examine the cost of these very carefully. Now, carriers come in there. If you keep carriers in existence, it's the operating costs of the carriers, but the airplanes you buy for that carrier are capital gains because you're going to buy those airplanes someday anyway. So that's an actual gain. That increases your military capability, but the operation of your carrier doesn't increase your military capability—you've got to operate it tomorrow. I think that's a pretty sound way to approach

this. There is such a thing as buying the wrong thing, and you've got to watch out for this. For example, if you increase the numbers of ATLASEs in hard targets, you may not want ATLASEs by the time you get them. So, when do you have to make the decision to get more ATLASEs? I mean if you made the decision right now, you don't get ATLASEs until '62 anyway—therefore, do you need to make the decision right now to get ATLASEs in '62 or can you make the decision six months or a year from now and just keep these production lines running longer?

One of the things you've got to consider is when do you make a decision on each of these points? They will vary. The ATLAS decision probably doesn't have to be made now—however, the carrier decision has to be made about a month before the first carrier goes out, and perhaps the decision to get some more carrier airplanes needs to be made pretty quick. Anyway, let's get going.

Arleigh Burke

*L.R. GEIS
By direction*

**245. Memorandum for the Record of Telephone Conversation
Between Eisenhower and Burke¹**

Washington, March 26, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Telephone conversation between the President and Admiral Burke, 1130, 26 Mar 1960

1. The President called me to discuss augmentation of the Polaris submarine program. Following are the highlights of this discussion.

2. The President pointed out that the Navy has quite a bit of money in the FY '61 budget for attack submarines and said he thought attack submarines seem to have rather limited usefulness because other people do not have much shipping. He acknowledged that he

¹Source: Discussion of augmentation of the Polaris submarine program. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 2 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

was not taking into consideration use of submarines to attack enemy submarines and pointed out that he wondered whether the Navy might consider using this '61 money budgeted for attack submarines to be applied as long leadtime funding for additional Polaris boats.

3. I told him that the '61 budget had money in it for 3 attack submarines in an amount of about \$171M. I pointed out that this was about equal—not quite but within shooting distance of what the long leadtime items would cost for 6 Polaris submarines. I then explained that the disadvantage to this would be that it is partial funding. However, since we have already put in for long leadtime items for 3 Polaris boats anyway, I thought that Congress would understand such a change. The President said then that Mr. Stans had talked with him and had said that actual expenditures for 6 new ones would require operational authority in FY '61 of only \$200M. Completing these 6 boats would require \$600M more in future years and the expenditure in '61 would be only \$21M. I said that essentially Mr. Stans was correct. The expenditures are not very great under such a proposal in '61.

4. The President then indicated he thought we should do this as long as we were not unduly reducing our attack capability against enemy submarines by such a course of action. I agreed and said that, in my belief, over the long run such a course of action would be better. I pointed out that we can build attack submarines a little bit faster than we can Polaris boats primarily because we know more about the building process of regular attack submarines. I explained that taking such a course of action did not mean cancellation of attack submarines in FY '61 but rather deferral until a later date.

5. The President ended up the conversation by telling me to think over this proposition and toward the middle of next week come in and talk with Mr. Stans and Jerry Persons because he, himself, was going to be tied up with Prime Minister Macmillan.

Arleigh Burke

246. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

CM-516-60

Washington, April 11, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904/1) (C)

REFERENCE

JCSM-149-60 (attached)

1. Attached are the divergent views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proposed amendment to NSC 5904/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2057.

2. The NSC Planning Board has reviewed NSC 5904/1 and has agreed to recommend to the National Security Council that, except for deletion of the footnote on page 2 as an editorial change, NSC 5904/1 not be revised at this time.

3. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have agreed to deletion of the footnote or as an alternative to change the title of the Section and modify the footnote.

4. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force does not agree to deletion of the entire footnote since the first sentence states U.S. policy which was current when NSC 5904/1 was approved. (17 March 1959). He does agree to the deletion of the second sentence as an editorial change.

5. I consider that NSC 5906/1, which considers the various types of war, provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff with adequate guidance for any amplifying directives to unified and specified commanders. Furthermore, I concur with the view of the NSC Planning Board that deletion of the footnote in NSC 5904/1 would be editorial.

6. Accordingly, I recommend that the footnote be deleted.

N.F. Twining

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment:

JCSM-149-60

¹ Source: JCS views on revisions to NSC 5904/1. Top Secret. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers.

247. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

JCSM-149-60

Washington, April 11, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904/1) (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed amendment to NSC 5904/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2057, and have been unable to reach agreement thereon.

2. Accordingly, forwarded herewith, as Appendix "A", are the views of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps; and as Appendix "B", the views of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.

3. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be advised of your decision in this matter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

Washington, undated

*VIEWS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND THE COMMANDANT
OF THE MARINE CORPS*

on

US POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR (NSC 5904/1) (C)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have reviewed NSC 5904/1 in light of the NSC Planning Board's proposal.

2. *a.* The footnote associated with the title of Section B was designed to eliminate from NSC 5904/1 an issue more properly resolved by

¹ Source: Transmits JCS revisions to NSC 5904/1. Top Secret. 4 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers.

revision of 1958 Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1), and to allow publication of NSC 5904/1 (17 March 1959) before completion of the review of the then current Basic National Security Policy. Although the deletion of the footnote to Section B of NSC 5904/1, as proposed by the Planning Board, would not specifically clarify the definition of the type of aggression being addressed in this section, its deletion without replacement is, in the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, an acceptable proposal since it is assumed that users of this document will also have knowledge of NSC 5906/1, which considers the various types of war. It is our recommendation that the Planning Board proposal be accepted.

b. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps cannot, however, concur in any footnote, to the effect that a war with Russia is a general war, since nowhere in NSC 5906/1 is general war so defined. Furthermore, such a definition is considered to be completely unacceptable by reason of inaccuracy. Paragraph 9 of NSC 5906/1 recognizes that we are now engaged in a war with Russia; the cold war. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps do not consider that this war is comparable to the conditions they envisaged would exist in a general war.

3. If clarification of the subject matter of Section B is considered desirable by the National Security Council, it is suggested that either:

a. The title of this Section be changed to read:

"US POLICY IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT IN WHICH SIZEABLE FORCES OF THE USSR ARE NOT INVOLVED."

b. or, the following footnote be adopted:

NSC 5904/1, Page 2, Footnote:

"This section of the policy statement addresses itself to those conflicts in which sizeable forces of the United States and USSR are not involved. Present U.S. policy is based upon the concept stated in paragraph 16, NSC 5906/1, that 'conflicts occurring in the NATO area or elsewhere involving sizeable forces of the US and USSR should not be construed as local aggression.'"

Appendix B

Washington, undated

VIEWS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
on
U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR (NSC 5904/1) (C)

1. I have reviewed the NSC Planning Board proposal, which recommends that NSC 5904/1 not be revised at this time except for deletion of the footnote on page 2 as an editorial change.

2. I do not agree that deletion of the entire footnote on page 2 of NSC 5904/1 would constitute only an editorial change. The first sentence states U.S. policy which was current on the date it was approved (17 March 1959). The second sentence establishes that the validity of this policy is subject to re-examination when Basic National Security Policy was next reviewed. That review has occurred. There was not action taken in that review which in any way suggested that the statement of policy in the first sentence has become invalid or that national policy in this respect has been substantively altered. It is obvious that the second sentence is no longer appropriate and should be deleted as an editorial change.

3. NSC 5904/1 appropriately amplifies the broad guidance contained in current Basic Policy (NSC 5906/1) in that it provides more definitive and more specific guidance for one area to those agencies directly concerned. This guidance is valid, timely and substantive. To delete the first sentence of the footnote would imply a modification of national policy which has not occurred. In addition, its deletion would remove useful and informative clarification specifically applicable to guidance in this policy.

4. Therefore, I recommend that the Secretary of Defense propose to the National Security Council that the first sentence of the footnote on page 2 be retained and that the second sentence be deleted.

248. Paper Prepared by the NSC Staff¹

Washington, undated

*MEGATONAGE INVOLVED IN PREVIOUS
NET EVALUATION STUDIES*

1955 Study

Under conditions of surprise attack, 600 megatons were delivered on targets in the Continental U.S. In U.S. retaliatory strikes, 9000 megatons were delivered on Soviet targets world-wide.

1956 Study

Under surprise attack conditions, the USSR delivered 4407 megatons on the U.S. (in retaliation, the U.S. delivered 8010 megatons on the Sino-Soviet Bloc). In a condition of full alert, the USSR delivered 5047 megatons on the U.S. (and the U.S. delivered 11,200 megatons on the Bloc).

1957 Study

Under conditions of surprise attack, the USSR delivered 3905 megatons on the U.S. (and in retaliation the U.S. delivered 7896 megatons on the Soviet Bloc). In a condition of full alert, the USSR delivered 5173 megatons on the U.S.

1958 Study

In a surprise attack situation, the USSR delivered 2186 megatons on the U.S. (the U.S. delivered 5810 megatons on the USSR and 705 megatons on China).

¹Source: "Comparisons in Megatonnage Involved in Previous Net Evaluation Studies." Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.

249. Paper Prepared by the NSC Staff¹

Washington, April 26, 1960

*PLANNING BOARD QUESTIONS
NET EVALUATION PRESENTATION*

1. What use was made of the 48 hours strategic warning? Why did we not do better than get only 33–1/3% of SAC in the air after getting 48 hours warning?

2. Why was the UK “V” Force destroyed on the ground?

3. What did the Soviet ground forces do? Walk West?

4. Was the new Soviet surface-to-air “Guideline” missile taken into account in developing losses of our attacking forces?

5. Why was less megatonnage dropped on U.S. per this report than in the exercise several years ago?

6. Could the Government relocate upon receipt of strategic warning without attracting wide public attention?

7. Would not the increased weight of the Soviet nuclear warhead mentioned in recent intelligence estimates but not in the intelligence used by NES result in greater megatonnage falling on the U.S.?

8. Why were the 117 Soviet residual ICBM’s left after the 18½ hour exchange not used for further attack on the U.S.?

9. Why did the State governments survive?

10. Was any assessment made of damage to members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than the USSR?

11. What activities will the NES Staff be engaged in during the next nine months?

12. Why were only 50% of the weapons striking the U.S. set for ground bursts, while 95% of the U.S. weapons on the USSR were set for ground bursts?

13. Mr. Gray asked General Hickey to consider giving greater emphasis in his introductory remarks to the fact that the attack was war-gamed.

¹ Source: “Planning Board Questions, Net Evaluation Presentation.” Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.

250. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 29, 1960

SUBJECT

Debrief of NSC Meeting, 28 Apr 1960

MR. GORDON GRAY—Said questions had been brought up in the planning group about the 48-hour warning and about the relocation of the government people, during those 48 hours. With all the military on full alert and with all of this being known, would the Soviets attack then or would they not?

—The second question was what should be done in regard to warning and instructions to the civilian population?

There was a lot of discussion as to difficulties in calling off an attack once it has been ordered, and the possibility that if they tried to call it off somebody wouldn't get the word and it would be launched anyway. Then, the war would be on and they would have lost their initial advantage of a heavy initial attack. In other words, if the Russians tried to call it off and if they weren't successful in calling it off, they would have really lost their nation and not have gained anything by it. It was decided that it was very unlikely that once the Russians decided to launch an attack that they could afford to call it off. The decision had to be made once and for all.

—The next question as to whether to tell our people. A lot of people said that it would be better if the people were not unduly excited and were told it was an exercise, that you wouldn't know for sure that an attack was coming, and that if you told them that an attack was coming for sure, they would probably panic. However, the President said that you should tell the people. I agree, even though a lot of people would panic. If they are not told completely about what is happening, it is going to leak and they will lose confidence in the integrity of their own government in periods of crisis and they will desert and be wholly selfish. In a time of crisis if you told the people the whole business, as much as you possibly can tell them, they would realize that their government is doing everything it possibly can to protect them and that their government is going to fight like hell. You can't play games with people in periods of crisis.

¹ Source: Debrief of the NSC meeting of April 28: Polaris reserves, Soviet intercept capability against aircraft, SAC dispersal, fallout. Top Secret; Hold Closely. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originators File, 1 March to 30 April, 1960.

COMMENT: This was not brought out at the meeting.

THE PRESIDENT—Then discussed in general the vulnerability of SAC land-based equipment. He asked how long does it take to fire Minuteman and when the research would be done on Minuteman? He asked when Hound Dog would be operational? Then, he noted that the reserves for Polaris were very few, and he thought we should have 100% reserves of Polaris missiles in coastal areas where we could possibly get them.

ADM BURKE—Told him we had 33% reserves in tenders.

THE PRESIDENT—Said he didn't think that was enough, that it should be 100%.

ADM BURKE—Said thank you.

—Then said we had thought of putting reserve missiles in tenders and sending them into safe waters such as Trinidad or African or South American ports.

THE PRESIDENT—Said well, you would have to send a submarine a long distance to get reserve missiles and he thought it would be wise to have some reserves right in the United States.

I heard Mr. Douglas whisper to Andy Goodpaster that it would take weeks to get reload on this basis.

THE PRESIDENT—Then said, in answer to a question, that he wanted to have some residual power left so that he wouldn't be helpless—that, if he had started a war like that, he wanted to be able to finish it, and he was interested in having a capability after the initial strikes were over.

MR. GATES—Asked him if he thought the follow-on strike capability would have any deterrent effect.

THE PRESIDENT—Said no, he just wanted to have military capability afterwards.

MR. MC CONE—Then asked if we had studied the growing intercept capability of the Russians against aircraft. He pointed out that the Russians had been improving their surface-to-air missiles. They had good interceptors, good communications, and there was a lot of intelligence information which indicated that the Russians were really stressing air defense, particularly against high altitude aircraft. With the introduction of missiles into the Soviet arsenal, aircraft were becoming increasingly vulnerable while missiles were not, and yet 90% of our stockpile was now for aircraft delivery and only 10% was for other types of delivery—and, I think he said only 2% was for missile delivery.

It was then brought out there would be a gradual shift from aircraft to missiles, but this would have to be continuously re-examined. The vulnerability of missiles was discussed a little bit but that was not important.

THE PRESIDENT—Then asked about an air alert.

GENERAL LE MAY—Said that, if they had 15 minutes warning, it was not profitable to have an air alert, that the only mission of an air alert was when you didn't have any warning. He then mentioned blind takeoffs in which they had cut down their take-off time to one-third what it had been previously, and that the intervals between aircraft takeoff was now 15 seconds. He said he had some movies which he offered to send to the President.

THE PRESIDENT—Accepted.

COMMENT: This was the first time I had heard of this.

THE PRESIDENT—Then discussed the dispersion of SAC, and again the answer was that it wasn't necessary to disperse SAC much further if they were able to achieve their takeoff capability.

There was then a long discussion as to the amount of long term fallout hazard, particularly Strontium-90 and similar elements. For example, the study said there would be about 3 million additional leukemia and bone cancer cases directly due to Strontium-90 after a 6,000-megaton yield delivery by both sides.

THE PRESIDENT—Thought this was probably low.

They are going to look into it. Nobody knew what they were talking about.

GORDON GRAY—Said he would like to discuss what they would do at the next NESC study.

THE PRESIDENT—Said that doesn't have to be decided here.

Arleigh Burke

251. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–5–60

Washington, May 3, 1960

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles, and the major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of such missiles. In addition, to estimate the technical capabilities of the Soviets in space, including the earliest possible dates of achievement of important future space ventures. (The period covered runs through about 1965, except where otherwise stated.)

NOTE

This estimate entirely supersedes the Summary and Conclusions of NIE 11–5–59, dated 3 November 1959, and the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11–5–59, dated 19 January 1960. In addition, it updates and should be used in conjunction with the Discussion in NIE 11–5–59, pertinent paragraphs of which are cross-referenced at the beginning of each section in this estimate.

Annexes to this estimate entirely supersede the following portions of NIE 11–5–59: Annex A supersedes Table 3 of Section VIII (Possible Soviet Space Development Program); Annex B supersedes Section IX (Summary Tables).

THE ESTIMATE

1. During the last six months we have acquired new evidence on Soviet guided missile capabilities and programs, generally confirming progress along the lines indicated in NIE 11–5–59 and in some cases resulting in refinement or modification of our estimates. Our principal acquisitions relate to: (a) Soviet ICBM characteristics and continued test-firing activities; (b) characteristics and deployment of Soviet surface-to-air missiles; (c) Soviet surface ships for missile launching; and (d) Soviet research and development in cruise-type surface-to-surface systems. Despite this improvement in our knowledge of some Soviet missile programs, serious gaps in our information still exist, especially regarding Soviet ballistic missile production and concepts of deployment, research and development on second generation ICBMs

¹ Source: "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles." Top Secret. 21 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.

and other ballistic missiles, Soviet programs for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the USSR's approach to the problem of defense against ballistic missiles, and Soviet space programs.

The Soviet ICBM Program

(See paragraphs 69–84, NIE 11–5–59)

2. Recent test firing activities indicate that the ICBM development program continues in an orderly fashion rather than on a “crash” basis. Since early November 1959, there have been seven generally successful ICBM firings, including two 6,500 n.m. shots to the Johnson Island area in the Pacific. This brings to 25 the total number of firings to ranges of 3,500 n.m. or more.

3. *IOC Date.* Evidence derived from flight tests is considered adequate to gauge the general progress of the program, but we cannot state with certainty the precise timing of the USSR's initial operational capability (IOC); that is, the date at which a few—say 10—series produced ICBMs could have been placed in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities. We also consider the IOC as marking the beginning of the planned buildup in operational capabilities. [*text not declassified*] We believe, however, that this does not preclude an earlier Soviet decision that the system was satisfactory for initial deployment. Limited number of operational personnel could have received training in conjunction with the test firings. We believe that for planning purposes it should be considered that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960.^{2,3}

4. *Production and Deployment.* An exhaustive re-examination has failed to establish Soviet ICBM production rates or to provide positive identification of any operational ICBM unit or launching facility other than the test range. Our belief that series production of ICBMs is under way is based on the time elapsed since the start of test firings in 1957, the generally successful results of the test program, and particularly the increased rate of firings since early 1959, all of which lend credibility to Khrushchev's claim of early 1959 that series production was then beginning. Final assembly of ICBMs may be taking place at more than

² The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes there is insufficient information to judge that the conditions for IOC as described in paragraph 3 have been met. He believes therefore that an IOC date of not earlier than mid-1960 should be used for planning purposes. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, wishes to clarify his position with respect to the Soviet ICBM IOC date. He believes that as of 1 January 1960 the Soviets had an emergency capability to launch a few series-produced ICBMs against North America, but that these ICBMs probably would have had to have been launched from R&D facilities, rather than from a separate operational facility. However, he agrees that for planning purposes, it is prudent to assume that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960. [Footnote is in the original.]

one plant in the USSR; we now have limited evidence pointing to two Soviet cities as possible production sites.

5. There is no new evidence to establish the Soviet ICBM deployment concept. The available evidence suggests that the Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile, but we do not know whether the deployment pattern as a whole will comprise rail mobile units, hard or soft fixed installations, or some combination of these methods. In any case, Soviet ICBM sites are not likely to be found at locations remote from rail support.

6. *Configuration.* On the basis of data obtained from ICBM and space vehicle launchings, we believe the Soviet ICBM to be a one and one-half staged (Atlas type) vehicle or a parallel staged vehicle, with the former now considered somewhat more likely. It almost certainly employs nonstorable liquid propellants. Data acquired on the re-entry vehicles used on the shots to the Johnson Island area indicate that the nosecones employed in those tests were of the ablative rather than heatsink type. We therefore estimate that the Soviet ICBM employs an ablative nosecone. Use of such a nosecone would permit the delivery of a 6,000 pound nuclear warhead to a range of about 6,500 n.m., that is, from virtually any point in the USSR to virtually any point in the US. A reduction in warhead weight would permit a greater range or the incorporation of penetration aids in the nosecone.

7. *Accuracy.* [text not declassified] the Soviet ICBM probably has radio-inertial and not all-inertial guidance. The guidance system is believed to employ radar tracking with radio command, and to include inertial components within the missile. The data available for estimating Soviet CEPs are far from exact; considerable reliance has been placed on general state of the art and US analogy. These factors, together with our estimate of Soviet capabilities in related components such as gyroscopes and accelerometers, point to a *theoretical* CEP at IOC date of about 2 n.m., which we believe would be degraded to about 3 n.m. under operational conditions.⁴ This is an approximate figure and we apply it to all ranges to which ICBMs are likely to be fired.

8. We believe that operational considerations will lead the Soviets to incorporate an all-inertial system in their ICBM sometime during 1961–1962 or possibly earlier. A Soviet all-inertial system, as of today, would probably have a *theoretical* CEP of about 3 n.m., degraded to

⁴ Under operational conditions, *theoretical* CEPs will be degraded by several factors such as: (a) re-entry errors induced by undeterminable winds and air density over the impact area; (b) human and experience factors; and (c) geophysical errors including gravitational anomalies, geoidal uncertainties, and uncertainties of target location relative to launch point and local verticals. [Footnote is in the original.]

about 5 n.m. under operational conditions. Units already equipped with radio-inertial guidance probably would not be retrofitted with the all-inertial system.

9. We estimate that over the next few years, probably not later than during 1963, the operational CEP for a Soviet ICBM system with all-inertial guidance could be reduced to about 2 n.m., and that with radio-inertial guidance, the operational CEP could be made somewhat better. ICBM accuracy under operational conditions could probably be still further improved to about 1 n.m. in 1965–1970. The element of uncertainty in our estimate of CEPs for future years is very great.

10. *Reliability Factors.* The strategic significance of an ICBM force is heavily dependent on the reliability of the system under operational conditions, and on the percentage of missiles which can be kept in commission. We have again reviewed the factors which would affect Soviet ICBM reliability and in-commission rates under various circumstances, taking into account what little intelligence is available, general state of the art, and US analogy. The uncertainties are such that figures can be provided as working assumptions only.⁵

11. On this basis, we believe it reasonable to assume that in mid-1960, some 60–80 percent of the USSR's operational ICBM inventory could be in commission. The lower limit of this range approximates the percentage which might be maintained in commission for an indefinite period. The upper limit might be achieved if the Soviets prepared their force for an attack at a specific time. The in-commission rate would improve as the system matured. Ranges comparable to those given above might approximate 70–85 percent in 1961 and 85–90 percent in 1963.

12. With respect to reliability on launcher and in flight, we assume that in mid-1960, some 50–60 percent of the ICBMs in commission and on launchers could successfully go through count-down, leave their launchers at scheduled times or not later than 15–30 minutes thereafter, and detonate in the vicinity of assigned targets. As in the preceding paragraph, the lower limit of this range approximates the reliability which might be maintained indefinitely, while the upper limit might be achieved if the Soviets prepared their force for an attack at a specific time. The percentage of successful missiles might increase to 55–65 percent in 1961 and 65–75 percent in 1963.

13. *Follow-on System.* During the next few years, the Soviets will probably have under development a follow-on ICBM system, although there is no direct evidence that such a development program is now

⁵ For missiles other than the ICBM, the table of missile reliabilities in NIE 11–5–59 provides the best working assumptions we have been able to derive. [Footnote is in the original.]

under way. We are unable to estimate when the USSR could achieve an IOC with a new ICBM system, but we would expect first flight tests to precede IOC date by some 18 months to two years. Desirable characteristics for such a system might include fast reaction time, storable liquid or perhaps solid propellants, greater flexibility, and less bulk than the present system.

Other Ground-Launched Ballistic Systems

(See Paragraphs 50–68, NIE 11–5–59)

14. Missiles in this category which we know the USSR has developed and continues to improve include those with maximum ranges of about 75 n.m., 200 n.m., 350 n.m., 700 n.m., and 1,100 n.m. (designated SS–1 through SS–5 by US intelligence). All these systems are considered to be operational, but there is little evidence as to their deployment. [*text not declassified*] Although our information points to several plants which may be engaged in the series production of short and medium range ballistic missiles, it is insufficient to establish production rates.

15. There is no new evidence to cause any major change in our estimates of the characteristics of the foregoing ballistic missile systems. We continue to believe that systems with ranges of 700 n.m. and less are road mobile, although missile carriers and support vehicles are readily adaptable to rail transport. The 1,100 n.m. missile is considered suitable for road or rail mobile employment.

Ground-Launched Cruise-Type System

16. Recent Soviet statements, as well as other information, indicate that the USSR has a current interest in cruise-type vehicles. We estimate that the Soviets are developing and could have available for operational use in 1961–1963, a ground-launched, ramjet propelled vehicle, with a speed of about Mach 3, an altitude of 65,000–70,000 feet, and a range in excess of 4,000 n.m. Such a system could be employed for weapon delivery or reconnaissance, and would further complicate Western air defense problems. Although unlikely, it is possible that such a system could be employed as a research vehicle for investigation of structures and propulsion systems in the Mach 3 region.

Air Defense Missile Systems

(See paragraphs 16–39, NIE 11–5–59)

17. *Surface-to-Air*. The flexible, mobile, surface-to-air missile system (SA–2) first identified in East Germany and now extensively deployed in the USSR, is believed to be the mainstay of the Soviet missile defense system against aircraft. The early Moscow system (SA–1) is now apparently being bolstered by the partial introduction of the more effective SA–2 missile (GUIDELINE) into the original herring bone sites and by

the addition of sites of the new type. Both systems are capable of interceptions at medium and high altitudes up to 60,000 feet, and would have some capability up to about 80,000 feet, particularly if carrying a nuclear warhead. The SA-1 system has a low altitude limit of about 3,000 feet. The low altitude limit of the SA-2 is approximately 1,000 feet under ideal siting and engagement conditions. Under usual conditions, it would be considerably higher, and under unfavorable conditions it might be as high as 7,000 feet.

18. Each SA-2 site appears capable of 360° coverage. The system possibly can handle two targets simultaneously, with more than one missile in the air against each target. However, these targets must be within the approximate 12° radar look angle (both horizontal and vertical) of the system's guidance radar during the period from acquisition to intercept. Maximum intercept range will vary depending upon type of target, approach angle, and other operational factors; for example, against a directly incoming, high-flying B-52, SA-2 range would be on the order of 25 n.m. The CEP will also vary under different conditions, but probably approximates 100 feet on the average.

19. The SA-2 system does not appear to be designed or sited to cope with low-level attacks. We continue to estimate that the Soviets are probably developing a surface-to-air system (SA-3) specifically designed for defense against targets down to about 50 feet. It is still possible that such a system could become available for operational use late in 1960, but an initial capability in 1961 now appears more likely.

20. For defense against advanced aircraft and cruise-type missiles, the USSR will probably incorporate technical improvements into the SA-2 system to increase its altitude and range capabilities. Significant improvements could appear in about 1961. In view of the widespread deployment and estimated growth potential of the SA-2, we now consider it very unlikely that the Soviets will develop in the near term an entirely new high-altitude system (previously estimated as SA-4). It remains possible, however, that such a system will be developed at a later date, and we believe it could become operational 2-3 years after the initiation of flight tests.

21. *Antiballistic.* We believe the Soviets are pursuing a very high priority program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. Solution of the problems of an antimissile missile would involve the development of complex and costly components and their integration into a weapon system with high capabilities for distant detection, discrimination, identification, and interception. The net result would be heavily dependent on tactics, deployment, and the effectiveness of Western countermeasures. While such a system (SA-5) is

probably being developed and could become operational in the 1963–1966 period, we cannot estimate what its capability would be against Western ballistic missiles.

22. The USSR is probably also exploring unconventional techniques for active defense against ballistic missiles. We cannot predict the nature or success of such studies. In any case, continuous research and development in antimissile defenses will be under way during the next five years and beyond.

23. *Antisatellite*. The USSR may also develop a ground or air launched system to counter Western satellites with relatively low, established orbits. However, the Soviets could adapt for this purpose an antiballistic missile system such as that discussed in the preceding paragraph.

24. *Air-to-Air*. We continue to estimate that the Soviets have several types of short range (up to 6 n.m.) air-to-air missiles with HE warheads, for employment with their interceptors. There are some indications that one or more of the foregoing types are now operational with Soviet interceptors, and it is possible that they have been supplied to the East German and Chinese Communist Air Forces. The USSR will probably develop, during the period of this estimate, additional types with longer ranges, more sophisticated guidance, and larger payloads (including nuclear).

Air-to-Surface Missiles

(See paragraphs 40–49, NIE 11–5–59)

25. The current Soviet air-to-surface missile (the subsonic, 55 n.m. AS–1) is designed primarily for use against ships. It could also be used against well-defined radar targets such as prominent coastal installations. It imposes severe limitations on the launching medium bomber aircraft. We believe, however, that a new, transonic missile (AS–3), designed for similar purposes and with a range of about 100 n.m., will probably be ready for operational use in about 1961. It should overcome the limitations of the AS–1, and may be intended to supplement and eventually replace it. We continue to estimate that the USSR will also have available in about 1961 a supersonic missile (AS–2) of at least 350 n.m. range, primarily for use against land targets. This system will probably be compatible with currently-operational Soviet heavy bombers and possibly medium bombers, as well as any follow-on bombers entering service in the next few years. The Soviets could also have in current use an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bombers, but evidence is still lacking on such a vehicle.

Naval-Launched Missile Systems

(See paragraphs 86–94, NIE 11–5–59)

26. *Submarine-Launched.* Recent evidence continues to indicate an emphasis on ballistic missile armament in Soviet submarines. There has been no additional information on the few submarines believed to have been converted some years ago to topside stowage of cruise-type missiles (SS–7), and they may have been supplanted for operational use by ballistic missile types. A total of about four long range, conventionally-powered “Z” class submarines have been modified by enlarging the sail and installing hatches, probably to accommodate ballistic missiles. Each can probably launch two ballistic missiles (SS–11) against land targets at ranges of 200 n.m. and possibly 350 n.m.⁶ More recently, the USSR has undertaken construction of a comparable new class of submarine, designated “G” class, at least six of which may now be operational. This class is probably also designed to accommodate ballistic missiles. Considering the size and configuration of the “G” class submarines, we estimate that each can probably launch about six missiles (SS–12) with 350 n.m. range. It is possible, but less likely, that the missile has a range of 700 n.m. Although we have no specific information on ballistic missiles employed by these submarines, we estimate that both the SS–11 and SS–12 systems would be capable of achieving 1 to 2 n.m. CEPs under operational conditions. For missile launching, both the “Z” and “G” class submarines would need to be surfaced or more likely with the sail awash. We believe that their missiles do not use solid propellants.

27. We continue to believe that the USSR will develop a system capable of delivering ballistic missiles against land targets from a submerged submarine, although there is still no firm evidence of its development. Assuming that an active program is well under way, a 500–1,000 n.m. system of this type (SS–9) could become operational in 1961–1963.

28. *Other Naval Systems.* The USSR has made further progress in its program of arming surface ships with missiles. Some destroyers have been modified and others newly constructed to launch surface-to-surface cruise-type missiles. Two types of cruise missiles are utilized, with speeds in the Mach 1 region and with effective ranges of about 30 n.m. against ships at sea. With the use of forward sea or airborne observation stations, the range of one (SS–8) could be increased to about 100–150 n.m.

⁶ The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe it probable that a 350 n.m. missile is used with both the “Z” and “G” class submarines. It is believed that the modified “Z” class submarine served as a prototype for the “G” class submarine, and that the 350 n.m. ground launched missile (SS–3), with minor modifications, could be accommodated by vertical tubes observed in the “Z” class submarine and believed to be in the “G” class submarine. [Footnote is in the original.]

against ships or land targets, and the range of the other (SS-13) could be increased to 60–80 n.m.

29. The Soviets are also constructing a new class of motor patrol craft which may be equipped with guided missiles or free rockets. We continue to believe that Soviet ground-launched surface-to-air missiles can be adapted for use by surface ships, but there is no indication that this has yet been done. Although there is no evidence, we estimate that the USSR will probably also develop missile systems for antisubmarine warfare. Such a system (SS-10) could probably enter service between 1962 and 1965.

Space Program

(See paragraphs 107–132, NIE 11–5–59)

30. The USSR's space program to date has been characterized by a series of spectacular "firsts," demonstrating a high degree of technical competence and capitalizing on Soviet possession of very powerful propulsion systems. Nevertheless, the number of launchings to date has been less than we previously expected, and the Soviets do not seem to have followed a systematic program designed to achieve maximum progress toward clearly-defined scientific goals. Partly for this reason we are unable to predict with confidence the future course of the Soviet program.

31. The Soviets could at any time undertake a variety of new ventures, including, for example, the launching of very large satellites containing instrumentation or animals. Such attempts would be useful for scientific purposes, and would undoubtedly be exploited by the Soviets to serve general purposes of policy and propaganda. Other projects, however, and especially that of putting a man in space, would require more preparation and preliminary experimentation than we believe the Soviets have accomplished. We believe the Soviets capable of achieving, within about the next year, one or more of the following:

- a. vertical or downrange flight and recovery of a manned capsule;
- b. unmanned lunar satellite or soft landing on the moon;
- c. probe to the vicinity of Mars or Venus;
- d. orbiting and recovery of capsules containing instruments, animals, and thereafter, perhaps a man.

Annex A

Washington, undated

SUMMARY TABLE, SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

POSSIBLE SOVIET SPACE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

SPACE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES	EARLIEST CAPABILITY DATE
These dates represent our estimate of the earliest possible future time period in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. We believe that some could have been accomplished in 1959 or earlier, though the Soviets did not choose to do so. Competition between the space program and the military missile program as well as within the space program itself makes it unlikely that all of these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods.	
<i>Unmanned Earth Satellites</i>	
5,000–10,000 pounds, low orbit satellites	1960
Recoverable (including biological satellites)	1960
Military Satellites—The dates shown are the earliest in which feasibility demonstrations could begin. After feasibility demonstration, militarily useful systems could generally become available in two to three years.	
Surveillance: weather, mapping, and force deployment	1960
Navigation, geodesy, and communications	1960
Early warning	1960
ECM and Elint	1960

(Continued)

SPACE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES	EARLIEST CAPABILITY DATE
<i>Unmanned Lunar Rockets</i>	
Biological probe	1960
Satellite of the moon	1960
Soft landings	1960
Lunar landing, return, and earth recovery	1963–1964
<i>Planetary Probes</i>	
Mars	About October 1960
Venus	About January 1961
<i>Manned Vertical or Downrange Flight</i>	1960
<i>Manned Earth Satellites</i> —The specified time periods for manned accomplishments are predicated on the Soviets having previously successfully accomplished a number of similar unmanned ventures.	
Capsule-type vehicles ^a	Late 1960 or 1961
Glide-type vehicles ^a	1 to 2 years after above
Maneuverable (minimum; conventional propulsion)	1963
Maneuverable (nuclear propulsion)	About 1970
Space platform (minimum, nonecological, feasibility demonstration)	1965
Space platform (long-lived)	About 1970
<i>Manned Lunar Flights</i>	
Circumlunar	1964–1965
Satellites (temporary)	1965–1966
Landings	About 1970

^a Recovery would probably be attempted after the first few orbits but life could probably be sustained for about a week. [Footnote is in the original.]

SUMMARY TABLES, SOVIET MISSILE PROGRAM

SUMMARY TABLE I
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS^a
(GROUND AND NAVAL LAUNCHED)^b

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^c	MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE ^d (IN FEET)	MAXIMUM HORIZONTAL RANGE (NM) ^d	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY ^e (CEP IN FEET)	GUIDANCE	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^f	REMARKS
			SPEED CLASS				
SA-1	1954	60,000 (min- imum about 3,000).	20 against incoming B-52's at high altitudes	65-120	Track-while- scan radar/ radio command.	450-700 HE or Nuclear	B-200 guidance sys- tem with the single stage V-301 missile deployed only around Moscow at fixed sites. Boosted Guideline also apparently uti- lized in SA-1 system as a partial replace- ment for single stage V-301.
			Mach 2.5.				

See footnotes at end of table.

(Continued)

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^c	MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE ^d (IN FEET)	MAXIMUM HORIZONTAL RANGE (NM) ^d SPEED CLASS	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY ^e (CEP IN FEET)	GUIDANCE	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^f	REMARKS
OTHER	It is possible that the Soviets will develop and place in operation: A surface-to-air missile system capable of delivering a nuclear or HE warhead to a range of about 100 nm and to altitudes up to about 90,000 feet (previously estimated as SA-4), could become operational two-three years after first flight test. A mobile system for defense against reconnaissance drones and aircraft, helicopters, etc. (about 1965). A mobile system for field force defense against ballistic missiles (by 1967). A shoulder fired guided missile capable of defending small units against slow aircraft and helicopters to a range of about 3,000 meters (1961).						

^a We evaluate this program as “probable” with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. [All footnotes are in the original.]

^b Adaptations of SA-2 and SA-3 would be suitable for cruisers and destroyers and SA-3 for destroyer escorts.

^c Date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

^d Maximum altitude is not necessarily achieved at maximum range. A limited capability will exist above the indicated altitude. Range will vary with the size, direction of approach, and altitude of the attacking aircraft.

^e Accuracy varies with target size, speed, altitude, and range.

^f Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

SUMMARY TABLE II
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS^a

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNA- TION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	GUIDANCE	OPERA- TIONAL ACCURACY (CEP IN FEET)	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^c	APPROX- IMATE GROSS WEIGHT (LBS.)	COMPATIBLE AIRCRAFT			REMARKS ^e
						Aircraft	Attack Capability	Range (nm) ^d	
AA-1	1955–1956	Radar beam rider.	20	40 HE	200	Flashlight and modified Flashlight.	Rear quarter 360.°	2½ (Tail) 5 (Head-on).	All-weather. Soviet des- ignation "ShM."
						Fresco D, E		2 (Tail only)	
						Farmer B		2 (Tail only)	
						Fagot	Day Fighter.	Limited by radar range to approximately 1 nm.	Limited to clear air mass ^f and tail cone attack.
AA-2	1955–1956	Infrared homing.	10	25 HE	175	Fresco A, B, C			
						Farmer A			
						Faceplate Fitter	Limited all- weather.	2½ Sea Level.	
						Fresco D Farmer B Flashlight			
						Modified flashlight. Fishpot	All-weather.	4 at altitude.	

SUMMARY TABLE III
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS^a

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	1956–1957	MAXIMUM RANGE (NM)	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP)	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^c	CRUISE SPEED (MACH No.)	GUIDANCE	REMARKS
AS-1 ^d			55	150 feet against ships. 1 nm against coastal targets.	3,000 HE or Nuclear.	0.8	Beam riding with semi- active radar homing. Beam riding only against coastal targets.	Primarily anti- ship missile “Komet.”
AS-2 ^e	1961	At least 350		2 nm against land targets.	3,000 Nuclear	1.5 to 2.0	All-inertial.	For use against land targets.

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	MAXIMUM RANGE (NM)	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP)	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^c	CRUISE SPEED (MACH No.)	GUIDANCE	REMARKS
AS-3 ^{f,g}	1961	100	150 feet against ships. 1 nm against coastal targets.	3,000 HE or Nuclear.	1.1	Beam riding with semi- active radar homing. Beam riding only against coastal targets.	Primarily antiship missile.
Decoys	The USSR is probably developing and may now have operational air launched decoys to simulate medium or heavy bombers.						

^a We evaluate this program as “probable” with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. [All footnotes are in the original.]

^b The date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

^c Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

^d The BADGER is believed to be the carrier aircraft for the AS-1. Launch altitude is about 15,000 feet. The BADGER’s radius is 1,250 nm when carrying one missile, 1,000 nm with two. This radius can be increased by about 35 percent by a single prestrike aerial refueling.

^e The AS-2 will probably be compatible with the BEAR and BISON, and possibly with the BADGER. The AS-2 will probably weigh 9,000 to 10,000 pounds; two could be carried by both the BEAR and BISON. The BADGER could carry one and possibly two. A range degradation of 8–10 percent for these aircraft when carrying one missile, and 15–20 percent when carrying two is estimated.

^f The BADGER probably would be used as the carrier aircraft for the AS-3. Launch altitude is about 35,000 feet. The BADGER’s radius would be about the same as with AS-1.

^g The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that the AS-3 warhead weight should be 1,000 pounds, and that guidance should be inertial with active radar homing and a provision for command override of the inertial guidance system.

SUMMARY TABLE IV
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR GROUND-LAUNCHED
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS^a

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERA- TIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM) ^c	GUIDANCE	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) ^d	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^e	CONFIG- URATION	REMARKS
SS-Antitank	Prior to 1958	About 5,000– 6,000 yards.	Command wire link	2 feet	20–40 HE- shaped charge.		
SS-1	1954–1957	75	Radar track-radio com- mand/inertial with terminal correction or all-inertial.	1,200 feet	1,500 HE, Nuclear, CW.	Ballistic	SCUD—Launched from self- propelled tracked vehicle. Road mobile.
SS-2	1954	200	1954: Radar track-radio command/inertial. 1958–1960: All-inertial.	$\frac{1}{3}$ – $\frac{2}{3}$ nm	2,000 HE, Nuclear, CW.	Ballistic	Second generation missile—out- growth of V-2. Road mobile.
SS-3	1954	350	1954: Radar track-radio command/inertial. 1958–1960: All-inertial.	$\frac{1}{2}$ –1 nm	2,000 HE, Nuclear, CW.	Ballistic	Outgrowth of V-2. Probably based on German designed R-10 and Soviet developed Korolov missiles. Road mobile.

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERA- TIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM) ^c	GUIDANCE	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) ^d	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^e	CONFIG- URATION	REMARKS
SS-4	1956	700	1956-1958: Radar track- radio command/ inertial. 1958-1960: All-inertial (retrofit optional).	1-2 nm.	3,000 Nuclear, possibly CW.	Ballistic	SHYSTER—Road mobile.
SS-5	Late 1958 or early 1959.	1,100	Radar track-radio com- mand/inertial or all-inertial.	2 nm.	3,000 Nuclear	Ballistic	Road and/or rail mobile.
SS-6 (ICBM)	For planning purposes it should be con- sidered to have occurred by 1 January 1960. ^f	6,500 ^g	Radar track-radio command/inertial. 1961-1962, or possibly earlier: All-inertial (retrofit unlikely).	About 3 nm at IOC. See para- graphs 7-9	6,000 Nuclear ^g	Ballistic	Could be rail mobile with rail mobile units, fixed installations or a combination of the two.
OTHER:	The Soviets probably are developing and could have available for operational use in 1961-1963 a ground-launched, ramjet-propelled vehicle with a speed of about Mach 3, an altitude of 65,000-70,000 feet, and a range in excess of 4,000 n.m. Such a system could be used for weapon delivery and/or reconnaissance. Although unlikely, it is possible that such a system could be employed as a research vehicle for investigation of structures and propulsion systems in the Mach 3 region.						

See footnotes at end of table.

(Continued)

SUMMARY TABLE IV—Continued

^a We evaluate this program as “probable” with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. We estimate that considerable energy will be expended on second generation longer range missiles, particularly on an ICBM of greatly improved operational characteristics. [All footnotes are in the original.]

^b Date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit. In the case of the ICBM, it is the date on which a few—say 10—series produced missiles are in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities.

^c Generally a ballistic missile can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-third the maximum operational range without serious increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

^d CEP is the radius of a circle within which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors. The accuracies specified are approximate figures which we apply to all ranges to which the missiles are likely to be fired.

^e The type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission of the missile. In general, however, we believe that for missiles with maximum ranges of 350 nm or less, high explosive (HE), nuclear, or chemical warfare (CW) warheads will be employed in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, depending upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. We estimate that for missiles with ranges of 700 nm and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use in 700 nm missiles for certain limited purposes. We believe that the USSR is capable of developing techniques for missile dissemination of biological warfare (BW) agents, although we have no specific evidence relating BW and missile research and development. In view of operational considerations we consider BW use in ballistic missiles unlikely, although possible for certain special purposes.

^f The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that an IOC date of not earlier than mid-1960 should be used for planning purposes. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, agrees that it is prudent to assume for planning purposes that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960, but believes that the Soviets actually had only an emergency capability at that time. See footnotes to paragraph 3.

^g The current missile is believed to employ an ablative rather than a heatsink nosecone. A reduction in warhead weight would permit a greater range or the incorporation of penetration aids in the nosecone.

SUMMARY TABLE V
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR NAVAL-LAUNCHED
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS^a

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM)	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) ^c	CONFIGURA- TION	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^d	GUIDANCE	REMARKS
SS-7	1955-1956	150-200	2-4 nm	Cruise	2,000 lb Nuclear	Inertial	Speed subsonic, low altitude operation. For launch from surfaced "W" class submarine which can carry two missiles. Possibly no longer operational.
SS-8	1958	*100-150	150 ft against ships. 2 nm against land targets.	Cruise	1,000 lb. Nuclear or HE.	Inertial with radar override during mid-course phase. Active radar terminal homing used against ships.	Speed high subsonic, low altitude operation. Launched from destroyers and cruisers.

See footnotes at end of table.

(Continued)

SUMMARY TABLE V—Continued

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM)	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) ^c	CONFIGURA- TION	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^d	GUIDANCE	REMARKS
SS-9	1961–1963	500–1,000	1–3 nm	Ballistic	1,000 lb. Nuclear	All-inertial	Launched from sub- merged submarine.
SS-10 (ASW)	1962–1964: (Surface ship- launched), 1963–1965: (Sub marine launched).	20	400 yds. at water re-entry.	Ballistic Launched depth bomb. Ballistic Launched, homing torpedo.	450 Nuclear 150 HE	Inertial Inertial w/self- contained acoustic homing.	Primarily for use against submarines. May pos- sibly be used against surface ship targets. Both configurations available for both submarine and ship launching.
SS-11	1958	'200 (possi- bly 350)	1–2 nm	Ballistic	2,000 lb. Nuclear	All-inertial	Launched from sail awash "Z" class sub. Carrying capacity, two missiles.
S3-12	1959	'350 (possi- bly 700)	1–2 nm	Ballistic	2,000 lb. Nuclear	All-inertial	Launched from sail awash "G" class submarine. Carrying capacity, six missiles.

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE ^b	MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM)	OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) ^c	CONFIGURA- TION	MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) ^d	GUIDANCE	REMARKS
SS-13	1958	°60-80	150 ft. against ships.	Cruise	1,000 lb. Nuclear or HE.	Inertial with radar override during mid-course phase. Active radar terminal homing.	Speed low supersonic with very low altitude operation. Launched from destroyers and cruisers and used against ship targets.
OTHER:	The Soviets now have operational a large motorboat which may be equipped with guided missiles of about 30 nm range, or with free rockets. Feasibility studies indicate that a submarine-launched 100 nm ballistic missile could be developed for antishipping use.						

^a We evaluate this program as “probable” with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. [All footnotes are in the original.]

^b Date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

^c CEP is the radius of a circle in which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors.

^d Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism. The weight of the structure and the heat protection of the nosecone are not included in “payload.”

^e These ranges can be obtained against ship targets only if the launching ship has forward seaborne or airborne observers. Otherwise a maximum range of 30 nm can be attained.

^f The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe it probable that a 350 nm missile is used with both the “Z” and “G” class submarines.

252. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11–6–60

Washington, May 3, 1960

STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength of the armed forces of the USSR as of 1 January 1960.

THE ESTIMATE

1. On 14 January 1960, Khrushchev declared that the personnel strength of the Soviet armed forces was 3,623,000. We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence available to us, and we conclude that Khrushchev's statement was substantially correct.

2. In a number of instances it is impossible to be confident as to the subordination of elements of the Soviet armed forces. Accordingly, we have presented the estimates in categories corresponding generally to the primary missions or functions which the various elements perform. In this connection, it ought to be noted that the part played by civilians in the Soviet military organization is considerable, especially in research and development, in construction, and in various other support functions.

3. The following paragraphs give estimated strength figures, with explanatory comments. They are followed by a table which presents the same figures in summary form. The evidence is, however, insufficient to establish the precise accuracy of any of these figures.

I. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 70,000

4. *Headquarters.* The Ministry of Defense—including the General Staff and the Main Staffs of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Navy, other staffs and directorates, and military missions abroad—probably comprises about 25,000 military personnel on active duty, as well as an undetermined number of civilians.

5. *Research and Development.* Military scientific research and development in the USSR is conducted largely by civilians. In addition, we estimate that there are about 35,000 active duty military personnel in research and development, primarily subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. These include principally the personnel at missile test ranges, and in electronics, nuclear development, and aviation technology. These are not the only military men in R&D and allied functions, such

¹ Source: "Strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR." Secret. 7 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.

as ordnance development, weapons proving, submarine development, etc., but these latter groups we consider to be counted under other headings in this estimate.

6. *Draft Boards.* We estimate on the order of 10,000 active duty military personnel serving on local draft boards, and as military instructors at civilian schools and clubs.

II. THEATER FIELD FORCES 2,445,000

7. *Ground Forces, Field.* Based on identification over the last two or three years, and information on strength levels, in particular of line divisions, we now believe that the Soviet ground forces include:

About 100 combat ready line divisions, at high level (averaging about two-thirds) strength.

About 70 line divisions at low level (averaging about one-third) strength, and requiring replenishment with reserves before combat.

Of the 100 combat ready divisions, we estimate there are 57 motorized rifle/mechanized, 13 rifle, 22 tank, and 8 airborne divisions. Most of the low strength units are rifle divisions, but also in this category are 2 tank, 2 airborne, and 21 motorized rifle/mechanized divisions. The total strength of line divisions is estimated to be about 1,275,000 men.

8. Our estimate of strengths of combat support forces and service support units rests on less certain and less comprehensive information; it is based on known Soviet organization and the requirements of the line divisional force. The combat support forces consist of about 550,000 men organized into some 16 artillery divisions, a substantial number of separate artillery, antiaircraft artillery, antitank and rocket artillery brigades and regiments, as well as other combat support units. Headquarters, service support units, and certain schools account for about 425,000. The ratio of support to line units is austere, with only a little over 25 percent in combat support and about 20 percent in the logistic and administrative tail.

9. *Tactical Aviation.* The operating and support personnel of Tactical Aviation, exclusive of air transport, is believed to be in the neighborhood of 195,000 men. This and other estimates of the personnel strengths of the operational military air components are based on the estimated aircraft Order of Battle, on a detailed calculation of field support requirements, and on some information concerning the actual Soviet support establishment.

III. AIR DEFENSE FORCES 365,000

10. *Antiaircraft Artillery.* The estimate of Air Defense Forces is complicated by the circumstance that a substantial shift from anti-aircraft artillery guns to surface-to-air missiles is in process, and that the subordination of the various AAA units which have been

located is usually not known. Altogether the antiaircraft gun units of the PVO Strany, those guarding air bases, and those protecting key coastal areas and under naval control, probably total about 100,000 men. Additional AAA units are with the field ground forces and are counted with them, although they also contribute to the overall air defense capability of the country. We estimate that as of 1 January 1960 there were at least 60,000 men in surface-to-air missile systems, including men in training.

11. *Fighter Aviation of Air Defense.* The estimate for Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (125,000 men) is calculated from the estimated aircraft Order of Battle, exclusive of transport aircraft.

12. *Warning and Control.* The estimate of 80,000 personnel, from all service branches, for the warning and control system rests on a calculated manning level which we believe appropriate to meet observed standards of operation for Soviet radars.

IV. LONG RANGE ATTACK FORCES 85,000

13. *Long Range Aviation.* Based on the estimated aircraft Order of Battle of this force, not including its transport aviation, the operation and support of Long Range Aviation probably requires about 70,000 men.

14. *Surface-to-Surface Missiles.* The organization, subordination, and manning levels of Soviet long range (700 n.m. and above) missile systems are uncertain. The personnel required to operate these systems on 1 January 1960 was probably no more than 10,000 men. Adding a substantial number for training, we estimate that as of 1 January in all about 15,000 men were serving in the long range missile systems.

V. NAVAL FORCES 495,000

15. The personnel strength of the Forces Afloat is estimated, partly on the basis of information and partly on the basis of Western standards for manning of fleet units, to total about 185,000 men. The number for Ashore Support can only be inferred; we have assumed that the Soviet requirement is for a ratio of one man ashore to each man afloat. Of the Ashore Support strength, 10,000 men are counted in the Ministry of Defense category; the figure carried here is therefore 175,000. We do not know how many, if any, men in training are not in billets afloat or ashore; we estimate that 40,000 men should be counted above the ship and shore total.

16. *Naval Aviation.* We estimate this force to have about 80,000 men in operational units. This estimate is based on a calculation of manning levels comparable to those of the other air forces, but with account of the fact that the great majority of naval air stations are co-located with or near other naval base installations, and obtain a large portion of their support from the general shore support establishment.

17. *Coastal Defense.* There is little evidence concerning the size of coastal artillery; our estimate is about 15,000 men. As earlier noted, antiaircraft artillery for defense of key naval bases and coastal areas is included in our total for antiaircraft artillery. Naval personnel also participate in the overall air defense warning and control system.

VI. MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION 55,000

18. The overall Soviet military air transport is estimated on the basis of calculations from the aircraft Order of Battle to total about 55,000 men. The assignments of transport units from Military Transport Aviation are indicated in the Table.

VII. PREOPERATIONAL AVIATION TRAINING 110,000

19. In addition to the more than half-million men in the five operational air forces, there is a substantial preoperational training establishment. In light of the probable requirements of the Soviet Air Forces, we estimate the strength of these training facilities at about 110,000 men. A substantial part of the ground crews and general support personnel probably receive their initial training in courses conducted within the operational field establishment.

VIII. SECURITY FORCES 250,000

20. The strength of the Border Troops of the KGB can be estimated with some assurance; including customs guards, about 5,000 maritime security men, and support personnel, they total about 150,000 men. The strength of the Internal Troops is much more uncertain, but one division and a number of small independent "regiments" (of about 800 men each) have been identified, and there is evidence of many personnel guarding bridges and other installations. In all, we estimate the internal troops to total about 75,000 men. In addition, there are about 15,000 men in special Signal Troop Regiments of the KGB, and on the order of 10,000 men in the Convoy Troops, who guard prisoners in transit and in detention.

IX. NOTE CONCERNING CIVILIANS

21. There are a substantial but unknown number of civilians working for the Soviet military establishment. The major part of scientific research and development with military uses is conducted by the Academy of Sciences, by the State Committees for Defense Technology, Aviation Technology, Scientific-Technical matters, Radio-Electronics, and Shipbuilding, and by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (nuclear weapons development and production). Moreover, there is evidence that some functions previously conducted by military personnel have in the course of reductions in recent years come increasingly to be filled by civilian employees, particularly in construction activity and other aspects of logistics.

PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
1 JANUARY 1960

Ministry of Defense		70,000
Headquarters	25,000	
Research and Development	35,000	
Draft Boards	10,000	
Theater Field Forces		2,445,000
Ground Forces, Field	2,250,000	
Tactical Aviation	195,000	
Air Defense Forces		365,000
Surface-to-Air Missiles	60,000	
Antiaircraft Artillery (Gun)	100,000	
Fighter Aviation of Air Defense	125,000	
Warning and Control	80,000	
Long Range Attack Forces		85,000
Long Range Aviation	70,000	
Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SS–4, 5, and 6)	15,000	
Naval Forces (excluding personnel counted elsewhere)		495,000
Forces Afloat	185,000	
Ashore Support	175,000	
Training	40,000	
Naval Aviation	80,000	
Coastal Defense	15,000	
Military Transport Aviation		55,000
Central Subordination	5,000	
Aviation of Airborne Troops	20,000	
Tactical Aviation Transport Units	20,000	
Air Defense Transport Units	5,000	
Long Range Aviation Transport Units	5,000	
Preoperational Aviation Training (for all aviation components)	110,000	110,000
TOTAL		3,625,000
Security Forces (not included in Total)		250,000
Border Troops	150,000	
Internal Troops	100,000	

253. Memorandum of Discussion at the 443d NSC Meeting¹

High Point, North Carolina, May 5, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 443rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 5, 1960 (At High Point)

Present at the 443rd Meeting of the NSC were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (C. Douglas Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below was the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also attending the Meeting were the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; Herbert York, Department of Defense; Herbert Scoville, Jr. and Colonel John A. White, Central Intelligence Agency; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

The Meeting convened in the President's Conference Room at the High Point Relocation Site. Participants in the Meeting (except for Governor Hoegh who was already at High Point) were flown to the Meeting from Washington as part of OPERATION ALERT 1960. Council Members were not provided with advance notice of the change in the place of the Meeting but were advised by telephone calls from the Office of the Executive Secretary, NSC, beginning at 7:20 a.m. that the Meeting would be held outside Washington and that helicopters would be available for transportation to the site of the Meeting.

Mr. Gray reported that General Twining had been left in Washington, Mr. McCone had a conflicting engagement and was unable to attend and Secretary Anderson was ill. Mr. Gray said he understood Secretary Gates and Mr. Dillon were so completely taken by surprise by the telephone calls this morning they had been unable to obtain official transportation to the site of the helicopter take-off. Mr. Dulles

¹ Source: Operation Alert exercise, and Agenda item 1: History of U.S. and USSR Long-Range Missile Development. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

said he was able to obtain official transportation but it broke down in the first hundred yards. Secretary Gates said he had no identification and at first the marines would not let him inside the gates to board the helicopter. Mr. Gray felt the exercise indicated that a meeting of the National Security Council could be assembled on rather short notice. The President believed the exercise of moving a Council Meeting to a relocation site had been a desirable one. He remarked that he had arrived at High Point early in order to inspect the facilities.

1. *HISTORY OF U.S. AND USSR LONG-RANGE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT* (NSC Action No. 2137)

Mr. Gray recalled that at the Council Meeting on October 15, 1959 (NSC Action No. 2137) the President had requested the Secretary of Defense to arrange for the preparation of a factual history of the development by the U.S. of long-range guided missile weapons systems. The President had also requested the Director of Central Intelligence to arrange for the preparation of a history of the development by the USSR of such missile systems. These histories had now been prepared and summaries of them would be presented by Dr. York for the Department of Defense and Dr. Scoville for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. York said that before and during World War II, the development of missiles had been primarily in the hands of the Germans. Following World War, II U.S. armed forces instituted a number of study programs of long-range missiles, which were considered to be missiles with a potential range greater than 1000 miles. He displayed a bar chart entitled "Development of Long-Range Missiles by the U.S." which portrayed our long-range missile programs from 1945 to the present. Dr. York called attention to the Army HERMES B and C programs which involved a winged ram-jet and a study of rocket missiles. All of the study programs, Dr. York went on, were characterized by rapidly changing plans through 1950. Dr. York also called attention to the REDSTONE program which later became the JUPITER program and to TRITON, which was a Navy study at an applied physics laboratory but never an actual missile. However, out of TRITON developed the REGULUS I and REGULUS II, both of which were eventually cancelled because of the prospective development of POLARIS. Dr. York then called attention to a number of Army Air Corps and later U.S. Air Force studies which involved some work on rockets, although the bulk of the work was concerned with air breathers. Most of these studies ended after a year except for SNARK which went on into the development phase. However, at the time of the Korean War it was decided that no program should be given priority unless it involved a missile which could be ready by 1954. After this decision SNARK reverted to study status.

Dr. York then reported on developments which resulted in a change from the emphasis on broad research studies to emphasis on early operational missiles. He referred to the Keller Survey which had examined all types of missiles in order to determine which ones should be selected for development. As a result of this Survey, study of the ATLAS was reinstituted. At this time long-range missile programs had the lowest priority because the yield of the warhead which could be carried in them and the inaccuracy of their guidance systems made them unattractive in comparison to other weapons systems. In 1953 Secretary Wilson ordered a review of surface-to-surface missiles. One committee under Von Neumann studied long-range surface-to-surface missiles while another committee under Trevor Gardiner studied all other missiles. The Von Neumann Committee recommended development of a long-range missile weapons system. Dr. York pointed out that by the time the Von Neumann Committee formulated its recommendations, the thermo-nuclear bomb had been exploded by the U.S. and the possibility of achieving high yields from warheads of limited weight was better understood. A second Von Neumann Committee instituted ATLAS as a development program in 1954 although the final configuration of the ATLAS was not clear at this time. ATLAS at one time was a seven engine vehicle; later its engines were reduced to five in number and then to three as at present. As a result of the studies of the second Von Neumann Committee, the Ramo-Wooldridge set-up, and other studies, a decision was made to provide backup programs for all ATLAS components. These backup programs early in 1955 evolved into the TITAN program. The Killian Committee then made studies of the missile question and concluded that an IRBM could be made operational sooner than an ICBM. The Secretary of Defense, after review of the Killian Committee conclusions, instituted the THOR and JUPITER programs. Originally JUPITER was conceived of as a land or sea missile while THOR was to be a land missile only. As nuclear yields in relation to the size of the warhead increased, it became apparent in the summer of 1956 that the required payload could be delivered by a missile four-tenths the size of the JUPITER. At the same time it became apparent that progress was being made with solid propellants and that liquid fuel rockets would be unsuitable for use in submarines. Accordingly, both JUPITER and THOR became land-based missiles exclusively; POLARIS began to be thought of as the submarine missile. JUPITER and THOR became operational about three years after development of them began. ATLAS became operational about 1959, about 4½ years after it was decided to give the highest priority to the three-engine ATLAS design. POLARIS would become operational about four years after it was instituted.

Dr. York said that 1958 was marked by further progress on solid propellants, progress which led to the initiation of MINUTEMAN. Dr. York then pointed to the figures on the chart which indicated the funds spent or obligated for various missile programs through FY 1960. He pointed out that practically all the funds spent by the U.S. on long-range missiles, amounting to between \$9 and \$10 billion dollars, had been spent since 1953.

The President asked whether the figures given by Dr. York included short-range missiles. Dr. York said he had given the figures for long-range missiles only. Mr. Stans asked why the SNARK was not shown on the chart as operational. Dr. York said SNARK was not operational at the end of 1959; and Secretary Gates added that SNARK was just now becoming operational.

Secretary Gates said that the development of a U.S. long-range missile program, most of which had taken place since 1953, was a remarkable achievement when compared with the development of other weapons systems, e.g. fighter aircraft. The President agreed that the achievement was indeed remarkable but said that it was difficult to explain to the Russians that we had virtually lost the years 1945–1953 so far as the development of long-range missiles was concerned. Dr. York felt that our decisions in the years 1945–1953, not to give the highest priority to long-range missile development, had been based on the fact that we had the nucleus of a strategic air force with bases near enough to the USSR to reach vital targets in that country. By contrast, during this period, the Soviet Union did not have the bases or the means of delivery to place atomic weapons on the U.S.

Dr. Kistiakowsky, noting that he had been associated with some of the early studies, including the Von Neumann Committees, said that in 1953 when a survey of the ATLAS program was made, all the plans provided that ATLAS would carry a Nagasaki-type bomb. Since that time, of course, the yield of the ATLAS warhead has been constantly increased. Secretary Gates thought the concept of the ATLAS had once been the same as the concept of the present Russian ICBM. Dr. York agreed that ATLAS had been through the phase mentioned by Secretary Gates but noted that ATLAS had achieved its present configuration in 1955. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that in addition to the two Von Neumann Committees mentioned by Dr. York there had been a third Von Neumann Committee which had produced information on the new possibilities of achieving high yields in relation to weight of warhead. Dr. York said the seven-engine and five-engine concepts for ATLAS would have made the gross weight of ATLAS about the same gross weight of the present Soviet ICBM.

The President felt the discussion explained why the Soviets had produced such large missiles. Dr. York agreed, adding that the Soviets

had frozen the design of their missiles earlier in history as well as earlier in the design stage. They had frozen their designs at a time when it was thought a very large warhead would be required in order to produce a large explosion.

Mr. Allen asked when the U.S. first conceived the idea of launching an earth satellite. Dr. York said the idea of launching a satellite was an old one in scientific circles. The RAND Corporation had discussed what has now come to be called SAMOS as early as the end of World War II. However, launching an earth satellite required a large rocket so that no one began to think seriously of earth satellites until a large rocket began to be developed. There was no point in time at which it could be said the idea of an earth satellite was conceived but the launching of such a satellite became feasible in 1955 or 1956 when large rockets became available. Mr. Allen asked which missiles were used for launching satellites. Dr. York replied that THOR and JUPITER had been used for this purpose. Unsuccessful attempts had also been made to launch a satellite with the ATLAS. Colonel White pointed out that the so-called "talking satellite" had been launched by an ATLAS. Dr. York said the "talking satellite" was itself an ATLAS placed in orbit. A NASA lunar probe last Thanksgiving using ATLAS as the launching vehicle failed. An attempt early this year to put up MIDAS with an ATLAS also failed. This latter failure was particularly disturbing because ATLAS had failed only three times in the last twenty-three firings. ATLAS and TITAN were only about half as big as the Russian missiles. Our satellite launchers have had only about one-tenth of the thrust of the Russian satellite launchers primarily because we have not yet used ATLAS intensively for space work but have used THOR and JUPITER instead. Mr. Allen asked whether there was much difference between THOR and JUPITER. Dr. York replied that these two missiles were practically the same. The President recalled that there had been a controversy about which of the two missiles would be retained and which would be scrapped. At one time it had been agreed that both THOR and JUPITER would be given the highest priority but that the Secretary of Defense would decide which to keep and which to discard within six months. After the six months period was up, the Secretary of Defense said he needed another year to make this decision.

Mr. Gray inquired about the time which elapsed from the initiation of a missile program to the operational capability of the missile. He said he gathered it was $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 years. Dr. York said to be more precise ATLAS became operational after $5\frac{1}{2}$ years, TITAN after $5\frac{1}{2}$ years, THOR and JUPITER after 3 years, POLARIS after $4\frac{1}{2}$ years and MINUTEMAN after $4\frac{1}{2}$ years.

The President asked Dr. York to furnish him with a chart similar to the one displayed during Dr. York's briefing and asked whether, in

addition, it would be difficult to indicate our effort involving short-range missiles on a chart. Dr. York believed a chart showing our work on short-range missiles would be difficult to prepare because these missiles were initiated and then discarded with such great rapidity. About fifty short-range missiles had been developed. The President said in that case he would be satisfied with the chart on long-range missiles.

Mr. Allen asked whether POLARIS would be the next missile to become operational. Dr. York answered in the affirmative, adding that POLARIS would become operational at the end of this calendar year.

Mr. Gray felt that the information in Dr. York's presentation should be made available to the public. He wondered why the chart was classified SECRET. Secretary Gates believed there was no reason for classification of this information. He added that information of this kind had appeared in speeches and testimony already. Dr. York said that an unclassified history of our missile development had been published in the Congressional Record. Mr. Stans felt that if the chart were to be made public, the dollars spent each year on the missile programs shown on the chart should be indicated.

Mr. Allen asked what function TITAN and MINUTEMAN would be expected to perform. Dr. York said TITAN would display the same gross performance as ATLAS but would be a better missile because it was different in significant details, e.g. reaction time. MINUTEMAN would require less logistic support, was adaptable to firing from silos, and could be rail-mobile. The President said he had recently been visited by a Dr. Long, whose appointment had been arranged by Dr. Kistiakowsky. Dr. Long had indicated that scientists think highly of the MINUTEMAN and believed we should be giving it a high priority.

Mr. Allen asked which missile was used for the man-in-space program. Dr. York replied that ATLAS was used for this program primarily because it was a year ahead of other missiles in its development and was more reliable. Secretary Gates said TITAN had the potential of carrying a larger warhead. Dr. York agreed that TITAN had advantages as far as payload was concerned but said that ATLAS was more reliable.

Mr. Gates said he felt we had made a correct military decision when we decided to develop a smaller engine for ATLAS rather than a SATURN-type engine. This correct military decision, however, resulted in our not having large rockets for space programs. Dr. York said the ATLAS became available for space work two years later than the comparable Russian rocket. This caused a big difference in U.S. and Russian space programs. The President said he thought some space work had been done with a combination of ATLAS and THOR. Dr. York said this was not the case; THOR and JUPITER with added stages had been used in space work.

Dr. Kistiakowsky believed that we were equal to or even ahead of the Russians with respect to the scientific information being derived from our earth satellite program. The President agreed but added that the public sometimes asked whether scientific information would enable us to defend ourselves against the USSR. Dr. York said the fact that ATLAS was available two years later than the comparable Russian rocket had attracted a great deal of attention. The President said we know that the Russians were working earlier on the large rocket engine but it was difficult to get the public to appreciate the real significance of missile developments. Mr. Allen said as a result of our recent successes in space activities, we have recouped much U.S. prestige abroad which had been lost after SPUTNIK. Secretary Gates believed it was essential to separate space activities from military requirements in talking to the public about missile programs. The President noted that such a separation was one of the reasons for creating NASA. Secretary Gates believed the public was somewhat fearful of lunar probes. Dr. York said the Russians had simply demonstrated a capability for lunar probes which we knew they possessed. Mr. Stans wondered whether we were making high enough claims for our scientific achievements in space.

The President asked whether PIONEER V was still sending signals. Dr. York said the satellite was still sending on the small radio. The large radio would be turned on when the satellite was 10 million miles out unless the small radio failed before that time.

The President asked when the communications balloon would be put aloft. General Goodpaster said this firing was scheduled for tomorrow.

Dr. Scoville was then called upon to summarize the CIA report on the history of USSR long-range missile development. Dr. Scoville said the Soviets had no guided missile program before or during World War II, although Soviet scientists had worked on liquid fuel propulsion systems. The Soviets had been impressed by German achievements with the V-1 and the V-2. Consequently, immediately after the war they had devoted a major effort to exploiting German scientists and technicians who had been engaged in the German V-1 and V-2 programs. At first these Germans had been exploited in Germany. Later, in 1946, German scientists and technicians had been evacuated to Kaliningrad, near Moscow, where research laboratories had been established to emphasize V-2 development. Here a modification of the V-2 had been tested.

The President asked whether the V-2 had any guidance. Dr. Scoville replied that the V-2 had a type of radio inertial guidance but no terminal guidance.

Resuming his presentation, Dr. Scoville said that the original range of the V-2 of 200 nautical miles was expanded by the Russians to 350 nautical miles. Then, in addition to exploitation of German scientists and technicians, the Russians undertook to build from the ground up a native Russian missile program which led eventually to the Russian ICBM. Khimki became another site for the development of large rocket engines. In 1947 a test program was started at Khimki where the Russians began firing V-2's first over a range of 260 nautical miles, later, in 1949, over a range of 350 nautical miles. The Soviets also put tremendous effort into developing their electronics program. Starting practically from zero they built up an electronics background in five years so that after 1950 they did not have to depend on any outside electronic assistance.

Dr. Scoville reported that less information was available on Russian missile developments during the period 1950 to 1954 [*text not declassified*]. This period must, however, have been a period of design studies. One development of note was the testing in 1953 of the first Soviet thermo-nuclear device which was a very bulky and cumbersome device. At this time the Soviets probably did not realize that high thermo-nuclear yields could be derived from small packages. Consequently, the Russians decided that they would build a large rocket in order to carry a large thermo-nuclear warhead. In 1955 the Russians tested a smaller thermo-nuclear weapon but by that time their ICBM design was frozen. After 1954 the U.S. was able to obtain information about the Soviet missile program because of the establishment of COMINT coverage of Soviet firings. Dr. Scoville then displayed a chart of Soviet missile tests indicating that the Kapustin Yar range had fired about 600 missiles. In 1953 this range was firing a 700 nautical mile missile which reached operational status by the end of 1956. An 1100 nautical mile missile was fired for the first time in June of 1957. At the same time that the 1100 nautical mile missile was being developed, the Soviet ICBM was being developed. Beginning in 1957 firings of the ICBM from Tyura Tam were detected. In addition to Kapustin Yar and Tyura Tam, the Soviets developed a third firing range, Vladimirovka, from which cruise type missiles, both short-range and long-range, were launched, beginning in 1956. The Russians had attempted three flights of HOT CROSS during the past year. Two of these flights had apparently been failures, although not much was known of this program. However, most of the Russian effort has been concentrated on ballistic missiles rather than on cruise-type missiles.

Dr. Scoville reported that the Russians had fired about 730 700 nautical mile missiles with three failures; they had fired about 60 1100 nautical mile missiles with four failures; they had fired twenty-five ICBMs

with five or six failures; and they had launched fourteen HOT CROSS cruise-type missiles with an unknown number of failures.

Dr. Scoville said our information with respect to the production and deployment of Soviet missiles was poor. Missile engine manufacture was apparently started at Dnepropetrovsk in 1957. Movements between Tyura Tam and Kuybyshev seemed to indicate that production facilities started at the latter place in 1957.

Summarizing, Dr. Scoville pointed out that the Russians concentrated a tremendous effort on the ballistic field fifteen years ago. Their ballistic missile program proceeded in an orderly manner from short-range missiles through long-range missiles to ICBMs. In conclusion, Dr. Scoville said he believed the Russians had not put any great emphasis on missiles which could be fired from submarines. No submarine missile firings had been positively identified but submarines had been observed which were believed to have equipment capable of firing missiles with a 350 nautical mile range.

Mr. Allen asked whether the Russians were still using non-Russians in connection with their missile programs. Dr. Scoville reported that all foreigners working on Russian missile programs had been repatriated by 1951. Colonel White added that Germans had continued to work on the Soviet air defense program until two years ago. Mr. Dulles said the problem of ground-to-air missiles was a separate one not dealt with in this report. The Russians had also concentrated great effort on ground-to-air missiles. Concluding, Dr. Scoville said he wished to emphasize the fact that the Soviets had built up a native ballistic missile program and that since the war they had built up from zero an electronic capability which approached that of the U.S.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed oral summaries of the reports on the subject by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2137.

a. Keeping the NSC Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination and other components of the NSC Staff informed of research being done within and outside the Government which has significant bearing upon their responsibilities for national security policy-making or operations coordination, placing emphasis upon a high degree of selectivity.

b. Facilitating appropriate access within the Government to such research.

Marion W. Boggs

254. Memorandum for the Record of Meeting Between Sprague and Merchant¹

Washington, May 25, 1960

Manny Sprague came in to see me yesterday afternoon for about half an hour to ask my unvarnished comments on the OCB and its operation. He has similarly privately and alone interviewed every other member of the OCB.

In sum, I told him that I thought the OCB was a necessary coordinating mechanism, given the complexity and size of our government and its responsibilities. I said that with officers in the Department concerned with its functioning I emphasized that they should give it their best efforts and not resent the time demands of chairing working groups since, if the OCB did not exist, their lives would be far more difficult.

I said that I thought OCB by reason of its wide membership and cumbersomeness had the potential of slowing up and making more difficult the function of coordination. However, I said, under Gordon Gray's chairmanship this had not been the case because he was open-minded and reasonable and not seeking to bring into the OCB orbit problems involving two or more members of the Board which were already being adequately coordinated by direct informal procedures.

I made three suggestions. First, I thought the weekly activity report insofar as it comprised summaries of Departmental telegrams on various problems not under current OCB scrutiny provoked needless and time-wasting discussions on matters on which few, if any, of the members were currently informed. These extracts I thought could be usefully dropped from the weekly agenda. Secondly, I said I thought that the OCB luncheons were probably the most valuable aspect of the entire organization and that I would favor seeking to establish a ratio of two luncheons to one full-dress meeting rather than the present one to one ratio. Thirdly, I said that I thought the luncheons would be even more stimulating and useful if they were agendaless and if members did not try to use them for quick clearances, particularly where only a fraction of those present were directly concerned. In other words, I said, I thought the opportunity for unguided, unrecorded discussion of the major problems in the forefront of our minds was the best way to generate ideas or suggestions which could then be worked out and refined or rejected in staff channels.

Finally, we discussed the "P" factor. I reiterated my basic point, which is that good policy makes good propaganda. Hence I believe

¹Source: Operations Coordinating Board. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 100.4-OCB/5-2560.

that the public relations aspect of actions or policy decisions is one of insuring imaginative, effective presentation. I said that the State Department's function, as I saw it, basically is to formulate the soundest possible policy recommendations to the Secretary and the President. In the process there has to be in the policy makers' minds an awareness of the impact of a particular course on public opinion, be it domestic or foreign. The emphasis, however, should be overwhelmingly on the side of the soundness and appropriateness of the policy insofar as it contributed to the national security. It would be wrong to approach any decision from the point of view of seeking something which would have a spectacular effect on public opinion. On this general note our conversation ended.

Livingston T. Merchant

Enclosure

Handwritten Note Prepared by Herter

Washington, May 26, 1960

I think the Secy will be interested in this some *weekend*.

CAH

255. Memorandum of Discussion at the 448th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, June 22, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 448th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 22, 1960

Present at the 448th NSC Meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: U.S. Policy on Continental Defense: Port Security. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Budget; the Acting Attorney General (Walsh) (Items 1 & 2); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 1 & 2). Also attending the meeting were the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell); General Thomas D. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretaries of Defense John N. Irwin, II and Charles C. Finucane; Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE: PORT SECURITY

(NSC Actions Nos. 1862-g, 2051 and 2075; NSC 5802/1, paragraph 19; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 16, 1960; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 15 and 21, 1960)

Mr. Gray recalled that members of the Council had recently concurred by Memorandum Action in a revised Port Security paragraph (Paragraph 19; transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 16, 1960), proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury for inclusion in U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1). Mr. Gray said he had subsequently discussed the revised paragraph, as well as the revised port security program developed by the Secretary of the Treasury to carry out the new policy paragraph, with the President in a meeting also attended by Secretaries Herter, Anderson and Gates. The President approved the revised Paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1, rescinded the port security program which he had approved on April 21, 1958, and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to place in effect such port security programs as are necessary and appropriate to implement the revised policy, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence (keeping the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security informed). In discussing the revised port security program, the President had indicated his desire that occasional boarding and searching of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels before their entry into U.S. ports should be continued. Mr. Gray said the subject was placed on the agenda of this Council meeting in order that the Council may note the action taken by the President, as reflected in the draft NSC Action transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 15, 1960. Mr. Gray said that the Secretary of the Treasury might at this time wish to make some remarks regarding the implementation of the new port security program and that the Council might wish to note these remarks.

Secretary Anderson said he had very little to add to Mr. Gray's introduction of the subject. He would be agreeable to having the record of the meeting show that the new port security program would include provision for occasional boarding and searching of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels prior to their entry into port. He would also be agreeable to having the record show that the new port security program would be put into effect in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence and that he would consult with other interested departments, agencies, and committees prior to making any modifications in the program.

Mr. McCone asked whether he was correct in understanding that all Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels would be inspected after their entry into port, while only occasional inspections would be made at the barrier to the port. Secretary Anderson said Mr. McCone's understanding was correct.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had formulated views, in which the Secretary of Defense had concurred, which were consistent with the provision for occasional boarding and searching of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels prior to their entry into port. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had indicated that if inspections prior to entry are suspended, thorough and effective inspections after entry must be made. In concurring in the cautionary comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense had recommended that they be brought to the attention of those responsible for implementing port security policy. Mr. Gray understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff want their views to be on record. He asked whether General White wished to add anything. General White called attention to the fact that the Joint Chiefs has also stated that "continuing emphasis must be given to developing improved techniques for detection of nuclear devices in ships, in ships cargoes, released on harbor bottoms and in channels."

Secretary Gates recalled that at the meeting with the President, referred to by Mr. Gray, the President had indicated that the details of the port security program were not a matter for adoption by the NSC. Mr. Gray agreed that the President had not wished to give his specific approval to the revised port security program but had approved only the general guidelines under which the program would operate, i.e., the revised Paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted the approval by the President on June 11, 1960, of the revised paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 16, 1960, following concurrence therein by Memorandum Action by the other members of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

b. Noted the President's rescission as of June 11, 1960, of the Port Security Programs approved by him on April 21, 1958, and his authorization to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary

of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence (keeping the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security informed), to put into effect such Port Security Programs as may be necessary and appropriate to implement the revised paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1.

c. Noted that the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to *b* above, would:

(1) Put into effect, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, the Port Security Program contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of May 16, 1960, including provision for occasional boarding and searching of vessels prior to entry into port.

(2) Consult with the other interested departments, agencies and committees referred to in *b* above prior to making any modification in that Program.

d. Noted that the comments of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the revision of paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 (transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 21, 1960) were being referred to those responsible for implementing the policy set forth in the revised paragraph 19.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for appropriate action.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

256. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, July 13, 1960

SUBJECT

Paragraph 13 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1)

DISCUSSION:

Paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 is as follows:

“The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military

¹ Source: Discussion of paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 on chemical and biological weapons. Top Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President."

At the time of the Planning Board's last annual review of Basic National Security Policy, several questions were raised, principally at the instance of the Bureau of the Budget, about the validity of this policy guidance. In essence Budget's concern was that research and development for BW and CW weapons is costing too much if the U.S. does not plan to use them, and that perhaps not enough of these weapons are being purchased if they represent a militarily effective addition to our weapons systems. The uncertainty about the U.S. position on BW-CW weapons, according to Budget, was at least partly attributable to Defense's failure to report fully and accurately to Budget on its programs in this field. Submission of this issue to the Council was deferred to allow Defense an opportunity to provide necessary information.

At the moment, except for the type of BW and CW agents available during World War II and Korea (including incendiary agents of the napalm type), plus some new more effective riot control agents, the U.S. has no substantial capability in being, although Defense scientists believe there is promise enough in these weapons systems to warrant further research and development.

As a result of Planning Board discussion, Budget now concurs in continuing present policy with the understanding that Defense will report adequately the status and implications of its current and projected programs and activities. Accordingly, a draft NSC action has been prepared (Tab B) which (1) continues present policy in effect, (2) calls for Defense to make certain reports, (3) reflects the feeling of certain Planning Board members that non-lethal BW-CW agents (e.g., nerve gas or other controlled temporary incapacitants) should be emphasized in research and development programs; and (4) notes the Planning Board's agreement that an exception to the provision for Presidential approval in advance of use of BW-CW weapons should be made in certain cases.

The language of the draft NSC action is, however, not clear on this last subject (Tab B, para. c), and permits the interpretation that existing smoke and incendiary agents (e.g., napalm) may be used without the President's prior approval in situations short of war including the suppression of civil disturbances. Such an interpretation was not intended, of course, and the record should be corrected. Accordingly, your concurrence in the proposed NSC action should contain a statement of your understanding of sub-paragraph c as set forth below. This matter has been discussed with Defense, and there seems to be no disagreement on the point.

The Department does not have detailed information on Defense plans or preparations for the possible use of chemical and biological weapons. We should, therefore, continue to seek such information and be alert to possible foreign policy implications and their bearing on

over-all national strategy, particularly in the light of the possibility that some non-lethal agents may have useful applications in limited military operations.

Recommendation:

That you indicate concurrence on the voting slip attached at Tab A subject to the following interpretation of sub-paragraph c:

“Prior approval by the President is not necessary for the use by US military forces of (a) existing smoke and incendiary agents and riot control agents in appropriate military operations and (b) riot control agents in suppressing civil disturbances.”

Attachments:

Tab A—Vote Slip

Tab B—Draft NSC Action

Tab A

Memorandum From Herter to NSC Executive Secretary

Washington, July 21, 1960

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy: Paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1

REFERENCE

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 5, 1960

As requested, I am indicating below my action with respect to the enclosure to the reference memorandum of July 5, 1960:

Concur: ✓ C.A.H

Do not concur: _____

Comments: My concurrence is subject to this interpretation of sub-paragraph c: Prior approval by the President is not necessary for the use by US military forces of (a) existing smoke and incendiary agents and riot control agents in appropriate military operations and (b) riot control agents in suppressing civil disturbances.

Christian A. Herter
Secretary of State

257. Draft NSC Action¹

Washington, July 19, 1960

Since the breakdown of the Summit Conference in Paris the Soviets have clearly embarked on a major propaganda and agitational campaign with the United States as its chief target. It seems designed to increase international tension, provoke and encourage disorders wherever possible and has involved a wide range of threats, provocation and blackmail. In the field of action the Soviet Government has broken off the disarmament negotiations on June 27 when conceivably with new Western proposals forthcoming, of which the Soviet Government was aware, an opportunity for genuine progress might have presented itself. In addition, on July 1 the Soviets shot down a United States military plane over international waters.

In most respects this campaign has followed the previous cold war propaganda campaigns with one very important innovation. For the first time in its history the Soviet Union has asserted its willingness in recent weeks to give military support to any regime which seems to serve Soviet purposes, and to threaten atomic retaliation against any country which might take action against such regime. Such threats have been made in the case of Cuba with reference to the United States, and in more generalized terms in the case of the Congo. These threats are probably merely part of the current war of nerves designed in the first instance to weaken the prestige and leadership of the United States, to separate it from its allies, and in particular to pose as champion of all colonial or former colonial peoples in the world. Even though there may be no serious intention of acting militarily on these threats, they do appear to enunciate a new doctrine with the Soviet Union coming close to asserting the right of military intervention in any part of the world when it suits its purposes to do so. This is undoubtedly in part a reflection of the Soviet belief in its present military power.

It is this aspect of current Soviet behavior which requires something more in response than mere words. Some form of action should be taken to bring calmly and coldly to the attention of the Soviet Union the dangers of its current attitude. While they may have no intention of acting on these threats, it is nevertheless possible that the Soviets if they feel that this propaganda campaign is succeeding might progressively commit themselves in future courses of action in the military field which would be extremely difficult for them to disavow if ever put to the test. In addition, we must consider the effect of this

¹ Source: U.S. response to Soviet propaganda campaign. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material.

Soviet campaign of threat and blackmail on other countries, particularly the uncommitted areas of the world. If this campaign seems to be proceeding without any strong response on the part of the United States, it might well create the impression that the Soviets are in fact in total command of the situation and that the United States is unable or unwilling to devise any appropriate counter.

In surveying the fields in which the United States could take action which might have a salutary and sobering effect upon the Soviet Union and offset any psychological disadvantageous effects of this campaign in certain parts of the world, it would seem that an increase in our military and mutual security budgets through a request for supplementary appropriations in the August session of Congress would be the best for these purposes. It would fall into the category of action and not words; it could be presented in the most sober and calm manner in order to avoid any impression of panic or belief in the imminence of war but would serve as evidence of American determination not to be brow-beaten by Soviet threats or blackmail, and a very timely reminder that the United States has the resources and will if necessary to add in the future even more appreciably to our military defenses if Soviet behavior renders it necessary.

It could be presented to Congress in a very simple message, merely stating that since presentation of the United States military budget and military assistance part of the Mutual Security Act, the world situation due to Soviet actions had considerably worsened, listing if necessary the specific acts and threats which the Soviet Union has indulged in since the collapse of the Summit Conference. This could be set against the backdrop of the calm attitude of the United States and its allies which makes absolutely clear that the responsibility for the increase in international tension is due solely to Soviet actions and attitudes during this period. The ideal thing would be for the Congress to authorize the President to spend at his discretion up to [blank space in the original] dollars to supplement the existing budget, in order to place our forces in a special state of readiness to deal with any contingency that may arise, and to utilize a portion thereof for the increase of the defense systems of our allies and, if conceivable in Congressional terms, a certain portion for emergency economic aid in the event of special need.

The exact Soviet purposes in mounting this extreme campaign is not entirely clear. It most probably does not forecast Soviet military action, but on the other hand the element of uncertainty is sufficient to justify placing ourselves and our allies in a special state of readiness quite apart from the salutary effect such action on our part should have on the Soviet leadership.

258. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 100-6-60

Washington, August 9, 1960

**PROBABLE REACTIONS TO U.S. RECONNAISSANCE
SATELLITE PROGRAMS****THE PROBLEM**

To estimate Soviet reactions to US launchings of earth satellites with military reconnaissance capabilities,² and other world reactions to these launchings.³

THE ESTIMATE**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. Man's excursion into outer space presents many new problems, and adds a new dimension to some old ones. The possibility of military reconnaissance conducted from orbiting space vehicles is one of these problems, which is now coming to the fore because the US has an urgent requirement for photographic and electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and other denied areas.

2. The Soviets are aware of this requirement from the U-2 case and other US air reconnaissance. They have been cognizant of official American interest in reconnaissance satellite systems since 1948, and have noted recent US disclosures of active developmental programs leading toward operational reconnaissance satellites within a few years. They probably realize that satellite systems are not likely in the near term to produce the quality of information that can be obtained by other means. However, they almost certainly do assume that satellite reconnaissance has considerable potential for intelligence collection.

II. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

3. There is no doubt that the Soviets do not want the US to orbit military reconnaissance vehicles over the USSR. The Soviet press and

¹ Source: "Probable Reactions to U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programs." Secret. 5 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.

² This estimate is concerned primarily with photographic reconnaissance systems, although under certain circumstances it would also apply to infrared early-warning or elint vehicles, particularly if the US were to announce that such satellites were engaged in reconnaissance activity. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ It is emphasized that this estimate deals only with foreign reactions to US launching of reconnaissance satellites; it does not consider various other implications of such a program. [Footnote is in the original.]

radio have already branded as reconnaissance activity the launching of various US weather and communications satellites. Clearly, the Soviets prize secrecy as a strategic asset, and want to prevent the US from observing key military and military-industrial installations and preparations. Beyond this, they would regard any publicly avowed US reconnaissance activity as a challenge to their prestige.

4. Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet leaders may not choose to react immediately to a US reconnaissance program. The Soviets have made no formal protest about the Tiros weather photographic satellites. They are unlikely to believe that reconnaissance satellites offer much threat to their secrecy for the next year or so, but during the period of developmental testing of the Samos they will have to weigh the consequences of permitting the establishment of a precedent for unchallenged reconnaissance. Moreover, as capabilities of US reconnaissance vehicles grow they will have to review their policy.

5. At present and for some time to come, the Soviets are likely to have only a marginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites. Even detection and tracking in the early orbits of any satellite will be difficult. It might take two weeks to discover an unannounced vehicle designed to minimize detection, after which the track could probably be determined in a few days. It will also be quite difficult to identify the function of a new satellite. During the period of US test operations, roughly 1960 through 1962, the Soviets will probably seek to devise and perfect measures for rapidly detecting, identifying, and tracking satellite vehicles and means for jamming or otherwise disrupting the transmission of data from them. They will probably avoid premature disclosure of methods for which the US could develop countermeasures, but they will prepare for later actions to destroy or to neutralize operational US reconnaissance satellites. In the course of its program to develop an antimissile missile system, the USSR could obtain a limited capability to destroy such vehicles after they have made a number of orbits. This capability might be theoretically achievable about in the period 1963–1966, soon after the presently programmed introduction of a US reconnaissance satellite system. However, the capability for a system for destruction of satellites on their first orbit does not appear achievable until the latter part of the decade.

6. Since the technical-military possibilities for destroying the vehicle or neutralizing its transmission will be limited for some time, the Soviets will probably conclude that only two courses are open to them in the next few years: (a) a campaign of pressure to generate political support in the world, particularly through stimulating

tensions, for a cessation of such reconnaissance activity, or (b) not to bring the issue to a diplomatic climax or even to public view before they could destroy the vehicle. The Soviet decision on what to do about US reconnaissance satellites and when to do it will be affected not only by their judgment about the effectiveness of the program, but even more by the extent and nature of publicity attending the future course of the program.

7. There has already been a great deal of unofficial and semiofficial publicity about the US reconnaissance satellite program, and there will probably be more in years to come. However, if the US Government refrained from officially avowing and attempting to justify a reconnaissance program, and perhaps explained the launching of new satellites on other grounds such as scientific research, we believe that the chances are better than even that the Soviets would not press the issue until they were able either to destroy a vehicle, or to establish its mission by authoritative US acknowledgment or other convincing proof.⁴ It is possible that the Soviets would act early in the US development test program, in order to agitate the issue and if possible to inhibit US plans, as well as to lay the foundation for later direct physical action against US reconnaissance vehicles. But we believe that they would probably estimate that all available courses of action—political as well as military-technical—would be of doubtful effectiveness in compelling the US to end the program, and that there was little advantage in forcing the issue, especially during the developmental phase of the program.

8. On the other hand, if and when publicity about the US reconnaissance operation reached a point at which the Soviets thought that their prestige was being threatened, we believe that they would stage a strong campaign of protest. They would probably consider it necessary to oppose vigorously by political and propaganda means any avowed and politically defended US program to penetrate their secrecy, about which they are extraordinarily sensitive. Their reaction would not be less vigorous because of uncertainty over the effectiveness of such a campaign in getting the US to cease the program.

⁴ The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, considers it unrealistic to suggest that the US refrain from avowing a program that is obviously a government activity whose nature, magnitude and even locus is already known to the world at large. He would revise this sentence to read: "However, unless the US Government deliberately provokes sharp Soviet reaction by giving the intelligence implications of the program undue stress in its publicity, we believe that the chances are better than even that the USSR would not press the issue until it was able to destroy or interfere with the effective operation of US reconnaissance vehicles." [Footnote is in the original.]

9. The basis for protests, propaganda, and possible UN action would probably be the allegedly illegal and hostile nature of the intelligence activities of such satellites, and not Soviet claims to sovereignty in outer space itself. They could introduce the issue into the UN, either in terms of a demand on the US to cease, or in terms of a general measure to outlaw any military satellite or space vehicles, including those for reconnaissance. They would probably attempt to raise tensions and to make the issue appear to have dangerous consequences for world peace.

10. They will, in any case, probably exert all efforts to neutralize the transmission of data from vehicles which might be providing useful intelligence. Whenever the USSR does acquire a capability, it will probably seek to destroy US reconnaissance satellite vehicles. Such action might be accompanied by attempts to use heightened anxiety over war for a diplomatic offensive, and also to persuade the world that the USSR had a successful defense against ballistic missiles.

III. NONCOMMUNIST WORLD REACTIONS

11. World reactions to the US reconnaissance satellite program will vary significantly and will be influenced by the international political climate at the time, by the manner in which the US handles the program, and by the Soviet reaction. Unless the USSR stirs up the issue, world opinion will probably be largely indifferent. But if the Soviets stimulate tension—for example by threatening countries which cooperate in a US “spy” program by furnishing facilities for tracking stations—and try to make the issue appear to have dangerous consequences for world peace, the US would have to contend with adverse reactions in neutralist countries and among some segments of opinion in Allied countries from those who would view the US action as provocative and risky.

12. The governments of the principal countries of the Free World, as well as military, official, and some other segments of opinion in these countries, are well aware of the requirement for effective intelligence on the USSR to support the US deterrent posture, and would not object to the reconnaissance satellite program. Many governments would be favorably impressed by evidence that the US could in fact penetrate Soviet secrecy. Favorable reactions in Allied countries might be enhanced by joint Allied association with the program. Nevertheless, in the event of violent Soviet reaction to the program, Free World governments would still have to contend with considerable popular anxiety over heightened international tension. However, most Allied governments would probably support the US program and would endeavor

to persuade their people to accept it, and some other governments would also probably acquiesce.⁵

⁵ The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, considers that paragraph 12, as written, overemphasizes the unfavorable reaction of neutralist elements in the Free World. He believes that restrained, well timed publicity could stimulate both governmental and popular support for a US reconnaissance program and that the governments and informed peoples of the Free World would draw encouragement from the knowledge that the US was able to penetrate Soviet secrecy. This would do much to offset the effects of a violent Soviet denouncement. He would, therefore, substitute the following for paragraph 12:

"12. The governments of the principal countries of the Free World, as well as military, official, and some other segments of opinion in these countries, are well aware of the requirement for effective intelligence on the USSR to maintain Free World security, and would support the US reconnaissance satellite program. Such support could be broadened and reinforced and the impact of violent Soviet denouncements and threats reduced by a restrained, well timed information program. Such a program could have some effect in converting neutralist opposition to acquiescence. Many governments and peoples of the Free World would be favorably impressed and encouraged by evidence that the US could in fact penetrate Soviet secrecy; by the same token they would be discouraged and disappointed if they were given reason to believe that the US was unable to achieve such penetration. Favorable reactions in Allied countries might be enhanced by joint Allied association with the program, though not all objections would be overcome. Even in the event of violent Soviet denouncements and threats, the US program would have substantial popular acceptance as well as the support of most Allied governments." [Footnote is in the original.]

259. Letter From Gates to Goodpaster¹

Washington, August 10, 1960

Dear Andy:

I tabled this paper with the Joint Chiefs of Staff this afternoon, and it is the subject we wish to cover with the President tomorrow morning at 10:15.

In view of the fact that Admiral Burke is planning to attend to protest this proposal, I felt you at least would want to read it first, and perhaps even informally discuss it with the President prior to our arrival. I expect to review the entire subject with the President when we arrive for our meeting.

Sincerely,

Thomas S. Gates

¹ Source: Transmits draft paper on target coordination and associated problems. Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary.

Enclosure

Draft Memorandum From Gates to JCS Chairman

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Target Coordination and Associated Problems

REFERENCES

- (a) JCSM-171-59 dtd 8 May 1959 (Memo to SecDef from JCS)
- (b) CM-380-59 dtd 17 August 1959 (Memo to SecDef fr Chrm., JCS)
- (c) CM-386-59 dtd 24 August 1959 (Memo to JSC fr Chrm., JCS)
- (d) JCSM-193-60 dtd 6 May 1960 (Memo to SecDef from JCS)
- (e) JCSM-273-60 dtd 29 June 1960 (Memo to SecDef from JCS)
- (f) JCSM-380-60 dtd 7 July 1960 (Memo to SecDef from JCS)
- (g) SM-696-60 dtd 20 July 1960 (Memo to JCS signed by Admiral Blouin, Secretary, JCS)

1. By the referenced memoranda the Secretary of Defense has received for decision or as a basis of discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff matters relating to command and control of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Forces, strategic targeting and associated problems.

2. After exhaustive discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and study of the referenced documents, I have concluded as follows:

a. It is neither necessary nor desirable to establish at this time a Unified Strategic Command.

b. The National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, attached as Tab A, should be promulgated.

c. A national strategic target list (NSTL) should be developed and maintained which is responsive to the policy.

d. The Joint Staff is not organized, manned or equipped to develop and to maintain the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) responsive to the approved policy.

e. CINCSAC is capable of developing and maintaining the NSTL and should be designated the Director of Strategic Target Planning (Tab B), an agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose responsibilities will be delineated in Tab A.

f. A single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for attack of the targets on the NSTL is needed to insure maximum effectiveness, mutual support of forces, and economy of force.

g. The DSTP should develop the SIOP responsive to the policy (Tab A) in accordance with Tab C.

3. It is desired that CINCSAC be immediately informed of his designation as DSTP, the policy (Tab A[B]), and requested to advise the Secretary of Defense promptly through the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his proposed organization and manning requirements to carry out the functions of DSTP.

4. In the light of the above decisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, as a matter of priority, advise me of their views in regard to the remaining questions stated in CM-386-59, reference (c) above.

Tab A

NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGETING AND ATTACK POLICY

1. *Intent.* To provide guidance for the optimum employment of appropriate United States atomic delivery forces in the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

2. *Objectives.* The basic objective of this policy is to establish an essential national task to be accomplished under the several conditions under which hostilities may be initiated. Specific objectives are:

a. Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and government controls of major importance.

b. Destroy the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent necessary to paralyze its economy.

3. *Method of Accomplishment.* In planning the strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential, a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a single integrated operational plan (SIOP) shall be developed which will provide for the optimum integration of the committed forces for the attack of a minimum list of targets, the destruction of which will accomplish the objectives stated in paragraph 2 above.

4. *Responsibilities.* The responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and of the Director of Strategic Target Planning are as follows:

a. *Joint Chiefs of Staff.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

- (1) Be responsible for National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy.
- (2) Review and approve the NSTL and the SIOP.
- (3) Specify the date on which the SIOP will become effective.

b. *Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands.* The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

- (1) Provide permanent senior representation at the headquarters of the Director of Strategic Target Planning.
- (2) Commit appropriate forces to the attack of targets of the NSTL and insure the timely execution of these attacks in consonance with the SIOP.
- (3) Program no attacks against targets on the NSTL unless provided for by the SIOP.

c. *Director of Strategic Target Planning.*

(1) There shall be a Director of Strategic Target Planning, who as agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

(a) Organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning staff consisting of personnel from the various services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions.

(b) Develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSTL.

(c) Submit the NSTL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, highlighting points of difference which he resolved during the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP.

(2) There shall be a Deputy Director of Strategic Target Planning of flag or general rank who shall be selected by the Director of Strategic Target Planning and who shall be of a different service than the Director.

5. *Damage and Assurance Criteria.* Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the NSTL will be based on the criteria set forth below:

a. Damage Criteria. In applying these damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. It is recognized that variations from established probabilities will be desirable in order to adjust to variable target configurations, yields and CEP's of available weapons, characteristics of delivery vehicles, and other operational factors.

(1) Ninety percent probability of severe damage to military targets directly related to atomic delivery capability.

(2) Ninety percent probability of severe damage to military and government controls of major importance.

(3) Ninety percent probability of severe damage to 50 percent of industrial floor space in major urban areas.

b. Assurance Criteria. Taking account of all pertinent operational factors, plans and operations will be based upon achieving a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to targets on the NSTL.

Tab B

Memorandum for General Power, USAF

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Director of Strategic Target Planning

1. You are hereby designated Director of Strategic Target Planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Your task, responsibility and authority are as contained in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy dated _____.

3. Selected portions of Study 2009 are being forwarded to you under separate cover. Access to this study will be on a strict need-to-know basis in connection with your duties as Director of Strategic Target Planning.

Tab C

Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Commanders

Washington, undated

MEMORANDUM FOR

Director, Strategic Target Planning
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, Alaska
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Commander in Chief, Caribbean
Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe
Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

SUBJECT

Implementation of Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (U)

1. In consonance with "National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy" dated _____, the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) will develop for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the unified commanders the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) as a matter of priority.

a. NSTL. The NSTL will consist of a minimum number of specific targets whose timely and assured destruction will accomplish the specific objectives set forth in paragraph 2 of the policy.

b. SIOP. The SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the several possible ways in which hostilities may be initiated and will:

- (1) Govern all attacks on all targets listed in the NSTL.
- (2) Determine the targets to be attacked based on the capabilities and limitations of committed forces.
- (3) Determine the effort against each target consistent with the worth of the target and damage and assurance criteria specified in paragraph 5 of the policy.

(4) Integrate individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, ECM, etc.

2. In accomplishing this task, direct liaison with any agency of the Department of Defense is authorized.

3. In accordance with the foregoing, the DSTP shall submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 14 December 1960 and on (date) of each year thereafter the following:

a. The NSTL, consisting of all installations under attack in the SIOP. These installations will be grouped together by Target Data Inventory (TDI) major reference number.

b. The SIOP in a format which can be readily reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DGZ's selected for various conditions of warning supplemented with:

(1) The list of the weapons, delivery forces, and the unified and specified commanders furnishing those forces programmed for each DGZ.

(2) The list of the installations under attack by weapons assigned to each DGZ.

c. An over-all damage assessment summary by country for each category of essential enemy resources attacked to include the assurance of attaining specified levels of destruction under the following assumed conditions for initiation of war:

(1) U.S. attack with full strategic warning.

(2) U.S. attack with tactical warning under initial circumstances that are reasonably likely to occur.

d. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization prescribed.

4. *Participating Commands and Forces.* The commanders of all unified and specified commands shall advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the attack of targets on the NSTL and which should be included in the SIOP. The inclusion of forces in the SIOP constitutes a first priority commitment.

5. The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority. It is recognized that points of difference involving tactics, use of forces, etc., may develop between the commanders of unified or specified commands and the DSTP. Such differences will be resolved by DSTP to permit completion of the SIOP and will be highlighted in presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their review and approval.

6. The unified and specified commanders will meet at the Headquarters, DSTP, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, on 14, 15, and 16 December 1960, to review with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the initial NSTL and SIOP.

260. Draft Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 11, 1960

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President on SecDef's Proposal to turn Targeting and the Preparation of Single Integrated Operational Plan over to SAC

1. Present:

The President
SECDEF Gates
Deputy SECDEF Douglas
General Twining
Admiral Burke
General Goodpaster
Colonel Eisenhower

2. The SecDef, using his written proposal as a guide, discussed in general the points in his policy paper only. He did not discuss the details contained in his TAB C, a copy of which I do not have but which was, I think, the directive for preparation of the target list and the single integrated operational plan.

3. SecDef stated that he had worked on this for a long, long time with everybody he could think of, and he had drawn it up with the help of Mr. Douglas and General Twining. He said that it did not give any Service all the things it wanted. For example, the Air Force wanted a unified strategic command, and he did not approve of that. The Army originally wanted to have the Joint Staff develop the target list but now went along with this proposal. He repeated the arguments which were used yesterday on the policy for his paper.

¹ Source: Record of a meeting among Eisenhower, Department of Defense leaders, Twining, and Burke on turning over responsibility for targeting and SIOP to SAC. No classification marking. 8 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP Briefing. Drafted by Burke.

4. SecDef stated that everybody agreed with this but Admiral Burke and that he felt very much concerned about it and had asked to see the President.

5. I then used my handwritten paper as a basis for discussion with the President and followed it very closely.

6. The final result, after two hours of discussion, was that the President stated he did not want to make a final decision now and perhaps later have to revise it just before he left office. He did want to make the final decision before he left office if it were in any way possible. He in general agreed with Mr. Gates' ideas, but he agreed with my concept that we should try and see what it is before a final decision was made. CINCSAC, with a joint staff and with the help of the Unified Commanders, is to draw up a national target list and a plan in the same manner, and using the same data to present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the middle of November or first of December. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and everybody else will be given an opportunity to completely analyze, check and correct this plan. After that, if there is disagreement, it may be brought before the President for a decision again.

7. Coming back in the car the people from the Department of Defense wondered how this could be done, and I stated by simply ordering the people in there and asking them to do it.

COMMENTS:

I fear there will be attempts to make the final decision now to do it, and with the idea of making corrections in the procedures in three or four months but not change the method.

8. There were a great many comments most of which I probably have forgotten. The following comments are not in the order that they were made.

9. First, the President said that this was apparently an emotional issue because he could see both from General Twinings remarks and mine that there was emotion involved in this, and he hoped that objective men could arrive at some satisfactory answer.

10. The President believed that this was not a problem which really should have come to him because he felt it was merely a procedural problem. He said Burke agrees that there should be a single integrated operational plan and he agreed that the people have to follow it. He just disagrees on who makes it out. He wants it made by the Joint Staff and the SecDef wants it made by CINCSAC.

11. I said, no, that's not quite it. I think that if SAC makes these two there will be completely different target lists and completely different operational plans than if the Joint Staff makes it. That's one point. The other point is that we, the Joint Chiefs, can exercise control and

influence over the development of these papers if they are CIN Joint Staff, but they cannot do this if they are [illegible in the original] or any other agency. The third point is that I do not believe that all the details or routing, timing, subsidiary targets, ECM and those things should be included in a fixed rigid plan made by one commander for the forces of another commander. I felt that the Unified Commanders should have some leeway.

12. At one point General Twining said that the Navy would not let this thing work, that we would wreck it. Apparently the President has been told this a good many times by somebody. I remonstrated and said I thought that was an unfair accusation, but nobody picked it up much but me, although I think the President did perhaps not like it very much. The President talked on all sides of the problem at various times but obviously wanted to agree with Tom Gates as much as he possibly could. He said as far as who did it was concerned it didn't seem to make any difference to him, the Joint Chiefs would be able to check it.

13. I reexplained the difficulties that the Joint Chiefs would have in checking it and emphasized that if the Joint Chiefs organization could not make the plan out in the first place they would have great difficulty in checking it, particularly if it had to be done in a hurry by the Chiefs themselves.

14. The President was not very much impressed with the NATO difficulties I pointed out because they did not have any capability now. He said of course they would want to get into the planning later on, but that can be done somehow no matter what system we adopted. I didn't bear down on this point.

15. I emphasized many times that I felt that Mr. Gates thought there would be a short target list and an operational plan which would be easily followed, but I suspected something considerably different from this and I thought it was very important that we see what came out of it before we buy it. We went [illegible in the original] this ground over and over and over again. Most of my stuff was in the original paper I wrote, repeating it.

16. Tom got awfully close to accusing me of disloyalty. He didn't quite say it. I don't think he mentioned it. Although I'm not so sure now because this happens too often. Not quite disloyalty, it isn't that, it's just that I'm not a member of the team. The Navy is always the shouter. Nate made no bones about it. He said: Mr. President, unless we make a decision to do this now, an irrevocable decision, the Navy will wreck it. He said if you delay this I am sure Tommy White will come over here and not like it at all. Now the President took him apart on that a little

bit gently. He said he didn't see any reason why they couldn't wait and make a final decision sometime later.

17. I left all of my notes over with Andy Goodpaster and he's going to send them back. I didn't quite read them all and he can get them all down in his notes, see some of the points I didn't make. I didn't quite get finished. The discussion got so hot I never came back to the paper.

18. Goodpaster never entered into the argument. He never does. Mr. Douglas entered into the argument. Everybody did, all three of them did. I have forgotten what points Douglas especially made, except that SAC has this great capability. Of course Polaris entered into it. Service positions entered into it.

19. The President insisted over and over again we've got to have a single plan and people have got to follow it. Don't you agree with that, Burke? Yes, sir, Mr. President, I do agree with it, but the plan has got to be right. It can't be detailed and it's got to be made with the full realization of the other things that have to be done other than this, and to do these things most efficiently there must be enough leeway left to the commanders so that they do them most efficiently, but certainly you are absolutely correct. There must be a list of targets which must be struck at a certain specific time.

20. The President made the point that all he was looking for was the first strike. He said this is the first strike, the first 24 hours. After that of course the Unified Commanders must use their forces the way they see fit under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

21. I thought a couple of times that Tom implied that they had to get somebody, if people were objective, they would accept his plan, that's what he was really saying. People who didn't accept the plan were not objective, too much Service bias. Nate picked up right after that and talked about the awful Navy. I thought sure "there goes the whipsaw". I was just about ready to say "if that is your opinion then obviously I shouldn't be here." I just started to say it. I counted and I didn't, but it very nearly came out. Maybe I should have. That was pretty serious.

22. We have got to get the word around somehow that the Air Force is wrecking the hell out of this joint. This is one of them. Either you do it my way or I won't play. That's the Air Force, and they got their way completely on this, except for this one thing—the final decision is not made yet. That's the only thing we got and we've got to throw some of our very best people in this because in this decision Tom Gates, Douglas and Twining have all made up their minds absolutely what they will do in January no matter what decision is made. They talked about it. If

the thing doesn't work in January, then what should we do, get a new SAC commander? Maybe it's the man. That's not it. Douglas said that.

23. The President listened. I really don't know whether I made the points well or not. There's no doubt about it, after two hours you get tired of clawing your way up the cliff over and over again.

24. I think the President was the only one there who would listen at all. The other people, they just don't want to see—I'm afraid. Our job now is to get this paper ready. I suspect they'll call a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gates and Twining will probably go over this, [illegible in the original] "copy everything down that you can". The only thing I care about is the final result, that the final decision will not be made until the two [illegible in the original] been tested and checked and analyzed by every agency that knows how to do it, and everybody that wants to do it. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to do this thing, they can do it, but it must be done quickly. So we've got to get our corps of experts here and this is the most important thing we've got to do. Not to tear it to pieces. We want to make this thing work because if it does work, it will be helpful, but I don't think it can work. But if it does God bless us, let's make it work. What I didn't say to Twining was: Supposing this thing is lousy (and I think it will be) in January, that's the reason why you don't want to give it a trial, that you want to make the decision now because you feel you don't want to let it all show the light of day.

25. I am afraid I used my quota of mercy with the President—which is all right. I think he took the only decision he could take under the circumstances because he could not decide to throw this into the Joint Chiefs of Staff now. He could not have decided that with the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman all against it. What disappointed me a little bit was he used so many of their arguments back in trying to persuade me. I know that's a technique.

26. I came away with the same opinion I had when I went in there. I didn't get mad. Nobody got mad. Twining got a little emotional.

27. Captain Aurand, who had been present at the debrief, made the following comments: I think one of the most important points is this business is just the first strike. From there on the Unified Commands do their own planning and also consideration must be given in the initial plan for this posture that it will leave and which the Unified Commanders will be left. Twining cannot ignore that. It can't be that all out.

261. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 15, 1960

SUBJECT

Conversation with Mr. Gates on the preparation of the NSTL and SIOF, 15 Aug 60

1. I asked for an audience with Mr. Gates at 1345 on Monday.

2. I told Mr. Gates that I had heard enough rumors in regard to my attitude and the Navy's attitude to warrant explaining directly to him what my attitude was so that there would be no doubt whatever in his mind. In addition to the rumors, there was a smear campaign started against Burke and against the Navy which was as yet in the generating stage. Nothing serious had come up yet. They were just laying the groundwork. This was evident in the papers over the weekend. The papers by themselves would not have caused me any concern but I was warned by one of my friends in the newspaper business who called up and asked what was the campaign going on against Burke. What had I done? What was I so uncooperative about? Why was not I a team-player? He thought I was a teamplayer. I told him I did not know what it was all about whereupon he said I just wanted to let you know there are stories that are being spread which you should know about.

3. I told Mr. Gates that because of these stories I wanted him to know directly that although I did not agree one damned bit with his decision and the President's support of his decision, the decision was made and I and the Navy would support it. I told him that he should know that from his past experience and that I was disconcerted first—when General Twining was talking to the President and stated that the only reason this thing might not work would be that the Navy would not want to make it work. As he would remember, I replied that if this plan were put into effect and it failed, it would not fail because the Navy would not try to make it work but because some other group did or because the system itself was wrong. Also I was concerned when I had heard rumors that Mr. Gates had made statements and I think he had made them to me too, that he expected to bear reverberations from the Navy on this, that he expected to be crucified by the Navy, and other similar things. I said he ought to know better than that. The Navy was not going to do any such thing, although naturally there would be great disappointments and there would be some comment but there was not going to be any general attack on Mr. Gates.

¹ Source: Record of a meeting between Burke and Gates on preparation of NSTL and SIOF. Top Secret; Hold Closely; No Distribution. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOF Briefing.

4. Mr. Gates said he really did know that, but that he particularly did not mean the leadership of the Navy. He knew that we would support the decisions that were made if we accepted the decision at all. If we were to fight we would fight above board. However, he said that he had had great experience since he had been in the Secretary of Defense office. There had been many occasions when subordinate people in all Services kept fighting for their own Services against the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. I said that I did not know about that. I didn't think the Navy was really very much involved in that sort of business. Before the decision was made, that could be true. There would be presentations which all the Services would put on to favor their own projects and that sort of business.

5. I again repeated that I wanted Mr. Gates to know exactly where I stood, that I had taken this thing to the President although I knew when I asked to see the President that the President would have to stand by the Secretary of Defense's basic decision. What I wanted to do then was to impress upon the President and upon the Secretary of Defense, and everybody else two things. First, the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had to know what they were doing. They had to get into the basic data. They had to have the basic data available to them. They had to analyze the NSTL and the SIOP. They had to be able to do this completely, thoroughly and in any way it might turn out to be most convenient to do it. This meant that all data, raw data, finished data, working data, everything else had to be made available to the JCS in the event the JCS wanted it. And to the [illegible in the original] of the JCS.

6. Mr. Gates said I certainly had made that point clear enough. And he agreed with it. He was sure the President understood it. The President had said that in different words himself when talking about the means of doing this.

7. I then said the second reason why I wanted to take this to the President was to prevent a snow job. I knew that Mr. Gates expected a reasonable target list and a reasonable operational plan to come out of this organization. I did not think it would come out unless extraordinary efforts were taken. I meant to take those extraordinary efforts. And I wanted to make sure that everybody knew that those extraordinary efforts would be necessary and that was one of the reasons why I wanted to make sure that all of the data would be available for checking. What I was afraid of was that the atomic weapons requirements and the force levels, the disposition of forces, the whole budget procedure could be changed radically if these documents were not well analyzed, studied not only by the Joint Chiefs but also by the Unified Commanders.

8. Mr. Gates agreed with this thoroughly.

9. He then said that one of the reasons and by no means the least reason why he wanted to get this done now was because of what he was afraid was coming in the next Administration regardless of who was elected. He said that this would permit the Joint Chiefs to get hold of SAC. He was going to speak to General Power in very harsh terms. He did not like what Power had done to date. He was going to tell Power exactly what he thought and exactly what Power would have to do in order to make this thing reasonable and to make it work. He also said that this procedure would permit the Navy and the other Services, but mostly the Navy because the Navy had the most to lose, to escape from a more radical reorganization later on. He thought that unless something were done now that we would surely be faced with a strategic command in which SAC or the Air Force would take command of the Naval delivery units sometime in the future. He thought this decision he had made would prevent that. He said that perhaps in two years from now the Navy would feel like giving him a Guggenheim Medal. I said that perhaps that was correct if it came out the way he expected it to come out which I was going to try to make it do, he should have a Guggenheim Medal. The thing that I was still afraid of was that there was a long road ahead, and a lot of turning-off paths, a lot of slippery places and I was still fearful that SAC would get hold of a budget in such a way that nobody could reexamine it.

Arleigh Burke

262. Memorandum of Discussion at the 458th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, September 7, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 458th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 7, 1960

Present at the 458th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense (Douglas); and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council actions

¹ Source: Agenda item 4: Civilian Readiness Base. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Secretary of Commerce (attending for Items 3 and 4 and participating in action on Item 5). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency (Washburn); the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary (Boggs), NSC; and Mr. Robert H. Johnson, NSC.²

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are pages 2–7.]

4. CIVILIAN READINESS BASE

(NSC Action No. 2114–c; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 59; NSC Actions Nos. 2131–c and 2254; NSC 5912, Part 4)

Governor Hoegh began his presentation by summarizing the provisions of Paragraph 59–b of NSC 5906/1 (Basic National Security Policy) and then took up each of the elements mentioned in that paragraph in turn. In his discussion Governor Hoegh also referred to the national plan for civil defense and defense mobilization which is supported by fifty state plans, 2400 community and county plans, and 240 metropolitan area plans. He said that the national plan had served as a model for many NATO countries. He pointed out that Congressional approval of administrative matching funds for civil defense will make available \$1 million per month and will materially improve civil defense at the state and local level.

Turning first to the civil defense program, Governor Hoegh displayed a chart showing some of the conclusions of WSEG (Weapons Systems Evaluation Group) Study No. 45. In particular he called the Council's attention to the conclusion that, with an assumed 2000-megaton attack on the U.S. and assuming no shelters and no anti-ICBM system, 97 million casualties would occur. With the best possible anti-ICBM system but no shelters, casualties would be 68 million. However, with fallout shelters and no anti-ICBM system, casualties would be 14 million. The report concluded that the effect of fallout shelters in protecting the U.S. population was far more significant than active defense alone, while the two combined would be still better.

² Add Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., CIA

Mr. Morris Fishow, CIA

Mr. Knight McMahan, CIA [Footnote is in the original.]

Governor Hoegh described the steps that had been taken to implement the present fallout shelter policy. He noted that the information and training program had been accelerated and that \$60 million worth of television and radio time had been provided at a cost of only \$900,000 to the Government. He briefly described the adult education program. He pointed out that sample surveys indicate that 25 per cent of the population can be adequately protected against fallout in existing buildings without structural modification. He noted that research had been accelerated. He stated that over 200 prototype dual-use shelters are being constructed and that the FY 1961 budget provided funds to complete this prototype program. Governor Hoegh said that incorporation of fallout shelters in federal buildings was an essential aspect of federal leadership and example under existing policy but Congress has failed to support this aspect of the program. He noted that federal loan and grant programs, such as those of the Veterans Administration and the Federal Housing Administration (and a number of others), can now be used to assist shelter construction.

Governor Hoegh stated that a Gallup Poll had shown that 71 per cent of the American people favor fallout shelters and 38 per cent had indicated that they would be willing to construct fallout shelters at their own expense up to a cost of \$500. Since fallout shelters can be built for \$100–\$300, this percentage could be increased to 50–60 per cent. Governor Hoegh stated that the construction materials industry had been helpful in promoting the shelter program.

Governor Hoegh emphasized that without federal leadership and example, the national shelter policy would not succeed. Congressional support for the program has been less than expected at the time the policy was adopted; Congress had approved less than one-third of the funds requested. However, Governor Hoegh believed that the policy will eventually produce the desired results. It might be necessary, however, to stimulate action by more funds for education and by more incentives.

Governor Hoegh pointed out that when an enemy attack is detected, we can today warn 376 critical points in the U.S. within fifteen seconds. This was being expanded to 460 points. Our goal in radiological defense is at least one federal monitoring station in each of the three thousand counties by the end of 1963. We now have more than 1500 such stations.

Turning next to support of the military logistics base, Governor Hoegh stated that while the goals of the military logistics program had not yet been translated into detailed industrial requirements, it was clear that overall industrial capacity was sufficient to meet military demands in all situations short of general nuclear war.

Governor Hoegh then briefly discussed the status of the stockpile and manpower programs and stated that he would deal with

that aspect of the mobilization program relating to support for foreign economic policies in connection with the last item on the Council's agenda. He then turned to survival and recovery planning. [*text not declassified*] This program, however, is presently being restudied. The \$3.8 million in the FY 1961 budget to begin the protection program was not appropriated. Reliance, meanwhile, is being placed on the [*text not declassified*]. Governor Hoegh noted that construction would begin in December on the first of the underground regional control centers. He stated that \$212 million in medical supplies were dispersed in 43 federal warehouses or pre-positioned in the states and local communities. Studies indicated that these supplies had a high probability of survival. He referred to the President's approval of a new plan covering requirements for medical supplies estimated at \$723 million.

Concluding his presentation, Governor Hoegh returned to the fallout shelter program. He stated that the basic elements underlying our present policy were sound and workable. It was too early to demonstrate their success or failure. He again emphasized the importance of federal example. Without it, he stated, a more forceful policy and one involving a greater degree of federal financial responsibility would be required.

The President referred to Governor Hoegh's description of the stockpiling program and asked whether the stockpiles, in particular those of strategic metals, were located outside the population centers. Governor Hoegh stated they were located in 240 communities. Much of the materiel, he said, was in the area in which it would be processed; much, of it was in or adjoining a city. The President expressed the view that the stockpiles ought to be away from the cities and that they did not constitute much of a reserve if they were in the cities.

Mr. Gray pointed out that existing policy called for construction of fallout shelters in new federal buildings but that it excluded military buildings. It was not clear, Mr. Gray stated, whether we had plans for inclusion of such shelters in military construction. In response, Governor Hoegh said that Secretary Gates had on July 28 issued a policy which was in line with the policy on non-military construction. It provides for surveys and for incorporation of shelters in military buildings as funds are available. Secretary Douglas observed that no funds have been available for this purpose although they had been requested. Governor Hoegh said that the new DoD policy was helpful and could be quoted in dealings with Congress.

The President inquired as to whether Governor Hoegh thought it would be helpful if he were to build a shelter in his own home. He referred to previous discussion of this question and to the possibility that such action might just scare the American people. Governor Hoegh expressed the view that such action would be helpful in stimulating the people to take action. He noted that Prime Minister Diefenbaker is building himself a shelter and so are twenty-five governors. Secretary

Douglas noted that the President had on other occasions raised questions as to the effect of the U.S. adoption of a major shelter program on our allies. This, Secretary Douglas observed, was a difficult question to answer. The President stated that if the program were on a compulsory basis, the effects would be bad but that as long as it was on the basis of federal leadership and example, with the people taking responsibility for shelter construction, the effects would not be adverse. He asked whether Sweden did not have a large shelter program. Governor Hoegh said that seven countries require that shelters be included in all multiple-family dwellings.

Secretary Douglas asked whether we could really expect much progress in the shelter program without some federal assistance. Governor Hoegh expressed the view that we could. If Congress provided funds for fallout shelters in new federal buildings, it would be the signal to the American people to go to work. Many were building shelters already. As industry gets at this problem and gets its sales force out all over the country selling shelters, there would be a considerable increase in shelter construction.

Mr. McCone inquired whether there was not a Bureau of the Budget policy which prevented construction of shelters in federal buildings. Mr. Staats pointed out that the House Committee had written into legislation a prohibition of shelter construction in federal buildings. Thus, even where the Government had funds available, it could not use them for this purpose. In response to an inquiry from Mr. McCone, Mr. Staats indicated that this prohibition applied not just to 1961 money but to all federal funds. The President observed that if we had a real scare, it would be interesting to see what these same Congressmen would say about shelters. Governor Hoegh observed that the Senate always went along with the Administration on these matters but that the House had been very arbitrary. Mr. Gray noted that Congress had not neglected to construct shelters in new Congressional buildings. Secretary Douglas stated that there was a wider acceptance of the idea of shelters in the military services today than one, two or three years ago. What worried the military was the credibility of our deterrent when the U.S. had done little to protect its own population.

There was some discussion of Governor Hoegh's reference to the fact that surveys indicated that 25 per cent of the population could be protected from fallout in existing buildings. Mr. McCone asked if these buildings were properly sealed. Governor Hoegh said that they were adequate. In the course of this discussion, Governor Hoegh stated that if Congress would provide funds for surveys of existing structures, local governments would provide supplies to stock them. Governor Hoegh noted that General Mills had developed a processed food, a gallon can of which would cost \$2.50 and would provide one person sufficient food for two weeks. He also noted that the best examples of fallout shelters were in Kansas and Oklahoma where people

had suffered from cyclones and where they were constructing cyclone shelters that were also good fallout shelters. In response to a question from the President, Governor Hoegh indicated that 18 inches of concrete or two feet of earth were now considered adequate protection from fallout. Previously two feet of concrete or three feet of earth were considered to be necessary. This difference arose from the fact that earlier studies had indicated that a dosage of 75 roentgens would cause illness whereas recent tests indicated that it took 200 roentgens to produce illness.

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject, in the light of an oral presentation by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, based upon a report prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2131-c and the forthcoming annual report on the status of the civil and defense mobilization program as of June 30, 1960.

5. *U.S. IMPORT COMPETITION AS EXEMPLIFIED BY CASES
UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION
ACT OF 1958*

(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(14); Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 12, 1960)

Governor Hoegh's presentation was based upon the reference memorandum of July 12, 1960. When Governor Hoegh had concluded his presentation, Secretary Herter observed that the guidelines developed by OCDM were very good and that extraordinary good sense had been shown in the examination of these cases. Secretary Mueller stated that he agreed completely with Governor Hoegh's report and noted that a few of the cases that had been brought under Section 8 should have been brought as escape clause actions. In fact, they had been brought as escape clause cases at the same time that they were brought under Section 8 as a device for getting action in one area or the other.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject, in the light of an oral presentation by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, based on the enclosures to the reference memorandum of July 12, 1960.

b. Concurred generally in the guidelines which the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, has applied in making determinations under Section 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958.

Robert H. Johnson

263. Briefing Note for the September 15 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, September 14, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Continental Defense

1. The first item before the Council is a Discussion Paper submitted by the PB on the subject of Continental Defense. The purpose of the paper is to provide the basis for a discussion by the Council of factors which in the judgment of the PB require a reassessment of our Continental Defense Policy. To this end, there are presented in the Discussion Paper six questions, some of the answers to which will have an important bearing on recommendations which the PB will make at a later date for specific revisions of the statement of U.S. Policy on Continental Defense presently set forth in NSC 5802/1.

2. In laying the predicate for the questions subsequently dealt with in the Discussion Paper, the PB has presented in Parts II and III a resume of Soviet Capabilities (drawn from relevant NIE's) and an analysis of U.S. Policies and Capabilities having a bearing on the subject. At the risk of doing an injustice to the PB's assessment appearing on pages 2 through 8 of the Paper, it can be summarized in briefest fashion as follows:

a. Our present Continental Defense Policy was adopted during a period when the Soviet manned bomber force was the primary threat to the protection of our retaliatory capability based on the North American Continent, and that period is drawing to an end. (By the end of 1960 the Soviet ICBM threat will constitute a grave threat to U.S. metropolitan areas—by 1961 it will present an extremely dangerous threat to SAC bomber bases, ICBM sites and command installations—and in a few years the principal threat will be Soviet ICBM's, supplemented by a mix of heavy and medium bombers, increased numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and possibly cruise type missiles.)

b. The advent of major Soviet ICBM capability, and a consequent reduction in the reliability of our early warning capability, raise a question as to the continuing validity of those provisions of present policy which are geared to the concept that attack warning would permit the launching of a significant portion of our SAC force before its destruction on the ground; would provide the lead time required for alerting key military forces; would permit the making of decisions by key officials

¹ Source: U.S. policy on continental defense. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

and the communication of those decisions; and would allow time for evacuation and relocation of the civilian population.

c. Moreover, the present policy places predominant emphasis on *active* defenses as compared with passive defenses for the protection of our retaliatory capability and our population. The PB's paper suggests that continued predominant emphasis on active over passive defenses is questionable. It is reflected in the Discussion Paper that the improvements visualized in 1958 for our active defense against nuclear attack have not materialized—quite to the contrary, it is reported that our major active defense system against ballistic missiles now under research and development (NIKE-ZEUS) would not produce an operational system within the next 10 years, barring unforeseen break-throughs.

d. Therefore, the PB has taken a preliminary look at our present Continental Defense Policy in the light of present-day estimates of an imminent Soviet ICBM capability, and in the light of our actual and potential capabilities and vulnerabilities, and as a result the PB has blocked out the six questions which appear on page 1 of the Discussion Paper and are subsequently discussed at some length in the Paper. I will read the questions as background to a presentation which will be made by the Department of Defense. The Defense presentation will address itself to Questions 1, 2, and 6, and reference will be made to Question 3. After the presentation, I will come back to Questions 4 and 5.

3. *CALL ON* the Secretary of Defense to introduce the Defense presentation.

4. (*After the Defense presentation.*) I would like now to refer briefly to Questions 4 and 5 of the Discussion Paper which were not dealt with in the Defense Presentation:

Question No. 4. The background of this question is set forth in paragraphs 49 through 65 of the Discussion Paper, beginning on page 15. The basic consideration is that our "low key" shelter policy was adopted on the premise that improved *active* defense was attainable—an expectation which is apparently not to be realized for at least 10 years insofar as an anti-ICBM system is concerned. The question posed is whether there should be a substantial increase of emphasis on providing fall-out shelters for the civilian population, or whether there should be a continuation of the present "low key" approach called for in current national policy on "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter" (NSC 5807/2).

Question No. 5. The background of this question is presented in paragraphs 66 through 69 of the Discussion Paper, beginning on page 20. Involved in this question are the concepts in present policy which call for continuity of wartime Government functions through relocation to hardened sites by those who survive an initial missile attack, and their continued functioning under circumstances characterized

by possible loss of communications and command personnel. Unless someone wishes to express views on this subject, the Council will note that OCDM is studying this question.

5. Perhaps the Council would now like to address itself to the questions posed on page 1 of the Discussion Paper, and to related provisions of the proposed Record of Action which is before you.

Question No. 1. Is there discussion on this question?

Question No. 2. Is there discussion on Question No. 2? The Council will note that paragraph *c* of the proposed Record of Action contemplates a study by the Department of Defense on this subject; and the submission of a report which would be included in the annual report on the status of the military program.

Question No. 3. This question was alluded to in the presentation by the Defense Department. This subject is treated in paragraph *d* of the proposed Record of Action, which provides that I would confer with the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding the proposal for a study relating to the matter.

Question No. 4. Is there discussion on this question? The Council will note that paragraph *a* of the proposed Record of Action contemplates that OCDM is to review the full-out shelter policy and will report on progress of the program in an early report to the Council.

Question No. 5. Is there discussion on this question? It will be noted that paragraph *f* of the proposed Record of Action refers to the current re-examination of the subject by OCDM for use in the review of Continental Defense policy.

Question No. 6. Is there discussion on this question? This subject is covered in paragraph *g* of the proposed Record of Action. In this connection, I propose that paragraph *g* of the Record of Action be revised to read: "Noted that any test which involves destroying a satellite or space vehicle should not proceed without specific Presidential approval."

6. It will be noted that the Discussion Paper does not include the Internal Security provisions of Continental Defense Policy (which are being separately considered in the PB), nor the provisions dealing with Port Security (which have already been revised following separate consideration by the Council).

264. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, September 28, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962

REFERENCES

- A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations", dated June 18, 1958
- B. NSC Action No. 1934

The enclosed study on the subject, prepared by an Interdepartmental Study Group consisting of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to agreement between the heads of these agencies and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 6, 1960.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum for Gray

Washington, September 28, 1960

SUBJECT

Study of "Capabilities for Limited Military Operations"

Transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council is the interagency study, "United States and Allied Capabilities

¹ Source: Transmits a study by interdepartmental study group on "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962." Top Secret. Extracts—11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs, Limited Military Operations.

for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962," prepared in accordance with the agreements reached between our respective offices. This paper is the product of a special study group composed of representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. While it has not been given formal Departmental or Agency clearance, it has been presented before the Armed Forces Policy Council and discussed by the undersigned.

This work differs from the limited war study of 1958 in several important respects. It takes into account new developments and capabilities to 1 July 1962 and revises certain assumptions made in 1958, particularly with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons by the opposing sides in limited military operations. Also, greater attention is given to logistic capabilities and implications, and thus its scope is considerably broadened.

The study examines the capabilities for the next two years of U.S. and Allied forces to conduct limited military operations in certain hypothetical situations, employing only those weapons systems now in the armed forces inventory or rapidly approaching that status.

Since the situations considered have not been wargamed and are admittedly based on hypothetical but possible circumstances, the conclusions should not be considered as definitive or restrictive either with respect to future policy actions or in determining the size and nature of United States forces required for limited military operations. Nevertheless, the conclusions are important because they indicate certain strengths and weaknesses in U.S. and Allied capabilities and highlight certain issues of a policy nature which affect those capabilities.

In this context it is a useful and meaningful document.

/s/ Livingston T. Merchant
For The Secretary of State

/s/ Thomas S. Gates
Secretary of Defense

/s/ Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

Interdepartmental Study Group Paper

Washington, July 14, 1959

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UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED
MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

I—INTRODUCTION

A. *AUTHORITY FOR STUDY*

1. An interagency study of U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations was conducted in 1958 pursuant to NSC actions 1842g(4), 1844, 1881, and 1934. Subsequently, it was agreed between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that this study should be periodically reviewed and evaluated. In conversations and exchanges of correspondence during 1959 among the principals concerned, it was agreed that a complete revision should be made, both to account for new developments and to adjust certain assumptions made in the first study, particularly as to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons by the opposing sides in limited military operations. Greater attention was given to logistic implications in the present study, and thus its scope was considerably broadened.

2. Of the 12 geographic areas considered in the 1958 study, the State and Defense Departments agreed on five (Korea, Quemoy/Matsu/Taiwan, Iran, Berlin and Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam) as suitable for more extensive study. Draft terms of reference for the study were then drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Later, the terms of reference were agreed to by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The terms of reference, including the assumptions and scope of the study, are appended as Enclosure "A".

B. *PROCEDURES OF STUDY*

1. An interdepartmental study group, was established with representation from State, Defense (JCS, ISA and DR&E) and CIA. Although the principal from each participating agency drew upon the full resources of his agency, and although meetings were attended by experts on various functional topics and geographic areas, this report represents the views of the interdepartmental study group and does not constitute the official position of any of the participating agencies.

2. The following procedures were used in developing the scenarios, or scripts, for each of the five geographic areas considered in the study: the study group met as a whole to develop general outlines from which the State Department drafted a script on the political situation giving rise to the limited military operations. This was then examined by the group as a whole and when approved in draft, formed the basis for the script on military actions prepared by the Joint Staff. Following

these two steps, the study group made necessary revisions and adjustments and then further developed the political and military situation in the light of such factors as enemy intentions, international (including Communist Bloc) reactions and allied support. CIA drafted that portion of the study dealing with international reactions. Once the basic script had been prepared and approved by the study group, the conclusions were written by the group as a whole.

3. An effort was made by all members of the committee to reflect insofar as possible the views of their agencies. Although the widest possible coordination was achieved, no effort was made to obtain formal agency clearances for the study prior to its completion. Where there were divergencies of views, the matter was resolved in the light of the consensus of the study group.

C. SCOPE OF STUDY

1. The basic assumptions of the study are set forth in the terms of reference appended as Enclosure "A". However, it should be noted that the study had to be conducted within certain artificial limits. For example, each situation had to provide the occasion for U.S. limited military operations. On the other hand, situations likely to lead immediately to general war had to be avoided. Consequently, there was often a conflict between the need to develop a scenario which would permit an examination of U.S. and allied capabilities for conducting limited military operations, and the actual facts of the particular situation, based upon the best current estimates and intelligence. In almost all cases some compromise was necessary, but on the whole, the scenarios developed do reflect both the current situation and the best available judgment of enemy intentions and capabilities and of the probable responses by the United States in the light of existing national security policy. However, since judgments about enemy intentions were specifically designed to support the study, they should not be construed as intelligence estimates for application to actual situations.

2. In several of the studies it was necessary to recognize that when hostilities had reached a certain point it was likely that one side or the other would take steps to terminate it. At the same time it was necessary to continue the development of the situation to permit a more extensive examination of our capabilities. In these cases the device was adopted of noting that the situation might well terminate at a particular "threshold" or level of intensity; but that for the purposes of the study certain assumptions were made to permit the military operations to continue. Where necessary, the military actions were divided into phases in order to take into account alternative assumptions about the most probable ensuing developments.

3. On the matter of weapon systems, the study was based upon those known or expected to be in enemy or U.S. and allied inventories

by the terminal date of the study, 1 July 1962. Therefore, the scenarios could be developed only up to a point to permit examination of particular systems, available and appropriate to the situation.

4. By agreement of the participating agencies, U.S. and allied capabilities for covert military operations and psychological warfare were excluded from the study. The study group recognizes, however, that such capabilities would be relevant to a number of the situations studied.

5. In contrast to the 1958 study in which capabilities for limited military operations were discussed on a general basis and supported by shorter studies of twelve geographical areas, the present study examined five situations (Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Berlin and Laos) which are considered adequately representative of the types of areas and situations in which the United States might conduct limited military operations. Each of the five has been prepared in sufficient detail to stand independently. Together they cover a sufficient range of problems to permit over-all conclusions to be drawn on U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations.

II—OVER-ALL CONCLUSIONS

1. U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studied but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to:

- a. Initiate partial mobilization.
- b. Augment existing military lift capabilities.
- c. Expand the war production base.
- d. Waive financial limitations.

2. The U.S. overall capability for general war would be degraded initially by any one of the five limited military operations studied, except Berlin, although not to an unacceptable degree. The capability of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces for general war would in no case studied, be seriously affected.

3. Although U.S. capabilities might, in some circumstances, be adequate to conduct two of these limited military operations simultaneously, the U.S. over-all capability for general war would, in such circumstances, be degraded to an unacceptable degree.

4. On the basis of the assumptions utilized, the five studies did not indicate a need for change in existing deployments of U.S. forces.

5. Substantial conventional forces—ground, sea and air—were required in all cases studied whether or not nuclear weapons were employed.

6. From the U.S. military point of view, the desirability of initiating the use of nuclear weapons varied in the five cases studied. In Berlin,

Iran, and Laos, their use would not provide a clear military advantage. However, use of [*text not declassified*].

7. Anticipation of the need to initiate a limited military operation along with the earliest possible decisions on its character and objectives, including possible restrictions on weapons systems to be employed, will substantially enhance U.S. and allied capabilities to respond rapidly to the threat.

8. Limited military operations to achieve national objectives are based on a careful balance of political and military considerations which may require restraints on the use of military force. Such restraints may seriously handicap the conduct of military operations and must be kept under continuous review for the purpose of considering their possible revision, where necessary, to achieve established national objectives. The closest possible coordination of political and military decisions and actions will enhance our capability to conduct limited military operations effectively.

9. From a military point of view, it would not be advantageous for U.S. and allied forces to initiate the use of lethal CW/BW agents, principally because current programs provide only a limited capability and because our allies lack protective equipment and training.

10. U.S. employment of non-lethal CW/BW agents would, under certain circumstances, enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces.

11. The United States and its allies presently do not have an adequate capability for counter-guerrilla type limited military operations.

12. If fully committed and used in optimum fashion, the U.S. military airlift, including reserve and national guard, is adequate when augmented from civilian sources for effective support of the individual operations studied in Iran, Laos or Korea, but is not adequate to support two such operations simultaneously.

13. An augmentation of existing sea-lift capabilities would be required in all cases except Berlin. This would vary from a rather small augmentation of existing cargo lift in the Pacific for the Offshore Islands to an extensive augmentation of cargo and passenger lift for Korea—including a transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific of passenger transports.

14. World-wide strategic communications are adequate to support all operations studied except in Southeast Asia, where they would require considerable U.S. augmentation.

15. Pre-stockage of supplies in the European and Far East areas substantially enhances our capabilities to respond promptly and effectively. Although present pre-stocks in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia are minimal and add little to our capabilities to respond, programmed pre-stocks will partially correct this deficiency by 1962.

16. Transit rights and bases in Italy and Turkey are essential to U.S. limited military operations in Iran. Additional over flight, staging and operational rights in advance of U.S. deployment would enhance our ability to deploy forces rapidly.

17. Transit rights and logistic bases are essential in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines for the timely and sustained support of operations in the Western Pacific. In addition, similar rights are essential in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam for successful operations in Southeast Asia.

18. Existing logistic support facilities and air bases in Southeast Asia are inadequate to support sustained operations of U.S. and allied forces. The timing and extent of operations in this area are almost entirely dependent upon the effectiveness of corrective measures to rectify deficiencies.

19. In all cases studied, some degree of mobilization was required, ranging from a modest mobilization of selected reserve units in the Berlin case to a total mobilization of the 1,000,000 man Ready Reserve for Korea.

20. An expansion of the war production base would be required in the event of hostilities in Korea, the Offshore Islands or Laos in order to prevent a dangerous degradation of war reserves in PACOM and CONUS. In the case of Korea and Laos, six months would be required to re-establish these reserves to required levels. In the case of Berlin and Iran, it would be desirable to make preparations for the rapid expansion of the war production base.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the study.]

Enclosure A

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR STUDY OF CAPABILITIES OF FORCES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS (C)

1. To review and update the joint study of United States and Allied capabilities for limited military operations from the present to 1 July 1962.

THE PROBLEM

2. Limited military operations could be in progress in more than one area of the world simultaneously.

ASSUMPTIONS

3. The U.S. military posture will remain substantially unchanged through 1 July 1962.

SCOPE OF STUDY

4. National policy, as set forth in NSC policy papers, will be used as guidance in the consideration of probable U.S. political and military response to the situations examined by the study. These studies should not be inconsistent with national policy.

5. Because they are the most likely situations which might develop and which could involve the United States in limited military operations, the study will consider the following areas: (a) Korea; (b) Quemoy/Matsu/Taiwan; (c) Iran; (d) Berlin; (e) Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam.

6. However, the situations examined pursuant to NSC Action 1842g(4) may be re-examined and updated as appropriate in light of existing conditions and the National Intelligence Estimates.

7. Examination of each situation will include consideration of:

a. U.S. national objectives, to include deterring Communist limited military aggression or, if necessary, to defeat such aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war,

b. U.S. and foreign political backgrounds and implications,

c. Enemy objectives and capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear,

d. U.S. and Allied capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to include logistic capabilities,

e. Effect on U.S. and Allied posture for general war, and,

f. Special political and military problems involved in the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.

8. The study shall be prepared in sufficient detail so as to supersede, rather than augment, the previous study.

9. The study will not extend to the preparation of detailed plans to deal with each situation.

10. Should a situation reach the point of general war, further examination of that situation will be beyond the scope of the study, except that the considerations under paragraph 7 e shall be assessed.

11. Conclusions will be drawn for:

a. Each situation relating to:

(1) Adequacy of U.S. and Allied military capabilities to deal with that situation.

(2) Foreign policy implications.

(3) Other national security implications revealed by the examination.

b. The over-all study relating to:

(1) Adequacy of U.S. and Allied Military capabilities for limited military operations.

(2) Foreign policy implications.

(3) Other national security implications revealed by the examination.

265. Letter From Smith to Irwin¹

Washington, September 28, 1960

Dear Jack:

I thought your presentation to the Armed Forces Policy Council on Tuesday morning was of great interest and importance.

Having thought a good deal about this subject for some years, I would like to pass on a few personal observations in the hope that they may find reflection in any final version of your statement before the NSC.

I recall the conversation that Secretary McElroy, Secretary Herter, you and I had in Geneva in 1959 about the limited war study which was the predecessor of the present one. That study concluded generally that US limited war capabilities were adequate. I stressed that this conclusion was based on the very optimistic assumption that the US could employ nuclear weapons while the enemy would only use conventional weapons. This assumption is not supported by the pertinent national intelligence estimate.

Secretary McElroy then suggested that our limited war capabilities be restudied to determine their adequacy for use against an enemy using nuclear weapons. The present study, I believe, had its origin in those Geneva conversations.

However, it seems to me that this study still leaves largely unexplored the question of whether our limited war forces would be adequate to fight an enemy who also used nuclear weapons.

In the Off Shore islands case, there is some discussion about the possibility of ChiCom use of nuclear air to air weapons, but no conclusions are drawn as to the result of such use on ChiNat/US ability to control the air over Formosa Strait.

I think it would be a service to direct the Council's attention to a place in the report where the question of the possible military consequences of two-way use of nuclear weapons is considered. On pages 121 and 122, after pointing out that there might be some margin, of advantage to the UN forces from an initial exchange, the following language appears:

"In the event the communists expanded the nuclear exchange to include all of South Korea, the extreme vulnerability of the U.N. LOC would become a major consideration. A relatively few weapons

¹ Source: Questions some of the assumptions about non-use of nuclear weapons by Communist forces made in the limited war study. Secret; Personal. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Limited War.

employed on key fixed logistical installations, such as Ascom City and Pusan, would seriously affect the US and Allied capability for sustained combat in Korea. Contrariwise, the communist forces are relatively primitive in nature and their supply requirements are substantially less."

On page 122 and 131, it is concluded that under conditions of a continuing two-way nuclear exchange there would result either a military stalemate or an unpredictable expansion of the conflict. Query as to the significance of this conclusion for any judgment as to the present adequacy of our limited war forces?

I got the impression from listening to the discussion on Tuesday morning that your people continue to assume that there would be US monopoly use of nuclear weapons in limited operations. Is this a wrong impression?

In addition to the proposition "we can't win unless we use nuclear force", I would like to hear more discussion of the question, "Can we win if both sides use nuclear force as our intelligence estimates suggest would occur?"

SNIE 100-7-58 of July 22, 1958, entitled "Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to US Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East" concluded, in part, that

"We believe that if the US used nuclear weapons in meeting Bloc local aggression in the Far East, there would be a grave risk that the Communists would retaliate in kind. . . . If, in the case of Communist aggression against South Korea . . . the US nuclear response were limited to Korea . . . the Communists would probably respond in kind in the same area."

An informal check indicates that our intelligence people believe this SNIE is still valid.

I think it would be most helpful if some time in the future the NSC's attention could be sharply focused on the effect of limited enemy nuclear attacks on our forces.

I am inclined to think that if this is ever done it will lead to a change in our policies and financial allocations to limited war forces.

Perhaps a Net Evaluation Committee study of an attack on the Off Shore islands, assuming both sides use nuclear weapons, would be desirable as a next step in exploring the question of whether it is to US advantage to use nuclear weapons in attempting to win a limited war. I would appreciate your reaction to this last suggestion.

Sincerely,

Gerard C. Smith

266. Memorandum From Rathjens to Kistiakowsky¹

Washington, October 5, 1960

SUBJECT

Comments on Attached Study

1. The main conclusion of the study is that U.S. capabilities for the limited operations studied are adequate. The most serious criticism that can be leveled is that this conclusion is not supported by the analysis. Five case studies are discussed as indicated below:

a). *Berlin*: In this instance it is acknowledged that “the adequacy of U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations in defense of Berlin is dependent upon demonstrated U.S. and Allied resolution to risk general war over this issue, and Soviet unwillingness to accept such risk over Berlin.” (p. 23, para. A) In other words, defense of Berlin is dependent on the credibility of the threat of general war, since our limited capabilities are otherwise inadequate!

b). *Laos*: The introduction of Chinese “volunteer forces” is assumed to be beyond the scope of the study (p. 50, para. G), though it is acknowledged that this would be the most probable consequence of the assumed U.S. attack against N. Viet Nam (p. 52, para. 6).

c). *Iran*: It is acknowledged that if the Soviets follow one of the three courses of action proposed—Course I (open intervention with Soviet forces),—the best we could hope for would be to hold the southern part of the country (p. 63, para. d(3)). It is further stated that such Soviet action is considered beyond the scope of the study (p. 81, para A).

d). *Offshore Islands* and e). *Korea*: In these cases, the judgment is reached that we should use nuclear weapons, but the consequences of enemy use are not explored. It is acknowledged that our logistic base is very vulnerable.

In view of the foregoing, I believe the first conclusion of the study might more accurately be rewritten along the following lines:

U.S. and Allied capabilities are adequate provided the Bloc does not take actions for which they are inadequate.

I think this a sad example of people coming up with a conclusion that they think their bosses want to hear, regardless of the facts and any analysis.

2. In a number of places (e.g., page 20, para. E 1) there is a supposition that the Soviets will not expect, will be unpleasantly surprised by, and will therefore back down in the face of a moderately tough

¹ Source: Comments on limited war study. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

U.S. response. It seems to me that in most of the contemplated circumstances, especially with reference to China, the aggressive actions by the Bloc will have been taken in the expectation, and in spite of the fact, that we will react as strongly as is indicated in each of the several examples.

3. In several instances in the scenarios (e.g., page 49, para. 5 a, page 77, para. F) it is stated that the guidance provided U.S. commanders is to the effect that "military action should be conventional—until it became clear that over-all national objectives could not be achieved in this way." It seems to me that there is the clear implication that the way to get out of a jam is to start throwing nuclear weapons around. This might have been reasonable in 1950, but seems out of date now that the other guys have large numbers too. There seems to be a lingering idea that the use of nuclear weapons is advantageous for our side, an idea not supported by analysis.

4. Particularly as evidenced in the Berlin example, there is an important point that is developed in these studies, but which doesn't seem to have been quite realized, though it is obvious; that is, that in almost all cases where there is a question of the conflict being expanded, it is the U.S. that must make the decision for a qualitative relaxation of limits, e.g., with respect to Berlin, it is we who must cause the first physical violence (knocking down barriers, detonating mines, etc.), and it would be we who would have to make the decision to introduce nuclear weapons, and eventually we who would have to make the decision to start an all-out nuclear exchange. Because we are quantitatively inferior (and in the case of Berlin, particularly, in such a vulnerable position), the Bloc can always increase the scale of fighting gradually and quantitatively, while we must then either back down or make a qualitative decision. I would submit that it is probably easier to make the decision to send in one more division (especially when you know the other guy doesn't have any more) than it is to make the decision to introduce nuclear weapons or start an all-out TN exchange (when you know the other guy has like capabilities).

5. In summary, I think we are probably in a lot weaker position than the authors of this paper would like to have us believe.

Two detailed comments.

a). Apparently the use of improved types of conventional ordnance by the U.S. was not considered in the analysis on the grounds that the secrets here are too precious to risk in a limited war;

b). The airlift analysis is worrisome. The CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) is assumed used though the Korean War was not deemed a sufficient emergency, I believe, to require its use. It is untested. The a/c cannot carry vehicles, guns, etc., because of openings and floor loadings. Resupply of forces by air is an operation that can consume a lot of air lift. In a place like Iran, it would require at least 30 days and more likely

45 to get sea lift there. We *might* have enough airlift to get the forces postulated to Iran in the time assumed. I very much doubt we could support them by air once there. (Will look into this further.)

G.W.R

267. Briefing Note for the October 6 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 5, 1960

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

1. The principal item this morning is the 135-page report on UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962, prepared by an interdepartmental study group from the Department of State and Defense, including representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. You will doubtless recall a similar study that was prepared in 1953 pursuant to NSC directive. Following the presentation of the 1958 study to the Council, it was agreed between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and myself, that the study would be periodically reviewed and evaluated. It was later agreed that a complete revision should be made, both to account for new developments and to adjust certain assumptions made in the earlier study. Mr. Irwin, in his presentation today, will tell you of three adjustments, perhaps the most important of which relates to the possible use of nuclear weapons by the enemy.

2. The earlier study considered twelve geographic areas; the present study addresses five: Berlin, Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam, Iran, The Off-Shore Islands, and Korea. These areas were considered suitable for the more extensive treatment that was called for in the new study. The terms of reference, I might add, were drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and agreed to by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and myself. Mr. Irwin will explain to you certain of the basic limitations of the study, but I should like to ask that you also bear in mind:

¹ Source: Limited war study. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

(1) That the study does *not* contemplate limited military operations against Soviet Armed Forces; because, under the current strategic concept, overt military engagement of USSR and US Armed Forces is deemed to be general war;

(2) That the study, by agreement, does *not* include US and allied capabilities for covert military operations and psychological warfare;

(3) That the study has *not* been given formal Departmental or Agency clearance.

3. At the last Planning Board meeting a number of questions were raised concerning the study, with considerable emphasis on the problem of the possible use of nuclear weapons by *both* sides in limited military operations. Mr. Irwin will touch upon this and other issues in his presentation. With your permission, however, following his presentation I may wish to return to certain of the Planning Board questions and suggestions.

Mr. Irwin.

(CALL ON MR. IRWIN)

(After Mr. Irwin's presentation)

Thank you, Mr. Irwin.

4. Before asking for comments, I *would* like to suggest a sort of ground rule. I think it fair to say that the one clear point of agreement that emerged from the Planning Board discussion of this subject was agreement that the paper is a useful vehicle for raising problems concerning our posture for limited military operations but that decisions on those problems should await further and more detailed study of each. If you agree, Mr. President, I propose that we proceed on that basis: to identify major issues that require further study.

May I now ask the Secretary of State for comments and perhaps questions.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE)

And now may I call on the Secretary of Defense for his views.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

I understand that the Chiefs have certain reservations about the study. Perhaps the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would care to present them in greater detail.

(CALL ON THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

The importance of prompt action regarding mobilization and an expansion of the war production base has been sharply illustrated. May I ask the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for his views, particularly on these two problems.

(CALL ON THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE
MOBILIZATION)

I appreciate the problem for intelligence in a study of this nature. However, I would much appreciate the comments of the Director of Central Intelligence, and especially those relating to possible enemy reaction to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in a Korean or Off-Shore Island situation.

(CALL ON THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY)

And now may I seek the views of science and technology. Dr. Kistiakowsky.

(CALL ON THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)

Are there other comments?

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY)
(CALL ON THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET)

I believe that most of the Planning Board questions have been covered adequately during the course of the discussion,² so I will limit my own observations to two further suggestions:

First, the Off-Shore Islands script covers a most important area of possible conflict, involves the problem of possible use of nuclear weapons, and, at least to me, seem a less contrived situation than that depicted for Korea. For those reasons, I would think that the Off-Shore Islands problem might be usefully and realistically war-gamed. May I suggest, then that the Joint Chiefs be asked to war-game for the Council the Off-Shore Islands script, assuming that the U.S. initiates the use of nuclear weapons as described and that the ChiComs retaliate in kind.

Second, I suggest further that the Joint Chiefs be asked to prepare for the Council a more detailed study of any real deficiencies that are indicated by the paper before us.

² (Attached is a short listed of questions that you may wish to use if certain of the points are not adequately covered in the discussion). [Footnote is in the original.]

268. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 6, 1960

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on Limited War, 6 October 1960

Mr. Irwin gave the prepared presentation commencing at 0915 and continued through for approximately 28 minutes without interruption.

Mr. Dillon stated he considered only two of the studies realistic, *i.e.*, Offshore Islands and Korea. He considered it significant that we do not have the capability to defend these two areas without resorting to some form of nuclear weapons. He wonders how a war game or realistic examination of the [*text not declassified*] in these two areas would actually come out. In the next 4 or 5 years, the CHICOMS will have a nuclear capability of their own and may be willing to use it, while the U.S. and USSR may be unwilling to use these weapons. He believes it is in our interest to war game such a situation and get the results quickly.

Mr. Dillon continued that if a two-sided atomic war came out even or ended in a stalemate, this would not be to our advantage. He felt that loss of allies and bases in the Far East would certainly result. He thought we ought to strengthen our conventional forces to meet the Chinese on a conventional basis and wants some sort of answer to a war game of two-sided nuclear war before the new Administration is installed.

Mr. Gates questioned that we would have the ability to fight the Chinese in a conventional sense due to their tremendous advantage in manpower.

Mr. Dillon again pressed for follow-on studies and both Mr. Gates and General Lemnitzer emphasized that the conclusions of such additional studies were entirely dependent upon the assumptions. General Lemnitzer emphasized the terrible vulnerability of the Pusan port complex under the threat of Communist atomic attack in any conventional war in Korea. He stated that in the last Korean conflict, we had alternate plans in case [*text not declassified*] was hit which were never used but that unquestionably that [*text not declassified*] was the best atomic target in Korea.

Mr. Gates, on Mr. Dillon's further request, agreed to do some follow-on studies on the Offshore Islands and Korea but questioned that they would help resolve current problem. General Lemnitzer observed

¹ Source: Record of October 6 NSC meeting on limited war. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: Lot 64 A 2710. Drafted on October 10.

that in a real situation, we would have intelligence on which to base actual decisions.

Mr. Dillon observed that such studies would be of great assistance to State, even though hypothetical.

Mr. Gray recommended that Defense and the Joint Staff prepare follow-on studies of the Offshore Islands and Korea on a two-sided nuclear war basis, with participation by other agencies when necessary.

General Lemnitzer stated that it would be essential to get inter-agency agreement on the basic assumptions, in which case the studies could be undertaken.

Mr. Gordon Gray will prepare a record of action.

James M. Polk

*Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Planning*

Info copies:

Mr. Williams, ISA
Lt Gen Wheeler, JCS
RAdm Ferrall, JCS

269. Report by IIC–ICIS¹

Washington, October 11, 1960

REPORT BY IIC–ICIS ON STATUS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. AS OF [illegible in the original]

Introduction

1. This year's status report on Internal Security deals with the 50-old programs which make up the total Internal Security Program of the United States. The over-all program is coordinated by the IIC and the ICIS in their respective areas of responsibility, either pursuant to specific policies and directives or under the broad terms of the charters of the two NSC Committees.

2. Two programs which have a direct bearing on internal security are not reported on because they fall outside the primary responsibility of

¹ Source: Status of the internal security programs. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

the Committees. These are the Port Security Program (for which Treasury has primary responsibility,) and the Government Employee Security Program (for which the Civil Service Commission has a coordinating responsibility).

Highlights of Report

3. *These are the highlights* of the report which were considered by the Planning Board:

a. The over-all objective of the Internal Security Program is to maintain the highest practicable state of internal security consistent with our form of government.

b. The primary threat to the internal security of the United States is Communist activity, espionage and sabotage, including the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons for use against selected U.S. targets in wartime.

c. A summary appraisal of our internal security program leads the Committees to these conclusions:

(1) While total internal security defenses are unobtainable, improvements are considered possible in the areas of Entry and Exit, Physical and Industrial Security, the Security of Vital Data, and in defenses against Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons.

(2) The Committees find no basis for [illegible in the original] that the completion of over-all program objectives will be achieved in the next year, in the absence of improved measures to meet the internal security provisions of [illegible in the original] National Security Policy.

d. The Investigative Program of the FBI and the other IIC agencies is highlighted by the following:

(1) The identification, penetration and coverage, of the ranks of Communist Party members and supporters requires a full-time, major investigative effort. The FBI continues to develop evidence for use in legal action against subversive individuals and organizations, and the outcome of cases now pending in the Supreme Court will materially affect the prosecutive program.

(2) The FBI is also expending full-time investigative effort to maintain an up-to-date listing of individuals that will be considered for detention as potentially dangerous in a war emergency. (12,000 persons are currently listed, of whom all are aliens).

(3) Intensified coverage of Soviet bloc diplomats and official representatives and the penetration of foreign intelligence operations in the United States also requires a major investigative effort. The number of Soviet bloc official nationals stationed here has steadily increased over the past five years. Of the 557 bloc officials assigned in this country 160 are known or suspected to engage in intelligence operations. The Soviet intelligence potential is doubled by the availability of the other Bloc officials in the United States whose intelligence operations are supervised by the Soviets. [text not declassified].

(4) Comparison studies by the IIC disclose that United States attache personnel stationed in Soviet bloc countries are subjected to

harassment, denials and restrictions which have no counterpart in our treatment of Bloc attache personnel in this country. Meanwhile, Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat remain exempt from travel restrictions which are applied to Soviet nationals in reciprocity for Soviet travel restrictions on U.S. nationals.

(5) *[text not declassified]*

e. *Turning to the investigative aspects* of the Internal Security Program—which will [illegible in the original] the policy recommending and coordinating responsibility of the ICIS—a number of specific programs are treated in the report. Security measures have been established in such areas as:

[text not declassified]

Internal Security controls on seamen coming off Soviet bloc ships.

The screening of Bloc escapees and refugees.

The screening of visa applicants from Communist countries.

Border control measures and standby emergency border controls.

There is also a Watch List program under which selected agencies furnish the State Department a list of their employees who possess information so sensitive that their departure from the U.S. could present a danger to the internal security. Then if a listed employee applies for a passport, State consults with the agency involved.

And (jointly with IIC) a countermeasures program to detect and defend against clandestine introduction and use of nuclear weapons.

Continued improvements in our internal security databases are considered possible and [illegible in the original] in making the internal security problems posed by the following:

The admission of Soviet bloc visitors to the United States under our policy on East-West Exchanges.

The absence of legislation to permit the denial of U.S. passports to Communists.

The lack of legal authority by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to exercise closer controls over the subversive activities of aliens who are in the U.S. prior to their departure under deportation orders.

The absence of an adequate program, under the auspices of OCDM, to provide the necessary physical security protection for key Government and industrial facilities against clandestine attack by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, on the order of protection which is afforded to facilities which are under the cognizance of NSC and Defense.

Another area in which present measures do not provide a solution to the internal security problem involved has to do with the acquisition of Unclassified strategic data by Soviet Bloc diplomats and official personnel. Present U.S. policy provides that we are to place restrictions "*on the basis of strict reciprocity*" upon travel, photographing, sketching, and such activities of Bloc representatives, as a means of deterring their acquisition of such information. The imposition of these reciprocal restrictions is coordinated by an inter-agency group chaired by State. In the Planning Board discussion, State referred to the difficulty in applying *strict reciprocity* in our dealings with the Bloc countries. The Status Report also reflects the view of Commerce Department (which has a responsibility for seeking equitable exchanges in return for Soviet bloc acquisition of publications) that any restrictions on Soviet access to Government Printing Office materials might seriously interfere with the operations of U.S. publication procurement officers in Russia.

There are also limitations on the program for the development and use of devices to detect the presence of nuclear materials coming into the U.S. at selected ports of entry. Present devices, while improved, cannot positively identify nuclear materials as such—and the prototype of such a discriminating device will not be ready for testing until early in 1961. Steps to improve the operational use of present devices await completion of the review of Continental Defense policy. Meanwhile, under present policy when the devices indicate the presence of a radioactive source in an accompanied Soviet bloc diplomatic pouch, the pouch is not challenged unless the device registers the presence of uranium, plutonium or other neutron source. In any event, the devices cannot be used on baggage which is put on airplane flights which are pre-cleared by U.S. Customs in Canada and at Bermuda, Searches of unaccompanied Soviet bloc diplomatic baggage, effects and [illegible in the original] to be made by Customs under present policy.

4. This concludes a summary of the highlights of the Status Report.

270. Note From the Secretaries to the JCS¹

JCS 2056/181

Washington, October 12, 1960

**JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF ACTIVITIES OF
INTEREST TO THE JOINT STAFF (U)**

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group to the Director, Strategic Target Planning, JCSLG 105–60, dated 16 September 1960, together with its attachments (Appendices “A”, “B” and “C”; Annex to Appendix “B”; and Annexes “A” through “K” to Appendix “C”), is circulated for information.

F.J. Blouin
M.J. Ingelido
Joint Secretariat

Enclosure

Memorandum From Spivy to the Joint Staff Director

Offutt AFB, Nebraska, September 16, 1960

SUBJECT

JSTPS Activities of Interest to the Joint Staff

Attached hereto for information of the Joint Staff are:

a. JSTPS Policy No. 1, Subject: JSTPS Policy Regarding Procedures For the Handling of Differences of Opinions and “Dissents”² dated 13 September 1960.

b. Minutes³ of the initial meeting of the JSTPS Policy Committee.

c. Agenda⁴ for the JSTPS Education Program for Planning Conference commencing 15 September 1960.

/s/ Berton E. Spivy, Jr.
Brig. General, USA
Chief

¹ Source: Transmits paper on “Integration and Utilization of SIOP Forces.” Top Secret; Limited Distribution “C”. 10 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files, CCS 5175 (16 Sep 60, Sec. 1).

² Appendix “A” [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Appendix “B” and Annex [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Appendix “C” and Annexes “A” through “K” [Footnote is in the original.]

Annex to Appendix B

Washington, September 14, 1960

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Policy Committee Meeting, 14 Sep 60

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Secretary	1

The JSTPS Policy Committee met at 1030, 14 September 1960, in Room 2B-10. The purpose of the initial meeting was to review and approve basic operating criteria and definitions to provide a point of departure for detailed planning actions required in developing the SIOP. The terms of reference, operational concepts and ground rules reflected herein were approved by JSTPS Policy Committee on 14 September 1960.

INTEGRATION AND UTILIZATION OF SIOP FORCES⁵

1. The objectives to be kept in mind in development of the SIOP are:

A. *MUTUAL SUPPORT*. Timing of available forces to take maximum advantage of the principles of mass, crossing tracks, ECM and enemy defensive degradation. (S)

B. *ROUTE COORDINATION*. Strike routes will take cognizance of all preplanned bomb impact points to enhance the probability of successful arrival of a weapon carrier at the bomb release line by reducing the exposure of the weapon carrier to blast, flash and radiation. (S)

⁵ The portions of this paper which have been underlined reflect the topical headings of the briefing presented to the Policy Committee. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined text is printed in italic type.]

C. *TOT RESOLUTION*. When two or more weapons are preplanned for release on the same target or targets in close proximity, provisions must be made to separate the releases by enough time and/or distance to insure that the second and succeeding delivery vehicles will not be exposed to unacceptable blast, flash or radiation. (S)

D. *ECONOMICAL WEIGHT OF EFFORT*. Only the number of weapons required for reaching the desired level of destruction will be programmed. Realistic probability factors will be used for each weapon carrier to determine the number of weapons to be programmed for each target. (S)

E. *OPTIMUM INTEGRATION*. The best use of the capabilities of each system will be made to cover the targets most vulnerable to that system. (U)

2. *BASIC PLANNING FACTORS*.

A. *PLAN FOR CALENDAR YEAR 61 (AMENDED AS NECESSARY TO EXTEND EFFECTIVENESS—1 MAY 1962)*. The JCS directive requires that the SIOP be briefed to the Secretary of Defense, JCS and the Unified and Specified Commander in December 1960 and not later than May of each succeeding year with the second briefing scheduled for 1 May 1962. Experience has shown that development of war plans for more than a year is not realistic due to the changes in our force structure, changes in enemy defensive capabilities and changes in the enemy target system. The initial plan will require a major amendment to extend effectiveness through the period specified for the second briefing. (S)

B. *PLANNING ON BASIS OF FORCES AVAILABLE DURING CY 61*. Those forces available at any time during calendar year 1961 will be given SIOP responsibilities. Application of forces that are not available throughout the life of the plan cannot be given as high a reliability as those continuously available. (S)

C. *OPTIMUM MIXED TARGET SYSTEM*. It is highly desirable to apply the forces available to a common target system which considers targets of primary importance in event of either an initiative or retaliatory execution. (S)

D. *TARGETS WILL BE DELETED INDIVIDUALLY FROM THE NSTL WHEN FINAL PREPLANNED TOT FOR THAT TARGET HAS ELAPSED*. JCS guidance states that NSTL targets cannot be struck except as provided for in the SIOP. The provision for dropping the targets individually is made to enable individual commanders to lay on strikes on a target after the final preplanned TOT for that target has elapsed. However, this provision declares the target available for re-strike in the event sufficient destruction has not been achieved by the SIOP force. (S)

E. *SIOP TERMINATES WHEN PREPLANNED TOT FOR FINAL NSTL TARGET HAS ELAPSED.* After the last SIOP TOT time has passed, any commander can strike any target. SIOP has no further effect and ceases to exist. Definite cut off time will be determined when the SIOP timing has been finalized. (S)

3. DEFINITIONS.

A. *TACTICAL WARNING.* Tactical warning time is that time which each weapons system can be expected to survive enemy action. Time will vary depending upon degree of mobility and/or hardness of the weapon carrier. (S)

B. *ALERT FORCE.* That force which is constantly prepared to execute a preplanned NSTL assignment after receipt of an execution order under conditions of "tactical warning" and within an established time period.

FIXED BASE—15 MIN

MISSILE SUBS—2 HOURS

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS—2 HOURS

This is not an all inclusive list of forces which may be included in the alert force. However, to be included in the alert force there must be a reasonable assurance that the weapon carrier will survive enemy action long enough to be launched effectively. If only a short time is available there must be a high degree of destruction levied upon the primary target system, assuming that the remainder of the U.S. force will be destroyed. (TS)

C. *STRATEGIC WARNING.* That period of time which permits a commander to prepare and position his forces to execute his War Plan. To permit peacetime training and other activities, all of a commander's force cannot be in the desired posture or location to most effectively launch his force against the target system. The time required for generating and positioning his entire force is full strategic warning. (S)

D. *FOLLOW ON FORCE.* That portion of the SIOP Force that is generated after receipt of a preparation order (A-Hour) to execute a preplanned NSTL assignment. This is that position of the SIOP forces following the alert force. This force cannot be counted on for effective utilization without some strategic warning. (TS)

E. INITIAL STRIKE.

- (1) *The total SIOP effort against preplanned NSTL assignments.*
- (2) *Weapons carriers will not be preplanned for recycle assignments.*
- (3) *SIOP assignments remain the responsibility of parent command until assigned SIOP weapon(s) are expended on the assigned target or until the last schedule time for that target has elapsed.*

A weapon carrier which has delivered a weapon on an assigned target will be released to the commander concerned. Until the weapon assigned to an NSTL target is expended or lost the parent commander is obligated to apply that weapon to the assigned target unless the target has fallen out of the NSTL. (In accordance with the definitions previously established in paragraph 2E.) (S)

4. FORCE APPLICATION CONCEPT.

A. *Weapon systems which can launch from a peacetime position under tactical warning to meet committed TOTs will be assigned targets for rollback, corridor development and targets of primary importance within range and penetration capabilities.*

(1) Weapon systems which do not have an all weather capability will be assigned a probability factor reflecting their limitations and potential. All available alert forces will be applied against the target system. Those forces which by virtue of delivery limitation in weather or darkness will be given a lesser probability of delivery than all weather capable systems. Actual probability of the day VFR weapon carriers will be developed. (S)

B. *All forces will be applied in order of arrival at common timing line. A common timing line must be established for the purpose of resolving TOT conflicts and to time the ECM support.* (S)

C. *All forces which cannot launch under conditions of tactical warning will be given follow-on assignments.* These forces will be used to increase the reliability on targets struck by the alert force and to expand the target coverage to lesser priority targets. (S)

D. *Follow-on Force will be applied in order of force generation.* Launch of non-alert sorties will be based upon the time required to prepare for launch after receipt of a preparation of order (A-Hour). (S)

E. *Only sorties capable of strike launching within 48–72 hours under conditions of tactical warning will be included in the tactical warning option (actual cut off time to be determined during the planning process).*

(1) Separate options will be provided to accommodate forces generated for various conditions of strategic warning. (S)

5. TACTICS.

A. *Sorties will be planned to provide a fuel time pad to permit TOT adjustment.* This is required so that a weapon carrier can speed up or delay at the common timing line to assure weapon separation required in the target area. (S)

B. *Tactics employed will be those proven for the weapon system involved. Delivery and penetration tactics for a specific sortie and target will be as determined by the force application team.* No tactics will be planned for the SIOP that have not been accepted by the commander concerned as a reliable and effective tactic. The team which examines the target defensive structure and is responsible for applying the force will determine the penetration and weapon delivery tactic for each sortie and target. (S)

C. *Weapon Separation Criteria for each delivery vehicle will be determined by the command providing that vehicle.* The time and distance criteria used to insure safe separation from nuclear blast and radioactivity will be used in resolving TOT conflicts. Separate criteria must be provided for each type of delivery vehicle (except missiles) from each type weapon being employed. (S)

D. *Range capability will consider the fuel requirements for tactics, wind factors and recovery.* Target coverage for a given weapon carrier must be conservative enough to allow for predictable degradation to range caused by adverse winds or tactics which cause a deviation from optimum range, i.e., low level penetration and/or delivery. Also considered is the point of intended recovery as it affects the area of target coverage. (S)

6. OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS.

A. *All SIOP Forces will be timed relative to a common reference; Designated as "E" hour.* This is required to insure proper timing of the force to take maximum advantage of mass, ECM, roll back, TOT resolution and corridor development. All weapon carriers must launch at a predetermined E/time or on an alternate launch schedule with reference to "E" hour. (S)

B. *All SIOP Forces must be launched on a [illegible in the original]. Conditions of Readiness should be standardized for all SIOP Forces to provide common time for generation purposes. (A-Hour). The JCS will direct advanced conditions of readiness for all SIOP Forces. All CINC Headquarters of SIOP committed forces will be tied to a common alerting system.* All of the above operational assumptions are made to permit initialization of the time for execution purposes. All forces must begin preparation under conditions of strategic warning to permit selection of the best option for execution, the one that takes maximum advantage of forces available for launch at any given time. This can only be done effectively when reliable fast reaction alerting and execution facilities are available. (S)

271. Memorandum of Discussion at the 463d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 13, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 463rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
October 13, 1960

Present at the 463rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Item 1); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); The Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for Security Operations Coordination (also acting for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), for Foreign Economic Policy, and for Science & Technology; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; the Acting NSC Representative on Internal Security (Ash); The White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC (Boggs); and Mr. Robert Johnson, Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and main points taken.

*1. STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS ON JUNE 30, 1960
(NSC 6013)*

Mr. Harr introduced Mr. Ash who summarized the report. (A copy of Mr. Ash's Briefing Note and a copy of his presentation are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and other copies are also attached to this Memorandum).

Following Mr. Ash's presentation, the President asked whether, if we develop a machine which will indicate the introduction of nuclear materials and we find that the Soviets are introducing such materials, we should break relations with them. Secretary Herter responded that this would be about as serious an aggravation as one could think of.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1960. Top Secret. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

He pointed out that we had had one experience of this sort in connection with an Israeli shipment. We had acted to stop this shipment although it was under diplomatic seals. The Israeli Embassy was as surprised as we were. This was a shipment which was going out from the U.S. to the Ministry of Defense in Israel. It was due to be shipped at five p.m. on the day that we caught it. We did stop it but it turned out to be nothing but radium dials. At that time we decided that we would stop such shipments even if they came in in diplomatic pouches. In this connection Secretary Anderson noted that there was an agreement between Treasury and State that if neutrons were given off by a diplomatic pouch shipment, we would ask the country concerned to open the pouch. If they refused, we would ask them to take the pouch out of the country. All of this was now being done on a very silent basis.

Mr. Harr asked Mr. Hoover and Mr. Doherty whether they had any comments on the status report. Mr. Hoover indicated that he had none. The President asked Mr. Hoover whether he was getting enough people; whether he got all he wanted. In reply Mr. Hoover said that in the last several years Congress had given good cooperation in granting requests which the FBI had been allowed to make through the Bureau of the Budget. The President, turning to Mr. Stans, asked if the Administration had been reasonable in dealing with FBI requests. Mr. Stans said that there had been no difficulties. Mr. Hoover confirmed that there had been complete cooperation during the last two years.

The Attorney General confirmed that Justice had gotten everything it had asked for in this respect. He went on to say that the Martin-Mitchell case demonstrated the importance of doing everything we could to tighten up all along the line on security. There was a tendency, he said, to let down in such matters. The President asked if Martin and Mitchell had had to have visas to get out of the country. Attorney General Rogers stated that they had not needed passports or visas and that the physical situation made it virtually impossible to control movement into Mexico or Canada even if passports were required. The borders were so long it was very easy to slip over them.

Mr. Hoover pointed out that both Martin and Mitchell had been investigated; one by the Office of Special Investigations and the other by Navy Intelligence. In one case emotional instability had been uncovered; a former superior of this individual when he was employed by the Navy had stated that he wouldn't want him back. The other had a homosexual background. Yet both were retained. Mr. Hoover expressed the view that in evaluating the results of investigations, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the Government in sensitive areas. The President turned to General Lemnitzer and suggested that those who had cleared Martin and Mitchell should be investigated. He said he would like to

know who did it and went on to indicate that those responsible should be appropriately disciplined.

Attorney General Rogers stated that the Soviets are exploiting sex situations. Every time a tourist goes to the USSR who has something like this in his background, they try to entrap him. He felt that we should alert people in the Government to this problem. He also expressed his agreement with the principle that all doubts in such cases should be resolved in favor of the Government. The President agreed with this principle and went on to state that if the Supreme Court required the Government to re-employ such individuals, they should be put to work in innocuous activities.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that he had instituted a new system under which the superior of each group of men was responsible for the men under his supervision. If the supervisors had known the conditions under which Martin and Mitchell were living, we could have caught the situation. The President pointed out that someone had received a report in the Martin and Mitchell case and should have acted differently upon it. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the President was talking about the initial investigation whereas what he was thinking about was what happened after an individual came to work for the Government. The President expressed the view that there should be some way to place responsibility for decision and some system for follow-up of responsibility for decision. He then turned to Mr. Ash and asked whether the internal security status report contained recommendations. Mr. Ash noted that the report was simply a status report and did not contain recommendations.

The Attorney General again expressed the view that there should be some way to sound the alert throughout the Government to be stricter in these matters. He stated that the Soviets seem to have a list of homosexuals. They had entrapped students and attempted to black-mail them as a means of getting them to go to work as agents. What worried Attorney General Rogers about Martin and Mitchell was not these individuals alone but the possibility that there is an organized group of such people. Secretary Anderson inquired how good a list we had of homosexuals. Mr. Hoover indicated that we did have a list and that local authorities notified federal authorities when they obtained such information. He also pointed out that a person who had been an employee of a U.S. Government agency until April had been involved in homosexual activities with Mitchell. The President expressed the view that the Attorney General or the FBI should devise a program in the Government so that when a report was obtained on an employee, a full report by the agency back to the Attorney General would be required. This report should indicate the action that the agency had taken. Attorney General Rogers agreed that we needed to do something. He

pointed out that the Russians had entrapped one individual who, in his confession, had stated that there was an international group of homosexuals. Action in this area was so distasteful that you hated to take it, but we needed to be more on the alert. The Attorney General said that he would do something. Mr. Hoover agreed that there should be some kind of follow-up procedure.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the polygraph provided clues in this area which often led to confessions. Mr. Hoover noted that the polygraph had been used on Mitchell and that it had shown that he had homosexual tendencies. The Attorney General agreed that the polygraph worked well in such cases. Mr. Dulles noted that he got a report every month which listed all those who had been rejected for employment by CIA for such reasons. The President expressed the view that such lists should be given to someone who would have responsibility for watching to ensure that such individuals were not employed by other Government agencies. Everyone who applied for a job should be fingerprinted. Then if you had a fingerprint and an indication that the individual had been rejected for such reasons, you would have a basis for preventing his future employment. Mr. Hoover agreed that this was a useful idea. Mr. Harr then noted that in the Planning Board discussion of the Martin-Mitchell case, reference had been made to certain studies now going on the Government looking toward a tightening up of security procedures. The President concluded the discussion by observing that it was difficult to get rid of such people once they were employed and that the time to catch them was when they came into the Government.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the status of the Internal Security Program as of June 30, 1960, prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and transmitted as Part 7 of NSC 6013, as summarized orally at the meeting by the Acting NSC Representative on Internal Security.

b. Noted that studies are presently under way in the U.S. Intelligence Board and in the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security concerning, respectively, personnel and physical security measures for the protection of sensitive U.S. information from unauthorized disclosure.

c. Agreed that the personnel security programs of the most sensitive Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch should be appropriately strengthened and maintained with a view to insuring against unauthorized disclosures of classified Government information, including recognition of the principle that in making determinations as to the qualifications for employment or retention in employment of persons in the Federal service, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the national security interests of the United States.

d. Noted the President's request that the Attorney General, in the light of the discussion and pursuant to his advisory responsibilities under Section 13 of Executive Order 10450, consider the methods and procedures, including reporting and follow-up procedures, which should be instituted by the Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch to ensure the continued strengthening and maintenance of employee security programs.

NOTE: The action in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to the National Security Council for information and guidance. The President approved the action in *c* above subject to the understanding that it did not authorize increases in personnel or funds for personnel security programs other than such increases as might result from the normal budgetary process.

The action in *d* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate action.

[Omitted here are pages 6–9.]

Robert H. Johnson

272. Briefing Note for November 7 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, November 4, 1960

OUTER SPACE [illegible in the original]

The first item this morning is a presentation by the Defense Department on the Outer Space program being planned or considered under the auspices of that Department.

At the Council meeting on May 31, 1960, Mr. President, you stated that you had reached some different [illegible in the original] that some of the Services were thinking along extremely [illegible in the original] lines with respect to [illegible in the original] military space programs. You expressed concern that there might be not only inadvertent duplication of outer space programs, but possibly also the initiation of some programs so advanced scientifically as to make a re-appraisal advisable. You accordingly requested that the "Department of Defense present to the National Security Council a full report on all of the outer space programs being planned or conducted under the auspices of the Department of Defense."

¹ Source: Outer space programs under the auspices of the Department of Defense. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

You also indicated, Mr. President, that Defense should not make its presentation until after completion of a related study to be undertaken by Dr. Kistiakowsky. (NSC Action No. 2245, approved June [illegible in the original], 1960). The latter study, which related to the [illegible in the original] reconnaissance satellite, was completed and presented to the Council as a special [illegible in the original] on August 25, 1960.

As I have indicated, today's presentation relates to Defense space programs, the Planning Board has suggested that, at a later date, the Council might wish to hear a presentation on other outer space programs, which are being conducted under the auspices of NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration).

We shall now hear the Defense presentation, which will be given by Mr. John H. Rubel, Acting Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

(CALL ON: MR. RUBEL)

273. Memorandum of Discussion at the 466th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, November 7, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 466th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, November 7, 1960

Present at the 466th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; Mr. Livingston T. Merchant for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Directory, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also attending the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director Bureau of the Budget; and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency (Item 1). Also present at the Meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; from the Department of Defense—Deputy Secretary James H. Douglas, Messrs. Haydn Williams, John R. Rubel, Lt. Col. Paul Nadler, and Col. Harvey

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of the Department of Defense. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

Shelton; Assistant Secretaries of State Gerard C. Smith and Thomas C. Mann; The Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, CIA (Items 2 and 3); the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat (Johnson).

There follows a summary of the discussion of the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. *OUTER SPACE PROGRAMS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (NSC Action No. 2245)*

Mr. Gray described the background of the Defense presentation, noting that the Planning Board recommended that NASA be asked to make a similar presentation on its programs, and then called on Mr. John H. Rubel, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering, to make the presentation. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum. A copy of Mr. Rubel's presentation is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting).

At the conclusion of Mr. Rubel's presentation, the President said that he did not know where the money for such programs was going to come from. It seemed to him that we should finally reach the point where these programs were not constantly going up until they absorbed nine-tenths of our research money. We should determine some sort of level of effort and set a dollar ceiling which would be changed only if there were some sort of startling development that should be exploited. If we continued to budget such programs on the basis that we did not know what they would ultimately cost, expenditures would increase constantly and there would be little hope for free government. We would have to be ruthless with respect to other areas of expenditure if we were to continue to support programs of this sort. He said he had watched these programs go up and that he had supported them and believed in them. Programs which offer real promise should be supported, but in the case of others, we should stay closer to basic research. No one, however, was suggesting elimination of important defense programs. Except for the work which they provided, there was nothing productive about these programs. They did not, for example, reduce costs of U.S. exports. He was for getting useful information, but not for spending billions to put a man on the moon.

Secretary Anderson referred to a statement Mr. Rubel had made in his presentation to the effect that the cost of many of these programs depended upon the life of the satellite involved. He wondered what the problems were with respect to ensuring long life for these satellites. Mr. Rubel said that the principal problem in this respect was an

adequate power supply. Present systems for recharging batteries by sunlight did not provide an adequately reliable power source. We also did not know enough about the space environment in this connection. Bombardment by particles in space reduced the life of satellites. Another problem derived from the fact that we continue to have to use some tubes in these satellites and these have filaments which burn out. The large number of parts in a satellite limit its reliability. The failure of one part could eliminate the capability of a satellite to accomplish its mission. The sequential operation of mechanical elements in the satellites provide opportunities for failure. Finally, we still know relatively little about the effects of the space environment on various materials involved in the satellites such as plastics.

Secretary Anderson next referred to the statement by Mr. Rubel in his presentation that communications are being bounced off the moon. He wondered whether we could not use the existing planets as a means of relaying communications instead of putting up artificial satellites. In response Mr. Rubel said that this was not feasible, partly because we did not have receivers of sufficient sensitivity to receive messages over such long distances and partly because of the large volume of power that was involved in such transmission.

Secretary Anderson next asked whether there was any agreement on a law of space. In the discussion which followed, Dr. Glennan pointed out that while many articles have been written and much discussion of this subject had occurred, there was no definitive statement on the matter.

The President noted that Mr. Rubel had stated in his presentation that navigational satellites would permit the fixing of the position of a ship within a quarter of a mile. He wondered how this compared with the accuracy of ordinary celestial navigation. In the discussion which followed, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, while it could be done better, on a typical vessel celestial navigation would give a fix of within one to two miles of the actual position. He also noted that in bad weather, it was impossible use to celestial navigation. The President wondered whether the gain in accuracy that was obtained through such navigational satellites warranted the cost that was involved. Secretary Gates expressed the view that the President's point was well taken—that it was easy to spend a lot of money to obtain a ten per cent improvement in accuracy. There was then some discussion of the accuracy of inertial navigational systems in the course of which it was pointed out by Dr. Kistiakowsky that really precise inertial systems cost millions of dollars. The President observed that this cost would not be as great as the cost every year of maintaining a navigational satellite system in being. Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed that this was true. He stated that he was not arguing for or against the TRANSIT system, but it would provide a means by which every merchant vessel, without expensive equipment,

could get accurate navigational fixes regardless of the weather. Secretary Gates observed that the TRANSIT system had been extremely successful and that its cost had been relatively low. The President asked how long a TRANSIT satellite would stay up. Mr. Rubel said that we did not plan to make the system operational until the reliability problem had been solved. When that problem had been solved, it should be possible to keep such satellites in operation for from three to five years. The President said he had no argument with what was being done. However, if one wanted complete assurance of the destruction of a target, one might expend 20,000 rounds of ammunition, but if on the other hand, all one wanted was reasonable assurance of such destruction, 1000 rounds might be sufficient. He indicated that he felt we could go too far in striving for perfection.

Mr. Stans referred to recent press reports on an Air Force program for a "space plane". He had two questions: (a) the relationship of this program to other programs, especially DYNASOAR; and (b) why this was a Department of Defense activity rather than a NASA activity. Mr. Rubel observed that this was one of a series of unauthorized disclosures to the press. The space plane proposal was neither a project nor a program. Last year industry and the Air Force had become interested in the possibility of developing a capability for a special kind of flight. This involved take off from the ground in a conventional manner, then an intake of air into the craft, the liquefaction of this air, and the separation of the oxygen from the nitrogen, and the burning of the oxygen with hydrogen. Convair had prepared a "secret" brochure and had attempted to secure funds for further research. Last year and this year the Air Force had supported some related studies. The Air Force had asked for \$20 million for FY 1962 for this effort. The Air Force had not yet explained what it wished to do with this money. Mr. Rubel again emphasized that no program had been approved.

Mr. McCone inquired as to the prospects of success of SAINT. In response Mr. Rubel said he had no doubt we could develop satellite intercept capability within a time period of three to four years. His only doubt was whether we could do it for the \$61 million which was projected. Mr. McCone suggested that if we could do this, it raised a question of the effectiveness of SAMOS and MIDAS for we had to assume that the USSR could develop a similar capability. Mr. Rubel stated that we did not know enough about the economics of such operations to know whether the development of such a capability by the USSR would be much of a problem in relationship to SAMOS. If a SAMOS satellite were put up over the USSR and if its orbit shifted by 1000 miles on every pass, we did not know how difficult it would be for the Soviets to knock it down. The President asked whether the Russians would not be able to predict its orbit. Mr. Rubel acknowledged that they would be able to predict its orbit on the basis of one or two passes. This was

why the possibility of an intercept capability raised serious doubts as to the feasibility of putting weapons in orbit. However, SAMOS could take millions of pictures in one or two passes. Therefore, it was difficult to know whether the Russians would consider it economical to knock it down. MIDAS, on the other hand, had to remain for a long time in the same orbit. It therefore might turn out to be economical to intercept MIDAS satellites. However, such intercepts would themselves constitute warning of possible attack.

Mr. Gray observed that when the President had requested this presentation, he had been concerned about the possibility that space programs were being undertaken without adequate review. Mr. Gray felt that the monitoring of these programs depended upon the mechanism which the President had approved, especially upon Dr. York's office. His office provided a means by which ideas could be reviewed before they became programs. So long as Dr. York and Dr. Glennan were on top of the situation, we would avoid the possibility that a gleam in someone's eye might become a program before anyone realized that had happened. The President said that he was delighted with the mechanism that he had created. Secretary Gates noted in this connection that the six or eight committees described by Mr. Rubel took the place of eighteen to twenty older coordinating groups. Moreover, this new mechanism had adequate authority behind it.

In connection with a brief discussion that followed of planned space shots which would occur within the next few days, Secretary Gates observed that the miniaturization of equipment which had been accomplished in connection with these various programs was one of the most astounding technical achievements in the history of mankind. It compared favorably with the Russian ability to launch larger payloads.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject, on the basis of an oral presentation by John H. Rubel, Acting Directory, Defense Research and Engineering, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2245.

b. Noted the President's request that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration present to the National Security Council at an early date a report on the outer space programs now being conducted under the auspices of NASA, and on the level of effort the United States should devote to non-military outer space activities in the future.

NOTE: the action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Administrator, NASA, for appropriate action.

Robert H. Johnson

274. Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower¹

Washington, November 25, 1960

Carrying out your directive to report to you on the methodology used in the preparation of the Optimized Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), my associates (Dr. H.E. Scoville and Dr. George Rathjens) and I studied the relevant aspects of the activities of the Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSPS), and I have come to the following conclusions:

1. The staff is following the directives received from the JCS which, in turn, are based on your approval of the NSC action following the presentation of “Study 2009” by General Hickey. The JSPS is making effective use of available intelligence information. I believe that the presently developed SIOP is the best that could be expected under the circumstances and that it should be put into effect.

2. I recommend that an effort be initiated now to review the directive to, and the procedures used by, the JSPS in anticipation of the preparation of subsequent SIOPs for the following reasons:

(a) [*text not declassified*]

(b) [*text not declassified*]

(c) The staff is making extensive use of computers, but I believe that their programming could be improved and that the most competent people (such as available in WSEG, for instance) should become involved. This refinement, the revision of damage criteria, and possibly a re-evaluation of the importance of “counter force” strikes, will become especially important when operational plans are developed for less than our total alert force (the force that may survive a surprise attack by the enemy).

(d) [*text not declassified*]

I attach herewith a summary of our detailed observations, made on the basis of briefings from the Joint Strategic Planning Staff.

Attachment

*Comments on Briefings by the Joint Strategic Planning Staff,
November 3–5, 1960*

The JSPS staff is following quite closely the so-called “Study 2009”—General Hickey’s presentation to NSC—as regards criteria for

¹ Source: Comments on Joint Strategic Planning Staff work on targeting and SIOP. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

the selection of targets and the assessment of damage required. Since that study, in turn, followed rather closely the earlier War Plans of SAC, so-called ALPHA and BRAVO, the emerging SIOP is in these respects a refinement, a combination and expansion of earlier SAC plans, rather than a brand new approach.

Much of the briefing emphasized the objective character of the plan of procedure and the extensive use of machine calculations. Actually, however, we found so many consecutive steps involving judgment that this so-called point system of military worth of targets and the machine calculations based on it appear to be of very secondary importance. In fact, some of the machine uses may be unsound. So long as the plan is designed for the entire alert force, this has no grave consequences because of the large number of weapons assumed to be available and, therefore, of exceedingly high expected damage to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. However when, subsequently, operational plans based on smaller forces (assumed to survive surprise attack) will be developed, it will be most important to review the entire procedure and introduce more effective use of mathematical procedures, as otherwise the assignment of forces to targets may be inefficient, and less than optimum effect may be calculated for the retaliatory force still available to us; thus "evidence" may be obtained that we have inadequate forces and the attack, if carried out, will not be optimized.

The steps which are involved in the preparation of SIOP are as follows:

[text not declassified]

In a number of cases the urban and military targets are close enough together that they can be thought of as co-located and, as explained below, ground zeros (DGZ) are so selected as to maximize damage on the complex of targets by quasi-objective machine operations.

[text not declassified]

The next step involves the assignment of available forces against the strategic DGZ (target) list. *[text not declassified]* The assignment is done by a complex procedure, the logic of which is not wholly clear. It is first assumed that every weapon that will be used *[text not declassified]*.

Thus, two very important aspects of the plan, although they are worked out on the machines, are then redone on the basis of judgment, so that the machine calculations are in effect not used. *[text not declassified]*

275. Record of Meeting Between Burke and Aurand¹

November 25, 1960

*ADMIRAL BURKE'S CONVERSATION WITH CAPTAIN
AURAND, 25 NOV 60*

CAPT AURAND: Dr. Kistakoswky saw the President this morning and he really gave him a charge. I didn't even mention it—and when I got up stairs he said, "Pete I'm hearing some things about this Omaha deal that really frighten the devil out of me".

ADM BURKE: Did you get a copy of my letter to Lemnitzer?

CAPT AURAND: No sir. He says this thing will over-kill and what not. He said they are going to make a hell of a lot more bombs than we have now and I think we have too many already. I said those would be relatively cheap if you're going to have to buy a lot more missiles and bombs. He said that's right. Then he started talking about how to knock-off this being sure—you know, times 10 business.

ADM BURKE: That's why I want you to take this memorandum.

CAPT AURAND: He said, you know what I think we could do—he said POLARIS may be the solution to this whole thing, he said what we can do is take the POLARIS boats and say "alright, you're the back-up" and we will let everybody just have one whack—not ten whacks and then we will get a report from these satellite and whatever other reconnaissance we can get and tell the POLARISES to clean up what isn't done. He said that maybe that will cut—

ADM BURKE: Through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CAPT AURAND: Well he wasn't—Now, one thing that Kisty told him and he told me this too—I think it's a cover for Kisty and I think I would do this if I were in his place too—he told the President that he recommended that he not disapprove the plan but say that the next plan has got to be brought up along these guidelines.

ADM BURKE: Give the President a copy of this memorandum.

CAPT AURAND: I told him that if he ever approved this plan it would be a prescription for everything you ever heard of. He said, yes the other night when Kisty told him that Powers told him that this thing would never be used as a thing to increase forces and he said that if he said that, he's crazy. He says the plan calls for more forces and if he

¹ Source: Eisenhower's reaction to targeting plan, dispersal sites for President Top Secret. 8 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Transcripts and Phone Calls (NSTL).

believes in the plan, he ought to ask for more forces—he says, that’s the damnest thing I ever heard, I never did think much of that guy Power, he didn’t shut up when I told him to. For 20 minutes all I was doing was saying yes sir, that’s right.

ADM BURKE: Have you ever seen my book?

CAPT AURAND: No sir.

ADM BURKE: You can borrow it tonight if you want to. I want it back though on Sunday. Its a good thing to look through. This is a short summary of the whole works—written by Burke, primarily. This is something that I told Lemnitzer and that is something that is written very restrained.

CAPT AURAND: One other important remark the President made, he said they told me there were 483 targets and he said, God. I said, Mr. President, I have seen and heard of plans that have many times more than that—and he said, well we’ve got to get this thing right down to the deterrence.

ADM BURKE: Maybe you can show the President this thing.

CAPT AURAND: Well, Kisty sure gave him the ungarbled word. I think it was the first time he ever got it from somebody who, in his estimation, is in a position to make a —. You know, he had one session with Tom Gates and Gates was so interested that he asked him to come back and he also asked him if he wouldn’t give this to the Chiefs and Kisty said no, that I told my President that I would take a reading for him and that I’m perfectly willing to give it to you—it’s just the principle of advising, that I didn’t go to look at it from a military view.

ADM BURKE: What you might want to do Pete, is to show this book to Kistakowsky—this is my book—and I have said things about Power in here which I believed—it’s not quite true now because this was written over a period of weeks, but essentially, it is true. Ask Kistakowsky what he thinks of it and maybe the President would want to take a look at parts of that. You can tell him that it’s my book and you got to looking at the thing and you got interested in the thing. That’s my notebook that I carry in my pocket when I talk about it.

CAPT AURAND: Now he almost said that he thought that we ought to go to POLARIS entirely but he revealed the thought by saying, “You know I never have believed that we ought to have one weapon system but” and he never finished the sentence of what else he was thinking but the obvious fill in for that was “POLARIS ought to be it”. He was really steamed up. Fortunately I had it on my check off list to mention it to him and I didn’t even have to say word one. Here is this thing on Theodore Roosevelt. He said that he was glad to find out that

Navy was honest enough to say that things they have tried didn't work just right and was positively for you making sure you knew where the target was before shooting.

ADM BURKE: Yes, they don't know where the target is unless you shoot into these.

CAPT AURAND: I brought up this nuclear sub problem of going into Japan. . . He said that I'm not sure that doing that would solve the problem and in fact, I'm not sure it wouldn't cause more trouble than they had in the first place. He said particularly with the Emperor. And, I got a . . . on the Emperor. The Emperor's safety is the highest priority thing they have. They wouldn't think of letting him ride in an open car, even before the riots.

ADM BURKE: Well, maybe the Emperor's son, the Crown Prince—

CAPT AURAND: I don't think you're going to get much action out of

ADM BURKE: I'm going to write him a letter myself. MacArthur is just a little bit afraid that I had upset his apple cart when I was out there.

CAPT AURAND: He's the kind of guy though, that when he gets a little mad he'll put his heels in.

ADM BURKE: Yes, and he gets vindictive. He also wants to be liked. MacArthur wants to be liked. I know his mother pretty well.

CAPT AURAND: Well, he didn't go for that one very much. Just had the idea, I, on the dotted line, have briefed the incoming staff. I have got one with Salander and Jim Hagerty on the Presidential relocation set-up of communications and all of that but as of now we have three probable places that the President would go. He makes up his mind at the moment. I was thinking that maybe just gratuitously putting in the NORTHAMPTON.

ADM BURKE: More than that. Put in the NORTHAMPTON and say that we are working on this and we will get—she could be used right now except she doesn't have any files aboard for this sort of business—but we are going to convert her and make her a little more suitable. We won't change her ability as far as an operating ship and then tell him that I am playing with the idea of an old conventional submarine and gutting it and putting in communications and things and a small crew up here at the Gun Factory. She would have bunks and emergency communication equipment. She would be primarily for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then she would go out in the river and sink to the bottom.

CAPT AURAND: She can't sink very far.

ADM BURKE: Can't sink very far but she can get out of sight.

CAPT AURAND: You don't submerge until you get 30 miles down the river.

ADDM BURKE: You don't steam submerged—but you can submerge in place.

CAPT AURAND: You go down to the bridge—or even past Dalgren—20 feet. I would rather get in a chopper and go to one in the bay myself.

ADM BURKE: If you don't have fall out.

CAPT AURAND: The chopper is perfect for fall out—1500 feet of air is as good as 6 feet of concrete—there is no inhibition on moving by chopper in a fall out situation.

ADM BURKE: Well then just put it in the NORTHAMPTON.

CAPT AURAND: I would like to see him get a good one—give him the TRITON.

ADM BURKE: Oh, hell, the TRITON couldn't get up here.

CAPT AURAND: You can get into Chesapeake Bay.

ADM BURKE: Yes, but she doesn't have the communication equipment.

CAPT AURAND: But she's got the place to do it. You got a CIC in her as big as this room and you got 16 masts to play with.

ADM BURKE: Well, you [illegible in the original] the TRITON.

CAPT AURAND: And just have her hang around Chesapeake Bay.

ADM BURKE: The NORTHAMPTON is better.

CAPT AURAND: Except for the submerging.

ADM BURKE: You could put the NORTHAMPTON there and put the TRITON down as not having as good a facilities but submerging.

CAPT AURAND: Depend upon what the threat is.

ADM BURKE: Yes. Now, you might read that first couple of paragraphs there on the memorandum to Lemnitzer. I think that's something that you can give to the President. That's a very soft sell—that Lemnitzer has bought.

CAPT AURAND: One thing that Kisty said—he said, why the Chiefs gave a directive—the counter force targets were the highest priority and they should be attacked with heavy damage. He said this accounts for 80% of the over-kill.

ADM BURKE: Well, the Chiefs didn't do that. It came out of the Chief's order but Gates gave the Chiefs the choice of signing that thing or him signing it—that's what it amounts to.

CAPT AURAND: I would like to hold this sort of in reserve. I'm sure that he's going to follow this Omaha thing. I told him that you were going out there and it will undoubtedly come up again.

ADM BURKE: I think you should talk it over with Kistakowsky.

CAPT AURAND: Showing him this memo?

ADM BURKE: No, the book is enough—the book is the same thing, a little longer and more factual data.

CAPT AURAND: One thing on Kisty, the Air Force has sold him these low cost figures on MINUTEMAN and I pointed out to him that they had a lot of stuff in there that they called inherited assets.

ADM BURKE: Ask him this one question: "How is it MINUTEMAN which is essentially a three stage POLARIS with the same type of propellant, but more of it, the same type of material in the framework and body, but more of it, the same type of guidance system, the same type of warhead—costs less than POLARIS?"

CAPT AURAND: He will admit that on a bird-to-bird ratio —

ADM BURKE: But this is their prices—overall prices are based upon about 700,000 dollars for a MINUTEMAN and we are basing ours on a million dollars per POLARIS and all the rest of the costs are the same sort of thing—I mean their costs are about 50% on the known things less than it costs a similar thing in POLARIS.

CAPT AURAND: Well, then they fall back on that you pioneered it for them.

ADM BURKE: Sure—but the research and development—they aren't counting any research and development in that. This is a missile in production and we did do all the pioneering for them—but the missile is in production. In their figures they haven't added one nickel of R&D—not one.

CAPT AURAND: Or security forces.

ADM BURKE: Or security forces or nothing else—and they admit that. I've got to go and make a speech here.

276. NSC Report¹

NSC 6019

Washington, November 29, 1960

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EVACUATION AND PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS IN
DANGER AREAS ABROAD

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 106/3
- B. NSC Action No. 2259-b-(1)
- C. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 8, 1960
- D. Executive Order 10893, dated November 8, 1960
- E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 29, 1960

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting.

The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 106/3 and the Record of Action on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 29, 1960.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; and direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: "Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad." Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6019.

Enclosure

Statement of Policy

EVACUATION AND PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Every reasonable effort must be made to protect U.S. citizens abroad in the event of imminent or actual general hostilities, localized hostilities or civil disturbances; including the evacuation of such citizens to relatively safe areas, and provision for their welfare if such evacuation is not possible. Primary factors influencing any decision to implement emergency plans for the protection of U.S. citizens abroad are:

- a.* The imminence of danger.
- b.* The capability and willingness of local authorities to provide adequate protection.
- c.* The effect of an evacuation on the local or international situation.
- d.* The availability of evacuation facilities and relatively safe holding areas.
- e.* The essentiality of reducing the numbers of U.S. noncombatants in probable combat areas in order to:

- (1) Avoid impairment of the combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied military commanders necessitated by their care, and to
- (2) Minimize the hazards of their capture as hostages.

2. It is essential that flexibility be provided in planning for the protection and welfare of U.S. noncombatants in danger areas overseas, since the probability of successful evacuation of such persons to the United States or their movement to relatively safe holding areas could be substantially reduced by:

- a.* Political considerations prior to actual outbreak of hostilities, and
- b.* The disruption of transportation, port and airport facilities incident to a massive attack.

In view of these factors, emergency planning should provide for the disposition and welfare of U.S. citizens overseas within their host countries as well as for evacuation to the United States or movement to relatively safe holding areas. This “standfast” planning is applicable to the eventualities of localized hostilities and civil disturbances as well as general hostilities.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

3. In the event of imminent or actual general hostilities, localized hostilities or civil disturbances:

a. To protect U.S. citizens including, if necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.

b. To reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens subject to the risk of capture as hostages.

c. To reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in probable combat areas in order not to impair the combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied military commanders.

POLICY GUIDANCE

4. In furtherance of the foregoing policy objectives, the Secretaries of State and Defense shall:

a. Conduct a continuing review of conditions abroad with respect to:

(1) Imminence of general or localized hostilities or civil disturbances which may involve U.S. citizens.

(2) The capability and willingness of local authorities to provide adequate protection.

(3) The numbers and locations of U.S. citizens.

(4) The evacuation and protection capability, including availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas.

b. Make recommendations to the President if required for the timely reduction of the number of U.S. citizens in an area.

c. Maintain plans for: (1) evacuation of U.S. citizens to the United States or their movement to and welfare in other relatively safe areas; and (2) "stand-fast" and welfare of U.S. citizens in the countries where appropriate.

5. Normally, the decision to initiate evacuation shall be made in Washington, taking into consideration the recommendation of the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the country concerned, or of the appropriate U.S. Military Commander. The following additional considerations apply in initiating evacuations:

a. Evacuation not Involving the Use of U.S. Military Forces and Facilities: When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or are so imminent as to jeopardize the safety of U.S. citizens and conditions do not permit communication with Washington, the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative is authorized to initiate such action as the gravity of the situation warrants.

b. Evacuation Involving the Use of U.S. Military Forces and Facilities: Because of the grave international consequences that may be involved, the President's advance approval for the use of U.S. military forces and facilities is required except:

(1) Where such use would be limited to non-combatant military forces and facilities which are normally assigned to the diplomatic or consular mission concerned or which are used routinely for the

transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment into and out of the country from which evacuation is to take place;² and

(2) In those extreme cases where conditions do not permit either the principal diplomatic or consular representative in the area concerned or the appropriate military commander to obtain Presidential approval in time to initiate effective action.

c. Responsibility for initiating action under the circumstances described in b–(1) and (2) above devolves in the following order:

(1) The principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the country or countries concerned has primary responsibility for making the decision that immediate use of military forces and facilities is necessary for evacuation or protection of U.S. citizens and for requesting assistance from the appropriate military commanders, who will respond to the extent which he considers militarily possible. Responsibility for the execution of such evacuation centered military operations rests wholly with the military commander, coordinating, [illegible in the original] with policies of the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative.

(2) If timely communications cannot be established between the principal diplomatic or consular representative in the country concerned and the appropriate military commander, the military commander concerned shall assume the responsibility for undertaking the above actions.

6. In implementing the guidance outlined in 5, the Secretary of State shall have over-all responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens abroad. In certain areas the Secretary of Defense shall have primary responsibility for the protection and evacuation of those U.S. citizens specified jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Secretary of Defense has supporting responsibility for the evacuation of all other U.S. citizens abroad.

NOTE ON FINANCING

1. The cost of the preparation of evacuation plans and the necessary support thereof, in times of peace, is absorbed by the several Departments concerned out of their regular operating budgets.

2. It is impossible, at this time, to estimate the cost of evacuation in time of emergency, because conditions under which evacuation will occur can not be foreseen.

² As requested, attache aircraft; scheduled MATS flights and MSTs runs which fall within the above criteria. [Footnote is in the original.]

277. Memorandum From Burke to Flag and General Officers¹

Washington, December 4, 1960

TO:

Flag and General Officers

SUBJECT

Special Edition Flag Officers Dope

(This is not to be further distributed, but you may discuss with your more senior officers).

NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGET LIST
AND
SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN

The Secretary of Defense met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders in Omaha 1–2 December to discuss National Strategic Target List and Single Integrated Operational Plan. The Director of Strategic Target Planning, General Power, and the members of his staff gave a very comprehensive and very smooth presentation pointing out the improvement of this plan over the previous coordinated plan and explained in general how this plan was developed.

There was great pressure to approve this plan even though it was also recognized that there was much improvement that could be made in both NSTL and the Plan itself. However, all Unified Commanders agreed that this plan was better than the previous ones and the improvements that were necessary in the next plan were brought out very clearly during the discussion.

It was also brought out very clearly that this plan was approved based upon the presentation of General Power and without study of SIOP by conferees. The NSTL, as a matter of fact, was not available and will not be available for several days. However, Navy people worked on the plan and based on this, approval of the plan was justified with the understanding that modifications in the directives and procedures for the next plan will be prepared.

The briefings were very long and complex. Nearly all of the questions that were asked at all were asked by Mr. Gates and naval officers.

¹ Source: Burke's comments on the December 1–2 NSTL/SIOP meeting in Omaha with Secretary of Defense, JCS, and CINCs. Secret. 10 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, NSTL/SIOP.

The following points were brought out:

The NSTL and SIOP are good first efforts but there are quite a few things which had to be accepted without examination because of the compressed time scale for the development of the NSTL and SIOP. Further examination will be needed in quite a few areas so as to improve the next NSTL and SIOP. Many revisions and refinements will be essential.

a. Minimum NSTL.

The NSTL is probably bigger than necessary. When it is published, which we expect to take place sometime this week, the NSTL will comprise a “minimum NSTL”, additional targets considered to be of major importance, those defense targets which must be destroyed in order for attacking forces to reach their targets, plus those targets which theater commanders must destroy in order to protect their own forces. A great deal of work will be necessary in order to make sure that the NSTL is really minimum because its size to a large extent will determine force levels in the future and also will have a great deal of impact on the types of weapons systems which will be procured.

b. Intelligence.

In general, the intelligence used for the preparation of the intelligence annexes was agreed joint intelligence but owing to the time limitations, the operational intelligence was developed by SAC. There were no significant errors of commission or omission in this intelligence insofar as could be determined in the very short time available for examination.

One of the things that the JCS will have to develop will be how to get really joint intelligence into the plan and NSTL without undue delays. We can't have long delays in arriving at an agreed intelligence solution and at the same time, neither should we permit raw intelligence to be cranked in which may affect the plan significantly without having that intelligence looked at by other people. The evaluation of intelligence data has very significant effects. We want to make sure that our intelligence upon which this plan is based is just as good as it possibly can be. It is for this reason we feel that there should be a joint intelligence center in Washington where all various intelligence agencies can turn to and really crank out good intelligence using all the raw data that is available to anybody.

c. Assurance.

[*text not declassified*] There was great disagreement as to what the maximum assurance should be on any one target. For example, the most important targets should have greater assurance of a weapon arriving at BRL than on lesser targets. However, when you get up into

high assurance levels, the flat part of the curve is reached and it is a question of how high you should go on assurance for the most important targets. [text not declassified] These are things that are going to have to be studied in great detail by the staffs and the JCS will have to write new instructions regarding assurance in the next couple of months. There seemed to be general agreement except for the Air Force people that our assurance criteria are now probably too high or perhaps the assurance on the various types of targets is not proper now. However, this is not a fatal defect in this first plan.

d. Damage Criteria.

Damage criteria [text not declassified] damage criteria. The JCS will also have to examine the damage criteria and the way the damage criteria are applied to various types of targets in order to ensure targets that have to be destroyed are really destroyed once instead of several times. The methods of computing damage will probably have to be reviewed too. It may be that severe and moderate if not the proper way of doing it because the photographs of what moderate damage was, looked to be pretty severe. [text not declassified] As I stated, this is an area in which the JCS will have to lay out in greater detail the damage criteria to be used in the development of the next plan.

e. Follow-on Forces.

The SIOP as developed utilized all of the committed forces which, of course, was entirely within the ground rules which were given to the DSTPS. However, there is considerable question as to whether all of these forces are, in fact, required and whether or not it would be advisable to withhold some forces for contingency operations following the initial attack. This naturally relates back to the size of the NSTL, the assurance of delivery, damage criteria also the survivability of launch bases.

f. Constraints.

The plan was juggled several times in preparation and weight of weapons and types of delivery were adjusted so as to bring the fallout at selected check points down within the levels prescribed in JCS guidance. [text not declassified] This whole problem is urgently in need of attention.

g. Base Survivability.

The problem of survivability of the various types of bases, both fixed and mobile, was only superficially addressed in the preparation of this plan and it is evident that we must develop adequate factors for considering this problem. Base survivability naturally has a marked effect on force levels and types of forces for the future. Base

Survivability can only be determined after thorough war gaming and it is to be expected that this will be a major area in which much detailed work needs to be done by the JCS and the Services.

h. War Gaming.

It was generally agreed that the SIOP should be war gamed by a group in Washington under the direct control of the JCS. This is most important in order to come as close as possible to an unbiased evaluation of this new plan and to develop factors and criteria for use in the succeeding plans. The SIOP also may be war gamed by the JSTPS which, of course, smacks of their inspecting themselves.

i. Points System.

The development of the NSTL was in large measure governed by the use of the SAC ALFA and BRAVO points systems—ALFA points being assigned to military installations and military and governmental control centers. BRAVO points to urban and industrial targets. In coming up with an optimum mix target list, the planners found that the ALFA and BRAVO points were not mathematically compatible and so they were forced to come up with a new type of points which they called OMEGA points. These OMEGA points are an arbitrary judgment based on amalgamation of the ALFA and BRAVO points and have no real mathematical validity. The SAC people are working on developing a new points system. The Navy is also trying to come up with a new points system using the talent and facilities at the David Taylor Model Basin.

j. The Staff and Organization.

The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff has not up to this time been a truly joint staff. All key positions with the exception of the Deputy Director have been held by Air Force officers. Almost all of these Air Force officers have held concurrent jobs in the SAC Staff organization. We believe that the staff must become a truly joint one with equitable distribution of the key positions within the staff itself and that the officers assigned to the staff should have that as their sole assignment. It has not been possible to persuade the Army to provide as much representation on the JSTPS as we would have liked to see and I am hopeful that they will realize the importance to the Army of the organization in Omaha.

k. Reliability Factors.

The reliability factors used in various weapons systems naturally have a marked effect on assurance and thus relate back in the long run to force levels. It is worth noting that the reliability factors used for missiles results in what appears to be a very high level of programming

of missiles on targets and also the backup of each missile by an aircraft-delivered weapon. The paucity of data on missiles at this time probably makes this a reasonable approach but it is obviously something that we need to correct in the future and this can only be done with more and better data. At the meeting with General Power, it was rather strongly inferred that he intends to probe into the tactics and reliability of weapons other than SAC which are used in the SIOP. I do not know now just how he will go about this but we must be prepared for such examination of our systems.

In summary, there is a tremendous amount of work that must be done soon, primarily by the JCS, in order that the criteria and ground rules that are given to the DSTPS will result in the development of a greatly improved NSTL and SIOP for the next go-round. This SIOP will be made effective on 1 April 1961 and the next plan is due on 1 May 1962.

Arleigh Burke

P.S.

None of the above has anything to do with "Merry Christmas" which I hope you all have.

Arleigh

278. Memorandum From Boggs to Holders of NSC 6013¹

Washington, December 7, 1960

The enclosed Part 1 (The Military Program) is transmitted herewith for insertion in NSC 6013.

Part 1 has been given a special limited distribution, and access to it should be on a strict need-to-know basis.

Marion W. Boggs
Deputy Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Transmits Part 1 of NSC 6013, "Status of United States Military Programs as of June 30, 1960." Top Secret; Restricted Data; Special Limited Distribution. Extracts—14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 6013.

Enclosure

Department of Defense Report to NSC

NSC 6013

Washington, December 10, 1960

STATUS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS

THE MILITARY PROGRAM

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NSC 6013, PART 1, THE MILITARY PROGRAM

I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY PROGRAM.

The basic national objective of the United States is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. The basic military threat to fulfillment of this objective stems from an aggressive and deeply hostile International Communism directed by the USSR and/or Communist China, and backed by growing military strength in both nuclear and non-nuclear fields. All elements of the U.S. national power must be resolutely directed toward meeting this communist challenge.

The primary objectives of the U.S. military programs, in support of the basic national objective and in light of the primary threat, are:

To develop and maintain forces of all Services for general war, with sufficient strength to deter general war or to prevail if it should occur.

To develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and to keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise.

To develop and maintain an adequate military capability for defense of the United States and other vital areas of the western hemisphere.

To provide within the total U.S. military forces, highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces which, in concert with other forces, are adequate to deter or defeat local aggression or fight a limited war in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war, using all weapons (including nuclear weapons) as required.

To reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural measures in order to achieve national objectives.

II. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5906/1.

Overall Evaluation. Between June 1959 and June 1960, there was little change in either the magnitude or character of major U.S. combat forces. Newer weapon systems will be more evident during FY 1961. All Services find it necessary to maintain adequate forces equipped with weapon systems of proven capability to satisfy security requirements and, at the same time, to provide for the development of new systems of yet unproven operational capability. There are two main aspects of this problem.

The complexity of modern weapon systems has resulted in extraordinarily long procurement lead times, and greatly lengthened technical training programs.

Development and procurement of these new weapon systems become more costly each year, and so it has become increasingly difficult to accomplish modernization within available resources.

General War. In evaluating our general war capabilities, the JCS note the requirement for forces capable of both nuclear and conventional operations. While these forces now have a greater capability for delivery of nuclear weapons than ever before, this may not in itself represent a net gain in relative military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Our deployed forces are subject, with little or no warning, to attack by significant communist forces. Within the near future, the Soviet Union may bring into operational readiness intercontinental ballistic missiles with the capability of attacking our base complex in the United States. The security of our long-range, land-based nuclear retaliatory forces

will be increasingly dependent upon such factors as adequate warning, airborne alert capability, hardening and mobility. During FY 1961, two of our ballistic missile early-warning installations (Thule, Greenland and Clear, Alaska) will be operational. One site has an initial operational capability today. Full coverage is not scheduled for completion until the U.K. Station becomes operational in FY 1963. The latter site is needed to cover missile launchings from sites in southwestern USSR against targets in the eastern U.S. To augment BMEWS, research and development effort increased in FY 1960 on the satellite-borne ICBM attack alarm system MIDAS. Good progress has been made in satellite programs which are essential to our reconnaissance and intelligence activities. We have no active defense against ballistic missiles but development effort on NIKE ZEUS continues at the highest priority. A coordinated Soviet attack against our long-range nuclear retaliatory forces, our deployed land-based forces, our logistical base, and our naval forces at sea would be extremely difficult to execute with complete surprise, and only a coordinated attack with almost complete surprise could endanger our effective retaliatory power.

Limited War. As the Soviet nuclear, ballistic missile and conventional capabilities grow, the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced in Communist dealings with the rest of the world. In their continual probing of the strength and determination of the West they will be more aggressive in their use of political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. Although the Communists probably would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor as to make clear that further involvement would incur serious risk of general war or political disadvantage, the chances of their miscalculating such risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing. Our military capacity to counter a single local aggression supported by the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to meet national security requirements. Dependent upon the location and size of force required, we would be hard pressed to execute limited military operations simultaneously in two or more areas of the world and maintain an acceptable general war posture. In the latter event, national measures providing for a degree of mobilization and augmentation of lift capabilities might well be required. If sizeable forces were involved in such situations, our capabilities for limited war are such that authorization to use nuclear weapons selectively would probably be required. Our capability to conduct non-nuclear war is very substantial and although it has not kept pace with our growing nuclear capability it has increased. Additionally, we must continue to rely, to a considerable extent, upon indigenous forces to cope with guerrilla and jungle warfare.

Cold War. Unified Commanders have formulated plans and are active in assuring increasingly effective utilization of their resources in the cold war. MAAGS, missions, attaches, rotational forces, prestockage of equipment, exchange officers on military staffs and in military schools, weapons demonstrations, show of force, official military visits and assistance in national disasters contribute to the over-all cold war effort. In order to limit the Sino-Soviet initiative in cold war, the United States must develop a broad range of capabilities whereby it may counter Sino-Soviet Bloc and communist activities in many parts of the world. Portions of South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are areas of particular vulnerability.

Mutual Security. In both limited and general war, a substantial contribution is expected from our allies. Military planning takes cognizance of the limitations and capabilities of indigenous forces. Although our national security is predicated upon the concept of collective security, the United States must continue to develop adequate strength and a strategy for its employment to deter or successfully wage war, survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny, and to maintain the leadership of the Free World.

Summary. Statements in previous annual reports and evaluations by the JCS recognized the probable diminishing relative military advantage of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. From the position we occupied with a great manned bomber fleet supported by a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons, at a time when the Soviet Union was very limited in long-range bombers and nuclear weapons, it was to be expected that our margin of advantage would certainly decrease. The statements referred to seem less appropriate today, as our over-all military power continues the greatest in the world.

Our task is to maintain our effective retaliatory capability and to improve our ability to defeat or contain local aggressions. The probable strength of the Soviet Union in ballistic missiles calls for major effort on our part to increase the survivability of our retaliatory strike forces. This need has given emphasis in our programs to increase warning, quick reaction, dispersal of bombers, and hardening, mobility and concealment of missiles.

In last year's report it was stated that by the end of FY 1962, with a continuance of present U.S. and Soviet trends and programs, and with no major breakthrough, each side may be expected to possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions. It concluded that in such a situation an advantage, possibly conclusive, could accrue to the side taking the initiative. Although this is possible, the progress made in our programs referred to above, to make certain the survival and readiness of effective retaliatory power, gives reasonable assurance that in

the period ahead no enemy can expect to launch an attack against us without inviting his own destruction.

With respect to limited and local aggression more adequate provision has been made for Army modernization and for airlift. Also, since the end of fiscal 1960 our readiness has been increased by the deployment of an additional attack carrier to the Mediterranean and the Far East, the deployment of the first POLARIS submarine in the Atlantic, and the achievement of a capability to mount a significant airborne alert.

On 2 December 1960 the JCS approved the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operations Plan to become effective on 1 April 1961. The Plan and the Target List were developed by a Joint Staff composed of members of all four Services and representatives of Unified Commanders contributing forces to the initial attack on targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Targets selected, assurance factors, and damage criteria used were consistent with NSC Study 2009. This action is very significant in that for the first time it integrates effectively and provides for mutual support of aircraft and missiles of all Unified Commands in one attack plan.

As of 7 December 1960 the following missiles were in an immediate response posture: 38 THOR in the United Kingdom; 12 JUPITER in Italy; 13 SNARK at Presque Isle, Maine; 5 ATLAS at Vandenberg AFB, California and Warren AFB, Wyoming; and 16 POLARIS missiles deployed aboard the U.S.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON.

The ICBM site activation program suffered some delay in construction and initial installation and checkout of equipment. Delay in operational readiness occurred at the first five (5) sites. Scheduled target dates will be met from March 1961.

The GAM-77 (HOUND-DOG) is a supersonic air-to-surface missile designed to be used as a primary target weapon or as a penetration aid at a maximum range of 650 n.m., thereby enhancing the striking power range and operational life of its carrier aircraft, the B-52. The first two B-52 squadrons were scheduled to be equipped with operational missiles by December of 1960. However, additional testing is required to improve reliability and some slippage is occurring. The first B-52 squadron with 18 operational missiles is participating in testing at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The present program involves 29 B-52 squadrons, all scheduled to become operational by September 1962.

A. PROGRAMS FOR NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCES. The first objective of the U.S. Military Program has dictated maintenance of strategic nuclear retaliatory striking forces, tactical nuclear delivery forces, and deployment of forces as appropriate, all acting in concert to deter general war or to prevail in the event general war occurs.

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) has the largest capacity for nuclear retaliation and is charged with primary responsibility for exploiting the

U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected targets and target systems at the outbreak of general war. Total SAC force has been reduced from 43 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 4 reconn.) wings of bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at end FY 1959 to 40 (12 heavy, 25 medium, 2 reconn. and one strategic missile) wings at end of FY 1960, 2 reconnaissance wings and 3 B-47 medium bomber wings having been inactivated, and one each B-52 and strategic missile wings activated. Programmed changes in FY 1961 will result in inactivation of 4 more B-47 wings and activation of the first B-58 medium bomber wing. This trend of decreasing aircraft wings will continue for the next few years as missiles are introduced into the inventory.

Combat capability of SAC heavy bomber wings increased during FY 1960 as one more B-52 wing was activated, bringing the total to 12 B-52 wings with 34 squadrons equipped² and remaining 2 in process of being equipped. By end FY 1961, 13 wings will be fully converted to B-52s. While combat capability of SAC heavy bombers is improving through introduction of new equipment, the medium bomber fleet, with exception of newly activated B-58 units, is approaching obsolescence. (The first SAC unit became operational with 12 B-58s on 3 August 1960.) The B-47's, which make up the bulk of the bomber force and have now been in service nearly 8 years, have undergone a major safety of flight structural reinforcement to extend their usefulness.

As the Soviet delivery capability increases, so does the vulnerability of SAC retaliatory forces within and outside the United States. To reduce vulnerability, *SAC dispersal and alert programs* have been enhanced as follows:

a. *Heavy bomber dispersal.* Although the present goal is to have no more than one heavy bomber squadron on any one base, 36 sqdns are presently located on 28 bases, i.e., 3 bases each with 3 sqdns, 2 bases each with 2 sqdns, and 23 bases each with one sqdn. Two of the 36 heavy bomber sqdns are in process of receiving B-52 aircraft. By end FY 1961, 37 sqdns are programmed to be dispersed on 29 bases, i.e., 3 bases each with 3 squadrons, 2 bases each with 2 squadrons, and 24 bases each with one squadron.

b. *Medium bomber dispersal.* At present there are 25 wings on 18 bases. Seven bases accommodate 2 wings each and 11 bases accommodate one wing each. At end FY 1961, 23 wings are programmed to be on 19 bases (4 bases each with 2 wings, and 15 bases each with one wing). In extension of this fixed dispersal, SAC has developed plans to reduce vulnerability of the medium bomber force by further dispersal

² Note: An "equipped" unit possesses 50% or more of authorized number of modern aircraft. [Footnote is in the original.]

to non-SAC military airfields and civil airfields during certain emergency situations.

c. *Alert.* On 20 May 1960, SAC reached the readiness posture of 1/3 of its force on continuous 15 minute ground alert. As of 30 June 1960, 448 bombers and 237 supporting aerial tankers are on a 15 minute ground alert status. Also one SM-65 (ATLAS) and four SM-62 (SNARK) missiles were in a war readiness alert posture.

Continued airborne alert training has been conducted throughout the year with the objective of developing the maximum feasible airborne alert capability. Among several specific actions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the U.S. military posture were those to augment airborne alert capabilities.

During FY 1960 there was some slippage in the *ATLAS ICBM operational site program* for the first 4 squadrons. The first ATLAS complex, (1 of 3 launchers) of first squadron at Vandenberg AFB, became operational in September 1959. A second complex (3 launchers) of the Vandenberg squadron became operational primarily for crew training in FY 1960, but one launcher, temporarily down for retrofitting, will become operational again in August 1960. The second ATLAS squadron (programmed for Warren AFB) is now scheduled to have its 6 launchers fully operational prior to end CY 1960. Programs for deployment of the ICBM force have been revised to provide for increased levels of hardening of the force and increased numbers of missiles for later ATLAS squadrons which will result in a significant increase in over-all effectiveness of ATLAS forces. Research and development programs for TITAN and MINUTEMAN are progressing satisfactorily. The first 2 TITAN squadrons at Lowry AFB are programmed by Air Force to be operational by end CY 1961 and the first MINUTEMAN squadron during FY 1963.

Supplementing SAC retaliatory capabilities are *USAF tactical nuclear strike forces*. In the *Pacific*, these forces consist of 3 wings (9 squadrons) of tactical fighters, one wing (3 squadrons) of tactical bombers and two squadrons of MATADOR tactical missiles. These forces continue in the program during FY 1961. In the *United Kingdom, Europe and the Middle East*, tactical nuclear strike forces consist of 6 tactical fighter wings (18 squadrons) permanently deployed plus 4 squadrons on continuous rotation from the United States, one wing (3 squadrons) of tactical bombers, and 3 squadrons of tactical missiles, consisting of one MATADOR and 2 MACE squadrons. Except for conversion of the MATADOR squadron to MACE missiles the tactical nuclear strike units in these areas are programmed to remain unchanged during FY 1961. Nuclear capable tactical air forces in the *United States*, capable of augmenting forces overseas, consist of 6 tactical fighter wing equivalents (comprised of 24 sqdns, excluding the 4 on rotation to Europe) which continue in the program through FY 1961.

Certain *major U.S. Naval forces* possess a significant nuclear retaliatory strike capability. This capability rests primarily in the attack carrier striking forces and a growing capability in submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

There are 14 *attack carriers* and 16 associated carrier air groups in the fleet. Normally, 4 to 5 attack carriers, with their embarked air groups, are deployed in overseas areas in position to strike assigned targets. Technological advances in aircraft, carrier facilities, electronic equipments and improved operating techniques have materially increased Navy's nuclear weapon delivery capability. The 4 CVA 59 (FORRESTAL) class carriers have increased nuclear striking power, improved operational flexibility and enhanced safety of operation. Action will be taken in FY 1961 to increase the U.S. nuclear retaliatory strike capability by deploying one additional FORRESTAL class carrier in each of the SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets, loaded with nuclear-capable attack aircraft. KITTY HAWK, another FORRESTAL class carrier, will join the fleet before end FY 1961 and will provide additional nuclear striking power to the U.S. retaliatory capacity and will replace one of the 7 World War II ESSEX class carriers still in the operating inventory.

Present operational capability for guided missile delivery of nuclear warheads from surface ships and submarines is represented by *REGULUS system* for which nuclear warheads are stockpiled. REGULUS is installed in 5 submarines (one of which is nuclear powered) and 2 heavy cruisers, all assigned to Pacific fleet. There are 9 more submarines equipped with REGULUS radar guidance system (TROUNCE) to provide terminal control of a REGULUS missile launched from either a submarine or cruiser. One launching submarine is continuously deployed on station in North Pacific waters with target assigned. The other 4 are available in times of tension.

The first 2 *Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) POLARIS submarines* have been commissioned and are conducting pre-deployment tests and will be operational with missiles on board prior to end CY 1960. Seven more FBM submarines are presently under various stages of construction. A total of 6 are scheduled to be operational in CY 1961. Congress authorized 5 additional FBM submarines for a total of 14 and long-lead items funding for 7 more in the FY 1961 Budget. POLARIS missile development has progressed rapidly and all major milestone dates have been met. The missile was successfully fired from a submerged submarine on 20 July 1960.

Included in naval forces are *Fleet Marine Forces* which contribute to the over-all nuclear retaliatory capability. This capability is contained primarily in 3 Marine Aircraft Wings, one of which is maintained in the Pacific. The 3 Marine Divisions, including the division in the Pacific as well as the Battalion Landing Team maintained afloat in

the Mediterranean, also possess nuclear capabilities (8" howitzer and HONEST JOHN).

Nuclear delivery systems organic to deployed *major U.S. Army forces* contribute to the nuclear retaliatory capability. *In Europe*, Army currently maintains 2 REDSTONE missile groups, 8 CORPORAL missile battalions (2 bns in a medium missile command and 6 separate bns), 2 LACROSSE battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN rocket battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN batteries, four 280 mm gun battalions (to be reduced to 2 during FY 1961), nine 8-inch howitzer battalions and five 8-inch howitzer batteries. [text not declassified] New weapons design and missile check-out procedures have appreciably reduced reaction time. Nuclear delivery units *in the United States* capable of augmenting forces overseas include one medium missile command (2 HONEST JOHN and one CORPORAL bns), one air transportable missile command (HONEST JOHN bn), one REDSTONE missile group, 5 LACROSSE battalions, 3 CORPORAL battalions, 2 HONEST JOHN battalions and the nuclear delivery means organic to CONUS divisions. During FY 1961, 4 LITTLE JOHN battalions will be activated. Planned transition from the liquid-fueled REDSTONE and CORPORAL missiles to solid propellant and an all-inertial guidance system for the PERSHING and SERGEANT systems will greatly improve mobility and reaction time. Current developmental progress of the PERSHING missile indicates that it will have an operational capability in FY 1963.

The Soviet Bloc has the following general capabilities for defense against the foregoing U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces:

Present capabilities of the Soviet air defense system would be greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers in daylight and clear weather at altitudes between about 3,000 and about 45,000 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Fighters would retain some effectiveness at altitudes in excess of 50,000 feet, but capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility. In the increasingly widespread areas defended by surface-to-air missiles, air defense capabilities would be unimpaired by weather conditions and would extend to at least 60,000 feet in altitude.

Despite improvements in the Soviet air defense system, it still has basic weaknesses in coping with a sophisticated air attack. At altitudes below about 3,000 feet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; below about 1,000 feet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers, stand-off weapons, decoys and electronic countermeasures, air defense capabilities would be significantly diminished. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would be complicated

by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed, including cruise-type missiles, fighter bombers, supersonic bombers and low altitude attack bombers.

The Soviets have no known operationally effective system for defense against ballistic missiles and artillery by purely defensive means.

B. PROGRAMS FOR HIGHLY MOBILE AND DEPLOYED READY FORCES.

General. United States ready forces deployed throughout the world, together with the highly mobile back-up forces in CONUS and augmentation provided by our allies are considered to be the most significant deterrents to local aggression or limited war. They also contribute to deterrence of general war. Equipped to conduct nuclear or non-nuclear war, these forces are designed to move quickly against local aggression or limited war, where timeliness of force is the key to maintenance of U.S. interests and prevention of general war. Their capabilities for nuclear war have been included, for the most part, in preceding paragraphs. Following paragraphs describe programs for these forces.

The new M-14 (7.62mm standard NATO round) rifle is now being made available to selected *U.S. Army* combat units on a limited scale. A new medium tank (M-60) and armored personnel carrier (M-113) entered the inventory in limited numbers in FY 1960. The new 7.62mm machine gun will be available to some units of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) in FY 1961. A high explosive warhead for the HONEST JOHN rocket is now available to overseas and CONUS units. The first dual capable DAVY CROCKETT will be issued to troop units during FY 1961. Army is also scheduled to receive the first models of the new AO-1 MOHAWK combat surveillance airplane and AC-1 CARIBOU 3-ton transport airplane during FY 1961.

U.S. Navy has continued the integration of guided missiles weapons systems into fleet operations. Atlantic Fleet has increased its capability in surface-to-air missiles for anti-air warfare with TERRIER equipped ships. The guided missile cruiser USS GALVESTON is now conducting evaluation of the TALOS shipboard system. In Pacific Fleet, there are 5 submarines and 2 cruisers with REGULUS guided missile capability which are deployed on a rotational basis. Two other cruisers in Pacific Fleet are TERRIER equipped. All carrier fighter aircraft carry either SIDEWINDER or SPARROW III air-to-air missiles for anti-air warfare employment. Some types carry a mixed load of these missiles allowing greater latitude in attack. Light attack aircraft are being configured as fast as procurement will allow, to use BULLPUP, a close-air-support guided missile. Deployed forces in both Atlantic and Pacific Fleets are now equipped with these missiles.

Included in naval forces are *Fleet Marine Force* ground and air units with the capability to employ tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, either surface or air launched. Capabilities for conducting helicopter-borne vertical assault operations continue to improve. Three interim amphibious assault ships (LPH) now serve the fleets. One more antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS) converted to an LPH will be added during FY 1961 while 2 further LPH, currently under construction, should be available by FY 1963.

In certain areas the capabilities of *U.S. Air Force* tactical forces have continued to improve during FY 1960. Compatibility tests between tactical fighters and KC-135 jet tankers have been successfully completed making it possible to deploy Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) units to overseas locations by use of these jet tankers, if desired. This will not only provide greater reliability for refueling operations, it will also permit more rapid deployment. Modernization of tactical forces with F-105 all-weather tactical fighters began in FY 1960. Tactical Air Command is now equipped with one wing of F-105 aircraft, to be increased to 3 wings by end FY 1964. Equippage of theater based forces will begin in early FY 1962 for Europe and early FY 1963 for Far East. About one wing equivalent of F-100 and all F-105 aircraft will be capable of delivering BULLPUP air-to-surface missiles, which will be coming into the operational inventory in FY 1961. Improved reaction time for MATADOR tactical missile units has resulted in an increased readiness posture for those forces and similar improvement is scheduled for MACE units during FY 1961.

[Omitted here are pages 10–23.]

III. PROGRAMS FOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE.

ESTIMATED SOVIET THREAT AND CAPABILITIES. As of 30 June 1960, by employing their entire heavy bomber force, many of their medium bombers, their small submarine-launched missile capability, and available ICBMS, the Soviets could mount large-scale initial nuclear attacks against North American targets. Actual weight of attack launched against the United States would depend upon Soviet judgment as to optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas where U.S. and allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and other essential targets were located. Soviet leaders probably regard their current long-range attack forces as adequate to deliver a devastating attack on concentrations of population and industry, but incapable of preventing, by military action, the nuclear devastation of the USSR. How long this latter consideration remains valid depends upon the progress made in maintaining an effective U.S. military posture *vis-a-vis* the Soviets.

Because the ICBM offers the Soviets the best prospects of being able to achieve destruction of a substantial portion of U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability prior to launch, future development of Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will be primarily a function of production and development of ICBMs. However, for some years to come, long-range striking capabilities of the USSR will include both manned bombers and ballistic missiles. The Soviets probably will consider that ballistic missiles can best be employed to neutralize U.S. based retaliatory and other capabilities in an initial blow, relying upon bombers for follow-up attacks. Soviet employment of long-range striking capabilities would continue to face great difficulties of timing and distribution of attack against widely deployed, mobile and ready Western strengths.

It is estimated that the USSR now has a limited capability to launch ballistic missiles from about 12 long range, conventionally-powered submarines, 4 of which probably can accommodate 2 ballistic missiles each. A new class of submarine has been in production since 1958. About 9 of these are now considered operational. Although only fragmentary information is available on this class, it is believed to be designed to accommodate about 6 ballistic missiles. It is believed that these submarines would be capable of a 350 n.m. missile range with a CEP of one to 2 n.m., launching from surface or sail awash condition.

Clandestine attack on the United States by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, could occur against specifically selected targets.

Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs—Comparative Evaluation. Communist China has an extremely limited CW capability and no BW capability. The capabilities of other Bloc countries (not including the USSR) are little better. However, the over-all USSR CW/BW capabilities may be superior to those of the United States and its allies but there is no firm intelligence information to support a precise comparison. The USSR may have more different types of CW agents, greater quantities of each agent and also more delivery means. USSR BW capabilities are not known, but it is certain that their efforts in this field have been most extensive and it is known that they have a very comprehensive R&D CW program.

U.S. BW and CW Programs. Increased funding provided in FY 1960 and projected for incremental increase during next 5 years should do much to reduce present USSR relative advantage. The possibility of qualitative improvement through research and development of both agents and munitions appears to be great. A comprehensive report on current status of Department of Defense biological and chemical weapons research and development programs is included in Section VI, Military Research & Development Program.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report, sections IV–IX.]

279. Annex to JCS comments, JCSM–553–60 (print Document 130)¹

JCSM–553–60

Washington, December 9, 1960

ANNEX

SPECIFIC JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF VIEWS ON POSSIBLE
DEFICIENCIES IN THE U.S. POSTURE FOR LIMITED MILITARY
OPERATIONS (C)

1. *a.* Airlift and sealift studies prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1959 included the following:

(1) Airlift Requirements and Capabilities under Mobilization and Wartime Conditions (FY 1960–1963).

(2) U.S. Ocean Shipping Requirements and Availability. These studies, based on actual plans and prepared annually, are coordinated within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Services. They provide the basis for joint guidance on transportation planning matters.

b. The above studies used resumption of hostilities in Korea coincident with six months of mobilization as its criterion for limited war capabilities and requirements.

(1) In the airlift study, it was concluded that Military Air Transport Service (MATS) capability for limited war, assuming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is activated, is adequate for passenger and cargo requirements except for shortages during the first 20 days. Approximately three-fourths of the cargo deficit in this period can be overcome by temporary transfer of capability from the Atlantic area.

(a) Since the airlift study was completed additional passenger capability has been allocated to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to meet the passenger deficits as indicated by this study.

(b) The cargo capability situation also has been improved since the study by additional Civil Reserve Air Fleet allocations.

(2) The conclusion of the sealift study was that, although there are some shortages of cargo and passenger ships in the first 60 days of a limited war, sealift is adequate. Shortages in cargo ships could be made up from available foreign flag shipping. Passenger ship shortages could be eliminated by “hot bunking” and use of friendly Allied passenger ships.

(3) No airlift or sealift studies have been completed at this time regarding Southeast Asia. New studies on subjects tabulated in paragraph 1 *a* (1) and (2) above, dealing specifically with Southeast Asia, are scheduled for completion by May 1961. The effect of the logistic

¹ Source: “Specific Joint Chiefs of Staff Views on Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations.” Top Secret. 25 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs.

limitations of this area on U.S. transportation capabilities will be considered in these studies.

2. Military Logistics Base plans (Mobilization Base Plans) are formulated by the Military Departments in accordance with the general guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense. The latest guidance is the Secretary of Defense memorandum of 15 March 1960, subject, "Guidance for the Development of FY 61/62 Logistics Programs," which provides for acquisition objectives, production base planning objectives, and materiel retention policies, for both limited and general war planning in the Department of Defense. There has been insufficient time to implement fully this guidance. It is expected that if funding permits implementation of this guidance, our capability to support limited war situations, without degrading our general war readiness posture, should be improved in the near future. However, current budgetary limitations will not enable the Military Departments to meet in all categories the supply and equipment objectives of the logistic guidance. The status of Service mobilization base planning and programs is summarized below:

a. Army. Detailed mobilization plans and programs to support current limited and general war plans are in advanced state of preparation. Major deficiencies, as they relate to limited war operations, are:

(1) Strength, both active and reserve, dependent upon the scope and nature of the conflict.

(2) Planning for the support of limited war is based on the Limited War Plan for the Resumption of Hostilities in Korea. However, its current status of implementation would result in degrading the general war posture in the event a limited war is quickly followed by a general war.

(3) While Army forces are equipped with sufficient materiel to support U.S. forces in limited war operations envisaged in the current time frame, only about one-half would be of the preferred model and the balance would be of an older less effective but acceptable model. Recent allocation of funds will reduce this deficiency to some degree from a qualitative point of view in the time frame under consideration.

b. Navy

(1) The Navy logistics mobilization planning objective is to provide the materiel support to the forces needed to prosecute a limited war with an accompanying selective build-up of forces, while at all times maintaining an adequate general war posture. Planned acquisition requirements to meet this objective are:

(a) Meet the peacetime force materiel requirement.

(b) Complete equipping of selected reserve forces.

(c) Attain a level of war readiness reserve stock not to exceed 180 days combat support for general war for Marine Corps forces deployed

overseas. For all other Naval forces, the general war objective will not exceed 90 days combat support.

(d) Attain an additional level of war readiness reserve stock of those items necessary to sustain in limited war for 180 days designated Naval forces, plus a maximum of 180 days training support for the other Naval forces.

(2) Budgetary limitations have precluded reaching these logistic readiness goals. The most important shortage is modern conventional weapons and ammunition, such as ASW torpedoes, electronic equipment (sonar, radar and ECM), and guided missiles.

c. Air Force. U.S. Air Force wartime planning and programming documents, upon which emergency war plans are formulated, presently reflect the force and war readiness materiel requirements for limited war activity as well as for general war. In order to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved contingency plans of the unified commands in consonance with Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated 15 March 1960, the Air Force has segmented the total package authorized for limited war actions and has distributed them on a global basis. Detailed Air Force plans provide for world-wide base prestockage rather than the portrayal of the force and attendant war readiness materiel assets in one location or area to meet limited war threats. The separation of War Readiness Materiel (WRM) for general and limited war will enable the commander to identify readily those items of WRM which are specifically designated for limited war and prevent degradation of general war assets. Additionally, the Air Force has revised its policy on WRM to provide for prestocking and prepositioning materiel in support of approved contingency plans. The concept provides for locating the materiel at or near the point of planned usage.

d. Marine Corps. Mobilization planning is current through the FY 1961 period. These plans provide guidance under conditions of cold, limited or general war, and reflect actual Marine Corps capabilities including provision for assembly of resources available. Mobilization plans are designed to permit incrementally phased activations of units in the event partial mobilization is required. Current actions to improve mobilization capabilities include a reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve to support more accurately specific mobilization requirements.

3. The general statue of war reserves by Service, is:

a. Army

(1) The status of war reserves, based on the guidance for the development of FY 61/62 Logistics Program, is being computed and analyzed at this time. Therefore, the following information on the general status of war reserves is a qualified estimate, based on available data.

(2) Procurement Equipment Missiles Army (PEMA).

(a) Total assets available for initial issue and war reserves represent a little less than two-thirds of the objectives authorized by the FY 61/62 guidance. Since sufficient assets are not available, the provision of adequate support for a limited war would necessitate the withdrawal of equipment required to meet initial equipment requirements for the balance of the forces authorized by the guidance.

(b) Assuming a six months limited war, up to 24 months would be required after the initiation of procurement to reconstitute that portion of the inventory which would be consumed during the six months period.

(3) Minor secondary items and repair parts.

(a) Mobilization reserve assets and planned acquisition through Fiscal Year 1962 will meet approximately 60 per cent of the requirement.

(b) If mobilization reserves were depleted by a limited war of six months duration, the time required to replace stocks after the initiation of procurement would vary from 6 to 15 months depending on the item.

b. Navy. Navy Mobilization Reserve Stocks (MRS) are stored in CONUS and in reasonably protected sites overseas in locations so as best to support the forces in being and the forces to be mobilized. MRS is maintained, rotated, and modernized to the extent practicable under current financial limitations. The time required to reconstitute the various categories of materiel included in the MRS will vary from three months for certain standard consumables up to 36 months for major electronic equipment.

c. Air Force

(1) The War Readiness Materiel (WRM) requirements for limited war are based on plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Air Force supporting plans call for prepositioning such materiel at or near the point of planned usage. Based on the approved strategic concepts reflected in the War Objectives and Basic National Security Policies present stocks are deemed adequate to permit immediate reaction to anticipated (current plans) limited war situations. However, should these concepts change, Air Force WRM requirements would reflect this change. The lack of Base Rights agreements in certain areas of Southeast Asia and the Middle East preclude full implementation of the prepositioning policy. In such case, the required materiel is prepositioned at the nearest United States controlled base. The lack of Base Rights thus causes not only a mal-location of materiel, but also places an additive requirement on transportation resources.

(2) Those WRM assets consumed during war operations will be replaced from materiel in transit; in depots stocks; from stocks in long-supply; diversions from activities with lower priority missions (except that the General War posture will not be degraded); and by expedited deliveries from production and repair facilities.

d. Marine Corps

Sufficient materiel, including repairable unserviceable as well as serviceable assets, is on hand to meet 52% of the M-Day materiel requirement. Time required to reconstitute materiel reserves is estimated to be 18 to 24 months for major items, 10 to 12 months for ammunition, and 9 to 12 months for minor items. This estimate assumes immediate unrestricted availability of funds, and disregards possible delay due to simultaneous maximum demand on industry by all Services. Actions being taken to assume maximum utilization of reserve stocks include regular rotation to obviate deterioration; continuous maintenance in a high degree of readiness of mount-out and resupply stocks; and selective prepositioning of supplies both in WesPac and NELM for contingency requirements.

4. The logistic limitations in Southeast Asia, stemming from the lack of development of communications, port and terminal facilities and transportation means, would severely affect U.S. and friendly indigenous military operations. Furthermore, the existing logistic support facilities are extremely vulnerable to disruption and are inadequate to support sustained operations of U.S. and Allied forces. These limitations would probably affect enemy operations to a lesser degree.

5. Thus, lack of surface LOC's, adequacy of terminal facilities in the area, and the status of strategic communications in Southeast Asia, are recognized as factors which would influence the nature of the operations and the type force to be employed. Military operations for Southeast Asia take into account the geophysical limitations of the area. These limitations establish the *modus operandi* of military operations. Any improvement in facilities would cause changes to plans to utilize the improvements. The lack of facilities is a limitation to be considered in planning.

6. In addition, there are inadequate logistical units in the indigenous forces of Southeast Asia for the support of their own combat forces. Current contingency plans for Southeast Asia include requirements for U.S. logistical units for the support of indigenous combat forces. This limitation in the indigenous force structure is recognized and, as the logistical capability of indigenous forces improves, the contingency plans are revised accordingly.

7. The solution to the problems which pertain to operations in Southeast Asia is not to devote more of our current military assistance to the development of logistic, communication, and support facilities designed specifically for U.S. use. This would have an adverse impact, both political and military, on the host country. Rather, the primary objective of our military assistance program should be the improvement of indigenous capabilities with the eventual goal of adequately trained and equipped indigenous forces which are essential for the conduct of operations in Southeast Asia. In addition, one of the major objectives of

the Military Assistance Program is to provide the host country with a capability to resist Communist aggression by defending its borders and maintaining internal security. Therefore, any program designed specifically for the development of U.S. capabilities to operate in Southeast Asia should be in addition to the existing programs for direct military assistance to the countries of the area.

8. At the time the Limited War Study was being prepared and subsequent thereto, certain actions were being taken to facilitate operations in Southeast Asia. These include:

a. Increased and reoriented military assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia.

b. Deployment of additional Army forces to the Far East, e.g., an airborne battle group and additional Army logistical support forces to Okinawa.

c. CINCPAC Operation Plan for Southeast Asia refined and approved.

d. Additional Marine elements afloat with Seventh Fleet.

e. Continued development of planning and coordination by SEATO forces.

f. Action by Air Force to establish a limited stockpile of conventional munitions in Thailand.

g. Assignment of a third aircraft carrier to the Seventh Fleet on a continuing basis.

h. Increased number of attack aircraft deployed in aircraft carriers with the Seventh Fleet.

i. Programmed modernization of the Airlift Force. (\$33,000,000 is programmed for the development of the so-called SOR aircraft (long-range jet powered cargo aircraft). For interim modernization \$83,900,000 has been apportioned during FY 1961 for the procurement of 16 C-130E aircraft. The FY 1962 program plans procurement of an additional 34 C-130E aircraft, making a total of 50 such aircraft. Consideration is being given to the procurement of 50 of the C-135 type aircraft.)

j. Strategic mobility exercise scheduled for early 1961. (Airlift one Army battle group and deploy Composite Air Strike Force from Continental United States to Far East.)

k. Periodic deployment of Composite Air Strike Force for training purposes.

l. The Department of Defense has officially supported the Department of Commerce in its actions to maintain the National Defense Reserve Fleet at the best practicable degree of modernity and in sufficient strength to fulfill civilian and military requirements in national emergencies.

m. Action by the Army to establish the DA Forward Depot, Pacific, on Okinawa.

9. Actions being taken or that could be taken with regard to obtaining required transit and base rights in Southeast Asia, improving strategic and tactical communications in Southeast Asia, and the improvement of capabilities to conduct over-the-beach supply operations are as follows:

a. Transit and Base Rights in Southeast Asia.

(1) Requirements exist for the following facilities for dispersal, staging and recovery of aircraft and prepositioning and prestockage of materials and supplies as required to support CINCPAC plans.

(a) Vietnam

Tan Son Nhut, Saigon
Tourane
Cap St. Jacques
Nha Trang
Bien Hoa

(b) Laos

Vietiane
Seno

(c) Thailand

Bangkok/Don Muang
Korat Nakhon Ratchasima
Takhl
Chiang Mai
Ubon
Udorn

(NOTE: Current interpretation of the restrictions imposed by the terms of the Geneva Convention have thus far prevented any use of facilities in Laos and Vietnam. Rights have been obtained for limited prestocking in Thailand.)

(2) Transit rights for overflight and for use of bases for peacetime training exercises are obtained on an individual basis.

(3) CINCPAC contingency planning for the area assumes that existing bases, facilities and services will be made available when and as required.

b. Strategic and Tactical Communications.

(1) *Existing Strategic Communications.* Communications to and from Vietiane, Saigon, and Bangkok are provided by the Army Strategic Communications (STARCOM) Station at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, which interconnects into the world-wide communications system of the Department of Defense. There is, in addition, a communications circuit between Bangkok and Saigon. The Southeast Asian terminals of all these circuits have limited capacity and utilize air-transportable equipment. A high capacity circuit links the British communication system at Singapore with the Naval Communication

System in the Philippines. In addition, the Naval communication facility at San Miguel, Philippines, provides a circuit to inter-connect Naval units afloat with the world-wide communications network.

(2) *Planned Expansion of Southeast Asian Strategic Communications.* During fiscal years 1962–64, the high-frequency circuits which link Clark Air Force Base with the countries of Southeast Asia will be expanded to provide additional reliability and an increased traffic handling capability. This will be accomplished by the utilization of fixed-station types of equipment in place of transportable equipment. The fixed-stations will have increased power and transmitters with a greater circuit capacity. To provide for communications westward from Southeast Asia, the Department of Defense has under consideration a request for an Asian Gateway Communications Station in Karachi which, if authorized, will furnish high capacity communications between Karachi and Bangkok. Within the Southeast Asian countries, an expanded communications circuit is planned between Bangkok and Saigon.

(3) *Contingency Communications.* West of Hawaii, air-transportable equipments which may be used on point-to-point communications circuits are located at Clark Air Force Base, in Okinawa and Japan, and in Seoul. These equipments represent a reasonable additional communications capability to augment existing circuits into Southeast Asia and will be supplemented by improved air-transportable equipments which are under procurement for delivery during the current fiscal year. It should be understood, however, that the technical teams which are necessary for the operation and maintenance of supplementary communications must, except on a very limited basis, be provided from the continental United States.

(4) *Tactical Communications.* The U.S. Military Services do not maintain in being tactical communications systems in Southeast Asia. Each Service provides tactical communications for the control and direction of Service forces within an area of tactical operations. These tactical systems consist of transportable communications equipments which are deployed into an area by tactical forces. Coordination for joint operations is the responsibility of the area commander. Tactical communications systems are, therefore, organic to military units, connect into strategic networks, and are not required prior to the movement of military forces.

(5) *Actions which could be taken to improve Strategic Communications.*

(a) Existing strategic communications connecting into Southeast Asia, together with planned improvements, will provide a minimal capability for limited war operations. Fixed communications systems are dependent upon high frequency circuits designed essentially for teletype operation with only a comparatively few voice circuits available.

(b) If it should be decided to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia, communications planning will have to be revised to reflect operational requirements. The specific nature of such programs will depend upon the concept of operations, the magnitude of forces employed, and the location of controlling and supporting headquarters. Communications for such purposes are not available in the existing system nor contemplated in scheduled improvements. Basically, communications would have to be expanded to include the provision of voice and data transmission between elements of the combat forces and high quality circuits capable of direct extension to command centers in the United States. Included would be measures for increasing the capacity and improving the reliability of the fixed strategic communications system, and for providing extensions from strategic networks into contiguous areas by the use of transportable tactical equipment.

(c) Over-the-Beach Supply Operations.

(1) Army

(a) These operations, which are an important part of the resupply capability of U.S. Army Forces, are periodically tested and improved through the conduct of realistic exercises, and the development and adjustment of doctrine based on lessons learned. One of the most recent exercises was conducted in total darkness with complete success at Fort Story, Virginia, on 17, 18 and 19 October 1960. Another exercise (NODEX-25) was conducted on the coast of France 26–28 October 1960.

(b) Present plans call for a partial shift from landing craft to amphibians as equipment becomes available. For example, four (4) platoons equipped with Barge, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (BARC), will be in operation in CONUS and the Far East (Okinawa) by the end of FY 61, an increase of two over present strength. Also, existing equipment in amphibious truck companies, consisting at present of WW II DUKWs, will be placed in the future with the Lighter, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (LARC-5) thus, greatly increasing the capability of these units.

(c) The present capability to support combat forces in Southeast Asia by over-the-beach resupply operations, if required, is deemed adequate for the forces to be deployed to this area under existing limited war plans.

(2) Navy

(a) The Navy has, under continuous study and development, programs and projects to improve logistic support of landing forces in amphibious operations which include evaluation of various over-the-beach supply support systems. Each system is analyzed with respect to inter-relationship and combined productivity of packaging, materials handling and transportation procedures and techniques. These studies result in continued improvement in the hardware utilized and

techniques employed in over-the-beach supply support operations for amphibious assault.

(b) Private research contractors, the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory and the U.S. Army Transportation Corps are principal contributors to the Navy Program. Some items now in the evaluation stage are:

i. Landing Craft Retriever (LCR), a vehicle for unloading LC's in one operation, with up to 70 tons cargo lift capability. Tests to date show promise in achieving a through-the-beach capability vice over-the-beach.

ii. Hi-line system of cables from an LST to the beach gives the capability of underway pallet loads from LST's stranded off the beach direct to a truck.

iii. Causeway extensions for unstable beaches ("rush role").

iv. Hose reels for buoyant fuel systems.

v. Transfer line barges.

vi. Deep-water fording kits for tractors used in the surf zone.

vii. 600 GPM ship-to-shore fuel systems.

viii. Inflatable causeways.

ix. Ship-to-shore heavy duty cargo systems.

x. Booster stations for ship-to-shore fuel systems.

xi. Helicopter aerial delivery systems.

xii. Improved high-speed tracked amphibians.

Items recently placed in fleet use are:

i. 21-foot wide end-to-end connected pontoon causeway (replacing 14-foot wide lapped units).

ii. 300 GPM bottom laid ship-to-shore fuel system.

iii. Hi-speed shore party crane.

iv. Controlled pontoon launching from LST's.

v. 100-ton advanced base crane.

11. Subsequent to the preparation of the Limited War Study, a decision was made with regard to use of funds to improve our readiness posture. This funding action will improve our capability to conduct limited military operations. Authorization was granted to increase Army modernization, increase amphibious assault capabilities, provide for additional aircraft carriers on station with the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, and increase air alert status. Subsequent budgetary action may not permit continuation of all of these readiness measures.

280. NSC Report, NSC 6022¹

NSC 6022

Washington, December 13, 1960

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5802/1
- B. NSC Action No. 2151-*f*-(1)
- C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 14, 1960
- D. NSC Action No. 2300
- E. NIE 11-8-60; NIE 11-5-59

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in accordance with NSC Action No. 2151-*f*-(1), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, December 22, 1960.

It is recommended that, if the enclosed statement of policy is adopted, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and direct that the departments and agencies indicated in the table on "Primary Responsibilities for Implementation" (with the exception of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency) report, in a special annex to their respective annual status reports, on progress in implementing the appropriate paragraphs of the approved paper.

The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted and approved, is intended to supersede NSC 5802/1.

Marion W. Boggs
Acting Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

¹ Source: "U.S. Policy on Continental Defense." Top Secret. 26 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Enclosure

U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

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CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

<i>Paragraph and Subject</i>	<i>Primary Responsibility</i>
9—International Collaboration and Coordination	State in Collaboration with Defense
10—Strategic Warning	Intelligence agencies under DCI
All except 2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences	coordination within existing law and established policy
2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences	All appropriate agencies
11—Tactical Warning	Defense
12—Active Defense	Defense
13—Passive Defense	Defense
14—Response to Attack or Attack warning	Defense in collaboration with OCDM
15—Alert Status of Air Defense Forces	Defense
16—Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil Defense	Defense in collaboration with OCDM
17—Research and Development	All appropriate agencies
18—Continuity of Government	OCDM in collaboration with all participating agencies
19—Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities	OCDM in collaboration with all participating agencies
20–26—Civil Defense	OCDM
27–32—Internal Security	IIC and ICIS coordination
33—Port Security	Treasury, keeping IIC and ICIS fully informed

DRAFT STATEMENT of
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION

1. This statement of policy on “Continental Defense” does not encompass all elements of U.S. or allied strength contributing to the defense of North America. Only those U.S. policies are included which are essentially defensive in nature; i.e., which contribute directly to the defense of the North American Continent and to the protection of that element of our retaliatory capability based on the North American Continent.

2. The defense of the United States is an integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements and of military and non-military measures. Each of these has its proper role in deterring an attack or in the defense of the United States should an attack occur. An effective continental defense system will constitute one of the key deterrents to an attack on the North American Continent.

3. Current national intelligence estimates indicate that Soviet delivery systems are changing importantly in character, and imply the following periods:²

a. The period is drawing to an end when the primary element in the threat to the United States is manned bombers.

b. The period of the early 1960's will represent a transition from a largely bomber threat to one mainly composed of ICBM's. In the early 1960's the estimated Soviet ICBM force will present an extremely dangerous threat to SAC bomber bases, unhardened ICBM sites and command installations.

c. In a few years, therefore, the principal element of the threat to the United States will be ICBM's supplemented by BISON heavy bombers and possibly by some refueled or one-way medium bombers, by increased numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and possibly by cruise-type missiles.

4. The changing character of the Soviet threat and our current assessment of the relative effectiveness of various active and passive defense measures³ have made it necessary that the United States re-examine its military and non-military programs for continental defense. [In particular, national planning must recognize that, barring a technological breakthrough, the development and deployment of an adequate AICBM system during the 1960's is questionable.]⁴

OBJECTIVES

5. *a.* To protect and preserve a retaliatory capability of such force and certainty as to constitute a strong and credible deterrent against attack on the North American Continent.

b. To limit the damage to our civil and military strength which would occur in the event of attack, in order to ensure the survival of

² NIE 11-8-60, July 28, 1960, including relevant revisions to NIE 11-5-59 of May 3, 1960. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ In accordance with accepted practice, the term "active defense" is used in reference to those measures that involve an attempt to physically incapacitate or destroy a threatening object; e.g., interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, anti-missile missile systems. The term "passive defense" embraces all other means of defense; e.g., airborne and ground alert, warning and response to warning (including the launch of recallable aircraft), dispersal, mobility, hardening, protection against radiation and BW and CW agents. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ JCS reserves. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

the nation and to pursue the ensuing hostilities to the most favorable possible conclusion.

MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE

Relative Emphasis

6. Predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen and protect our nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent.

MAJORITY

7. As long as the manned bomber threat continues to be of significant proportions, continue measures to maintain our active defenses against manned aircraft. However, in view of the increasing reliance of the USSR on ballistic missiles for inter-continental attack and the present limitations of achievable active defense measures the U.S. should:

a. While pursuing measures to achieve adequate active defenses, make a particular effort to exploit passive measures that will afford the requisite degree of protection to our retaliatory power and to relate elements, including communications and command.

b. Give increased attention to measures for the passive defense of the U.S. population.

BUDGET-JCS

7. Continued reliance will be placed on a balance of active and passive defense measures consistent with their contribution to the over-all defense posture of the United States, the changing nature of the Soviet threat, and the increasing number of technological options open to the USSR.

7-A. The United States should place predominant emphasis on measures to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures. [Particular emphasis should be accorded those active and passive defense measures essential to the protection of the U.S. capability for prompt nuclear retaliation.]⁵

Time Phasing

8. The time phasing of U.S. “continental defense” measures should take into account the threat posed by the present nuclear attack capability of the USSR and by future improvements in Soviet weapons and delivery capabilities, particularly the achievement in the early 1960’s of a major ICBM capability. This will be a period during which the United States will largely depend on its U.S.-based air retaliatory force. Accordingly, during the early 1960’s special attention should continue to be given to measures for minimizing the vulnerability of

⁵ Budget proposal. JCS would substitute 7-b of the Majority Proposal for this sentence. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

the strategic air retaliatory forces to ICBM attack. Effective continental defense requires that the United States be constantly on guard against "technological surprise" and that it continually strive for technological superiority.

International Collaboration and Coordination

9. Continental defense requires continued close collaboration with certain allies. The principle of joint defense of the North American Continent by the United States and Canada, begun in World War II and developed progressively in subsequent years, should be fostered. The highly satisfactory arrangements with Denmark for maintaining defense installations in Greenland should be continued. Efforts should also be made to continue, or to create or improve as necessary, collaboration with other countries concerned with the defense of this continent.

Warning

10. *Strategic.* With the Soviet acquisition of an operational missile capability and the intensification of Soviet efforts to deny warning information to the United States, it has become increasingly important, as well as more difficult, to acquire timely strategic warning of Soviet Bloc attack against the United States. However, barring an extremely fortuitous break, intelligence warning can be expected only to point to a period of sharply heightened risk of hostilities. Therefore, for planning purposes it cannot be concluded that the United States surely will, or surely will not, have strategic warning. Responsible officials must recognize that they may have to accept intelligence warning judgments based on limited, evidence. In this situation it is increasingly important that:

a. The United States have accurate estimates of (1) Soviet military capabilities, (2) their view of their power position in current critical or potential critical situations, (3) their willingness to accept risks, and (4) their progress toward maximum combat readiness. These assessments will also assist in determining requirements for strategic warning and in indicating areas in which new and improved intelligence collection techniques must be developed.

b. It be recognized that, if any reasonable degree of success in obtaining adequate strategic warning is to be achieved, risks are inherent in the execution of high priority collection programs. These risks should be weighed against what may be even graver risks inherent in failure to obtain strategic warning.

c. Vigorous efforts be made to develop improved techniques for the processing, analysis and evaluation of possible indications of hostile enemy intentions.

11. *Tactical.* Every effort should be made to achieve effective tactical warning of aircraft or missile attack to assure adequate time for retaliatory forces to take action, for other military forces including defense

forces to achieve alert readiness, and for initiation of the implementation of civil defense, internal security and other non-military measures. To this end:

a. For warning against attack by aircraft and non-ballistic missiles:

(1) An effective early warning radar net, including its seaward extensions, having a capability for very high and very low-level altitude detection, should continue to be maintained.

(2) Weaknesses in aircraft identification techniques and procedures should be remedied as quickly as feasible.

b. For warning against attack by ballistic missiles: Improvement of the capability to provide early warning of ballistic missile attack should be continued as a matter of the highest national priority.⁶

c. For warning of nuclear detonations: Installation of the currently-programmed bomb alarm and fallout reporting systems for SAC bases should be completed; a national attack surveillance system should be undertaken.

d. For warning against BW and CW attack: Development of a capability for rapid detection and identification of BW and CW agents.

Military Functions

12. *Active Defense.* Active elements of the continental defense system must contend with a mixed threat consisting of manned bombers, non-ballistic missiles, intercontinental, submarine-launched and possibly air-launched ballistic missiles. To this end:

a. Against aircraft and non-ballistic missiles: The United States should continue to make improvements in and to maintain in a high state of readiness, an integrated air-defense system providing defense in depth and capable of destroying enemy aircraft and non-ballistic missiles before they reach vital targets. It is possible that integrated functioning of the air defense system may be compromised by ballistic missile attack. To take care of such an eventuality, the capability of the various weapons elements of the air defense system to act independently should continue to be improved. In addition to the primary air defense forces, all other forces that have an air defense capability and that can be made temporarily available, should, in the event of attack or the threat of immediate attack, be made immediately available and employed as required within this system.

b. Against ballistic missiles: The United States should continue efforts to develop an effective capability against ballistic missiles as a matter of highest national priority.⁷

⁶ Those specific warning systems assigned this priority are set forth in NSC Actions. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ Those specific weapons systems assigned this priority are set forth in NSC Actions. [Footnote is in the original.]

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in an attempt to develop an , and to insure some operational

AICBM capability by the earliest possible date, both for its own value and to offset the practical and psychological disadvantages of possible Soviet claims of success in this field.

c. Against the threat of missiles launched from ocean areas: The United States should strive to achieve and maintain an effective and integrated sea surveillance system that permits detection and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within missile-launching range of the North American Continent; and should improve its related anti-submarine capability. Until technology permits the deployment of an effective active defense against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the principal measures of protection should be provided by the capability to attack prior to launch, and, in the case of non-ballistic missiles, by elements of the air defense system.

13. *Passive Defense.* The United States should carry out those passive defense measures that will add significantly to its ability to protect its retaliatory capability and the survival of the other essential military elements of its national power, including with respect to:

a. The retaliatory capability: Measures, such as increase in mobility, dispersal, hardening, reduction of reaction time, the capability to mount an airborne alert of SAC bombers, and protection of essential facilities including command and communications centers.

b. The air defense forces: Similar measures, as appropriate, to reduce the vulnerability of air defense forces.

c. The surviving military forces: Similar measures, as appropriate, to reduce the vulnerability of our other defense forces.

14. *Response to Attack or Attack Warning.* The United States should develop capabilities, procedures and doctrine adequate to provide secure command and control of its retaliatory and defensive forces within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic missile attack. It is essential to ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication with the surviving retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air. The United States must possess an effective and flexible response that is not necessarily dependent upon the survival of the seat of government and other vital units of the planned system for command and control. At the same time, it is essential to ensure launch and commitment of the counter-offensive forces in response to attack or warning of attack with positive safe-guard against commitment based on equivocal warning or attack information.

15. *Alert Status of Air Defense Forces.* The United States should continue to maintain the alert status of its primary air defense forces, and cooperate in improvement of Canadian primary air defense forces, so as to provide an immediate reaction to warning of an enemy attack.

16. *Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil Defense.* The execution of essential military tasks is the primary mission of the military forces. Forces not required in the execution of or capable of executing essential military missions during and immediately following the initial attack should be prepared to assist civil authorities in maintaining law and order and in other essential civilian tasks when civilian capability is inadequate. Additionally, elements of the retaliatory forces and air defense forces should be prepared to assist in the civil defense role when no longer required for their primary role.

Research and Development

17. A vigorous research and development program should be maintained in order to improve the continental defense system and to counter improving Soviet technological capabilities for attack. Of particular importance are the following (without indication of priority):

- a. Early warning capability against enemy aircraft and missiles, by radar and other techniques; and the rapid dissemination of such warning.
- b. Reliable conversion of warning information into prompt decisions and responses.
- c. Effective defenses against ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, very high- and very low-altitude aircraft attacks, and aircraft-launched stand-off missiles.
- d. Reduction of vulnerability to electronic countermeasures.
- e. Improved anti-submarine capabilities, to include detection, surveillance, identification and destruction.
- f. The detection, surveillance, identification, and destruction of satellites and space vehicles.⁸
- g. The rapid detection and identification of biological warfare agents.

Civilian Functions

18. *Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of the Federal Government.*⁹ Plans and relocation facilities needed to ensure the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government should be completed and maintained in a state of operational readiness at the earliest time practicable.

- a. Plans should provide a ready and certain system of attack warning, reaction and decision-making, with adequate communications and provision for conducting emergency operations.

⁸ Tests involving the destruction of a satellite or space vehicle shall be made only with the specific approval of the President. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ Studies having a bearing on this subject are in preparation by OCDM and by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (see NSC Actions Nos. 2300-d and -f and 2247-b). This paragraph will be reviewed by the National Security Council following submission of the OCDM study. [Footnote is in the original.]

b. Emergency Federal relocation facilities should be equipped as required to permit immediate activation upon arrival of relocated personnel, and should be continuously staffed as determined by the President.

19. *Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities.*¹⁰

a. Except as otherwise determined by proper authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of existing Federal facilities, important to national security, should not be located in target areas. The location of new or expanded military installations shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary of Defense [, except that he shall consult with the Director, OCDM, with respect to the location of new fixed retaliatory bases and of major administrative headquarters.]¹¹

b. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings of suitable size. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in [all suitable]¹² [selected]¹³ existing Federal buildings.

ALTERNATIVE 1: MAJORITY

20. *Civil Defense.* An essential part of a balanced continental defense posture is an adequate program for the protection of the civilian population from the effects of a nuclear attack, and measures to facilitate recovery and rehabilitation after such attack. [The protection of the population from fallout, together with the questionable prospects for effective active defense in the 1960's against ICBM attack, makes development of an effective civil defense a matter of greatly increased urgency.]¹⁴ An effective civil defense is an important element which a possible aggressor would have to consider in calculating the response of the United States to any threat to our vital national interests, and as such, would contribute to over-all deterrent strength.

21. The key element in an effective civil defense program is a comprehensive system of fallout shelters, since fallout is expected to be a primary hazard to the civilian population. Blast protection is a desirable added feature of shelters under certain conditions. Specific guidance on this subject is contained in a separate NSC policy document.

¹⁰ A study on the passive defense of the population, particularly with regard to fallout shelters, is in preparation by OCDM, in collaboration with State and Defense, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2300-e. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ Defense-JCS propose deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

¹² Majority proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

¹³ Treasury-Budget proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

¹⁴ JCS proposes deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

ALTERNATIVE 2: TREASURY

20. *Civil Defense.* Adequate protection of the civilian population would, if it were achievable, both facilitate survival of the nation in the event of general war and contribute to the deterrence of war. Means to provide adequate protection are, however, not now foreseen. Nevertheless, the United States should constantly strive to improve the degree of protection which could be afforded the civilian population in the event of nuclear war. In the light of the limited prospects for effective active defense against ballistic missile attacks, such efforts must rest on an improved and strengthened civil defense program. Increased attention, therefore, should be given to such realistic measures for improving the passive defense of the U.S. population as would offer some contribution to the deterrence of general war without prejudicing the implementation of other measures likely to reduce the risks of war.

21. Fallout shelters constitute the best—although still inadequate—means presently available for reducing the number of casualties in the event of nuclear war. The Federal Government should, therefore, promote construction of such shelters by measures based firmly upon the following fundamental principles:

a. It should be the obligation of each property owner to provide protection on his own premises.

b. The role of the Federal Government should be to provide leadership and example.

c. There should be no elements of compulsion, penalty, or subsidy in Federal programs.

d. Actions must avoid creating alarm, causing Congressional and public reaction prejudicial to higher priority national security programs, presenting the posture of the United States as that of a nation preoccupied with preparations for war, or losing the support of our allies.

ALTERNATIVE 3: BUDGET

20. *Civil Defense.* An essential ingredient of continental defense is improved and strengthened civil defense which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack and to contribute to deterring such attack.

21. Measures to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard represent a key element in an effective civil defense program. Specific guidance is contained in a separate NSC policy document.

* * * * *

22. In order that Federal, State and local governments may carry out their essential responsibilities during and after nuclear attack or other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments to function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance in the form of guidance, direction and resources. Such assistance should

include pre-attack planning for the full utilization of local resources and for support by available Federal resources, including military forces.

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23. Civil defense will continue to include local planning for the emergency dispersal of populations, not as a substitute for shelter, but as a possible supplement thereto under certain circumstances.

24. Guidance and leadership should be provided to industry essential to [initial]¹⁵ recovery from nuclear attack in the development of plans and programs designed to ensure the continuity of essential production and services.

25. Civilian items essential to survival and [initial]¹⁶ recovery from nuclear attack should be identified, minimum requirements determined,

MAJORITY

and measures developed to meet minimum requirements. Where necessary to this end stockpiling should be undertaken.

26. The United States should continue its present policy of supporting activities which will:

a. Warn the people of impending attack and make possible essential communication before, during and after attack.

b. Give emphasis to the protection (including dispersal where necessary) of essential civilian survival supplies, equipment and facilities.

BUDGET

23. Civil defense policy for protection of the civilian population in case of nuclear attack, while continuing to include local planning for the emergency dispersal of urban populations on attack warning, incorporates the concept of fallout shelter. Specific guidance is contained in a separate NSC policy document.

TREASURY-DEFENSE-BUDGET

and industrial inventories located and related to Government and State stocks. Where total availabilities appear inadequate, measures should be developed to meet minimum requirements with the least disruption of the economy, the least cost to the Government, and maximum encouragement of private participation.

¹⁵ Treasury-Budget proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

¹⁶ Treasury-Defense-Budget proposal. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]

c. Provide for the conduct of research and development on improved measures for the protection of the population, including radiological defense, defense against chemical and biological warfare, mass communications, medical care, and survival requirements.

d. Provide appropriate and adequate information to the public of the nature and extent of the dangers from nuclear attack on the United States now and in the future, and of the measures being taken or which could be taken to alleviate them.

Internal Security

27. The Soviet Bloc should be confronted with internal security measures presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to covert attack against the United States.

28. The United States should, to the extent practicable, provide adequate deterrents (a) to clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by any means such as submarines, small craft, merchant vessels, aircraft, illegal entry of persons and things, and diplomatic channels; and (b) to utilization of such weapons against vital targets. Efforts should be continued to develop improved passive devices for the detection of fissionable material introduced by such means, and to assure their effective use. Efforts should be continued to develop a prototype of an active device.¹⁷ This policy and the programs to implement it will be kept under continuing review in accordance with existing arrangements and in light of all applicable factors, including the growing shift to ICBM's in Soviet strategic attack capabilities against U.S. retaliatory forces.

29. Measures should be taken to protect U.S. aircraft and airports as appropriate, against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities, and to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the operations within the continental United States of Soviet Bloc airlines.

30. Selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly critical nature should, as appropriate, be protected against espionage and clandestine attack by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and conventional sabotage.

31. Selective counterintelligence coverage should be maintained of foreign diplomatic and official personnel suspected of engaging in activities beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic assignments.

32. Plans for the detention in the event of emergency of persons potentially dangerous to the United States should be maintained in a high state of readiness.

¹⁷ No decision as to production and use of such a device will be made by the President before completion and testing of a prototype. [Footnote is in the original.]

*Port Security*¹⁸

33. Measures should be taken (a) to protect U.S. ports and vessels therein against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities; (b) to supervise and where appropriate deny entry of vessels; and (c) to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the presence in U.S. ports of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels. Insofar as feasible, having due regard for legal procedures and rights, subversives should be excluded from vessels and waterfront facilities.¹⁹

¹⁸ Certain measures under this heading are supplemental to those contained under the previous heading, "Internal Security". [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁹ Experience has shown that only a very small percentage of the persons believed to be subversives can be excluded under procedures acceptable to the courts. [Footnote is in the original.]

281. Briefing Note for December 20 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 19, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5802)

1. The Council had before it a draft statement of revised U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 6022) which has been proposed by the NSC Planning Board in accordance with [illegible in the original]. In preparing this proposed policy revision the PB had the benefit of discussion which took place in the Council recently, when consideration was given to a preliminary Discussion Paper in which the PB had identified certain questions relating to basic concepts of Continental Defense.

2. The present statement of Continental Defense Policy (NSC 5802/1) was adopted by the Council and approved by the President in February, 1958. The policy review has taken into account two factors which have a particular bearing on the formulation of policy objectives in the area of Continental Defense: First, is the significantly increasing ballistic missile capability which our Intelligence Estimates attribute to the Soviet Union during the period of the 1950's; and second, the limited prospects of the United States' for the development and deployment of an adequate anti-ballistic missile system during the same period.

¹ Source: Continental defense policy. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

3. Against this background of an increasing Soviet ballistic missile threat, and the absence of an active defense on our part, some divergent views emerged in the PB with respect to certain elements of the over-all policy. Before taking up these policy issues, perhaps the Council would want to note the following key provisions of the proposed policy on which the PB is in agreement.

a. The policy statement encompasses only those objectives which contribute directly to the defense of the North American Continent and to the protection of that part of our retaliatory capability which is based on the North American Continent.

b. An effective continental defense system is considered to constitute one of the key deterrents to an attack on this country.

c. Intelligence estimates reflect that the period of the 1960's will represent a transition from a largely bomber threat (now drawing to an end) to threat consisting mainly of Soviet ICBM's—with the prospect that in a few years the principal threat to the U.S. will be Soviet ICBM's supplemented by a mix of bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and possibly cruise-type missiles.

d. The achievement of a major Soviet ICBM capability in the early 1960's will take place during a period in which the U.S. will largely depend on its U.S.-based air retaliatory force. Accordingly, during that period special attention should be given to measures for minimizing the vulnerability of our strategic air retaliatory forces to ICBM attack.

e. Recognition is given to the increasing importance—and difficulty—of acquiring timely strategic warning of Soviet attack on the U.S. The paper also includes recognition of the prospect that with the Soviet acquisition of an operational missile capability, U.S. officials may have to accept intelligence warning judgments based on limited evidence—therefore, the risks which are inherent in certain “high priority” intelligence collection programs must be weighed against the even graver risks inherent in failure to obtain strategic warning.

f. A capability for tactical warning against attacks by aircraft, ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, and by CW and BW agents, is singled out for particular effort—along with a requirement for completing the bomb alarm and fallout reporting systems for SAC bases, and the undertaking of a national attack surveillance system.

g. In restating present policy requirements for an integrated air defense system providing defenses in depth against enemy aircraft and non-ballistic missiles, the proposed revision calls for an improved capability of various elements of the system to act independently should integrated functioning of the system be compromised by ballistic missile attack (the objective being to prevent a “free ride” by the enemy over the U.S. in such an eventuality).

h. The proposed policy, as revised, specifically calls for passive defense measures (in addition to *active* defense) to protect our retaliatory capability—including such measures as increases in mobility, dispersal, hardening, reduction of reaction time, the capability to mount an air borne alert of SAC bombers, and the protection of command communications centers.

i. Another agreed policy revision points to the need for developing procedures and doctrine which will provide course command and control of our retaliatory and defensive forces within the time dimensions of a surprise missile attack. The objective is to insure the survival of

the decision-making machinery and a means of communicating with our retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air, in case of such an attack—with recognition of the necessity for an effective and flexible response not necessarily dependent upon survival of the seat of government and other command and control centers.

j. In singling out research and development areas of particular importance, there is included the detection, surveillance, identification and destruction of satellites and space vehicles (with a footnote reflecting existing policy to the effect that tests involving destruction shall be made only with the specific approval of the President.) (Par. 17, p. 13).

k. [illegible in the original] of policy regarding plans and facilities to ensure continuity of essential Government functions are subject to future NSC review upon completion of the pending [illegible in the original] by OCDM and the Special Assistant referred to in the footnote to Par. 18, p. 14.

l. In the area of Internal Security, Par. 28 of the proposed policy calls for certified efforts to provide deterrents against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. As revised, the policy no longer contemplates the use of active devices on the person and pouches of Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel entering the U.S.—because of the State Department position that Bloc officials might detect radiation emanating from the covert device and claim violation of diplomatic immunity (with possible retaliation against U.S. diplomatic pouches and shipments). Such a detection device is under development and a prototype will be completed by AEC and tested early in 1961. As indicated in the footnote on p. 19, production and use of the device would be for Presidential decision at that time.

m. Port Security Policy, stated in Par. 33 was separately considered by the NSC and previously approved by the President on 6/29/60 (NSC Action [illegible in the original]).

POLICY ISSUES

4. The Council may now wish to turn to these paragraphs of the proposed policy statement which reflect divergent views of a policy nature which emerged in the PB:

Par. 4, p. 2, last sentence: The JCS [illegible in the original] its position on this language which questions the U.S. capability to develop and deploy an adequate anti-ICBM system during the 1960's, barring technological breakthrough. It appears that this JCS reservation applies equally to subsequent parts of the paper dealing with Relative Emphasis (Par. 7) and Civil Defense (Par. 20). Accordingly, at this point the Council might hear the comments of JCS concerning its reservation, before moving on to a consideration of succeeding "splits" which involve the same JCS position. (CALL ON: JCS, for comment on the bracketed last sentence of Par. 4).

Par. 7, p. [illegible in the original]: At this point in the paper there appears a split on the question of Relative Emphasis which should be applied as between *active* and *passive* measures to defend our retaliatory capability and our civilian population (a definition of "active" and "passive" defenses appears in the footnote on p. 2). The issue involved here begins with the agreed statement in Par. 6 that *predominant* emphasis should continue to be placed on measures (i.e., whether "active" or

“passive”) to protect our nuclear retaliatory power. Next appears the Majority view in Par. 7 (left hand column) which begins with a specific reference to the increasing ICBM threat and the present limitations on our active defenses. In Par. 7-*a*, while recognizing the need for “active” defenses, a *particular effort* to exploit “passive” measures is called for—and in 7-*b*, the Majority view extends this principle to a requirement for *increased attention* to “passive” defense of the U.S. population. The Minority view of Budget and JCS (right hand column) called for a continued *balance* of “active” and “passive” measures, consistent with the changing nature of the Soviet threat and other factors—with a specific requirement in Par. 7-A for *predominant emphasis* on “active” defenses, and *particular emphasis* on both “active” and “passive” measures to protect our nuclear retaliatory power (but at this point the JCS part company with Budget, and the JCS would call for *increased attention* to “passive” defense of the civilian population). Perhaps the Council would now want to discuss this question, beginning with comment from the Majority and Minority proponents, before discussing a later split on Civil Defense aspects. (*CALL ON*: Defense—and then Budget and JCS).

Par. 20, p. 15: In this paragraph on *Civil Defense*, there is in some respects a continuation of the preceding split on Relative Emphasis. There has been circulated to the NSC a related paper on “Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelters.” The pertinence of the OCDM paper will be apparent from an oral summary of it which the OCDM Director is now prepared to give to the Council. (*CALL ON*: OCDM).

(*After the OCDM Presentation*): The OCDM presentation on Fallout Shelters appears to sharpen the policy issues involved in the alternative views which are set forth in Pars. 20 and 21 of the Continental Defense paper.

Alternative I, the Majority view (p. 15–16) would identify an effective civil defense as providing a deterrent to enemy attack, and a comprehensive system of fallout shelters is described as a key element of civil defense (JCS objected to the second sentence of Par. 20 in which the questionable prospect for an active defense (against ICBM’s in the 1960’s is stated as a reason for the urgent development of an effective civil defense). *CALL ON*: Defense and JCS.

Alternative II, the Treasury view, is stated, on p. 16—and the difference of views appears to relate mainly to the brakes which would be put on Federal financing of a shelter program, admittedly desirable though it may be. (*CALL ON*: Secretary of the Treasury).

Alternative III, (Budget view) on p. 16–A, is a restatement of present Continental Defense policy on Civil Defense (Par. 24 of NSC 5802/1) with a cross reference to existing policy on Fallout Shelter which was stated in NSC 5807/2 (at a time when greater weight was given to the prospects for an adequate active defense against ICBM’s). *CALL ON*: Budget Director.

Par. 23, p. 17: The split here is on the emphasis which should be placed on the dispersal of the population as a civil defense objective, in relation to the fallout shelter program. (*CALL ON*: Budget, for comment on the Minority view.)

Par. 25, p. 17: Raises the issue as to whether the future stockpiling of civil defense items should be confined to requirements for initial recovery from attack, or extended to recovery after attack. Treasury-Defense-Budget hold the Minority view that our policy should be limited to

stockpiling for the initial post-attack period, and limited to measures involving least disruption to the economy, least cost to the Government, and with maximum private participation, as provided in present policy. (CALL ON: OCDM Director, to speak to the Majority view.)

Par. 24, p. 17: Reflects the Minority view of Treasury and Budget that Federal advice and guidance to industry on recovery from attack should be limited to the *initial* post-attack period.

Miscellaneous Issues

5. At other points in the paper appear other split views which the Council may wish to consider:

Par. 12-b, p. 9-10: Here the JCS differed with the Majority on the question of whether U.S. efforts to develop an anti-ICBM capability should proceed to a completed system, or whether in the course of that development there should be provision for some operational capability without waiting for the complete system. A comparative study of U.S. and Soviet programs to develop anti-ballistic missile capabilities was reported to the President in October by the Comparative Evaluation Group—with no recommendation for efforts to demonstrate a kill capability prior to completion of the current NIKE ZEUS program, although the psychological advantage of an early demonstration was recognized. (CALL ON: JCS for comment on the language proposed for Par. 12-b).

Par. 19-a, p. 15: Here, Defense-JCS propose deletion of the final clause which would require that the Secretary of Defense consult with the Director of OCDM before locating new fixed retaliatory bases and major administrative headquarters. (CALL ON: Defense and OCDM)

Par. 19-b, p. 15: There is agreement on the requirement for fallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings of suitable size. However, as to *existing* Federal buildings, the majority favor incorporation of fallout shelter in *all* buildings capable of such incorporation, whereas Treasury-Budget feel that fallout shelter should be incorporated into only those existing buildings which may be selected on a basis of relative criticality. (CALL ON: Treasury and Budget).

282. Briefing Note for the December 20 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 19, 1960

The first part of the [illegible in the original] item is a report by NASA on its outer space programs.

At the meeting on November 7, 1960, the Council heard a presentation by [illegible in the original] on the outer space programs being

¹ Source: NASA space programs. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

conducted under Defense auspices, [illegible in the original] that meeting that the President requested NASA to present to the Council a report (a) on the outer space programs now being conducted under the auspices of NASA, and (b) on the level of effort the United States should devote to non-military outer space activities in the future.

(CALL ON: DR. [illegible in the original])

The second part of the first item is a presentation by Dr. Kistiakowsky of a report by the Science Advisory Committee on "Man in Space."

(CALL ON: DR. KISTIAKOWSKY)

283. Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 20, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 20, 1960

Present at the 470th meeting were The President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Administration. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, National Science Foundation (Item 1); the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Item 1); the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Deputy Director, OCDM; Mr. Gerard C. Smith and Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretaries of State; the Deputy Administrator, NASA (Item 1); the Associate Administrator, NASA (Item 1); Mr. Franklyn W. Phillips, NASA (Item 1); Mr. Herbert York and Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Douglas R. Lord, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Item 1); Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of NASA. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on December 21.

1. *OUTER SPACE PROGRAMS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF NASA*
(NSC Action No. 2328)

Mr. Gray introduced Dr. Glennan's presentation on the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.

Dr. Glennan said the NASA presentation would fall into two parts: (1) a long-range identification of NASA objectives, which he would discuss; and (2) a more detailed examination of the NASA program now under way or planned for FY 1962, which Dr. Dryden would discuss.

Dr. Glennan began his part of the presentation by noting that a year ago NASA had developed its first long-range plan establishing space objectives for eight to ten years in the future. NASA had just completed a revision of this first long-range plan. Dr. Glennan believed the revised plan, as well as its funding, was more realistic than the first plan. He also noted that the funds required for space activities tended to increase rather than diminish.

Dr. Glennan then displayed a chart indicating that in 1960 NASA had accomplished first launchings of a meteorological satellite, a passive reflector communications satellite, a SCOUT vehicle, a THOR-DELTA vehicle, and an AGENA-B vehicle. A suborbital flight of an astronaut had failed. In addition, a scientific satellite (PIONEER 5) had been launched into a sub orbit to demonstrate long-distance communications.

Dr. Glennan displayed a large chart showing the major target dates for NASA missions from 1961 through 1970. This chart indicated that in 1961 such missions as the following would be attempted: the suborbital flight of an astronaut, an ATLAS-CENTAUR firing, the firing of the first stage of SATURN, and so on. The program would continue with an impact landing of instruments on the moon and a test of the planetary space craft in 1962; the firing of the second and third stages of SATURN and a soft instrument landing on the moon in 1963; the orbiting of an astronomical observer, a MARS-VENUS probe, and the qualification of the C-2 SATURN engine in 1964; the qualification of a very large rocket engine and the testing of a prototype of the main space capsule beyond MERCURY in 1965; the flight test of a nuclear rocket and the landing of mobile instruments on the moon in 1966 or 1967; the sending of a space craft in orbit around another planet in 1968 to 1970; and a man landing on the moon after 1970.

Dr. Glennan said that NASA anticipated 25 to 30 major space flights per year, ranging from JUNO-2, ATLAS-ABLE and THOR-DELTA to NOVA in 1968.

Dr. Glennan then turned to present and projected NASA budgets. He displayed a chart indicating that expenditures for most purposes would continue to rise, on the assumption that projected programs

would continue. He noted that the NASA long-range-plan provided for making decisions at certain specified dates—for example, 1963 would be the time to decide whether to proceed with the expensive NOVA concept. Dr. Glennan said that NASA has now been in business 27 months, and was just beginning to carry out its own program. Up to the present time, most of the program had been inherited from the Military Services. At the end of FY 1959, NASA had had just over 9000 employees; at the end of FY 1961, it had 18,900. Dr. Glennan said that less than 2000 NASA employees were net additions to the Federal payroll; the remainder came to NASA as transfers from the Military Services.

Dr. Dryden then presented the NASA obligational authority as follows: FY 1959, \$338.9 million; FY 1960, \$523.6 million; FY 1961, \$915.0 million; and FY 1952, \$1,159.2 million. Dr. Dryden then displayed a chart breaking the research and development item in the FY 1962 NASA budget into 10 main and 14 subheadings. He then discussed NASA's immediate flight schedule, and commented in greater detail on the MERCURY program. He said that in 1961 two MERCURY flights per month would be made until August. Other flights would be made to check after body heating on the capsule of the type which recently blew up, to carry a chimpanzee into space, to test maximum dynamic pressure, to check re-entry just below satellite speed, and to check the ground system. After that, the first manned flight would be made in a MERCURY vehicle, with a REDSTONE vehicle providing the propulsion. Continued manned flights would follow until in July of 1962 a manned orbital flight would be attempted for the first time. The FY 1966 budget provided \$74 million for the MERCURY man-in-space program.

Dr. Dryden noted that the SATURN program would require \$7 billion over nine years. Major decisions would be necessary before attempting a landing on the moon. Somewhere around the period of 1964 to 1966, the United States would have to decide (1) whether to spend large sums of money to put a man on the moon, and (2) if a manned landing on the moon were to be attempted, what vehicle should be developed for the purpose? Dr. Dryden pointed out that a nuclear rocket having less weight than chemical rockets had been considered, and that there were also possibilities for rendezvous and electronic propulsion systems.

At the conclusion of the presentation, Mr. Gray asked if the members of the Council had any questions. The President said he had a thousand questions. Laymen could understand the curiosity of scientists, but perhaps could not as readily understand the haste with which scientists sought to satisfy their curiosity. In the space field there appeared to be no practical test of the immediate usefulness of a program. The President wondered how to segregate those elements of the program which would be useful from those elements which would not be so useful. He said he did not care whether the man landed on the moon soft or hard. He was

anxious to do whatever was necessary for security, but wished to avoid the development of a SPUTNIK complex. He felt we must be concerned with developing a gauge with which to measure the value of space programs. He noted that the cost of space programs was still rising when Dr. Glennan's chart ended in 1970. He was not prepared to say that he would support a program of \$2.4 billion for space activities in 1970.

Dr. Glennan said he did not disagree fundamentally with the President's views. However, in developing a long-range plan he assumed that programs already started would continue. He had been careful to point out that at various specific dates in the future decisions should be made as to the continuance of various programs. This year had been one point of decision. He had already decided not to embark on a full-scale man-in-space program beyond MERCURY. Dr. Glennan also pointed out that a substantial portion of the funds going into the development of vehicles would result in the ability to launch satellites or to engage in manned space flight.

The President recalled that two years ago \$1 billion was spoken of as the upper limit of the space program. Now it appears that the \$1 billion ceiling will be breached in 1962. The President said he was reluctant to spend sums of this magnitude on space activities. He had no hesitation in supporting vast programs for the security of the country, or programs designed to acquire specific scientific information, or programs which were necessary for psychological reasons; but he believed the \$1.9 billion which he had seen on the chart should be cut back.

Mr. Gray then called on Dr. Kistiakowsky to present a report by a panel of the Science Advisory Committee on "Man in Space". Dr. Kistiakowsky said he wanted to estimate the cost of landing a man on the moon. He assured the Council that what he had to say was very unpleasant, particularly to Mr. Stans' ears. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that to land a man on the moon after 1970, we needed to develop a rocket bigger than the SATURN rocket. A panel of the Science Advisory Committee, consisting of industry men as well as long-haired scientists, had concluded that the man-in-space program cannot now be justified on scientific grounds, but can only be justified on the basis of an emotional urge for exploration such as the urge which motivated Columbus. The President said that, like Isabella, we were hocking our jewels for this purpose. Dr. Kistiakowsky, continuing, said that the man-in-space program could also be justified on the political ground of prestige. He noted that no money could be saved by eliminating instrumented flights and going directly to manned flights because development of the instruments was an essential prerequisite of man's flight into space. After this introduction, Dr. Kistiakowsky displayed charts showing that the total cost, 1961-1975, would be \$3 billion for SATURN, and from \$25.5 to \$53 billion for NOVA. The composite expenditures for SATURN and NOVA, 1961-1975, would be from \$33.5

billion to \$46 billion. Dr. Kistiakowsky concluded by saying he would not attempt to estimate the cost of landing a man on Mars, but he knew it would be several times as great as the cost of a moon landing.

Mr. Scribner asked about the cost of landing a man on the moon versus the cost of bringing him back to earth again. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that a man could be landed on the moon without a return trip for the cost of SATURN—that is, \$8 to \$9 billion.

Dr. Waterman said he wished to endorse Dr. Kistiakowsky's statements about the general attitude of scientists toward the man-in-space program. He believed scientific observation was important, but thought there was no need to send a man into space if scientific observation could be made by means of instruments alone.

The President raised the question of the rate at which space activities were developing. He said the SPUTNIK complex impelled us to do everything yesterday. He noted that the first time a man was lost in an attempted space flight we would be compelled to start over again and spend twice as much. He agreed with the remarks of Dr. Waterman. He had to think about the country as a whole, the economy, and the other demands on the budget. He believed it might be necessary to establish an annual budgetary ceiling for space activities. Dr. Dryden said the total cost of space activities would not be reduced by spreading the program over a longer period of years. The President agreed, but pointed out that not as great a sum would have to be spent in any one year.

Secretary Gates wondered why it would not be desirable to spend more money on getting scientists to work in laboratories and less on hardware. He believed our space programs, as well as our defense programs, might advance more rapidly if more time was spent thinking and working on the drawing boards instead of building hardware which might not function when it was completed. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that there was a human urge to build a prototype soon after it had been conceived.

Mr. Stans said the NASA budget was the most difficult one on which he had worked, except for the Defense budget. The Bureau of the Budget had worked very closely with Dr. Glennan, and was convinced that the figures presented by Dr. Glennan were about as low as any that could be achieved short of the cancellation of major programs such as SATURN. The figures in the NASA budget were in effect the result of program decisions made some time ago. The President noted that NASA had over 18,000 employees. He wondered whether money couldn't be saved if the number of employees could be reduced to say, 15,000. Dr. Dryden said the really large expenditures in the NASA program would not be reduced by reducing the payroll. The President said he was concerned about the pace of accomplishment. He wondered why a particular flight had to be

made in 1963 instead of in 1965. He felt that our scientific knowledge of space depended on the gradual accumulation of data.

Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that to a large extent the objectives of the space program must be charged to the cold war. The Soviets had succeeded by propaganda in instilling the idea that achievements in space were an accurate over-all measure of a country's scientific and technological potential. Perhaps it was necessary to re-educate people here and abroad to the fact that there are other measures of scientific achievement besides space activities. After such re-education, the space program could be slowed down without adverse political effects. The President believed that he could use \$1 billion to better advantage on some other aspect of the cold war. Secretary Gates thought the cold war argument had been refuted. The President added that \$500 million more spent on our information services might have more effect than the same amount spent on space. Dr. Waterman said that if space exploration could be internationalized the competitive aspects of the space race would disappear.

Secretary Herter noted that at the Tehran and Istanbul meetings last year we had made a presentation to our allies on our space programs. Our allies had been very encouraged by this presentation because up to that time they had been concerned with propaganda about the Soviet achievements. Secretary Herter asked whether the Soviets had not already tried and failed to put a man in space. Mr. Dulles said the Soviets may have made such an attempt.

Mr. Gray said he had the impression that Drs. Glennan and Waterman and Kistiakowsky all took a dim view of the man-in-space program. He had not heretofore realized that this was the feeling of scientists. The President said he was ready to say that he saw no scientific or psychological reason for carrying the man-in-space program beyond the MERCURY program. He thought the idea of a man on the moon was sheer Buck Rogers fiction. Dr. Glennan said his most difficult job was keeping the space program on a sensible basis. He believed that as solid scientific achievements were recorded from earlier space programs, the urge for putting man in space would disappear. The President said we were facing a difficult fiscal problem because our rate of expenditure was increasing faster than our economic growth.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed a presentation on the subject by the Administrator and Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, based primarily on the first annual revision of the NASA long-range plan.

b. Noted and discussed a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology of a report by a panel of the Science Advisory Committee on "Man in Space".

c. Agreed that further testing and experimentation will be necessary to establish whether there are any valid scientific reasons for extending manned space flight beyond the MERCURY program.

NOTE: The action in *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Administrator, NASA.

[Omitted here are pages 7–15.]

Marion W. Boggs

284. Memorandum of Discussion at the 472d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 29, 1960

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 472nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 29, 1960

Present at the 472nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Merchant); the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Julian Paired for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Items 1 and 2); Mr. Alan H. Belmont for the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Items 1 and 2); the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the Naval Aide to the President (Items 1 and 2); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

¹ Source: Agenda item 1: Attack warning channels and procedures for civilians; Agenda item 4: Evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens in danger areas abroad. Top Secret. Extracts—9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

1. *ATTACK WARNING CHANNELS AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVILIANS*

(NSC 5513/1; NSC Action No. 1565; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated February 20, 1957, December 3, 1959, December 14 and 28, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray called upon Captain Aurand, Chairman of the Special NSC Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures, to summarize briefly the changes which the Committee proposes, with particular attention to revisions considered to be of a policy nature.

Captain Aurand referred to the chart now contained in NSC 5513/1 and to the proposed new chart as circulated to the Council on December 14. He said the Committee proposed two changes in attack warning channels and procedures which involved policy considerations. The first change involved the use of the CINCONAD DEFCONs as triggers for action, replacing strategic warnings, defense emergencies, and air defense readiness. The DEFCON system was a new system established by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a uniform alert mechanism. In the process of adapting the old chart to the DEFCON system, the Committee had noted the DEFCON-3 called by Secretary Gates from Paris last spring. Some of the actions taken by the military as a result of the DEFCON came to the attention of the public and the press and a certain amount of public confusion resulted. The Committee believed that steps should be taken to prevent public confusion or panic when a DEFCON is declared.

The President asked what was meant by the term DEFCON. Captain Aurand replied that DEFCON stood for "defense readiness condition". DEFCON-1 and DEFCON-2 (the most serious DEFCONs) cannot be declared without public knowledge. The DEFCON-3 called from Paris last spring resulted in an excess amount of telephoning in some cities such as Denver with the result that the switchboards were jammed. Captain Aurand then turned to the second policy recommendation by the Committee, namely, a recommendation that the President delegate authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM jointly to make public announcements when DEFCONs are declared in order to avoid public speculation and confusion. DEFCONs would be declared with such speed that the matter would not come to the attention of the President before announcements were made locally.

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board had generally concurred in the recommendations of the Special Committee as summarized by Captain Aurand. However, the Chairman of the Planning Board (Mr.

Gray) did not fully agree with these recommendations. He believed that there should be a clear delegation of authority to make only local, not national, announcements upon the declaration of a DEFCON. He feared that panic might be stimulated by a public announcement made at any level of government lower than that of the President. The President asked what kind of an announcement would be made. Captain Aurand replied that the local OCDM Director would state that the Air Defense Command had declared a state of readiness, that people should continue their normal conduct, that telephones should not be used excessively, and that the public should listen for further announcements on the radio. There would be no reference in the local announcement to the reason for declaring a DEFCON; any such statement of reasons would be reserved for the national announcement by the President. Announcements of this kind would apply to the declaration of DEFCONs 1 and 2 and conditionally as indicated in the chart to the declaration of DEFCON-3.

The President wondered how the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM could coordinate with each other more rapidly than they could consult the President. Captain Aurand said that identical situations would obtain in many DEFCONs so that the proposed public announcements could be planned and “packaged” in advance. Captain Aurand added that there was a conditional [*text not declassified*]. The President asked how the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM would consult regarding the public announcements. Mr. Gray said he presumed the two officials would consult in advance. The President wondered how authority could be given to local officials to make an announcement of the kind contemplated.

Secretary Gates felt that a public announcement would have to be made at the national level quite frequently when DEFCONs were declared. He expected that a DEFCON-3 would be declared every month or so as a drill and he hoped there would not be a public announcement on each such occasion. Captain Aurand said no public announcement would be made in the case of drills. Governor Hoegh added that no public announcement would be made on DEFCON-3 unless the public had already obtained information concerning the alert; and then the announcement would be for the purpose of putting the activity into a lower key. Mr. Hoegh recalled that in the case of last spring’s DEFCON-3, OCDM had announced in Denver that the activity was a test exercise. The President wondered why it could not be announced in most cases that a test exercise was underway. Governor Hoegh thought such an announcement would still require advance coordination. The President thought some of the difficulties in this field would be avoided if we could announce that a drill was

underway. Secretary Gates believed inquiries would still be directed to the Pentagon. Captain Aurand pointed out that the DEFCON-3 called last spring was not a drill. The President said that the DEFCON was really a drill. Captain Aurand said it was not called a drill. Mr. Gray pointed out that the chart proposed by the Special Committee was designed for the actual situation, not for a drill. The President believed there should be some way of calling an alert without frightening everyone.

General Lemnitzer thought that DEFCONs should be called regularly. The appropriate commanders should be informed that these DEFCONs are drills and if the public becomes aware of the DEFCONs, it should be announced publicly that drills are underway. The President agreed that if drills were called frequently, the public would become accustomed to them. Governor Hoegh pointed out that DEFCONs-1 and 2 probably indicated that strategic warning had been received. He felt a great deal of weight should be given to warning under conditions of nuclear war. When DEFCON-1 was called, the people should be warned so that they can help prepare themselves for attack. Secretary Gates said that under DEFCON-1 conditions, all planes would take to the air and the President would make a public announcement. Mr. Gray pointed out that the chart proposed by the Special Committee did not require Presidential participation. The President said the chart did not require Presidential participation but, nevertheless, he said such participation would be desirable.

Mr. Gray then called on Governor Hoegh to indicate the significant non-military actions which would be taken by OCDM in DEFCON situations. Governor Hoegh said that DEFCONs-5, -4 and -3 primarily required only staff action. Under DEFCON-2 OCDM would verify conditions with its Regional Directors, notify the heads of agencies, advise on public information releases, notify the governors, brief the staff, update recommendations regarding the relocation site, recall key officials from leave, inform and notify the White House of the OCDM readiness status. Under DEFCON-1 OCDM would issue a public announcement urging that readiness measures be taken, would recall all officials from leave, would order 50 percent of the pre-designated emergency personnel to occupy the relocation site, would call up the Executive Reserve, would assure the immediate availability of Presidential Action Documents, and would initiate twenty-four hour operations at the relocation site.

The President said that there ought to be among the President's Action Documents a draft of the President's broadcast for use in DEFCON-1. When conditions became this serious, the President had a duty to inform the public right away. He felt a draft Presidential

announcement of about 150 words with some blanks left to be filled in at the last minute was a necessity. Governor Hoegh pointed out that that conditions varied a great deal from one DEFCON situation to another. The President said the thermonuclear bomb did not vary very much and was the bomb which made all these preparations necessary. He believed it was desirable to tell the people what to do. In response to a question from Governor Hoegh, the President said the draft broadcast should be kept secret and would be a part of the Presidential Emergency Documents.

Mr. Gray then pointed out that the Planning Board proposed to amend Footnote No. 3 of the chart to include CINCLANT as one of the commands which can declare DEFCONs outside the continental U.S. He went on to indicate that Dr. Kistiakowsky's representative on the Planning Board had raised the question whether warnings Yellow and Red would be transmitted directly to the White House from CINCONAD instead of being routed through the Joint War Room. The President said extra time was consumed by having additional people transmitting messages. General Lemnitzer said no delay resulted from routing the warning through the Joint War Room. Transmission of the message to the White House was only a matter of pushing the button which caused a prepared tape to be played. Secretary Gates, however, saw no objection to transmitting these warnings directly to the White House if this proved to be feasible. Mr. Gray said he would have this matter looked into.

Mr. Gray then pointed out that Dr. Kistiakowsky's representative in the Planning Board had felt that Warning Yellow as described in the proposed chart should be based on "warning indications" rather than on "intelligence" that hostile aircraft or missiles are suspected of being enroute to the U.S. Secretary Gates felt the word "intelligence" was correctly used in the chart proposed by the Committee.

The President said that every war started under unexpected conditions. Therefore, he wished to place a *caveat* on all delegations of Presidential authority, that the President should be consulted if feasible. Such consultation might require better communications, for example, a telephone line direct from the War Room to the White House. Mr. Gray said he would ask the Committee to examine this matter. The President said he had no serious quarrel with the procedures described in the chart but he believed if the President could be reached, he should be consulted. Secretary Gates pointed out that the President was on the command line. As soon as command conferences are set up, the President would be consulted. General Lemnitzer said the President could be in various places at various time. The important communication was the message from the War Room to the White House Communications Center, which knows where the President is at all times and is able to

get word to him. The President said it might be possible to get through to the President directly without going through intermediaries 80 per cent of the time. Captain Aurand said a direct message to the President would save only two to three seconds. The President said it was not worth initiating some special procedure in order to save that amount of time. General Goodpaster said that any report of such significance as to warrant bringing it to the attention of the President was given to the President without awaiting evaluation and would be accompanied by a statement that it had not been evaluated. The President agreed that any information of great significance coming to the attention of the War Room must be passed on to the President. Mr. Dulles said there was a regular procedure for giving the President important information through intelligence channels. The President said that any warning of any great significance on BMEWS would automatically cause a warning to be flashed on the White House board. He was referring not to the responsibilities of individuals but to an automatic mechanism.

In response to a question from Captain Aurand, Mr. Gray said that the Special Committee would be asked to review the chart in the light of the discussion, including an insertion of language indicating that the announcements called for would be local announcements.

Mr. Stans said January 20 or January 21, from the enemy point of view, would be an ideal date for an attack on the U.S. The President said he had asked representatives of the new Administration to get in touch with Captain Aurand and General Goodpaster. Mr. Stans said he was concerned about civil defense activities since no successor to Governor Hoegh had been designated. The President said he shared the concern expressed by Mr. Stans. For instance, he might have to issue sudden orders to the fleet in view of the explosive situation in Laos. However, he had been unable to get the incoming Administration to realize the importance of this area of activity. General Persons said he was urging Mr. Clifford to have the new Administration put officials in touch with officials of the present Administration in these key fields.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the enclosures to the reference memorandum of December 14, 1960; in the light of an oral presentation by the Chairman, NSC Special Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 28, 1960).

b. Noted the President's view that, in the event of receipt of information which might require the declaration of DEFCON 1, 2, 3 or 4, the President should be immediately advised and consulted if at all feasible, to include specific comment as to whether the information has been evaluated. The President also suggested that consideration be given to preparing in advance a draft of a possible Presidential

announcement in the event of a declaration of DEFCON 1. In addition, the President stated that tests of action to be taken under DEFCON 3, 4 or 5 should be clearly identified as routine drills or exercises to the responsible commanders or officials and, when necessary, to the public.

c. Requested the NSC Special Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians to revise the chart enclosed with the reference memorandum of December 14, 1960, in the light of the discussion at this meeting, and submit it for consideration by the Council by Memorandum Action.

NOTE: The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM.

The actions in *b* and *c* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, NSC Special Committee, for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here are pages 7–10.]

4. EVACUATION AND PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD

(NSC 106/3; NSC Action No. 2259–*b*–(1); Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 8, 1960; Executive Order 10893, dated November 8, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 29, 1960; NSC 6019; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 15, 1960)

Mr. Gray presented NSC 6019 to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray referred to the three changes in the agreed Planning Board paper proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and called upon General Lemnitzer.

General Lemnitzer said one suggestion offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet the problem that was always arising in planning, i.e., how to divide military forces between the missions of (1) evacuation and (2) military action. In his view the commander in the field was the only one who could properly decide how to divide his forces to meet competing requirements. Mr. Merchant said the first change proposed by the JCS was acceptable to the State Department.

General Lemnitzer, turning to the second JCS proposal, said he believed the word "coordinating" was preferable to the phrase "acting under the general supervision of the Ambassador." The President said that, in his view, the Department of State should approve the policy of evacuating U.S. citizens from danger areas but from that point on evacuation operations were almost entirely a military matter. It would be wrong to designate the Ambassador as the official in charge

of operations which were approaching a condition of hostilities. Mr. Merchant said that the interim guidance on this subject approved by the President on August 25 contained the phrase "acting under the general supervision of the Ambassador." However, Mr. Merchant believed that the military operation should not be conducted under the general supervision of the Ambassador but that the evacuation operation should be under the Ambassador's supervision. The President believed one difficulty lay in deciding where supervision begins and ends. He had frequently insisted that the Chief of Mission must be the principal U.S. authority in a foreign country. The question was, at what point does our chief diplomatic official cease to have overall authority and responsibility. Of one thing he was sure, namely, that we would need both a good Ambassador and a good military commander in the event evacuation operations were necessary. General Lemnitzer said the JCS were not raising any question as to the overall authority of the Ambassador but they did question the extent to which he should become involved in military operations. The President, with an assist from Mr. Merchant, then proposed the language in Paragraph 5-c-(1) of NSC 6019 which appears in the action below.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6019; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 15, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6019, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Pages 5 and 6, subparagraph 5-c-(1):* Add at the end of the first sentence the clause "who will respond to the extent which they consider militarily feasible"; and revise the second sentence to read as follows: "Responsibility for the conduct of such evacuation operations by military forces rests wholly with the military commander, acting in coordination with, and under evacuation policies established by, the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative."

(2) *Page 6, paragraph 6:* Revise the first line to read as follows: "6. In implementing this policy, the".

NOTE: NSC 6019, as amended by the action in *b* above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6019/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Marion W. Boggs

285. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Merchant to the NSC Executive Secretary¹

Washington, December 30, 1960

SUBJECT

Protection Against BW and CW Attack

REFERENCE

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 15, 1960

As requested, I am indicating below my action with respect to the draft NSC Action on the subject:

Concur: _____✓_____

Do not concur: _____

Comments:

Livingston T. Merchant
Acting Secretary of State

Enclosure

Memorandum From Dorse to Merchant

Washington, December 28, 1960

SUBJECT

Protection against BW and CW Attack

In a memorandum dated October 17, 1960, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), on which State is represented, reported to the NSC that a review of the status of certain biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) defense programs under the general cognizance of OCDM showed a deficiency in BW defense programs. The ICIS considers these deficiencies, which involve measures for rapid detection and identification of BW agents, to be a serious internal security shortcoming. The ICIS previously had suggested that OCDM request necessary funds for additional research on which to base development of procedures for rapid detection and

¹Source: Concurrence with draft NSC action on protection against BW and CW attack; includes a memorandum to Merchant recommending a Department of State position. Confidential. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5802 and 6022 Series.

identification of BW agents. However, the Director of OCDM had indicated his belief that current research programs of the Department of Defense and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare are related to the problem and concluded that it would be difficult to justify a special request by OCDM for funds for the purpose recommended by ICIS.

It is understood that Defense is not optimistic that its research and development in this field will prove successful and believes there is need for additional research and development. HEW feels that current research will contribute little to a solution of the over-all problem. ICIS, therefore, has urged expansion of research in the BW field to eliminate present shortcomings and feels that OCDM is the appropriate agency for funding such additional research.

The NSC Planning Board recently considered the ICIS memorandum on this subject and requested the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology to convene a special interdepartmental group to discuss technical questions relating to the problems of BW detection and identification. The group concluded that (a) there are specific research areas in this field which warrant exploration from a scientific point of view; (b) research programs of HEW and Defense will eventually accomplish results necessary for the attainment of departmental missions in this field; and (c) increased efforts in support of the ICIS concern for an early solution to the problem would require either expansion of current research or additional research.

Accordingly, the Planning Board has prepared the attached draft NSC record of action concurring in the ICIS view that research in the field of BW detection and identification is important from the viewpoint of national security and directing the heads of all executive departments and agencies concerned to consider, in collaboration with OCDM, further actions that might be undertaken.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you concur in the draft NSC record of action by initialing the voting slip (Tab A) in the appropriate place.

CONCURRENCE:

S/P—Mr. Furnas

Attachment

Note From Perkins to Ryder

Washington, December 19, 1960

SGA – Mr. Ryder

NSC Vote Slip Action: Protection Against BW and CW Attack

Attached is a copy of a memorandum of December 15 for the NSC from its Executive Secretary enclosing as suggested NSC action on the above subject, together with a copy of a vote slip for action by the Secretary.

You are requested to have prepared a memorandum to the Acting Secretary recommending whether or not he should concur in the adoption of the proposed action by initialing the vote slip accordingly. The original of the vote slip will be retained in S/S and attached to the SCA memorandum when it is received.

The memorandum should be cleared by S/P–Mr. Furnas and should be received in S/S by December 28 (we believe that the Secretary will not be in the Department on that date).

Raymond L. Perkins

S/S–RO

Ext. 5262

cc: S/P–Mr. Furnas

Attachment

Memorandum From Lay to the NSC

Washington, December 15, 1960

SUBJECT

Protection Against BW and CW Attack

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5802/1, paragraph 16

B. Executive Order 10421

C. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “BW Detection and Identification”, dated October 17, 1960

The NSC Planning Board has considered the letter on the subject from the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (circulated by Reference A), and recommends that the National Security Council adopt the draft NSC Action attached hereto.

It is requested that each member of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau

of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, indicate his action with respect to the attached draft NSC Action by completing and returning the enclosed memorandum form, if possible *by or before Thursday, December 29, 1960*.²

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Attachment

Draft Record of Action by the National Security Council

PROTECTION AGAINST BW AND CW ATTACK

(NSC 5802/1, paragraph 16; Executive Order 10421; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "BW Detection and Identification", dated October 17, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Protection Against BW and CW Attack", dated December 15, 1960)

a. Concurred in the judgment of the NSC Planning Board that research in the field of BW detection and identification is important from the viewpoint of national security.

b. Noted the request of the President that the heads of all Executive departments and agencies concerned, in collaboration pursuant to Executive Order 10421 with the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, consider actions that might be undertaken to protect vital facilities (including government buildings) against BW and CW attack, utilizing presently available measures as appropriate.

NOTE: The action in *a* above, as approved by the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of Defense and Health, Education and Welfare, and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, for guidance in the initiation and conduct of research and development programs related to this problem.

The action in *b* above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all appropriate Executive departments and agencies for appropriate implementation.

²Memorandum form not enclosed. [Footnote is in the original.]

286. NSC Report¹

NSC 6027

Washington, December 30, 1960

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
CHANNELS FOR TRANSMISSION OF WARNING OF ATTACK

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 116
- B. NSC Action No. 2215-c

The NSC Planning Board on December 6, 1960, reviewed NSC 116, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2215-c, and agreed that revisions of an editorial nature only were required to bring this policy up to date.

Accordingly, the enclosed statement of policy on the subject, incorporating the editorial revisions agreed upon by the Planning Board, is transmitted herewith as NSC 6027 in accordance with NSC Action No. 2215-c, which provides that where NSC policy papers do not require "revision except of a purely editorial nature, the NSC Planning Board should make a written report to that effect to the Council as a matter of record."

In approving paragraphs 4 and 5 of NSC 116 on September 19, 1951, the President directed their implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, as indicated therein. These instructions by the President continue to be applicable to the enclosure.

NSC 6027 supersedes NSC 116.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: "Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack." Top Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 273, Policy Papers File.

Enclosure

Statement of Policy

CHANNELS FOR TRANSMISSION OF WARNING OF ATTACK²

1. The Standing Group, in considering the provision of warning of imminent attack, has concluded that there is a clear requirement for certain defined national responsibilities and established secure channels for the transmission of warning of attack.

2. The Standing Group has suggested that the following responsibilities should be recognized by the signatory Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty, and should be included in orders to the Major Commands of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

a. The discoverer of credible information indicating definite preparations for, or movement in initiation of attack against any element of NATO is responsible that the substance of such information be transmitted immediately through the duly established channels for the information of the Major Commands of NATO and the Standing Group.

b. Each Power and each Major Command of NATO is responsible for preventing the transmission in its name of unofficial and/or unvaluated warning of attack. To this end, it should advise the Standing Group and the Major Commands of NATO as to the agencies who are authorized to transmit warning messages.

c. Only in extreme emergency, in which the element of time would prohibit normal complete processing through internal channels, should there be recourse to releasing the information at some lower level.

3. The Standing Group suggested the following channels for transmission of urgent intelligence as being currently appropriate and adequate:

a. From the designated agency of the country or command first receiving AND EVALUATING the information, to the Standing Group via the duly established channels (see subparagraph 2-*b* above) with information copies to the NATO Major Commands.

b. In cases of extreme urgency, when the element of time is vital, any internationally identifiable agency (for example, ambassadors and commanders in chief, as opposed to those specifically designated) should inform the Standing Group by the quickest means available, with copies to Major Commands of NATO.

² This paper was originally a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 14, 1951. It was concurred in by the National Security Council on September 18, 1951 (NSC Action No. 558) and paragraphs 4 and 5 were approved by the President on September 19, 1951. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 2215-c, the NSC Planning Board editorially revised the paper, to bring it up to date, by amending paragraph 4 and deleting paragraph 6 of the 1951 paper. [Footnote is in the original.]

4. In implementation of subparagraph 3–*a* above, it is considered that advantage should be taken of existing agencies and action channels. At present, intelligence is furnished to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Military Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. This intelligence is quickly evaluated by the Watch Committee and its conclusions immediately given to the United States Intelligence Board which, in turn, through the Director of Central Intelligence, advises the National Security Council. The personnel and functions of these agencies (Watch Committee, United States Intelligence Board and National Security Council) are so inter-related and organized as to provide for the most expeditious handling of and making recommendations to the President on matters concerning information on the imminence of attack. It may be noted that the Watch Committee is composed of representatives from all agencies dealing with the evaluation of intelligence, with their superiors constituting the United States Intelligence Board, whose superiors in turn are either members of or attend the meetings of the National Security Council. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who normally attends these meetings, ensures that the U.S. Representative to the Standing Group is kept informed. It is therefore considered that in order to provide both political and military consideration, the President, on the advice of the National Security Council, should authorize the transmittal of warning of attack messages to the Standing Group and Major Commands of NATO. It is further considered that, in view of the communications channels available to them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be the U.S. agency to transmit warning of attack messages. In case actual hostilities have commenced, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider hostilities too imminent that time is of vital importance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be authorized to transmit to NATO such warning of attack messages simultaneously with transmission to the President, the members of the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. It is considered that, in cases of extreme urgency, when the element of time is vital (reference subparagraph 3–*b* above), information available to the United States of the imminence or actual commencement of hostilities will reach the Standing Group and the Major Commands of NATO through already established intelligence procedures and channels which are internationally identifiable.

Arms Control and Disarmament

287. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, December 26, 1957

SUBJECT

U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments

REFERENCES

- A. NSC Action No. 1419
- B. NSC Action No. 1513 and Annex thereto
- C. NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto
- D. NSC 5707/8
- E. NSC Actions Nos. 1676 and 1722

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, is transmitted herewith for preliminary consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Monday, January 6, 1958.

Also enclosed for the information of the Council are Annexes A, B and C (consisting of maps referred to in the enclosed report); and Annex D, "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament", made by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Transmits memorandum on revision of U.S. policy on disarmament: test suspension, reduction of military personnel, protection against surprise attack. Secret. 19 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meeting Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A.

Attachment

Memorandum From Lay to the NSC

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF: Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments", dated December 26, 1957

The attached revised Memorandum for the National Security Council is transmitted herewith for attachment to the above-mentioned memorandum, superseding that memorandum presently attached thereto. The memorandum has been revised to include the Director, Bureau of the Budget, in the cc's at the bottom of the page.

It is requested that the superseded page be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

**Report Prepared by the Special Assistant to
the President for Disarmament**

Washington, December 27, 1957

REVISION OF U.S. POLICY ON DISARMAMENT

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Need for Review of U.S. Disarmament Position

1. Present basic policy states that the United States should "actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments". (NSC Action No. 1419, June 30, 1955; NSC 5707/8, June 3, 1957)

2. It is clear that the major developments since the last U.S. comprehensive review of detailed positions on disarmament require an essential revision of such detailed positions in order to form a reasonable foundation for actively seeking a sound and safeguarded agreement with the USSR on disarmament.

3. The U.S. net evaluation studies conducted by the General Thomas Committee; the Security Resources Panel Report (Gaither Group); and the U.S. joint intelligence estimates; all point to the high degree of devastation which would result from a modern general war and thus confirm the soundness of the basic U.S. policy to actively seek a sound safeguarded agreement.

4. One feature of the August 29th Western proposals² widely criticized at the recent United Nations General Assembly sessions by Free World nations as well as by the Soviet Bloc countries, has been the "inseparability clause". This clause is contained in Section XI of the August 29th proposals. It states: "This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable."

5. The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow recently has reported: "I continue to believe that the Soviets genuinely seek a first step agreement on disarmament and believe it is this they have chiefly in mind in pressing for high-level talks" (November 23, 1957). However, he considers that the Soviets from their standpoint regard the August 29th proposals as so heavily weighted in the West's favor that the United States should not realistically expect the Soviet Union to accept them, nor should the United States consider the Soviet rejection of them to be a fair test of whether or not the Soviet is genuinely seeking an agreement. (Cable of Ambassador Thompson, September 3, 1957)

6. [text not declassified]

7. The only feasible way to ascertain whether or not the Soviet Union will enter into an inspected and safeguarded agreement which is reasonable and which would be mutually desirable because of a resultant reduction in the dangers of war, is to make an offer of such an agreement.

8. Making such an offer is also the only reliable manner in which the cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations and of the uncommitted states can be maintained by the United States. This cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations is vital to the security of the United States.

Separate Test Suspension

9. The United States has consistently held to the position that inspection is necessary for each step in each provision of any disarmament agreement. Thus when the Soviet Union proposed the suspension of nuclear testing, the United States insisted upon the requirement of inspection. In the informal bilateral discussions, carried on with full knowledge of the other Western partners at London, the Soviet Union on June 7, 1957, agreed to inspection stations inside the USSR to monitor the suspension of nuclear testing.

10. The United States has also consistently maintained that a first step should be carefully measured and should guard against a disadvantageous result in the event of violation by the Soviet Union. Thus the United States insisted that a first agreement for test suspension should be of limited duration so that laboratories could be maintained

² See Annex D hereto. [Footnote is in the original.]

in the event of a breach of the agreement. The Soviet Union finally responded in the informal bilateral discussions conducted in London with a counter-proposal of an initial period of two or three years of nuclear test suspension.

11. Leading U.S. atomic scientists state that they could hold their laboratories and scientists together for a two-year period if it was explained as being in the national interest, and they could during this period conduct highly desirable nuclear research without conducting test explosions.

12. [*text not declassified*]

13. At the UN General Assembly session on November 19, 1957, the key vote in the test suspension issue was taken on an Indian resolution which provided for an inspected suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The vote was 24 in favor, 34 against, and 20 abstentions. The make-up of this 34 voting with the United States was 27 nations in the NATO and Latin America groups, plus Australia, Nationalist China, Pakistan, Spain, the Philippines, Israel, and New Zealand. New Zealand with its new Government has since changed its position and now favors a test suspension. Six Latin American countries did not follow the U.S. lead—but even more significant was the fact that 24 Asian-African countries did not support the United States. As indicated above, no African countries supported the United States on this vote, and only 4 Asian countries (Nationalist China, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Israel).

14. It is widely recognized that Asia and Africa are principal competitive battlegrounds and may probably swing the decisive weight between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. The two leaders of two most influential Asian nations—India and Japan—have repeatedly and strongly spoken out in favor of a separate test suspension. Nehru, on December 10, 1957, said: “I feel that suspension of atomic explosives is a valid first step (in disarmament). It is a dramatic step. It would not change the power of any country but would give it a tremendous lead. It would come as a tremendous relief to hundreds of millions all over the world.”

15. The prompt negotiation of an inspected two-year test suspension, because of the time necessary to work out the inspection agreement and obtain Senate approval, could not at best be made effective as a ratified treaty prior to September 1, 1958, and therefore the next series of U.S. tests would be completed before the suspension became effective. [*text not declassified*]

16. A temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests would bring into being a United Nations supervisory organization which could be the forerunner of an organization to regulate and control armaments and armed forces in the decades ahead.

17. A temporary suspension of nuclear tests would establish a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on successive steps of armaments regulation and control.

18. A temporary nuclear test suspension would: (a) inhibit the development of more powerful new types of weapons at a time when the United States would have a relative superiority in nuclear weapons; (b) deter the spread of the production of nuclear weapons to other less responsible countries; (c) break the 12-year stalemate in the disarmament negotiations and establish a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on further steps of armaments regulation and control; (d) carry with it an inspection system which would begin the opening up of the Soviet Union and other Communist areas to international regular observation and would assist in the evolution of the Soviet system toward a more liberal and peaceful form.

Inspection Zones

19. Another consideration resulting from the recent London and New York disarmament discussions is that there is reason to believe that the Soviet might separate out from its proposals and negotiate a reasonable European inspection zone. The USSR would prefer to have a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe (Bulganin letter of December 10, 1957) but would also consider a European inspection zone as a first step.

20. The latest intelligence estimate on Soviet policies states that the Soviet leaders are "acutely concerned over the potential threat of a revived and nationalistic Germany backed by the United States." The USSR has tended to concentrate on such disarmament proposals as the ban on use of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals in Europe. According to the intelligence estimate: "Their (Soviet) interest in inducing a U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe would probably lead them to go even further (than inspection for a test ban) in allowing mutual inspection in Europe." (NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957)

21. General Norstad has recommended to the NATO Council that it would "enhance the security" of NATO to establish a European inspection zone against surprise attack. Norstad said that the "minimum area" he had in mind was Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

22. The present Western position (August 29, 1957) states that provided there is agreement by the USSR to either a North America-Soviet Union zone or an Arctic Circle zone that the United States, with the concurrence of its allies, would agree to a European inspection zone including all of Europe to the Ural Mountains (60 degrees East longitude) and in the south to latitude 40 degrees North. If the Soviet reject this zone (which they have), the policy provides that under the same proviso as above a more limited zone of inspection in Europe would be "discussed", but only if a significant part of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, was included.

23. The Soviet has rejected the August 29th European zone proposals. However, they did evince interest in earlier informal U.S. suggestions based on a 5° E–30° E zone running from a line east of Paris to a line just west of Leningrad-Odessa. In response to this informal U.S. probing, the Soviet on April 30, 1957, responded with a proposal for a zone running from 0 degree (Greenwich) to 25° E (Lvov-Brest-Wilna).

24. The Soviet likewise has rejected the August 29th Arctic Zone and the North American-USSR zone. In response to informal earlier probing by the United States during the London talks, the Soviet on April 30th responded with the suggestion of an Eastern Siberia-Western United States zone running from 108° E to 90° W.

25. The Western European UN Subcommittee members (UK and France), in line with the May 25, 1957 Presidential decision³ that the European zone should be left to the initiative of Western European nations, did take the initiative in advancing in the NATO Council the concept of a 5°–35° European zone. The NATO Council then left to the Western UN Subcommittee members (U.S., UK, France, Canada) the manner in which this zone should be advanced. During the 4-Western Power meetings at the end of July with the Secretary heading the U.S. Delegation, it was decided not to advance 5°–35° European zone but to advance for “discussion” and only under conditions of complete inseparability a small but undefined European zone.

Outer-Space Objects

26. Particularly in view of the recently apparent Soviet strides in satellite-missile technology, it is in the U.S. interest now to make separable from the rest of the package and to agree to the August 29th proposal for the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would assure the use of outer-space objects for peaceful purposes.

27. The Soviet during the London discussions did not react to the U.S. missile proposal except to indicate that their proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons included all “rockets”.

Armaments Regulation Organization

28. The setting up of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the UN Security Council would be in the U.S. interest. Agreement on such an organization by itself would have certain value in breaking the atmosphere of stalemate and thereby improving the chances for agreement on subjects on which the two sides are not now far apart. Such an organization also could begin to make the

³ NSC Action No. 1722. [Footnote is in the original.]

control studies that would be basic to agreements on any additional steps of disarmament.

29. The Soviet have repeatedly indicated their support for some kind of international control organization under the UN Security Council.

Other August 29th Proposals

30. The remaining proposals in the August 29th paper are separable and can be practically implemented in successive steps if agreed upon.

II. POLICY OBJECTIVES

31. Actively to seek a safeguarded disarmament agreement, beginning with a partial agreement and subsequently extending the initial step or steps into a more comprehensive agreement. In negotiation of the foregoing, the United States should seek either individually or in combination measures which would:

a. Break the present deadlock, gain experience in inspection and regulation, and at the same time be careful not to impair the security of the United States in the event that further progress in developing wider disarmament agreements was not forthcoming.

b. Reduce the danger of great surprise attack and thereby give continuing vitality to the nuclear deterrent.

c. Inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of "fourth countries".

d. Reduce the probability of weapons systems, particularly missile systems, from developing in a way as to increase the danger of major nuclear conflict being initiated either by accident or by actions of other than the responsible national officials, particularly with regard to the growing problem of dispersion of authority to take action which would initiate world war.

e. Enhance the political position of the United States with regard to its allies and the uncommitted nations.

f. Facilitate within the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc countries the rise of "non-Stalinist" elements and ultimately the evolution of the Soviet Bloc countries into more liberal and democratic societies, including the true independence of the satellite countries.

III. POLICY GUIDANCE

32. The United States, after consultation with the NATO states and other free countries as appropriate, should propose the following separable measures as a basis for an initial agreement:

a. (1) Immediately following ratification of the agreement, the installation of approximately eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations with appropriate agreed scientific instruments, in the USSR, a like number in the United States, and suitable numbers of such stations in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at other necessary

locations, as agreed by competent scientists and as specified in the agreement. (See attached map, Annex A.) The inspectors to have the right to make prompt on-the-spot observations at any point indicated by their instruments as being a probable site of a nuclear test explosion in violation of the agreement.

(2) Subject to the satisfactory agreement on the inspection stations and on prompt installation of the inspection system, and further subject to the right to end the test suspension before expiration of the 24-month period upon notice of a violation of the agreement upon any important particular; a 24-month suspension of nuclear testing beginning on September 1, 1958, or as soon thereafter as the agreement is effective. This agreement would take effect as soon as ratified by the United States, the USSR, the UK, and any other state, such as Australia, whose territory might require inspection. This agreement would be open to adherence of additional states.

b. Establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in Western USSR and Central Europe. (See attached map, Annex B.) This zone would be from approximately 3° East longitude to 28° East longitude and from 45° North latitude to the Arctic Circle zone described in *c*.

c. Establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern United States, and Western Canada. (See attached map, Annex C.) This zone would include all of Siberia east of 108° East longitude and the additional Soviet Arctic Circle territory including the Murmansk area. The West would submit to inspection the Arctic Circle area of Norway, Greenland, Canada, and Alaska, and in addition a sufficient proportion of Northwestern United States and Western Canada so as to approximate the same number of square miles as the Soviet area and to include the same percentage of U.S. and USSR area.


(NOTE: The zones referred to in paragraphs *b* and *c* would have aerial and limited ground inspection of the type proposed in the Four-Power proposal of August 29, 1957.)

d. The establishment of a technical committee to study the inspection requirements of a system to assure that outer-space objects would be used and maintained only for peaceful purposes. This committee would limit its study to the technical problems.


e. The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations to supervise any of the foregoing measures that are agreed, as well as to prepare for the supervision of future additional agreed measures.

f. An undertaking by all signatory states to make an early and sustained effort, during the initial 24 months of the test suspension, to reach agreement upon, and begin to implement additional steps of, disarmament and arms control, including all of the other measures contained in the August 29, 1957, Western proposals.

Annex A



Annex B



Annex C



Annex D

Working Paper

Washington, August 29, 1957

UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION CANADA, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working Paper:

Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament

I. The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments

A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention, the following States will restrict or reduce their armed forces respectively to the maximum limits indicated below:

France	—	750,000
United Kingdom	—	750,000
Soviet Union	—	2,500,000
United States	—	2,500,000

The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.

B. During this same period, these States will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an International Control Organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention.

C. The relation of other States to the convention, including the agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.

D. The States listed in paragraph I–A will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condition that:

1. Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been verified to their satisfaction.

2. There has been progress toward the solution of political issues.

3. Other essential States have become parties to the convention and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits set out in paragraphs A and B above.

E. Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be undertaken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less

than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

F. Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would be 650,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

G. Upon the conditions cited in D above, these States will also be prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calculation of any such armament limitations will be in agreed relation to the armed forces determined in paragraphs E and F above and will be completed prior to the application of the further limitations in armed forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed the quantities thus allowed in each category.

H. No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments beyond those provided for in paragraph A and B above will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately expanded and is able to verify such measures.

II. Military Expenditure

In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of paragraph I, and looking forward to the reduction of military expenditures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agree to make available to the International Control Organization information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter. The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance and annexed to the convention.

III. Nuclear Weapons

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense.

IV. The Control of Fissionable Material

A. The parties to the convention further undertake:

1. That all future production of fissionable materials will be used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclusively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning one month after

the International Board of Control described in paragraph VIII has certified that the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.

2. That they will co-operate in the prompt installation and in the maintenance of such an inspection system.

3. That for the purpose of accomplishing the above undertakings, the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as possible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a progress report for their approval within the first ten months after the entry into force of the convention.

B. The parties which are producers of fissionable material for weapons purposes at the time of cessation of production for weapons purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for equitable transfers, in successive increments, of fissionable materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad, including stockpiling; and, in this connexion

1. To fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and

2. To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios following the cut-off date for production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes provided in paragraph IV–A–1:

1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III.

2. Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissionable material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapons purposes.

V. Nuclear Weapons Testing

A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as may be necessary, with the consent of the Governments concerned.

B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will meet as soon as possible to design the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.

C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspension for a further period under effective international inspection.

D. If the inspection system referred to in paragraph V-A is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes agreed to under paragraph IV-A-1 above, all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been put into effect.

E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to announce and register in advance the dates of each series and the range of total energy to be released therein; to provide for limited observation of them; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

VI. *The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space*

All parties to the convention agree that within three months after the entry into effect of the convention they will co-operate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

VII. *Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack*

A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties concerned will co-operate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.

B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is proposed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee be set up at once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.

C. With regard to inspection in the Western Hemisphere and in the Soviet Union, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose the following:

1. That all the territory of the continental United States, all Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.

2. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe, referred to in paragraph D below, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

D. With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection.

E. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, then, under the same proviso expressed above, a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the understanding that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

F. The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

G. Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the States concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones described in paragraphs C–1 and –2, but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the agreement with in all cases the concurrence of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.

H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention, the parties will provide to the Board of Control inventories of their

fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and within such additional area or areas as may be agreed.

I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger of surprise attack from anywhere.

VIII. *The International Control Organization*

A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.

B. All the control and inspection services described in the convention and those which may be created in the course of its implementation will be within the framework of an International Control Organization established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include, as its executive organ, a Board of Control in which the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Subcommittee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.

C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available information freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in categories which will be set forth in an annex to it.

D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures provided for in the convention are progressively applied.

E. Other matters relating to the Organization will be defined in annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which the Organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function, its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working conditions, jurisdiction, immunities, and prerogatives.

IX. *Movement of Armaments*

In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments.

X. *Suspension of the Convention*

A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control

Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party, or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of the violations or prejudicial action.

XI. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable. Failure to fulfill any of the provisions of the convention would create a situation calling for examination at the request of any party.

288. Memorandum of Conversation Between Stassen and John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, January 2, 1958, 3 p.m.

Governor Stassen said he hoped I would be in a position to support his recommendations coming up at the NSC. I said I was very skeptical as to the recommendations. I said I felt that they would involve a practical abandonment of our proposals dealing with the substance of the matter, i.e., the cut-off of fissionable material for weapons purposes, the supervision against surprise attack, and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

Governor Stassen argued that he felt on the contrary that if we started with suspension of nuclear testing and supervision of such suspension that would make it more likely rather than less likely that we would gain our further objectives.

We discussed the problem of opening up the Four Power Proposals as approved by NATO and the danger that by opening up one point everything else would become unbuttoned. Governor Stassen felt there was no such danger.

Governor Stassen contended broadly speaking that the Four Power Proposals were very heavily weighted against Russia and that they should be moderated in Russia's favor. I asked in what respect he felt they were so weighted and he said it was largely because of the zones for inspection that we had urged. I pointed out that we had

¹Source: Four-power disarmament proposal. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.

agreed to discuss other zones in Europe if the Soviets wanted, and that they had not responded.

Governor Stassen also referred to the 55–45 formula. I agreed that this was probably somewhat weighted in our favour but that in these matters it was necessary to have some ground to give in negotiation and that I did not feel that our position as a negotiating position was unfair and certainly the Russians did not expect it to be our final position.

JFD

289. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, January 3, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

REFERENCE

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 26, 1957

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Mr. Stassen's latest disarmament proposal, transmitted by the reference memorandum, are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its preliminary consideration of this proposal at its meeting on Monday, January 6, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹Source: Transmits JCS views on Stassen proposals to modify Four-power joint proposals. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meetings Minutes File, 350th Meeting, Tab A.

Enclosure**Memorandum From Twining to McElroy**

Washington, December 31, 1957

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Mr. Stassen's latest disarmament proposal, which is to be submitted for preliminary consideration by the National Security Council on 6 January 1958. They feel that from a military point of view, and also from a political viewpoint, the position they have taken on the Four Power Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 is still sound. However, they are aware that the political climate has changed to some extent since the submission of those proposals. The best evidence of this change lies in the feelings expressed by several countries at the last meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris that we must continue, especially with our NATO neighbors, to attempt to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on disarmament, and must not evince an intransigent position.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the most recent disarmament proposal is an effort on the part of Mr. Stassen to meet these aims, and to advance a U.S. position which will lead to the reopening of fruitful discussions on disarmament with the USSR. However, there are three points in the proposal which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe to be dangerous to the United States.

a. The major change that Mr. Stassen has made to the Four Power Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 is the abandonment of the provision for inseparability of the individual items of the proposals. From a security viewpoint, there has been no improvement in the international situation since 29 August 1957 to warrant such a critical departure from the joint western position rejected by the Soviets. On the contrary, the apparent advances in Soviet missile technology disclosed since that date, coupled with the boastful and belligerent attitude of the Soviet Union with respect to these events, have aggravated the international situation. In addition, the Soviets have withdrawn from the present UN Disarmament Commission. The inseparability provision of the 29 August Proposals made these proposals barely acceptable to the United States in meeting the minimum requirements for the security of the United States and the other NATO powers. Abandoning this essential provision would present the Soviets with the opportunity of accepting only those proposals compatible with their national interests—for example, the suspension of nuclear testing—to the detriment of the U.S. and NATO interests.

b. The former provision for the control of fissionable material, both for peaceful and weapon purposes, which goes to the heart of the disarmament problem, is no longer a prerequisite. It has been included only for discussion and possible agreement at some future date. It has

not been high-lighted, as it should be, and could be lost entirely in any future negotiations with the Soviets. It is this provision which would assist significantly in diminishing the threat of nuclear warfare. The cessation of nuclear testing, *per se*, need not contribute at all to the effective control of nuclear weapons. This fact was recently emphasized in the Eisenhower cablegram to Nehru, dated 15 December 1957, in which President Eisenhower said, "... however, I do not believe that we can accept a proposal to stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccompanied by any assurance that measures—which would go to the heart of the problem—would follow."

c. The new inspection zones proposed by Mr. Stassen are weighted heavily in favor of the Soviet Union. The Western USSR-Central Europe zone includes the great majority of NATO installations and troop disposition while it covers only the East European satellites and a small portion of western USSR. The second zone proposed in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern United States, and Western Canada includes a sizable portion of the United States with many important military and industrial installations in exchange for a negligible coverage of comparable Soviet territory and military installations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the establishment of inspection zones in the general areas mentioned, but they take serious exception to the inequality in military and industrial significance of the zones proposed by Mr. Stassen.

3. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while recognizing the desirability of maintaining a reasonable position in the eyes of the world, recommend:

a. Against the adoption of Mr. Stassen's proposal.

b. Adherence to the basic principles of the Four Power Proposals of 29 August 1957, while maintaining flexibility in stating our positions.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

290. Letter From Stassen to Eisenhower¹

Washington, February 14, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

On March 19, 1955 you requested that I make the studies and submit the recommendations for the policies of the United States in the

¹ Source: Letter of resignation. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Stassen, Harold E., 1957.

field of control and regulation of armaments, for consideration by you and by the National Security Council.

With the assistance of an able, experienced, and devoted group of men from without and within the government these studies have now been completed and a comprehensive set of recommendations have been made, some of which have already been adopted as the policy of the United States and the others of which are well understood within the Administration. It has been an honor, inspiration, and privilege to work with you in this task.

It is my highest hope and my fervent prayer that our endeavors in this assignment are confirmed in the years ahead as having made a contribution to a lasting peace with freedom and justice.

It is my belief that I may now make a larger contribution to your objective of a durable peace, which I share, by reentering the active political field in the Pennsylvania Governorship campaign and by discussing with the people of our country the issues and problems of the worldwide competition of ways of life and the tasks of building peace and safeguarding against war.

I write with deep appreciation and commendation for your life time of service to our country, with an especial heartfelt thanks for your leadership as President these five years, and with best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Harold E. Stassen

Special Assistant to the President

**291. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster
Dulles and Sherman Adams¹**

February 19, 1958, 3:33 p.m.

The Sec said he had quite a talk with Gruenther re disarmament. The Sec suggested the handling of it should be under the control of State through some regular fellow but that we should have an outside panel of advisers or consultants to guide us. G thought that was a good way and he would be agreeable to serving on such a panel. The Sec thought

¹ Source: Advisory panel on disarmament. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

of Bedell Smith and he recommended Professor Wolfers of Yale. Does this commend itself to A? A said yes—he should think so. A said if you get a panel you might as well put it in the newspapers so you might as well get good names. Get whom you want. The Sec said this is largely scenery. It is a public relations job and you are never going to get anywhere with these..... A said to get some practical people who can sit around and talk about it. A asked what about CD? He does not want to help? The Sec indicated such was the case.

292. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Lovett¹

February 20, 1958, 5:09 p.m.

The Sec said he wants L's help on disarmament. The Sec wants to set up a new way to carry on that will be better. It has to be part of State and L agreed. One trouble, said the Sec, with Stassen was he was only interested in disarmament. The Sec needs 2–3 people he can talk with in a general way as to the lines we are following. He wants an informal panel composed of 3—Gruenther, Smith and L—he can talk to them from time to time to get their counsel and advice. He does not think it will take more than a couple of hours a month. It would be an immense service to the Sec if he can do that. L said he has been in the hospital and is leaving to recuperate until April 7 but will be available after that. It is not a formal group but the Sec would like to have it known. The Sec feels the prospects of getting any substantial result are not very good unless and until there are some solutions to political problems. But it is vitally important to keep pressing in this field and it will be disastrous if it is felt we were not interested. L said it would be better if Congress and the papers shut up so trained diplomats can work it out. The Sec referred to the last letter to Bulganin—which L approved of heartily.

¹Source: Request to Lovett to join advisory panel on disarmament. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

293. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, February 24, 1958, 3 p.m.

1. I showed the President the proposed statement with reference to organizing the disarmament work. He said he would like to get Jack McCloy on the panel also. I said that I would ask him to serve.

2. I referred to the request of Ambassador Menshikov to see the President and pointed out the embarrassment that would result if ambassadors adopted the habit generally of trying to see the President directly on the affairs of their governments. The President wholly agreed. He suggested that we should tell the Soviet Ambassador that he could, of course, see me at once, but that due to the President's engagements it would not be possible for the Ambassador to see him until toward the end of the week and then I would, of course, be present.

3. We discussed the "Summit" meeting and Macmillan's letter. I said I would attempt to draft a reply which would point out the desirability of having our agenda and positions and participations agreed with our NATO Allies before we started to negotiate with the Soviets and much more so before we attempt to fix a date. The President felt that this was the right line to take.

I showed the President Roscoe Drummond's article on "Summit" talks from the *Herald-Tribune* of February 23.

4. I also showed the President the quotation from the speech of Defense Minister Malinowski criticizing the United States and Britain for delaying the opening of a Second Front.

5. The President referred to a report he had received that Soviet submarines had been sighted off the Atlantic Coast. He said that Admiral Burke was coming to see him about that. The President also expressed his strong reluctance at our Soviet overflights.

I mentioned the Soviet complaint about our "buzzing" Soviet trawlers off the Banks.

6. The President referred to Macmillan's suggestion of participating both in the Citadel and De Pauw events and suggested that it would be best if Macmillan merely came for the De Pauw meeting and then came to Washington the following day, Monday, June 9.

7. We discussed the list of prospective official visits during the latter part of the year. The President said that he was favorable to setting up a meeting for Garcia, but did not think favorably of King Idris,

¹ Source: Disarmament panel; summit meeting; Menshikov meeting; Soviet submarines off U.S. east coast; official visits; Macmillan's visit; youth exchanges with the Soviet Union. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

President Chiang or Prime Minister Sihanouk. He suggested we should defer on these latter three. In this connection, I showed the President Mr. Herter's memorandum to me of February 20, attached.

8. The President spoke again of his interest in making a proposal for bringing over a large number of Soviet young people to study here, and at our Government's expense. I said we were having this staffed as there were many technical problems involved.

JFD

294. Press Release¹

Washington, February 27, 1958

The Secretary of State has, with the approval of the President, designated Ambassador James J. Wadsworth to act, under the Secretary's direction, as United States representative in future negotiations for an agreement on the limitation of armament. He will also participate in the preparation of positions which the United States will support in disarmament negotiations. Ambassador Wadsworth will, at least for the time being, retain his position as Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

In addition, the Secretary of State, with the approval of the President, has asked certain qualified private citizens to advise and consult with him informally, from time to time, on the broad policies which should govern the United States in seeking limitation of armament. Alfred M. Gruenther, Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, and Walter Bedell Smith have accepted to serve in this way.

The United States continues to consider it urgent that an international agreement be sought and reached which will effectively limit armaments. The Government of the Soviet Union has since last August, refused to discuss the constructive proposals advanced by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada, or to participate in the work of the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It has also announced that it would not participate in any proceedings of the Disarmament Commission as reconstituted by the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly. It has reacted negatively to the statement by the NATO Heads of Government that they would welcome a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock.

¹ Source: Wadsworth appointment as disarmament negotiator; advisory panel. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

The United States believes that limitation of armament is so imperative a goal that efforts to reach it should not be interrupted by such procedural obstacles as the Soviet Government has put in the path. We are striving, and will continue to strive, to overcome these procedural difficulties and to find a way to go forward to lift from the shoulders of mankind the dangerous and growing burden of vast and ever more destructive armaments.

295. **Appendix to Memorandum From JCS to McElroy (Print Document 141)**¹

Washington, March 13, 1958

APPENDIX: ESTIMATED SPECTRUM OF WEAPONS
YIELDS AFTER 1 SEPTEMBER 1958²

Vehicle	Yield Range	
	USSR ³	U.S.
ICBM	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
1000 NM IRBM	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
700 NM Missile	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
Tactical Missiles (75–350 NM)	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
ASM	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
Strategic Bombers	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
Tactical Bombers	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
Fighters	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
SAM	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
AAM	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
ASW	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
Torpedoes	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
Artillery	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]

¹ Source: Estimated spectrum of weapons yields after September 1958. Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

² Assuming no nuclear testing by either the USSR or the United States after 1 September 1958. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ See Contributions to Report on Nuclear Test Moratorium by the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, Atomic Energy Working Group Disarmament Panel, dated 3 March 1958. [Footnote is in the original.]

**296. Tabs A–E to Memorandum From Farley to John Foster Dulles
(Print Document 142)¹**

Washington, March 18, 1958

Tab A**NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION***PROPOSED POLICY*

Nuclear tests to be suspended for a period of three years, beginning January 1, 1959, or as soon thereafter as agreement is reached on the nature and location of control posts to monitor the agreement. The agreement would be automatically extended for an indefinite period at the end of the three years if agreement has been reached on the installation of a control system to ensure that no further fissionable material is produced for weapons purposes.

If such agreement has not been reached, all states would be free to resume testing. The United States would, at the outset, declare its intention to resume nuclear weapons testing in these circumstances, but that all such testing would be conducted underground in order that no further radioactive material be put in the atmosphere.

DISCUSSION

August 29 proposals—A 24-month suspension of testing which would become indefinite when the cut-off is in effect is provided for. However, this measure is conditional upon signing of a treaty covering all other elements of the proposals.

Proposed position

Although a test suspension after the next Pacific series would appear to be in our interests, since it would establish inspection posts behind the Iron Curtain, since it would tend to preserve the further lead in weapons technology we expect to achieve at HARDTACK, and since it would inhibit development of Nth power nuclear weapons capabilities, this proposal should be cast in the terms set forth in the President's 1958 State of the Union Message: "that we will always go the extra mile with anyone on earth if it will bring us nearer a genuine peace."

This proposal would prevent our being faced, in one or two years, with a UN resolution recommending cessation of tests supported by a majority of the membership, an eventuality which seems almost

¹ Source: Nuclear test suspension; cut-off of fissionable material production; establishment of surprise attack zones; preliminary measures relating to missile controls and outer space; reduction of manpower and conventional armaments. Secret. 9 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3–1858.

inevitable if we continue on the present course. It would also deprive the Soviets of an issue which has been skillfully used by them as a diversionary one in disarmament negotiations, serving, in effect, as a “put up or shut up” proposition.

We do not believe, however, that we should completely abandon the linkage between test suspension and other disarmament measures. Accordingly, we propose making continuation of the test ban beyond three years conditional upon agreement on the cut-off. The advantage of retaining this linkage is that it would put additional pressure on the USSR to accept further disarmament measures, since we anticipate that our position, which would be in line with those expressed by Japan and by Yugoslavia, would gain worldwide support.

The statement that testing, if it is resumed, would take place only underground would help us meet the health hazard argument against testing, since underground testing (which has been proved technically feasible) would not put any further radioactive material into the atmosphere.

Probable reaction of our allies

UK—could be persuaded to support and will view with relief any moves which will make the cut-off less imminent. The U.K. has recently reminded us of our Bermuda agreement to consult with them on any proposed changes in testing policy.

France—would probably oppose privately, but may be persuaded to support rather than be the only testing power. Also possible, in view of the fact that suspension would not take effect until January 1, 1959, that France may have completed its first test by then.

Canada—would support strongly.

Provision should be made in any agreement on testing for continued experimentation with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international auspices.

Tab B

CUT-OFF OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION

PROPOSED POLICY

A. Suspension of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons as soon as an effective inspection system is agreed and installed.

B. Agreement on schedule for transfer of materials from weapons to peaceful uses to go into effect simultaneously with A.

C. Immediate convening of a technical working group to design an inspection system capable of accomplishing this cut-off.

DISCUSSION

August 29 Proposals—Cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes is a key element of this proposal, but implementation was conditional upon acceptance of all other elements.

Proposed position

We believe that suspension of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes would be in our interest as an independent measure. We recognize that there is little likelihood, however, of Soviet acceptance of this proposal in these terms. Accordingly, in Tab E, we set forth the conventional measures we would be willing to undertake if this proposal were accepted.

This proposal should be advanced in two alternative forms (or a combination thereof):

A. Fissionable materials production plants would continue to operate, subject to international inspection to insure that the material produced was used only for peaceful purposes; or

B. Plants now producing fissionable materials would be shut down, thereby drastically simplifying the inspection problem. In the latter case, peaceful uses requirements would be supplied from existing stocks or by dismantling weapons.

Transfers of fissionable materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes would be made in agreed equitable ratios.

Probable reaction of our allies

All except the U.K. would strongly support, and the latter would probably tie acceptance of this proposal to amendment of the Atomic Energy Act and agreement to exchange of weapons information and materials between the U.S.-U.K.

Tab C*ESTABLISHMENT OF SURPRISE ATTACK ZONES**PROPOSED POLICY*

The following measures might be undertaken simultaneously or separately:

(1) The broad U.S.-Canada-USSR zone set forth in the August 29 proposals would be reaffirmed.

(2) A European zone extending from 50–35° east, with the smaller central European zone proposed by General Norstadt (but expressed in terms of geographic coordinates) as a fallback position, with or without an arctic zone similar to that proposed on August 29.

(3) Ground control posts (a la Bulganin) be established on a reciprocal basis at agreed installations (both within the U.S. and USSR and at their foreign bases—e.g., naval and air) with or without the zones described above.

DISCUSSION

August 29 proposals—Provide for the wider aerial inspection zone and a European zone only if the wider or Arctic zones are accepted. Elements were inseparable part of the entire proposal.

Proposed position—We believe that establishment of surprise attack zones apart from any other arms control measures would be in our interest. However, in view of the past Soviet insistence that surprise attack zones be linked to such other measures, we have, in TAB E, indicated what conventional reductions we would be prepared to undertake should the Soviet Union be prepared to accept any of the three inspection proposals described above. If the European NATO members should be unwilling to have a European zone standing by itself, we should propose that it be conditional on Soviet acceptance of either of the other surprise attack inspection measures proposed above.

Probable reaction of our allies—Would probably support.

Tab D

PRELIMINARY MEASURES RELATING TO MISSILE CONTROLS AND OUTER SPACE

PROPOSED POLICY

The following measures may be undertaken simultaneously or separately:

(a) Immediate initiation of an international working group to plan an inspection system to insure that the sending of objects through outer space is for peaceful purposes only.

(b) Joint cooperation in selected outer space projects, such as the development of an outer space platform, an interplanetary rocket and reconnaissance satellites, looking forward to centralization of all outer space activity in an international organization when the program envisioned in (a) goes in to effect.

(c) Advance notification and, if possible, inspection of all vehicles, military or otherwise, entering outer space (or, as a fall-back, all objects to be launched into orbit).

DISCUSSION

August 29 Proposals—Provided only for a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

Proposed position

The proposal under (a) is a reaffirmation of our suggestion that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only. The decision whether a cessation of missiles production could be implemented separately or whether it should be tied to other elements of disarmament should be left for the future.

We cannot take a final position on a proposal either to ban the production, testing and deployment of intercontinental and intermediate

range missiles or to ban testing of missiles alone, until further technical study of the problem has been made within the U.S. Government. This study should be designed to answer the major question:

Is it possible to devise an effective inspection system to police an agreement banning production and/or deployment of strategic missiles, taking into account present and prospective U.S. and USSR progress in developing and testing operational missiles traversing outer space?

We believe that conclusions as to the military effect of a cut-off of testing could, if our studies are pressed with sufficient vigour, be completed in time to include proposals on the subject in this package before it is discussed with the Soviet Union or our allies. A ban on testing may well prove to be the only feasible and inspectable method of preventing development of operational ICBM capabilities. It may also be found that the problem of missiles must be treated as a whole and that the valid distinction among missiles systems must be based upon range and not upon whether a particular missile is "air-breathing" or ballistic and capable of travelling outside the earth's atmosphere.

Probable reaction of our allies

U.K.—reluctant to accept principle that missiles would be controlled apart from other disarmament measures, but could be persuaded to support proposal cast in above terms which does not prejudice separability pending completion of study. France, Canada and other allies would probably support.

Tab E

*REDUCTION OF MANPOWER AND CONVENTIONAL
ARMAMENTS*

PROPOSED POLICY

(a) Provided any two of the three surprise attack measures proposed in Tab C are accepted;

(1) Reduction of U.S. and Soviet armed forces to the level of 2.2 million men, and to corresponding levels for the U.K. and France;

(2) Placement of designated quantities and types of modern conventional arms capable of serving as nuclear delivery systems (submarines, missiles, aircraft, etc.) in international arms depots.

(b) If the nuclear cut-off and wider inspection zone (U.S.–USSR–Canada–Europe) are accepted:

(1) Reduction to 1.8 million men for the U.S. and USSR, and comparable levels for other states (with a listing of the overseas bases which the U.S. would give up as a consequence of such a reduction).

(2) Placement of such amounts of important conventional armaments in international arms depots that the armaments retained will have a general agreed relationship to the armed forces remaining.

DISCUSSION

August 29 proposal—Present policy provides for a first stage reduction to 2.5 million men, and sets a lower limit of 1.5 on force levels (1.7 in August 29 proposals) ceilings, but makes them conditional on prior political settlements.

Proposed position—The figure of 2.2 million in the first recommendation was selected because it represented the same relation to existing force levels (2.5 million men) that 2.5 million represented at the time it was agreed, i.e., a reduction of 300,000 men. This reduction would probably be accomplished by the United States within the next few years in any event. Current Soviet force levels are estimated as being somewhere around 3.8 million. The establishment of ground control posts in the U.S. and USSR and at their foreign bases plus the mobile ground and aerial inspection of central Europe should ensure that these Soviet forces were substantially reduced, with some concomitant decline in the Soviet capability for limited aggression.

With regard to the second recommendation: the nuclear cut-off would justify us in accepting the more extensive conventional reductions, while the reductions—which would be of sufficient size to affect our overseas posture—might induce the USSR to accept the cut-off. We could not accept the conventional reductions without the nuclear cut-off or either one without adequate inspection, which would involve aerial and mobile ground inspection of the countries concerned.

This proposal no longer attaches political conditions to a more substantial reduction in conventional forces. It is believed that the advantages for the U.S. of a nuclear cut-off and unlimited inspection of the U.S. and USSR against surprise attack warrant agreement to such a reduction, which could have significant advantages in itself.

This proposal would make clear to the USSR under precisely what conditions the U.S. would accept lower force levels and more far-reaching conventional arms cuts in a way that would receive full support by world public opinion.

Probable reaction of our allies

U.K., France and Canada—would probably support.

Germany—may consider the second part of the proposal too drastic without reunification as a pre-condition, but probably could be persuaded to accept, in view of fact that reunification would no doubt be pre-condition to any reductions below 1.8 million and in view of fact that Soviets would probably reject the second proposal.

297. Memorandum for Eisenhower From Cutler¹

Washington, March 21, 1958

In our talk last night relative to the importance to the United States of developing “clean” nuclear weapons, I omitted in my advocacy one very important reason:

The ability to set off “clean” nuclear detonations without contaminating nuclear radioactive fallout would have tremendous significance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. By using greater explosive force than there has ever been known before, when free from contaminating radioactive fallout, land-locked waters can be channeled to desert areas, rock and earth obstructions to industrial and civil progress can be removed, mines can be more easily opened, oil can be freed from non-porous rock where it is now trapped, safe and deep-draught harbors can be developed, and large canals can be dug even through mountainous areas.

Robert Cutler
Special Assistant

¹ Source: Peaceful uses of “clean” nuclear weapons. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Cutler, General Robert L., 1958 (3).

298. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

March 23, 1958, 1:40 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT (IN AUGUSTA)

Sec said he would like to ask for quite a bit of the Pres’ time tomorrow afternoon. Sec said we have a briefing Cutler set up, but perhaps right after that. Sec said there were two things coming to a crisis. (1) There were considerable reports around with credibility that the Soviets after their present series of intensive tests are making a unilateral announcement of suspension of testing. Sec said he thought Pres should do something comparable e.g. announce that this series next summer will be the last during his Administration. Sec said this would only mean a couple

¹ Source: Possible announcement of nuclear testing; summit preparations. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

of years, you could not bind your successors, and would be dramatic. Sec said it should be announced tomorrow. Sec said he had seen Strauss yesterday and was seeing Strauss and Quarles this afternoon. Sec said if it was not done soon the Soviets would do it first and we would be aping them. Sec said it would be quite dramatic and would not cost much. Sec said McElroy if he was back from Cincinnati, or Quarles, Strauss, the Joint Chiefs and himself should talk to the Pres re this. (2) The Brit are pressing hard to do something on a Summit conference and are more or less prepared to concede in the preparatory talks a 5–5 basis. Sec said he was reluctant to do that. Sec asked Pres what he would think of the possibility of asking the NATO people to ask Macmillan to go to Moscow to explore the possibilities and report back. Sec said it might give Macmillan the prestige he needs; of course there was the risk that he is under great political pressures at home, personally he was the best of the lot. His talks might prove it was not worthwhile to have a Summit conference, although he might be reluctant to come to that conclusion.

Sec said he could not come much before 3 because he was giving a luncheon for Erhard, and then the briefing was at 3, but they could talk about these matters right after it. Sec said if Pres did decide to do this he should call Macmillan on the phone to tell him by 10 p.m. which would be 5 p.m. our time. Sec said he could not come in the morning as he was giving his major presentation on MSP before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

299. Memorandum of Conversation with the President¹

Washington, March 24, 1958

PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
General Twining, Chairman, JCS
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles
Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Admiral Strauss
General Cutler
General Goodpaster
Secretary McElroy

¹ Source: Proposal to suspend nuclear testing dropped; includes draft Presidential statement. Confidential; Personal and Private. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

We discussed my suggestion that the President, in connection with the opening of the present series of nuclear tests, might state that following this the United States did not intend to have further tests for a period of two years or substantially the duration of his Administration. I pointed out in this connection the estimate of the Intelligence community that Khrushchev might announce a voluntary suspension of testing within the next two or three days and that this would put us in an awkward position *vis-à-vis* world opinion. I pointed out that good world opinion was vital to our cause in the long run and over the broad aspects of the problem which involved more than winning a military war. I expounded the matter along the lines of the annexed draft, although I did not give the President a copy of this. Copies had, however, been given to Messrs. Strauss and Quarles. The proposal was strongly opposed by Strauss, Quarles and Twining and to some extent by McElroy.

The President raised the question as to whether the matter might be handled in a less formal way, indicating a more or less routine administrative announcement. However, there appeared to be difficulties also in that way, and in the end we let the proposal drop.

I was impressed particularly by a suggestion made by General Twining that our allies might feel that we have become frightened. I also felt that without adequate preparation Macmillan and Adenauer might perhaps be embarrassed and feel that we had played into the hands of their political enemies.

Admiral Strauss presented an alternative proposal in the form annexed. I expressed the opinion that this would not have much of a public relations aspect because it seemed to be a repetition of our whole "cut-off" theme. Also whereas it was within our own administrative discretion not to have another series of tests for two years or whatever time we determine we could not alter our agreed disarmament proposals as this would involve action without negotiation with our allies which would make it impossible for us to anticipate the possible Soviet action.

JFD

Attachment

Draft Presidential Statement

After reviewing and confirming plans for nuclear testing in the Pacific this summer, President Eisenhower announced today that he did not intend (for 2 years thereafter) to authorize any additional testing of nuclear weapons. The President believes that this policy is consistent with the security interests of the United States.

The President said that the Free World could take sober satisfaction in the contributions which the next test series will make to the defense

of the Free World and to the development of weapons with greatly reduced radioactive fall-out.

The President said that it has always been his policy only to authorize such nuclear tests as were indispensable to develop United States nuclear weapons systems for the defense of the Free World. With the completion of this summer's tests, very great and flexible nuclear deterrent strength will be available, and the President now sees no early need for further United States nuclear testing.

Research will continue in our laboratories, since there can be no certainty that the long impasse in disarmament negotiations will be ended and in view of the promising applications of nuclear explosions to peaceful uses. It is the President's understanding that if a resumption of U.S. testing is in the interest of the free world, much of any such testing could be conducted underground, so that no radiation would enter the atmosphere.

It is the President's hope that this public announcement of his intentions will improve opportunities for negotiation of an effective safeguarded international agreement to reduce the dangers of surprise attack and to control and reduce military force.

Extensive studies of radiation effects in the United States and other countries continue to support our position that testing adds but an insignificant amount to radiation from other sources and is not dangerous to humanity. The great peril to mankind arises not from nuclear tests but from the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and new means for their instant delivery through outer space. Safeguarded agreement to control this peril is a main objective of United States disarmament policy. In connection with such an agreement, the United States of course remains willing to enter into inspected international arrangements covering, among other things, the suspension of nuclear testing.

300. Draft Presidential Statement¹

Washington, March 24, 1958

The President of the United States today stated:

"As the American people well know, the danger to all the people everywhere as the result of a nuclear war has weighed upon my mind and my heart for many years.

¹ Source: Announces upcoming nuclear test at Eniwetok. Confidential. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

"These concerns caused me to propose the program of Atoms-for-Peace which has resulted in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The endorsement of that proposal by the governments of 80 nations testifies to the universal desire for peace and to find a means to reduce, hopefully to eliminate, the terrible threat of atomic warfare.

"The Government of the United States has maintained that agreements to ban the use of atomic weapons are illusory because such agreements are unenforceable if war should occur. It is also obvious that a suspension of testing of atomic weapons would not mean that stockpiles of weapons of existing types would not continue to increase by continued manufacture. I have pointed out again and again that, with our basic international political issues and difficulties unresolved, it is the existence of atomic arsenals and their enlargement in the possession of three nations, and their inevitable acquisition by other nations, which forces the world to live on a knife-edge of uncertainty as to the maintenance of peace or an atomic holocaust.

"I now propose to the governments having atomic weapons and the means of increasing their numbers, a new approach to peace.

"Let us agree for a trial period of, say, two years to cease all production of the weapons materials. U-235 and plutonium, without which atomic weapons cannot be made. Let us cease to produce these materials for any purpose, military or peaceful. This suspension can be easily inspected since these plants are large, not numerous, and can be kept under U.N. surveillance simply by seeing to it that they are not operated.

"Let us during this period supply the growing demand for fissionable materials to meet the energy needs of a power-hungry world by using our nuclear materials that are in existence,—beginning to use the materials in our weapons stockpiles.

"During the two-year breathing period, let our negotiators seek safe means of resuming production under controlled methods which will foreclose the possibility that any of it will be converted to weapons use.

"Coincident with this more significant agreement a collateral agreement can easily be reached on such subordinate questions as a concurrent suspension of testing, or testing with limited fall-out or testing for peaceful uses only under U.N. supervision or some combination of these."

Attachment

Semi-Final Draft Presidential Statement

Washington, March 24, 1958

SEMI-FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

(To Be Released After Reading at Press Conference)

The United States will demonstrate to other nations the progress our scientists have achieved in reducing radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions.

To this end, we are inviting the United Nations to select fifteen qualified scientists to observe at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds in the Pacific this summer a large nuclear explosion better than 90% free of radioactive fallout. We will also invite a representative group of U.S. and foreign news media representatives.

The U.S. has made a long and determined effort to eliminate radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions, in the belief that a breakthrough could be achieved toward basic advances in both the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy.

Such advances by American scientists could have tremendous significance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. When man is able to use the stupendous force of a greater radioactive free nuclear explosion, waters can be channeled to desert areas, mineral deposits can be more readily reached, safe and deep-draught harbors can be developed, and level highways and canals built through mountainous areas.

This scientific progress will also make it possible to limit the effect of nuclear weapons to strictly military targets, eliminating the fallout hazard to civilians outside the target area. We can all agree that an explosion of the magnitude which the observers will see at Eniwetok should be used only for peaceful purposes. However, until a safeguarded international agreement is reached to control and reduce nuclear weapons and other armaments, these scientific advances constitute forward steps toward protecting civilian non-combatants from the horrors of modern war.

The United States has always publicly announced its nuclear testing programs. Open shots for official observers and the press, including those from foreign countries, have been held. We hope that other nations will be willing to announce their nuclear tests, and, by opening significant tests to international observation, will reveal their nuclear progress to the peoples of the world.

(Details will be announced later by the responsible departments and agencies of our Government.)

301. Memorandum From Washburn (USIA) to Cutler¹

Washington, March 25, 1958

USIA feels very strongly that unless the President can state that the open shot at Eniwetok will be 90% fallout-free or better—and unless AEC is sure it will be at least that clean—it would be better for the United States *not* to hold the shot.

The President has already publicly used the figure of 96%.

If the 6 megaton shot is 95% clean, it will still yield 300,000 tons of fission contamination—or the equivalent of 15 Hiroshima bombs.

If it is 90% clean, it will still yield as much fallout contamination as 30 Hiroshimas.

Any “cleanliness” less than this, in our judgment, would be far more embarrassing to the President and to the United States than having to find some reason for not holding an open shot at this time.

Abbott Washburn

Acting Director

United States Information Agency

¹ Source: Eniwetok test. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Eniwetok Test, 1958.

302. Memorandum From Melbourne (OCB) to Cutler¹

Washington, March 25, 1958

SUBJECT

Draft Presidential Statement

The special group to revise the draft Presidential statement met at 9:30 today and consisted of Admiral Paul Foster, AEC, Mr. Abbott Washburn, USIA, Mr. George Spiegel, representing Mr. Berding of State, Mr. Bertram Saymon, representing Mr. Snyder of Defense, and Mr. Henry Loomis, representing Dr. Killian.

It was agreed to work from the AEC draft, making revisions, and the first such revision occurred in an amendment of the first sentence of

¹ Source: Discussion of draft Presidential statement. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Eniwetok Test, 1958.

paragraph 2 which was designed to give time to State to consult informally with Hammarskjöld, who is now in the Soviet Union for a few days, before having too precise a statement on a method of selection of scientists being made. This amendment of State was a completely firm position of that agency, since State considered that it had full responsibility for the method of working out the details of selection of scientists vis-a-vis the UN.

Mr. Washburn raised the point that Press Secretary Hagerty would certainly want to indicate the percentage of reduction in radioactive fallout that the pending test would show. He stated that the whole purpose and origin of the exercise had been to support the President's press statements on July 3 and that the elimination of the figure of 90% or better would not do this and if it were not possible to achieve such a figure in the test, the backfire from world opinion would be too great to justify having it.

Admiral Foster talked with Admiral Strauss and with a technical expert in the AEC. They affirmed doubts as to whether the percentage figure could be guaranteed in the particular test in view of complicated factors from ground radiation and said that while it was hoped this could be done, they felt it unwise to include a precise percentage figure. Admiral Strauss added further, as a clincher for continuing with the test shot, that he considered the President had made a definite decision to go ahead with the test and that the AEC did not wish the percentage figure in the draft.

The sentence included in the composite draft agreed last Saturday was inserted in the AEC draft as the second sentence of paragraph 5. There were other editorial changes which can be noted in the annotated draft attached.

One problem raised in the third sentence of paragraph 5 deserves attention, where the phrase "basic international differences are settled and..." was inserted by the AEC into a sentence contained in the earlier composite draft. AEC insisted that it remain, and, while State had no strong feelings, it concurred with the others that this gave too broad a scope to the context of this concrete announcement, which is simply devoted to nuclear testing. Further, the query was raised whether or not the inclusion of this statement would not give rise to widespread criticism that the U.S. was tending to raise a whole series of unspecified, international differences which had to be settled prior to any action in the nuclear testing field. Defense suggested a possible alternative which would have the sentence read, "Until basic international differences are settled enabling a safeguarded..." I would personally suggest deletion and would suggest that you may wish to try to obtain appropriate assent to its deletion.

It was agreed by all except USIA that in view of the situation described and by AEC standing on its basic text and the fact that the test will not be deferred, that there should not be a question and answer

sheet for background purposes. It was considered by others of the group that the statement would raise questions which would not be seemly for the President to attempt to answer. However, Mr. Washburn did feel that it would be advisable for the President to have some background questions and answers, and in the event you consider it useful, I am attaching a copy of a memorandum sent to me yesterday by USIA, which lists possible questions and answers from a USIA perspective. As a footnote to this aspect of the matter, when Admiral Foster talked with Admiral Strauss, he strongly urged the latter to get in touch with Press Secretary Hagerty and to have him agree that the President would refer questioners to the competent agencies concerned.

Mr. Washburn left before the meeting was over because of another meeting he was obliged to attend and, on leaving, indicated his dissatisfaction with the draft statement as it stood with no percentages indicated for fallout and with the decision that there be no attached question and answer sheet for the President. Earlier I had the occasion to tell him privately and in general terms of what you had given me as the substance of what had been discussed at the special White House meeting yesterday. He indicated that he thought USIA, with its worldwide information responsibilities, might be brought into the chain of developments if it was intended to take substantive policy actions on any crash basis. Mr. Washburn told me on the phone what he had said to you on meeting you after leaving the meeting and your request to him, with which he is complying.

Roy M. Melbourne
Acting Executive Officer

cc: Mr. Staats
Mr. Damon

303. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Lodge and John Foster Dulles¹

March 25, 1958, 2:51 p.m.

L said he sees the Pres is scheduled to make an announcement tomorrow re having observers for the Hardtack Operation. Of course the Sec knows more than L does but from where he sits he thinks we

¹ Source: Public relations considerations to nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

are likely to get scooped. He thinks the Russians will come out unilaterally re suspension of testing and L thinks we should consider saying we will stop after the next test. Why is it being done so far ahead when it is not until August? Also make it definite who the observers are. L thinks it should be the radiation comm. The Sec said Herter is handling it through OCB. L will talk with him. The Sec told re working hard over the weekend with Defense and AEC on suspension but finally they agreed not to do it. The Sec went into a discourse about how in the long run we look militaristic though some isolated cases and their decisions are right. If we just had to win a war that would be easy but it's the diplomatic and economic arenas where we might lose out. Then L, after agreeing, asked if the Sec has thought of asking the Pres to ask to Soviets to agree on an inspection system. L added he is afraid it is going to be bad from a PR standpoint.

304. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 28, 1958

SUBJECT

Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Nuclear Testing

REFERENCE

NSC Action No. 1840-c

The Report on the subject,² called for by NSC Action No. 1840-c-(1), has been prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Panel established by the reference NSC Action (consisting of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency), and will be presented orally at the National Security Council meeting on Thursday, April 3, 1958.

¹ Source: Appendices A-E to Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group (Bethe Report) (print Document 147). Technical feasibility of cessation of nuclear testing; Appendices B, D, and E not declassified (25 pp.). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Appendix A is Secret. 64 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament—Bethe Report.

² Report enclosed with this copy. *Special security precautions should be observed in the handling of the enclosures, and access to them should be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.* [Footnote is in the original.]

Because of the sensitivity of this Report, copies have been circulated only to those agencies represented on the NSC Ad Hoc Panel and to the Department of State. A copy of the Report is available, in the office of the Executive Secretary, NSC, for reference by other regular participant members of the Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Enclosure

Memorandum From Killian to Gray

Washington, March 28, 1958

SUBJECT

Transmittal of Report

In accordance with Action No. 1840 of the National Security Council, as approved by the President on January 9, 1958, I submit herewith a report of the Ad Hoc Working Group devoted to the following three studies in the area of nuclear testing:

“(a) A study of the losses to the United States consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates.

“(b) A symmetrical study of the losses to the USSR that would accrue from cessation of nuclear testing, using the same hypothetical dates.

“(c) A study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension, including the outlines of a surveillance and inspection system.”

The Ad Hoc Working Group submitting this report is made up of representatives nominated by the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Ad Hoc Working Group, in preparing this report, limited itself to the technical feasibility of monitoring nuclear tests and to the technical losses that would result to the U.S. and the U. S. S. R. from a cessation of tests. Although the Group considered some of the military implications of these technical losses to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a complete evaluation of these military implications would have required extensive studies by the Department of Defense and these are not yet

available. It excluded from its consideration any question of policy with respect to whether there should be a suspension of nuclear tests.

J.R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman

Attachment

Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group

Washington, March 27, 1958

*REPORT OF NSC AD HOC WORKING GROUP
ON THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF
A CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING*

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Appendix B. Detection of High Altitude Nuclear Tests, report by Hans A. Bethe

Appendix C. Concealment and Detection of Nuclear Tests Underground, report by Harold Brown and Hans A. Bethe

Appendix D. Chart of Present and Future U.S. Nuclear Warhead Developments, report by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Appendix E. Impact of a September 1958 Nuclear Test Moratorium on Soviet Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, report by the Central Intelligence Agency

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Dear Dr. Killian:

We submit herewith for transmittal to the National Security Council the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing established in accordance with NSC Action 1840 *c*. The report is concurred in by all members of the Working Group which included representation from the President's Science Advisory Committee, Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency.

Hans Bethe, Cornell University

Chairman

Harold Brown, University of California Radiation Laboratory

Maj. Gen. Richard Coiner, USAF

Herbert Loper, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Carson Mark, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Doyle Northrup, AFOAT-1, USAF

Herbert Scoville, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency

Roderick Spence, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Brig. Gen. Alfred Starbird, Atomic Energy Commission

Col. Lester Woodward, USAF

Herbert York, University of California Radiation Laboratory and
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense

Appendix A

Washington, March 18, 1958

REPORT ON THE DETECTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Prepared for Inclusion in the Report of the
AD HOC PANEL ON NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATION
for the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ABSTRACT

PRESENT AFOAT-1 SYSTEM

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- Acoustic Net
- Seismic Net
- Electromagnetic Net
- Air Sampling
- Capability

PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
FOR THE DETECTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS*ABSTRACT*

A long range detection system consisting of seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic and air sampling components is presently deployed around the USSR. This system can detect and identify nuclear tests of 10 KT or larger conducted within the USSR and China as shallow sub-surface, surface or air bursts up to 50,000 ft with an estimated reliability of 90–100 per cent. Nuclear tests as small as 3 KT in the same environments can be detected and identified with a reliability of 30 per cent. Underground explosions of 10 KT or larger can be detected with a certainty of 90–100 per cent but cannot be identified as nuclear explosions. Underwater explosions of 20 KT or larger conducted in deep ocean areas of the Northern Hemisphere and some parts of the Southern Hemisphere can be detected with 90–100 per cent certainty and probably identified as an explosion rather than an earthquake. Since the present system was designed to detect tests conducted in the USSR, its capabilities for tests outside the USSR are limited. Nuclear tests as large as a few hundred kilotons and possibly even one megaton might be missed if conducted in areas remote from the present detection network.

A system of improved capability for the detection of nuclear tests possibly conducted on a clandestine basis in the USSR or China is described. This system would consist of about 70 geophysical stations in the USSR and China plus an aerial sampling network involving overflight of critical areas as required to intercept radioactive clouds for the purpose of proving the nuclear nature of the explosion. It is estimated that this system could detect and identify with 90–100 per cent certainty nuclear tests of 1 KT or larger conducted as shallow sub-surface, surface or air bursts up to 50,000 ft within the USSR and China. Underground explosions of 1 KT or larger in the USSR and China could be detected with a certainty of 90–100 per cent but not identified as nuclear in nature. Identification of such underground disturbances may be possible through the use of on-the-spot inspection teams investigating about 300 unidentified sub-surface disturbances of 1 KT or larger per year in the USSR and China. If inspection only of those disturbances of 5 KT or larger is contemplated, only 35 events per year would require investigation.

A system for the detection and identification of nuclear tests in areas of the world remote from the present detection system is described. This system would consist of about 30 geophysical stations located principally in the Southern Hemisphere plus an aerial sampling network necessary to intercept radioactive clouds to prove the nuclear

nature of the explosion. It is estimated that this system could detect and identify with 90–100 per cent certainty nuclear tests of 20 KT or larger conducted as shallow sub-surface, surface or air bursts up to 50,000 ft in remote areas of the world. Underground explosions of 20 KT or larger in remote parts of the world could be detected with a certainty of 90–100 per cent but not identified as nuclear in nature. Identification of such underground disturbances may be possible through the use of inspection teams investigating about 100 suspected test areas per year in remote regions of the world. Underwater explosions of 20 KT or larger anywhere in the world could be reliably detected and probably identified as explosions rather than earthquakes.

PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR THE DETECTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

INTRODUCTION: This report describes the present system for long range detection and identification of nuclear tests in the USSR including an evaluation of its capabilities and limitations. The results of a study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension is presented, including the outline of a surveillance and inspection system for detecting and identifying, if possible, nuclear tests conducted in the USSR, China and in remote areas of the world.

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE AFOAT-1 LONG RANGE DETECTION SYSTEM:

a. *General.* The present Long Range Detection System is deployed around the USSR and consists of four major components, i.e., acoustic, seismic, electromagnetic and nuclear. The purpose of this system is to determine the fact of an explosion, time, location, height of burst and yield, and finally from the analysis of the nuclear debris to reconstruct, insofar as possible, the detailed characteristics of the nuclear device tested.

Scientific observation posts for each of the four techniques are located as close as possible to the USSR and are operated by units of the Army, Navy and Air Force as appropriate. Preliminary analysis of the radioactive debris is accomplished in field radiochemical laboratories and more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the samples is carried out in a central laboratory in California, all operated by AFOAT-1. In addition, highly specialized measurements are made by laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission, civilian contractors and university laboratories in the U.S. Collection and preliminary evaluation of data from all these laboratories are effected by AFOAT-1 analysts assisted by special studies at RAND Corporation. Finally, all data and evaluations are reviewed by the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Committee, Professor Hans A. Bethe, Chairman, a committee which is responsible jointly to the Division of Military Application, AEC, and to AFOAT-1.

The final conclusions are reported as intelligence to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, where the information is collated with intelligence from all other sources, and National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet nuclear capability are prepared.

A limited cooperation between AFOAT-1 and the United Kingdom has been in progress for a number of years. Geophysical stations are operated by the British Ministry of Defense. Measurements from these stations are reported by cable directly to headquarters, AFOAT-1. Radiochemical data obtained on samples of Soviet weapon debris are exchanged with the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell under Sir John Cockroft and the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston under Sir William Penney.

b. *The Acoustic Component.* The acoustic element of the Long Range Detection System consists of 10 acoustic stations surrounding the USSR as shown in Figure 1. One of these stations is omitted from the figure for security reasons. Eight of these acoustic stations are operated by the U.S. Army Signal Corps from a headquarters at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. These stations are located in Japan (2), Philippine Islands, Turkey, Eritrea, Germany, Greenland and Alaska. Two acoustic stations are operated by the United Kingdom. In addition to the permanent net stations, data are frequently obtained from experimental stations in San Diego, Washington, D. C. and Ft. Monmouth, N. J.

Each acoustic station consists of four condenser microphones, one located at each corner of a 6- to 10-mile square. Although only three microphones are necessary to establish the azimuth and apparent velocity of the incoming acoustic wave, four are used to provide a factor of safety for instrument malfunction and to improve the precision of measurement. Time sequence of arrival of the acoustic wave at individual microphones provides a measure of the azimuth and apparent velocity. The microphones are coupled to the atmosphere through a pipe array 1000 ft in length with openings every five feet throughout the length. This coupling device greatly reduces the background noise from wind turbulence (about a factor of 10) and permits identification of acoustic waves having pressure amplitudes as low as 0.1 dyne/cm^2 under favorable conditions. Each microphone is connected by wire lines to a central recording station where variations in atmospheric pressure in the subsonic frequency range from approximately 1.0 to 0.01 cps are amplified and recorded on Esterline-Angus pen recorders. Service personnel, trained especially for the purpose, continuously scan the records on a 24-hour basis. When signal characteristics meet the criteria determined by AFOAT-1 to be indicative of a large explosion, the station personnel itemize the principal signal characteristics in a coded message to the net headquarters at Ft. Monmouth, N. J. There the data are checked, correlated with other acoustic data, and transmitted to

AFOAT-1 for further evaluation and correlation with data from other elements of the Atomic Energy Detection System.

Equipment of the same type has been supplied to the British for their operations. In a similar way they identify significant signals and send the signal characteristics by message through headquarters, AFOAT-1, to the net headquarters at Ft. Monmouth for correlation with U.S. data.

The acoustic data are used to determine the time of burst to about ± 5 to 10 minutes, the location of burst within a radius of about 100 miles, and the yield to about \pm a factor of 2 for small shots and to about ± 15 to 20 per cent on large yield tests.

c. *The Seismic Component.* The seismic component is made up of eight surveillance stations under the operational control of AFOAT-1. These stations are located in Spain, Turkey, Korea, Alaska, Australia and three in the U.S. (See Figure 2.) In addition, one seismic station with similar equipment is operated by the U.K.

Each seismic station is composed of an array of four concrete piers poured on solid rock and deployed when possible at equal spacing along a two-mile line. Each pier accommodates a vertical sesimometer and one of the piers has, in addition, two horizontal instruments oriented at 90° with each other to permit recording of the three components of earth's motion on that pier. In those cases where a linear array is possible, the axis of the array is oriented to favor reception of a signal from the USSR and to discriminate against known sources of microseisms. The individual seismometers are connected through wire lines several miles in length to a central recording station. Seismic waves from a distant source are refracted upward from the mantle to the seismometers at an angle which is nearly vertical. In-phase signals are thus produced on all four seismometers which result in a gain in amplitude proportional to the square root of the number of seismometers. Since microseismic disturbances, in general, travel horizontally from local sources to the station, the response of the seismometers to noise is uncorrelated. Earth motion of about 1–2 millimicrons can be detected under favorable background conditions.

At the central recording station the signals from individual seismometers are amplified and recorded on 35-mm film, together with standard time signals from WWV or WWVH as appropriate. The response characteristics of the seismographs favor the reception of seismic disturbances in the period range of 0.5 to 1.0 seconds where the maximum energy in the earth from atomic explosions is found. Background noise at other frequencies is excluded and as a result the signal-to-noise level at the station is increased.

The film at each of the seismic stations is developed three times during each 24-hour period and scanned by field personnel for evidence

of signal characteristics meeting certain criteria of significance. When, in the opinion of the team personnel, these criteria have been met, the principal characteristics of the signal of interest are transmitted by TWX to AFOAT-1 in Washington, D. C. A central analysis station at Laramie, Wyoming but programmed to be located at headquarters, AFOAT-1, presently receives all of the incoming messages and makes a careful study of the significance of these reports.

From the seismic data AFOAT-1 can ascertain the time of explosion to the nearest $1/2$ second, and estimate to the nearest $1/10$ th second; can determine the location to the nearest 2-5 miles; and can obtain a rough estimate of yield (to an order of magnitude). Yield determinations by seismic methods are very uncertain since the coupling between the explosion and the earth is affected both by height of burst and the geological formations at ground zero. Neither of these factors is known in the case of an explosion in the USSR.

d. *The Electromagnetic Component.* The Long Range Detection System presently contains eight electromagnetic stations located in Minnesota, Washington State, Alaska (2), Japan, Pakistan, Turkey and Germany. Installation of two additional stations is in progress. These stations, located as shown in Figure 3, are under the operational control of AFOAT-1.

The equipment at each station is energized by two antennas: one a vertical whip and the other a pair of crossed loops. The signal from the crossed loops passes through amplifiers and records on a cathode ray oscilloscope. This record permits determination of the azimuth of the incoming signal. The energy from the vertical whip is utilized to remove the 180° ambiguity in determination of azimuth from the crossed loop circuits described above. The vertical whip also energizes the equipment for recording waveform and energy content of the pulse.

The direction finding circuits operate on a frequency of 10 kc with a 2 kc pass band. The equipment for recording waveform and energy content utilizes four channels. The waveform itself is recorded in a wide band from 3 kc to 300 kc and, in addition, three other narrow bands (2 kc) centered on 20 kc, 75 kc and 5 mc are recorded for sampling the spectrum of energy radiated by the explosion. The waveform is recorded on a 500 microsecond sweep which is triggered by the initial signal from the vertical whip and provided with a suitable delay circuit to permit recording of the entire waveform from start to finish.

The channels at 20 kc, 75 kc and 5 mc have been added in the hope that the distribution of energy from the bomb will be different from lightning flashes. The five channels described, together with a WWV channel for timing purposes, are all recorded on 35-mm film on a

24-hour basis. Signal strengths as low as 30 millivolts/meter are detectable under favorable conditions.

The electromagnetic system suffers from a defect of recording millions of lightning flashes which look very similar to the pulse transmitted from a nuclear explosion. Therefore, the individual station cannot, on its own, determine whether the recordings have significance with respect to a suspected nuclear explosion. For that reason the film is transmitted to the analysis center at AFOAT-1 where correlation studies are made to determine the existence of multi-station time and azimuth coincidences. The usual procedure is to search that part of the electromagnetic film covering a time period considered to have been significant from reports of the other geophysical systems or from the date and time established by measurements on fresh debris from the nuclear system.

Signal significance is determined by three methods: coincidence in times of arrival, consistency of intersections of azimuth, and compatibility of recorded signal strength at widely separated stations, assuming a single source and applying known attenuation factors. These methods, however, are applicable only after some method of sorting has been accomplished. At present, this sorting depends upon establishing a time of the explosion by acoustic, seismic or nuclear means.

The electromagnetic system has produced time and azimuth, multi-station coincidences for all of the large Soviet tests as well as several smaller tests, and, of course, it has been checked for accuracy on U.S. tests. The time obtained by electromagnetic data can be determined to 50 milliseconds and estimated to 20 milliseconds. The azimuth can be determined to ± 3 degrees.

Recent experience, on one small Soviet test, indicates the possibility of detection of relatively small tests in the USSR which, if conducted on the surface, produce large electromagnetic signals. If this experience on one Soviet test can be duplicated on all small surface tests, an important detection capability for small tests may be realized. At present, however, the electromagnetic component of the Long Range Detection System does not report independently the detection of a nuclear test in the USSR. It is capable only of response to query.

An important contribution of the electromagnetic time, however, is that when combined with seismic time it is used to determine the height of burst of a nuclear test. The electromagnetic time, of course, corresponds to the exact detonation time of the device and the seismic time gives a reasonably accurate time at which the shock wave from the device strikes the earth. Since there is available a "time-distance curve" on the shock wave transmission through the air from the burst to the ground, it is possible to utilize this curve to determine the height of burst.

e. *The Nuclear Component.* A system for collecting radioactive debris from a test utilizes airborne filters for removing the particulate debris from the air along the flight tracks of the aircraft. Specially designed air filters have been mounted on WB/50 aircraft operated by the Air Weather Service out of bases in Japan, Alaska and Burtonwood, England. WB/50 aircraft fly tracks northeast and southwest out of Japan, north and southwest out of Alaska and to any predesignated point in Europe or the Middle East out of Burtonwood, England. (See Figure 4.) The flight tracks from Japanese and Alaskan bases are planned to cover on a once-each-24-hour basis all air mass trajectories coming out of the USSR between 30° N and 85° N. The aircraft usually fly at 10,000 feet outbound and about from 20,000 to 30,000 feet on the return track so that two altitudes are covered during each flight.

Instantaneous radiation detectors mounted behind the filter papers indicate to the pilot when the filter paper is collecting unusual amounts of radioactive debris. This information is radioed back to the base and used for vectoring special missions to intercept "hot" parts of the atomic cloud and is used as a guide to enable the aircraft to orbit within the cloud while sampling.

The airborne filters are analyzed in a field laboratory (Japan and Alaska) by physical and chemical methods to determine whether or not fresh radioactive debris has been encountered on the flight. Although in most instances early warning by geophysical techniques alerts the air crews to the possibility of intercepting debris, in five cases the initial and only detection of Soviet tests has been by the radiochemical analysis of filter papers. The field laboratories at operational bases in Japan and Alaska also conduct comprehensive radio-chemical analyses of the filters, concentrating mostly on short-lived isotopes for dating and other purposes, and thus provide information which would not be obtainable by the time the filters had been sent back to the central laboratory in Sacramento, California.

Reports of unusual amounts of radioactive debris, or the detection of fresh debris together with the preliminary reports on chemical analysis of short-lived isotopes, are submitted by the field laboratories through priority dispatch to the headquarters, AFOAT-1, Washington, D.C. All significant filter papers are transmitted to the central laboratory at McClellan Air Force Base, where a decision is made with respect to the distribution of samples among the laboratories in the U.S. which contribute to various phases of the analysis program, as well as to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston, England. Laboratories participating are the McClellan Central Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, and Tracerlab, Inc. In certain cases, the Los Alamos Scientific

Laboratory, University of California Radiation Laboratory at Livermore and the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory perform special analyses.

These laboratories make quantitative mass spectrometric studies, alpha pulse analyses, activation studies and chemical identifications of induced activities and isotopes of the transuranium elements and fission products over a period of one to three months after the collection of the debris. All of these data are forwarded by letter report to AFOAT-1 where the final evaluation is carried out. Data received from all of these laboratories are also transmitted to the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Committee and are reviewed at periodic meetings. AFOAT-1 and the Bethe Committee review and discuss conclusions concerning the type of nuclear reactions, materials and geometry utilized by the Soviets in each specific test.

2. EXISTING CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS:

The Long Range Detection System of AFOAT-1 was primarily designed to detect and identify surface bursts or air bursts and sub-surface bursts detonated within the boundaries of the USSR. In considering its capabilities and limitations as a system for monitoring an international agreement on nuclear test limitations, the following four environments for possible test detonations within the USSR have been considered: surface or air bursts below 50,000 feet; sub-surface tests; high altitude tests; and surface or air bursts in remote geographical locations.

a. *Surface or Air Bursts below 50 Kilofeet within the USSR.* To date 44 nuclear tests have been identified within the USSR which are believed to have been between the surface and 50 kft and two which may have been higher than 50 kft. The remaining two Soviet tests were known to be sub-surface, probably underwater. Table I shows the part played by each component of the Long Range Detection System in identifying the 48 Soviet tests. It is noteworthy that five of these tests were picked up by nuclear techniques only. No geophysical response was obtained. Of interest to the study of detection capability, four of the tests did not produce nuclear debris which was detectable. All four of the components of the system seemed to be relatively successful in tests of 500 KT or higher. The absence of electromagnetic detection of some of the tests does not indicate necessarily a low capability but rather that it consisted of only one station overseas and three stations in the U.S. prior to 1957 and no stations prior to 1954. Finally, the table shows a variety of combinations of the techniques which produced successful detection on different Soviet tests, thus demonstrating the value of including all four components in the system.

Table I
AFOAT-1 Identification of USSR Tests

Component	Yield			
	3.5–8 KT	10–45 KT	60–500 KT	750–4300 KT
N	<20, <20, <5, 8, 8			
A		30, 45		
AS		20, 20		
AN	3.5, 4, 4, 7, 8	15, <20, 20, 25, 25, 25, 25, 30, 30	70, 100	
EN	<5			
AEN	7	15	70	
ASN		25	90, 300, 500	~1000
ASEN		30	60, 90, 100, 200	750, ~1000, 1300, 1700, 2200, 2700, ~3000, 3200, 4300

A – Acoustic

S – Seismic

E – Electromagnetic

N – Nuclear

The *electromagnetic technique* does not contribute, at present, to detection without the assistance of one or more of the other techniques. It does show considerable promise for the detection of surface bursts of relatively low yield, but this promise requires further exploration before any definite statements can be made. Reference to Table I shows a detection capability for tests in the USSR as low as 5 KT. However, in general, it is believed that a lower limit of reliable detection for surface bursts is more like 25 KT at ranges of 4000–5000 kilometers. A reduction in detectability is observed at burst heights of 8000–10,000 feet. Pending completion of developments of machine sorting techniques and a discriminator between bomb pulses and lightning pulses, the electromagnetic system may not contribute greatly to detection of very low yield tests within the USSR.

Except for subsurface tests, the *seismic technique* is applicable principally to surface or low air bursts of 100–150 KT or larger. One surface test of 25 KT in the USSR was detected, but this is the exception and

not the rule. In general, we record about 300 seismic disturbances per year in the USSR above 100 KT, of which about 75% are identified as earthquakes, leaving about 75 disturbances which cannot be identified either as man-made or natural.

The problem of detecting and identifying clandestine tests in the environment (surface to 50 kilofeet in the USSR) under discussion will depend principally upon the success of the combined nuclear and acoustic components of the Long Range Detection System. For the purpose of studying the effect of these two techniques, AFOAT-1 detection data on 25 Soviet tests and 66 U.S. tests in the range of 3.5 to 50 KT were selected. U.S. data are fairly well spread out through all of the seasons. Soviet data does not include many tests in the summer and spring.

Acoustic detection at individual stations has a marked diurnal variation due to the fact that noise levels at night are normally lower by a factor of 2 or more than they are in the daytime. A marked seasonal variation is noted in the detection of acoustic waves, since stratosphere wind patterns in the winter time are most favorable for transmission toward the east and, conversely, stratosphere wind patterns in the summer favor transmission toward the west. Stations to the north or south in general show relatively smaller seasonal effects than do east-west stations. Normally, the stratosphere winds permit longer ranges of detection in summer and winter than in the spring and fall.

Further complicating the acoustic picture is the fact that the amplitude of pressure waves from an explosion varies greatly due to fluctuations in winds and temperatures encountered in the atmosphere at altitudes above the known meteorology. Pressure amplitudes are only very qualitatively related to yield.

In estimating the capabilities of the acoustic net, it has been necessary to rely mainly on actual results obtained from U.S. and Russian nuclear tests. These estimates cannot be precise but they are believed to be as realistic as it is possible to make them at present. Four ranges of detectability were established, as follows: excellent—90 to 100%; good—60 to 90%; fair—30 to 60%; poor—0 to 30%. The result of the study is shown in Table II.

Table II
Acoustic Detection* Capability for Low Yield Air or
Tower Nuclear Tests

Detection Coefficient	Based on USSR Test Results		Based on U.S. Test Results		Overall (KT)
	Winter-Summer (KT)	Spring-Fall (KT)	Winter-Summer (KT)	Spring-Fall (KT)	
Excellent (90 – 100%)	≥15	≥20	≥10	≥15	≥15
Good (60 – 90%)	5–14	10–19	3–9	10–14	10–14
Fair (30 – 60%)	1–4	5–9	1–2	3–9	5–9
Poor (0 – 30%)	<1	<5	<1	<3	<5

* Detection but not identification as nuclear in nature. [Footnote is in the original.]

The last column of Table II shows a conservative overall acoustic detection capability obtained by averaging the winter/summer and spring/fall results obtained from USSR and U.S. tests.

Nuclear debris from relatively small yield low altitude shots within the USSR seems to be readily detectable. Shots of the order of 3–10 KT can be expected to produce substantial clouds of debris if detonated at or near the surface and this debris will not rise much above the 10,000 to 20,000 ft levels routinely patrolled by aircraft out of Japan and Alaska. However, when the yield increases to substantial fractions of a megaton or higher, so much of the debris is deposited in the stratosphere that collections on routine patrols at 10,000 to 20,000 feet are extremely unsatisfactory. From the standpoint of detection of the fact of a nuclear burst, however, it is believed that most very large tests will leave enough debris in the troposphere to permit the fact of fresh debris to be ascertained for the high yield tests.

Clandestine tests of low yield devices conducted at altitudes of 20,000 or 30,000 feet will probably produce debris which will pass over the top of surveillance flights at 20,000 feet. This actually occurred on the U.S. "HA" shot (3 KT) where debris was picked up over Washington at 40,000 feet while no debris was obtained from that same shot on flights between Bermuda and Washington at 10,000 and 20,000 feet. Since altitudes above 20,000 feet are not routinely patrolled but are searched by special high altitude aircraft only upon warning from the geophysical system, it is quite possible that low yield shots fired at

altitudes above 20,000 feet will not be detected by nuclear techniques. Figure 5 is a graphic portrayal of the situation that will occur in the case of low yield tests in the environment under discussion.

Debris collection seems to be at its greatest disadvantage in the summer time. From fall through winter and spring collection activities are at their best. It is, therefore, believed that the air sampling technique will substantially add to the overall system capability but it is difficult to make a quantitative assessment. The overall detection capability for the system under the environment being discussed must, therefore, rely to a certain extent on the judgment as to what size nuclear cloud could escape routine sampling flights from 30° N to 85° N during short periods when interruptions of flight schedules occur and to what extent clouds from small shots would overpass routine flight lines.

Taking everything into consideration, it is believed that for tests in the USSR between the surface and 50,000 feet there will be a substantial contribution to the acoustic component by the nuclear detection component. A combined acoustic and nuclear detection capability, which is believed to be the determining factor in the low yield range, is shown in Table III.

Table III
Overall Detection and Identification Capability for Airbursts
between the Surface and 50,000 feet

Detection Coefficient	Overall Acoustic (KT)	Acoustic plus Nuclear (KT)
Excellent (90–100%)	≥15	≥10
Good (60–90%)	10–14	5–10
Fair (30–60%)	5–9	3–5
Poor (0–30%)	<5	<3

The limited capability for seismic and electromagnetic techniques to contribute in the low yield air burst range does not permit any quantitative evaluation of the small contributions which they may make. Both techniques are limited, however, in any case to small tests conducted on or near the surface as indicated above and to some large yield tests at moderate heights of burst. There is the possibility mentioned in paragraph 1c of some assistance from the electromagnetic component on surface or low air bursts.

b. *Subsurface Tests.* It is assumed that a clandestine subsurface test by the USSR will be conducted in such a way that no radioactive debris will be cast into the atmosphere, that the shot will be sufficiently tamped to prevent any energy appearing in acoustic waves and, of course, that there will be no electromagnetic radiation. The seismic component of the Long Range Detection System will then be the sole component responsible for the detection of such a test.

The seismic system is limited to the determination that a large subsurface disturbance has occurred. There is no unique way of identifying with certainty the signature of an underground nuclear explosion. At long range detection distances the individual characteristics of the source of disturbance are very difficult to detect, since the character of the medium through which the wave is propagated plays a predominant part in determining the character of the recorded signal. The problem is considerably simplified, however, by the existence of several useful, though not unique indicators of earthquakes or blasts.

For example, many large earthquakes persist for many minutes or hours whereas the record from a small underground blast has a maximum duration of a few seconds to a few minutes. Another useful indicator is the fact that all subsurface blasts produce a compressional first wave, while many earthquakes produce alternate compressional and dilational first waves as one proceeds around the source with a seismic detector. Thus, a dilational first wave is an almost certain indicator of an earthquake. The usefulness of this indicator, however, is limited to the large shots where the first wave can be clearly distinguished from the background fluctuations due to microseismic disturbance. In the yield range below 5 KT, it is doubtful if this criterion would be of much use at long ranges. A few earthquakes occur so far below the surface that the seismograms clearly indicate earthquake origin. However, a very large percentage of earthquakes occur at shallow depths (20 kilometers) and do not give any indication that would be useful in separating them from blasts. Most earthquakes produce large clearly identifiable shear waves, whereas most explosions do not produce shear waves. However, there are earthquakes on record where no detectable shear wave was recorded at long range detection distances and there are blasts on record, for example, Rainier, Wigwam and many of the small Nevada shots that have produced noticeable shear waves. Finally, repeated blasts at the same underground location will produce almost identical wave shapes at the same long range detection station. This might be useful in the event that repeated use were made of the same location for clandestine tests. It is concluded, therefore, that the seismic surveillance for underground tests might detect the presence of an underground explosion but would not uniquely identify the source as nuclear in origin.

The ability to detect underground explosions by seismic means has been carefully studied. The limitation in pushing to smaller and smaller yields appears to reside principally in noise generated by storms and man-made disturbances in the vicinity of the stations. A general deterioration of capability for the entire net in the wintertime is observed because of the storm activity in the Northern Hemisphere. There are also short periods of relatively poor capability during summertime windstorms. Natural earthquakes and, occasionally, volcanic activity produce additional background noise which reduces capability for the detection of small yield

underground tests. Large earthquakes produce disturbances which persist for many hours and are often accompanied by aftershocks on several succeeding days which individually persist for many minutes. Natural seismicity of the earth varies considerably from one point to another within the USSR. (See Figure 9.) Natural seismicity is, in general, higher to the south near the Himalayas and along the eastern coast.

The transmission characteristics of the earth for seismic waves varies considerably with the distance between the source and the seismic observatory. (See Figure 6.) It will be noted that a distinct loss of sensitivity occurs at distances between 500 and 1100 miles from the source. A second band of loss in sensitivity occurs between 2000 and 2700 miles from the source. Since all the stations of the existing network are beyond 1000 miles from known Soviet test sites, the seismic detection capability for the existing system is not affected by insensitivity in this range. However, the region of loss in sensitivity at 2000–2700 miles does affect the seismic capability for detecting low yield subsurface shots with the existing network of stations. The reason for the loss in sensitivity in the range of 2000 to 2700 miles is believed to result from a rapid change in the physical characteristics of the mantle at approximately 1200 kilometers depth which results in a dispersion of seismic energy at the surface for this particular range from the source.

The effect of the transmission characteristics of seismic waves as a function of distance on detection by existing stations is shown in a map of the USSR in Figure 7. The areas of poor detection for surface tests resulting from this effect are cross hatched. Subsurface bursts in these areas will also be the most difficult to detect with the present network. A reasonable estimate of yield for subsurface shots which would be detected in these areas is obtained by dividing the yield for surface tests by a factor of 25 for summertime conditions and by 12-1/2 for wintertime. Thus, general statements about seismic detection capability cannot be applied uniformly to the entire Soviet-dominated area. However, for tests within approximately 90–95% of the area some general estimate can be made. Taking all the above factors into consideration, it is believed that the present seismic detection capability is as indicated in Table IV. The capability indicated in Table IV applies to the clear areas in Figure 7. In the cross hatched areas, however, subsurface tests of 10–15 KT might escape detection by the present network.

Table IV

Seismic Detection* Capability for Low Yield Subsurface Nuclear Tests

Detection Coefficient		YIELD (KT)	
		Summer	Winter
Excellent	90–100%	4	8
Good	60–90%	3	6
Fair	30–60%	2	4
Poor	0–30%	1	2

* Detection but not identification as nuclear in nature. [Footnote is in the original.]

c. High Altitude Tests. The Long Range Detection System has no evidence to date that the Soviets have tested a nuclear weapon at extremely high altitudes. U.S. tests conducted so far have been limited to altitudes below 50,000 feet (HA, 37,000 ft). Theoretical investigations of the effects of very high altitude tests (100,000 to 250,000 ft) have been made by Professor Hans A. Bethe and others in recent months. These studies indicate many very interesting and unusual phenomena which will be discussed in detail by Professor Bethe in another paper.

Of the four existing detection techniques, only the acoustic and electromagnetic techniques appear to offer promise for the detection of very high altitude tests and these are debatable in the light of present knowledge. It is believed that adequate detection of high altitude tests will involve development of new or improved detection techniques following experimental high altitude tests at HARDTACK involving new influence fields, i.e., optical, magnetic, etc., as well as possible modification of existing acoustic, seismic and electromagnetic surveillance methods.

d. Nuclear Tests Conducted in Remote Geographical Locations. The AFOAT-1 Long Range Detection System is deployed around the USSR as the primary target. It therefore has very great limitations for shot points in such remote geographical locations as the Antarctic, South Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. It is believed possible that shots of several hundred kilotons and possibly even a megaton could be detonated in these areas far from the present acoustic stations without fear of detection by acoustic means. British tests in Australia at points only 20°–30° S produced no nuclear, no seismic, no electromagnetic and, in six shots out of twelve tests, no acoustic data although advance notification of time and place of the test was provided by the U.K. Six tests did excite one and in two cases two acoustic stations but detection even in these cases was certainly greatly assisted by advance knowledge of U.K. intentions.

The seismic capability suffers very seriously from core shadow for shots detonated in these remote areas. Over 60% of the Southern

Hemisphere would produce very poor capability for shots in the low megaton range. Electromagnetic capability for detection of tests in the Southern Hemisphere is unusually poor because of the high frequency of thunderstorms in the inter-tropical front along the Equator. The ability to collect samples of debris in the Southern Hemisphere is very limited.

e. *Summary of Existing Capabilities and Limitations.*

(1) *Surface or Air Burst 50 kilofeet within the USSR.*

(a) The electromagnetic technique may possibly detect shots within the USSR of 25 KT or greater but requires a determination of time independently by some other geophysical technique to take care of the sorting problem.

(b) The seismic technique is capable of detecting surface or low air bursts of 100 KT or larger.

(c) The acoustic system is capable of detecting tests of 15 KT or larger.

(d) The nuclear technique is capable of detecting tests as small as 3 KT as long as the debris does not rise much above 20,000 feet.

(e) The overall detection capability for the Atomic Energy Detection System is excellent (90–100%) for surface or air burst tests of 10 KT and greater between the surface and 50 kilofeet.

(2) *Subsurface Tests.* The seismic system presently has an excellent capability of detecting subsurface shots of about 10 KT or larger over 90–95% of the area of the USSR. Subsurface tests as large as 10 to 20 KT in the remaining 5–10% of the USSR might escape detection by the present AEDS. It is estimated from Figure 8 that a total of about 140 earthquakes per year of 10 KT or larger occur in the USSR. Identification of about half this number is possible, leaving about 70 events which may be either explosions or earthquakes.

(3) *High Altitude Tests.* It is not possible to evaluate the present capability of the AEDS to detect high altitude tests.

(4) *Nuclear Tests Conducted in Remote Geographical Locations.* Tests in remote areas in the Southern Hemisphere of from several hundred kilotons to a megaton or two might escape detection by the present Atomic Energy Detection System.

Summarizing, the present Long Range Detection System will detect and identify surface or air bursts below 50 kilofeet in the USSR having a yield of 10 KT or larger. It will detect about 140 subsurface events per year (by seismic means) of 10 KT yield or larger of which only 70 will be positively identified as earthquakes leaving 70 subsurface events of unknown origin. The detection capability for very high altitude bursts over the USSR is unknown and for tests in remote geographical locations is limited to the high kiloton or low megaton range.

3. A SYSTEM FOR DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR TESTS WITHIN THE USSR.

This section will discuss a Long Range Detection System within the USSR and China designed to meet the following requirements: (1) The detection and identification of tests as small as 1 KT between the surface and 50 kilofeet, and (2) Detection of underground explosions, and possibly their identification, in a yield range of 1 KT and above.

a. *Seismic Net.* In considering the deployment of seismic stations within the USSR to give 90% capability of detecting tests of 1 KT or larger, three problems of major magnitude appear:

(1) The band of low signal level between 500 and 1100 miles from the source.

(2) The high microseismic noise level expected at stations in average localities.

(3) The frequency of earthquakes of yield equivalent to 1 to 5 KT which because of small signal amplitudes are the most difficult to identify.

As a result of the loss in signal level between 500 and 1100 miles, it is expected that signals from a one kiloton explosion in this distance range will be smaller than the prevailing microseismic noise. It is to be expected that the noise level at a station removed from sources of cultural noise would be as high as .005 microns. An inspection of Figure 6 will show that such a station would be unlikely to detect an explosion at a distance greater than 400 miles. This loss in detectability makes it necessary to use more elaborate techniques than are currently employed at AFOAT-1 stations in order to detect 1 KT without covering the USSR and China with an inordinately large number of stations. It is believed possible to obtain an improvement in detectability of about a factor of four at individual seismic stations by employing arrays of about 20 seismometers at each station. A spacing between the seismometers can be chosen which should result in considerable cancellation of microseismic noise without appreciable degradation of signals of interest. The seismometers would be distributed approximately uniformly over an area of about six square kilometers. With the signal-to-noise improvement of about four to one, it may be seen from Figure 6 that signals of the order of three millimicrons would be detectable between 0 and 500 miles and again between 1100 and 2000 miles.

In addition, it is believed that ultra-long period seismometers (par. 2c(1)) under study may add considerably to the detection of long period surface waves from small subsurface tests. To date, long period surface waves were observed on Wigwam but not on Rainier. However, these instruments would be included in addition to the improved arrays of the present instruments to supplement detection at ranges possibly unfavorable to the present equipment mentioned above if future tests confirm the existence of long period surface waves from small subsurface tests.

Relative to identification of the “detected” events, the annual number of earthquakes within the USSR-dominated area which are larger than a given yield is shown in Figure 8. This relationship is derived from statistical data on world-wide distribution of earthquakes from Gutenberg and Richter, “Seismicity of the Earth,” and AFOAT-1 measurements of seismic wave amplitudes from subsurface explosions. From this curve the number of earthquakes in the USSR and China which produce energy in the earth equal to subsurface explosions of 1–5 KT is found to be 2100. The areas of most frequent occurrence of these earthquakes are shown in Figure 9. The indicators mentioned in par. 2b permit identification of about 85% this number as natural earthquakes provided there are at least three stations within 400 miles of the burst. There remain about 300 earthquakes per year in this yield range which cannot be distinguished from explosions by scientific means.

Considering all of the above factors, it is believed that it will be necessary to install about 43 seismic stations with improved arrays and ultra low frequency seismometers within the USSR and China. Possible locations of such stations are shown in Figure 10. The stations shown are concentrated near seismic regions to obtain the maximum amount of information leading to the diagnosis of natural earthquakes. Any shock originating in the vast aseismic areas of the USSR and China would be strongly suspected of being man-made. It is believed that this network of stations would permit a 3-station fix on a completely tamped subsurface shot as small [*text not declassified*] in about 90–95% of the area of the USSR and China.

It is estimated that about 300 earth shocks in the range of 1–5 KT would occur each year which could not be distinguished from subsurface nuclear tests. It would, therefore, be necessary for inspection teams to investigate most of these sites for the purpose of determining whether or not the seismic indications were from an explosion or from an actual earthquake.

b. *Acoustic Net.* It is estimated that about 30 acoustic stations within the USSR and China (see Figure 11) placed roughly on a 700 nautical mile square grid will provide an excellent (90–100%) capability to detect shallow subsurface, surface, and air bursts with a yield as low as [*text not declassified*] any place in the USSR and China and immediate surrounding water and island areas. This estimate is based on a study of the actual detection results obtained on all U.S. shots (29) in the yield range from .1 to 10 KT. These results indicate a reliable detection range of at least 700 nautical miles for a yield as [*text not declassified*]. This detection range, coupled with the requirement for detection by a least two acoustic stations in order to determine the location and time of explosion, established the grid pattern stated above.

c. *Electromagnetic Net.* Data available on electromagnetic detection of small U.S. surface or tower bursts indicate that a 1000-mile range

would give good assurance of obtaining electromagnetic data on shots as [text not declassified]. Data on U.S. high air bursts is, of necessity, very limited. It does indicate that the electromagnetic signal strengths from high altitude tests are considerably smaller than from surface tests. However, the electromagnetic signals [text not declassified] were obtained at ranges of 1350 miles and 2400 miles, respectively.

It is, therefore, recommended that an installation of about 30 electromagnetic stations co-located either with seismic or acoustic stations (see Figures 10 and 11) would permit taking maximum advantage of the electromagnetic technique. Since the technique does not provide independent detection at the present time, its purpose would be to strengthen acoustic and seismic evidence of a clandestine test. In about one year improved sorting techniques may permit independent detection by the electromagnetic component and correspondingly increase its value.

It should be noted that relatively simple gamma ray shields of lead or water surrounding the bomb will prevent detection at useful ranges by the electromagnetic system. For example, there was a calculated and measured attenuation of the electromagnetic signal by a factor of [text not declassified] for the U.S. test which was shielded by water. [text not declassified] The signal strength, at long range detection distances, would thus be reduced well below the detectable limit.

d. *Nuclear Sampling.* The nuclear sampling network required to detect radioactive clouds from tests of 1 kiloton or larger in the USSR and China introduces a requirement to intercept air masses emanating from tests in this area at all altitudes from the surface to 50,000 ft. The difficulty of this problem arises principally from the fact that clouds from tests in the very low kiloton range have been observed to be no more than a few thousand feet thick. Setting up a picket line to insure interception of all such clouds by sampling aircraft is obviously impractical. It is estimated that a daily air filtering effort along a meridian at 135°E, at altitudes of 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 feet would provide ample coverage of air masses emanating from tests in both the USSR and China. Tests conducted near the east coast of these countries would produce clouds which would still be relatively small in extent as they pass the flight lines and would have the greatest chance of escaping detection. Clouds from tests further inland in Asia would be stretched out to considerably greater lengths and permit a greater chance of detection.

Several months after a moratorium on testing nuclear devices has been in effect the analysis of nuclear debris samples would become considerably more sensitive than they now are for the detection of fresh nuclear debris, since background levels from old debris would be considerably reduced. As a result, smaller samples would still provide significant radiochemical analyses. The number of disintegrations per minute of 2.7-day Mo⁹⁹ at various times after detonation is given in the following table for a sample size of 10⁷ fissions, a rough

average of the intensity of a single particle of nuclear debris. From this table

<i>Days after Zero Time</i>	<i>dpm Mo⁹⁹ in 10⁷ Fissions</i>
2	66
4	40
6	24
8	14.5
10	8.7
12	5.3
14	3.2

it can be seen that even ten days after zero time the Mo⁹⁹ is still detectable even in a very small sample. In general, samples of debris are at least an order of magnitude larger than 10⁷ fissions. Of course, other short-lived activities could be investigated; e.g., 17-hour Zr⁹⁷, 33-hour Pr¹⁴³, 7.5-day Ag¹¹¹, 2.3-day Cd¹¹⁵, and 2.3-day Np²³⁹, to detect the presence of fresh debris.

In general, it is believed that daily aerial filtering at the altitudes and over the flight tracks defined above would provide 90–100 per cent certainty for detection and identification for yields of 3 KT or larger detonated between the surface and about 25,000 feet. Debris from tests as small as 3 KT detonated at altitudes between 25,000 and 50,000 feet will probably be found at altitudes in excess of those recommended for routine patrols. In this case, the air sampling technique will require an assist from the early warning geophysical network in order that high altitude aircraft can be dispatched to altitudes above those routinely filtered for interception of radioactive clouds from such tests.

Radiochemical laboratories should be located at or near flight terminals; in this case, probably Tokyo, Japan and Fairbanks, Alaska. These laboratories would be equipped with the latest techniques for determining the presence of fresh radioactive debris.

It is expected that for small tests deep in Asia, it may be necessary to overfly certain areas of the USSR and China in order to intercept debris which might not come out across the Japanese flight lines. These overflights might require permission to land and refuel at Soviet bases.

e. *Detection of Soviet Concealed Underground Nuclear Tests.*³

"Under a test moratorium, it is possible that the Soviets might endeavor, because of overriding technical considerations, to conduct a limited series of low yield, underground tests on a surreptitious basis. Therefore, the seismic component of the inspection system within the USSR must be capable of detecting signals generated by an underground test, and the moratorium agreement should permit access for on-the-spot ground inspection of suspect areas upon presentation of seismic records that cannot be properly explained as a natural phenomenon.

"Should such evidence of a possible test be obtained from seismic data or other intelligence sources, it must be promptly evaluated in terms of all available information, including the pattern of normal seismic disturbances within the USSR. If the data cannot be discounted as a natural phenomenon, a small mobile inspection team should be dispatched to the area pin-pointed by the information at hand. In the event of underground tests, a mobile inspection team would provide the only capability for confirming the fact of a nuclear explosion, other than that derived inferentially from repeated suspect activity at a given site.

"Such teams must be able to move rapidly into the suspect area before instrumentation and other physical evidences of testing have been removed; conduct low altitude aerial reconnaissance; follow roads and car tracks, and inspect on the ground any unusual activity; and, if justified, interrogate residents in the vicinity and obtain, under extreme conditions, the right to drill for core samples. Such drilling operations are time-consuming and difficult, but provide the only proof that a very low yield deep underground test has been conducted.

"This elaborate inspection system and the concurrent use of all intelligence sources will not guarantee detection of such underground tests, particularly since seismic signals from a low yield underground test cannot be consistently distinguished from normal earthquake signals. However, these elaborate precautions should raise serious doubts in the minds of the Soviets as to whether they should risk such an attempted evasion. We believe it more likely under these circumstances that they would abrogate a test moratorium under some false pretense rather than by surreptitious testing.

"The expansion of the nuclear test detection system to include geophysical stations and mobile inspection teams within the USSR will greatly increase our overt and covert intelligence collection capabilities against a wide range of other Soviet activities. While this does not of itself justify implementing the proposed test moratorium and inspection system, it is a bonus therefrom that would have direct bearing upon military order of battle, early warning and economic intelligence."

³ These opinions of the Central Intelligence Agency were prepared by the Assistant Director of CIA for Scientific Intelligence, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. and are included at this point in the AFOAT-1 report at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Limitation. [Footnote is in the original.]

*f. Contribution of Other Intelligence Sources to the Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Test.*⁴

"In addition to the aforementioned capabilities of the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System as augmented, it is anticipated that a concurrent expansion of the clandestine collection effort will be attempted. This covert effort will be designed to help detect attempted evasion of a test moratorium via the development of selected informants and the surveillance of activities which may be indicative of such an attempt.

"The routine flow of information from all other intelligence sources should provide assistance in alerting us to possible attempts at evasion within the USSR, but they will not provide any direct evidence that a test in violation of the moratorium has been conducted. The major contribution of such sources would be the detection of preparations for such an evasion and the targeting of the general area involved.

"Conceivably, Soviet clandestine nuclear tests could be staged in remote areas outside the Soviet Bloc such as Antarctica or southern waters. However, all intelligence agencies have agreed that such possibilities would probably be excluded by the Soviets, since various conventional intelligence collection efforts would be almost certain to spot the activities which would be associated with test preparations, if not the test itself. Difficulty would probably be encountered in proving such a test had actually been conducted unless fresh radioactive debris was obtained, and this could be associated in some way with Soviet operations."

g. Security and Classification Problems. It would probably not be advisable to reveal the existing operational network of the AFOAT-1 Long Range Detection System to other nations for the following reasons:

1. Termination of the moratorium would leave the U.S. with the requirement to use a compromised world-wide network of stations.
2. Many small countries presently giving hospitality to AFOAT-1 stations would be compromised by release of the information to the Soviet Union.

The operation of an International Test Monitoring System will presumably be for the purpose of producing scientific proof of a violation by the U.S., the USSR, the U.K., or any other nation. The type of scientific proof will be as follows:

- (1) Seismic, acoustic or electromagnetic records of nuclear tests which permit determinations of time, place, height of burst, and yield.
- (2) Radiochemical data on samples of debris which establish its date of origin, nature of the device (fission or fusion), etc.

⁴ These opinions of the Central Intelligence Agency were prepared by the Assistant Director of CIA for Scientific Intelligence, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. and are included at this point in the AFOAT-1 report at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Limitation. [Footnote is in the original.]

The present Atomic Energy Act of 1954 classifies data in both of these categories for both U.S. and U.K. weapons as well as the samples of debris themselves as Restricted Data because they may reveal "important information on the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons."

Two problems arise, therefore, in the operation of a monitoring system. First, the data in the above categories would have to be cleared for distribution to foreign nationals, and second, some procedure would have to be developed to limit analysis of debris to those measurements necessary to establish the freshness of the debris but to exclude more esoteric measurements which may reveal important information on nuclear devices exploded by either the U.S. or the U.K.

h. Installation Costs of a Long Range Detection System for Clandestine Tests in the USSR. The Long Range Detection System within the USSR discussed above involves 30 acoustic stations of the present type, 43 seismic stations utilizing improved instrumentation at each station, 30 electromagnetic stations utilizing present equipment plus complete aerial filtering coverage of air masses emanating from the USSR and China. The seismic and acoustic stations, because of their mutually incompatible technical site requirements, cannot generally be co-located. The electromagnetic stations, however, are usually found, from a technical standpoint, to be compatible with either seismic or acoustic locations and they therefore may be co-located with one or the other. Therefore, a total of 70 detection stations within the USSR and China would be required.

The time required to install such a system will depend on a number of factors. First, negotiation with the Russians for station locations could turn out to be quite protracted. Technical surveys of possible site locations will have to be made for each of the acoustic, seismic and electromagnetic components installed. Low, flat land remote from electrical disturbances both man-made and natural, as well as from large metal buildings, fences, etc., are the principal requirements for a good electromagnetic station. Level or slightly rolling terrain in areas of relatively low wind velocity provide good acoustic locations. Residential areas of cities are practical since man-made noise does not affect the ultra low frequency acoustic detectors. The geology of the region is critical to satisfactory seismic locations. Of importance also to a good seismic site are areas of low storm activity and areas remote from man-made or natural noise.

The above general statements concerning the requirements for adequate site locations are greatly simplified and presented only to indicate that the survey for the location of all the proposed stations will be a relatively involved and time-consuming operation. Usually it is desirable for the survey team to remain in the area taking background measurements for a period of approximately 1 to 3 months, depending on the technique which is to be used at the site. If several survey teams could operate simultaneously, the time could be reduced.

A conservative estimate indicates that the survey would take of the order of at least six months for all the stations suggested.

The procurement of equipment, which could be initiated concurrently with the surveys, is estimated to take from 6 to 18 months, depending upon the type of equipment. The installation of the equipment, which must take place in series with the surveys, will take from 12 to 18 months, depending on the type of installation. Training of operators, which can start concurrently with the start of the survey, will take from 6 to 12 months, depending on the type of training and upon the procurement of personnel to be trained. This could become relatively involved if utilization of personnel of several nations is planned.

Based upon the above time factors, it is conservatively estimated that two years would be required for the installation. Assuming a minimum of ten months to determine U.S. policy and to negotiate an agreement with the USSR, the system would not be in operation prior to 1 January 1961.

A rough estimate of cost of the installation has been made based upon the assumption that each installation be self-sufficient and independent of the local economy. It was further assumed that all materials and labor would be provided from the U.S. Individual station costs include water supply and filtration, electrical power supply, sewage disposal, access roads, pole lines and vaults, equipment shelters, barracks and latrines, mess hall, vehicle storage and maintenance, fuel storage, technical and support equipment and, most costly of all, a complete communications center. Obviously, depending upon local conditions at each site, the extent of local support in manpower, materials and communications, considerable reduction in cost figures could be effected. These rough estimates indicate that the equipment and installation would cost about \$100,000,000 and operation might run \$30,000,000 per year.

4. A SYSTEM FOR DETECTING NUCLEAR TESTS IN REMOTE AREAS OF THE WORLD.

In Section 3 of this report, a comprehensive detection system has been described which would detect clandestine tests of relatively low yield within the USSR. While this system is by no means fool-proof, principally because of the possibility of evasion by conducting tests underground where detection and identification of all tests is extremely difficult, it would certainly force the Soviets to consider other environments in which clandestine tests might be conducted either with less risk of detection or with greater facility.

It has been pointed out previously in this report that the existing AFOAT-1 Long Range Detection System, as well as the system within the USSR and China described in Section 3, will have a very poor detection and identification capability for tests in areas of the earth remote from those detection systems. The Soviets certainly are aware of this fact and therefore might be strongly tempted to conduct tests in these remote areas using a submarine task force. Tests under these conditions would probably permit limited but adequate diagnostics for the purpose.

One rather disconcerting possibility in this connection would be for a Soviet submarine to deliver a nuclear device to the Marshall Islands and detonate it, fully aware that it would be detected. Such a maneuver would probably be followed up by Soviet propaganda that the U.S. had conducted another test in violation of a moratorium agreement. Proving the national origin of such a test by any scientific means would be extremely difficult.

With possibilities such as these in mind, a system is now described which would permit a greatly increased detection capability in the most remote areas of the world. This system includes acoustic, seismic, electromagnetic and air sampling components designed on the basis of availability of land masses in the Southern Hemisphere and in the large ocean areas of the Northern Hemisphere rather than being designed for a specific detection capability. The system has then been evaluated for its probable detection capability.

a. *Acoustic Net.* It is estimated that about 22 acoustic stations (see Figure 12) would be required to supplement the present long range detection net in order to achieve a capability of 90–100 per cent to detect shallow sub-surface, surface and air bursts with a yield as low as 40 KT anywhere in the world outside the USSR and China. This estimate is based on experience in detecting U.S., U.K and USSR nuclear tests which indicates that explosions as low as 40 KT can be detected with excellent reliability at a range of 2500 nautical miles. The requirement that at least two acoustic stations detect an explosion in order to establish the location and time of the event also influences the choice of stations.

It should be noted that two factors make the capability estimates less reliable for places outside the USSR than for those within the USSR. One is the fact that there have been only 15 nuclear explosions conducted in the Southern Hemisphere, e.g., U.K. tests in Australia, and acoustic data on these are sparse. The other is the fact that a number of island locations for stations had to be chosen in order to cover the Antarctic and remote ocean areas. Noise levels at these locations will probably be considerably higher than at present sites, making detection more difficult.

It is estimated that such a net could detect shallow sub-surface, surface or air bursts with a capability of 90–100 per cent for 40 KT or larger, 60–90 per cent for 10–40 KT, 30–60 per cent for 5–10 KT and 0–30 per cent for less than 5 KT.

b. *Seismic Net.* About 10 seismic stations (see Figure 12) of the type presently used by AFOAT-1 would be required to supplement the present long range detection net in order to achieve a capability of 90–100 per cent to detect underground bursts with a yield as low as 20 KT anywhere in the world. This estimate is based on experience in detecting the Rainier shot and a number of underground high explosive charges. The limited data available indicate that seismic signal amplitudes expected from a 20 KT sub-surface burst would be about twenty times larger than shown in Figure 6. Assuming good station locations could be found with

noise levels of the order of 5 millimicrons, signals should be detectable at all distances out to 6000 nautical miles. A minimum of four detecting stations is required to determine the location, time of occurrence and depth of focus of each shock. Suitable station sites south of the equator are rather limited in number, since the Southern Hemisphere is predominantly oceanic, and island locations are generally found to be extremely noisy. With the addition of stations shown in Figure 12, it is believed that signals could be received at four or more stations from large subsurface shots in all parts of the world. The region of least detection capability is an area of about 1000 miles radius centered near 10° S, 165° W in the South Pacific Ocean. It is estimated that such a worldwide net would have a capability of 90–100 per cent to detect subsurface bursts of 20 KT or larger. Below 10 KT the detection capability deteriorates very rapidly, e.g., at 5 KT there is virtually no possibility of three-station detection.

The identification of those natural earthquakes producing signals of the same size as a 20 KT sub-surface burst is discussed in paragraph 2b. It is estimated that 400 shallow earthquakes per year will be in this class. Of these, about 300 can be identified as earthquakes with reasonable certainty, leaving 100 events per year requiring detailed investigation by inspection teams.

c. *Electromagnetic Net.* Electromagnetic detection of tests in the Southern Hemisphere is favored by the fact that most of the propagation paths will be over water, which will give somewhat less attenuation than over land. However, an unfavorable characteristic of the Southern Hemisphere with respect to detection is that South America, Africa and the East Indies are areas of high thunderstorm activity. Furthermore, the inter-tropical front which encircles the globe approximately at the equator with seasonal shifts from the north to south, constitutes a band of additional thunderstorm activity.

A network of 23 electromagnetic stations has been selected, with the stations made parasitic on the acoustic or seismic locations shown in Figure 12. The detection capability for the network as a whole is estimated to be 90–100 per cent for tests of 100 KT or greater throughout these remote areas of the world.

d. *Air Sampling Net.* In designing a network of air sampling flights for nuclear detection in the remote ocean areas of the world, consideration has been given to the complexity of the wind patterns on a global basis. It is estimated that daily aerial filtering along three meridians with approximately pole-to-pole coverage at each of two altitudes, e.g., 20,000 and 40,000 feet, will provide a detection capability of 90 per cent or greater for tests of about 5 KT detonated between the surface and 25,000 feet. Tests detonated at altitudes higher than 25,000 feet will require special-vectored high altitude sampling flights based on early warning from other components of the detection system.

As is shown in Figure 13, the pole-to-pole coverage is along meridians at approximately 140° E longitude, 50° W longitude and 20° E

longitude. Radiochemical laboratories would be located at Tokyo, Melbourne, Montreal, Buenos Aires, Rome and Capetown. These laboratories would be equipped with the latest devices for the detection of fresh nuclear debris.

e. *Overall Detection Capability.* It is estimated that this system of about 30 geophysical stations plus an air sampling network could detect and identify with 90–100 per cent certainty nuclear tests of 20 KT or larger conducted as shallow sub-surface, surface or air bursts up to 50,000 feet in remote areas of the world. Underground shots of 20 KT or larger in remote parts of the world would be detected with a certainty of 90–100 per cent but not identified as nuclear explosions. Identification of such underground disturbances may be possible through the use of inspection teams investigating about 100 disturbances per year in these remote regions of the world.

The U.S. underwater test (WIGWAM), conducted at a depth of about 2000 feet, produced a unique spectrum of seismic waves at distances of 3000 miles. Ultra-long period seismometers would probably extend this range at least by a factor of two. The existence of these waves suggests that any similar occurrence in remote parts of the world would attract immediate notice on the network of seismic stations described above. It is therefore believed that an underwater explosion of 20 KT or larger anywhere in the world would be reliably detected and probably identified as an explosion rather than an earthquake, because of the marked difference between such signatures and normal earthquake signatures.

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


Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

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


Figure 4

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


Figure 5

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


Figure 6

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


Figure 7

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


Figure 8

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


Figure 9

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Figure 10

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


Figure 11

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


Figure 12

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


Figure 13

Appendix B

[Appendix B not declassified (4 pages of source text).]

Appendix C

CONCEALMENT AND DETECTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS UNDERGROUND

Harold Brown and Hans A. Bethe

I. *General*

Complete containment of a test explosion underground, though devised as a method for making testing easier by eliminating fallout, may also serve as the most effective method of concealing the existence of tests, and may make it very difficult to gather effective proof that such tests have been carried out in violation of a suspension agreement.

Such an explosion provides no electromagnetic signal, and the acoustic signal if it exists at all will be so muffled and distorted that it will not be characteristic even at a distance of a few hundred miles. No activity is released into the atmosphere, so that the only detection method is the seismic. To provide proof by scientific means the residual activity from the explosion must be located underground and sampled.

II. *Results from Rainier Test*

The only such shot carried out in this country which casts any light on such procedures is the Rainier shot of Operation Plumbbob. This was 1.7 KT in yield, and was buried 800 feet from the nearest ground surface, in volcanic tuff. About 1% of the energy appears to have gone into the seismic wave, producing a magnitude 4.2 earthquake indication on seismographs a few hundred miles distant from the shot. Accelerometers indicate that the top of the mesa under which the device was located moved up about a foot and then fell back again. Rocks on top of the mesa were displaced somewhat, and some were rolled down the side, but the appearance of the surroundings after the shot was not inconsistent with the results of a small earthquake; rocks moved by the shot could not be distinguished from those moved by past earth motions, and fissures were present both before and after. Most observers at a distance of 2-1/2 miles felt no earth shock. This is due principally to the absence of hard rock between the source and the observation point. (It is possible that an underground shot will create *less* disturbance above ground than an earthquake of the same seismic magnitude, and that this might be ascertained by examination of the ground around the event and by questioning of the local population, if

any, but extensive experience in the local effects of underground shots would be needed before any such difference could be established.)

One could expect to contain the shot completely without venting by using as little as 500 feet distance to the surface if more disturbance of the surface were allowed; such disturbance would still not be characteristic of an explosion rather than an earthquake. Burial depth required will vary with somewhere between the $1/3$ and $1/4$ power of the yield; a reasonable formula is $400 W^{0.3}$ feet (W in KT).

No activity above background was discernable either above the ground or in the tunnel leading to the explosion chamber, which was blocked off only 200 feet from the shot site. Thus the absence of activity is not merely absence of a radioactive cloud at several hundred miles, but of any radioactivity above ground or in any other region accessible without drilling. The horizontal access tunnel, 1700 feet long from the portal, showed some slabbing and cavein for several hundred feet beyond the point where it was blocked.

Exploration of the region around the zero point by drilling in from the tunnel at a distance of 210 feet has revealed that the solid fission products are contained in a shell a few feet thick at a radius of 55 feet. After four months the peak activity measured along a line at the level of the zero point was 800 mr/hour, while along a line aimed at a point 50 feet below zero from a point 210 feet away horizontally the peak was 40 r/hour. Outside of the shell the activity as measured by a counter was indistinguishable from background. Peak temperature along the horizontal line was 45°C , along the other line it was 65° . Diffusion appears to have carried elevated temperature into the zero point, and some rise above ambient is also noted out to about 70 feet.

Thus a 55-foot radius hole appears to have been established momentarily but then to have collapsed, and the falling in appears to have continued up to a point 400 feet above zero, where a hole 25 feet in radius and 25 feet high was discovered in drilling. This hole contained gaseous fission products at the same concentration as they appear inside the 55-foot radius region around zero, so the entire volume in between appears to be simply connected. This accounts for only a few percent of the gaseous fission products, and it is thought that the remainder were trapped in the resolidification of the molten rock. The region from 55 feet to 130 feet is still impervious but was apparently crushed since the drilling shows water return but no core return. It has not yet been feasible to detect this crushed region by sonic measurements even from inside the tunnel, so that detection by sonic means from above the surface is at least very difficult.

III. *Diagnostic Experiments*

Diagnostic experiments necessary for weapon development can be easily carried out underground. The yield can be measured by shock

arrival time measurements in the rock, analagous to the fireball measurements above ground. This was done on Rainier and appears to be accurate to 10% even without a calibration. The radius of the radioactive debris or the amount of material melted might also be used if the medium is calibrated by a shot of known yield. The prompt diagnostics such as neutron and gamma ray measurements to give time interval or propagation burning data, streak camera work, etc., can be done better below than above ground since the shielding is free and one need only drill holes as desired. Radiochemistry has not been demonstrated to be satisfactory, since fractionation does occur. However, the use of hollow pipes leading into reception chambers from the device may give a substantial fraction of debris unfractionated, and may lead to satisfactory radiochemical diagnostics.

Preliminary estimates indicate that a test operation can be carried out more cheaply underground than on towers and balloons. The diagnostic stations could also be underground for clandestine tests (in fact they probably will be even if the tests are not hidden). Keeping underground tests secret will increase the costs by preventing the use of a single diagnostic bunker for many shots on the basis that more than one in a given vicinity increases suspicion and the possibility of proving a violation. It may mean that each shot must be in a completely different area, but this conclusion may be modified to some extent, because also natural earthquakes have aftershocks. In any event, such extra costs are associated with clandestine tests generally rather than underground tests specifically and are not likely to be more than a few million per shot, which is not a large percentage increase.

IV. Dependence of Seismic Signal on Yield and Medium

On the basis of observations, it is believed that the amplitude of the earth motion from an underground explosion increases as the 1.2-power of the energy released. This scaling law is obtained on the basis of explosions of conventional explosives underground (quarry blasts). The law is somewhat surprising; theoretically one would expect that the seismic amplitude would go as the square root of the energy release. The empirical law has been used in Appendix A to predict the frequency of earthquakes in the USSR which might be confused with subsurface shots of various yields. The empirical law clearly gives more larger results for the seismic signal to be expected from shots of larger yield than Rainier than the "theoretical expectation" would give.

The empirical law indicates that a larger fraction of the energy release goes into seismic waves at higher yield. This effect certainly must stop at some point; at about 100 kilotons the entire energy would be converted into seismic energy if the 1.2-power law held up to that yield. Experiments are urgently needed to establish the actual relation between yield and seismic signal. These should be carried out with

nuclear explosions since conventional explosives may not give the same effect due to the evolution of large amounts of gas.

The seismic signal will depend strongly on the medium in which the test is conducted. The volcanic tuff in which the Rainier test was conducted probably gives a relatively small seismic signal; it is only equivalent to an air shot of about 20 times greater yield. Hard rock would almost certainly give a stronger seismic signal while on the other hand it may contain the radioactive products in an even smaller volume. On the other hand, unconsolidated material which is found in many places near the surface of the earth may well reduce the seismic effects below those observed in the tuff because the signal should decrease with decreasing yield stress, and unconsolidated material may have a yield stress as low as one-tenth of that of tuff (which has about 10,000 psi).

It may also be possible, by excavating a large chamber to begin with, to reduce the energy found at large distances by a factor of 10. One possibility which may reduce the seismic energy is the excavation of large cavities in salt domes. Such cavities may be tens or even hundreds of millions of cubic feet in volume, and need not be spherical. For example, a cavity 150 feet in diameter and 3000 feet long may have nearly the same effect as a spherical one of the same volume. The excavation of such a cavity would be fairly costly, and its use might be limited to a single occasion because it might cave in. To find out to what extent the seismic signal from an underground explosion could be reduced by suitable choice of medium, many tests would be required but most of these could be carried out at low yield.

It is likely that reduction of seismic signal is easier for low-yield shots than for high-yield ones. Unconsolidated material is found only in the top layers of the earth and the required burial depth increases with yield, so that it may be difficult to find such material deep enough to successfully contain a 50-kiloton test. The digging of underground caves large enough to give a substantial reduction of the seismic signal from a 50-kiloton explosion will be very costly and may in fact be impossible, especially since for mechanical stability a cave must be *smaller* at great depth than near the surface. Thus it may well be possible to reduce the signal from a 5-kiloton explosion so that it "looks like" 1/2 kiloton, but more difficult to make 50-kiloton explosion appear like 5 kilotons.

V. Identification

It is shown in Appendix A that the seismic wave from a 1-kiloton sub-surface explosion in surroundings similar to those of the Rainier shot will be detected by the net of seismic stations proposed for the USSR in that appendix. However, there are about 2500 earthquakes per year in the USSR which give signals of similar strength. The most promising feature of seismic signals from underground explosions distinguishing them from earthquakes is that the first pulse from explosions always

corresponds to compression while the first pulse from an earthquake is compressive in two quadrants, while it corresponds to dilatation in the other two. It is estimated in Appendix A that there will be about 300 earthquakes of strength equivalent to 1 kiloton or over which will give signals in the proposed seismic detection net which cannot be distinguished from nuclear explosions and therefore will require further investigation on the spot. If the limit is set at 5 kilotons the number of unidentifiable earthquakes will be about 35.

It should be pointed out that 1 and 5 kilotons refer to the size of the seismic signal, not to the actual yield. By proper choice of the medium as discussed in Section IV, tests of 10 kilotons might be made to look like a normal 1-kiloton explosion, and perhaps, with more difficulty, 50 kilotons to look like 5. According to seismologists, it is unlikely that a nuclear explosion could be so conducted (by proper shaping of the explosion chamber) that the signal is dilatational in some directions.

The seismic signals would locate the source within about 5 miles. Investigation on the spot will then be necessary to decide whether the signal could be due to a test, this is described in Section 3e of Appendix A.

One would presumably try to find the entrance to the tunnel which was used for the test. The experiment could be carried out in a remote area, where there would be no people to give away the game, but then such indicators as roads, unusual human activity, etc., might make the inspection team dispatched on receipt and study of the seismic signal suspicious. They would still have to find the entrance (say a 6 foot hole, since covered up), proceed to the correct part of the tunnel, and drill successfully to get proof. This is made difficult by the small radius of the shell in which the radioactivity is concentrated (55 feet for Rainier). Alternatively one might use an area of substantial human activity, thus producing less unusual change in what is going on, but perhaps requiring more local people to know about what was going on or become suspicious about it.

To summarize:

1. Detection of underground shots depends entirely on a seismic net. Identification depends on local investigation.

2. Adequate proof of violation probably depends on location of the debris, which is confined to a shell whose radius is of the order of $40 W^{1/3}$ feet where W is in KT, and whose depth is of the order of $400 W^{1/3}$ or larger as desired. Within the five mile radius circle of uncertainty identified by the seismic signals, the entrance to the tunnel or hole must be found as a beginning in finding the activity. Broad access is required to have a good chance of locating the debris and thus providing proof.

3. Adequate diagnostic information for weapon development can almost certainly be obtained at no great increase (and perhaps some decrease) in cost by testing underground. It has not been proven that radiochemical detectors can be used, but it appears possible that some

can by appropriate design of underground chambers. Some extra cost may be incurred if it is required to duplicate diagnostic bunkers, etc., in order to avoid testing several devices in one region so as to reduce suspicion; this is characteristic of clandestine rather than of underground shots.

4. Experimental data is lacking or insufficient and should be acquired either prior to or as part of an agreement on the following subjects:

(a) Reducing the seismic energy by choice of medium and design of explosion chamber. Reducing the radius of the radioactive region by choice of medium.

(b) The complete range of radiochemical detectors in diagnostics of underground shots.

(c) Possible distinctive characteristics of underground explosions which will enable them to be told surely from natural earthquakes. This includes the seismograph records at a distance, and earth motions nearby. Possible special chamber design to remove such distinctions if any are found to exist must also be studied.

(d) Use of acoustic sounding from above the surface to detect the disturbed region below the surface. This has not yet proven feasible even from inside the tunnel.

Appendix D

[Appendix D not declassified (5 pages of source text).]

Appendix E

[Appendix E not declassified (16 pages of source text).]

305. Memorandum for the Record by Goodpaster¹

March 28, 1958

Admiral Strauss phoned on March 25th to say that Secretary Dulles had called him and indicated he had swung around to Admiral Strauss' line of thinking concerning the discontinuance of atomic tests.

¹Source: Records Strauss' comments on his conversation with John Foster Dulles on nuclear testing. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AFC, Vol. II.

Admiral Strauss said this action left a vacuum, in that neither paper had been adopted at the meeting on the 24th. He said he would talk further with Secretary Dulles as to how action should proceed.

If action were to go forward along the lines of Admiral Strauss' proposal, a bipartisan meeting should be held to present the matter to Congressional leaders.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

306. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 28, 1958

SUBJECT

Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement

REFERENCE

NSC Action No. 1840-c

The Report on the subject,² called for by NSC Action No. 1840-c-(2), has been prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Panel established by the reference NSC Action (consisting of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency), and will be presented orally at the National Security Council meeting on Thursday, April 3, 1958.

Because of the sensitivity of this Report, copies have been circulated only to those agencies represented on the NSC Ad Hoc Panel and to the Department of State. A copy of the Report is available, in the office of the Executive Secretary, NSC, for reference by other regular participant members of the Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

¹ Source: Transmits a report on "Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement." Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 273, Official Meeting Minutes File, 361st Meeting, Tab A.

² Report enclosed with this copy. *Special security precautions should be observed in the handling of the enclosures, and access to them should be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.* [Footnote is in the original.]

cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Enclosure

Memorandum From Killian to Gray

Washington, March 28, 1958

SUBJECT

Transmittal of Report

In accordance with Action No. 1840 of the National Security Council, as approved by the President on January 9, 1958, I submit herewith "a study to cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful purposes (such as the launching of scientific reconnaissance vehicles)." This report has been prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed to the membership of this Working Group and the Department of Defense did not, itself, nominate additional representatives.

The Ad Hoc Working Group did not consider whether a missile test prohibition agreement could be enforced by the inspection of missile production, operational launching sites or the nuclear aspects of the problem. These questions were felt to be outside of the area of competence of the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

The Ad Hoc Working Group, in preparing this report, limited itself to the technical factors involved. It excluded from its consideration any question of policy with respect to whether there should be a rocket test agreement. In accord with its directive, it also excluded from its consideration the military implications of a test suspension on the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This report is submitted for the consideration of the Council at its meeting on April 3, 1958.

/s/ J.R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman

Attachment

Report Prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group

Washington, March 26, 1958

REPORT OF THE NSC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE MONITORING OF LONG-RANGE ROCKET TEST AGREEMENT

In response to the action taken by the National Security Council meeting on January 6, 1958, an ad hoc working group of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency has undertaken a study of "the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful purposes."

On the basis of technical presentations and discussions at its initial meeting on 13 March 1958, the working group arrived at the conclusions set forth below. For the purpose of this study, the working group considered "long-range" rockets to include the IRBM, ICBM, and vehicles capable of orbiting satellites for either military or peaceful purposes. No attempt was made to establish an exact definition for "peaceful purposes." However, it was assumed that rockets for the delivery of nuclear or other warheads [*text not declassified*] are not for "peaceful purposes."

CONCLUSIONS

1. The remote detection of long-range rockets, which are fired from any point in the Soviet bloc and which leave the atmosphere, could be made almost certain by a monitoring system employing an expansion of the present intelligence detection systems at locations outside the Soviet bloc and new techniques now under development. [*text not declassified*]

2. The detection of long-range rockets, which are fired anywhere in the Soviet bloc from either known or unknown launching sites and which leave the atmosphere, could be further improved by a monitoring system which included suitably placed stations [*text not declassified*] however, such stations may actually not be required to provide certainty of detection.

3. The above mentioned detection techniques may not be capable of discriminating in all cases between "long-range" rockets and other large rockets which leave the atmosphere, such as short-range military ballistic missiles and certain types of AICBM's. For this reason the remainder of the conclusions are stated in terms of "large rockets which leave the atmosphere." It must be recognized that the definition

of “long range” or “large” rockets would have to be very carefully considered in the preparation of any type of agreement in this field.

4. Although an agreement to exchange advance flight schedule information on large rockets leaving the atmosphere could be monitored, it would not be possible to distinguish with any degree of confidence between a large rocket fired as a part of a military program and one fired for “peaceful purposes” [*text not declassified*].

5. In view of the inherent similarity of the technical problems involved in [*text not declassified*].

6. Even though inspectors stationed at authorized launching sites were empowered to undertake an inspection of the assembled rocket prior to the launching as part of an agreement limiting large rocket tests to “peaceful purposes,” it would not be possible to assure that the tests would not contribute most if not all of the essential data for the development of a military ballistic missile program as well as operational experience for military personnel.

7. A complete prohibition of the launching of all large rockets leaving the atmosphere, including those intended for “peaceful use,” could be fully monitored and would freeze the development of ballistic missiles and space vehicles near their present status and would prevent their use for “peaceful purposes.”

8. An agreement, prohibiting *all* national large rocket testing and establishing either an international or joint US-Soviet agency to plan and *execute* all rocket firings for “peaceful uses” of space would still provide the nations participating in the agency with some information pertinent to military missile development. However, such an agreement could probably be designed in a manner which would limit the rate of accumulation of this information to a rather low level.

9. Although an agreement which established an international or joint US-Soviet agency to plan all rocket launchings for “peaceful uses” of space without prohibiting other national tests would not have direct effect on the capability of participating nations to develop military missiles, such an agreement might have desirable features in developing international cooperation and might contribute to a reduction of international rivalry in the missile field. [*text not declassified*] The advantage of such an agreement would be increased if the rocket launchings were carried out by the agency.

10. An agreement to prohibit *all* nationally conducted large rocket tests would not prevent the USSR from building up an operational military missile force, if the USSR had already developed an ICBM capability as of the time of such an agreement. The maintenance and expansion of this capability by the USSR could only be prevented by the prohibition of the retention or manufacture of ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads. The panel did not consider whether, in fact, such a

missile prohibition agreement could be enforced by the inspection of missile production, operational launching sites, and other techniques or the nuclear aspects of the problem. A military missile force built up under these conditions, without the opportunity for quality control tests and military training tests, would deteriorate with time and cease to be instantly available.

Robert F. Bacher
Lawrence A. Hyland
James W. McRae
Col. John A. White
George B. Kistiakowsky, *Chairman*

307. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, April 2, 1958

SUBJECT

Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Nuclear Testing

REFERENCES

A. NSC Action No. 1840-c-(1)

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 28, 1958

The enclosed memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, transmitting the views of the Department of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its discussion of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, April 3, 1958.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

¹Source: Transmits the views of the JCS and Department of Defense on the report on "Technical Feasibility of Cessation of Nuclear Testing," Top Secret; Restricted Data. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Technical Feasibility.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Quarles to Cutler

Washington, April 1, 1958

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

REFERENCE

NSC Action No. 1840, 6 January 1958

Pursuant to the above reference designated representatives of the Department of Defense have participated in the discussions and findings of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation, established by the Science Advisory Committee to report on the studies called for in paragraph 1c(1), (a), (b), and (c). In addition, at the request of the Panel, the Department of Defense submitted its views on those aspects of the technical studies related to the military losses to the U.S. and the USSR consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates. The Department's views are contained in the attached memorandum of March 21, 1958, which also forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed to the Secretary of Defense in the memorandum of March 13, 1958. The Chairman of the Panel now informs me that the views expressed therein relate, in part, to matters outside the scope of the technical studies made by the Panel, and, therefore, that these views have not been considered by the Panel and will not be appended to the report as originally contemplated. Accordingly, it is requested that the attached memorandum be circulated for NSC consideration in connection with the report to be submitted by the Ad Hoc Panel of the Science Advisory Committee.

Donald A. Quarles
Deputy

Attachment**Memorandum From Quarles to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation (Kistiakowsky)**

Washington, March 21, 1958

SUBJECT

The Effects of a Total Suspension or Cessation of Nuclear Testing

Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840, 6 January 1958, representatives of the Department of Defense have participated in the discussions of your Panel concerning the technical feasibility of monitoring a nuclear weapons tests suspension and the predicted technological status of the United States and the USSR with respect to the development of nuclear weapons, assuming a total suspension of nuclear tests as of 1 September 1958. Documents prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency portraying the predicted position of the United States and the USSR, respectively, have been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views relative to the military impact of cessation of testing are transmitted herewith.

The reports of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency are accepted as reasonable and satisfactory estimates of the technological positions of the United States and the USSR, with the understanding that events of the near future may necessitate significant revisions of these estimates. Broadly stated, the estimates indicate that at present and also as of the end of 1958, the United States possesses an advantage in yield versus weight ratios, in flexibility of applications, in the economy of use of special nuclear materials and possibly in knowledge of weapons effects of a specialized nature.

It is reasonable to assume that with the continuation of testing the gap will be narrowed and that both nations may be expected to attain the practicable limits of nuclear weapon development as these limits can be foreseen at this time. It is equally reasonable to assume that in the absence of testing the gap will likewise be narrowed but at a slower rate which will be governed by a number of factors over which the United States can exercise little or no control, such as stepped up espionage, ingenuity in devising partial substitutes for testing, and the extent to which the Soviets may be willing to accept the risks of clandestine testing as well as the risks of a lower probability of achieving desired performance characteristics. The achievement of technological parity as regards the practicable limits of nuclear weapons development as now foreseen with and without continuation of testing appears, therefore, to be a matter of time differential only, with the United States holding an advantage for an indeterminate period in either case.

Concerning developments in the nature of “break-throughs,” that is, beyond presently foreseen practicable limits, both parties will be inhibited by a test cessation and the advantage will lie with the nation which is able to maintain the higher level of effort and interest in nuclear weapon research and development, the security with which it guards its findings, and the risk it is willing to accept in the conduct of clandestine test operations or its attitude toward the abrogation of treaties.

Relative technological status of nuclear weapons development at the moment and for the foreseeable future is not an adequate index of relative military posture. Consequently, an assumption that the future improvement of weapons designs and the knowledge of weapons effects to be gained from nuclear testing is more important to the Soviets than to the United States is untenable. Within the time available for the submission of the Defense Department’s views on the subject matter set forth in NSC 1840, it has not been possible to prepare, on the basis of material submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency a system-by-system comparison which the Panel has indicated to be desirable in order to appraise the relative impact of test cessation on the military postures of the Free World and the Soviet Bloc. With the rapidly changing weapon development scene it is highly questionable whether such an appraisal would be valid even for a brief period.

As pointed out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cessation of testing as of the date under consideration will find a number of important U.S. research and development programs aborted or drastically limited:

(a) The study of effects at ultra high altitudes essential to the design of effective anti-ICBM and other systems involving outer space, including the warheads, the delivery means, countermeasures and counter-countermeasures;

(b) Second generations of IRBM’s, ICBM’s and Fleet Ballistic Missiles designed to drastically reduce overall systems costs and reaction times;

(c) Economical designs of warheads for highly mobile systems for the support of battle groups and for air defense;

(d) Clean weapons in the middle and lower range yields;

(e) Weapons which combine absolute nuclear safing with safety from predetonation.

With respect to Items (a) and (b) above, the facts are:

(a) That the USSR possesses a recognized long range missile capability and that following the conclusion of the HARDTACK test program the United States will still not be fully assured of the design of an effective anti-ICBM system to include adequate knowledge of weapon effects at ultra high altitudes and the essential characteristics of the nuclear warheads required.

(b) Since the deterrent capability of U.S. long and medium range missile systems is compromised by the Soviets' ability to adopt the initiative, the retaliatory threat of these systems should be maintained at the highest feasible level through further warhead development, improved readiness and, if necessary, by greater dispersion and larger numbers.

It is the Department's view that until these two requirements are adequately and assuredly met through necessary test programs, the United States should not enter into a test cessation agreement unless it is a part of a broader agreement which offers very large compensating advantages.

In considering the inability of the United States to pursue Items (c), (d) and (e) as listed above, it appears necessary to give adequate weight to political, psychological and economic factors which are certainly not of equal importance to the United States and the USSR. While broadly speaking these factors are outside the area of direct military responsibility, they have a distinct and important bearing on the total Free World military posture. The problems of world wide dispersion of nuclear weapons for potential use by and support of friendly forces and the occupation of foreign bases by U.S. forces possessing a nuclear weapon capability affect not only quantitative requirements but also design features maximizing safety in handling and simplicity of maintenance. On a broader basis, concepts developed in the interests of political solidarity of the Free World which would place restrictions or restraints on the use of nuclear weapons by reason of geographical, psychological or moral considerations, may require the conduct of nuclear operations under conditions which the Department of Defense could not meet without the further developments indicated above. While the Department of Defense does not necessarily indorse limited war concepts which would place restraints on the types of nuclear weapons which may be used and the targets which may be attacked, it is my view that it would be a serious disadvantage for the United States to enter into a test cessation agreement which would block it from further tactical weapon developments of the type indicated by (c) and (d) above.

As regards the inability or time lag attributed to the Soviets in achieving a position equivalent to or approaching that of the United States, it should be obvious that as long as quantitative aspects of nuclear weapons and both quantitative and qualitative aspects of other weapons and delivery systems remain uncontrolled, efforts will be made by both sides to compensate for failures to attain practicable and desirable objectives in nuclear weapons designs by improving delivery systems, maintaining larger forces or by other means. For example: The Soviets' assumed inability by reason of a test suspension to achieve an ICBM warhead of yield equivalent to ours does not deny them the capability of an equally effective ICBM system through the development of

larger payload capacity, improved accuracy of delivery and/or reliance on larger quantities.

It is in the light of the above considerations that I find myself in general agreement with the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in *its* overall long range effects a test cessation will operate to the distinct disadvantage of the United States. If such a test cessation is a positive and integral part of more comprehensive measures which deal with the stabilization and reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the prevention of surprise attack and the regulation of armaments and armed forces, the military disadvantage of test cessation becomes acceptable in the light of these major objectives. In any case, the United States should not become a party to a test cessation agreement which would prohibit the conduct of tests of yields, in environments and under conditions which the agreed and implemented control system would be unable to monitor satisfactorily as to detection, identification and responsibility.

Donald A. Quarles

Enclosure:

Memo for SecDef frm JCS,
13 Mar 58, w/Appendix

308. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

April 7, 1958, 8:30 a.m.

The Sec. said he was sending to the President a clean draft of a message to Khrushchev. The Sec. said that after he wrote the Pres. on Sat. we sent a draft to London. Macmillan looked it over and came back with some minor suggestions which are incorporated in the draft the Sec. was sending over. They discussed whether the Sec. would come to the WH this morning and Sec. said he could come over at 10 on his way to the Pentagon.

The Sec. mentioned Jim Hagerty's idea about the possibility of a somewhat different approach to Khrushchev and try to put him behind the propaganda eight ball by saying he suddenly talks one-third of our initial proposal where he said both of us do this and it would be

¹ Source: Message to Khrushchev; cessation of testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

inspected. Let us say we will go back to the initial program and have a meeting right now of the UK, USSR and us, and possibly France. The Sec. said perhaps we could “beef” it up a little. The Pres. said we could tell Khrushchev that we stand ready in the meantime if he is ready to go ahead on that particular thing. If he would agree to that meeting and that purpose in spite of our plans we would postpone our plans. Perhaps we couldn’t because they are all out in the Pacific. The Pres. said he thought that Hagerty might have something. He said that he and the Sec. were always talking about a new approach and this might be something that would make Khrushchev squirm.

309. Informal Memorandum From Hagerty to Eisenhower¹

Washington, April 7, 1958

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing and Defense Reorganization

Here are some thoughts on two subjects—Nuclear Testing and Defense Reorganization. These thoughts are admittedly in the propaganda field, but that seems to be the way things are emphasized these days. I don’t know whether they are practical or not; or whether they will give people the jitters—but at least I put them down on paper.

USSR—Nuclear Testing

The Soviets have now made their big propaganda move in the testing field and they apparently are going to play it as hard as they can. Khrushchev has sent you his first note, using this subject to make another propaganda plug. Using his note as a basis, is it possible to answer along these lines?

1. You are glad to see that the Soviets, at long last, have finally started to make some sense on the whole question of disarmament. After maintaining a negative attitude for a long time, the USSR has now come forward with one-part of a proposal that the US and the UN have made for some time—namely that by international agreements nuclear testing and production of weapons can and should be halted. Up to now the USSR has declined to treat this great problem seriously.

¹ Source: Nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

2. Despite past experiences in this field with the Soviets, you are prepared—in the interest of peace—to accept this latest Russian statement at its face value. In effect you say to Khrushchev: “All right, so you now say you are stopping tests and ask the US to do the same. Well, the US will take you up on this since we have been trying to get some agreement about this with you for some time. So—”

3. Let’s try seriously to work out an agreement. Naturally for any such agreement to function in the world successfully, other nuclear powers—the United Kingdom (and probably France)—have to be in accord. Let’s get them to join us in working out such an agreement.

4. To do this, let’s forget for the time being the so-called Summit Conference. Although you have talked about having such a Summit Conference you haven’t even answered the US–UK–French memorandum filed with the Soviet Foreign office a week ago. While we are perfectly willing to have such a Conference with you to discuss other important world matters, we still insist that preparation for such a meeting is elementary to its success.

5. While we should continue to work for such a meeting in order to discuss other world matters, let’s concentrate right now on one single problem—the suspension of testing. Let’s take up that one subject and let’s add to it—in order to make it mean something for humanity—the question of production and inspection. The US has already proposed that in addition to the end of testing, an end should also be reached on the production of nuclear weapons and that a workable system of inspection be instituted to guarantee any agreement we might reach.

6. Let’s have this Nuclear Conference soon—and let’s hold it where all the world can see and hear it. Here is what I proposed to you:

That a Nuclear Conference be held and that the Heads of State of the nuclear powers attend such a meeting. This meeting could be held soon (within a month?). It could be called as a sort of special session of the United Nations, so that all the nations of the world could “sit in” as observers and—in effect—as judges of our sincerity. This meeting could be held at the UN headquarters at Geneva or at New York. At the Conference, the nuclear powers should be able to work out an agreement which would combine an end of testing and production with a suitable and workable inspection system. Then—to make the nuclear powers responsible before the world for living up to that agreement—we could sign this agreement before the representatives of the nations of the world.

7. If you accept this suggestion and join with me in this meeting, I would do one thing more. Even though it might place the US and its allies at a disadvantage—since the USSR has already conducted its tests this year—I would, nevertheless, to show the good faith of the

United States postpone our present Pacific tests while we were working together to see if we could reach a nuclear agreement. This postponement would, of course, be limited to a reasonable period—it could not be expected to last indefinitely.

8. A nuclear agreement between the nuclear powers would be of vast importance in the world and would greatly lessen existing world tensions. In addition, it would make further meeting between us on other world problems much easier to accomplish. As a matter of fact, our diplomatic representatives could begin to discuss preparation for such a meeting at the same time. I see no reason why they could not go ahead in this field with discussions which we have already urged be started this month. Meanwhile we could also go ahead with the Nuclear Conference I have proposed.

310. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

April 8, 1958, 10:48 a.m.

The Sec. said one of the questions he may get at his press conference was would we be willing to have technical studies about inspection required for a suspension of testing without also having technical studies of the cut-off supervision? The President said this was not an easy one. The Pres. said we had tried hopefully to put something in our reply. The Sec. read this portion from the letter to Khrushchev. The Pres. said the Sec. could say we would be quite ready to participate in any study—that is technically to find out what can be done. This would bring about a closer understanding and better knowledge. The Pres. said to say we are always ready to study the technical thing. The Sec. said he would try to duck it a little. If we started supervision and control in any field, that is a step forward. The Pres. said that was what he was trying to say.

The President mentioned they might jump him on the word “appreciable”. He said it doesn’t mean “material” but “unnoticeable”. They discussed the definition of the word.

The Pres. said he could not let McElroy go to NATO because of the hearings the Pres. had coming up. If Kilday would agree to a

¹ Source: Possible press questions on suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

postponement, that would be all right. The Secretary said it was not vital that McElroy go to the NATO meeting. There would be no decision taken at the mtg.

311. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1958

SUBJECT

First Meeting of Special Working Group on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

State

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, US Representative on Disarmament

Mr. Philip J. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, S/AE

Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE

Mr. Lawrence D. Weiler, S/AE

Mr. Donald R. Morris, S/AE

Mr. Henry Owen, S/P

Defense

General Alonzo Fox

Colonel Fred Rhea

AEC

Admiral Paul Foster

Mr. James Goodby

CIA

Mr. Robert Amory

Dr. Killian's Staff

Mr. Spurgeon Keeney

Ambassador Wadsworth welcomed the members to the first meeting of the Special Working Group on Disarmament for Summit Preparations and asked Mr. Farley to explain the terms of reference of the group.

Mr. Farley noted that last week the President had established a Special Cabinet Committee on Summit Preparations to be chaired by the Secretary of State. Other members are the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the AEC and the Secretary of the Treasury. At its first

¹Source: Record of the first meeting of the Special Working Group on Disarmament; preparations for summit, suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 611.0012/4-958.

meeting on April 7, the Special Cabinet Committee established a working group on U.S. disarmament policy with members from the Departments of State, Defense, AEC, CIA and Dr. Killian's office. The working group was asked to report by Tuesday, April 15, to the Special Cabinet Committee presenting its initial assessment of (1) the adequacy of present U.S. disarmament policy and (2) the opportunities for new U.S. initiatives in this field.

Mr. Farley reviewed the status of summit preparations within the Department of State, noting that the US, UK and France on March 31 had proposed to the Soviet Union that preparatory talks to pave the way for a possible summit meeting begin in the latter half of April. Therefore, it is a matter of urgency that this government have completed as soon as possible whatever review of its disarmament policy may be necessary.

Mr. Farley noted that while the predominant feeling in the Department of State is that there would be no summit meeting until fall, it is essential that we be ready to begin preparatory talks within the month. He said we recognize that this is a broad field and that probably a great deal of detailed work will be necessary. However, it is desirable at this point for the working group to ask itself (1) if the present U.S. position on disarmament (August 29) is one on which we can stand in detail, (2) if there are possible ideas for change which should be explored, (3) if there are modifications of the present policy which are desirable at this point. He said that probably the prospects of an agreed interagency position by April 15 were slight, but that the working group must by then identify for the principals on the Special Cabinet Committee any lines needing further detailed study. He explained that he considered it the task of the working group to pose the issues, suggest initiatives and assemble the facts so that the principals may be able to make any decisions necessary.

Mr. Farley then explained that the paper distributed to the working group had been prepared by the Department of State in order to put forth the results of our own preliminary re-examination of the broad field of disarmament policy. He noted that it has been approved by the Secretary of State, after discussion with the panel of disarmament advisers, for interagency consideration. He explained that we had considered the present form of the paper as that most useful for comparison with existing policy, that is, an interlinear modification of the June 11, 1957 NSC policy statement on disarmament.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that based on this, he felt the working group should reconvene Monday to receive initial suggestions from its members as to: 1) whether the U.S. should stand firm on its present policy, 2) any new ideas from the various agencies, or 3) any areas which

they felt should be studied further. From this discussion a preliminary report should be prepared for transmission to the President's Special Cabinet Committee.

General Fox said that he thought an aspect of our policy which should be considered very seriously is the question of how it is presented. He said he felt the August 29 proposals were substantively quite sound but had been presented very badly. He thought the working group should pay particular attention to how, in the future our policy may be presented as to be clear and immediately understandable throughout the world.

Mr. Farley agreed, noting that our negotiators had great difficulty presenting our case, and that it is very difficult to separate policy from public impact. However, he noted that this is secondary to the work the group must do. The group must first focus on policy; once that is decided we can consider how it is to be presented. He stressed that the report to the Special Cabinet Committee on next Tuesday should give a consensus of the working group as to whether the August 29 policy should stand, whether it should be changed, studied further, whether detailed technical studies are needed or whether the working group would need immediate Presidential decisions before it could proceed further.

General Fox said that as far as the possible separation of test cessation from the cutoff was concerned, the answer from the military would most certainly be no. However, he said that this might be different if the question were asked relative to the state of our knowledge after HARDTACK has been completed.

Mr. Farley agreed that any decision would clearly be easier given successful completion of the HARDTACK testing program. But he noted that an immediate response to the Soviet demarche might be necessary.

General Fox said that the Defense Department could not recommend such a decision. *Mr. Farley* noted that this was not just a military consideration but that there were extremely important political problems involved.

Admiral Foster said that he was not very sanguine about the possibility that HARDTACK would give the AEC laboratories all the information they want. He said that we would certainly have to predicate our assumptions on what the USSR is doing at the time the U.S. might stop testing. Would they continue their present cessation or would they resume? *Mr. Farley* noted that the Soviet Union by its unilateral cessation of testing has given up considerable freedom of action. What we do with regard to nuclear testing will certainly affect the future Russian position.

Mr. Farley reviewed the extent of separability of the various items in the State Department paper, noting that we propose not only changes

in policy as a whole but also changes in the interdependence of various items. Thus nuclear testing could be agreed to separately subject only to the condition of an agreed inspection system and the stated intention of the U.S. to resume testing at the end of two years unless international agreement on the cut-off of production had been reached. Outer space cooperation could be dealt with separately. Missile control proposals were contingent on further feasibility studies by Dr. Killian's staff. Inspection zones might be accepted independently.

General Fox asked if the target date for agreement—September 1, 1958—assumed Senate ratification. *Mr. Farley* noted that the specific date is, of course, subject to more discussion and at any rate would be stated in terms of a specific date or after ratification of an agreement by all states, whichever was the later. He noted that all the provisions would require a treaty and thus be subject to ratification, although the President could, by executive agreement, stop testing.

Ambassador Wadsworth reviewed our position on the nuclear testing issue in the United Nations. He recalled that many of our friends had felt at the 12th General Assembly that testing should be stopped and that the vote on the issue had been a lot less favorable to us than in the past. Since the 12th General Assembly the feeling among the great majority of the delegations in New York was that the United States should stop testing. Even the SYG had said this publicly. He noted that these people appreciate our need for continued testing, but feel that the unilateral Soviet cessation has changed the situation. He said that there will be a strong movement next fall for a resolution calling for cessation and that while this might not be successful, we certainly will lose many of our former supporters to the abstention list. He noted that this problem had many facets: for instance, a too rigid position by the U.S. may seriously jeopardize public opinion in countries where we have military installations. He reported that the SYG felt on the basis of his Moscow trip that the USSR wants summit talks more than anything else. They object to our DC-SC procedure because they believe it is a trick to prevent a summit meeting. They are also suspicious of the March 31 tripartite note for the same reason, feeling that the proposed preparatory talks would be used as a stratagem to avoid a summit meeting. He reiterated his feeling that the testing question had gone far beyond being a theoretical problem. Even the Norwegians and Danes were becoming increasingly restive. Many nations of the world were hysterical and panic stricken at the thought of possible effects from fallout from nuclear testing. USUN feels we need a broad move at this juncture.

General Fox asked if the Secretary of State would have to tip our hand concerning any proposals we might make during the course of the preparatory talks, or whether we could have a surprise demarche such as the Open Skies proposal, which had a great impact at Geneva.

Would a policy have to be fully coordinated with our allies? *Mr. Farley* noted that there was more of a pattern of cooperation now than there had been in 1955. The experience of last summer had built up a precedent of NATO cooperation which we have continued in coordinating replies to the Bulganin letters. However, he could certainly recognize the value of surprise impact. [*text not declassified*]

Mr. Farley said he thought he should make quite clear that the U.S. will not take much credit from cessation of testing. However, such a move will clear the air as to our general aims in disarmament. We must have more than this to recapture the initiative in world public opinion. He noted that we need during the preparatory talks to show the USSR that the U.S. really wants progress.

General Fox said he felt that the members of the working group were not in a position to make decisions, that they could not judge this issue adequately. *Mr. Farley* agreed but said that the group must examine disarmament policy and, on the basis of their knowledge, make a recommendation to the principals.

Mr. Keeney explained that this is what the Killian panel on nuclear testing had in effect done when it determined the impact on weapons development which would result from cessation of testing, even though it had not discussed military implications. *Mr. Farley* said that the working group is expected to deal with the issues such as test cessation. While the group cannot make final decisions it certainly must recommend courses of action to the Special Cabinet Committee.

General Fox reiterated that on the question of test cessation the Defense Department's answer would clearly be "no". *Mr. Farley* said in that case the group would report differing views and perhaps ask for more studies. *Admiral Foster* said that the group might very well come up with a consensus that test cessation would be unwise from a military point of view but that over-riding political reasons made it wise to stop testing. *Mr. Farley* agreed with this and said it was possible that one or all of the members might take the position either (1) that there should be no decision until HARDTACK had been completed and evaluated or (2) that in preparing for the 13th General Assembly we must have a change in policy.

Admiral Foster noted that it takes about six months properly to evaluate the results of a test series. This would be long past the opening session of the 13th General Assembly.

Mr. Amory said it was quite clear to him that the political deadline of the 13th General Assembly must be met.

General Fox said that from a national security point of view our vital security interest militated against a cessation of testing. *Mr. Spiers*

noted that our political relationships were as much a part of our national security as our military preparedness. *Admiral Foster* said that in view of the shortness of time, he felt that the working group should assume that over-riding political considerations do exist and that a Presidential decision to cease nuclear testing has been taken. The group could then evaluate the result of such a decision. He expressed the personal view that a decision had already been made that the U.S. must have a fall-back to its August 29 policy.

Mr. Farley explained that formerly, during Governor Stassen's tenure, the mechanism for policy change had been for Governor Stassen to make recommendations which were considered by the NSC and sent to the President for final decision. Now Secretary Dulles was the principal disarmament advisor to the President, with Ambassador Wadsworth as chief negotiator and Mr. Farley responsible for policy formulation. He said establishment of this group was an attempt to get interagency development of policy. Thus he felt the group must uncover these problems for eventual decision on a higher level. He noted that there had not yet been any decision on any of the questions on disarmament. It was the task of the working group to propose policy guides for such decisions. It must identify possible advantages of shifts in policy. On the testing question, it may only be able to identify the views of each agency.

Ambassador Wadsworth set 2:30 p.m., Monday, April 14, as the time for the next meeting of the working group.

312. Memorandum From Bethe to Killian¹

Washington, April 17, 1958

SUBJECT

Clean Weapons

[text not declassified]

It has been stated publicly that it would be possible to develop completely clean weapons in the course of five or more years of further testing. In my opinion, complete cleanliness has no significance

¹ Source: Development of clean weapons. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Nuclear Weapons.

in military applications of nuclear weapons. The military application mostly contemplated is the use of a clean weapon in a ground burst against a hard enemy target. In such an application, the neutrons coming from the weapon will create radioactivity in the soil next to the weapon. This radioactivity will be carried up with the debris of the weapon itself and will cause fallout in the neighborhood.

It has been estimated that the radioactivity in the ground is at least 1% of the radioactivity which would be produced in a pure fission weapon of the same yield. Since the radioactive materials formed in the ground are different from fission products, the radioactivity will change with time in a different way from that of fission products. However, calculations at Los Alamos indicate that this difference is not very great, and that at any time the radioactivity created in the soil will be of the order of 1% or more of the corresponding fission activity

[*text not declassified*] for sometime to come. It is conceivable that further technical progress and testing may make it possible to return to lead even for the smaller weapons, but this seems quite difficult, quite far in the future, and would undoubtedly be connected with a further loss in yield for a given weight.

For these reasons, and particularly because of the radioactivity necessarily produced in the ground, it does not seem of practical interest to develop clean weapons of a cleanliness of better than 1%. Whether such a development is technically feasible is not known at this time. [*text not declassified*]

According to Dr. Teller, Dr. Brown of the Livermore Laboratory, head of its Theoretical Division, is the person most competent on the development of clean weapons. In a recent conversation with him he was very skeptical whether a completely clean nuclear weapon could be developed.

The only circumstance in which a completely clean thermonuclear device might be of interest would be for peaceful applications. I do not know of any such applications at present. In the case of a deep, underground explosion for peaceful purposes, I believe that there would be other means of protection from the radioactivity than complete cleanliness. Besides, I do not think that the uncertain possibility of some peaceful applications would be a sufficient reason to continue nuclear testing merely for the purpose of developing a completely clean nuclear weapon.

Hans A. Bethe

313. Memorandum From Walmsley (IO) to Herter¹

Washington, April 20, 1958

SUBJECT

United States Position in the Security Council on the Soviet Complaint of April 18, 1958

Present instructions to Ambassador Lodge call for completion of consideration of the Soviet complaint in the Security Council as expeditiously as possible. As yet it is unclear whether the USSR intends to submit a resolution. If not, we continue to believe expeditious disposition of the Soviet item, without any resolution, is the preferable course of action. Submission of a resolution, in the absence of a Soviet resolution, does prolong Council action in circumstances where not too much political mileage will be gained.

Moreover, our submission of a resolution has certain disadvantages: (a) there is a strong risk that the USSR will seek Council endorsement of a summit meeting to deal with this and other outstanding issues among the Great Powers (although the USSR may do this in any event); (b) introduction of a resolution dealing with procedures to cover surprise attack or calling for a meeting of the Disarmament Commission risks opening up the overall disarmament problem, thereby providing an opportunity for the USSR to introduce a resolution calling for an independent test ban, a move that would embarrass us and our friends; (c) even with the Security Council weighted in our favor so that we can prevent adoption of a test ban resolution, Council failure to act on this issue might precipitate a move for a special Assembly session. In particular, the United States would have to oppose a Soviet proposal endorsing the unconditional convening of a summit meeting.

If the USSR submits a resolution, there are three alternatives open to us: (a) to reject outright any Soviet resolution submitted; (b) to amend any Soviet resolution; (c) to press for a resolution of our own. Whether outright rejection of the Soviet proposal is a desired course of action depends specifically upon its content. If, for example, the Soviet text is a clumsy attempt to condemn the United States, the Council members would reject it. However, if the resolution is of a more anodyne character, such as a bland endorsement of the need for peaceful and neighborly relations among states, the Council members might be reluctant to reject it outright. The possibility of amending any Soviet resolution depends upon its character. Even if amended and the USSR still votes for it, it will remain as a Soviet initiative, for which the USSR will claim future credit.

¹ Source: U.S. position on possible Soviet moves in the Security Council on "fail safe" procedures; includes draft Security Council resolutions. Confidential. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 330/4-2058.

There are, however, advantages to having a resolution, at least on a contingent basis in the event any Soviet proposal is of such a character that its outright defeat would be difficult. In particular, such an alternative resolution would have some or all of the following advantages: (a) to seize the initiative and turn pressure upon the USSR; (b) to maintain a United Nations link with subsequent consideration of the issue of disarmament; (c) to dramatize Soviet intransigence; (d) to maintain the integrity of the Assembly's resolution on disarmament; (e) to broaden the narrow scope of the Soviet complaint and focus attention on the entire complex of disarmament issues.

The attached draft resolution (TAB 1) has been prepared to stress the Secretary's interest in an inspection system for the northern zone, but within the disarmament package of August 29, 1957.

It is assumed that it would not be possible, in the time available, to separate out the aerial inspection proposal without a new decision of the United States Government, consultations with France, the United Kingdom and Canada who are associated with the August 29 package, and discussion with Canada and Denmark whose territory would be involved in any Northern Zone proposal. We have nevertheless prepared a draft resolution (Tab 2) covering this possibility.

To counter a possible Soviet proposal for a summit conference we have prepared a draft resolution (TAB 3) stressing the United States position on the need for preparatory diplomatic exchanges. The substance of this draft resolution could also be used to amend a Soviet proposal if this tactic should be desirable.

Tab 1

Draft Resolution

April 20, 1958

The Security Council

Having considered the complaint of the USSR of 18 April 1958,

Believing that effective steps toward a disarmament agreement at an early date are essential to the achievement of the purposes of the General Assembly's resolution 1236 (XII) entitled "Peaceful and Neighbourly Relations among States",

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1148 (XII) urging states concerned to give priority to reaching a disarmament agreement which, as one of its major elements, provides for: "The progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack",

Noting that the Disarmament Commission has not yet met and that the Subcommittee has been requested to report to the Disarmament Commission by April 30, 1958,

1. *Urges* the Disarmament Commission to meet forthwith and to take immediate steps to implement the recommendations contained in Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII),

2. *Calls upon* the members of the Disarmament Commission principally concerned to join in technical discussions looking toward the establishment of a northern zone of inspection against surprise attack, as proposed by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada to the USSR on August 29, 1957.

Tab 2

Draft Resolution

April 20, 1958

The Security Council

Believing that establishment of zones of aerial and ground inspection would decrease tensions;

Considering the desirability of such confidence-building steps as measures to prevent surprise attacks;

Recalling the General Assembly resolutions 914 (X) and 1148 (XII) which endorse such measures,

Calls upon Canada, France, United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR to seek early agreement on the establishment of a northern zone of inspection against surprise attack such as proposed by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada to the USSR on August 29, 1957;

Requests these parties to join at once in studies of the necessary technical requirements for the establishment of effective inspection in such a zone and to report promptly to the Security Council on the progress of these studies.

Tab 3

Draft Resolution

April 20, 1958

The Security Council

Having considered the complaint of the USSR of April 18, 1958,

Noting that certain members are initiating diplomatic exchanges to discuss matters of mutual interest, including the question of disarmament,

Expresses the hope that such diplomatic exchanges will make possible ultimate agreements on matters of mutual interest, including the question of disarmament.

314. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Herter¹

Washington, April 20, 1958, 5 p.m.

At my request, the President agreed to see me to discuss the projected moves to be taken by Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations on Monday, the 21st, in connection with the Soviet request for a Security Council meeting to consider the question “on taking urgent measures to end the flights of the United States military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs towards the frontiers of the Soviet Union.”

I advised the President of the suggestions which the Secretary had sent back to us from his plane trip to Duck Island and stated that these had all been incorporated in the speech prepared for Lodge to deliver. I also told him we had given careful consideration to the filing of a resolution of our own (Tab A) and had prepared two other resolutions (Tabs B and C) in the event the Soviets should file a resolution of their own and it would be necessary to protect our position. I told the President that after we had consultations with Ambassador Lodge and our own staff, I had felt it wiser not to file any resolution of our own if it were possible to dispose of whatever move the Soviets might make in a single session. However, should the Soviets at the last moment file any resolution other than a merely clumsy denunciation of the United States, members of the Security Council would undoubtedly ask for 24 hours delay in which to consider the resolution, and that I would then have an opportunity of consulting with him as to the next move.

The President read the draft speech Ambassador Lodge had sent us, which differed somewhat in arrangement and wording from our suggested draft but which in substance was almost identical. The President read it through carefully and, with the exception of two paragraphs which I had myself questioned, felt it was excellent and agreed that we should proceed along the lines recommended.

¹ Source: U.S. position on Soviet complaints about “fail safe” procedures. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 330/4-2158. Drafted on April 21.

The President then expressed real distress that releases apparently approved by the Department of Defense should have led up to the protest lodged by the Soviets. He called Secretary Quarles expressing his unhappiness with regard to these approved releases, and apparently Secretary Quarles said he would institute a very thorough review as to what had led up to them. I had told the President I did not think there was any security violation involved but that I thought the release of the type of information which had caused the difficulties should be carefully reviewed with the Department of State and the President in the future because of the international implications involved.

I have today sent to General Goodpaster a memorandum, with attachments, which showed that the whole "Fail Safe" concept had been made public as early as November 1957.

Christian A. Herter

Enclosures:

Three draft resolutions.

315. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Lodge and John Foster Dulles¹

April 20, 1958, 12:07 p.m.

The Sec. said he was having a meeting on the Soviet item. He said we are disposed to feel here that we ought to follow this up by positive action of our own which would involve a resolution by the SC calling on the parties to accept the principle of an Arctic zone along the lines of our proposal of last fall and to have the US, the Soviet Union and others involved designate technical people to study how to carry it out. Sec. said it seemed quite obvious that the SU was launching a new major propaganda theme. The Soviets may not have anticipated the rapidity of their defeat but they knew, they were not that stupid, that their resolution would be defeated in the SC. The Sec. said the theme would constantly reappear. It was present in Khrushchev's latest note—how we were sending these planes, etc. The Sec. said they can make big propaganda out of it. The Sec. said we could say surely this is a dangerous situation and the only sensible thing to

¹ Source: Follow-on to defeat of Soviet resolution. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

do is to follow the President's "Open Skies" proposal. It was a grave situation caused by the fact that we both have the capacity for massive surprise attack. The Sec. said if we got a resolution along these lines and the Soviets vetoed it, that would permanently spike their propaganda. Lodge asked what the Sec. wanted done about the Disarmament Commission. The Sec. said he wouldn't go there. The Soviets by bringing this case themselves have accepted the jurisdiction of the SC but not the jurisdiction of the Disarmament Commission. Sec. said we should have a meeting of the Disarmament Commission (they agreed any time) but not on this particular item. Lodge said he would arrange a *pro forma* meeting in the DC.

The Sec. said he would see the President today about the proposed resolution and would like to move on this by Monday. The Sec. said we would be having consultation and would be in touch with Lodge.

Lodge said they could do their business in the Security Council on Tuesday rather than Monday. It was difficult to get anyone to work over the week end. The Secretary said let us make Tuesday our target date. The Sec. said that the resolution which had been sent up was on a contingent basis. We would be working on a revised one. Sec. said he wanted to pin the Soviets down.

316. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Quarles and John Foster Dulles¹

April 23, 1958, 3:31 p.m.

The Sec just left the Pres. We were talking about the Soviet move in the SC. We are planning to go back at them with a proposal which in essence would say if you think this Arctic area is so dangerous why don't you agree to establish an inspection zone as we (Def and St etc.) agreed last fall. The Sec said it did not occur to him it would require further clearance because they approved the zone but he wanted to mention it. The Sec is sure the Soviets will veto and that will put us in the position we want to be in. Q said he does not think it will pose a problem but he wants Fox et al. to study it closely and will tell the Sec at NSC. The Sec said he talked with Lodge and they want to launch it Tues and want to speak to the British and French and other friends before.

¹ Source: Proposal to declare the Arctic an inspection zone. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

317. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Lodge and John Foster Dulles¹

April 24, 1958, 11:43 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB LODGE (MR WILCOX HEARD
MOST OF IT)

L's over-all feeling is favorable. Some people on his staff think we should never provoke a Soviet veto but L thinks the proposal should be the deciding factor and this has good qualities. The Sec said he is encouraged by the fact Defense went for it and read from their letter. L and the Sec agreed not to present this as a propaganda view.

L said Wadsworth said the Pres may make a nuclear test suspension speech of his own. The Sec never heard of it.

L said the para re the zone of inspection as proposed by us was rubbing their noses a bit. They went into that and mentioned saying as considered. L said he would put this in a telegram and the drafting officer could consider it.

L mentioned putting in something about having a technical group study it for a summit meeting to be held on these points—L thinks they won't want it. The Sec explained why he did not agree on that.

L said in the next-to-last paragraph strike "to settle the technical problems involved" and substitute "to make recommendations for agreement on the technical problems involved to be submitted to a conference of foreign ministers".

L asked re putting in Sweden and Finland. The Sec said a way might be found to include those areas if they agree. They have never been consulted. The Sec mentioned putting them in on a contingent basis. L is putting that in a telegram.

L asked re the speed of it and the Sec said if we have a Foreign Ministers Meeting that aspect would delay it.—The Sec mentioned saying making a report to be considered by the govts concerned through their foreign ministers.

L said now that we are going into the SC we should drop the disarmament comm mtg. The Sec is agreeable to drop it for the time being with the understanding we will have it sometime.

The Sec will restudy the res. L will wait until he hears and then will see the people there. The Sec said he may get Caccia in. L said he would like the changes telephoned to him.

¹ Source: Arctic inspection zone proposal. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

318. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Lodge and John Foster Dulles¹

April 24, 1958, 5:49 p.m.

L thinks the first reaction of the three is good and the Canadians were really enthusiastic. The Sec said Robertson seemed quite interested. Murray (#2 man for Canada) had an interesting idea, said L. Have Sweden co-sponsor. There is a lot of merit in asking them—at least they would vote for it. L wishes the Sec would think it over and maybe let him have a word in the a.m. The Sec said he had not given thought to sponsorship. Four powers? L said no. They agreed we have to do it anyway. L said Japan also was mentioned.

L thinks Houghton should speak to Jules Moch in Paris.

The Sec gave a little flavor of his talk this p.m. L said after this he is afraid Alphand will not get it across as the Sec would like him to and repeated re Moch.

L thought he would tell Hammarskjold and the Sec agreed.

L said Sunday he would plan to put out a call for a meeting Tues. He won't be able to sit down to sum up the language until Monday am but that is all right. L hopes for his speech text as soon as possible.

The Sec said he told them we would put it up not in a belligerent spirit but in the spirit of wanting to get something done. He explained it would save much money in view of NSC meeting this a.m. Robertson agreed.

¹ Source: Arctic inspection zone proposal. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

319. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Barco (USUN) and John Foster Dulles¹

April 25, 1958, 6:39 p.m.

B knows both the Br and Fr have agreed on this move. The Canadians have not been hard [*heard*] from. Barco talked with them and

¹ Source: Arctic inspection zone proposal. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

told them we would have agreement and he thought it would be helpful to speed up their reaction. They do not as yet know they have agreed as they (the Br) just left. The Sec said he thinks it would be helpful for the Canadians to know. The Sec said the Br had one or two minor suggestions about the phraseology and the French wanted it understood we would not let it open up into a European zone and the Sec assured them of that. They agreed Sweden's sponsorship could not be gone into—we do have time. B agreed. The Sec mentioned its leaking and they agreed it would be a good thing to put out the call tomorrow. Get the Canadian agreement and put out the call and then perfect the text Monday. The Sec said that won't be a great problem. The Br, said B, raised the question of publishing the text fairly soon after the meeting and they agreed this is good. B will call Lodge in Mass. B mentioned a northern zone as a term to use and the Sec said we can't do that because our Defense Dept has approved this in terms of that zone. Caccia suggested to the Sec to redefine it without identifying it. The Sec thinks that would be cumbersome but he will look into it. These were not conditions however.

320. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower¹

Washington, April 30, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a summary record of the discussion last Saturday with Al Gruenther, Bob Lovett, Jack McCloy and Bedell Smith. I am sending you separately some recommendations about the question of testing.

Faithfully yours

John Foster Dulles

¹ Source: Transmits a record of Dulles' meeting with disarmament advisory panel. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Disarmament.

Enclosure

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 26, 1958

SUBJECT

Meeting with Disarmament Advisors—April 26, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
General Gruenther
Mr. Robert Lovett
Mr. John McCloy
General Walter B. Smith

Ambassador Wadsworth
Mr. Philip J. Farley
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss
Mr. Donald A. Quarles
Mr. James Killian

The Secretary said that it was urgent that we do something to erase the picture which people abroad hold of the United States as a militaristic nation. This is a false picture which is belied by the facts. But it is difficult for the United States to change this picture in view of the way in which our press selects and publicizes sensational incidents and statements. In this respect the Soviet Union, with its ability to control what is known about it, has an advantage over a free society like that of the United States. This picture of continued military emphasis in the United States hurts us and probably causes us to lose more than we gain from small technical military advances. While our position is understood by the governments of our most important allies like Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, these governments are in various respects in a precarious position.

It is thus imperative that actions be taken which will make evident the United States interest in peace and in controlling armaments. A review has been underway by the interested United States agencies. The result to date has been to indicate that generally the familiar major areas of arms control must be considered in examining the possibilities for new initiatives. It does appear possible to break up the disarmament package. Already we have separated out the Arctic Zone and are planning an initiative on this April 29 in the Security Council. We have also recently emphasized the possibility of commencing technical studies of inspection of various disarmament measures as a practical way of making a start.

The Secretary then proceeded to review the position on the various elements of the present disarmament package.

1. *Tests*—The President's Science Advisory Committee has recently reached a conclusion that an inspected test suspension at the end of the HARDTACK series would be in the interest of the United States on

military technical grounds. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, however, believe that tests should continue. The United Kingdom not only wishes to complete its planned tests this year, but also does not feel able to give up further testing unless the results of United States weapons tests can be made available to the United Kingdom through amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. Paradoxically, Prime Minister MacMillan says agreement on nuclear test suspension is the only foreseeable result of a summit meeting.

2. *Nuclear Cut-Off*—A suggestion by Admiral Strauss has been given some consideration. This calls for shutting down fissionable material plants in order to ease the inspection problem and require cannibalisation of weapon stockpiles to meet peacetime requirements. However, this was strongly resisted by the United Kingdom which depends on its fissionable material plants for its nuclear electric-power program. Accordingly, no major change in this area is being considered.

3. *Surprise Attack Zones*—We have already decided to separate out the Arctic Zone of inspection against surprise attack. There is a difference of opinion, between General Norstad on the one hand and Chancellor Adenauer and the Defense Department on the other hand, regarding the desirability of accepting European zones of inspection independent of a zone involving North America, and also regarding the possibility of a small European inspection zone covering only Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

4. *Outer Space*—The idea that outer space might be used only for peaceful purposes has been viewed hopefully as a possible major United States initiative. Careful studies by Mr. Killian, however, have raised danger signals. The Soviet Union appears to be significantly ahead of us in ballistic missiles development. If we ceased testing ballistic missiles in the near future, the Soviet Union might have an operational ballistic missile capability, while we would not. As for a broader control of missiles, the inspection requirements for elimination of missiles production and stocks appear to exceed by far any inspection system hitherto contemplated. Accordingly, it appears that this proposal should not be pushed and that the most that can be looked for is some cooperation in peaceful exploration of outer space.

5. *Armed Forces and Armaments*—Some adjustment in our position on this matter will probably be worked out, but the Secretary did not feel that this was an area where we could look for significant or major steps.

The Secretary continued that the inter-agency working group would report shortly. When decisions had been taken, consultations with our allies would then get underway.

He suggested that Admiral Strauss, Mr. Quarles and Mr. Killian expand on the views which he had summarized.

Admiral Strauss said that he thought the nuclear test matter was a false issue. The danger to humanity lies in nuclear war not in nuclear tests. If we were to freeze testing, the Soviet Union would have proven nuclear warheads in sizes up to four megatons, together with offensive delivery systems. The United States would not have defensive systems. And the United States will need clean warheads since defensive missiles would be exploded over the heads of us and our allies.

Mr. Quarles agreed with Admiral Strauss. Even though the United States is ahead qualitatively in warhead development, our needs are different from those of the Soviet Union and there is not a reciprocal situation. So the JCS and the Defense Department after careful study believe it is not to our advantage to stop nuclear tests unless there are important compensating gains in other arms control areas. Admiral Strauss added that he doubted that agreeing to a test suspension would help us significantly with world opinion. He pointed out that even our gains from a positive move like "Atoms for Peace" had been evanescent.

Mr. Killian said that his *ad hoc* panel had looked at the testing question from the technical point of view and had found that the United States would, as Admiral Strauss and Mr. Quarles agreed, have a lead in nuclear warhead development over the Soviet Union at the end of HARDTACK. They had also found that an adequate inspection system to monitor a test suspension agreement could be devised. Another *ad hoc* group had studied the missiles situation and had reached the conclusion summarized by Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Killian continued that the Science Advisory Committee had then studied these matters from a broader military and technical point of view. They had a very great concern over the possibility that the USSR might in the near future call for a unilateral missiles test ban. They had reached the conclusion that, if the United States could act soon on nuclear test suspension, it might be more difficult for the Soviet Union to couple a suspension of both nuclear tests and missiles tests.

His Committee had then looked at the overall defense picture. They had concluded that not only would the United States have a lead in nuclear warheads over a wide range of sizes and types, [text not declassified]. The Committee felt that it was valid to question the need for five more years of testing just in order to make marginal improvements and to clean up these weapons.

Mr. Dulles asked whether further small testing could be done underground. Admiral Strauss said that it could, but that the information obtained would be reduced as a result. He remarked that there would be gaps in the warheads available after HARDTACK; for example, we would have [text not declassified] less than 1600 pounds. Mr. Killian pointed out that we would have the Nike-Zeus warhead. Admiral

Strauss said that this would not be clean and his medical advisors considered too many air bursts would be dangerous. Mr. Killian said that his Committee had studied this question and had found that even if all the warheads of our estimated anti-ICBM requirements were fired, the danger point in radiation would not be reached. He pointed out also that we would have a polaris warhead and thus have warheads for solid fuel missiles.

Mr. Dulles said that in considering these various technical judgments it must be remembered that unless in the next few months we do something to show that we are for reducing arms, we may over the next few years lose Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. Do we want further refinement of nuclear weapons at the cost of moral isolation of the United States? He pointed out that action on nuclear testing was the only real possibility in the areas that he had reviewed earlier. If there were other new ideas with the appeal of "Atoms for Peace" or "Open Skies" he would welcome them. We can push the surprise attack zones, but there are limits to what these can do for us especially in Europe. The outer space proposal was imaginative, but it appears now that the possible loss to United States national security would be greater than the psychological gains would justify.

Mr. Lovett said that he thought United States agreement to suspend nuclear testing would have a doubtful effect. We want an adequately inspected test agreement. Whatever the Russians may have said, they will not agree to what we consider adequate inspection. We will thus lead into another argument about how much inspection is needed, in which we may well not gain in world opinion, which will think we are putting obstacles. He thought also that the first question was not disarmament but whether there should be a summit meeting. General Smith said that he did not think we could avoid a summit meeting. Mr. Lovett thought that the foreign ministers meeting would be crucial and that the western position on an agenda should be carefully worked out and the intentions of the Soviet Union tested there.

General Gruenther suggested that an authoritative scientific study be obtained establishing conclusively that test fallout was not a danger to health. Admiral Strauss and Mr. Killian pointed out that the National Academy of Sciences and United Kingdom Medical Research Council had already done this. Ambassador Wadsworth said that a report on radiation by the United Nations Scientific Committee would be forthcoming shortly. While it was overwhelmingly reassuring, the one or two sentences about the genetic danger would in his opinion get all the headlines, and be used against us.

Mr. Killian said that he was concerned that the fallout from HARD-TACK, even though not dangerous in itself, will aggravate the situation and will give our opponents a chance to play up the health hazard.

Mr. McCloy said that he was concerned also about reaching a test suspension agreement at the summit. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will not talk about changing the *status quo* in Germany or Eastern Europe. And test suspension is a Soviet proposal; it would be better to take our action unilaterally rather than merely to say yes to a Soviet proposal. If the only agreement at a summit meeting is nuclear test suspension and Central Europe problems are not discussed, we will effectively have abrogated our position on German reunification and Eastern Europe, despite our protestations.

Mr. Dulles said that he agreed with Mr. McCloy's concern but our allies do not. Chancellor Adenauer wants disarmament as the sole agenda item for the summit. He will not insist on including German reunification for fear he will be charged with using that as an excuse to evade disarmament.

Mr. Lovett said that he was strongly opposed to a summit meeting leading to agreement only on test suspension. If the United States was going to take this step it should be announced now. If some form of agreement is required that should be worked out at a foreign ministers meeting. General Gruenther recalled the difficulties arising from the attitude of the British and French toward nuclear tests and the British and German toward the need for a summit meeting. Mr. Dulles said that his point about German attitudes was to illustrate the popular pressure for disarmament in Germany. He remarked that the United States would insist on raising the question of German reunification even if no Europe ally did.

Mr. Lovett and Mr. McCloy said that our agreement to suspend nuclear tests should be announced unilaterally, and thus taking the steam out of the pressure for a summit meeting. Mr. Dulles observed that this would make sense—it would then be absurd to have a summit meeting just to talk about the control posts and similar technical details. General Smith said that a summit meeting was probably unavoidable, but the danger would be greater if it occurred and led only to a test suspension agreement.

Mr. Quarles said that he was skeptical that the United States would get any cold war gain from stating willingness to agree to test suspension on condition of adequate inspection. He thought that the United States faced a basic dilemma. We cannot escape from our responsibility to maintain adequate devastating striking forces in the face of Soviet power—until a fundamental solution is reached embracing inspection and world order. What we should say at a summit meeting is that we will take any step which will make progress toward such a fundamental solution. Mr. Killian remarked that inspection of a nuclear test suspension would be a step toward such a solution.

General Gruenther commented that the recent United Nations Security Council meeting was a defeat for the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles said that we handled the meeting well, but that the Soviet Union certainly had expected the result. They took this step as the kick-off of an intensive propaganda campaign. Khrushchev has referred since to the danger of American bombers in his latest letter. Now the satellite governments are sending protest notes.

Mr. Dulles said that it appeared the right course of action would be for the United States to take action now on the nuclear test matter—perhaps by announcing readiness to stop nuclear tests for 12, 18 or 24 months. We would resume testing if an effective inspection system was not operating by the end of the period. He asked the reactions of the advisors.

Mr. Lovett said that he would favor this move if it would reduce the prospects of a summit meeting. Mr. McCloy agreed; he felt that in this way we could avoid jeopardizing our position on Central Europe at a summit meeting. General Gruenther expressed concern at the unilateral element. It would be hard for us to resume testing once we stopped, and accordingly the precise way in which the announcement was put would be very important. Mr. Dulles said that of course the United Kingdom would have to join in such a statement. As for the manner of putting it there could be a call for several stages: an initial agreement on an inspected suspension, a check point after a year on progress in installing the inspection system, and then the full operation of the inspection system. General Gruenther said that this kind of approach would meet his concern.

General Smith said that he favored such a move, but thought that we should not delude ourselves that the Soviet Union will accept adequate inspection. Admiral Strauss said that he foresaw that we will gradually be whittled down from 70 stations to 50 stations then 25, 10 and perhaps less. Mr. McCloy said that he thought even 10 stations would be worthwhile in view of the political gain of Soviet acceptance of inspection.

Mr. Dulles thanked the advisors for joining him and giving him the benefit of their counsel.

321. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

Washington, April 30, 1958

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 13 March 1958, subject as above, and to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation, dated 21 March 1958, subject: "The Effects of Total Suspension or Cessation of Nuclear Testing."

2. In these memoranda the effect of a cessation of nuclear testing on the United States relative to the USSR was analyzed. Based on this analysis these memoranda reflected the belief that, unless considered only as a part of a larger disarmament proposal to include suspension in the production of weapons and weapons material and an effective inspection system the over-all long-range effects of a test cessation will be to the distinct disadvantage of the United States. In view of recent increased pressures for the cessation of tests the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider a reiteration and amplification of their views on this subject necessary.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that an adequate military position for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems, which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat. Among the programs of weapon development for which future testing will be essential in order to provide this flexibility are:

a. Small, low-yield, highly mobile weapons for tactical and ASW uses.

b. Modern, light-weight, and instantly ready weapons of sophisticated design for use against hostile aircraft.

c. Warheads for anti-missile use.

d. Deterrent and retaliatory weapons, including warheads for second generation IRBM, ICBM, and FBM missiles.

e. A family of clean weapons.

4. The HARDTACK test series now underway, including the scheduled firing at Johnston Island prior to 1 September, is vital to the defense of the United States. Certain key shots, particularly those essential to the design and operational employment of the anti-missile missile, are crucial in the weapons development program. As past tests bear out, it cannot be presumed that this test series will be a total success or will

¹Source: Views of the JCS on suspension of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 3 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers, Chairman's Files.

in fact provide all of the much needed answers for presently foreseen military applications. Even if the HARDTACK tests are a complete success, there will be a continuing requirement for additional testing. Cessation of testing by us at any time in the foreseeable future would freeze our weapons research at a point far short of the objectives cited above. Moreover, if the USSR continued testing on a clandestine basis, both offensive and defensive weapons in our stockpile could quickly become obsolete. Further, it is believed that the matter of parity with, or supremacy over, the USSR may have been accorded undue emphasis in past considerations of test cessation. It is fallacious to assume that a present superiority in either numbers or types of atomic weapons would be maintained or that numerical superiority would in itself provide the free world with the capability to cope with all future situations.

5. In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize their great concern over the numerous proposals for cessation of weapons tests, especially when this cessation is divorced from a larger disarmament proposal which would provide also for complete suspension of the production of weapons and weapons materials, keyed to an effective system of inspection and verification.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you convey these views to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*/S/ N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff*

322. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

May 1, 1958, 11:47 a.m.

The Pres finished the Sec's memo re Sat and does not see anything stated about the enactment of the law—and there is a part where we start talking about announcements—the Pres is sure the UK will not agree to anything unless we have a law. The Sec is not sure about that. The Sec did not have in mind doing anything for a month or more until we know what

¹ Source: Congressional role in possible suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

is happening and the Sec thinks we should have a meeting with Strauss and Quarles who do not agree. The Pres is concerned re moral isolation. The Sec said by the end of the tests we will be unless we accompany it with some declaration. Don't think we need do it before June or July. The Pres said if we do anything before Congress acts we will stop them from acting. The Pres said Congress this year is causing more trouble than the previous four. The Sec thinks we can get the legislation through if we agree within 30 days they pass a concurrent resolution opposing it—they would think we won't carry it through then. Everybody is in agreement except the Dept of Justice. This has happened before. If it lies before Congress for 30 days Congress will express its views and it is highly unlikely 30 days.... The Pres said a concurrent resolution is bad—he can veto a joint res. This other takes 2/3s. The Pres thinks it would go through better if Strauss were not so disliked. The Sec does not think we can get it without the concurrent resolution or some control by Congress,—over each specific agreement. The Pres would not care if it were joint—the Sec said they won't take it. We have allowed concurrent resolutions to stop Exec action in several cases. The Sec said it is up to Justice now—he does not know what their final views will be. The Sec said you are asking them to lift a prohibition. The Pres said we don't want to upset the balance to get temporary advantage. But if there has been precedents all right. The Sec said Defense and AEC have agreed they do not see any substantive objection to the procedure. The Pres thinks the AG will say there is nothing unconstitutional but he does not like it. The Pres said then the approval mentioned in the last para is under the assumption the law will be passed. The Sec said that was right—this indicates the trend of our thinking—he does not want approval now but will discuss it further tomorrow.

323. Record of Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

May 2, 1958

S/S:

There follows, for limited distribution, an excerpt from a conversation between the President and the Secretary on May 2:

“I said that I thought that as soon as I returned we should have a meeting and try and shape up our presentation on possible suspension

¹ Source: Possible suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

of testing of nuclear weapons. The President inquired again about the status of the legislation. I explained the question of allowing agreements to be ineffective if within 30 days there was an adverse concurrent resolution. The President said that he felt while in general there was a duty to prevent any legislative encroachments, he recognized that this was a legitimate case for an exception and authorized Mr. Herter to inform the Attorney General accordingly. I said that the proposal had been concurred in by Defense and AEC."

D.E. Boster

324. Telegram 1259 From USUN¹

New York, May 2, 1958, 5 p.m.

1259. Re US Position on Fallout.

Suggest Department give consideration to basic change in US public posture re hazards of fallout. As seen from here US policy of always belittling hazards in public pronouncements has made it possible for Soviets to cast US as the apologist for fallout, and thereby to turn exclusively against US world's increasing concern re these hazards. Present situation with Soviets having completed test series and ours just beginning enhances their opportunity promote this development, which might lead to serious anti-American trend world public opinion. In carbon-14 they even have propaganda answer to clean bomb.

Despite combination factors unfavorable to US in present situation, and regardless US position on testing itself, however, believe there would be distinct advantages in courageous change to full and frank exposure fallout hazards consistent with UN Radiation Committee report. Our repeated belittling of fallout hazard appears decreasingly effective with public opinion, and losing US respect of informed people. Convincing posture of candor this issue will reaffirm that America stands for truth and humane consideration.

Moreover, believe we must consider long-range possibility Soviets have not really stopped testing and that time may come when we oppose testing and they continue, taking into account probable relative

¹ Source: U.S. position on fallout. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-258.

levels and rates of nuclear weapons development (we ahead and they catching up), and fact our policy more responsive to people.

To carry out above suggestion, immediate start could be made by official statements interpreting fully for layman nature and degree genetic and other effects radiation based on reports National Academy Sciences and Radiation Committee. Attitude displayed these statements should deplore any damage caused people of world and future generations, and show desire give balanced interpretation in terms meaningful to average man. Believe dismissal as “negligible” has become counter-productive.

Additional helpful step would be prompt and regular publication worldwide fallout data. Understand US in best position do this. Since widespread irrational fear partly based on lack of factual information, believe putting matter on route basis of common knowledge would dispel honest fear and defeat alarmists.

Believe US can gain much by fully backing up Radiation Committee and scientific conclusions in its report, thereby showing our respect for scientific truth and at same time putting whole issue in reasonable perspective.

Believe timing these steps urgent in view July release report, observation nuclear test, and forthcoming debates radiation, testing, and disarmament issues.

Lodge

325. Memorandum for the Files by Spiegel (S/AE)¹

Washington, May 3, 1958

The following are my comments on USUN 1259:

I realize that we are on a “sticky wicket” with respect to the fallout problem. I do not believe, however, that a “change in public posture” on the hazards is called for. I fail to see how our position can be characterized as being “apologetic” for fallout. I believe that if anyone takes the time to read carefully Dr. Libby’s remarks and reports such as the one issued by the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine

¹ Source: Comments on U.S. position on fallout. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Fallout.

that he would discover that we have been giving "full and frank exposure" of the fallout hazards.

In all of our official public utterances, we have sought to put radiation emanating from fallout into proper perspective. I fail to see how we could improve our position by agreeing with the dire, unwarranted conclusions of some scientists such as Linus Pauling and Dr. Schweitzer.

USUN has now sent three telegrams dealing with the carbon 14 problem. I recognize that we have been somewhat remiss in not getting an answer back to them. In this connection I would point out that experts in the AEC have been studying now for some two weeks the principal report of concern, namely one submitted by the USSR, sent to the Scientific Committee; however, something should be available next week on this report. In such matters as this, I think it is well to err on the side of caution and not rush into something which might be misleading and inaccurate. Dr. Libby's comments with respect to carbon 14 help to put the carbon 14 matter into proper perspective. The letter in THE NEW YORK TIMES of May 2 by Dr. Kulp and others should help.

The hearings on fallout conducted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy last summer offer the best evidence that we withhold nothing on the matter of fallout. A review of the statements made there and since then would show that we are aware of risks from radiation, but that the risks from radiation from fallout are minimal when compared with radiation received from cosmic rays, etc.

Maybe we can find a synonym for "negligible"; however, to me "negligible" is a good word and expresses the situation accurately.

We do publish regularly and as promptly as possible data on the world-wide distribution of fallout. Cumulative totals are now available through June, 1957. Later data on certain areas have been released but as a general rule we are almost a year behind in analyzing samples. When one considers the magnitude of the fallout collection operation and the limited number of people who are qualified and capable of analyzing the samples and the complexities involved in the conduct of the analyses, it is remarkable that we are not more than a year behind. With respect to "complexities", several months efforts were required to develop adequate means of analyzing radio-chemically the samples collected by balloon. In the past good samples of soil and other items have been destroyed through improper analysis. There is the "fly paper" operation and the "steel pot" operation carried out by HASL. There is the balloon program conducted by General Mills on behalf of the AEC and the AFSWP high altitude aircraft monitoring program. Food samples have been collected in various parts of the world as have soil samples, bone samples, etc.

Unless the draft of the UN Scientific Committee's report has been changed radically from the previous drafts, I believe that its release

should not cause us too many difficulties. The facts and conclusions are not dissimilar from those released by the NAS–NRC, and the British Medical Research Council in June, 1956.

To the best of my knowledge, no one has suggested that we not “back up” the Scientific Committee’s report.

CC: UNP—Mr. Owsley (2); and AEC—Adm. Foster (3).

326. Telegram 1283 From USUN¹

New York, May 8, 1958, 4 p.m.

1283. Re: Mytel 1277.

One of principal gains we made from SC debate of Arctic Inspection Zone was way debate dramatized difference between our willingness to open our territory for inspection and flat Soviet refusal.

Making this contrast clear brought out sharply principal reason why we keep our defenses at their present level.

Our defense measures are principal propaganda targets used by communists to undermine our popularity in world. Popularity affects tenure of our bases among other things and therefore is an important military factor.

We must therefore make every effort to make sure non-communist world understands our reasons for continuing to be suspicious of Soviet intentions and thus our reasons for keeping up our defenses.

Experience in SC shows that when our openness is compared with their secrecy, we gain decisively. This is the point we have been trying to make when we insisted on inspected disarmament. But the point is not often made with enough clarity to make the man in the street understand it. We ought to be stating it over and over again because it is a point on which they are fundamentally weak and we are fundamentally strong.

We can build on what we achieved in SC last week by following up with theme of communist secrecy versus our openness.

This is simple yet fundamental idea which should be pressed at every opportunity.

¹ Source: U.S. openness contrasted to Soviet secrecy. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 330/5–858.

For example:

1. Whenever the disarmament question comes up we should continue and redouble our emphasis on inspection—on “open sky”, on the idea of “openness”, on the suspicions and dangers of war caused by excessive secrecy.

2. As soon as possible but not later than the 13th GA we should draw together this and other topics—Open Sky, the IGY, the cultural exchange program—into a top-level, long-range proposal for opening the USSR and the US to unrestricted travel by each other’s citizens; unrestricted sale of each other’s newspapers, magazines, books and films; exchange of professors by hundreds and university students by thousands; equal access to each other’s domestic radio and TV networks; and similar steps to build mutual confidence in an open world. There should be no difficulty in making such a proposal so far reaching USSR would undoubtedly reject it but so reasonable that we would earn wide sympathy and USSR would be put on continuing defensive.

Lodge

327. Telegram 1310 From USUN¹

New York, May 14, 1958, 7 p.m.

1310. Re UN Report on Effects of Atomic Radiation.

1. In our opinion comprehensive report of UN Scientific Committee on effects of atomic radiation likely to give further impetus opposition to nuclear tests on health and medical grounds, generating further political difficulty for US on testing issue.

2. We think this will be case in spite of fact report shows health hazards from testing are statistically only fraction of hazards from medical and natural sources. It seems to us numerous deleterious effects from radiation, which is main subject of the report, will heavily outweigh this fact in public mind and that there will be opposition to any dangers from tests, no matter how small.

3. We recognize few of facts contained are entirely new and that many of them actually stem from report US National Academy of Science. But UN report inevitably does not have qualifications re security

¹ Source: U.N. report on effects of atomic radiation. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1458.

of West included in academy report. Furthermore UN imprint of new study will give it world-wide attention and sanction, directing official opinion more strongly to problem than before.

4. Examples of material included in report which we think may cause public reaction follow. We are afraid this material will be taken out of context and used without qualifications included in report. It may therefore be given great emphasis by press or, for political reasons, by other countries:

A. Rice eaters (e.g. Asians) may get five times as great a “marrow dose” of radiation than milk drinkers (e.g. Americans and British).

B. Children, foetuses and embryos are probably particularly susceptible to radiation and especially to radiation-produced leukemia and bone tumor.

C. Increased radiation may negatively affect intelligence level and life span.

D. Even smallest amounts of radiation are liable to cause deleterious genetic, and perhaps also somatic effects.

E. Because of delay with which somatic and genetic effects may appear, full extent of damage is not immediately apparent.

F. Even slow rise in environmental radiation could eventually cause appreciable damage to large populations before damage could be identified as due to radiation.

G. Continued tests could result in 2,000–30,000 cases of leukemia, 6,000–170,000 bone tumors and 1,000–120,000 major genetic defects per year under most disadvantageous assumptions made in report (on basis tentative figures in current draft).

5. We understand (Deptel 789) Dept feels Belgian draft para for conclusion (para 54, previously 45) best obtainable under circumstances in committee. We should be prepared, however, for probability that conclusion by saying “cessation of contamination of environment by explosion of nuclear weapons (is one of steps that would) act to benefit of human health” will be regarded in and outside UN as calling for test suspension for medical and health reasons.

6. While understand we would be in position to say we were developing bombs which would not contaminate environment and that committee recognized factors other than health were relevant to decision, net effect undoubtedly be to increase pressures for test suspension. Nor do we think argument that some radiation danger is acceptable cost for Western defense likely make much progress against emotionalism on this issue, especially as we are regarded as more advanced in atomic field and because most military benefits necessarily not revealed to public. Similar comment would apply to argument pointing out tentative and highly uncertain nature of conclusions in report, to which answer would be any error must be on safe side.

7. Comments:

A. If we are making progress toward policy favoring test suspensions, believe it is of overriding importance that we announce this new policy prior to release of report.

B. If we are not we should be prepared with reasonable and constructive response to anticipated reaction which takes fully into account medical and health problems report elucidates.

Lodge

328. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 15, 1958

SUBJECT

Reply to Khrushchev letter of May 9 on Technical Talks

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Mr. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Kohler, EUR
Mr. Farley, S/AE

The British Ambassador called at the Secretary's request.

The Secretary handed the Ambassador copies of the proposed US reply to Khrushchev's letter of May 9 agreeing to technical studies of the methods of detecting violations of a possible test cessation agreement.

After reading the draft letter Ambassador Caccia said that his government had two points of interest in the Khrushchev letter. First, they did not want to seem to be dragging their feet and thus give the Soviets a propaganda advantage. On the other hand they wanted to know what we would say and would like to get together with US experts before meeting with the Russians.

The Secretary referred to the discussion he had had on this subject with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at Copenhagen on May 6, 1958. He said that Selwyn Lloyd had thought perhaps a distinction

¹ Source: Possible technical studies of methods of detecting violations of a test cessation agreement. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

could be made between testing of small bombs and those of a megaton or more. The Secretary had then suggested the possibility that the termination of atomic testing might be approached in two phases. Detection of megaton explosions would be relatively easy. Smaller weapons required more refined and elaborate methods of detection and this might be developed in the second phase. Thus there would be more time for the testing of smaller weapons. The Secretary said he had mentioned this idea to Dr. Killian whose preliminary reaction was that some such gradual approach might be practical.

The Secretary agreed with the Ambassador that we should concert our views on the subject. While a meeting with the Soviets should be definitely scientific and technical in nature, the experts should of course not be left without guidance of experienced political advisers. In this connection he cited the experience of the Japanese trade negotiations with the Chinese Communists in which the Japanese trade experts had innocently agreed that the Chinese Communist trade representatives in Japan should be allowed to fly their flag. This had led to all kinds of complications. The proposed technical talks on methods of detecting tests would be full of political booby traps, e.g., the problem of placing control installations possibly in Communist China or Russian attempts to have such installations placed on Taiwan or in Vietnam. Certainly the head of the delegation should be technical, but must have competent political guidance.

The Secretary then went on to say that he thought it imperative that we should reply quickly, mentioning in this connection that the US draft had been acted upon rapidly following his own return to Washington and had been approved by the President, Defense Secretary McElroy, Atomic Energy Director Strauss, and Dr. Killian. Following British agreement we would propose to advise the French and the Canadians of our plans and then lay the matter before the North Atlantic Council.

Ambassador Caccia said he felt the Canadians would be quite agreeable though he feared that the French would be sensitive on the subject. In this connection he referred to a conversation of UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld with the Russian UN Ambassador. Sobolev had interpreted the Khrushchev letter as meaning bilateral US–UK talks which Mr. Hammarskjöld had said would be completely unacceptable. If the talks were to be convened within three weeks the Ambassador thought US and UK experts should be brought together almost immediately, probably next week. It would be useful, he said, to have an early indication of our thinking. In this connection Mr. Farley said that he would try to get the Killian study on the subject to the British tomorrow and follow up later with a fuller statement.

Ambassador Caccia remarked that action regarding a test suspension from the British point of view would be dependent upon the fate of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. The Secretary recognized that while it would be clearly stated that these technical talks were

undertaken without any political commitment, obviously we would be engaged in a course which would inevitably bring us closer to suspension of tests. The Secretary then drew the Ambassador's attention to Mr. Khrushchev's reference to the Arctic as being the shortest route for missiles between the USSR and the USA. He felt this was a foolish slip on the part of the Russians of which we might be able to take advantage.

329. Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Strauss¹

Washington, May 16, 1958

Admiral Strauss discussed with me the question of suspension of testing. He indicated that if we thought it politically important it might be possible to announce before the end of the HARDTACK series that future testing would only be done under conditions which would assure no fallout. He gave me in this connection the report of his General Advisory Committee, copy attached.

I reported on Lloyd's desire to extend the period for the testing of the smaller, e.g., less than one megaton, weapons, and my reply to Lloyd that it might be possible to deal first with detection machinery covering the big explosions with a second phase which would be introduced only later dealing with the smaller tests. Admiral Strauss seemed to think this might be possible.

I spoke of the composition of the experts who might function if this was agreed on with the Soviet Union. He suggested that there should be experts designated as jointly agreed between AEC, Defense, CIA and Dr. Killian. I said I thought we should have a meeting on this subject in the near future and I would try to set it up for next week.

I said we were not clear as to whether the Soviets would accept UK experts or merely wanted U.S. and Soviet experts. Strauss suggested that in the latter case we might keep in touch with the UK and perhaps have the meetings in London.

Admiral Strauss spoke very highly of General Norstad's testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee and suggested I should thank him. Admiral Strauss thought that the amendments could be put

¹ Source: Suspension of testing and reducing fallout from tests; includes report of Strauss' General Advisory Committee. Top Secret; Personal and Private. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.

through, particularly if we would accept the formula for disapproving agreements with other governments by a concurrent resolution. I asked how it would be if we accepted it by a two-third's vote. Admiral Strauss said he thought this might squeeze through and he would talk to Pastore about it if we wished.

I recalled my conversation with the President yesterday, in which the President indicated that there was doubt whether Admiral Strauss would continue to serve beyond his present term. The Admiral expounded on his reasons for this. I said that if he should not continue to serve, I felt that his services should be kept available to the Government and that he might, for example, be a consultant in the State Department with a mention to be a sort of "ambassador-at-large" for atomic peace matters, having in this respect the personal rank of ambassador, if and as he went abroad. Admiral Strauss indicated that something like this would be agreeable to him.

JFD

Attachment

May 7, 1958

The General Advisory Committee feels that the country is approaching a crisis with regard to the continuation of atomic tests on anything like the present scale. While most of the widely disseminated arguments against further tests are exaggerated and unsound, there is widespread uneasiness in the country over the prospect of constantly increasing radioactive fallout, and even many sincere scientists share this feeling. The statements of the President regarding a possible change of policy after the completion of the present series of tests make it important in our unanimous opinion that a statement should be issued before the end of this series, indicating that hereafter we are willing to restrict tests so that future fallout will be deeply reduced.

In our opinion the least concession which the Commission could offer with prospect of winning over a substantial part of the sincere opposition would be to say that hereafter the great bulk of our tests would be carried out underground, with no fallout production, and that tests in the atmosphere would be limited so that the maximum fission yield from the tests of the free nations in any year would not exceed a megaton providing the Russians agreed to a similar limitation. If they did so, and our allies cooperated, we would reduce the addition to potential fallout to between 10 and 20% of the average annual addition resulting from the tests made during the past four years. What is more important, in view of the rate of radioactive decay, etc., we would *actually not increase the total amount of potential radioactive fallout beyond that prevailing this summer.*

Admittedly the policing of this agreement would not be easy but an international inspection agency could be created which could determine compliance fairly accurately for each side. And, as a matter of fact, such a policy would penalize us so little that we might continue it for some time even if Russia did not cooperate. Actually, the only tests of any size and importance which now appear could not be carried out underground, would be in connection with the development of anti-missile missiles and some "plowshare" tests.

While a majority of the Committee recommends that the first proposal be the one made, it would be possible to go still further if necessary and eliminate all above-ground testing for a period of, say, two years. This would make it much harder to develop anti-missile missiles. It would also prevent tests on some peaceful uses such as "ditch-digger" unless special exceptions were made for them, possibly under international inspection. Such an agreement could not be readily policed, especially on small weapons, and would probably be evaded by the Russians unless there were extensive policing inside Russia, but it would practically eliminate any addition to fallout during the period the agreement was effective.

The Committee is unanimously agreed that to go any farther than this in the restriction of testing would seriously endanger the security of the United States.

330. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

May 17, 1958, 5:15 p.m.

The Sec. said we had certain complications on the reply to Khrushchev about the experts to be set up to detect testing. The British say, and he is inclined to agree with them, that if we set this up as British, French and the USSR, this will be picked up in France and used by a lot of people there, saying the French were being pushed around, etc. Sec. said you could go back to bilaterals but pick our experts from whatever country, including UK and France, or you could say that in view of the fact that the UK has made explosions and in view of the fact France is

¹ Source: Question of including the U.K. and France in U.S.-Soviet discussions on detecting testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

advanced in this field, we think France should be included. Sec. said he had tried to get hold of Dr. Killian in connection with the practical problem of getting experts of other countries. Killian said it would be a lot together but it would be bearable. The Sec. said he had not yet been able to get in touch with Strauss.

The Sec. said he would see the British Ambassador at 4:30 on Sunday to give him his reaction. By that time the Sec. should be able to get in touch with Strauss.

The Sec. said when we had the German problem the Germans did not demand to be there but wanted to be consulted. Sec. thinks the British and French would expect to be consulted. It was far simpler to discuss on a bilateral basis. He thought the Soviets would probably press it on that basis. Then we would be faced with the alternative of doing it bilaterally or break. Sec. said he didn't think the Soviets would accept a lineup of the US, UK and France against the USSR. Sec. thinks they would accept a lineup which says in effect the US and the USSR will pick their experts wherever they choose. We could pick French, Belgians, Japanese. Sec. said he thought there would be no problem of our being chairman of the group.

The Sec. said he would have drafted some formula on this subject and would see the President after church on Sunday. In the meantime the President could be turning this over in his mind.

331. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 18, 1958

SUBJECT

Reply to Khrushchev Letter of May 9

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State,
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Lord Hood, British Minister

¹ Source: Discussion of response to Khrushchev's letter. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

John Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy
Foy D. Kohler, EUR
Philip Farley, S/AE

The British Ambassador called at the Secretary's request at his home at 4:30 p.m.

The Secretary handed Sir Harold the revised draft reply to the Khrushchev letter of May 9. After reading the draft, with apparent approval, the Ambassador said he supposed we wanted it submitted to the British Government as rapidly as possible. The Secretary confirmed this, adding that he hoped we could receive their views tomorrow. The Secretary indicated that we were open-minded about including Canada in the draft. The Ambassador suggested that the draft be put up to the Canadians with their names specifically mentioned; they could then indicate what they wanted. In response to the Ambassador's inquiry, the Secretary confirmed that we contemplated putting the letter to the French and the Canadians first, before submitting it to the North Atlantic Council.

The Ambassador observed that the words "at least partially" in the first paragraph met the British Government's first point, and that the new formula removed the danger of affronting the French. In this connection he observed that it looked like it would be deGaulle anyway and that in France it would be said that we pushed the French into it. The Secretary said that in view of developments in France it would be too dangerous to appear to exclude the French at this time.

The Secretary went on to say that we recognize that the new formula involves some risks. We could expect that the Soviets would designate technicians from East Germany, Communist China, Hungary—indeed from practically every objectionable area from our point of view. He said, however, that he had discussed the problem with the President and we were disposed to accept such designations provided the individuals were competent experts.

In conclusion, Sir Harold commented that he thought the new formula was very good psychologically and that it would give us an advantage with public opinion, especially in the U.K. He said he would give the Secretary the British Government's views as soon as possible.

332. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Herter¹

May 30, 1958

The President telephoned me this morning in connection with a letter he had just received from Prime Minister McMillan concerning the exchange of information on atomic weapons which has just been approved in committee on the Hill. He said that any agreement under the bill will have to be laid before Congress for 30 days this year and 60 days thereafter before it can become operative. In that case, we will have to do some fast work.

I said I had talked to Admiral Strauss and we think we can step up our time table very materially. We have a draft reply to McMillan which we will get to the President before he leaves at 12:15 stating, in effect, that we will be in a position to have preliminary discussions with Plowden when he arrives next Wednesday, and shortly thereafter will be in a position to communicate with him about a time for the team of experts to come over. The President said he thought that, instead of aiming at the 1st of July, we should get it done by the 15th of June or we may get in trouble. I told him the only thing we had to be careful of was not to let word get out that we had begun negotiations before Congress has completed action.

The draft reply to McMillan was telephoned to the White House and the President called back at 12:05 p.m. to say it was all right with the exception of the first sentence of the second paragraph, which he suggested be changed to read: “. . . the discussions *by the experts* can in fact progress quickly”

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Reply to Macmillan letter on exchange of nuclear weapons information. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

333. Memorandum of Conversation Between Strauss and Herter¹

Washington, May 30, 1958

I telephoned Admiral Strauss this morning and told him Prime Minister McMillan had just written the President a letter stating that he is most anxious, now that the Congress appears to have approved the exchange of information on atomic weapons, to begin discussions as soon as possible. McMillan wants to send experts over here as soon as he is given the high sign. I told Admiral Strauss I understood June 16th would be the earliest date we would be in a position to talk to the British. We feel that we should have a completed draft of our own before we start discussions with them, but that, if at all possible, we should have such a draft before June 16th. Admiral Strauss said his people are at work on a preliminary draft now, that he would see how it stood and call me back this morning.

Admiral Strauss telephoned me a little later to say that his people have been working on the draft bilateral for some time. There have been some minor differences between them and Defense and they had been allowing time to straighten these out. However, he thinks they are relatively immaterial. Admiral Strauss said we could say to McMillan that we would be in a position to have preliminary discussions with Plowden when he arrives next Wednesday, and shortly thereafter would communicate with him about a time for the British team of experts to come over. Plowden will then have had a chance to review what we have and we will be in a better position to decide on the timing.

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Reply to Macmillan's letter. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

334. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1958

SUBJECT

Meeting with U.S. Experts for Geneva Technical Talks on Nuclear Test Detection

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. James B. Fisk
Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence
Dr. Robert Bacher
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny

The Secretary
S/AE—Mr. Farley
S/AE—Mr. Spiers

Dr. Fisk, who called at his request, introduced Drs. Lawrence and Bacher, who had been designated to serve as U.S. experts at the proposed Geneva technical talks on nuclear test detection, and outlined some of the preliminary work that the experts had been doing in preparation for the talks.

The Secretary emphasized to the group the importance which he and the President attached to the work the experts were to do in Geneva. He expressed gratification that men of their caliber were willing to undertake this assignment. He stressed also that he saw the group's mission as being purely technical in character: the purpose of the meeting would not be to reach political conclusions or to determine whether a given system with a specific level of capability would be sufficient. These decisions would be reached in Washington, on a political level, but the work done by the scientists and their views on the technical issues involved would weigh heavily as considerations. We had no idea, of course, whether the USSR would approach the meeting with serious purpose, or whether they would be willing to accept the inspection which we thought, at minimum, was necessary. *The Secretary* did not feel that a technically perfect system would be necessary, and that a lesser system which created an unacceptable risk for the USSR in undertaking violations might be adequate.

Dr. Fisk gave the Secretary a copy of the draft outline of points to be covered in the talks (attached) which he hoped the Department of State would be willing to send to the USSR to put them on notice about

¹ Source: Agenda for talks with Soviet Union. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6-658.

the extent of our preparations and to increase the possibility of having the Soviet experts similarly prepared. In response to the Secretary's questions, *Mr. Farley* said that he thought the suggested procedure was a good one.

Attachment

Draft Outline

June 9, 1958

*Technical Factors Which our Delegation Considers Relevant to a
Discussion of Monitoring a Nuclear Test Suspension*

- I.
 - A. Detection and identification by techniques and procedures, including:
 1. Acoustic
 2. Seismic
 3. Electro-magnetic
 4. Nuclear (air samples, ground samples)
 5. Visible light (high alt.)
 6. Mobile inspection teams
 - B. In physical environments:
 1. On earth's surface and at low altitudes
 2. At very high altitudes
 3. Underground, also underwater
 - C. For yields of:
 1. less than 1 KT
 2. 1 to 10 KT
 3. 10 to 100 KT
 4. above 100 KT
 - D. Carried out in locations including:
 1. USSR
 2. US (continental North America)
 3. Pacific and Australia
 4. Arctic and Antarctic
 5. Far East
 6. Southern Hemisphere oceans
 7. Africa and South America
- II. Some special questions to be considered:
 - A. Are there methods of evasion; e.g. can a 50 KT test (underground) be made to look like to 10 KT? 1 KT?
 - B. Possible interference with detection systems; e.g. introduction of excessive noise in seismic systems;

- C. Need for additional information in such areas as:
 - i. Observed seismic effect vs yield in underground tests;
 - ii. Variations in seismic coupling between a nuclear explosion and various underground environments.
-

335. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1958

SUBJECT

Proposed Nuclear Test Detection Discussions

PARTICIPANTS

Admiral Lewis Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Dr. James B. Fisk
Dr. Robert F. Bacher
Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
Mr. Donald R. Morris, S/AE

During the course of a background briefing on the preparations for the proposed Geneva nuclear test detection discussion, *Dr. Lawrence* told Admiral Strauss that they strongly felt the need for some underground shots to gain data on seismic coupling. *Admiral Strauss* noted that preparations for such shots were currently being made at the Ranier site and that he thought these could be speeded up. He would, on the basis of this oral request, undertake to facilitate such shots, but would need a formal letter during the course of the next week from Dr. Fisk. It was generally agreed that several underground shots of varying yields were necessary in order to obtain a picture of the yield versus seismic signal function. In addition, it would be very helpful to have one shot of the same yield as one of the series shots under conditions designed to decouple.

¹ Source: Proposed nuclear test detection discussions. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6–658.

336. Telegram 8917 to London¹

Washington, June 13, 1958, 9:39 p.m.

8917. You should deliver soonest following reply from Secretary to Prime Minister's letter of June 11 (pouched Embassy yesterday):

Dear Harold:

VERBATIM TEXT. June 13. Dear Harold:

Your letter of June 11 raises two points which came up in our discussions in Washington with respect to the nuclear test problem.

On the first, the possible variants in types of explosions which we might agree should be excepted from a suspension of nuclear tests, I agreed that this is one of the questions which should be thoroughly considered in working out our ultimate policy on nuclear test suspension. We hope to be able to approach you shortly on this as well as other disarmament matters, and the question you mention should be one of those discussed. My own view is that we should not reach decisions about this matter before the Geneva technical talks. The information developed there will probably allow us to take a closer look at this problem in the light of the Soviet attitude and in particular the degree of inspection they appear to be willing to accept. It may turn out to be necessary to approach the problem of test suspension in stages as you have proposed.

With respect to the second point, the need to approach the Geneva talks in an exclusively scientific spirit, we are in full agreement. Our respective experts have held preliminary discussions here in Washington and I understand there is a gratifying measure of agreement between us on the approach to be taken. Faithfully yours, Foster. *END VERBATIM TEXT*

Dulles

¹ Source: Transmits Dulles' reply to Macmillan letter. Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/6-358.

337. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, June 19, 1958

SUBJECT

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

REFERENCE

NSC 5725/1

The enclosed Semiannual Report by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State on the Implementation of NSC 5725/1, for the period December 1957–June 1958, is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

The Atomic Energy Commission advises that the enclosure is classified SECRET only because of paragraphs 54 and 55, which were furnished by another agency and were so classified. The remainder of the Report is unclassified.

Discussion of the enclosed Report will be scheduled on the agenda of an early Council meeting.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: Transmits Department of State-AEC semiannual report on NSC 5725/1, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Secret. 34 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725.

Enclosure

Semi-Annual Progress Report

SEMIANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NSC 5725/1—PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

1. This report summarizes significant events during the period December 1957–June 1958 under NSC 5725/1, “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” dated December 13, 1957. Because many of the items relate to several sections of the policy paper, the information is not keyed to specific paragraphs.

SUMMARY EVALUATION

2. U.S. leadership in peaceful uses of nuclear energy was affirmed during the reporting period when the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) requested U.S. cooperation in considering whether a joint nuclear program might be developed to install within the Community by 1963 sufficient U.S.-type enriched fueled reactors of proven design to supply 1,000,000 kilowatts of electric power. The EURATOM program ranks with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as one of the most important projects to be undertaken within the framework of the President’s Atoms-for-Peace program. It is presently in the final stages of negotiation.

3. Other significant developments include new offers of assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency; steady advances in controlled thermonuclear research paralleling those in the United Kingdom; development of an equipment grant program similar to the research reactor grant program; continuing assistance to other nations in the development of national programs; negotiation of a comprehensive power Agreement for Cooperation with Japan, and the increasing scope of U.S. preparations for participation in the Second United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

4. Meanwhile, Great Britain has revealed a “stretch-out” in the phasing of its massive nuclear power program, the target date for completion being moved from 1965 to 1966. There are indications of further slippage in the Soviet program. A 40-stage gaseous diffusion isotope separation pilot plant is reported to have begun operation in France in December 1957. Interest in nuclear propulsion for commercial vessels has increased, particularly in Japan, West Germany, Norway, Sweden, and France. U.S. firms maintained their dominant position in the foreign market for research reactors, but neither the U.S. nor any other

country announced any new export sales of nuclear power reactors during the reporting period. U.S. firms, however, are bidding on several projects abroad.

5. The initial five year U.S. power reactor development program has undergone a number of modifications during the past four years. New experimental power reactors have been added to the program; research and development on materials, processes and advanced concepts have been expanded; and cooperative industrial efforts have materialized as an important part of the program. Considerable experience in the design and construction of power reactors has been gained during these four years of concentrated effort and we are beginning to accumulate necessary operating experience. In short, the AEC and United States industry as a whole have gained a considerable degree of sophistication in power reactor technology. This record of accomplishment has kept the United States in a position of world leadership in this field.

6. As the initially defined period of the United States power reactor development program draws to an end, Commission re-evaluation of its objectives and plans, made with particular awareness of the increasing importance abroad of nuclear power, resulted in its determination that the following objectives are desirable and feasible:

a. Achievement of competitive nuclear power in the United States during the next ten years.

b. Achievement of competitive nuclear power in friendly foreign nations during the next five years through a comprehensive program of assistance, clearly defined and vigorously pursued.

c. Fortification of the position of leadership of the United States in the eyes of the world and the peaceful applications of atomic energy, particularly with regard to power.

7. *EURATOM*. The incentives to be offered the Euratom Community under the joint program being developed with the United States (see pars. 35–39) will require consideration as to their adaptability to other areas of the world. On the part of Euratom it will be necessary to obtain full support from the operating utilities within the six member countries, and Euratom also plans to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with the International Agency and with the O.E.E.C. Negotiations will be undertaken upon the request of Euratom to integrate existing U.S. bilateral agreements with member States into a comprehensive agreement with the Community.

8. In the course of negotiations with Euratom a special arrangement was developed for safeguarding materials supplied to Euratom by the U.S. under the proposed joint program. Under this arrangement the U.S. will receive all of the guarantees and assurances required by the Atomic Energy Act that none of these materials shall be used for

other than peaceful purposes. In addition, the principles which will be used in establishing and implementing the Euratom safeguard system must be mutually acceptable, the U.S. will assist Euratom in establishing their system, there will be frequent and continuing consultation to assure that the system is operating effectively under the agreed upon principles, and the U.S. has the right to terminate the cooperative program if the system is not operated in accordance with these principles. These principles also will be compatible with the safeguard provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. It is anticipated that this special safeguards arrangement, made with the multi-national organization Euratom, may draw criticism from other nations which have different safeguards provisions in their agreements for cooperation with the United States. Also, Mr. Sterling Cole, Director General of the IAEA, expressed the opinion that the IAEA should have the responsibility for safeguarding the material supplied to Euratom by the U.S. It is the judgment of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission that the special arrangement with Euratom is entirely adequate and will provide the U.S. with assurance that none of the material will be used for any military purpose. The close ties of these countries to the U.S. through NATO and the traditional support of the U.S. for institutions, such as Euratom, which foster European unity justify this special arrangement. Further, it is recognized that inspection of the program by the IAEA is politically infeasible at this time.

10. As a result of the discussions with Mr. Cole, the U.S. has proposed, and Euratom has agreed, that (a) the IAEA shall have the right of first option to purchase any special nuclear material, produced in reactors fueled with materials obtained from the U.S., which is in excess of the need of Euratom for such material for peaceful uses; (b) Euratom is prepared to consult with an exchange experiences with the IAEA with the objective of establishing a safeguards system reasonably compatible with that of the IAEA. In addition, there has been an exchange of letters between the United States and Euratom concerning the language contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on Safeguards and Controls recognizing that such language provides for verification, by mutually approved scientific methods, of the effectiveness of the safeguards and controls system applied to nuclear materials from the other Party and fissionable materials derived therefrom. Further, Euratom has advised the United States that in the event of the establishment of an international safeguards and controls system by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States and Euratom will consult regarding assumption by that Agency of the safeguards and control of fissionable material utilized and produced in implementation of the program contemplated by the Memorandum of Understanding.

11. *Safeguards.* Favorable results of the feasibility study of tamper-proof instruments to reduce manpower requirements are expected in June, but the numbers, recruitment, and training of sufficient personnel for a world-wide inspection system remains a formidable problem. No difficulties have been encountered by Commission teams that have inspected the start-up and initial operation of the six U.S.-built reactors now in use abroad, although the over-all question of inspection remains potentially a serious political problem.

12. If the Agency is unable to acquire special nuclear materials on financial terms and conditions more favorable than are available to Members through other sources, principally the United States, the IAEA will have difficulty in competing with bilateral programs. By law, the U.S. can make special nuclear material available to the Agency only on terms comparable to those offered domestic users in the U.S.

13. Although the IAEA is progressing with the tedious tasks of organization, firm U.S. leadership will be required to assure that the Agency moves into its programmatic phase as soon as possible.

14. *Bilateral Agreements.* The United States' bilateral program, inaugurated in 1954, is about complete; and it is not anticipated that many more important bilateral agreements will be negotiated. The emergence of regional groups and the International Agency will require a reassessment and possible modification of the bilateral program in order to be assured that the institutional approach most beneficial to the interests of the United States is given priority. Such a re-assessment will have to take into account the bilateral programs of other nations, such as the U.K. and Canada.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

15. *United States Domestic Program.* The power reactor development program of the United States has moved ahead on a broad front both from the standpoint of technology developments and industrial participation. Progress has been made in the whole range of effort, from laboratory research on new materials and processes to construction and operation of large-scale commercial nuclear power plants. Particularly important is the continued promise of the boiling water and pressurized water family of power reactors. A new and promising type of power reactor is being developed which uses organic fluids for cooling the fuel elements, avoiding corrosion of fuel elements and the problems of induced radioactivity in the coolant.

16. As of this time there are seven power reactor experiments and one completed prototype power reactor in operational status in the United States. The prototype plant, the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, at its designed rating of 60,000 electrical kilowatts net, is producing more electricity than any other individual reactor in the world.

17. Experimental operation of these plants has, in the main, been very gratifying. Three of the boiling water reactors, EBWR, BORAX-IV, and VBWR (a private project) have performed far above their designed ratings, indicating a potential for capital cost reductions. In addition, successful operation of several of these plants has relieved much of the serious concern once felt about certain operating characteristics. Operation of the Organic Moderated Roaster Experiment, for example, thus far, shows no evidence of fouling of heat transfer surfaces and gives added confidence that the cost of makeup for the organic material can be acceptably low.

18. The civilian power effort has clearly advanced to much firmer ground as a result of this encouraging operating experience and the direction of development required to achieve economic nuclear power can now be charted with more certainty.

19. It has become clear that the achievement of economically competitive nuclear power in the United States will require a continued aggressive program including design, construction, and operation of successive generations of nuclear power plants of the same basic type. Several generations of plants must be built in order to gain the experience which will lead to cost reductions through engineering improvements. The fact that these plants are expected to be economically competitive in other countries (with higher power costs) before this goal is achieved in the United States provides an economic incentive for a certain amount of integration of our domestic development program with our foreign assistance program in the nuclear power field. The building of some "middle generation" plants in other countries can provide progress towards the goal of economic nuclear power in the United States for the lowest government cost. The principal activity in U.S. efforts to facilitate the building of reactors based on U.S. technology in other countries has been the negotiation of an arrangement with Euratom to provide assistance in the building of one million electrical kilowatts of nuclear power to be in operation by 1963 in those countries.

20. It is recognized that power reactor technology which is most advantageous for the United States may have certain limitations or disadvantages when applied to the design of nuclear power plants for other countries. The principal example of this problem is the possible reluctance of other countries to become heavily committed to power reactors which require partially enriched uranium if this fuel is available only from the U.S. This factor is considered in the planning of the U.S. power reactor development program. However, all U.S. studies have continued to show that real advantages of flexibility of design, compactness, higher performance, and resulting lower power costs can be obtained from the use of partially enriched fuel rather than natural uranium. Meanwhile, these advantages are becoming better recognized

by the program planners in other countries. Moreover, the successes experienced by the U.S. in the execution of its experimental reactor program have added confidence to the U.S. approach. Reactor designs requiring partially enriched fuel also are receiving more favorable consideration as a result of U.S. policies on the supply and prices for enriched fuels.

21. It is expected that all of the power reactors being developed by the United States will be suitable for export in varying degrees. The projects include development of fuel cycles based on both source materials (uranium and thorium) and all fissionable materials considered applicable as fuel (U-235, U-223, and plutonium). The "exportability" of most of the designs being developed by the United States will be further improved by development and demonstration of technology for recycling plutonium. Thus, many systems which require partial enrichment of the core might be operated on an initial charge of partially enriched fuel, plus a natural uranium feed stream which is enriched with recycled plutonium. The development of plutonium fuel technology has expanded. Construction of laboratories for further expansion in plutonium fuel development has been initiated. Construction of a Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor also has started at the Commission's Hanford facilities.

22. The power reactor program has continued to explore power reactor designs which could operate on natural uranium. Pursuant to Public Law 85-162, extensive design work was performed on natural uranium gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors. In addition to use of natural uranium cores, consideration was also given to designs using partially enriched cores. It was concluded that with present technology, there is a significant economic advantage to the use of partially enriched uranium fuel in this type reactor.

23. Development work on heavy water moderated power reactors which would be operable on natural uranium proceeded in accordance with previous plans, but no acceptable proposal was received from industry for carrying out design and construction of a demonstration plant. Design work conducted to date has been inconclusive with respect to the economic promise of this system with natural uranium fuel, although indications are that it would have minimum penalty in ultimate performance and costs compared with partially enriched systems. Additional work, including construction of a Heavy Water Components Test Reactor, is planned. Work on several of the cooperative projects under the Power Demonstration Reactor Program also is pertinent to the evaluation of heavy water moderated reactors which might be operable on natural uranium fuel.

24. The Commission has reiterated its policy of taking the initiative to assure that desirable and necessary power reactor prototypes are built as justified and permitted by the status of pertinent technology, if such projects are not undertaken by industry on its own or through cooperative projects with the Commission. To this end, funds have been requested for construction of an experimental prototype gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactor using slightly enriched uranium and for further design effort on a heavy water moderated reactor of sufficient size and proper design to be operable on natural uranium fuel. It continues to be the policy of the Commission to give industry every opportunity to participate and bear or share the cost of these projects.

25. Contracts have been negotiated for construction of the Sodium Graphite Reactor at Hallam, Nebraska, one contract being with Atomic International for construction of the reactor and one with Consumers Public Power District for other parts of the plant and for operation of the total plant.

26. Design and construction of this plant depend upon data derived from experimental operation of the Sodium Reactor Experiment at Santa Susana, California. Initial difficulties with the SRE having been largely overcome, it now appears that design work on the Consumers plant may proceed. Accordingly, in February, an architect-engineer (Bechtel Corp.) was selected to perform preliminary design.

27. In addition to its positive steps to assure timely completion of plants for which it has assumed primary financial and technical responsibility, such as the PWR and the Hallam Plant, the Commission takes a positive interest in expediting construction of plants being built as cooperative projects or as entirely privately financed plants. In these cases, Commission action must take the form of expediting research and development supporting or pertinent to individual projects, assuring adequate liaison and flow of information, and prompt handling of matters related to the Commission's regulatory and licensing responsibilities.

28. Prior to the advent of nuclear fission, naturally occurring radioisotopes were scientific curiosities whose scarcity and expense limited their usefulness to such things as radium therapy and luminescent watch dials. Today, with the potential availability of tremendous amounts of radioisotopes of all the elements, these materials are rapidly taking their place as one of the more important tools of industry, medicine and agriculture.

29. The strides which have already been made in the utilization of radioisotopes are evidenced by the fact that it is conservatively estimated that industrial uses alone are resulting in annual savings in this country of greater than five hundred million dollars. When this is considered in conjunction with the immeasurable benefits that even now

accrue to millions of people through the diagnostic and therapeutic use of radioisotopes to alleviate human suffering, it is evident that in this modern genei we indeed have one of the most, if not the most, important peacetime benefits of atomic energy.

30. In spite of these accomplishments, we are far from satisfied. The industrial savings mentioned above can be attributed almost exclusively to use of radioisotopes in thickness gauging, flow and level control, and industrial radiography. There are in fact hundreds of other ways in which radioisotopes can bring about benefits and savings equal to or greater than those already realized. Even in such areas as thickness gauging and process control, in which radioisotopes have already proven their worth manifold, the surface has only been scratched. All major industrial effort involving carbon and hydrogen containing materials—and these cover organic chemicals, petroleum products, plastics, rubber, etc.—can expect to use radioactive carbon and hydrogen safely and efficiently in process control techniques that will result in untold savings. To a greater or lesser degree, the same may be said of the use of radioisotopes in almost every other industrial effort.

31. The potential of radioisotopes as a source of power in atomic batteries and luminescent sources has hardly been touched. The life, stability, mobility, and dependability of batteries and light sources using radioisotopes makes their utility almost unlimited.

32. Perhaps the most exciting general industrial application of radioisotopes, and certainly the one which seems to have the greatest potential impact on the entire industrial effort, and on the economy of the nation, is the utilization of massive radiation (million to billions of curies) from these radioisotopes to bring about, on an industrial scale, chemical and physical changes which either cannot be accomplished by other means or which can be accomplished by other means only expensively or inefficiently. Such things as the pasteurization or sterilization of feeds to retard decay, the formation of new linkages in plastics or rubber to bring about desirable changes in properties, the modification of the conditions of petroleum cracking to make that process cheaper and more efficient, the sterilization of drugs and medical supplies, the control of biological and botanical pests, and the development of new and improved strains of plant life, to name but a few, should, within the next few years do much toward making man's life longer, healthier and more enjoyable.

33. In view of the impressive progress which has already been made in the application of radioisotopes and radiation, in recognition of the tremendous potential good which can result from the use of these materials, and with the knowledge that the other major nations of the world—particularly Britain and the U.S.S.R.—are making great strides in this field, the Commission has established an Isotope Development

Program to accelerate these applications. This program, which is budgeted in FY 1959 at 6.6 million dollars, through work in Commission laboratories and through contracts for work in academic and industrial laboratories, will attempt to discover new uses and to make it possible for industry and science to exploit the already known uses of radioisotopes. In addition to its own program in this field, the Commission is working closely with the Quartermaster Corp of the Army in the design and construction of a two megacury Co-60 irradiator for use by the Quartermaster Corp in its program of large scale pilot irradiation of food at its Food Irradiation Center at Stocton, California.

34. Project PLOWSHARE, which has been in progress at the University of California Radiation Laboratory since 1957, investigates potential peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. During this year it will pass from the study phase to that of active experimentation. A survey is now underway to verify the feasibility and desirability of the Alaska Harbor Project announced on June 9, 1956. Cancellation or change in location could be forced by insoluble problems of safety, danger to wild life, lack of material, economic benefit, or engineering infeasibility; but to date no problems appear to be insoluble and it seems that the project will be fired in 1960. Other industrial applications of seemingly great promise are under investigation and it seems probable that one or more specific experiments will be made in 1959. Among these applications are: oil recovery from shales or tarsands, mining, production of aquifers for improvement of water supply or flood control, power production, and scientific experimentation in seismology, geology and special chemical reactions. No one of these applications has yet been proven feasible but all appear to justify further experimentation. The production of useful isotopes has also been the subject of theoretical study, laboratory work, and small-scale field experimentation. This work will continue. The AEC is also taking steps to establish cooperative relationships with industry for the prosecution of some of these experiments. These steps will include requests for legislation where necessary. It appears that the first cooperative venture will be an experiment in petroleum recovery.

*UNITED STATES FOREIGN PROGRAM, REGIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*

35. *EURATOM*. The European Atomic Energy Community (*EURATOM*) came into being on January 1, 1958, and in February the President approved in principle a joint U.S.-*EURATOM* program based upon, the following courses of action:

a. Participation by the U.S. on a lean basis in financing the capital costs of nuclear reactors capable of producing approximately 1 million kilowatts of electricity;

- b. Supplying the necessary special nuclear material to fuel the reactors;
- c. Entering into arrangements with regard to reactor fuel cycles reasonably consistent with those offered in the U.S. domestic program;
- d. Extending the present U.S. direct program of fuel cycle development and testing;
- e. Establishing a 10-year cooperative program of research and development;
- f. Assisting in the establishment of a training program, arranging for the exchange of technical information, and establishing a liaison office at EURATOM headquarters;
- g. Continuation by the U.S. of a strong program of research and development on advance reactor types, basic reactor technology, etc., and providing such information to EURATOM for use in meeting long-term objectives.

36. Within this framework, a Joint U.S.-EURATOM Working Party has held discussions in Europe and in Washington, and has developed a detailed program now under consideration within the Executive Branch prior to submission to the Congress. This program may be outlined in the following manner:

a. The proposed program will have as its objectives, (1) the bringing into operation by 1963, within the Community, of large-scale power plants using nuclear reactors of proven types, on which research and development has been carried to an advanced stage in the United States, having a total installed capacity of approximately one million kilowatts of electricity and under conditions which would approach the competitive range of conventional energy costs in Europe; and (2) the initiation of a joint research and development program centered on these reactors;

b. The total capital cost, exclusive of the fuel inventory of the nuclear power plants, is estimated not to exceed \$350,000,000. These funds would be provided for by the participating EURATOM utilities and other European sources of capital, such financing to be arranged with the appropriate assistance of EURATOM. Up to \$135,000,000 would be provided by the United States Government to EURATOM in the form of a long-term line of credit to cover a portion of the capital costs. These funds would be re-lent by EURATOM for the construction of nuclear power plants covered under the program;

c. In addition, in order to reduce the risks in operating costs to a point where the widespread participation of the European utility industry is assured, the United States, for a ten-year period of operation, would guarantee ceiling costs for the fabrication of the fuel elements required under the program as well as a fixed life for the fuel elements;

d. The proposed joint research and development program, which is for a 10-year period, would be centered on the improvement of the performance of the reactors involved in the program and at a lowering of fuel cycle costs. During the first five (5) years, the financial contribution of the Community and the United States would amount to about \$50,000,000 each, with the sum required for the second five (5) year period to be determined at a later date;

e. Technological and economic data produced in the program would be made available freely to the industries within the Community and the United States and the widespread dissemination of the information would be assured;

f. Under the terms of the program, the United States would sell to the Community, a net quantity of 30,000 kilograms of contained U-235 in uranium to cover the fueling and other requirements of the program over a twenty year period. An initial operating inventory of 9000 kilograms would be sold on a deferred payment basis. The balance would be paid for on a current basis. The International Atomic Energy Agency would have the right of first option to buy, at the announced fuel value price in effect with the United States at the time of purchase, any special nuclear materials produced in reactors fueled with materials obtained from the United States which are excess of the Community's need for such material for peaceful purposes. If IAEA does not exercise this option, the United States would be prepared to purchase such materials on the same terms;

g. The United States and the Community would recognize their mutual interest in assuring that the materials received from the United States, as well as special nuclear material produced therefrom, are used only for peaceful purposes, and an arrangement to accomplish this objective compatible with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency would be developed;

h. The United States will process in its own facilities, under the same terms and conditions as are offered to U.S. industry, spent fuel elements from reactors to be included in the program.

37. The Joint Working Party has finished its task, and the EURATOM Commission and Council of Ministers have approved the program. After final approval within the Executive Branch and after Congress has approved an international arrangement between the U.S. and EURATOM, the program will be incorporated in an Agreement for Cooperation under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In addition, the following legislative steps will be necessary:

a. Authority to enter into long-term arrangements for the purchase of plutonium and the reprocessing of material;

b. Authorization for the distribution of special nuclear material, for the joint research and development program, and for the fuel cycle.

38. It should also be noted that a Presidential allocation of additional U-235 to cover the requirements of the EURATOM program will be necessary.

39. A total of \$140,000,000 in authorization and funding will be required. Maximum cost of the fuel cycle arrangements is estimated at \$90,000,000 over a 10-year period with the first expenditures probably coming in 1962. The first 5-years of the joint research and development program is estimated to cost the U.S. approximately \$50,000,000 with EURATOM also making available approximately \$50,000,000. In 1959, \$25,000,000 obligational authority is required—\$10,000,000 for fuel cycle funds and \$10,000,000 in research and development money

with \$2,000,000 expenditures in the latter item expected in FY 1959. Other loans and credits in paragraphs 35 and 36 would not require new money authorization.

40. *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*—Steady progress was made on recruiting a staff for the Agency. Its 1958 calendar year budget is \$4,000,000. The program is expected to expand rapidly in 1959; therefore, the budget will increase. Estimates running as high as \$12,000,000 were discussed at the April Board meeting but the budget to be presented to the IAEA Conference in September is expected to be somewhere between \$6,000,000 and \$9,000,000.

41. The agenda for the second IAEA General Conference scheduled for late September 1958 is now being prepared. Meanwhile, the first program project of the Agency, a survey of nuclear developments and opportunities in Latin America, began in May. The international team selected by the IAEA is headed by Dr. Norman Hilberry, Director, Argonne National Laboratory, and includes representation from the Organization of American States.

42. The Agency has signed an agreement with the United Nations establishing its autonomous relationship with that organization and is negotiating similar agreements with the specialized agencies of the U.N. A draft Agreement for Cooperation with the United States is under negotiation.

43. With the formal offer by member States of special nuclear, source, and other materials, the Agency now has significant materials resources. These include the 5,000 kg contained U-235 offered by the U.S. and the U.S.-matching offers for the 50 kg and 20 kg pre-offered respectively by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Canada, India, Ceylon, South Africa, Norway, and Portugal have made various offers of material to the IAEA.

44. New U.S. offers of assistance were made to the Agency during the reporting period: (a) cost-free services for limited periods of 20–30 expert consultants; (b) matching contributions, up to \$125,000, to a fellowship fund for training abroad; (c) the allocation of 120 fellowships for training in the U.S. at an estimated cost of \$840,000, and (d) two mobile radioisotope laboratories. Additionally, the AEC has requested \$2,000,000 in FY 1959 funds to implement previous offers of a research reactor and radioisotope facilities.

45. *European Nuclear Energy Commission (OEEC)*. The European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), operating under the OEEC Nuclear Steering Committee, came into being February 1, 1958. At ENEA's request, the United States will provide technical and consultative assistance for the \$12 million pilot chemical processing plant to be built at Mol, Belgium. This is a joint project of 12 OEEC Members under a

convention establishing the European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (EUROCHEMIC).

46. As a country associated with the work of the OEEC, the United States is following with interest other OEEC programs, such as the security convention now in the process of ratification; the drafting of third party liability legislation, and feasibility studies regarding the use of Iceland's natural steam fields in connection with a heavy water production plant.

47. *Organization of American States (OAS)*. Drafting a statute for the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission continues. The first IANEC meeting is planned for early 1959. We believe it would be desirable that a second Inter-American Symposium on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy be held in late 1959 or 1960 in a South American country under the aegis of the new Commission. The Department of State and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission have agreed that full participation by the United States should be extended if such a Symposium is held.

48. *Puerto Rico Training Center*. The Puerto Rico Nuclear Center, which is operated by the University of Puerto Rico for the AEC, is intended to serve as a regional nuclear training center for Latin America. Initial operation of the center, in facilities made available by the University, and using some \$300,000 worth of nuclear equipment provided by the AEC, has proceeded successfully. Some 50 students, mostly from Puerto Rico, have now been trained in radioisotopes techniques, and the first course in nuclear engineering is in progress.

49. The principal facilities of the Nuclear Center will consist of a research reactor and associated laboratories, to be located at the Mayaguez Campus. The design of these facilities is in progress and contracts for their construction are expected to be awarded by the end of FY 1958, with completion scheduled in FY 1960. The cost of these facilities is estimated at \$3 million. An additional \$500,000 has been requested in the FY 1959 budget for a medical radioisotopes laboratory to be located at the San Juan Campus.

50. Upon completion, the Puerto Rico Nuclear Center will be able to accommodate upwards of 100 students annually in various phases of nuclear training, plus a number of research associates. Annual operating costs of the Center at that time will be in the vicinity of \$1 million. To serve its regional purpose, the Center must attract qualified students from Latin America. Although the students trained to date have been largely from Puerto Rico, there is encouraging evidence of interest in the Center throughout Latin America, and applications from the Latin American Republics are being received in increasing numbers. This interest was demonstrated by the attitudes and statements of scientists from a number of the Republics who participated in the Symposium on Health Physics in Biology and Medicine held at San Juan

May 26–28 under the joint sponsorship of the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine and the Commission. Their favorable comments about the Center are considered particularly meaningful in the light of certain other recent political events in South America.

51. *Asian Nuclear Center.* A tentative plan has been prepared for a more modest Asian Nuclear Center involving \$6 million in capital costs and \$4 million in operating expenses for the first three years. This plan is based on the assumption that the Philippine Government will cooperate with the United States in establishing the Center and donate land adjacent to the University of the Philippines in Quezon City for the Center.

52. Plans call for coordination of the proposed Center with the national Philippine nuclear energy program to avoid duplication or overlapping of facilities. Instruction and training would be related to the limited technological resources prevailing in most of the Asian nations which it is anticipated would use the Center, and primary emphasis would be placed on medical agricultural applications of nuclear energy.

MAJOR COUNTRY PROGRAMS

53. *USSR.* Recent reports indicate the USSR nuclear power program is slipping further below the goal announced in February 1956 of installing 2,000 to 2,500 electrical megawatts of nuclear power during the 6th five-year plan ending in 1960. The May 1957 Soviet report to the United Nations outlines a program totaling only 1,400 EMW involving three large and four small experimental nuclear power stations and no target dates were given.

54. Several recent Russian articles mention only one large station under construction in 1957 and, as late as April 1958, U.S. visitors were still being denied visits to the “large Soviet nuclear power stations” on one pretext or another. There is some evidence to show that the Soviets may have only about 700 EMW installed by the end of 1960, this being based on the completion of two pressurized water reactors of 100 EMW each, one 200 EMW graphite moderated water-cooled reactor, and four experimental stations.

55. However, it also is possible that the USSR is building dual-purpose reactors optimized for plutonium production that are not included in its “peaceful purposes” program. The USSR has never identified its atomic energy production sites. Therefore, one should not discount the possibility of the USSR achieving something closer to its announced 1956 goals via the dual-purpose reactors than is indicated in the estimated 700 EMW based on what the Soviet chooses to show Western visitors at this time.

56. *United Kingdom.* A British White Paper issued in April moved the completion date for the U.K. 5–6,000 megawatt nuclear power program from 1965 to 1966. It also indicated that a substantial proportion

of new generating capacity required in the U.K. between now and 1966 would come from coal-fired stations.

57. Significant bilateral activity between the U.S. and U.K. continued. U.S. consultants made available under the U.S.-U.K. agreement for cooperation were responsible for many of the recommendations relating to health and safety standards and procedures contained in the official Fleck Committee Report on the Windscale Accident. U.S.-U.K. study of the properties of graphite under in-pile conditions has been proposed and is under consideration.

58. The technical exchange of information on gas-cooled and fast-breeder reactors has raised the problem of reconciling the different policies relating to the disseminating of information which prevail in the two countries. Under U.K. policy, information developed with public funds is sold; under U.S. policy such information is disseminated without cost to the recipient.

59. The UKAEA has concluded bilateral agreements with several European Countries and is presently negotiating an agreement with Japan. Close U.K. cooperation with Canada and Australia has continued. Three British firms submitted bids on the S.E.N.N. project to be financed by the World Bank in Italy (six U.S. firms also submitted bids). It is expected that the construction of a full-scale nuclear power plant for AGIP-Nucleare, a publicly owned utility in Italy, by a British Consortium, will proceed on schedule, although no firm contract has yet been signed.

60. *France.* The French program has expanded greatly. France has appropriated 235 billion francs for its second five-year program as compared with a total of 148 billion francs spent by the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique since its establishment in 1945. The new five-year plan includes: (a) expansion and enlargement of present research facilities and setting up of more research centers; (b) construction of new research reactors and of several prototype reactors for nuclear power and marine propulsion; (c) increased production of natural uranium, plutonium and thorium (the French plutonium separation plant begun in 1955 was reported completed in May 1958); (d) an isotope separation facility either alone or in cooperation with other European countries. A French gaseous diffusion pilot plant went into operation at Saclay the last week in December 1957.

61. *Japan.* Negotiations were completed with Japan on a comprehensive bilateral Agreement for Cooperation which provides for a total net amount of 2,700 kgs. of contained U-235 for use in several research reactors, three experimental power reactors and a full-scale power reactor. The Agreement, which will run for a period of ten years, will supersede and incorporate a research bilateral Agreement for Cooperation which has been in effect with Japan since December 27, 1955. Japan's

first research reactor, built by an American firm, commenced operating in August 1957; a second research reactor is presently under construction under contract with an American firm.

62. The Japanese have stated that the first stationary power reactor to be purchased from the U.S. will be an experimental water-cooled, enriched-uranium-type of 15–20 electrical mw to be completed in 1961. Interest in nuclear marine propulsion has increased rapidly, stemming principally from Japan's position as a leading maritime nation and shipbuilder. There are tentative plans to complete two 40,000-ton tankers (20,000 HP) in 1965 and 1966, but these and other reactor projects were not sufficiently firm to be accepted by the U.S. as part of the 7,000 kgs of U-235 originally requested by the Government of Japan for inclusion in the proposed comprehensive bilateral.

63. Negotiations between the U.K. and Japan are still under way on a bilateral agreement. The Japanese have stated that they intend to purchase a 150 mw Calder Hall-type power reactor from the U.K.

64. *Argentina*. Based on their success in building an Argonaut-type reactor in their own country and fabricating the fuel elements for it, the Argentines have indicated an interest in building this type of reactor for export at a price under \$100,000.

65. *New Fuel Policies*. In March, the Commission authorized the transfer of U-235 enriched up to 90 per cent for both research and materials testing reactors providing individual core loadings do not exceed 8 kg of U-235 and that comprehensive safeguards contained in power bilaterals were in effect or agreed to by the cooperating nations. This action will make more flexible the cooperation with nations desiring to improve their nuclear training and development programs by making their reactors more efficient and economical. U.S. manufacturers experienced considerable difficulty in fabricating sound 20 per cent elements.

66. In May, the Commission granted domestic producers of uranium ores and concentrates the right to make private sales of these materials in the United States and abroad, all sales being subject to Commission licensing. This action enables U.S. industry to compete for the growing foreign and domestic market for nuclear fuel. Adequate safeguards must be in effect for sales of more than 1,000 kg to any one nation. Where such safeguards are not contained in an Agreement for Cooperation, a cumulative limit of 100 kg of normal uranium to a single foreign consignee and a cumulative limit of 1,000 kg for any one country will be in effect. This will enable foreign users of small quantities of uranium to continue to purchase from the U.S. source material needed for basic research, medical, and general industrial application.

67. *Agreements for Cooperation*. During the reporting period, comprehensive agreements with Spain and Italy came into force, superseding previous research bilaterals. Ecuador and Nicaragua ratified their

research agreements. After protracted negotiations, a comprehensive power agreement was concluded with Japan and awaits ratification. It authorizes the transfer of 2,700 kg of U-235 over the 10-year life of the agreement. Ratification of the Venezuelan power agreement has been delayed following the change of government in that country. Sweden has negotiated an amendment to raise the U-235 authorization to 200 kg. Denmark will seek either a power agreement or major amendments to its present research accord. Brazil has requested an amendment to its research agreement to increase the U-235 authorization from 6 to 12 kilograms. Brazil has not ratified its power agreement which is a separate accord from its research bilateral.

68. The United States now has 41 bilateral agreements in effect with 39 nations and the City of West Berlin. (Switzerland has 2 agreements.) Of these, 12 are for power and 29 for research. An Agreement Status Table is attached as the Appendix.

69. *Research Reactors.* The Republic of China, the University of Palermo, Italy, and the University of Geneva, Switzerland, have signed contracts with U.S. manufacturers for research reactors and Brazil's University of Minas Gerais plans to buy a research and training reactor. Twenty-five U.S. commercial research reactors have been or are being built or contracted for in sixteen nations.

70. Eight reactor grants of \$350,000 each were committed during the reporting period to Austria, Belgium, China, Greece, Israel, Italy, West Germany, and Sweden.

71. *Equipment Grant Program.* The Commission has approved a program of equipment grants ranging from "package" research laboratories and subcritical assemblies to relatively minor items of equipment important to many underdeveloped countries. So far in FY '58, \$121,000 has been committed for radioisotope training equipment in Lebanon and Ecuador and for the two IAEA mobile radioisotope laboratories. It is expected that any FY 58 funds remaining after research reactor grant commitments have been completed will be obligated for equipment grants.

72. *Education and Training.* Between February 1949, when foreign nationals were first admitted, and June 1958, the Commission has provided training for 255 foreign nationals in the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies Course in Radioisotope Techniques. Due to the excellence of the course and its resultant international reputation, the demand for increased enrollment has been such that the Commission has recently expanded its facilities to accommodate 48 instead of 32 persons per course. The International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering, which was established at Argonne National Laboratory as a part of the Atoms-for-Peace program, has enrolled 328 foreign nationals in the first seven courses. Students for the 8th Session are now being selected.

73. The Equipment Grant and Education and Training programs will contribute directly to extending the impressive benefits of isotope

and radiation applications to the under-developed areas of the world. Under the equipment program, emphasis is being placed on items such as teletherapy units, facilities for growing plants in gamma radiation fields to induce mutations, and isotope research and training laboratories. A special request has been received from the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission to provide training and practical experience to a number of qualified Indians in the radiation preservation of food. This request will be accommodated.

74. *Controlled Thermonuclear Research.* The United States and the United Kingdom continue to cooperate closely in pursuing a vigorous research program in the area of controlled thermonuclear reactions. In January, there was a major joint release which embraced practically all data declassified in the field on that date. Both countries are planning major demonstrations of this research at the Geneva Conference in September.

75. *Information.* A workshop for librarians in charge of the gift technical libraries distributed to European and Middle East nations under the Atoms-for-Peace program, held in Geneva in May, was well attended and favorably received. Additional libraries have been donated to the IAEA, Poland, and Honduras. The exchanges of classified information, classified discussions, and the dissemination of unclassified information continued to increase. Visitors from other nations to U.S. installations and U.S. atomic energy industry were averaging about 70 per month.

CONFERENCES, EXHIBITS AND MISSIONS

76. *Geneva Conference.* The United States, as in 1955, plans to make a significant contribution to the second United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva, September 1–13, 1958. Approximately 900 abstracts were submitted to the UN Conference Secretary General. It is expected that the U.S. will be allocated about 150 oral presentations at the Conference sessions.

77. Through May 15, 1958, the United Nations reported acceptance of the following number of papers from the countries indicated: USSR—158; United Kingdom—199; France—163; West Germany—65; and India—63.

78. Construction is well advanced on the comprehensive technical exhibit which demonstrates the latest and most significant advances in nuclear science and technology in the United States. It will include the controlled thermonuclear section previously referred to, two operating research reactors, and detailed demonstrations of many other aspects of peaceful research and uses. The Commission also is coordinating and will participate in a trade-fair-type commercial exhibit in down-town Geneva concurrently with the Conference. It is expected that about 45 U.S. firms will be represented at the latter exhibit.

79. The total cost of U.S. participation is estimated at \$4,600,000 of which some \$3,300,000 will be represented in the construction and operation of the exhibits. While the exact total of Conference Representatives and Advisors has not been determined, the total number of people scheduled to be in Geneva officially for the United States is about 600, including a number of guides and clerical help to be hired in Geneva.

80. *Other Conferences and Exhibits.* U.S. scientists will participate at the Fifth International Electronic and Nuclear Exposition and Congress in Rome, Italy, during the latter part of June. There also will be a large U.S. Atoms-for-Peace exhibit there. The Commission provided data and materials, including a small operating training reactor, for nuclear exhibits in the U.S. Pavilion and in the Science Section of the Brussels World Fair.

81. *Missions.* At the request of the nations involved, the Commission sent teams to New Zealand in March and to Australia in June, to hold discussions and seminars with a view to assisting the development and administration of nuclear energy programs in those countries. The New Zealand mission was most favorably received but it reported to the Commission that lack of coordination between the Government and the universities is hampering the progress of the New Zealand program. The Australian Mission is still abroad. There are four U.S. experts on the IAEA International Mission which began a South American survey in May. (See paragraph 41.)

82. *USAEC Scientific Representatives.* In cooperation with the U.S. embassies, the Commission Scientific Representatives in London, Paris, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, and Chalk River, Canada, have continued to render services in connection with the expanding technical cooperation in the areas under their respective jurisdictions. Their work is proving especially useful in evaluating the technical progress in many countries, assisting and participating in the work of the U.S. delegations such as those at the NATO meeting in Paris in December, the EURATOM and OEEC discussions, the Windscale investigation program, and the various Atoms-for-Peace missions.

83. *Foreign Trade.* An interesting development in the foreign trade activities of the U.S. atomic energy industry is the emergence of joint ventures with industrial concerns in other countries, notably in Europe and Japan. These range from cooperative sales arrangements to the formation of separate companies jointly owned by an American and a foreign firm. In some cases, they involve reciprocal licensing rights.

84. These cooperative business arrangements appear to offer U.S. industry a good chance for getting its share of international atomic energy business, particularly if the rapid development of nuclear industry in highly industrialized nations diminishes the prospects of U.S. firms, acting independently, selling appreciable numbers of complete nuclear power plants abroad.

Appendix

Agreement Status Table

June 3, 1958

DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

From: Program Review and Analysis Branch

STATUS OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION AS OF APRIL 1, 1958

Cumulative Number of Countries	Country	Score of Exchange	Effective Date
1	Argentina	Research	July 29, 1955
2	Australia	Research and power	May 28, 1957
3	Austria	Research	July 13, 1956
4	Belgium	Research and power	July 21, 1955
5	Brazil	Research	Aug. 3, 1955
6	Canada	Research and power	July 21, 1955
7	Chile	Research	Aug. 8, 1955
8	China, Republic of	Research	July 18, 1955
9	Columbia	Research	July 19, 1955
10	Cuba	Research	Oct. 10, 1957
11	Denmark	Research	July 25, 1955
12	Dominican Republic	Research	Dec. 21, 1956
13	Ecuador	Research	Feb. 6, 1958
14	France	Research and power	Nov. 20, 1956
15	Germany, Federal Republic of	Research and power	Aug. 7, 1957
	Germany: City of West Berlin	Research	Aug. 1, 1957
16	Greece	Research	Aug. 4, 1955
17	Guatemala	Research	Apr. 22, 1957
18	Israel	Research	July 12, 1955
19	Italy	Research and power	Apr. 15, 1958

Cumulative Number of Countries	Country	Score of Exchange	Effective Date
20	Japan	Research	Dec. 27, 1955
21	Korea, Republic of	Research	Feb. 3, 1956
22	Lebanon	Research	July 18, 1955
23	Netherlands	Research and power	Aug. 8, 1957
24	New Zealand	Research	Aug. 29, 1956
25	Nicaragua	Research	Mar. 7, 1958
26	Norway	Research and power	June 10, 1957
27	Pakistan	Research	Aug. 11, 1955
28	Peru	Research	Jan. 25, 1956
29	Philippines	Research	July 27, 1955
30	Portugal	Research	July 21, 1955
31	South Africa	Research and power	Aug. 22, 1957
32	Spain	Research and power	Feb. 12, 1958
33	Sweden	Research	Jan. 18, 1956
34	Switzerland	Research	July 18, 1955
	Switzerland	Power	Jan. 29, 1957
35	Thailand	Research	Mar. 13, 1956
36	Turkey	Research	June 10, 1955
37	United Kingdom	Research and power	July 21, 1955
38	Uruguay	Research	Jan. 13, 1956
39	Venezuela	Research	July 21, 1955

SIGNED AND IN RATIFICATION PROCESS AS OF APRIL 1, 1958

Cumulative Number of Countries	Country	Scope of Exchange	Date Signed
*	Brazil	Power	July 21, 1957
40	Costa Rica	Research	May 18, 1956
41	Iran	Research	Mar. 5, 1957
42	Iraq	Research	June 7, 1957
43	Ireland	Research	Mar. 16, 1956
**	Peru	Research and power	July 19, 1957

*Will [illegible in the original]. [Footnotes in the table are in the original.]

**Will [illegible in the original] present Research Agreement.

SUMMARY:

In Effect: 29 research and 12 power agreements with 39 countries
Signed: 4 research and 2 power agreements with 4 additional countries

338. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100–2–58¹

NIE 100–2–58

Washington, July 1, 1958

National Intelligence Estimate: “Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences”

[Source: Department of State, INR Files. Secret. 24 pages of source text not declassified.]

¹ Source: “Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences;” not declassified. Secret. 24 pp. DOS, INR Files.

339. Annex to NIE 100–2–58¹

Washington, July 1, 1958

Annex to National Intelligence Estimate: “Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences”

[Source: Department of State, INR Files. Secret; Restricted Data; Limited Distribution. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

¹ Source: “Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences;” not declassified. Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. DOS, INR Files.

340. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Killian¹

Washington, July 3, 1958

Dear Dr. Killian:

One of the most important aspects of disarmament negotiations is the question of measures to detect and discourage surprise attack. This aspect of disarmament is one on which the Soviet Union may be willing to enter into serious negotiations.

Several preliminary studies have been done for the Government in the past three years concerning inspection methods to be applied within any surprise attack zones. None of these, however, has adequately treated the problem of specific inspection and control systems designed to minimize the possibility of surprise attack, nor has any taken into account missiles capabilities. It would therefore be most helpful if the Science Advisory Committee could explore in a preliminary way some of the general facets of the surprise attack problem, with particular reference to its scientific and technical aspects.

What I have in mind is an examination of the ways of obtaining, through an international agreement, significant enhancement of early warning abilities and capability to detect preparations for a major surprise attack, as well as reduce the chances of accidental war, both in the current period and in subsequent years when strategic missiles would have been developed in large numbers. I should think that such study would endeavor to explore the question of just what are the critical areas of the Soviets' military and industrial activities, from the point of view of providing advance warning of a surprise attack, and thus what would be the most important objects and means of inspection and control in any such inspection system.

In making this preliminary analysis you may wish to consider United States capabilities to detect a surprise attack that could be utilized to strengthen reliance on an agreed international inspection system. You may also wish to comment on the extent to which an international inspection system could meet the problems of surprise attack detection which the Science Advisory Committee's Technological Capabilities Panel raised in its February 14, 1955 report to the President, entitled "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack".

On the basis of the above, I would hope that you could give a tentative evaluation of the degree of contributions to surprise attack

¹ Source: Request for exploration of surprise attack issues. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology Files, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.

protection which the United States would receive from implementation of the various proposals for surprise attack inspection which have been presented in the disarmament negotiations and/or which were discussed in the Second Interim Report of the Working Group on Disarmament Policy, dated April 18, 1958.

If there are other measures which have not been considered in our past proposals, or measures requiring further study, which you conclude might form a basis for international agreement to lessen the chances of a successful surprise attack and/or lessen the danger of accidental war, I would appreciate your including them in your report.

Because of the Soviet proposal of July 2 that a conference of experts be convened to discuss the technical questions concerning surprise attack, and also because of the requirement that the United States be in a position to discuss these matters with our allies in the very near future, it would be most helpful if the preliminary report could be made available by July 31, or earlier if possible.

I am aware that in such a short period of time analysis and conclusions of the Science Advisory Committee might be useful in assuming the validity of some of our present proposals, advancing our preparations for possible technical discussions with the Soviets, and deciding on further studies needed for policy decisions.

Mr. Philip J. Farley and members of his staff will be available to assist you in any way you may wish in formulating and developing such a study.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

341. Letter From Killian to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 10, 1958

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In your letter of July 3, you asked whether the President's Science Advisory Committee could explore in a preliminary way some of the general facets of the Surprise Attack problem, with particular reference

¹ Source: Problem of surprise attack not limited to technical or scientific issues. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.

to its scientific and technical aspects. Since receiving your letter, I have brought together a group of the Committee and we have engaged in a two-day preliminary discussion as to how the study you propose is to be undertaken. This discussion has resulted in a progress report containing several conclusions which I wish to present to you before we proceed with further study.

We would emphasize first that the Surprise Attack problem is wholly different in kind and in magnitude from the problem of devising an inspection system to monitor a nuclear test cessation agreement. It cannot be dealt with in such specific technical terms, therefore, as we have dealt with the current problems under discussion in Geneva. We also conclude that the examination of existing proposals for inspection zones will require a more general analysis, and in this general analysis some of the following problems will be important.

Our early warning lines and our radar detection systems are designed to provide us with a few hours' warning of approaching hostile aircraft. This time might be extended greatly by aerial inspection of the Soviet territory or by appropriately-stationed observers within the Soviet Union. The problems involved in thus extending our warning time may be more military and political than technical. The use of aerial inspection or ground observers clearly involve difficult military estimates of the result of any specific proposal about limited aerial inspection zones or limited numbers or mobility of ground observers.

In the event that we enter into discussions with the Soviets on the problem of Surprise Attack, it seems highly likely that they will raise the problem of the training flights by our Strategic Air Command bombers, particularly when these bombers are carrying nuclear weapons. If the U.S. delegates are to discuss such a topic, it would seem of great importance that we analyze in advance the present Fail-Safe technique and its possible modifications, the effects of limiting the numbers of aircraft in flight at any time, and of restrictions on their flight paths. These, too, are predominantly military problems.

We must also expect that the proposed discussions with the Soviets will not be limited to present weapons such as manned aircraft, but will encompass also long-range missiles. Their era is rapidly approaching, and consideration of them in the proposed discussions would greatly increase the significance and value of these discussions.

The size of the Soviet satellites leaves no doubt about the early achievement by them of missiles of essentially unlimited range when carrying warheads of thermonuclear size. They can be located anywhere in the USSR and still reach targets in the United States. Since this is true, it is clear that in the missile era geographically limited aerial or ground observer zones in our respective countries can provide no substantial

reduction of the threat of an attack without warning, although they may have other attractive features.

It now appears that unlimited aerial surveillance alone, no matter how elaborately reinforced by scientific devices, can increase warning time only to the limit of the duration of flight of missiles, i.e., to 30 minutes for ICBM's and to 15 minutes for IRBM's. Any further increase in warning time would require quite different kinds of measures and any discussions with the Russians would doubtless have to examine these measures. Examples of these additional means include: (a) Devising of intelligence indicators for providing strategic intelligence; (b) Ground surveillance adequate to cope with dispersed or even mobile missile launchers; (c) Controls on the design, deployment, and numbers of offensive weapons.

Any further increase in warning must be based on the observation, not of hostile acts, but of preparations for hostilities. Examples of the sorts of preparatory acts that might give indication of intention to launch a surprise attack include; (a) Forward deployment of long-range bombers; (b) Fueling and positioning of missiles in preparation for firing. It is an inherent limitation of observations of such action that they cannot give certain indication of the intent to launch hostilities. At best, the observable acts are clear indications of a state of heightened readiness on the part of the observed power. It may turn out, therefore, that no reliable system can be devised to provide dependable advance warning of a surprise attack except in conjunction with agreed limitations on weapons numbers or deployment. Given such agreement, the observation or detection of deployments or weapons production in violation of the agreement might furnish the kind of indicator that would be a reliable warning of attack.

With such considerations as these before us, we early came to the conclusion that discussions with the Soviets cannot long be confined to the strictly technical aspects of surveillance. They will inevitably touch upon the problem of weapons controls, controls of deployment, etc. While there are technical aspects to almost every part of the Surprise Attack problem, it is also clear that the subject of the proposed meeting with the Soviets is of such a nature that technical questions are in inextricably intertwined with political and military considerations.

We suggest that any group making preparatory studies for the conference should recognize the impossibility of separating technical questions from non-technical questions. If the Science Advisory Committee, therefore, is to be effective in conducting the study you request, we must join with competent representatives of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other government agencies.

If it is agreed that we should assemble such a representative group, we are prepared to do so, if the President approves. An Alternative arrangement would be for the Department of Defense to take responsibility for organizing it.

Before we proceed further, therefore, I wanted to place before you these conclusions to make clear our own conviction that a discussion of Surprise Attack involves many elements and that it cannot be studied in a limited technical manner. We believe, further, that the planning for the proposed discussions with the Russians must be undertaken with the assumption that those discussions will certainly lead into non-technical areas. We understand, finally, that the function of this study is not to recommend positions to be taken by the Government, but solely to make an analysis and list the alternatives which might be useful to you in reaching positions and making plans.

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Killian, Jr.

342. Telegram Denuc 103 From Geneva¹

Geneva, July 25, 1958, 4 p.m.

Denuc 103. For Secretary and Killian from Fisk.

I believe that evidence is accumulating rapidly here that the Russians want this conference to succeed, that they want an agreement on nuclear test cessation, that they want it soon, and that they are making and will make concessions to get it.

For example:

1) After first three days of sharp attack involving political issue, namely "purpose" of conference, the subject was dropped and has not been mentioned since.

2) Concessions were made by them on acoustic conclusions.

3) Conclusions on radioactive debris collection contained three significant concessions:

¹ Source: Soviet interest in agreement on nuclear test detection. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-2558.

Use of any aircraft,
 Use of aircraft over national territories and
 Acceptance of non-political wording.

4) Recognition and acceptance of “inspection” in seismic conclusions.

5) Lengthy, informal discussion of inspection in connection with proper place in the agenda has committed them farther than we believed they were prepared to go.

6) While there is pressure to complete work, there has been no recent reference to three or four weeks—or any other time limit.

7) General tone of meetings has been better; no further political hassles re communiques, etc.

8) In every important case they have accepted the major elements of our position, moving appreciably from their original position.

9) Their participation, whereas generally emphasizing theory rather than experimental data, has been on a high scientific plane.

We have reported earlier evidence of their concern re 4th power problem. Observations above may be interpreted as related primarily to this problem, but we believe they may have much deeper implications. On the assumption that my estimate is correct and that we do reach satisfactory understandings here with the USSR, the pressures will be intense to make the political decisions on what the next steps will be. I suggest that this issue be carefully thought out in Washington so that the US can take the initiative shortly after conclusion of this conference, which may be only ten days or so away. Soviet propaganda will no doubt make immediate capital out of the fact that Soviet and Western scientists have reached agreement on detection and identification of tests.

The true political implications of this development are not for me to evaluate. It seems clear that there have been important revisions in Fedorov’s instructions during the course of the meeting and he is accepting points which I did not believe at the outset he would accept.

I have discussed these observations with Sir William Penney, who has similar views which he has communicated to the Foreign Office.

Villard

343. Telegram 248 From Moscow¹

Moscow, July 26, 1958, 1 p.m.

248. Geneva experts conference has now proceeded to point where Soviet strategy is becoming fairly obvious. Their aim is to have meeting succeed, and, to this end, they have made number of important concessions which are not altogether in Soviet hard bargaining tradition. They have not, of course, surrendered on any points vitally affecting Soviet internal security and secrecy (nor were they really asked to by west), and conference has yet to discuss desiderata of control system scheme (which may well reveal significant divergences), but real clue to final outcome appears to have been their agreement to limited use of aircraft for flights to collect nuclear debris.

I would now assume that chances of success are sufficiently great to make it incumbent on us to decide where we go from there. Soviets are clearly calculating that final report agreeing to feasibility of control system and giving outline thereof will create irresistible pressure on west to cave in on separate test ban issue. We can be sure that all stops will be pulled from accompanying prolonged propaganda cry and that number of supports for this step in free world will exceed all previous records.

Thompson

¹ Source: Soviet desire for agreement on nuclear test detection. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-2658.

344. Telegram 661 From London¹

London, July 30, 1958, noon

661. Re nuclear tests suspension (Moscow's 248 to Department, rptd London 51):

Embassy wishes voice its strong support for comment reftel that it is urgent for U.S. to decide next steps on assumption Geneva Experts Conference will be sufficiently successful shortly to make it advisable

¹ Source: Embassy support for Geneva and Moscow recommendation that U.S. prepare for next steps in disarmament talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-3058.

be able act quickly in presenting U.S. and Western views on test suspension shortly after conclusion Geneva Conference. British position remains that last communicated by Lloyd to Secretary: i.e. that they would wish await results Geneva Conference before deciding on next steps. Nevertheless, Embassy has strong impression that UK is seeking lead from U.S. and, indeed, would welcome this plus indication how to deal with French in most helpful yet firm fashion. Because of strong public opinion pressures in UK for progress on disarmament and also some form test suspension under adequate safeguards, HMG rpt HMG may well be pushed by its public opinion to act rapidly once Geneva Conference terminated. FonOff clearly believes next 10 days will demonstrate at Geneva how anxious Soviets are to obtain agreement on feasible control system, and to demonstrate this interest through accepting reasonable monitoring system consistent with West's security. Nevertheless, working level FonOff also appears believe there will be great pressures on UK arising both from final reports on Geneva Conference and from report of U.N. Radiation Committee.

Embassy would welcome any indications Department's thinking.

Whitney

345. Memorandum of Conversation Between McCone and John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 30, 1958, 12:50 p.m.

Mr. McCone handed me the attached memorandum on a limited test moratorium and asked my views regarding it. I said that I thought that there should be urgent thinking along the lines of a constructive proposal on suspension of testing as if there were a possible outcome of the Geneva talk of experts, some such action was imperative. I said I thought it would in any event be imperative for the next General Assembly, particularly having regard to certain aspects of the prospective UN report of experts.

¹ Source: Dulles reacts negatively to a paper by Libby and Teller urging testing limitations. Confidential; Personal and Private. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.

Mr. McCone thought it would be very helpful for Murphy if he were stopping in Rome to talk with Cardinal Agagianian who he thinks is better acquainted with problems in Lebanon than anyone else in the world. He is an Armenian and has lived in Lebanon.

JFD

Attachment

Teletype Message to McCone From Libby and Teller

TELETYPE MESSAGE TO JOHN MCCONE FROM
AEC COMMISSIONER WILLARD F. LIBBY AND DR. EDWARD
TELLER, DIRECTOR OF THE LIVERMORE RESEARCH
LABORATORY

A LIMITED TEST MORATORIUM

People everywhere feel a great concern about the possible effects of radioactive fallout from weapon tests. A most powerful objection to continued testing would be removed if radioactive fallout from future tests could be limited or eliminated. One of the following two plans would, therefore, seem reasonable.

We might propose to limit the offsite fission fallout per year to 1 megaton equivalent each year released by the USA and the same amount by the USSR.

An alternative proposal would be to ban completely offsite fallout. This would permit underground testing by everyone.

The task of policing such a moratorium would be simplest in the latter case, but it does seem clear from our knowledge of radioactive fallout from weapons tests that it would be possible to conduct tests on the fallout ration basis.

It is of extreme importance at this time to put forth such a plan of test limitation. It would exploit the amount of agreement already obtained in Geneva. At the same time it would permit us to continue what kind of testing which is necessary to develop our tactical weapons, our clean weapons, and our lightweight warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Limitation of fallout to 1 megaton a year would, furthermore, permit some effects shots, such as are needed in developing the anti-ICBM system.

If we do not announce our willingness to accept a limitation such as the one given above we may be forced by public opinion into a

complete test cessation. According to the opinion of all reliable authorities small shots below 5 kilotons can be effectively hidden. Methods to hide bigger explosions may well be discovered and such methods may already be available in the Soviet Union.

It is most important for the defense of our country and also for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives that continued study of nuclear explosions take place. The proposed test limitation would permit continued testing in a calmer and more reasonable atmosphere. We believe, therefore, that it is important to put forward a proposal of this kind in the very near future.

346. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Goodpaster and Herter¹

August 4, 1958, 3:10 p.m.

3:10—General Goodpaster phoned to say that Dr. Killian met with the President today. After the meeting the President asked the General to tell CAH that we should have a statement ready following the present Geneva talks on nuclear testing. The President suggested we say that these negotiations now having been discussed satisfactorily the U.S. is considering what might be done in these areas to promote peace and stability. The President thought it should have the clearance of Defense, AEC, CIA and Gordon Gray. CAH told the General that a paper had been prepared by Mr. Farley on this subject and word was received from the Secretary that he approved it. He said it carried a covering letter to Dr. Killian. It was agreed that at the OCB luncheon on Wednesday CAH would get the clearances of the other Agencies as requested by the President. General Goodpaster said he would inform the President it would be taken up in OCB.

¹ Source: Statement following Geneva discussions. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

347. Memorandum From Killian to Herter¹

Washington, August 6, 1958

I read with great interest your letter of August 5, together with a staff paper proposing a suggested revision of our policy on nuclear testing. As you know, I have also had from John McCone a description of the proposal under consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission for a limited test moratorium.

First of all, let me note that the recommendation that there be a group brought together, as suggested in your staff paper, to discuss the nuclear provisions of U.S. disarmament policy, is desirable. I would raise this point with respect to what your staff paper suggests: Will it not at some point be necessary to have these proposals formally considered by the National Security Council? Should not the procedure be determined by the President?

I do not feel it possible to reach a conclusion on either the test cessation proposals in the State Department staff paper or in the memorandum from the Atomic Energy Commission without first being clear on certain national policy objectives. I think, in other words, that the specific suggestions in regard to test cessation or a limited test agreement must be appraised in the light of national policy.

If our national policy objective is to ease tensions or if this policy calls for freezing the Soviet nuclear capability at its present level or if our objective is to move in the direction of an agreed cessation of production of nuclear materials, then it seems that we would tend in our conclusions about nuclear test cessation to lean in the direction of the State Department's paper.

If, however, our national policy objectives provide for uninterrupted research and development to achieve every possible military refinement in nuclear weapons, while meeting at least partially the public clamor for reduction of fallout without at the same time stopping tests, then clearly a test moratorium might take the form of that under consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission.

It seems to me, then, that these basic issues must be discussed in order to reach conclusions about a specific form of test moratorium. There are other considerations affecting the selection of a specific plan: One of these is the value to the United States of having an inspection system in operation which would involve a massive penetration of the

¹ Source: Need for basic policy decision before deciding between test cessation or limitation. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-658.

Iron Curtain and consequent benefits in intelligence and exchange of information. Another such consideration is whether we want to give the Russians further opportunity to renounce their announced test cessation policy.

Without guidance with respect to these matters, I would personally at this stage find it very difficult to take any position with regard to one plan in contrast with the other.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

348. Letters From Farley to McCone, Quarles, and Allen Dulles¹

Washington, August 7, 1958

Dear Mr. McCone:

At the request of Mr. Herter I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. Policy on nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test moratorium which is outlined in a memorandum which you recently left with Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Herter's office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

Philip J. Farley

¹ Source: Transmits a proposed revision of U.S. nuclear testing policy. Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-758.

Washington, August 7, 1958

Dear Mr. Quarles:

At the request of Mr. Herter I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. policy on nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test moratorium which has been recently proposed by AEC Chairman McCone.

Mr. Herter's office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

Philip J. Farley

Washington, August 7, 1958

Dear Mr. Dulles:

At the request of Mr. Herter I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. policy on nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test moratorium which has been recently proposed by AEC Chairman McCone.

Mr. Herter's office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

Philip J. Farley

Enclosure

Proposed Revision of NSC Policy Paper on Disarmament

5. a. All parties will agree, independently of agreement on other provisions of section I,

(1) to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement, from nuclear testing until 36 months thereafter. (The suspension would not continue beyond a 12-month period unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system in (2) below.)

(2) to cooperate in setting up during the first 24 months, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.

b. The U.S. will announce that it will resume nuclear tests at the end of 36 months if agreement to an adequately inspected cut-off of the procurement of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has not been achieved.

c. The U.S. will announce that it will refrain indefinitely from nuclear tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph 5a(2) is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the inspection system for the cut-off has been put into effect.

d. The U.S. will announce that if tests are resumed, it will give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and conduct such tests underground.

e. Provision will be made for the continuation, under international auspices, of any nuclear explosions necessary for the development of peaceful application of such explosions.

Enclosure

Proposed Policy on Nuclear Tests

Discussion:

1. We believe that with the Geneva talks approaching a conclusion, early policy decisions must be taken on the question of nuclear tests. Dr. Fisk, Ambassador Thompson and Embassy London have also expressed this view within the past week. In your letter to Prime Minister Macmillan on June 13 you indicated that we hoped to be able to approach the UK shortly on this matter in the light of information developed in the Geneva talks; and the UK reminded the Department last week of its desire to discuss the question with us upon conclusion

of those talks. The approach of the United Nations General Assembly, the release of the United Nations Radiation Committee [report] scheduled for early August, and the possibility of the question of tests arising indirectly in connection with the proposed Special Security Council Session are additional factors which demand consideration of this question.

2. On July 30 Chairman McCone handed you a message sent to him by Commissioner Libby and Dr. Edward Teller (TAB B). The message suggests that to avoid our being forced by public opinion into a complete test cessation we might propose (1) to limit the offsite fission fallout per year to one megaton equivalent each year released by the U.S. and the same amount by the USSR, or alternately (2) to ban completely offsite fallout and permit underground testing by everyone.

3. While any measures which notably reduced fallout would lessen public concern about the health hazards of continued testing, we believe the AEC proposal is insufficient from the political standpoint and that it has the following specific disadvantages:

(a) It would be viewed as a retreat from previous Western proposals which have called for suspension of tests rather than test limitations, and would seem an illogical sequel to the Geneva talks directed toward methods for enforcement of a possible test suspension.

(b) It would not be accepted and hence would enable the USSR to continue to exploit the testing issue and its own unilateral suspension in world-wide propaganda and to avoid the question of a production cut-off by continuing to hide behind the issue of a test suspension.

(c) By the same token, it would be an easy way for the USSR to avoid the inspection to which it has otherwise become largely committed as a result of the Geneva talks.

(d) It would not inhibit the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by fourth countries, a problem which has been of some concern to the U.S. and one which is of apparently increasing concern to the USSR as well.

(e) It would not have the effect of a test suspension in freezing weapons development of the U.S. and USSR at a time when we retain some important advantages in weapons technology (according to technical studies prepared by the Science Advisory Committee).

(f) A limitation of fallout to a fixed amount would, according to past technical consideration of similar limitation proposals, be difficult to enforce by inspection.

4. The policy recommendations which you discussed in general terms with the panel of disarmament advisors and approved for discussion with other agencies in April, we believe, afford the best basis for decisions at this time. In summary, the nuclear test proposal we have discussed with the other agencies and revised in the light of their comments, is the following: The nuclear provisions of our present proposals (test suspension and cut-off) would be made separable from the

other elements of the package, but testing would remain limited, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the cut-off which would become a condition subsequent. Nuclear tests would be suspended for three years beginning as of the effective date of the agreement.² The suspension would not continue beyond twelve months unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system. The U.S. would declare at the outset that testing would be resumed if agreement on an adequately inspected cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes had not been reached at the end of three years. Conversely, we would announce that the suspension would be extended for an indefinite period if agreement is reached on the installation of a control system to assure that no further fissionable material is proposed for weapons purposes. The U.S. would announce that, if it became necessary to resume testing, the U.S. would henceforth test only underground.

5. This proposal would, we believe, turn to our advantage each of the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 above which weigh against the AEC proposal. It would be a logical follow-up to the Geneva talks, deprive the Soviets of the propaganda advantages of the testing issue, enable us to begin arms inspection within the USSR, inhibit fourth country programs, and could freeze our present weapons advantage. It would, by removing the test issue, enable us to place more effective emphasis in the nuclear cut-off as the condition subsequent. Most important, it would be evidence of United States willingness to go the "extra mile" to help achieve more meaningful measures of disarmament and thus go far to counter the image which is all too prevalent abroad of an overly militaristic United States.

6. Attached as TAB A is a proposed revision of the paragraph on nuclear tests in present NSC policy which would incorporate the changes recommended above. The other disarmament policy recommendations discussed in the interim report to the Cabinet Committee (TAB B) need not, in our view, be decided until the studies on surprise attack now underway under the leadership of Dr. Killian have been completed.

² A three-year period is a minimum for a meaningful inspected agreement since from 18 to 24 months will be required for installing the inspection system. [Footnote is in the original.]

349. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, August 12, 1958, 10 a.m.

1. We discussed the prospective meeting of the General Assembly on the Near East and the President's prospective participation. It was agreed that we would ask that the President should be the first speaker before credentials and like matters might be raised, and that if this could be arranged, the President would plan to speak at the opening, i.e., 10:30, Wednesday morning. It was agreed that after talking with Lodge I would phone the President. He said he would probably come up late in the day possibly for dinner and spend the night at the Waldorf.

With respect to the speech, it was felt that it was still about three pages too long. It was agreed that CD Jackson would attempt the revision and cutting while going to New York with me and that he would phone the revised text down to Mrs. Whitman. I pointed out the desirability of getting a definitive text in time for translation, duplication and circulation.

2. I noted that Bob Murphy would probably come to New York and report to me there en route to Washington.

3. I spoke of the Quemoy-Matsu situation and of the fact that it might be necessary to give a further warning to the Chicoms about this situation. I said that during the past four years the integration of these two islands into the Formosa-Penghu complex had been such that I doubted whether there could be an amputation without fatal consequences to Formosa itself. The President pointed out that this was not true from a military standpoint, and I indicated my agreement with that but did say that the connection from a political and psychological standpoint had become such that I thought now it would be quite dangerous to sit by while the Chicoms took Quemoy and Matsu. I said that I had the feeling that the Communist bloc might now be pushing all around the perimeter to see whether our resolution was weakened by the Soviet possession of nuclear missiles, but I felt confident that if it appeared that we were standing firm, then they would not take action that would risk precipitating a large-scale war.

The President indicated that I might say something along these lines with reference to Quemoy and Matsu at a press conference.

¹ Source: Need to resolve nuclear testing policy; Quemoy and Matsu; U.N. session on Near East. Top Secret; Personal and Private. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

4. I said that another matter that was urgent was the reaching of a policy decision on nuclear testing. It seemed likely that there would be an agreement at Geneva and that coupled with the United Nations Commission Report made it urgent that we arrive at a new policy. I said that State was working actively with Defense and AEC on this subject and that I thought some split would develop which the President would have to resolve. The President said he was thinking in terms of a total suspension except of underground tests. I said I thought that the Defense Department would not like this because in a confined area some characteristics of the explosion could not be accurately estimated. The President said that he did not think that this should be a reason against limiting the test to underground areas.

I suggested to General Goodpaster that he try to arrange a restricted meeting of those directly interested as soon as I could be back in Washington. The President said he had already asked Goodpaster to plan for this.

5. I said I received his note about George Whitney, that he was a good personal friend of mine and I thought highly of him. I observed however that Mrs. Whitman had indicated his age somewhat exceeded the President's estimate. I added however that I was not one who believed incapacity automatically came at 73.

John Foster Dulles

350. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Herter¹

New York, August 13, 1958, 1:14 p.m.

The Sec said on the whole it went well. The atmosphere is less tense than he thought it would be. Fawzi is a slick performer and made a smart conciliatory speech. The Sec said he talked with Gromyko yesterday and for the first time he did not recite boiler-plate stuff and it looked as though he would be interested in getting something. Their res is pretty moderate. If the order were reversed it would not be too bad. This may be the lull before the storm and it may get worse but it is off to a fairly mild start with a reasonable prospect of getting a res most

¹ Source: Cessation of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

would agree on. Probably that is over-optimistic and is due to the Pres' being here.

H said nothing too exciting is going on there. He is going up at 2 on EURATOM. It looks as though they have two reasonable bills if we could get them to report them out.

At 4 there will be another discussion on cessation of atomic tests. The Sec though H could push that along without waiting for him to come back. H said the Sec has to make the decision. Someone notified the man in Geneva re the difference and they have expressed themselves in a telegram which the Sec said he has not seen. H summarized it. It did not come from State—AEC or IAEA. He will try to find out shortly. The Sec is concerned about the French here and notices this formulation talks about parties to the agreement. Who are they? H said so far they are talking in bilateral terms. H replied he assumes it would not include the UK unless they want to join. They agreed they would want to join. The Sec said as you envision it just the UK, US and USSR make an agreement to suspend and the French would be free. H said there has been no real discussion with the French. The Sec said Couve will probably be here Monday and it might be useful to talk then. H will arrange this p.m. to move on it. The Sec said the area would not be limited to the 3 and H said it would be all the world. The Sec said that would require agreements with them. The consent of the others would be second-stage agreements. Agreed. The Sec said you don't know if the French will agree to set it up in the Sahara or the Chinese Communists—that would all be later on. The Sec mentioned our making a unilateral declaration and then will that be a treaty at first? H is not sure of it. The Sec thinks first there would be an Executive Agreement. The Sec mentioned again H's pushing it—if he gets into trouble he could come there for an hour or so if H wanted him to,—at the WH tomorrow or Friday. The Pres said the Columbine would stand by to get him. The Sec said the preliminary thinking along the lines he has indicated should be thought through.

H said at NSC tomorrow Gray has questions for discussion that may bring on discussion re Taiwan. H said he did not see the Sec's memo of conv with the Pres about that. The Sec referred to what he said and added he does not think what the Pres said re a statement before a press conf was his final considered opinion. H said they are drafting something to come here tonight for consideration and will send a copy to the WH. The Sec is reluctant to see it dealt with by a formal decision at NSC and H does not think it can be. The Sec said it is all right the way it stands.

351. Memorandum of Conversation Between Lovett and John Foster Dulles¹

August 14, 1958

Mr. Lovett brought up the continuance of the advisory group on disarmament matters and asked whether it still served any useful purpose. He said that he was perfectly glad to carry on if it did serve a purpose. I said that while events had taken a turn somewhat different from what had been anticipated when the group was appointed in that there seemed no early likelihood of high-level disarmament talks with the Soviet Union, one could never tell what would happen, and I felt that both the President and I felt it a comfort to be able to call on the four individually or collectively and talk matters over. I said I did not want them to serve if they felt they were being in any sense used as a cloak in respect of matters where they were not adequately informed. Mr. Lovett said he had no such concern, and indeed after the first announcement the existence of the group had largely been ignored or forgotten by the press. He said that in view of what I had said he thought the group should continue in being. I expressed satisfaction at this.

He said that Beedle Smith had raised the question with him and that Beedle had felt that the differences exhibited at the meeting with Macmillan were unfortunate. I said they would have been unfortunate with anybody but Macmillan but that he was practically a member of the family. Lovett said he agreed.

We talked about many other matters of a general character.

John Foster Dulles

¹Source: Continuation of the disarmament advisory group. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.

352. Memorandum From Bromley Smith to Gray¹

Washington, August 14, 1958

SUBJECT

Disarmament Working Group Meeting

The Disarmament Working Group met this morning to review the State and Defense proposals for revision of the U.S. position regarding the suspension of nuclear tests, as stated in para. 8 of the first phase of disarmament.

State presented a draft (copy attached). Defense presented a revision of its earlier draft (copy attached). AEC representatives did not attend because they were engaged in attempting to reach agreement on an AEC draft revision.

The Defense Department has reorganized its proposal in such a way that the Working Group was unable to marry the State and Defense drafts using either brackets or parallel columns. Thus it will be necessary to prepare an additional paper summarizing the policy differences between the two drafts.

In summary, the major differences in the proposed revisions are as follows:

a. State rejects the Defense concept of agreeing to refrain from such nuclear weapons testing as can be monitored by the agreed inspection system. State believes we should refrain from testing if we obtain agreement for the installation of an "*effective* international system of inspection".

b. State rejects the Defense provision (8-a-(3)) which would add as a condition to acceptance of the suspension of testing an agreement to cooperate in the design of an effective international inspection system to monitor the cessation of the *production* of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, and to seek agreement on the installation and operation of such a system. State believes the Defense condition is so close to existing policy that to make an offer to suspend testing on this basis would be inadequate to meet the political situation. State would introduce the concept of arrangements for the cut-off of production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes as one of the conditions to agreement to refrain indefinitely from nuclear tests at the termination of the 24-month period.

c. Defense has deleted from its draft the State provision which would permit the continuation, under international auspices, of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

¹ Source: Record of the Disarmament Working Group meeting. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

The Defense representative, General Byers, appeared to agree, during the course of the meeting, to present both State and Defense drafts to the Joint Chiefs formally so that work could be started in the Joint Staff on the JCS views.

The Group discussed the extraordinary complexity of attempting to deal with the question of “peaceful uses” of nuclear dynamite. Dr. Killian’s representative called attention to the fact that the atomic exhibit to be opened in Geneva this summer would include a section on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He restated the Geneva scientists view that an effort to distinguish between peaceful explosions and weapons tests had not been discussed, and would be practically impossible to accomplish under any kind of a monitoring system.

The discussion also made clear that the system being devised in Geneva will not work if stations are not established in Communist China. If other states will not accept monitoring stations in their territory, the number of stations in the USSR and in the U.S. will have to be greatly increased if the system is to have a significant capability.

As far as I could learn, the State Department has not attempted to list the policy issues involved in a decision to modify existing policy on nuclear testing. There was some feeling expressed by the State representative that Dr. Killian’s points, as summarized during Wednesday’s meeting, were so broad as to involve issues which need not be decided immediately.

Bromley Smith

353. Telegram Denuc 163 From Geneva¹

Geneva, August 14, 1958, 10 p.m.

Denuc 163. At further three-hour informal session today, para-by-para review of WestDel and SovDel draft conclusions continued and there appeared to be further meeting of minds on most significant points other than number of posts, discussion of which Fedorov obviously postponing until last. Exact degree agreement achieved difficult determine until redrafts based on today’s session prepared and exchanged. At end session, Fedorov gave Fisk redraft organization

¹ Source: Report of meeting with Soviets in Geneva on detection of nuclear explosions. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1458.

conclusions paper, which appeared on quick reading to omit political issues we had previously claimed inability discuss. (WestDel will transmit text when translation completed.) However, Fedorov made further plea that we explicitly recognize need for "parity" in governing organization in view of important powers it would exercise and stated that no control organ could be set up until this issue settled. He implied he wished us seek instructions this matter, but did not raise it again when Fisk reiterated that we would not under any circumstances be able discuss this matter.

Fisk gave Fedorov WestDel draft final report (Denuc 156) and requested comment.

Group will meet again informally 3:00 PM August 15.

Villard

354. Letter From Kistiakowsky to Killian¹

Washington, August 15, 1958

Dear Dr. Killian:

On July 14 the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State suggesting that he join with the Secretary of Defense and yourself in having a careful study made "to further our preparations for possible negotiations on measures to detect and discourage surprise attack." He further directed that this study should be made after appropriate consultation with other government agencies and officials, that the Working Group actually charged with the study be kept quite small, and that it take "full advantage of the analyses and studies of a technical nature bearing on this matter that are being developed within Dr. Killian's scientific and technical group."

The Inter-Agency Group that was brought together in accordance with these instructions to the Secretary of State herewith presents its report with Appendices I to IV attached. In addition there is included a J.C.S. document referred to in the report and a memorandum from the Chairman of the Watch Committee.

¹ Source: Conveys report of Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack (not included). Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.

The Working Group functioned as individuals, rather than as representatives of their agencies. The Group confined itself to an analysis of the problem and to conclusions about what further studies could most effectively be undertaken in order to prepare adequately in the time available for discussions with the Soviets which may open during the first week in October. The Working Group wishes to stress the fact that it is not making any recommendations in regard to positions which should be taken by the United States in these proposed discussions.

We do venture, however, to add to the conclusions and comments in our report our conviction that the U.S. Government faces a task of great complexity and difficulty in preparing adequately for the discussions, and that the time available is very short.

Yours sincerely,

G.B. Kistiakowsky

Chairman

Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack

355. Memorandum From Keeny to Goodpaster¹

Washington, August 15, 1958

Attached for your information are three documents on the Nuclear Test Cessation problem. Dr. Killian thought that you might find them useful as background for the Monday afternoon meeting with the President on this subject.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

¹ Source: Forwards three papers on nuclear test cessation. Top Secret. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology

POLICY QUESTIONS RAISED BY DISCUSSION OF TEST CESSATION OR LIMITATION

In weighing the pros and cons of some form of test cessation announcement or agreement, it seems desirable first to examine certain questions of basic national policy. The decisions with respect to these matters of national policy may be conclusive in determining whether we depart from our present policy of testing, and if so in what way. Some of the policy questions involved are:

1. If the NSC policy on disarmament seems to be unachievable, is the U.S. prepared to seek some partial solution in an effort to ease world tensions?

a. Should the nuclear provisions of our present disarmament policy (test suspension and cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons production) be made separable from the other elements of the disarmament package?

b. Should the suspension of nuclear testing remain linked, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the cut-off of weapon materials production?

c. Present policy states that the acceptability of any international system for the regulation of armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions. What degree of reliability of detection is required for a "safeguarded" system for the detection of nuclear tests?

d. What should U.S. policy be toward agreement on suspension *vs.* limitation of nuclear testing: (1) "complete suspension" of nuclear testing (although there would not be a good probability of identifying underground tests of less than 5 kilotons); (2) cessation of all testing except for devices of very few kilotons' yield below the limit specified by the monitoring agreement, such tests to be conducted without radioactive fallout; (3) cessation of such nuclear testing that can be satisfactorily monitored by the agreed system, contingent on progress for the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons; or (4) a restricted testing agreement limiting the amount of annual offsite fission fallout or banning offsite fallout.

2. Would a nuclear test cessation operate to the net disadvantage of the U.S. considering its military, political and economic implications? Is it to U.S. advantage to seek to hold at present levels the nuclear weapons capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR; or should the U.S. strive to achieve every possible military advance and refinement in nuclear weapons while the USSR does the same?

3. Is the U.S. willing to accept political arrangements necessary to extend the nuclear test detection and identification system to Red China?

4. Are we willing to accept an international inspection system in the U.S.? Are there constitutional questions?

5. Is it our conviction that a sound and adequate inspection system would be of advantage to the U.S. by bringing about a massive penetration of the iron curtain and subsequent benefit in intelligence and exchange of information?

6. What should be U.S. policy with respect to the international means required for monitoring a nuclear test cessation agreement, including organization and personnel?

7. Should the U.S. “seek to prevent the development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons capabilities” by means of a nuclear test suspension agreement?

8. Should the U.S. agree to abide by a test ban prior to the installation and operation of an adequate detection system?

9. Should our policy anticipate Soviet acceptance of the inspection concepts agreed at Geneva and seek to make it difficult for the Soviets either to resume nuclear weapons testing or to derive world-wide acclaim for unilaterally practicing a test ban?

10. Is it a national U.S. policy objective to seek now to diminish world-wide fears about the hazards of radioactive fallout and to take action which will reassure those who hold these fears?

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology

PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FOR A TEST CESSATION

1. Military Security of the USA: Relative Position vs. the USSR

Test cessation now or in the near future would be to the military advantage of the U.S. At the conclusion of the Hardtack tests, the U.S. will possess a tested series of nuclear warhead prototypes covering a very wide range of application, and probably with superior performance in all categories compared to the USSR. While it is evident that continued U.S. tests would increase U.S. nuclear weapons strength in an absolute sense, further tests will not increase our *relative* strength, and may even decrease it in the light of rapid Russian advances and the increasing maturity of nuclear weapons technology on both sides.

[*text not declassified*] According to intelligence estimates, USSR does not have a warhead in this weight class and is, therefore, restricted to very much larger ICBM's and may encounter difficulties developing a submarine-launched IRBM.

Similarly, there is no evidence that the Soviets possess tactical weapons of small size and yield comparable to those possessed by the U.S. Evidence on the Soviet test program indicates that it has not followed the most promising avenue for the development of weapons of small size and good yield.

If one looks back over the history of U.S. and Soviet weapons development, one has to conclude that a test cessation at an earlier date would have left the U.S. in a position of much greater relative military advantage. It is likely that the Soviet Union will continue to progress more rapidly than the U.S. and will approach the capability of the U.S. in nuclear warheads if testing is continued.

2. Military Security: Actual Requirements

a. The Hardtack test series has been very successful and has met essentially all important military requirements. [*text not declassified*]

b. In defending the U.S. against attack, particularly a ballistic missile attack, the major technological problems are not in the area of nuclear weapon development, but in the non-nuclear aspects of these defensive weapons—particularly electronics. If we can solve the electronics problems of these weapons systems, we can construct effective systems around nuclear weapons available after the Hardtack tests. In the case of ballistic missiles, while an increase in yields would be useful, we could gain much more by the improvement of guidance and thereby accuracy of delivery.

c. Although we do not now have small-yield “clean” weapons which unquestionably would have tactical applications, there are now available conventional weapons or air-burst fission weapons to accomplish equivalent objectives. It is also significant that radioactivity induced by “clean” weapons in ground burst is substantial and may produce radioactivity equivalent to 20% of fission yield.

3. Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Tests

There appears to be little question that it is technically possible to design a control system to monitor a test cessation agreement. The current Geneva Conference will probably result in agreed-upon conclusions concerning a control system which can effectively detect and identify nuclear explosions of between one and two kilotons and above in the atmosphere and above five kilotons underground and which would have at least deterrent value for lower yields. In addition, recent theoretical calculations have indicated that it is considerably more difficult to hide underground weapons tests by reducing the coupling to seismic waves than had previously been believed.

4. Test Cessation is an Important Step in Disarmament

A test cessation would be an important step in easing world tensions. It would create an atmosphere in which further disarmament missions which are considered more important from our point of view could more easily be negotiated. We must start somewhere seeking

ways to slow down this armaments race and it is unrealistic to expect the early achievement of over-all disarmament agreements. It will be easier to reach agreement on a small problem, like test cessation, than on a large one, like prevention of surprise attack. Unless we reach agreement on this small problem, we cannot expect to be successful in concluding agreements on the larger problems.

The Geneva Conference will probably result in agreement that both control posts and the right of rapid, unimpeded inspection are required in an effective control system. The Soviets have also agreed to limited overflight of the USSR in case there is suspicion of nuclear explosion on its territory. Even though these concepts will require clarification in a political agreement, they constitute a precedent for the acceptance of inspection by the Soviet Union.

5. Nuclear Disarmament

U.S. policy calls for a cut-off of fissionable material production for weapons as a second step in nuclear disarmament. A test cessation agreement could be tied to a future agreement on the cut-off of production. It will be our choice whether we wish to proceed further in nuclear disarmament.

6. International Relations

a. General—The position of the United States in the society of nations will deteriorate if we continue testing. We will increasingly be considered as warlike and as obsessed with aggressive military objectives, while the Soviets will seek to gain support as a nation with peaceful objectives.

We are now engaged in a technical discussion with the Soviets to determine if an agreed-upon system of effective inspection of nuclear explosions can be achieved and the make-up and capability of such a system. If there are agreed-upon conclusions upon the control of test cessation and if the U.S. then fails to seek a test cessation agreement, it may well subject us to world-wide criticism for bad faith, even though we carefully stated before the start of the Geneva talks that such talks did not commit us to any policy with respect to cessation.

b. Fallout—Even though the actual radiation hazards from fallout from nuclear tests may be relatively small, the uncertainties and warnings that have been expressed by scientists on radiation hazards have caused fear and apprehension throughout the world and a strong emotional opposition to testing. We cannot ignore or escape this growing world apprehension and/or escape damage to our position in the world which will result from our disregard of worldwide fears.

7. Peaceful Applications

If peaceful application tests are excluded by the test cessation agreement, it may be possible to re-introduce tests for peaceful application, after the issue of tests has lost its present controversial nature. Such a delay would be acceptable since these applications are of small importance compared with the stopping of the armaments race.

356. Letter From Kistiakowsky to McElroy¹

August 15, 1958

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On July 14 the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State suggesting that he join with the Secretary of Defense and Dr. Killian in having a careful study made "to further our preparations for possible negotiations on measures to detect and discourage surprise attack." He further directed that this study should be made after appropriate consultation with other government agencies and officials, that the Working Group actually charged with the study be kept quite small, and that it take "full advantage of the analyses and studies of a technical nature bearing on this matter that are being developed within Dr. Killian's scientific and technical group."

The Inter-Agency Group that was brought together in accordance with these instructions to you herewith presents its report with appendices 1 to 4 attached. In addition there is included a J.C.S. document referred to in the report and a memorandum from the Chairman of the Watch Committee.

The Working Group functioned as individuals, rather than as representatives of their agencies. The Group confined itself to an analysis of the problem and to conclusions about what further studies could most effectively be undertaken in order to prepare adequately in the time available for discussions with the Soviet which may open during the first week in October. The Working Group wishes to stress the fact that it is not making any recommendations in regard to positions which should be taken by the United States in these proposed discussions.

We do venture, however, to add to the conclusions and comments in our report our conviction that the U.S. Government faces a task of great complexity and difficulty in preparing adequately for the discussions, and that the time available is very short.

Yours sincerely,

G.B. Kistiakowsky

Chairman

Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack

¹ Source: Conveys report of Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack (not included). Top Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel, Surprise Attack.

357. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

Washington, August 15, 1958

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 15 August 1958, which enclosed a copy of the Department of State's draft proposal on the revision of the U.S. Position on the First Phase of Disarmament, and an alternate proposal prepared by the Department of Defense.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the two proposals, in the light of their memoranda to you of 13 March 1958 and 30 April 1958. They wish to re-emphasize and reaffirm their views expressed in their previous memoranda to you on this subject, that a nuclear test suspension or cessation should not be agreed to apart from a larger disarmament proposal which would include the termination of the production of nuclear weapons and weapons material. They consider that an essential prerequisite to any agreement to test suspension or cessation is an operational inspection and monitoring system in being. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that, in the foreseeable international political situation, any agreement to suspend nuclear testing would be tantamount to a permanent cessation, and that any escape clause that would seem to permit the resumption of testing would probably be ineffective in the light of world opinions, even if the United States was satisfied that the Soviet Union was not abiding by the agreement.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the present military position of the United States, in the light of recent world developments, fully justifies a continuing requirement for nuclear testing. The results at HARDTACK demonstrate the absolute necessity of testing weapons both from the standpoint of furthering development and also from the standpoint of proof-testing prior to stockpiling. [*text not declassified*] This is but one example of the need for testing in the development of warheads for new applications. In the area of weapon effects, additional data concerning the optimum kill mechanism for AICBM's are required. Also, experiments concerning new and important high altitude phenomena were conducted for the first time at HARDTACK and are only in the exploratory stage. It is increasingly clear that in the national interest nuclear testing must continue. Without testing, the inevitable result must be stagnation in the effectiveness of our present weapons systems. In addition, cessation of testing would preclude the

¹ Source: Conveys negative JCS views on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Nuclear Testing.

introduction of essential new weapon systems requiring new warheads and lead to the stockpiling of unproven weapons.

4. Nothing that has taken place in the recent past has, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, been cause for a basic change in the military factors which influenced the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in earlier memoranda. Rather, a strong adherence to the present United States position on the subject of Nuclear Testing seems plainly indicated. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you convey the views expressed in this memorandum to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

358. Letter From the President's Science Advisory Committee Panel on Surprise Attack to Killian¹

August 15, 1958

Dear Dr. Killian:

We are transmitting herewith a report of a Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee concerned with the problem of surprise attack. This report is entitled, "Some Technical Aspects of the Problem of Surprise Attack."

Since July 15 when you initiated the work of our Panel, we have given as intensive study to the problem of surprise attack as we were able to give in the time available. Our report discusses some of the technical aspects of this extraordinarily complex subject, and has benefited materially from briefings which were heard jointly with the Inter-Agency Working Group studying this same subject.

We especially wish you to note that our study has indicated several problem areas, both technical and military, that will require further intensive study. Some of these problems could not be carefully considered because of the limits of time. Others, it was felt, went beyond the charter of our activity.

¹ Source: Transmits the Panel's report (not included). Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

At your request we have forwarded copies of our analysis to the Inter-Agency Working Group studying this problem, and we are prepared to provide any additional assistance that you may deem helpful.

Respectfully,

R. R. Bowie
G. B. Kistiakowsky
E. M. Purcell
I. I. Rabi
J. H. Sides, VAdm., USN
J. B. Wiesner
J. R. Zacharias
Panel Chairman

359. Draft Presidential Statement¹

Washington, August 18, 1958

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AT TIME OF RELEASE OF REPORT OF GENEVA MEETING ON NUCLEAR TESTS

We welcome the successful conclusion of the Geneva discussions on technical requirements for monitoring testing agreements. The substantial agreement which has been reached on the technical aspects of this problem is cause for encouragement that disarmament negotiations can be fruitfully resumed. Since effective inspection is an essential element of any meaningful disarmament agreement, progress toward disarmament measures should be facilitated by this agreement of experts as to the technical requirements of a nuclear test monitoring system.

Important questions remain to be resolved before such a test monitoring system can be established. These include the organization of the control system and its relationship to the United Nations and national governments, the implementation of staffing, and on-the-spot inspection, and the participation of the authorities on whose territories control posts should be located. We stand ready to join in negotiations on these questions. We hope that such negotiations can be speedily commenced and carried through to a successful conclusion.

¹ Source: For release after successful conclusion of Geneva talks on detection of nuclear tests. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.

We have constantly pointed out during the course of recent disarmament negotiations that a suspension of nuclear tests in itself will not end the present arms build-up or the ability of the nuclear powers to wage devastating war. The heart of the nuclear armament problem is the tremendous destructive power now at the disposal of both sides, together with the means of delivering this destructive power. Unless the production of additional fissionable material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons is halted, and a gradual equitable reduction of present armaments is begun, the threat of mutual nuclear destruction will continue to mount. For these reasons we have urged that action should be taken simultaneously on nuclear testing, nuclear weapons manufacture, and other major arms control steps.

There is the possibility that mutually monitored suspension of tests might be a first step which would make it possible to reach other and more substantial agreements relating to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to other essential phases of disarmament. We are encouraged also by the statements of Soviet leaders indicating that a nuclear testing agreement might be an important first step toward halting the arms race and toward agreements in other areas of disarmament.

The United States is prepared to join with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, in negotiating an agreement for an effectively inspected cessation of nuclear tests. There could be drawn in on an *ad hoc* basis others who would assume obligations under the agreement, including those having authority over areas within which control posts are to be established in accordance with phased arrangements. The progress and results of these negotiations might be duly reported to the United Nations and its organs with disarmament responsibilities, through the intermediary of the Secretary General.

For our part we are prepared, unless testing is resumed by the U.S.S.R. or the U.K., to withhold further testing of nuclear weapons for a period up to one year beginning October 1, 1958, while agreement is being reached both as to the terms of the cessation and the detailed arrangements for inspection. Further, if agreement on the terms of an effectively inspected cessation of nuclear tests can be achieved, we are prepared to suspend testing on a year-by-year basis, subject to a determination at the beginning of each year of extension that satisfactory progress is being made (a) in installing and operating the agreed inspection system, and (b) in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures.

360. Telegram 1913 to London¹

Washington, August 19, 1958

1913. Deliver following message from President to Prime Minister Macmillan soonest. Advise time and date of delivery.

QTE August 19, 1958

Dear Harold:

I have just heard of Foster's talk with Selwyn concerning making a unilateral statement about cessation of testing provided the Protocol at Geneva is signed in a completely satisfactory form. In view of some doubts expressed by Selwyn to Foster, I want to assure you that it is our purpose to be as completely generous with your Government in the matter of passing information as the law will permit. I am sure you will understand the need for something being done promptly in the event that the Geneva Protocol is signed as expected.

With warm regard.

D.E. UNQTE

Herter
Acting

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan on public statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Confidential; Presidential Handling; Niact. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1958.

361. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and John Foster Dulles¹

New York, August 20, 1958, 8:55 a.m.

H returned the call and The Sec asked if he talked to McCone. H had and also with Killian and they agreed it is desirable to use the same wording as the Russians. McCone's reaction was to have nothing at all rather than giving the Russians veto power. The Sec and H agreed this is all right. The Sec read from a Supreme Soviet decision in the SU

¹ Source: Statement on nuclear testing; offshore islands. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

and said he just would say all types of atomic and nuclear weapons and say nothing more about the subject at all. H said they are heading that way. The Sec said it may be possible the way it is worded they intend to do it themselves—the Sec indicated I think we would.

H said he got the telegram re the Sec's talk with de Murville. They agreed it is good. H said they have not heard from Geneva. Macmillan has not sent word to the President.

The Sec said Couve wants to come to Washington and obviously to see the Pres though he did not say so. H will find out the Pres' weekend plans. The Sec told Couve Friday p.m. would probably be better than Saturday a.m.

The Sec said the Pres may get a question re the offshore islands. H read a suggested reply from WSR. The Sec would have thought he could have gone further. H said it has been quieter the last few days. The Sec thought the Pres could say our position remains the same, namely under the Treaty and authority under Public Law 4, the US would act if it seemed that the attack involved Formosa and the Penghus and that during the 4 years since that time there has been increasing integration between Formosa and the offshore islands and that would have to be taken into account. H told of today's Alsop story. If the Pres is asked re the ME he will say it is being actively discussed at the UN and it would be inappropriate to get into it in Washington. The Sec said speeches are supposed to end today and get down to real business tomorrow.

The Sec asked if the plan is to make a statement tomorrow. H said yes—they are signing at 11 in Geneva and he hopes the Pres will get it out about 10. Hagerty may want the Pres to step out of NSC to give to the Press. The Sec complained about all the jargon in the preliminary. H said it is to build up the idea it is only a small part of working towards disarmament. The Sec would suggest cutting down. It is essentially a propaganda exercise and the time it takes hemming and hawing people will wonder what we are up to and what it is. The Sec would think it could be put in more pungent terms though he realizes it is late. H said they can take a try and it would have to go through Defense, AEC etc. and H would hope we won't end up tonight with an indecisive statement. The Sec said if he has time he might make a suggestion later in the day but realizes it is late to do it. H said it can always be looked over again.

H said the French came in and talked to Farley last night. They talked it over and said it sounds as if an ultimatum went to Geneva but we pointed out we have acted as a group. This was about signature—not statement. The position here is mild compared with Geneva.

362. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and John Foster Dulles¹

August 20, 1958, 11:12 p.m.

The Sec said Lloyd was in the other room. The Sec has rewritten the statement somewhat but the principle thing is the US taking account of the Geneva conclusions is prepared to proceed promptly etc. and he read. Lloyd is anxious in order to maintain the integrity of our position to have a requirement that the concept of the putting the experts' report into effect should be accepted in principle by other nations—the SU and UK in our case. H said has it arisen in any way in regard to the French objection to have it submitted to govt—the Sec said no. We have taken the position we will not suspend unless there is a system to supervise—now we say we are going to stop testing for a year—we should insist the Soviets accept in principle there should be supervision and if we do that we have logic and integrity in our position. H thinks it has logic and the Sec thinks it has sense. The Sec said he talked to Farley about this. The Sec said he agreed to “the agreement should also deal with the problem of detonation for peaceful purposes as distinct from weapons tests.” They discussed something briefly I missed and H asked if we are free to continue during it and the Sec said yes, he thinks we are—we just agree to forego weapons tests. H said the logic is clear—the Sec said clear without spelling it out literally which we don't want to do. H liked accept in principle. The Sec said he just got the text of the Pres' letter. H said it was complicated.

¹ Source: Statement on cessation of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

363. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 20, 1958, 11:15 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
Dr. Killian
General Persons
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster

The meeting was held to discuss the timing of the statement of test suspension, and the timing of notification to the Congress concerning the statement. Secretary Herter said that the timing problems are very difficult, and that much remains to be brought together before the statement is issued. It would be possible, he indicated, to take a calculated gamble that the effect would not be lost by waiting another week until the report of the Geneva negotiations is filed and made public. The special significance of August 21st is the signing of the agreement in Geneva. If we should wait, however, we run the risk that the Soviets would launch some sort of propaganda campaign which would deprive us of the effect we are seeking through our action.

The President asked if we had received any reply from the British as to their agreement with our proposed action, and Secretary Herter said we had not. The President said he understood that the item that is causing a great deal of difficulty in our own government is the ruling out of peaceful detonations during the period while an agreement is being negotiated. He thought a reasonable solution would be to permit these to continue. Secretary Herter said he understood there were some scientific objections to this, in that it would open the way for possible cheating by the Soviets. He said that the period of unilateral suspension could be cut down to nine months and we could negotiate with the Soviets during that period concerning peaceful explosions. The disadvantage to the nine months period is that we would seem to be planning to discontinue simply until we were ready to start another test series the middle of next year.

There was then discussion as to the best means of notifying the Congress, and the President said he thought the best course was to ask Mr. Rayburn and Senator Johnson to get the appropriate leaders together, one group in the House and one group in the Senate.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on August 25.

364. Telegram Secto 8 From John Foster Dulles at USUN¹

New York, August 20, 1958, 1 p.m.

Secto 8. Personal from Secretary to Acting Secretary. I have again gone over the August 19 draft of Presidential statement to be made at the time of the release of report of Geneva Meeting on Nuclear Testing.

1. I understand that the language on one-year suspension will read “to withhold further testing of atomic and nuclear weapons for a period up to one year beginning October 1, 1958”. This would in my opinion permit of the use of atomic and nuclear power for clearly civilian and peaceful purposes, and do so without loss of world propaganda effect because our statement would be in this respect substantially identical with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of March 31, 1958.

2. While accepting the foregoing draft as a statement of United States policy, I believe that the President’s public statement could with great advantage be substantially simplified. I am adding redraft at end of message to carry out this thought.

Let me emphasize that I am not seeking through this redraft to retract or modify in any way any of the previously agreed language so far as it is a United States policy position. However, since the public statement is primarily designed to influence world opinion and gain good will, I believe that it is desirable to emphasize the positive aspects and avoid expressing publicly some of the difficulties and complexities we foresee and which are inherent in the situation. Following is text of public statement I would suggest:

Begin text: The United States welcomes the successful conclusion of the Geneva discussions on technical requirements for monitoring testing agreements.

Important questions remain to be resolved before a test monitoring system can be established. These include the organization of the control system and its relationship to the United Nations and national governments, the implementation of staffing and on-the-spot inspection, and the participation of the authorities on whose territories control posts should be located.

In an effort to resolve these questions, the United States is prepared to join with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, in negotiating an agreement for an effectively inspected suspension of nuclear tests. Representatives

¹ Source: Draft Presidential statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2058.

of other countries having authority over areas within which control posts should be established would of course be consulted. The progress and results of these negotiations might be duly reported to the United Nations and its organs with disarmament responsibilities, through the intermediary of the Secretary General.

The United States is also prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing of atomic and nuclear weapons for a period up to one year beginning October 1, 1958, while agreement is being reached both as to the terms of suspension of testing and the detailed arrangements for inspection. Further, if agreement on the terms of an effectively inspected suspension of nuclear tests can be achieved, the United States is prepared to suspend testing on a year-by-year basis, subject to a determination at the beginning of each year of extension that satisfactory progress is being made (a) in installing and operating the agreed inspection system, and (b) in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures, such as the United States has long sought.

As the United States has frequently made clear, it does not consider that suspension of testing of atomic and nuclear weapons is in itself a measure of disarmament or limitation of armament. The significance of an agreement for a monitored mutual suspension of tests is that it may lead to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitation and reduction of such weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. This is our hope. End text.

Dulles

365. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and John Foster Dulles¹

New York, August 20, 1958, 1:25 p.m.

Sec. said he gathered peaceful uses is still being batted about. H. said no not at all—President made decision this morning and McCone is very unhappy. Sec. said he thought it was a mistake to put peaceful uses in this statement. Sec. said what this public statement is is an exercise in

¹Source: Statement on cessation of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

public relations because we have been slipping so badly. H. said Pres. had gotten into a jam with McCone. H. was asked to go over (WH) before press conference. Sec. said re peaceful uses it is only a matter of interpretation. Killian says in document drafted in Geneva it very carefully covers all explosions. This statm. will have to be cleared today somehow.

H. asked Sec. if he had seen two messages from Macmillan. Sec. said no and H. read one to Sec. Goodpaster has it and will show it to the Pres. Sec. said we can't go all the way with military—if we have to H. and Sec. might as well quit. H. said Pres. is prepared to go ahead on this statm. and get full value. Sec. said he could come down to Washington for meeting. H. will call Sec. back after he talks with Pres.

H. earlier said another way the statm. might be handled would be to take calculated risk on releasing this before report is submitted to UN.

366. Message From Macmillan to Eisenhower¹

London, August 20, 1958

My Dear Friend,

I am greatly obliged to you for your letter of August 19 in which you gave me the assurance that it is your purpose to be as completely generous with us in the matter of passing information "as the law will permit". I gladly accept this assurance and I need hardly say that I have every confidence that you are determined to do your utmost for us.

I am sure you will recognise that in this I have a very heavy responsibility. During the past twelve years, we have made immense efforts to develop the nuclear weapons capacity which would enable us to play an effective part in the defence of the free world. We have made good progress and the tests that we are about to hold will take us a further step towards the solution of the two problems of invulnerability and reduction of weight which we must achieve. If our earlier work is not to be wasted, we must have the answers to these two problems. If you can provide us with the information you already have or will obtain in the future, then I can agree to suspension of tests, which I feel really means abandonment, with a clear conscience. Can I be assured that "the law will permit" you to give us this information if we are prevented from

¹ Source: Seeks assurance on release of nuclear testing information. Top Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

getting it for ourselves? If you tell me that I am justified in making that assumption, I can rest assured that the essential defence interests of my country are sufficiently safeguarded.

I am sending you a separate message on the political considerations which seem to me to arise on the timing and nature of any public statement on the results of the Geneva conference.

With warm regards,

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) Harold Macmillan

367. Message From Macmillan to Eisenhower¹

London, August 20, 1958

My dear Friend,

My first reaction to your proposed statement was one of grave concern. I will not pretend that I was not influenced to some extent by the technical side of the problem, to which I have referred. My concern on that account has now been dispelled. But I should like to make it plain to you that I was influenced almost as much by the political consideration which I set out in my second message. Two factors, in particular, weighed heavily with me. First, I thought it would be a profound mistake to concede suspension without securing Russian acceptance of an international control system. Secondly, I was seriously apprehensive about de Gaulle's reaction. On both these points I have been reassured by your messages of today. On the first, I think that Foster's new draft is a great improvement. Though, even now, I am not sure whether the Russians will accept a truly international system of control. If they should take the line that each country should man the control posts within its own territory, we shall not have achieved our essential purpose. I hope we shall both keep a careful eye on this. On the second, I would feel happier if I knew what de Gaulle himself was thinking. But I am relieved to know that Couve, at any rate, seems to be taking this quite quietly. I think that I must send the General a personal message about this just before the announcement is made. Perhaps you would consider whether you could do so too.

¹ Source: Agrees to statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

Finally, I note your anxiety about the state of world opinion. I had thought that a statement on the lines originally proposed might seem to be a little precipitate and that there was time for us to proceed in a more deliberate way. This is after all a pretty serious step and it did not seem unreasonable that we should spend a little more time in considering it. But I do understand, especially in view of what you say in the second paragraph of your message, that you think it important to proceed more quickly in order to recover the initiative with world opinion; and, as you will have seen from the separate message which I have sent to Foster, we are prepared to go along with you in this and to make a parallel statement in support of yours.

With warm regards,
As ever,

Harold Macmillan

368. Message From Macmillan to Eisenhower¹

London, August 20, 1958

My dear Friend,

I promised a second message on the political considerations about the statement which you are thinking of making when the report of the Geneva Conference appears.

I fully agree that we must make some public response to that report but I doubt whether it justifies us in going as fast as you propose in the draft statement which Foster gave to Selwyn in New York. It is true that the report will demonstrate the theoretical possibility of controlling a suspension of tests, and we ought to welcome it on that account. But we cannot yet say that we can see our way through the practical difficulties of putting this theoretical system into operation.

There is an enormous prize to win. Both you and I have always felt that through the Geneva Meeting we might move towards the establishment on Soviet territory of some system of international control. Even though that system might be unsatisfactory and inefficient, it would at least have gained us a foothold which we could exploit. If we

¹Source: Urges postponement of statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

now suspend all tests, the Russians may well think that they have got substantially what they want without having to pay any price for it. What I mean by this is that they might refuse to agree to any genuine international control, calculating that the West would never be able to resume the tests which they had voluntarily suspended.

If we felt that we must make some forward move on tests at the present time, I would much prefer to see it limited to those tests which we know can be detected by existing national systems—say, everything above 25 kilotons. A proposal on those lines would be consistent with our past insistence on linking suspension to control and would also go a long way to meeting public criticism of tests on grounds of injury to health, since it would eliminate all tests which release fission products into the stratosphere.

A limited suspension of this kind would also make things much easier for the French. I am seriously troubled about their attitude. I feel that after all our difficulties with de Gaulle over recent events, while he is still suspicious of our intentions towards him, it would be a serious mistake to force the French Government into a position of dissociating itself from our proposals. The trouble which we are having with them already at Geneva shows how suspicious they are on this question. We really must consult them fully and give them time to come to a conclusion. But de Gaulle will be in Africa for at least a week from now. I do feel strongly that the whole economic future of Europe, and perhaps its political future too, may be jeopardized if we allow the French to feel isolated or roughly treated over this question.

For myself, I should much prefer that any statement we may agree to make on future policy in relation to nuclear tests should be related, not to the end of the Geneva Conference, but to the opening of the General Assembly. We shall all be under acute pressure there to make some forward move with a view to getting the maximum benefit from it in the Assembly. If we play this card sooner we shall be bound to be asked for more when the Assembly meets.

Finally, I ought to tell you that the test series which we have just announced will not in fact be completed, at earliest, until the middle of October.

May I ask you, my dear Friend, to take these points into account. They seem to me to merit serious consideration. This is a very important decision. I agree with you absolutely as to your purpose, but I am anxious that we should make no mistake as to method and timing.

With warm regards,

Yours ever,

Harold Macmillan

369. Telegram 1969 to London¹

Washington, August 20, 1958, 9:22 p.m.

1969. Please deliver immediately to Prime Minister Macmillan the following message from the President:

QUOTE August 20, 1958. Dear Harold:

This cable replies to your first message, the one referring to certain technical matters. Foster is just now leaving for New York and during the trip will give to Selwyn his conclusions on the political side of the matter for immediate cabling to you. His cable will quote our statement as it has been revised, including such important points as timing.

My personal comment about the political side is merely that the week's experience at the General Assembly clearly shows that much of the world opinion is shifting, if not toward the Soviets, at least away from the West because of our alleged intransigence about all aspects of nuclear testing and so on. I feel that the publication of the report of the technical experts at Geneva may mark an opportunity for us to regain some of this world opinion. If we are to do so, I think we cannot wait for some weeks or days during which time Russian propaganda would make it appear that we are being forced into a position that finally might become untenable.

Now with respect to the two questions of reduction of weight and invulnerability, under the law I am permitted to convey to you any information needed so long as that information will not endanger our security. The law requires that I make a certification to this effect. Since our joint purpose is to make certain that the weapons we both manufacture are for use by the free world in our common defense, there will be no difficulty in my making the necessary certificate for this type of exchange. I understand that British and American technicians are having their first meeting on next Wednesday morning, at which time there will be some agreement as to the kinds of information in which both sides wish to delve. Out of that meeting will come to me further suggestions as to the certificates that I need to make.

Incidentally, we do not see how we could establish and stand by a limit of 25 kilos for bomb testing. The findings of tests are not sufficiently exact to make this a feasible condition.

I think this gives you the technical assurance you need.

¹ Source: Conveys message from Eisenhower to Macmillan on providing technical information and political necessity of making statement on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Presidential Handling. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2058.

I want further to say with respect to the whole matter that we are not trying to push you either politically or technically into an isolated or indefensible position. No matter what the exact language of the statement, which I think we will make no later than Saturday morning, we would hope that you could associate yourselves with it if you so desire. But in any event, we will do our best to make certain that our own action does not embarrass you.

When you have both the messages to which I refer, I hope that you will reply as soon as you can because we do believe we are up against one of those moments that we regard as psychologically correct.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQUOTE

Herter
Acting

370. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, August 20, 1958, 9:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>United States</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>
The Secretary	Mr. Lloyd
Mr. Reinhardt	Sir William Hayter
Mr. Greene	Mr. A. R. Moore
	Mr. Dennis Lasky

SUBJECT

Statement on Suspension of Nuclear Testing

The Secretary showed Mr. Lloyd the draft of a statement proposed to be made by the President on suspension of nuclear testing. In a lengthy discussion Mr. Lloyd argued that unless there be established in the statement a relationship between our readiness to suspend testing and Soviet willingness to join in negotiations for an agreement to supervise suspension of testing, we would give away to the Soviets

¹ Source: Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

without exacting any price an essential indeed fundamental part of our position.

As a result of this discussion, the Secretary agreed to insert at the beginning of the fourth paragraph the phrase "If this is accepted in principle", so as to establish the link between the two parts of our statement.

371. Letter From Strauss to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 20, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

The letter from Prime Minister Macmillan is returned herewith.

Where he mentions the "two problems" of "invulnerability" and "reduction of weight", I believe he means, in the first instance, weapons that are safe from pre-initiation. In the second instance, I assume he refers to weapons of large yield where we have succeeded in reducing both size and weight. In both circumstances, the *present law* does permit the transfer of such information as does the present bilateral agreement which became effective on the 3rd of this month. It is not necessary to amend the bilateral to provide for the exchange of further weapons information but, in each case, it will be necessary that we make a finding that the exchange is needed and "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security".

However, you should be aware that when the Department of Defense and the Commission witnesses testified before the Congressional Committee, they indicated that it was not contemplated that the most sensitive design information would be transferred in the initial exchanges but later when need could be demonstrated and information provided to you that such transfer "would promote and not constitute an unreasonable risk... etc.".

Respectfully,

Lewis

¹Source: Assures Eisenhower U.S. can provide nuclear information sought by Macmillan. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Strauss, Adm. Lewis.

372. Telegram Dulte 2 From John Foster Dulles at USUN¹

New York, August 21, 1958, 1 a.m.

Dulte 2. For Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Following is text of letter I have handed Selwyn Lloyd for Harold Macmillan: (Revised statement enclosed with letter in separate telegram.)

Dear Harold:

I have just returned from Washington where I went to discuss with the President your two messages of August 20. The message with respect to exchange of information is being handled from Washington. The other message I am answering through Selwyn Lloyd in line with the President's views.

We feel that it is important, as you say, that there be "some public response" to the report of the experts. We believe, however, that unless this public response indicates a significant program, we shall be subjected to a serious propaganda barrage, and if as you suggest we only make our statement on suspension at the opening of the General Assembly, we will then appear to have surrendered to Soviet pressures rather than have taken ourselves an initiative.

Our standing in the world is at a point where there is real danger to us in [illegible in the original] adjudged militaristic. That danger can have consequences as serious as the foregoing of some nuclear weapons knowledge. The United States has already held back on this suspension matter for several months largely in deference to our desire not to confront you with a possible test suspension before we could give you the benefit of our own knowledge in this field. We have through great exertion obtained an amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in your favor and the President has undertaken to act generously under it. We really wonder in the light of this whether you should ask us to take further serious risks in relation to world opinion.

We do not share the fear you express that if we temporarily suspend testing we will never be able to resume, and therefore the Soviets will have gotten something for nothing. Of course this is a risk. But it seems to us that if we made clear that we are suspending only in order to get some constructive progress in the field of disarmament, that will

¹ Source: Transmits for Eisenhower text of letter from Dulles to Macmillan on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2158.

put the Russians under pressure to do something in this field, as otherwise they will carry the responsibility for the resumption of testing.

That is one reason why we do not want to qualify our suspension in a way which would imply acceptance of the health hazard. If we did that then indeed we might have burned our bridges behind us. Rather we should emphasize that we are suspending only in the hopes that this will prove an opening wedge which will permit of progress in the disarmament field.

As to the French, I wonder if your fears are founded. Last night I showed Couve de Murville the statement we proposed to make. He gave it as his first impression that it was entirely satisfactory and that it would leave the French free to proceed if they so desired because if the Soviets and we stopped testing then there can be no allegation that a small test by the French would be a hazard to world health. Of course that was only a first impression, but during the intervening 24 hours, I have not received anything to the contrary. Certainly a suspension statement in September would be no better from the French standpoint than one made now. For any test that they could make would probably not be until next year.

As to dates, we are willing in view of your preoccupations to indicate October 31st as the date for starting the trial period of test suspension and then on the assumption that the Soviets will by then have initiated with us a serious negotiation.

We have redrawn the proposed statement to reflect somewhat more fully the foregoing views and to make it, we hope, a more effective public document. I enclose a copy of the redraft statement herewith. We will defer making it tomorrow morning, as we had planned, and hold it until Friday or Saturday morning, giving us time to hear further from you.

Faithfully yours,
John Foster Dulles.

Dulles

373. Record of Telephone Conversations Between Eisenhower and Herter and John Foster Dulles¹

August 21, 1958, 8:50 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT (Washington)

Sec. told Pres. he had long talk until Midnight with Lloyd and Sec. thinks that the British are now satisfied with the testing statm. Sec. said he made one change in draft statm. which met their wants (Sec. read statm. to Pres.). Sec. said he also made phrase to meet John McCone's wishes. Sec. now thinks it is in pretty good shape, and thinks Pres. will get approval from Macmillan today. Sec. also showed Lloyd Pres. letter to Macmillan which Sec. thinks will be all right to British. Sec. told Pres. we sent revised statm. to French but we haven't heard from them yet. Pres. said he has Couve de Murville coming down at 5:00 p. m. today.

Pres. said papers show that Arab resolution looks pretty good—Sec. agreed. Sec. said only one thing bad and that is that it will rehabilitate and invigorate Arab League. Pres. said we can't help that. Sec. said Israeli are very unhappy about it. Pres. said he thinks the resolution is all right. Pres. asked Sec. if he had talked to Herter re Congress. Sec. said he had tried to get him but he is at WH for NSC. Pres. said hold on he will get H. 8:56 a. m.

GOVERNOR HERTER

Sec. said he was saying to Pres. that we anticipate British will be happy about testing statm. H. asked Sec. re acceptance does he think we need Congressional action. Sec. said if it were treaty we would have to have Congressional action but merely to suspend testing it requires no action from Congress. Sec. asked H. to what degree of consultation do we have with Congress. H. said McCone is going on Hill today but will not go into substance of statm., however, if asked AEC's view he will have to tell them.

H. asked Sec. re Arab resolution and Sec. told him same as he told Pres.

H. asked Sec. should we make statm. that US is for Arab resolution and Sec. said we would have to hold off on any such announcement for timebeing—maybe later.

H. said he noted from morning papers that at Lloyd's back-grounder with the press last night he announced the British would give enthusiastic support to the Arab resolution.

¹ Source: Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.

Sec. said he is about to meet with staff and they will discuss any such announcement and will call H. back. H. said he would probably be at NSC a long time—there were a lot of items. Sec. said he would call him out.

374. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 21, 1958, 10:50 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Libby
General Goodpaster

Just following NSC, the President met briefly with Dr. Libby, at Mr. McCone's request, to express to Dr. Libby his philosophy regarding exchange of atomic information with the British. The essence of his view is that such exchange should be full and generous; any attempt to do otherwise with true allies is bound to alienate them. The President cited the British assistance to us in World War II through making their intelligence available to us (when we had no intelligence of our own, not having maintained intelligence sections between the wars); he further cited their assistance to us in getting work started on atomic weapons, in providing us information about radar, and information on the design and development of jet engines.

Dr. Libby said that the Atomic Energy Commission has favored a "measured" approach, but he felt Congress is ready to go all the way, in measured fashion, in providing this information to the British. He indicated he thought he understood the President's point of view, and that he was in agreement with it and would seek to carry it out. He recalled to the President that we have pressed the British, on their side, to make available information regarding certain lines of development having commercial significance which they have emphasized.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower urges full and generous exchange of information with U.K. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AEC, Vol. II. Drafted on August 23.

375. Telegram Secto 13 From John Foster Dulles at USUN¹

New York, August 21, 1958, 4 p.m.

Secto 13. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. You may find it useful to have my views on the importance of the inclusion in our proposed draft statement on nuclear testing of the sentence: "The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests".

I do not believe that any agreement to suspend the "testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons" should deny to mankind, perhaps forever, the possibility of using this vast new power for human betterment as in creating new harbors and waterways, making available underground sources of water, oil, minerals, etc. To attempt this would be to fly in the face of all human experience.

There may or may not be a mechanistic difference between the devices which are used for military purposes and the devices used for peaceful purposes. Surely there is an immense difference in the motivation. I believe that that difference in motivation justifies a distinction, although I recognize that there may be difficulty in implementing this criterion in a suspension agreement. Nevertheless it must, in my opinion, be attempted. Also I believe that during the period of self-denying and unsupervised suspension, we should be allowed in good faith to exercise our own judgment as to whether the motivation of a nuclear explosion by us is militaristic or peaceful. I believe that the statement referred to is important because it recognizes that there is a distinction between the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes and for the purpose of testing weapons.

Once a distinction is pointed out and so long as our voluntary denial is limited only to weapons, then I believe that we can in good faith conduct explosions for purposes which are demonstrably peaceful and economic.

I realize that this creates a possible loophole for the Soviets during the one-year period. I understand, however, that it is the judgment of those who work in this field that they would rather take this chance than to forego the peaceful uses, and I, myself, would concur in this conclusion.

I should emphasize again my thought that this whole statement is designed as a public document which we hope will contribute to our prestige and influence in world opinion. It must therefore, in my view,

¹ Source: Transmits Dulles' views on draft statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700/5611/8-2158.

be as simple as possible as to what we will and will not do in broad terms: It should not, as a policy document, set out all the complexities and considerations to be taken into account in giving effect to, or in negotiating, our basic position.

Dulles

376. Telegram Dulte 4 From John Foster Dulles at USUN¹

New York, August 21, 1958, 6 p.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Following is text of letter to Secretary from Macmillan handed Secretary by Lloyd in New York today:

“August 21, 1958. Dear Foster, thank you for your letter of August 20. I have now received the President’s further message and am most grateful for his clear assurances on the exchange of information. I should like to assure you that my concern in my messages to the President was not simply to protect this country’s nuclear weapons programme. Quite apart from this I felt real doubts as to whether your proposed action was calculated to extract the maximum advantage for the Western countries from the Geneva Conference. I was not thinking so much of world opinion, which I know is not fully with us on this issue, but of the risk of throwing away the prize we hope to gain by making the Russians accept an international control system on their territory.

As to the larger political problem, I welcome the revision of your proposed announcement, which goes a long way to meet my point. I still fear that the Russians may be able to escape paying the price for the suspension of tests, but I recognize the force of your arguments and I agree that the new procedure should reduce that risk. I am also grateful to you for accommodating us on the date from which a suspension of tests should begin. I am therefore ready to join you in the action now proposed. I am sending Selwyn some suggested amendments to your draft announcement which I hope you may feel able to accept.

My intention is to make a parallel announcement at the same time as yours. I am still not sure that we need make these announcements

¹ Source: Repeats telegram to London transmitting letter from Macmillan to Dulles. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.6511/8–2158.

quite as early as you suggest. May it not seem odd if we make our statements of policy before the world has seen the report of the Geneva Conference on which they are based? If nevertheless you feel it essential to go ahead on Saturday we shall be ready to make our announcement then.

I still feel worried about the French. I wish it had been possible to ascertain De Gaulle's personal views before taking this action. I am however greatly relieved by the news of your talk with Couve de Murville, and I gather Selwyn has had a similarly reassuring reaction from him. Selwyn will continue to keep Couve fully informed of what we are doing, and no doubt you will do the same. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan."

Lodge

377. Message From Macmillan to Eisenhower¹

London, August 21, 1958

My dear Friend,

I have written directly to Foster about the text and timing of your proposed announcement. But I want, in addition, to reply to your personal message of yesterday.

First, on the technical matters, may I say at once that I am very glad to have your assurance that you can and will give us the information needed, including the two points to which I referred specifically. I am completely satisfied with that assurance and most grateful to you for it. I have never for one moment doubted the sincerity of your desire to help us to play an effective part in maintaining the nuclear deterrent, on which the peace of the world at present depends. But this business has had a long and chequered history, and I know you will understand my anxiety that there should be no possible room for misunderstanding between us at this last stage. As I told you in my message of yesterday, I feel a heavy sense of responsibility over this, and I thought it was

¹ Source: Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

my duty to make sure that there was clear and explicit understanding between us. I am greatly relieved by what you have now said to me.

I am sending you a separate message about the political question as a whole.

With warm regards,

As ever,

(Sgd.) Harold Macmillan

378. Message From Macmillan to John Foster Dulles¹

London, August 21, 1958

Dear Foster,

Thank you for your letter of August 20. I have now received the President's further message and am most grateful for his clear assurances on the exchange of information. I should like to assure you that my concern in my messages to the President was not simply to protect this country's nuclear weapons programme. Quite apart from this I felt real doubts as to whether your proposed action was calculated to extract the maximum advantage for the Western countries from the Geneva Conference. I was not thinking so much of world opinion, which I know is not fully with us on this issue, but of the risk of throwing away the prize we hope to gain by making the Russians accept an international control system on their territory.

As to the larger political problem, I welcome the revision of your proposed announcement, which goes a long way to meet my point. I still fear that the Russians may be able to escape paying the price for the suspension of tests, but I recognise the force of your arguments and I agree that the new procedure should reduce that risk. I am also grateful to you for accommodating us on the date from which a suspension of tests should begin. I am therefore ready to join you in the action now proposed. I am sending Selwyn some suggested amendments to your draft announcement which I hope you may feel able to accept.

My intention is to make a parallel announcement at the same time as yours. I am still not sure that we need make these announcements

¹ Source: Statement on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles, 1955–59.

quite as early as you suggest. May it not seem odd if we make our statements of policy before the world has seen the report of the Geneva Conference on which they are based? If nevertheless you feel it essential to go ahead on Saturday we shall be ready to make our announcement then.

I still feel worried about the French. I wish it had been possible to ascertain de Gaulle's personal views before taking this action. I am however greatly relieved by the news of your talk with Couve de Murville, and I gather Selwyn has had a similarly reassuring reaction from him. Selwyn will continue to keep Couve fully informed of what we are doing, and no doubt you will do the same.

With warm regards,
as ever,

Harold Macmillan

379. Memorandum From Cumming (INR) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, August 30, 1958

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note—*Khrushchev Statement on Nuclear Test Suspension*

Khrushchev's "interview" in today's *Pravda* (attached) constitutes the first official Soviet response to the Western proposals of August 22 for negotiations on nuclear test suspension. Presumably a note forwarding Khrushchev's statement, or recapitulating its main points, will shortly be received in formal reply to our note of August 22.

Khrushchev accepts the date of October 31 for the beginning of negotiations and apparently also the participation of only the three powers (United States, Britain, Soviet Union) suggested by the West, although the latter point remains to be clarified. But he stipulates what in the Soviet view must be "the purpose" of the negotiations: the conclusion of an agreement to end "for all time" tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons "of all kinds" and "by all states." References to "all" or "any" kinds of weapons and to "all states" or to a "universal ban" have been standard in Soviet statements since May, when the USSR agreed to

¹ Source: Intelligence Note: Khrushchev Statement on Nuclear Test Suspension. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/8-3058.

hold technical talks on controls, and appear designed to cover France. Communist China would presumably also be affected.

Insistence on a cessation “for all time” would represent a change from last year’s Soviet negotiating position which provided for a suspension of “two or three years.” It also implies rejection of the Western view that each yearly extension of a test suspension would depend on the effective operation of an inspection system and satisfactory progress toward major and substantial disarmament measures. Khrushchev states explicitly that “we cannot agree” with these Western “reservations and conditions”, claiming that (1) controls can be easily established and (2) that the West itself has been responsible for failure to agree on disarmament measures and therefore advances the condition of “satisfactory progress” as a means of sabotaging a suspension of tests. (These points had also been made in Soviet propaganda reaction since August 22.)

It remains to be seen whether Moscow will insist on Western acceptance of the Soviet concept of the “purposes” of negotiations as a pre-condition to the actual beginning of negotiations. It will be recalled that Moscow sought Western agreement to a similar set of “purposes” prior to the Geneva technical talks but sent its delegation despite Western failure to comply. At the same time, it has long been the Soviet position that a test ban must be “unconditional” and independent from other disarmament measures and Moscow can be expected to maintain this position in negotiations. Khrushchev’s suggestion in *Pravda* that the USSR will seek United Nations approval of a test ban at the 13th General Assembly and his demand that negotiations last only two or three weeks indicate his intention of generating maximum pressure on the West to agree to a “simple” test ban.

Khrushchev’s other major point was the statement that continued Western testing “relieve the USSR of the obligation it had assumed unilaterally” regarding a suspension of tests. The Supreme Soviet decision of March 31 and several statements by Khrushchev and Gromyko had provided for such a move and strengthen the view that, knowing the United States had scheduled a series of tests during the summer, Moscow was exploiting a normal interval between Soviet tests for political purposes. August and the autumn months have traditionally been a Soviet testing season. Khrushchev did not state explicitly whether the USSR actually intends to resume testing; nor did he indicate whether Moscow would join the United States and Britain in suspending tests for one year once negotiations begin. Khrushchev’s acceptance of the October 31 date for the opening of talks, despite earlier Soviet propaganda complaints that this date was too late, suggests an intention to conduct tests in the interim. In such an eventuality Moscow would apparently calculate that world opinion can be persuaded that the USSR is entitled

to further tests in order not to be left at a disadvantage by intensive Western testing this summer. It may also estimate that popular anxieties concerning the effects of testing would be further stimulated in this way and that hence pressures on the West to accept Soviet terms for immediate and permanent cessation would mount.

Khrushchev did not deal with the question of "peaceful" nuclear explosions. There has been only one Soviet comment since August 22 criticizing the Western position on this point. The reference to ending tests of nuclear *weapons* of all kinds would appear to leave the Soviet position flexible.

In sum, the USSR appears ready to undertake negotiations with the West but appears intent by diplomatic means, through popular pressure and UN action to put the West under maximum pressure to meet Soviet terms in such negotiations.

A similar memorandum has been prepared for the Under Secretary.

380. Letter From Acting AEC Chairman to Eisenhower¹

Washington, September 4, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

On August 19, 1958 a joint letter, which was signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense and by Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, was sent to you recommending an initial exchange of information with the United Kingdom for the promotion of weapons research, design and fabrication. This exchange was to be effected under the authority of the new Section 144c(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the new bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom. The letter proposed to you the scope of the information to be exchanged in the initial meetings and requested your determination that the communication of the proposed Restricted Data would promote and would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

I wish to report to you that the initial exchange meetings with the United Kingdom were held in Washington on August 27, 28 and 29, 1958.

¹Source: Initial U.S.-U.K. information exchanges. Secret; Restricted Data. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Presidential Actions-Atomic.

The information transmitted by the United States was within the scope authorized by you in your letter of August 21, 1958 to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Certain of the information transmitted to us by the United Kingdom representatives generally paralleled the information which we transmitted to them. They, however, went further and gave us an indication of their general state of weapons development. The United Kingdom representatives also indicated to us their developmental requirements in the atomic weapons fields.

[text not declassified].

Attached for your information is a report on the joint U.S.–U.K. meeting which was signed on August 29, 1958 by the two leading representatives from each country. This report indicates the requirements of the British Government in atomic weapons and it indicates, in general terms, areas of exchange which are desired by both sides at the next joint meeting. Such a joint meeting has been tentatively scheduled to be held in Albuquerque, New Mexico starting September 15, 1958. The Restricted Data which the Commission and the Department of Defense will desire to communicate to the United Kingdom at that meeting is being prepared. Your determination that communication of such Restricted Data will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security will be requested in the near future.

Respectfully yours,

H.S. Vance
Acting Chairman

Enclosure:

Report of Joint U.S.–U.K. Meeting

381. Memorandum From Breithut (S/AE) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, September 8, 1958

SUBJECT

Your 4:30 p.m. Meeting with AEC Chairman McCone

We understand that Mr. McCone will raise the two topics discussed below. (Cf. Paris telegram 821, September 6—TAB A).

¹ Source: Briefing for meeting with McCone: IAEA, U.S.-French exchanges. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA-General.

REVIEW OF HIS GENEVA TALKS ON THE IAEA

Talks with the U.K., French, Indian and Soviet representatives have reinforced McCone's concern regarding the future of the Agency. The following have been cited as significant problems:

1. *The slow progress of the Agency's program:* Although the Agency's functions embrace the entire field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, public attention has focused to a significant extent on its role in the development of atomic power particularly in the underdeveloped areas. Expectations and aspirations in this field have greatly exceeded reasonable prospects for early progress. A growing realization that the Agency is unlikely to bring about the swift initiation of atomic power projects in underdeveloped areas has led to some slackening of the earlier ardent interest in the Agency of underdeveloped nations. The trend toward more conservative appraisals of the early prospects for atomic power in underdeveloped areas was reinforced by a number of technical papers at the Geneva Conference. Although the Department does not wish the U.S. to make statements and take positions in the IAEA which will promote extravagant expectations doomed to disappointment, Governor Herter has written Chairman McCone emphasizing the importance of making atomic power a principal theme of the U.S. representative's statement at the Second Geneva Conference (TAB B).

2. *Role of the IAEA and other U.N. organizations:* Mr. McCone is concerned with regard to activities of the U.N. and the specialized agencies which appear to be potentially in conflict with the functions assigned the IAEA by its Charter, and speeches by some of the participants at the Geneva Peaceful Uses Conference have heightened his concern. He may also refer to Secretary General Hammarskjold's report suggesting that the U.N. Radiation Committee might be given operating responsibilities and to resistance to the idea favored by the U.S. of the IAEA's sponsoring future Peaceful Uses Conferences.

We believe that the question of IAEA relationship with the U.N. and the specialized agencies is not a major problem, in spite of certain current frictions. Relationship agreements with ILO, UNESCO, and FAO satisfactory to the IAEA have recently been negotiated and will be submitted to the Second General Conference for approval; and we believe the IAEA can expand its present activities or add new activities in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy without running into any serious conflict with the specialized agencies. We consider that IAEA should sponsor any future Peaceful Uses Conferences, and that the U.S. should oppose in the Thirteenth General Assembly establishment of operational responsibilities for the U.N. Radiation Committee. IO is prepared to discuss these questions further with Mr. McCone in detail at his convenience after he has talked to you. The basic problem of the IAEA is to develop a significant program of its own. If this is done, the problem of the relationship of the IAEA to the U.N. and the specialized

agencies will be placed in proper perspective and the tension surrounding these problems will tend to disappear.

3. *Level and caliber of national representatives to the Agency:* Many governments are sending medium or low level diplomatic personnel to Board meetings and are showing signs of reducing the caliber of future representation. We are pressing a plan to facilitate future high-caliber participation by holding less frequent and shorter Board meetings in the future and have solicited appropriate capitals for support (TAB C). The level of the U.S. diplomatic and technical delegation is appropriate. The Soviet representative has long been pressing for an advisory committee to the IAEA consisting of scientists of international reputation but the U.S. has resisted the establishment of such a committee as it might jeopardize the role of the Board of Governors and ultimately damage, rather than aid, the Agency.

It might be useful to emphasize the importance of Chairman McCone's presence in Vienna during the opening days of the Second General Conference of the IAEA regardless of the positions the U.S. may find it necessary to take on the issues arising.

HIS TALKS WITH PERRIN, FRENCH HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR ATOMIC ENERGY

McCone reports that Perrin indicates that the French want (a) information on fuel to guide them in building a gaseous diffusion plant, (b) design information, or (c) alternatively, a submarine reactor which they feel was promised them last December. We have made it clear to the French that it is not legally possible for us to provide Restricted Data or a submarine reactor to them until a bilateral agreement has been concluded and has laid before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for 60 days. A U.S. team will visit Paris in mid-September to survey French security. A technical team will also have exploratory discussions of the possible scope of a French agreement. However, State and AEC agree that we cannot now answer most of the technical questions submitted to us by the French.

You may wish to emphasize to Chairman McCone the high political importance of the successful completion of a bilateral agreement with the French enabling us to aid them with their nuclear submarine program, assuming security guarantees are adequate. Thus far the AEC and DOD have been fully cooperating with the Department in doing all that can be done to promote progress toward its completion.

382. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1958

SUBJECT

International Atomic Energy Agency

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. Vance, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission

The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Wilcox, IO
Mr. Breithut, S/AE
Mr. Cargo, UNP

Mr. McCone, who had just returned from the Second Conference of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva, said that the American contribution at Geneva was superb. He had heard nothing but favorable comment on it. It was a big operation, however. He thought that if such conferences were held in the future, it might be better to break them down by subject—health aspects in one year, power in another, etc.

The Secretary wondered whether Mr. McCone had the impression that we had surpassed the USSR on atomic matters. Mr. McCone thought that we had in every area. The Soviets showed little advance over their position of three years ago except on the subject of thermonuclear fusion. On this they were working along parallel lines with us. In fact all four of the countries doing major research in this area were working along similar lines.

Mr. McCone said that he wished to report to the Secretary on the results of his discussions in Geneva with atomic leaders of other countries on matters relating to the IAEA. He said that he had talked with Emelyanov and Bhabha, as well as the representatives from Western countries, and they all were concerned about the present position and future prospects of the Agency. Mr. McCone thought that there was legitimate reason for concern. Emelyanov had said that he would propose a scientific council, with Director General Cole as chairman, to devote its time to the establishment of objectives and a program for the Agency, and Mr. McCone told Emelyanov he would support this proposal.

¹ Source: IAEA. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA-General.

Mr. McCone said he had had long talk with Mr. Ralph Bunche. Mr. Bunche said that the Secretary General and the UN Secretariat felt responsible for the Agency and believed that its failure would be a black mark against the UN. Mr. Bunche believed, however, that the organizational structure of the IAEA had the effect of drawing it away from the UN. The Board of Governors was like a little General Assembly. As a result of the political character of the Board of Governors, there was a reluctance on the part of the United Nations and specialized agencies to give the IAEA major responsibilities. For example, Hammarskjöld was reluctant to see the IAEA take over responsibility for further conferences on peaceful uses of atomic energy. He said there would be similar doubts with regard to work in the field of radiation, where the UN Radiation Committee is now active. Mr. Bunche doubted that the IAEA would be given any responsibility in relation to the verification of test suspension.

Mr. McCone added that each specialized agency was carrying out its own role in atomic energy matters. The IAEA did not seem to be serving the UN, whereas it should be a sort of "Atomic Energy Commission" for the UN.

The Secretary observed that this was not the original concept for the Agency and that the position of the Agency described by Mr. McCone was not an accident but was designed. What was sought was to create an atomic energy agency with only a tenuous connection to the UN, something like the International Bank. Mr. Breithut observed that the thought was that a direct connection with the UN might inject irrelevant political considerations into the resolution of IAEA problems.

Mr. Wilcox said that of course the specialized agencies should not jump in and deprive the IAEA of its proper functions. He noted that the Secretary General had a coordinating role in this respect.

Mr. McCone said that he believed that the question he had outlined, the relation of the IAEA to other UN bodies and its position in the UN system, would be the subject of debate in Vienna. He said that he would need guidance on this.

The Secretary remarked that the IAEA did not get off to a good start. The Soviets had stalled in the establishment of the Agency. He recalled his own negotiations with Molotov, who had been evasive and difficult over a long period. The negotiations had in fact taken from 1953 to 1957. Meanwhile, things had not been standing still. There had been bilateral atomic arrangements. EURATOM was conceived. The Geneva conferences were organized. The question was how the IAEA could get back into its hands various matters that it would have undertaken if it had been created earlier. The IAEA, for example, should be organizing the peaceful uses conferences held at Geneva. The Secretary

asked whether the answer to the problem was not to establish specific goals for the Agency and to pursue them.

Mr. McCone said that he was seeking specific objectives for the forthcoming conference but that he had not been able to get very far as yet.

The Secretary remarked that we certainly did not wish to see the IAEA fail. While Mr. McCone had referred to Mr. Hammarskjöld's concern about this, the United States had an even bigger investment of prestige in the Agency. The Agency had been created in response to a proposal of the President. There had been a major battle in the Senate over it. It would be a blow to the United States if the Agency collapsed or withered away.

Commissioner Vance thought that the Agency's purposes, as stated in its Statute, were so broad that they were capable of almost any interpretation. He said that Mr. McKinney and Mr. Cole wanted the Agency to go into the power promotion business. He considered that the Agency did not have a place in this. All the plans that had been advanced implied that the United States would have to come up with very substantial funds to support power development. Commissioner Vance believed that the Agency should be a regulatory body and that it should also carry out some research. In the latter connection, Commissioner Vance believed that research contracts, supported by US funds, could be placed in other countries. He referred particularly to a "pool of talent" in atom research in Western Europe. In an exchange of views with Mr. McCone, Commissioner Vance indicated that we would need to know where these research contracts would be placed. Mr. McCone thought there might be some resistance to this idea by other countries and that the Agency would want to have some voice in how and where such research would be carried out.

Commenting on the possibilities of a nuclear power program, Mr. McCone remarked that there was now a much greater degree of realism about the possibility of nuclear power than heretofore. Commissioner Vance observed that operating costs were very high. He said that he presumed that we should not be so willing to bolster up the IAEA that we would be willing for the United States to go into an extensive nuclear power development program. The Secretary indicated agreement.

At the end of the meeting, Mr. McCone again said that he would need guidance as to whether we wanted the Atomic Energy Agency to continue in a position like the World Bank or whether we would want it tied more closely to the United Nations. He felt that the Agency would be likely to be ineffective unless it were tied more closely with the UN.

383. Memorandum From Minshull to Killian¹

Washington, September 23, 1958

SUBJECT

Policy Decision re Terms of Reference for Surprise Attack Delegation

On Thursday, 25 September 1958, you are tentatively scheduled to attend a meeting with Secretary Dulles and Secretary McElroy to discuss the Terms of Reference for the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming surprise attack discussions in Geneva. The major question to be resolved at this meeting is whether the U.S. delegation will be instructed to discuss only the techniques and value of inspection per se, or whether they will also be allowed to consider limitations on force readiness as well as disposition and level of force as methods to safeguard against surprise attack.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken a formal position on this matter, contending that the discussions must be limited to inspection per se. They argue that limitations or controls on readiness, disposition and level of force are problems of disarmament, a topic not under consideration at these meetings. In this regard it is interesting to note that although Mr. Quarles forwarded the JCS position on this matter to the Secretary of State on August 30th, he did not specifically endorse the JCS views as the position of the Defense Department.

The State Department, on the other hand, has taken the view—as did the Interagency Working Group—that it is also necessary to consider the effect of arms limitation or control in discussing safeguards against surprise attack if the meeting is to yield useful results.

The means for bringing this basic policy difference to the attention of yourself and the two Secretaries is a draft of the proposed Terms of Reference for the November Conference (Attachment A). This document was prepared by the State Department (after informal and private consultation with this office) and was the subject of a meeting of staff personnel from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, CIA and this office on September 19th. At this meeting the participants came to general agreement on the contents of the draft with one exception: the Defense Department representatives (Lt. Gen. Byers and Col. Rhea of ISA) insisted that Items

¹ Source: Outlines JCS view that readiness, disposition, and level of forces not be included in Surprise Attack talks. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Surprise Attack.

III.C, IV.B.3, and IV.B.4 of the proposed agenda be deleted. (All of these items are on page 5 of the attached document and are starred in red.) However, the State Department representatives (Ambassador Holmes, Phillip Farley and Lawrence Weiler) insisted with equal determination that these items were essential to a productive discussion of the surprise attack problem.

In attempting to resolve this major policy difference, two points are particularly pertinent:

(1) The U.S. National Security Policy² clearly states that this country should seek with particular urgency an international system for inspection and regulation of armed forces and armaments. The NSC policy also states, almost parenthetically, that an inspection system within the Soviet Union assumes, in and of itself, significance to the U.S. security because of its intelligence value. Unfortunately, the JCS would like to recognize only the latter statement of U.S. policy as a basis for the forthcoming Geneva discussions. (Gen. Byers argued persistently during the staff level review of the Terms of Reference to have the entire statement of National Security Policy deleted, and was finally voted down by all others present at the meeting.)

(2) The Report of the Interagency Working Group on Surprise Attack should also be considered in resolving this major policy difference. This report concluded that the Geneva discussions must consider limited arms control in order to deal effectively with the surprise attack problem. Specifically, comments on this matter are contained in paragraphs B 1 and B 2 (pages 6 and 7 of Document No. K-TS-2509) of this report, and it states in part:

"Our examination of the appendices leads us to the view that a major reduction of the threat of massive surprise attack cannot be achieved by observation and reporting alone. Limitations on the disposition and readiness of forces, or on size and type of forces, appears to be necessary to create more effective safeguards against the possibility of massive surprise attack. It is unlikely that the October talks can deal effectively with the threat of surprise attack unless they are extended beyond discussion of inspection and related limited measures. . . ."

This report was prepared by Richard M. Bissell, Phillip J. Farley, John N. Irwin, II, General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, Gerard C. Smith, J. R. Zacharias, and G. B. Kistiakowsky, Chairman.

Although JCS has not to my knowledge made a formal defense of their position which precludes the discussion of any matter relating to disarmament, there are certain arguments that keep re-appearing in

²NSC 5801/1, Paragraph 40, dated 5 May 1958 and quoted on page 1 of the attached document. [Footnote is in the original.]

private conversations with military personnel on this matter. They run something like this:

This country depends upon great strength in a few types of weapons to deter the over-all more diversified military threat of the Soviet Union. Thus, US-USSR bilateral arms control of a few weapon types (or to be more specific, manned bombers and ICBM's) would leave this country at a severe military disadvantage. Furthermore, if this country discusses controls on individual weapon systems with the Soviets at Geneva, we are likely to be drawn into such an agreement by Soviet propaganda and public opinion. If such an unfavorable agreement were to materialize, the situation would probably become even more serious since Congress, as a result of a false sense of security, would probably reduce military funding.

If one tries to counter such an argument by stating that the forthcoming talks are only technical discussions, and that any actual agreement would be realized in later political negotiations where this country would pursue disarmament on a comprehensive basis, they answer: This is the same story that was given to us on technical test cessation discussions! They continue by noting that our policy prior to the Geneva test cessation talks stated that we would entertain test cessation only as part of a comprehensive program that included a monitoring system, the control of fissionable material and the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. They then point out that because of the "technical success" at Geneva and as a result of world opinion and Soviet propaganda, we have now been forced into a test cessation yet we do not even have an inspection system to monitor it.

I feel that the JCS are sufficiently dogmatic in their position on this subject that they are likely to exercise their prerogative to take this basic policy decision to the President. In the light of this possibility, I wonder if it would be advisable to invite Gordon Gray to the meeting on the 25th so that he may be apprised of the situation at the earliest possible date.

Over and above the major policy question that needs to be resolved, there are three other minor points that you may wish to bring up for discussion. The first involves the identification of "space vehicles" as instruments of surprise attack. Inasmuch as this country does not have such an exotic weapon capability, it does not seem reasonable to discuss an inspection system for space vehicles at the Geneva meeting. The technical discussions should point out, however, that modifications of the inspection system may be necessary as weapon technology changes.

The second item involves the wording of the footnote on page 3 of the attached document. I believe the footnote should read: "At this point, it is not essential that agreement be reached among the two

delegations as to the objects of control as long as the ability to discuss the objects of control of interest to both delegations is assured."

The third point is a suggested change in wording for agenda item II.4. I believe it should read: "Acoustic and infra-red detection techniques" rather than "Acoustic and infra-red detection, rocket launchings."

W.H. Minshull, Jr.

384. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, September 30, 1958, 9:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian first showed the President draft minutes of the first meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. The President indicated they were satisfactory to him.

Dr. Killian next said that Dr. Glennan will shortly be bringing up the question of the future status of ABMA. With the establishment of NASA, the Redstone group will not have a full mission in the future on military projects. The President said that the proposal to shift ABMA to NASA would seem to be reasonable to him; he anticipated that there would be opposition from the Army, however. Dr. Killian agreed, but said he and his group thought the shift would be a good one. Some provision would have to be made for continuation of Army work by ABMA.

The President said he would like to see a central agency heading up the whole scientific missile operation. He thought the transfer could be made with a "charter" to the Army permitting the Army to keep certain facilities, and have the right to the performance of certain activities when it needs them. The main function of the group would be in the "space" field, but with such a charter provision, since the Army has need for certain applications of the more basic research activity. He said

¹ Source: ABMA move to NASA, Geneva Conference on Atoms for Peace, surprise attack study. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

he would like to see the Secretary of Defense, with the agreement of his subordinates, come up with a recommendation. To do this a combined study would be needed, and the Army should be given an opportunity to state its case.

Dr. Killian referred briefly to the Atoms for Peace meeting in Geneva. He said the U.S. performance and exhibit were first rate. He mentioned that the Russians had top-flight scientists present, who went out of their way to be cordial. He mentioned that their top scientist, named Topchev, invited him to visit Russia next spring. He said he has replied that he does not see his way clear to doing so because of his schedule; he commented that in the present state of difficulties with the Soviet Union such a visit does not seem advisable. The President said he thought that if Dr. Killian had a chance to go, and if relations with the Russians improved, such a trip would be a good thing to do.

Dr. Killian said that the study group is having a very hard time on the Surprise Attack project. It is very difficult to get prepared for the discussions. One key question is as to the scope of the project, i.e., as to what should be monitored, and specifically as to whether limitation of arms and control of size of forces should be among the things being monitored. The President thought the first step is to determine what are the fields or areas wherein by certain actions we could limit or eliminate the danger of surprise attack. Then, what are the means of doing this, i.e., through observation or inspection; then what programs should be carried out to establish these means; then finally in what areas or in what respects could these measures be expected to be effective. Dr. Killian concluded by saying that the President may have to decide, before the matter is resolved, as to whether to include limitation of arms and inspection of such limitation in the Surprise Attack proposal.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

385. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, October 7, 1958, 9:15 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Chairman McCone
General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said he wanted to report to the President on a few matters of recent interest in his field of responsibility. The Atoms for Peace meeting at Geneva had gone extremely well. Following this Mr. McCone had visited AEC installations within the United States. He then returned to Vienna for the IAEA discussions. These had gone well until the Soviet representative delivered a diatribe against the United States—apparently entirely for propaganda effect, and to obscure the generous support by the United States for this project, and the total lack of Soviet support. Mr. McCone said the IAEA had experienced growing pains in its first year. In his judgment it should now be drawn much closer to the United Nations. There had been an idea that it could keep free from political overtones by being more independent; this has not, however, proven true. Our representative, Mr. Cole, has had his problems and has been under fire by the Canadians, British and Indians, among others. Also the Deputy, Mr. McKinney, has probably not given as much help as was needed. He is now resigning. The President asked Mr. McCone to work out with State very quickly a successor for McKinney.

Mr. McCone said that the current test series in Nevada is going forward very successfully. He said that some of these tests are showing great potentialities in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The President asked whether the AEC is making preparations for the experimental explosion in the Athabasca oil sands, aimed at releasing the oil now locked in the sands. Mr. McCone said he is trying to see if it can be gotten ready this winter; probably the hole can be drilled this winter, with the explosion more likely in 1960. He stressed the tremendous importance of these oil sands in international affairs—the reserves are apparently equal in magnitude to the total proven reserves in the Middle East. He said he was very anxious that the “plow-share” program go forward, and wants to be sure that the test suspension agreement does not prejudice it.

The President commented that if the heat of these tremendously big explosions could be captured, it was evident that it could bring the oil sands to a very high temperature. Mr. McCone also mentioned the

¹ Source: IAEA problems, Plowshare, uranium requirements. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

heat application to be developed by experiment in one of the Carlsbad salt domes. The President commented that we ought to be quite careful while negotiations are going on. We will reserve the right to conduct these tests. Once the techniques have been proved out he was confident the world would demand that they be utilized, so that civilization could obtain the benefits of this activity.

Mr. McCone said it is clear that we are overcommitted on the purchase of uranium during the period between now and 1962. He would propose to lengthen the term of the commitment, while holding its total unchanged, thus lopping off the “peak” now in prospect. The President commented that if these experiments turn out successfully, and large demands for peaceful uses arise, we could use a lot of uranium. He felt we should keep up long-range interest in providing this product. He would see no objection to going to 1970 in order to bring the procurement into a better schedule.

Mr. McCone concluded by saying that he is working with Mr. Quarles to reach agreement on the problem of long-range requirements for atomic weapons—out of which needs for plutonium and hence for added plutonium capacity can be determined. The President thought this was a good project and hoped that it would forestall a reoccurrence of this year’s situation when the individual Chiefs gave testimony at variance with the over-all Defense position.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

386. Note From Gray to Goodpaster¹

Washington, October 11, 1958

GENERAL GOODPASTER:

I thought you might like for your files a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Edward Teller, which has been reworked a little further since you saw it. I have sought to incorporate your

¹ Source: Conveys memoranda of conversation between the President and Teller and Bradbury, dealing with detecting nuclear tests. Top Secret enclosures. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.

suggestions. Also attached is a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Bradbury.

Gordon Gray

Enclosure

Memorandum of Conversation

October 9, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
DR. EDWARD TELLER

(in the company of General Goodpaster and Captain Morse)

In accordance with a request made of me by Chairman McCone on Friday morning, October 3, in connection with the NSC-OCB visit to the Nevada Test Site, I arranged for General Goodpaster and me to spend some time with Dr. Teller. This was primarily accomplished by driving with Dr. Teller from Las Vegas to the NTS on Saturday morning, October 4, and by sharing a car with Dr. Teller throughout the day's activities. Captain Morse was in almost constant attendance.

I indicated to Dr. Teller that I was particularly interested, in connection with the question of nuclear test suspension or moratorium, in loopholes, both from the point of view of the "threshold concept" and from the point of view of the reservation of testing for peaceful uses. There follows a summary of various points made by Dr. Teller:

1. Dr. Teller indicated that there was no disagreement as to the facts and that the difference came in interpretations, which he felt in individual cases were largely based on motivation.

2. *Atmospheric tests.* Dr. Teller pointed out that at Geneva there had been no attempt to work out a system of policing these tests under 1 KT. Down to 5 KT the system proposed would present good chances of detection of *atmospheric tests*, but not down to 1 KT. Atmospheric tests are not essential for *development of weapons*, but are important for weapons effects.

3. *Underground Tests.* The chances are not good of detecting an underground shot of the magnitude of 5 KT, and it is virtually impossible to detect an underground shot of 1 KT.

Originally in the Geneva conference we asked for 650 stations (even this number in Dr. Teller's opinion might not be enough to give a high degree of assurance against evasion). We finally agreed upon 160 to 170 stations with the statement that these could detect underground shots down to 5 KT, with some small chance below 5 KT, but not down to 1 KT.

In the course of a year there are approximately 100 natural events which, with present detection systems, would not be distinguishable from a [text not declassified]—20 or 30 of them in the Soviet-Sino bloc.

The Geneva report says that inspection groups investigating a suspected nuclear explosion would be provided with equipment and apparatus “appropriate to its task.” What the report does not say is that such instruments do not now exist. The only way to prove an event to have been of a nuclear character is to locate radioactivity. In such a case the detection machinery would have been effective only with respect to an area 10×10 miles, and a detection been would then have to seek the specific radioactive area and the precise locale of the shot. (Dr. Teller’s estimate is that for an underground shot, drilling would be required and the chances of success on any one drill-hole would be about 1 in 40,000.)

If one is thinking in terms of [text not declassified] the number of such events in the course of a year is about [text not declassified] in the Sino-Soviet bloc. This, from the point of view of sheer members, would present a physical impossibility to inspection teams.

In the matter of underground testing, there is some reason to believe that it is more difficult to detect an underground explosion if it is fired in hard rock, unlike the test conditions at the Nevada Test Site. Also, it is believed that an appropriate structure around the devise could, in effect, decouple the transmission of shock waves to the earth.

Dr. Teller believes that a series of underground tests, [text not declassified] progressively pursued, could enable the development of weapons of increasing yield without the great risk of detection. Thus, Dr. Teller believes that the largest loophole in the test control system developed at the Geneva meeting is the [text not declassified] especially involving experimentation with decoupling. He feels that this loophole is so great as to eliminate fears about loopholes arising from the reservation of explosions for peaceful purposes.

[text not declassified]

4. Generally, *underwater shots* can be detected with effort and if one is willing to spend the sums of money involved for patrol ships, etc. As far as *ocean shots* are concerned, whether atmospheric or underwater, they probably can be detected and indentified but it is very difficult to prove the source. In other words, if there were a test moratorium and if there were an ocean shot, the Soviets could have been responsible but could seek to place responsibility upon the U.S. with very little possibility on our part of disproving the charge. If the shot were under 1 KT it would be very difficult to detect and identify.

5. *High-altitude Tests*. At Geneva it was agreed that no known system can detect and identify shots above 70 miles (the U.S. has now had 25 and 50 mile tests). However, the use of a number of satellites could detect radiation. High-altitude testing was not seriously discussed at Geneva and two methods of evasion of detection are: one, testing

behind an object, such as the moon, and the use of distance. It is possible to go one-third of the way to the sun.

6. The *significance of a violation* involving high-altitudes would be that big weapons could be made lighter and of a *violation underground* that weapons below 1 KT and be below 5 KT (which have been neglected) could be developed; also that "clean" weapons could be developed.

7. Dr. Teller feels that a moratorium would *not* be to our advantage in any case. However, assuming a moratorium, the question is, how best to go about it. He suggests banning all shots that can be policed:

a. Forbid all *atmospheric shots* (thus getting rid of fall-out).

b. Forbid all oceanic shots (this assumes that we will be prepared to put sufficient money into patrol ships, etc.)

c. Forbid all *underground shots above the agreed level of detection*. With respect to this point, Dr. Teller acknowledges the difficulties and suggests two ways in which it could be done, the first being more easily explained, but the second preferable in his opinion.

(1) Prohibit all shots above 5 KT. If one wishes to make a shot, give notification to the international organization and have observers present although not telling them what is inside the device. These observers could detect the yield. This would be a form of international inspection.

(2) Prohibit all shots causing an earthquake equivalent above a certain magnitude—say 4.5. This means that if we make a shot which gives a 4.5 reaction or less, we can announce the shot and no inspection is indicated. However, if the shot produces greater than 4.5 then the inspection teams go into action.

d. *High altitude shots*. If high-altitude shots are to be reserved from the Treaty, it could be provided that they be allowed above 30 miles until a system was devised to detect them down to a certain size. Then if the treaty were to be revised each year it could be progressively tightened.

8. *Explosions for peaceful purposes*. Dr. Teller urges that if there is to be a moratorium, we should *reserve explosions for peaceful uses*. He does not feel that peaceful uses open up any loopholes which are not already in existence because of the "threshold concept." He acknowledges that we might consider opening up peaceful tests completely to international inspection. He also feels that we should make clear that we reserve nuclear experiments that are not tests of weapons, citing specifically nuclear reactions at the level of low yield explosions, or just below.

9. Dr. Teller said that in recent exchanges with the British we found that although they had devoted a fraction of time and money to their program as compared with the U.S. program, their developments substantially parallel our own. Nothing of special significance has escaped the British and on the other hand the British have learned nothing of special significance that we do not know.

Gordon Gray

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation

October 7, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. BRADBURY

The following points were developed in a conversation with Dr. Bradbury, with General Goodpaster and Mr. Harr present, Sunday morning, October 5:

1. Dr. Bradbury feels it is extremely important to continue *experimentation*. As an example, he alludes to the current work in rocket propulsion (Rover). He believes that this process should continue although in the experimentation there could develop a situation in which a fission action could blow materials out of the nozzle which would appear to have been a nuclear explosion.

2. Dr. Bradbury thinks that it is important to continue high-altitude *activity* primarily for scientific purposes.

3. Dr. Bradbury feels that it is very important to reserve explosions for peaceful uses.

4. It is Dr. Bradbury's view that although it can be said in a technical sense that we are ahead of the Russians in weapons development this actually means nothing. His point is that although we seem to have developed weapons of high yield in smaller packages than the Russians, this is substantially meaningless if one makes certain assumptions about Russian war strategy and accepts the best information one has about delivery systems. Whether the Soviets have weapons of as high a yield as some we have tested is relatively unimportant because we know that they have weapons large enough now to destroy our largest cities. Incidentally, Dr. Bradbury feels that we have erred in insisting upon developing weapons of a precise size, and that there is a margin of error of from 10 to 15 to 20% in any case.

5. With respect to peaceful uses. Dr. Bradbury thinks that we could stand almost any kind of inspection although it would be a considerable nuisance.

6. Dr. Bradbury indicated that we now know that the British have little to learn from us and that we have little to learn from them. This is comforting, he feels, in the sense that their efforts have corroborated the correctness of ours, although disquieting from the point of view that it may be assumed that the Soviets have made equivalent progress.

Gordon Gray

Attachment

Memorandum for the Record

October 10, 1958

Memorandum for Record regarding Trip to Nevada Atomic Test site—3–5 October

Discussions regarding the project for suspension of atomic tests brought out that the “equation” can be written in three major terms:

A. Military Security

1. Technically, there is no clear or substantial advantage either to the Soviets or to the United States in suspending.

2. Militarily, although there is some reservation on this point, the suspension is to the considerable disadvantage of U.S. security.

3. Should the Soviets continue in testing under exceptions to the suspension, or in evasion of it, while the United States did not, then (irrespective of whether the U.S. knew of Soviet action or not) extremely serious—possibly even fatal—damage to U.S. security could occur; there is a division of opinion as to the likelihood of such action by the Soviets and the U.S.

B. Foreign Affairs—Defensive Objectives

The Secretary of State has considered that world public opinion regarding testing has come to such a point that the United States diplomacy cannot be satisfactorily conducted without the suspension of tests or a demonstrated effort to nuclear agreement to suspend.

1. World opinion has been successfully brought to a state of alarm by propaganda regarding the genetic effects of nuclear tests.

2. World opinion, as expressed in the efforts and attitudes of several governments, is demanding a suspension of tests as a means of “lessening world tensions,” an objective on which they place a high value; as a corollary they call for agreement with the Russians on any significant subject as a means of lessening such tensions.

3. World opinion in many areas, and particularly those which have undergone heavy serial bombardment in past wars, attaches the horror of atomic warfare to the testing of nuclear weapons.

C. Foreign Affairs—Positive Goals

1. It is possible that agreement on suspension of testing, if achieved and if faithfully carried out, might prove to be a step to more significant measures of disarmament and reduction of the over-hanging armed threat of the Soviet Union to the United States, and vice versa.

2. It is possible that the inspection operations incident to the suspension of testing may “open” the Soviet bloc in such a way as to introduce liberalizing and democratizing effects, which may lessen the threat of use of armed force at totalitarian decision and direction.

D. Influential groups in the United States, both inside and outside the Government, are desirous of test cessation on a variety of grounds, largely represented as moral, humanitarian, etc.

Discussion

Of the considerations listed under A above, it may be said that they represent a substantial, though not fully agreed and not fully evaluated, cost and danger to the United States.

Of the considerations listed under B above, it may be said that the genetic effects are extremely small (most recent scientific findings indicate that the products of testing are below the threshold at which genetic effects would appear) and that the Soviets and those who have helped them have thereby achieved the end of influencing policy through false propaganda; with regard to the lessening of tensions, question exists whether partial suspension, or suspension that can be only partially policed, will achieve this end; also whether in an era of protracted conflict waged by the Communists against the West, in which tension arises from the conflict of Soviet aggressive aims with free world intent to defend and maintain itself, the lessening of tension is an objective that has validity for the free world. These considerations represent a propaganda defeat for the United States, which may well require to be retrieved by concessions at the cost of our security, if our diplomacy is to have satisfactory results.

The considerations listed under C above, to the extent we may have expectation that they will in fact be achieved, represent a true offset to the costs of suspension to our security.

It seems a fair summary that the United States has proposed action which, if taken, balances on the one hand a net cost and risk to U.S. security against, on the other, the necessity for some relief from Soviet propaganda successes, some hope of further disarmament steps and of tendencies toward liberalization in the Soviet bloc, and the satisfaction of the desires and objectives of certain influential groups within the United States.

There is some belief in some quarters that the Soviets may not accept an agreement on cessation of testing which satisfies the minimum terms acceptable to the United States, and that as a result of this whole exercise, the United States will have scored gains in world opinion and in propaganda without security cost to itself. Such gains, arising from a recognition of Soviet intransigence as the cause for failure to reach agreement, would have to be offset by any world opinion that may exist that the United States should have lowered its requirements in order to reach agreement. The danger must be foreseen that the United States, confronted with such later strands in world opinion, might progressively reduce its requirements and thereby incur greater danger of Soviet test evasion and other costs to U.S. security.

Finally, it is probable that the interest of the United States in its own security, in national solidarity, and solidarity with our allies, will require that, whatever the balance of the equation written above, it be represented to the world as a net gain or "triumph" for U.S. policy. At some level in government, however, the truth must be recognized, or the dangers will be compounded.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

387. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, October 16, 1958

SUBJECT

Surprise Attack Negotiations and Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

<i>Dept of State</i>	<i>White House</i>	<i>Atomic Energy Commission</i>
Under Secretary Herter	Dr. Killian	Mr. McCone
Mr. William C. Foster	Mr. Gordon Gray	General Starbird
Mr. Farley—S/AE	Mr. Bromley Smith	Dr. Kavanaugh
Mr. Spiers—S/AF	Mr. Keeny	
Mr. Haker—S/AF	Mr. Minshull	<i>Dept of Defense</i>
Mr. Weiler—S/AE		Mr. Quarles
Ambassador	CIA	General Byers
Wadsworth	Mr. Dulles	Mr. Irwin
	Mr. Brent	

Mr. Herter said the issue to be decided regarding the terms of reference paper for U.S. delegation to the Surprise Attack Safeguards Conference was whether the delegation should be completely barred from discussing the question of limitations on armaments as it affects the surprise attack question. He said there was no disposition in the Department of State to discuss limitations in the form of specific numbers.

Mr. Quarles expressed the thought that once we engaged in any discussion of what additional protection might be gained from limitations on armaments, or generally any changes from the present

¹ Source: Terms of reference for surprise attack delegation, nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

arms situation, we give the Soviets opportunity to discuss all their old proposals such as “ban the bomb”, and this would sow the seeds of destruction of the Conference, as well as place the U.S. at a propaganda disadvantage. He said it was quite true that disarmament measures with inspection would gain greater security for the U.S. but this Conference should not get into such questions. He commented that, in this regard, the language on Page 3 of the terms of reference paper was too broad.

Mr. Herter said the issue centered particularly in the wording to be used for Section III C of the agenda. He had hoped that it would be possible to have developed some specific suggestions from the delegation with respect to limitations that might be discussed but this had not proved possible.

Mr. Foster said he was the servant of whatever the Committee of Three decided, and that the possibility of some fruitful discussion with the Soviets existed even if we did not get beyond Section II of the agenda. However, he said, Sections III A and B are progressive in nature and when you get to qualification discussions, we can assess the value to the surprise attack problem of various types of hypothetical limitations, and this could be of real value to subsequent political negotiations. He said you could discuss variables in general terms or as percentages, or as “minimum cuts” and “substantial cuts”.

Dr. Killian inquired as to views of the delegation on any exclusion of a discussion of limitations, and said that any technical analysis he had seen shows that as far as missiles are concerned, there would be little value in more observation and inspection. He noted the views of the Interagency Working Group which expressed this view.

Mr. Quarles said he did not believe there would not be some value in observation and inspection.

Mr. Foster said we should aim at an assessment of the effectiveness of measures relating to various levels of armaments.

Mr. Quarles said he did not object to the technical discussion having a range of conditions which must be faced, but that this Conference should not get into a discussion of the value of reaching agreements on various disarmament measures.

Mr. McCone said we might start in the discussions at a zero assumption for certain armaments, such as missiles, and work upward rather than back in terms of reductions and limitations.

Mr. Foster commented that he had never liked the word “limitation” for use in the terms of reference paper and perhaps another word could be found.

Mr. Herter said there was always a danger that public opinion would view any technical recommendations of the experts as something that should be adopted by their governments, considering related

political or military factors. However, he said, we have an able delegation and while he would be surprised if the talks ever got beyond Sections I and II, the fact remains that the Soviets have proposed the talks and a mutual interest does exist in reducing the dangers of surprise attack. If we refuse to consider the problem of nuclear weapons, both sides will be faced with it, and if we restrict the delegation in a way that will hamper their exploration of Soviet thinking, we will restrict the potential value of the Conference and will also place ourselves in a disadvantageous propaganda position.

Mr. Foster noted that there was a possibility of fruitful exploratory discussion on methods that might reduce the likelihood of accidental war.

Mr. Quarles said the propaganda victory we had gained at the Geneva technical talks on nuclear testing resulted from our standing firm against Soviet efforts to make the Conference political in nature.

Dr. Killian expressed the view that the delegation should be allowed maneuverability in the talks, and *Mr. Foster* said it must at least have the opportunity during the preparatory work to look at the question of the effects upon the surprise attack problem of limitations and of variables in armaments.

Mr. Quarles said the delegation could study the question of the effects of limitations in their preparatory work, but that discussion of limitations in Geneva should not be undertaken without reference back to Washington. *Mr. Quarles* then proposed that Section II be changed in a manner that would limit discussion to technical problems that would have a range of variables to be concerned about. He said he would not object to the terms of reference paper stating that if the delegation felt that it had to discuss limitations, it should request instructions from the Committee of Three.

There was then some discussion to the effect that perhaps there was a meeting of minds on the issue of what should be discussed. It was agreed that the Department of State would redraft Section III, with appropriate changes in other parts of the terms of reference paper, in an effort to reflect the apparent agreement. The Committee of Three would then review the redraft.

Nuclear Test Suspension Negotiations

The meeting next considered questions relating to the nuclear test suspension negotiations scheduled to begin on October 31 in Geneva. The Third Report of the Working Group on Disarmament Policy (TAB A) served as a basis for the discussion.

Mr. Gray inquired whether there was yet a statement of the U.S. objective in the forthcoming negotiations; was it, for example, to eliminate tests, was it to get off the propaganda hook or was it to eliminate fallout as a potential health hazard.

Mr. Herter said that he considered the U.S. objective was not to eliminate testing *per se* as this was not very important one way or the other. It was instead to test the *bona fides* of the Soviets in following through on the recommendations of the Geneva experts and thus to test their willingness to subject themselves to inspection, which is the *sine qua non* for disarmament. There was, of course, much public sentiment on the basis of possible health hazards but this factor is not basic from the U.S. point of view.

Dr. Killian added that there was of course a public opinion factor to be taken into account.

Mr. Gray asked if agreement could have been reached in Geneva by the experts without a Soviet political decision to reach agreement. If such a decision were taken by the Soviets in August he wondered why their present attitude toward agreement had changed.

It was generally agreed that the Geneva experts' report was based upon a political decision by the Soviet Government that it desired to reach this agreement.

Mr. Farley suggested that one possibility that might account for a change in Soviet position was that our August 22 statement of willingness to proceed to political negotiation took the Soviets by surprise. They may have hoped by reaching agreement at the expert level to increase pressure upon the U.S. position rather than move toward real agreement. Another factor that might be responsible for a change in their attitude could be that the Soviets came to realize in the course of the Geneva discussions that they still had much to learn about nuclear weapons and their effects. This might account for their resuming tests promptly after the Geneva talks.

Mr. Herter raised first for discussion the threshold question. He said he understood the Secretary's position to be that the U.S. would take no stand at the beginning of the Geneva talks on the threshold question but that if the Soviets came to see the disadvantages to them of the extensive inspection required for a full cessation of tests, the alternative of a threshold might be introduced.

Mr. McCone said that he agreed with the Secretary that we let this evolve and begin by discussing the geometric rate at which on-site inspection increases as the threshold is lowered. He understood, for example, that in the case where a hundred inspections would be required for a 5 kt threshold, 1800 would be required at 1 kt level.

Mr. Quarles said he agreed that we should leave the threshold question to be handled in this way. He thought: 1) that we should leave no ambiguity as to what the capabilities and threshold of any agreed system would be; 2) that we should agree to discontinue all tests above the threshold; and 3) that we might unilaterally renounce, subject to certain

conditions, tests below the threshold of reliable detection. Then, if we catch the Soviets testing, we could withdraw our unilateral renunciation.

Dr. Killian said he agreed in general but would raise the question of whether we should in fact renounce even unilaterally tests below the threshold.

Mr. Gray said that the approach the Secretary had suggested and *Mr. Quarles* had emphasized of making clear the limits of any agreed inspection system would have considerable educational value. It would point up the idea not generally understood that the system agreed at Geneva would not reliably monitor all tests.

Mr. McCone said that for purposes of discussion we might separate the problem into two components:

(a) what is the importance of tests below 5 kt and what would we give up by unilaterally renouncing all such tests.

(b) what is the importance of our public posture in the propaganda aspects of the negotiations.

Leaving aside the second field, he had no doubt as to the importance of tests below 5 kt. So long as U.S. military plans anticipate the use of ground forces, small tactical weapons would seem to be required and there is in this area a large field not yet explored.

Dr. Killian said he would be reluctant to forego tests below the threshold, and in this connection, he read the following sections from a staff paper incorporated as ANNEX 3 of the Third Report of the Working Group.

This problem could be resolved directly by permitting continued "safeguarded" testing below 1 kt or 2 kt by all nations. One method of "safeguarding" such testing would be to have Commission representatives make yield determinations of each test to determine that it was in fact below the permitted threshold. If the Commission retained the right of inspection which was not limited to a particular minimum yield, there would be little incentive to conduct clandestine tests below the threshold of the system. The incorporation of this concept in a test cessation agreement would have the following advantages:

1. It would close a significant loophole in the proposed system which could be exploited much more easily in the USSR than the US.

2. It would maintain the concept of fully "inspected" agreements.

3. It would permit the US to continue small-yield weapon developments which are of particular interest to the US for limited war and defense applications. The US is now probably in a period of more rapid development in this field than the USSR.

4. It would tend to establish a differentiation between small-yield nuclear weapons for tactical purposes as opposed to large-yield nuclear weapons for mass destruction.

5. It would make the overall system more workable by greatly reducing the number of inspections required to give an acceptable level of confidence in the capabilities of the system below 5 kt.

Mr. Quarles said he preferred the position mentioned in the staff paper but in his previous comments stated his preference on the basis of the Secretary's proposal as outlined by Mr. Herter. At this point Mr. Herter was called to another meeting.

Mr. Farley said that the Secretary's position was simply that he did not want to go into the negotiations appearing to add to the two conditions in the President's statement of August 22 a third condition as to the size of explosions which would be suspended. This question could better be handled at a later stage of the negotiations on the basis of the extent of inspection the Soviets were willing to accept.

Mr. Farley raised the question of whether an authoritative study had been made on the military value of tests in the various ranges below 5 kt.

Mr. Quarles said he had heard no disagreement on technical grounds to the position that if one side tests below 5 kt and the other side doesn't, a significant military advantage would be lost. He said he believed the first proposition of the U.S. position should be that we should not agree to stop tests we can't monitor, that we would agree to stop those above the threshold of reliable detection. As a second proposition we should say that if the Soviets would stop tests below the threshold on a unilateral basis, we would do likewise.

Mr. Farley said he believed this position was reconcilable with the one he had expressed. We should try to define capabilities of any system under discussion and thus we might find a common interest with the Soviets in eliminating smaller tests than the system could cover within practical limits.

Mr. McCone said we may find that the system can be improved with experience and that the testing limit could then be progressively lowered as the threshold of reliable detection was lowered.

Ambassador Wadsworth said he understood it would be the consensus that we would not go into the negotiations with the threshold as a prominent feature of our position and that we would not have to put a hard and fast threshold into the treaty itself.

Mr. Quarles said we say, depending upon circumstances, want to put the threshold in the treaty.

Ambassador Wadsworth asked how you would write it in since, as Mr. McCone stated, the system might evolve in capabilities. *Mr. Quarles* said one might define the stations and locations and define the capability of the system described, for example, as 90% above 5 kt.

Dr. Killian asked what would then be written in as to tests below 5 kt. *Mr. Quarles* said this might be handled by unilateral statements and kept out of the agreement.

Mr. Farley said we could now attempt to work out a draft position on this point on the basis of the discussion. He suggested that we proceed to the question of how the conditions in the President's August 22 statement might be dealt with in the treaty. He thought there would be no negotiating problem in writing in the first condition, that is, satisfactory installation and operation of the control system. We would need, however, to discuss tactical variations in dealing with the second condition of progress in disarmament.

Mr. Quarles said that an enforceable agreement on testing separate from other disarmament measures in the view of the Department of Defense, would be to our national disadvantage. Defense feels that a minimum condition beyond the test suspension would be satisfactory progress toward limitation of armaments and particularly the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We could from a legal standpoint handle this by an annual renewal clause alone; but failure to renew would carry such an onus from a political standpoint that we would be unlikely to do it. For this reason he would like to see the treaty bear on the face of it a requirement for progress in disarmament, at least as a starting position in negotiations.

Mr. Farley said that he agreed this should be done as a starting position. However, to deal with the Soviet position on a permanent cessation it would probably be necessary to define our requirements for progress on disarmament. The question is only one of not having such rigidity in these requirements as to give the Soviets an advantage.

Mr. Gray said that a treaty which failed to mention the disarmament condition would be a departure from national policy; and would in effect be a separate test agreement.

Mr. McCone said that the more specifics there were in the treaty as to progress required the more defensible our position will be if we find it necessary to walk away from it. Specific conditions would also improve our position with Congress and with many elements of public opinion. Moreover, a tie to disarmament stated in the treaty would facilitate progress in disarmament.

Mr. Farley raised the question of who would decide when progress toward objectives defined in the treaty was substantial: would it be the Control Commission? If not, we would be back to a unilateral determination by each party.

Mr. McCone said that we should search for language that would define necessary progress as far as possible.

Returning to the threshold question, *Mr. Brent* asked if we should go into the negotiations seeking the lowest possible threshold.

Mr. Farley raised the question whether military interests suggest a desirable threshold or whether the threshold should be determined solely on the basis of inspection capabilities of the agreed system.

Mr. McCone said that we could not approach the problem on the basis of what level was to our advantage, since we could not have our cake and eat it on the threshold problem. We would not, however, want to approach it in a way which would give an important advantage to our adversary. If a system could be implemented on a 1 kt level, we should accept it. The area between 1 and 5 kt is of considerable military importance but we should not make an effort in the negotiations to reserve that area, since inspection capabilities can be brought below it.

Mr. Irwin said that he agreed.

General Starbird said that from a technical standpoint there would be a tremendous advantage in having a 1 kt exception, that there would be some additional advantage in an exception up to 5, but it was not a situation in which a 5 kt exception would be twice as good as 2 kt. The exception was progressively of less advantage as you move up the scale.

Mr. Irwin said the threshold should be as low as practicable in order to introduce as much inspection as possible in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Killian agreed, and said this was true also because we have at present a military advantage in the lower ranges.

Mr. Gray asked whether the improvement in the inspection to which *Mr. McCone* had referred would result in opening up the Soviet Union more. *Mr. Keeny* said that improvement in the system would, on the one hand, detect more events which might then be inspected but on the other hand, it would identify more events on the basis of instruments alone and thus reduce the need for on-site inspection.

Mr. Gray asked whether the threshold question applied to tests in outer space or at high altitudes. *Mr. Farley* said that a special study group was at work on this problem.

Mr. Keeny said that preliminary studies indicated that these would be good down to 1 kt at several hundred thousand kilometers and that a detailed report on this subject was scheduled for completion next week.

Mr. Gray emphasized the need for early decisions and it was agreed that the group should reconvene at the earliest possible time.

388. Memorandum From Wilcox (IO) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, October 27, 1958

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation with Ambassador Lodge

Ambassador Lodge has indicated he will call you on Tuesday to discuss: (1) the proposal for an 81-nation Disarmament Commission; (2) resolutions on testing which are pending in the First Committee. The following comments may be useful in your discussion:

1) *81-Nation Committee*

The Department has strongly opposed the establishment of an 81-nation Disarmament Committee since it is believed that such a committee would not serve a constructive purpose. The 81-nation committee would have the same problems that the First Committee has encountered in establishing even a moderately satisfactory negotiating body since such a body would have to be both small and representative. The enlarged Disarmament Commission would constitute in effect a continuing session of the General Assembly in which little of substance could be accomplished. It would supplant the present DC. Meetings of the 81-nation DC would probably deteriorate into a propaganda battle. Such a group would provide an opportunity for constant meddling by a number of countries. Attached (TAB A) is a statement which the Department has previously transmitted to USUN on this point.

On the other hand, it is recognized that acceptance of this proposal by the US would be responsive to the small power interest in maintaining a continued UN role in disarmament and would, as Ambassador Lodge believes "have important psychological value as an overall UN umbrella." Moreover, it is true that at such time as such Commission met it undoubtedly would have to set up sub-groups in order to function. We agree also that it is not possible in the words of Ambassador Lodge "to dream up another truncated Disarmament Commission."

Ambassador Lodge indicated there is "widespread support" for the idea of an 81-nation Disarmament Commission. We have been of the opinion up to now, based on information made available to us by USUN, that this proposal could be defeated if we continued our

¹ Source: Proposal for 81-Nation Disarmament Conference, nuclear testing resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 320.11/10-2758.

opposition and that this could be done without placing us in a seriously untenable position, since part of the onus for denying the UN a role would rest on the USSR for boycotting the 25-nation Disarmament Commission.

On balance, we believe it still is preferable not to support the 81-nation DC proposal. Since USUN has not made a systematic canvass of the strength of this proposal, it would be desirable for you to suggest to Ambassador Lodge that they provide us with a tabulation of the expected vote on this proposal. You might wish to add that if the systematic count confirms his view that there is widespread support for the 81-nation DC proposal, Ambassador Lodge would have discretion to support it.

2) Resolutions on testing

As Ambassador Lodge has indicated, the 17-power resolution (TAB B) with the US as one of the co-sponsors has somewhere between 45–50 votes in favor of it. Ambassador Lodge has not made any recommendations in his letter for further modifications of specific language. In response to Ambassador Lodge's previous recommendations, he has already been authorized to make certain changes in the 17-power resolution, if necessary. The 17-power resolution with such changes is attached (TAB C).

The Indian draft resolution to which Ambassador Lodge refers in his letter has since been superseded by an Indian-Yugoslav resolution (TAB D). We believe this formulation is not acceptable since it still tends to treat the subject of nuclear testing in isolation. However, we have authorized Ambassador Lodge to discuss certain modifications with the Indians and Yugoslavs which would make the resolution acceptable to us (TAB E).

In these circumstances, we believe you should indicate to Ambassador Lodge the following: (a) We would be able to support the Indian-Yugoslav resolution provided they accept the changes we have suggested; otherwise we believe (b) he should stand firm on the 17-power draft resolution with such modifications in it as Ambassador Lodge has already been authorized to accept; and (c) if the modified 17-power resolution does not have the necessary support or it seems desirable for other reasons, we could accept the procedural resolution suggested by the British as the concluding action of the Committee in lieu of any substantive resolution (TAB F).

Tab A**Excerpt From GADEL 61**

undated

2. DELGA 209

Department continues strongly oppose establishment 81-nation disarmament committee. It is unlikely serve useful purpose and in essence it is GA itself, which now debates disarmament annually and which can call special session if it desires. 81-nation committee would have same problems as First Committee in establishing moderately satisfactory negotiating body, and which would have to be small and representative. It would provide opportunity for constant meddling and in effect would constitute more or less a continuous session of GA on disarmament where little of substance could take place and propaganda battle would make serious negotiation more difficult, if not impossible. While we recognize that part of onus for opposing such proposal would be placed on US, we nevertheless believe Soviets would come in for at least equal criticism in view their irresponsible boycott of DC during past year. We doubt that 81-nation DC proposal could be adopted if US and UK continue vigorous opposition.

389. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 28, 1958, 5:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State
Thomas E. Murray

The Secretary said he was glad that Mr. Murray would be going to the Geneva conference on nuclear testing. He said he was counting on Mr. Murray's cooperation, stressing that we could not afford a show of division in these very delicate negotiations. He noted that they would

¹ Source: Geneva Conference on Nuclear Testing. Confidential; Personal and Private. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation.

now be made all the more difficult by the fact that the Soviets appeared to be taking a new look at their position.

Mr. Murray assured the Secretary of his cooperation. He said he would not “speak out” when he disagreed, but would express his viewpoint privately to Senator Gore. He said he had long favored stopping the testing of large weapons, but thought it essential to continue making small yield tests. He thought we could satisfy everyone’s needs, the scientists and military together, by underground tests.

The Secretary pointed out that we needed not only weapons but public good will and the support of our allies as well. He thought therefore that the main question would be one of tactics at the Geneva conference to insure that the blame for any breakdown was laid to the Soviets. We should not ourselves appear militaristic. The Secretary said that if we could work it out without jeopardy to our foreign relations, he would favor small underground testing. He said he did not think the conference would be a success; that the Soviets would continue testing and therefore we would then resume our own testing.

JFD

390. Telegram Supnu 45 From Geneva¹

Geneva, November 11, 1958, noon

Supnu 45. Following summary appraisal first ten days nuclear weapons test conference.

1. Soviet position. Soviet delegation after quickly coming terms on minor points such as private rather than public sessions, and use of “discontinuance” in conference title, immediately assumed rigid position on agenda. Soviet position on agenda has remained consistent that first act of conference be “conclusion” agreement on “cessation” weapons tests. This p.m. informal meeting three delegations proved inconclusive in changing Soviet position. Soviets have indicated wish continue informal discussions on agenda.

In spite of Soviet delegation rigidity on agenda Soviet position in meetings has not been one of complete avoidance substance. They have, of course, focused on their own draft treaty, but from time to time have engaged brief discussions on controls. Soviet challenge to U.S.

¹ Source: Summary of first 10 days of nuclear test conference. Confidential; Priority. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11–1158.

and U.K. delegations to table own versions draft agreement obviously calculated further center attention conference on first item of Soviet agenda, i.e., conclusion of agreement. Nevertheless may have had some element of attempt get substantive discussion going without formal adoption agenda. Moreover, generally low key at which Soviets have conducted conversations and meetings, even in face of occasional fairly stern lectures from Western delegations seems indicate Soviet delegation interested in prolongation of conference rather than early break, at least prior arrival Kuznetsov, and probably for some time.

2. U.K. position. U.K. delegation reflects preoccupation U.K. Government with securing treaty even if this means corners have to be cut. U.S. delegation gets general impression U.K. delegation will from time to time try to act as "honest broker". However, to date, cooperation of U.K. delegation has been good. Agreed tactics have been carried out with minimum of free-wheeling, and agreed positions maintained. U.K. delegation is noticeably silent in defending link with disarmament leaving this to U.S. delegation but we were on notice as to U.K. attitude before we reached Geneva.

3. U.S. position. Heaviest Soviet attack has been on "year-by-year" element of U.S. position, link with disarmament, and link with effective performance of controls. We expect attack on "year-by-year" and disarmament link to continue without let-up. One element of U.S. position already made public in President's August 22 statement has drawn no fire, namely reference to peaceful uses. Agreement by Soviets that conference should deal "weapons tests" and use of same term in Soviet draft treaty have made it possible consider peaceful uses item as means plugging loophole in commitment stop weapons tests rather than exception. Tactical position on this item therefore improved although U.S. delegation has yet to discuss it.

4. Conclusions. It is far from clear this stage whether Soviets have come under instructions find best propaganda method avoiding treaty and inspection or whether they are under instructions seek some sort of agreement with minimum of controls and these preferably more or less left to wither on vine after agreement actually signed. Actions Soviet delegation thus far seem indicate only that Russians did not come here looking for immediate break. Agenda deadlock does not give completely accurate picture of conference in which there has been some give and take on matters of substance. Our best guess on outlook is for protracted negotiations with or without adoption final agenda and with outcome very much in doubt.

Villard

391. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 17, 1958

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Albert Gore, Member, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy

The Secretary

William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary—Congressional Relations

Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy

The Secretary said that the President had been greatly interested in this discussion with Senator Gore and had suggested that the Secretary talk with the Senator.

Senator Gore outlined his reactions to the negotiations on nuclear test suspension under way at Geneva and his proposal for a U.S. statement calling for agreement on cessation of atmospheric tests and announcing a unilateral three-year U.S. suspension on such tests regardless of the Soviet position. Senator Gore said that he did not think there was much prospect of success in the Geneva negotiations and the move he was proposing would be highly effective since it would offer the prospect of an end to the “anti-social” fallout effects from atmospheric tests.

The Secretary said that Senator Gore’s proposal was very similar to what was being considered as a possible course of action in event the Geneva talks break down. He stressed the importance of a U.S. position, both in pressing the present negotiations and in any unilateral steps which might be taken in the event of a deadlock, which would show the moral and political soundness of the U.S. approach to nuclear testing. The present negotiations with the Russians was in many respects a “poker game” in which we would not want to show our hand too soon. Instead we wanted to expose the real attitude of the Russians toward acceptance of commitments for inspection and control.

Senator Gore spoke favorably of the performance of Ambassador Wadsworth and the U.S. Delegation.

¹ Source: Gore proposal on atmospheric testing. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11–1758.

392. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1958

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Tests Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Mr. Philip J. Farley—S/AE

Mr. Ronald I. Spiers—S/AE

Dr. James Killian—Special Assistant to the President

Dr. Hans Bethe—President's Science Advisory Committee

Dr. Killian explained that he had asked Dr. Bethe to report to the Under Secretary about developments in Geneva and his views on possible next steps. Dr. Bethe said he thought it would be particularly useful for Mr. Herter to have a first-hand account of the atmosphere in the negotiations. He said that the meetings were substantially different from the summer technical sessions and that things were moving quite slowly. He said that until the U.S. had put in its "excellent" treaty outline, there had been no movement on the part of the USSR. At this point the USSR was forced to discuss the control problem to some degree, since they could not let our statements go unchallenged. Consequently, we have received some clarification as to what the USSR does want and does not want. He remarked that the most hopeful point is that both the Russians and the U.S. have emphasized their commitment to the Technical Experts Report, which has now become a "sacred" document. It has become clear that the USSR strongly objects to our concept of organization of a control system and that they want the system organized on a basis of parity. They are particularly opposed to the idea of an administrator "who would be able to tell the U.S. and USSR what to do." Dr. Bethe thought that our best tactic was to continue to put in papers dealing with substantive points and to proceed to talk about them, thus by-passing insofar as possible the agenda issue. The Delegation felt strongly that we should not accept the Russian agenda. The Delegation was unanimous in its opinion that the USSR did not want to break the meetings off, although they might do this ultimately if the breaking issue is favorable to them. He emphasized that we should be willing to give the Delegation flexibility in determining tactics and in dealing with details of the control system, such as the division of the

¹ Source: Bethe's views of nuclear test suspension conference. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

authority between the Commission and the Administrator. A particularly important point for us to insist upon, in his view, is the automaticity of the mobile inspection in response to carefully defined geophysical signals.

Dr. Bethe said that the Delegation had been encouraged at the fact that the Soviet Union had not made a big point out of the peaceful uses testing problem and that their reference throughout the meeting has been to barring “weapons” tests.

The main Soviet fire is focused on our one-year position and our insistence on the link to disarmament, according to Dr. Bethe. The Delegation feels that the Soviet Union is in a strong position on this point and that their opposition would be sustained by public opinion. The Delegation had been happy to see the evidences of Washington flexibility on this point. Dr. Bethe recounted a conversation that he had had with Dr. Feodorov who had agreed, in a private conversation, that governments should be free to withdraw from the treaty if the control system was not installed and operating, although this was not the officially-stated Soviet position. However, the USSR would never agree to a loose provision leaving it to U.S. judgment whether satisfactory progress was being made in disarmament as a basis for treaty termination. He felt that the USSR was firm on this point and that he, himself, felt that it would be “monstrous” to have a treaty dependent upon other treaties not in existence.

Mr. Herter inquired whether it would be in our interest to have an open-ended commitment for cessation of nuclear tests and whether or not, in ten years, we would find that the Soviets had been able to improve their weapons position, even without testing, to such a degree that our security would be jeopardized. Dr. Bethe said that in the absence of testing, the U.S. would be in a far better position to continue nuclear weapons development than the Soviet Union. Our past tests have gone a lot further into diagnostics than we have any evidence to that the Soviet Union has and, consequently, we understand the interior workings of the nuclear weapons much better than they do. Therefore, we are in a better position to make further progress without testing than the Soviet Union. Dr. Killian said that a consideration on the other side is that the Soviet system might be better able to maintain good weapons laboratories in the absence of testing than the U.S. would. Dr. Bethe said that he was not convinced of this point, but that an important factor would be the ability of the USSR to cheat in the face of any system of control.

In this connection, Mr. Herter asked about the validity of the point which is often made about our need to improve our small weapons position, and what the Soviet small weapons capability was. Dr. Bethe said that we have little firm knowledge about Soviet very low-yield tests, but

that what we know about their capabilities in the 10 to 20 kiloton range indicates that they have not highly developed abilities in this area. With respect to our requirements in the small weapons field, Dr. Bethe admitted that there was much that would still be done to improve our position, but that we did have something of "every type in every yield." For us it is not a question of having or not having, but rather a problem of further refinements. Dr. Killian pointed out that you could go on endlessly making weapons refinements and that the Soviet Union could also. In view of our relative position in this field, the Soviet Union would have more to gain by continued testing.

Dr. Bethe said he wished to make two final points. The first was to emphasize that since the Soviet Union has not kept the privacy agreement in the meeting, it would be to the advantage of our Delegation if the "right things" could be said in Washington, particularly in clarification of our position on controls. If we could abandon disarmament link, we would be in a strong position from the propaganda stand-point. Secondly, he wished to say that whereas the UK had been at pains to maintain a united front with the U.S. in the open meetings, their position essentially was quite different and sooner or later this would come out. The British believe that cessation of nuclear tests is inevitable under any circumstances and that any controls we could get from the Soviet Union would be "gravy". Consequently, the UK will, in the last analysis, be willing to settle for substantially less than we will.

393. Telegram Supnu 77 From Geneva¹

Geneva, November 21, 1958, 11 a.m.

Supnu 77. US delegation has been giving close study to problem of how to (A) move negotiations forward into actual discussion controls, or (B) clearly establish Soviet unwillingness to deal seriously with controls and thereby place on Soviet onus for failure make progress towards treaty.

General Soviet position as reflected both inside and outside conference now seems clear. Soviets for present, and we believe for indefinite period, are willing stay on position that there must be some agreement, at least in principle, on QTE cessation UNQTE before Soviets will move

¹ Source: Proposes change in negotiating position in nuclear test conference. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-2158.

to serious discussion, let alone acceptance of, arrangements for control. Delegation appraises Soviet position as firm. We believe firmness stems from probability Soviets believe public attraction their call for agreement in principle cease tests for all time contrasts favorably with US–UK position of conditioning duration of treaty on year-by-year determination not only of satisfactory progress in installing control system but also of progress in the field of disarmament. Given this Soviet position, US delegation does not place much stock in tactical approach such as that proposed by UK (ref Nusup 73) as device for bringing Soviets to grips in discussion of controls. Any tactical approach, whether that proposed by UK or for that matter tactical approach preferred by US delegation itself, such as trying to operate without agenda or trying eventually to reach compromise agreed agenda appears likely fail to bring serious negotiation controls so long as Soviets stand on position agreement in principle cessation tests must first be achieved. This is not to say conference will not be dealing with matters of substance. As delegation has already pointed out, conference, under guise agenda discussion, has already been dealing with central substantive question of whether Soviets willing have treaty which includes effective controls. We believe public acceptance this fact well enough established so that there is little danger imminent break by Soviets occasioned by developments connected with present state negotiations within conference.

US delegation has concluded that most profitable general approach now would lie in sharpening contrast between Soviet and US–UK attitude toward controls and at same time weakening over-all Soviet position on “cessation” by removing vulnerable points in present US position. Vulnerability US–UK position rests on short-term implication of phrase year-by-year determination and in particular on this determination as applied to progress in disarmament, which seems to many people extraneous to problem of assuring end of weapons tests.

In private discussion with UK delegation, US delegation has gained clear impression that move to simplify and bolster public support of US–UK position by making this position rest clearly but solely on inseparability of obligation to cease tests from establishment of effective controls would give UK delegation, and presumably UK Government, confidence for strong negotiating line with Soviets. We believe this would be the best way to remove temptations for UK to adopt tactical approaches which we believe are dangerous and unproductive. UK delegation has from time to time expressed hope that we could meet present situation by simplifying and clarifying US–UK position. UK views on disarmament link are already known to Department. Accordingly, delegation recommends strongly that careful consideration be given to immediate move to make US position on agreement to stop tests rest solely on satisfactory establishment, extension and operation

inspection system. If such US position is adopted, we believe it should be set forth publicly in joint US-UK statement.

Possibility of dealing with disarmament link by mention in a "purposes" article of treaty and further mention in duration clause of treaty has been suggested by Department in Nusup 69.

Delegation has already submitted (Supnu 71) recommendation that disarmament link be dealt with by statement or purpose in preamble only for reasons given in reference message. We believe this position sound and can be explained convincingly in public statement.

US delegation realizes necessity of assuring periodic review of control system and of retaining US unilateral right of determining whether control system being established satisfactorily, coming into effect in satisfactory stages and operating satisfactorily thereafter. We believe such periodic determination can be adequately provided for by negotiating agreed phases within which specific parts of control system should be set up, and agreed standards in accordance with which control system must operate. Position can be publicly presented without short-term implications of "year-by-year" while at same time retaining right of periodic unilateral determination as to effectiveness of system.

In immediately following telegram delegation suggests draft public announcement by US and UK Governments which could give effect to recommended initiative with reference US policy on disarmament link. We believe issuance of such a statement would greatly strengthen relative public position of US-UK as against Soviets, would encourage UK to cooperate fully in probably prolonged and difficult negotiation, and would increase whatever possibilities there may be that Soviets can be brought to serious negotiation of treaty including controls.

US delegation has informed UK delegation of general nature of recommendation made this telegram.

Villard

394. Telegram Supnu 78 From Geneva¹

Geneva, November 21, 1958, 11 a.m.

Supnu 78. Following is suggested draft referred to Supnu 77.

The negotiations at Geneva for a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests are not making progress. The principal obstacle appears to be Soviet unwillingness to discuss, let alone accept, an effective system of controls to assure that an obligation to stop tests is honored. The Soviets claim that they cannot discuss controls until they have an agreed understanding on an obligation to cease tests. The United States and United Kingdom delegations have repeatedly made clear that as far as their governments are concerned the essential requirement to ensure a lasting agreement to cease tests is an effective system of controls. The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom believe that, if the Soviets will cooperate fully in establishing and operating such a system, an agreement to stop nuclear weapons tests will surely last. Moreover, they believe that the changed attitude toward controls which such Soviet cooperation would signify would remove the greatest single obstacle to progress in agreeing on and implementing measures of real disarmament. Therefore, to make their position crystal clear and to assist the negotiations, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan have decided to make the following joint declaration: "The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will agree to stop nuclear weapons tests once and for all, provided only that an effective international system of control is agreed, comes into operation by agreed stages, and operates satisfactorily in accordance with agreed standards."

The President and Prime Minister hope that the Soviet Union will accede to this declaration and will instruct its representatives in Geneva to proceed promptly, together with the delegations of the United States and United Kingdom, to negotiate and sign an agreement to stop tests that has proper provisions for effective international control.

Villard

¹ Source: Proposed U.S.–U.K. public statement. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11–2158.

395. Record of Telephone Conversation Between McElroy and John Foster Dulles¹

November 26, 1958, 12:53 p.m.

The Sec told of Nixon's cable. It would involve a change in our basic position. Should the Sec talk to Q or does M want to handle himself. M will be willing to get Q in it but he thinks for us to make that kind of step back should be after a lot of conversation. Our protection against big countries is our atomic strength. If we can't tie it in with restrictions on atomic weapons we are in trouble. M does not get the British point on this and does not think N on a TV program should announce this change. The Sec read the cable. The Sec referred to a message he got last night from Lloyd pressing us to move in this direction. The Sec does not think we should do this over the phone because N wants to have a press conf. M agreed. The Sec agreed it is a serious question and we should take adequate time to thrash it out among ourselves and bring the Pres in. The Sec replied he is not sure he agrees with what M said but is not going to try to rush for a contrary decision because N is having a press conf in London. We should be thinking about this and he suspects our people are because we had what appeared to be a unanimous recommendation from our del that we should accept this change. He believes Fox sent a telegram to Defense. M said maybe that is the way it should come but only after deliberation. The Sec will respond the Pres is in Augusta and it should be discussed among ourselves and him and not all can see him together.

¹ Source: Response to Nixon cable pushing for rapid change in U.S. negotiating position. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

396. Telegram 5175 to London¹

Washington, November 26, 1958

5175. Personal for Vice President from Secretary. Your 2888. Have discussed this with McElroy. He is strongly of opinion that we should maintain tie-up with QTE major and substantial arms control measures UNQTE as stipulated in President's statement of August 22 and which now constitutes agreed US policy except that we have since agreed to drop the QTE year-by-year UNQTE basis and need for annual determinations.

Under circumstances it is not practical to bring about a new policy before your press conference. McCone is in San Francisco, President is in Augusta, and in view of McElroy's views we could only change our position after a deliberate reexamination by all US elements largely concerned and presentation of views to the President.

It occurs to me that you might say that if adequate controls are accepted and installed for purposes of monitoring agreement to suspend testing, this would of itself go far to pave the way toward broader arms control measures so that the relating of suspension of testing to these other measures would not be apt in practice to constitute a serious qualification. Therefore, the first thing to find out is whether or not the Soviets will agree to an adequate control system. This goes to the heart of all aspects of limitation of armament. This issue they so far evade.

Dulles

¹ Source: Conveys view that there must be full deliberation on proposed change in U.S. position at nuclear test suspension conference. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/11–2658.

397. Memorandum of Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Gray¹

Washington, November 26, 1958

On 26 November, I met with Secretary Dulles. For the first portion of the meeting Mr. Philip J. Farley was in attendance.

The first subject for discussion was Senator Gore's memorandum to the President which I had circulated to the Secretary of State and others under date of 26 November. I suggested to the Secretary of State that, with his approval, we might make use of the interdepartmental machinery, which had previously been set up by Mr. Farley, to deal with problems arising out of the Geneva Conferences. I indicated that I had earlier received Mr. Farley's agreement to such a procedure.

The Secretary felt that this was altogether appropriate. He said, however, that inasmuch as the Gore proposal was something timed for an impending breakup of the conference, he felt that there was no great rush because he believed that the conference would not break up very soon.

He indicated, however, that a more pressing problem which the interdepartmental machinery should address itself to was the question of a link with other disarmament measures. He indicated that the British were eager to destroy this link for their own domestic political purposes and that we might have a very difficult time holding them with us. I agreed that this matter should have top priority but that the Gore memorandum should be considered as an auxiliary problem. The Secretary instructed Mr. Farley to proceed.

I had pointed out to Mr. Dulles that Mr. McCone was out of town until December 1 and that Mr. McElroy and Mr. Quarles were immediately unavailable because of Defense budget problems. Mr. Dulles then pointed out to me that he would be absent from Washington from Sunday, November 30th until Friday, December 5th.

At this point Mr. Farley departed the meeting.

I then discussed with Secretary Dulles my concern of not having been involved in the decisions reached at his house on Sunday, November 16. The Secretary assured me that this was an oversight and apologized, saying that he felt that it was more of an operating decision, but agreed with me that high policy had indeed been involved. He then

¹ Source: Use of interdepartmental machinery to deal with issues arising from nuclear test suspension conference. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Drafted December 5.

indicated that he has never invited General Cutler to such meetings at his house but it was his intention to make a change for the future.

We then discussed briefly the forthcoming Defense budget conference at Augusta which was to take place on Friday, November 28. The Secretary expressed a desire that, in his behalf, I report at the meeting his feeling that as long as we maintained an adequate deterrent, our greatest threat in the foreseeable future was not of nuclear war but of local aggression and the requirement for such actions as we have taken recently in Lebanon and in the Taiwan Strait. He therefore asked me to say that from the point of view of his responsibilities in the conduct of foreign policy, he hoped that budget decisions would not impair or cripple our capacity to deal with local situations.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

398. Telegram Supnu 121 From Geneva¹

Geneva, December 9, 1958, 10 a.m.

Supnu 121. Following is verbatim text of basic provisions tabled by SovDel at today's meeting. Copies being pouched London, Moscow, Paris for USRO.

Begin verbatim text.

Basic provisions determining the establishment and activities of the control organization for the control over compliance with a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests

1. A control organization for the control over compliance with a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, hereinafter referred to as the Control Organization, shall be established, on the basis of technical methods recommended by the Geneva Conference of Technical Experts, by the initial parties to the treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the founder states of the Control Organization.

2. The Control Organization shall consist of a commission for control over compliance with a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons

¹Source: Basic provisions text tabled by Soviet Delegation. Official Use Only. 12 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-958.

tests, together with the technical system at its disposal (departments, laboratories), necessary for carrying out its functions, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, as well as of ground control posts, control posts on ships, and specially equipped aircraft provided by the founder states of the Control Organization for the collection of radioactive debris over the high seas.

3. The direction of the entire Control Organization shall be vested in the Commission which must direct and coordinate the activities of all the elements of the Control Organization in such a way that it ensures:

(A) The carrying out by ground control posts and ships of continuous and effective observations over possible nuclear explosions, providing for the timely detection of violations of the Treaty on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapons tests.

(B) The carrying out of regular flights over the high seas by specially equipped aircraft provided by the founder states of the Control Organization for the collection of radioactive debris for the same purpose.

(C) The timely processing of documentary data on observations and the information by the governments of the states parties to the treaty concerning violations of this treaty.

(D) The organization and the carrying out of the on-site inspection of unidentified events suspected of being nuclear explosions the composition and functions of the Commission.

4. The Commission shall be established by the founder states of the Control Organization. The Commission shall carry out the following basic functions:

(A) It shall direct the entire activity of the Control Organization, approve instructions and control provisions and types of equipment

(B) It shall review all cases where data provided by the technical system of the Commission give evidence of the existence of events suspected of being nuclear explosions.

(C) It shall adopt decisions on the existence of sufficient ground for suspecting that a nuclear explosion has been carried out in an area.

(D) It shall inform the government of the state on whose territory a nuclear explosion has been suspected of having taken place and shall request its opinion thereon. Upon considering the reply of the said government, it shall adopt a decision as to the necessity or the lack of necessity for carrying out an inspection of the area where the explosion is suspected of having taken place, by despatching a ground or maritime (by ship) inspection team and by organizing an aircraft flight along the routes agreed upon in advance with the government of the state concerned for the purpose of air sampling radioactive debris.

All decisions of the Commission on the above mentioned and other important questions shall be adopted by agreement among the

founder states of the Control Organization. In the event of disputes, the Commission shall inform the governments of the states parties to the treaty and the Security Council of the United Nations.

The technical system of the Commission referred to above in paragraph 2 shall comprise appropriate departments for processing and analyzing data received and for providing the Control Organization with the logistic and technical facilities and personnel. The personnel of the various departments shall be selected and approved by the Commission on the basis of an equal representation of the two sides of founder states of the Control Organization.

5. The technical system of the Commission shall provide, in accordance with instructions from the Commission, for carrying out the following basic functions by the Control Organization:

(A) The carrying out at control posts and on aircraft designated for collecting radioactive debris of continuous and effective observation of events which make it possible to detect nuclear explosions through methods recommended by the Geneva Conference of Technical Experts.

(B) The arranging for the timely analysis and processing of observation data from control posts for the purpose of rapid detection of signs of possible nuclear explosions.

(C) The obtaining if necessary, through requests for observation information, of data from the existing network of seismic and meteorological stations for the identification of natural events which, according to readings at control posts, could be taken for nuclear explosions.

(D) The arranging for, by decision of the Commission, an inspection on the site of a suspected nuclear explosion.

(E) The arranging for the development, testing, and acceptance of measuring instruments and equipment used by the control post network.

(F) The arranging for reliable communications with control posts as well as with the bases from which regular flights by specially designated aircraft for air sampling of radioactive debris are carried out, through the means of communication existing in the territories of the states where control posts are located.

(G) The arranging for trips to and from the control posts for personnel thereof as well as for visits by the Commission personnel to control posts when the latter are considered necessary by the Commission, using the existing means of transportation.

(H) The utilization of results of new scientific achievements for the purpose of raising the effectiveness and the scientific level of the Control Organization.

6. The administrative, logistic and representation expenses of the Control Organization shall be financed with funds allocated by the states parties to the treaty, in accordance with an estimate to be

approved by the Commission. The amount of the contributions by states shall be determined by special agreement.

Ground Control Posts

7. The tasks of the ground control posts shall include the following:

(A) The arranging for a continuous round-the-clock, observation over nuclear explosions by means of technical facilities recommended by the Geneva Conference of technical experts.

(B) Regular, original processing of documentary data obtained by means of all types of equipment of the posts to detect signals characteristic of a nuclear explosion.

(C) Submission, under an established procedure, of reports to the Commission and to the government of the state on whose territory the control post is located on observation data and nuclear explosions.

(D) Timely carrying out of calibration and maintenance work ensuring that all technical equipment of the posts is in continuous operating condition and the maintenance of accurate relative time and of accurate measuring equipment.

8. Each ground control post shall be equipped with seismic and acoustic apparatus, with equipment for registering radiation from nuclear explosions, and instruments for sampling radioactive debris in accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of technical experts.

Certain coastal posts shall also be equipped with hydro-acoustic equipment. In this connection, the personnel of the control posts may not use measurement instruments which have not been provided for the equipment of such posts.

9. The personnel of a control post shall consist of no more than thirty specialists and of several supporting personnel. With the exception of controllers from either side, the personnel of the control posts shall be selected from among the nationals of the country on whose territory the post is located.

Each post shall include controllers designated by the founder states of the Control Organization on the basis of the two sides, with one or two persons from either side. The post shall be directed by a Chief of Post, a representative of the country on whose territory the post is located, and by a Chief Controller, representing the other side. In countries which are not members of NATO, SEATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, the posts shall have two Chief Controllers, representing both sides.

Foreign controllers shall enjoy diplomatic immunity equal to that of personnel of foreign embassies and missions.

Controllers shall place their seals on all self-recording registering instruments and on means of access to instrument data records, shall

be present when documentary records are removed and processed, and shall supervise proper use of post instruments.

The right of extra-territoriality shall not extend to the territory and the premises of the control posts.

The security personnel of the control post, who shall be subordinate to the Chief of the Post, shall be the responsibility of the local authorities.

Movement of foreign personnel of the posts in the territory of the state must take place on regular terms and conditions in accordance with the procedure existing for foreigners. Any missions of foreign states in the state concerned must not interfere in the work of the control posts.

The provisions of this paragraph as well as those of paragraphs 10 and 11 shall also apply to control posts on ships.

10. Each control post shall maintain a special log-book for the registration of seismic oscillations, radiation, acoustic waves and data on the analysis of radioactive debris samples and, in the event of detection of a PAL which may be suspected as being caused by nuclear explosions, shall submit a report to the commission.

The reports of a control post shall be signed by the Chief of the Post and by the Chief Controller (or both Chief Controllers). In the event that the Chief Controller (or one of the Chief Controllers) does not agree with the conclusions of the Chief of the Post, he must state his dissenting opinion in the report.

Control posts must also submit the results of their observations at the request of the Commission.

In all cases, a copy of the control post's report shall be transmitted to the appropriate government agencies of the state in whose territory the post is located.

All documentary records of the registering instrument and other observation data shall be preserved by the control post for three months, after which they shall be made available to the agencies concerned of the country in whose territory the post is located, to be used for scientific and technical purposes.

11. The communication between the Commission and the control posts, and between the control posts and the Commission, shall be through existing communication channels. Where control posts are located in remote areas, the governments of the states in which these regions are located must arrange for the construction of appropriate means of communication which would ensure a reliable, round-the-clock transmission of data from the control posts. The mail of the control posts shall be carried by airmail via existing airlines.

12. In the event that a state cannot with its own resources organize and staff a control post, the organization and the staffing of the post

shall be carried out by decision of the Commission with the resources of both sides of the initial states parties to the treaty.

Control Posts on Ships

13. Control posts on ships shall be equipped with hydro-acoustic and acoustic instruments, radiation registration instruments, as well as with facilities of a maritime type for collection and analysis of radioactive debris.

14. Each ship control post shall be assigned a specific area of the ocean to cover.

15. The ship control posts shall be staffed by personnel of the state which owns such equipped vessel. The ship shall have on board one or two controllers of the other side (including one controller for navigation).

The Collection of Air Samples of Radioactive Debris

16. For the regular air sampling of radioactive aerosols, weather reconnaissance aircraft shall be used which make regular flights along routes in the open air space over oceans.

The said aircraft must be equipped with special instruments for the purpose of the detection and collection of radioactive aerosols.

At each base of these aircraft there shall be one or two controllers from the other side, whose functions shall include control over collection of samples and over their timely analysis at the radio-chemical laboratory of the base. One of the controllers must be on board the aircraft during air sampling. Air samples, the analysis of which indicates the existence of fresh radioactive debris from a nuclear explosion, shall be sent to the Commission, together with the conclusion on the results of the analysis of such samples as well as with technical documentation obtained on board the aircraft.

Arrangements for On-site Inspection of a Suspected Nuclear Explosion

17. An inspection team shall be despatched to the site of a suspected nuclear explosion by a decision of the Commission to be agreed in each individual case after careful examination of all available data on the identification of natural events. The adoption of a decision concerning the despatch of an inspection team must be preceded by a mandatory study of the data from the existing network of seismic stations and of other data which can contribute to the identification of the events under study.

An inspection team shall be created and supplied with the appropriate equipment in each individual case by decision of the Commission, depending upon the task of the team before it. The size of the group shall also be determined by decision of the Commission.

The supporting and technical personnel of an inspection team, transportation, and equipment shall be provided by the state on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out. In the event that such state is not in a position to provide the necessary equipment and the supporting and technical personnel, the procedure to ensure the inspection shall be determined by the Commission.

An inspection team shall include controllers designated by the founder states of the Control Organization on the basis of two sides. The size of inspection teams must be determined in each individual case in accordance with the FBYB assigned to the respective team.

An inspection team shall be under the Commission, and shall carry out all its instructions.

An inspection team shall submit to the Commission and to the government of the state where inspection is carried out a report on the investigation carried out on site.

18. Flights in the air-space of sovereign states to collect air samples for the purpose of inspection shall be made, with the participation of a representative of the Commission, by decision of the Commission in aircraft of such states along routes determined in advance and agreed upon with the governments of such states.

The Relationship of the Commission with the Governments of the States Participating in the Control Organization

19. In order to ensure day-to-day mutual relations between the Commission and the appropriate authorities of the states on whose territory a control post is located, the government of each such state shall authorize one of its government agencies to have continuing contact with the Commission on matters which are within the competence of the Control Organization.

20. The Commission shall establish mutual relations with such agency on the following matters:

The selection of the location of control posts;

The construction of control posts;

The selection of personnel for the staff of the Commission and control posts;

Transportation and means of communication for the Commission;

Assistance in the carrying out of inspection; and the provision for all other measures relating to the competence of the Commission.

Other Matters

21. The Commission and its technical system should be located in one of the European neutral states.

End verbatim text.

399. Telegram Supnu 136 From Geneva¹

Geneva, December 15, 1958, noon

Supnu 136. Following text tabled today by US del as draft treaty Articles VI, VII, VIII, and IX. (Which are numbered as VII, VIII, IX, and X in present US draft).

Begin verbatim text

Article VI—Functions of the Commission

1. The Commission shall establish procedures and standards for the installation, operation and improvement of the detection and identification system in conformity with this treaty and its annexes.

2. The Commission shall appoint an administrator for the system, who shall serve for a period of two years and shall be eligible to succeed himself. The Commission shall approve regulations governing the appointment, remuneration and dismissal of the staff of the Control Organization.

3. The Commission shall continuously review the actions of the administrator and the operation of the system under the terms of the treaty and its annexes.

4. The Commission shall approve the locations of control posts, ships, radiochemical laboratories, bases of operation of routine aircraft sampling flights (satellite tracking stations) and regional headquarters.

5. The Commission shall establish procedures and standards for the formation, equipping, maintenance and staffing of inspection groups, for the provision of adequate communications and transport facilities for such inspection groups, and for the expeditious despatch of such groups to the locality of events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. The Commission shall approve the number and base location of inspection groups in accordance with the criteria set forth in this treaty and its annexes.

6. The Commission, in establishing procedures for the staffing of the control organization, shall apply the following principles:

(A) No national of a state within which an inspection group is operating or a control post is located shall be included as a member of the inspection group or on the technical and communications staff of the control post.

¹ Source: U.S. text for several treaty articles. Official Use Only. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-1558.

(B) The composition of personnel at any component of the detection and identification system shall be such as to minimize the possibility of obstruction to effective operation.

7. The Commission may at any time decide, by a two-third majority of all members, that a particular event qualifying under the terms of this treaty and its annexes for automatic on-site inspection need not be inspected.

8. The Commission shall establish procedures for the despatch of special air missions in accordance with the criteria set forth in this treaty and its annexes.

9. The Commission shall prepare findings in accordance with Article (blank) and shall make recommendations in accordance with that article as to measures to be taken.

10. The Commission may conclude agreements with any state or authority to aid in the carrying out of the provisions of this treaty and its annexes.

11. The Commission shall establish procedures for dissemination of data produced by the control system to nations participating in the system and to interested scientific organization.

12. The Commission shall prepare an annual report to the conference on its activities in carrying out its purpose as defined in Article II and such special reports as it deems necessary on its activities. It shall also prepare for submission to the conference such reports as the Commission may be requested to make to the United Nations. The Commission shall submit these reports, along with the annual reports to the parties to this treaty at least one month before the annual session of the conference following the period covered by the report.

13. The Commission shall establish procedures in accordance with Article (blank) for the surveillance of nuclear devices and observation of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes.

Article VII—Conference

1. The conference consisting of representatives of parties to this treaty shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the administrator at the request of the Commission or of a majority of parties to the treaty. The sessions shall take place at the headquarters of the organization unless otherwise determined by the conference.

2. At such sessions, each party to the treaty shall be represented by not more than three delegates who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the state concerned.

3. The conference shall elect a president and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office

for the duration of the session. The conference, subject to the provisions of this treaty, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each party to the treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on budgetary matters shall be made pursuant to Article (blank) and decisions on amendments pursuant to Article (blank). Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a simple majority of the parties to the treaty present and voting.

4. The conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of this treaty or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in this treaty and may make recommendations to the parties or to the Commission or to both on any such questions or matters.

5. The conference shall:

(A) elect states to serve on the Commission in accordance with Article IV;

(B) consider the annual and any special report of the Commission;

(C) approve the budget recommended by the Commission in accordance with paragraph (blank) of Article (blank);

(D) approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by any relationship agreement between the organization and the United Nations; or return them to the Commission with the recommendations of the conference;

(E) approve any agreement or agreements between the organization and the United Nations or other organizations as provided in Article (blank) or return such agreements with its recommendations to the Commission for re-submission to the conference.

(F) approve amendments to this treaty in accordance with Article (blank).

6. The conference shall have the authority:

(A) to take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the conference for this purpose by the Commission;

(B) to propose matters for consideration by the Commission and request from the Commission reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Commission.

Article VIII—Administrator and International Staff

1. The administrator shall be the chief executive officer of the system and shall be responsible to the Commission in the performance of his duties.

2. The administrator shall implement procedures established by the Commission for the installation, operation and improvement of the system.

3. The administrator shall be responsible in accordance with the provisions of Article VI, paragraph 2, for the appointment, organization and functioning of the international staff of the organization. He shall be responsible for including in the staff such qualified scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfill the purpose of the organization.

4. When the administrator is unable to identify as a natural occurrence an event which has been detected by the system and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion in accordance with the terms of this treaty and its annexes, he shall so notify the Commission; and after 24 hours have elapsed he shall proceed forthwith to have an inspection of the locality of the event carried out (unless he is otherwise directed pursuant to Article VI, paragraph 7) in order to determine the actual nature of the event.

5. The administrator shall have authority to order special aircraft missions under procedures approved by the Commission in accordance with the criteria set forth in this treaty and its annexes.

6. The administrator shall determine, subject to the approval of the Commission, specific sites for land control posts, radiochemical laboratories, aircraft sampling stations, (satellite tracking stations), and regional offices and locate ships in accordance with the general principles set forth in this treaty and its annexes. The administrator shall, subject to the approval of the Commission, determine the specific flight patterns for routine sampling flights, and orbits of satellites.

7. The administrator shall determine, subject to the approval of the Commission, the number and base location of inspection groups in accordance with the requirements in this treaty and its annexes.

8. The administrator shall be responsible for undertaking a program to improve the operational capability of the system either by research and development carried out by the staff of the system or by appropriate external contracts. This program may, with the approval of the Commission, include experiments performed by the Control Organization to test the effectiveness of the system, including experiments in connection with nuclear explosions carried under Article (blank).

9. The administrator shall prepare the budget of the Control Organization in accordance with paragraph (blank) of Article (blank).

10. The administrator shall render to the Commission such advice and assistance as may be requested.

Article IX—Detection and Identification System

1. The system shall be established and shall operate in accordance with the provision of this treaty and its annexes.

2. The parties undertake to provide the necessary transportation from the port of entry, or within the territory of the party, to the site

of any element of the system or any area where an on-site inspection has been initiated whenever adequate and expeditious transportation is not available or has been discontinued for any reason.

3. The parties undertake to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of national aircraft for the routine collection of air samples when the administrator determines that existing routine meteorological or commercial flights of national aircraft are acceptable for this purpose. In such cases, the administrator shall specify the equipment to be utilized, and one or more observers from the system, none of whom is a national of the state providing the aircraft, shall accompany the flight.

4. The parties undertake to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission either to permit flights by system aircraft over their national territory or to have national aircraft immediately available for flights over their own territory when the administrator determines that special aircraft flights are required over national territory in accordance with the criteria in Annex I. In such cases, the administrator shall specify the equipment to be utilized and one or more observers from the nuclear test detection and identification system, none of whom is a national of the state being overflown, shall accompany the flight.

5. The parties undertake to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of national vessels for use as elements of the system when the administrator determines that existing weather or geophysical exploration ships are acceptable for this purpose. In such cases, the administrator shall specify the equipment to be utilized and the operating specialists and technical staff.

6. The parties agree to give inspection groups immediate and undisputed access to the locality of any event for which an inspection has been ordered by the administrator. The parties further agree not to interfere with any of the operations undertaken by an inspection group and to assist the personnel of the inspection groups as they may require in the performance of their mission. Inspection groups may be accompanied by representatives of the states concerned provided that the inspection groups shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

(Paragraph 7 will be drafted to make provision for high altitude detection after this matter has been further discussed.)

End vervatim text.

Villard

400. Telegram Nusup 118 to Geneva¹

Washington, December 15, 1958, noon

Nusup 118. USDEL authorized table Annex I as contained December 10 draft with following changes:

Article 1: Replace with following text: "The Nuclear Test Detection and Identification System (hereinafter referred to as the "System"), provided for in Article 10 of this Treaty, shall include the features set forth herein which are based upon the Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests of 20 August 1958."

Article 2: Insert after "shall" in para 1 words "when completely established and unless otherwise decided in accordance with the provision of this treaty", and replace "a system of satellites" with words "agreed methods for detecting very high altitude nuclear explosions". Replace present text para 2 subpara (f) with "(appropriate techniques as may be decided for detecting very high altitude explosions should be inserted here.)"

Article 3: Delete first sentence para 1. Delete paras 2 and 3.

Article 4: Delete all after word "from" in first sentence para 1 and substitute "elements of the system". Replace present language para 1 sub-para (d) with "To examine continuously the work of the elements of the system to insure the maintenance of a high degree of technical proficiency". Delete paras 2 and 3.

Article 5: Add to first sentence para 1 words "or other elements of the system". Delete paras 2 and 3.

Article 6: In first sentence para 1 after "staff" add "equipment", substitute "direct" for "supervise" and replace all after word "events" with "which cannot be identified as natural events and which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions". Third sentence para 1: after word "responsible" add "at the direction of the Administrator".

Article 7: Substitute "in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of this treaty" for words "subject to etc." in para 1, and insert after word "concludes" words "cannot be identified as a natural event and". Combine para 1 sub-paras (a) and (b) in a new sub-para (a) with last sentence of old (b) changed to read "in addition, any unidentified seismic events with an estimated equivalent yield less than 5 kilotons which the data from the system indicates have an unusually high

¹ Source: Textual changes to delegation's proposal. Confidential; Priority. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12-1558.

probability of nuclear origin shall be inspected". Renumber sub-para (c) as new sub-para (b). Delete para 2.

Article 8: First sentence para 1 should read "The system shall, when completely established, have about ten regional offices each providing logistic support and administrative supervision to elements of the system operating in its region." Delete paras 2 and 3.

Article 9: Delete all after word "posts" in first sentence para 1 and substitute "uniformly equipped with apparatus satisfying the specifications set forth in the Report of the Geneva Conference of Experts of 20 August 1958." Second sentence para 1 should end before word "however" and should be followed by new sentence reading "The exact number of control posts within the limits indicated above shall be determined as a result of actually distributing them, etc." In para 2 substitute "operation" for word "observation". Delete paras 3 and 4.

Article 10: Delete "and Functions" in title of para 1. Delete paras 2 and 3.

Article 11: Begin first sentence para 1 with word "Daily". Substitute for present text para 2 sub-para (b) "When geophysical data from the control posts indicate that an event has occurred which cannot be identified as a natural event and which could be suspected of being an uncontained nuclear explosion". Correct reference to treaty in last sentence para 2. Delete para 4. Insert first three sentences present para 5 as last two sentences para 2. Final sentence para 5 should be inserted as final sentence present para 3.

Article 12: Add words "by the Central Inspection Office" to para 1 sub-para (h). Delete present para 2. Delete title para 3 and incorporate para 3 as part of para 1.

Article 13: Delete present text. Change title to "High Altitude Detection" and substitute following parenthetical text for this Article: "(appropriate techniques as may be decided for detecting very high altitude explosions should be described here.)"

Article 14: Replace all before word "immediately" in first sentence with words "all elements of the system shall". Third sentence should read: "On request, all elements of the system shall provide additional data to the center." In final sentence first para, substitute "shall" for "will" and delete last four words. Substitute "examined" for word "observed" in first sentence second para.

PART VI: (Time Schedule) Department confirms views expressed para 3 of NUSUP 112 on method of handling this problem.

Herter
Acting

401. Memorandum From Herter to Gray¹

Washington, December 17, 1958

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore

In response to your memorandum of November 26, to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian, there has been prepared by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament the enclosed "Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore". This report has the concurrence of this Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and Dr. Killian's office. Chairman McCone has indicated he will transmit the comments of his agency in a separate memorandum.

/S/ Christian A. Herter
Acting Secretary

Enclosure

Memorandum From Gray to Multiple Recipients

Washington, November 26, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

There is inclosed a copy of a memorandum prepared for the President at his request, by Senator Albert Gore, which summarizes a suggestion the Senator made to the President orally with respect to current negotiations in Geneva on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

The President, in requesting Senator Gore's memorandum, assured him that his suggestion would be given most careful evaluation. I have been directed to obtain for the President a coordinated view to be used in preparing a responsive reply by the President to the Senator.

¹ Source: Response of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament to a request for an evaluation of a test suspension proposal by Sen. Gore. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/11-2658.

In considering the Senator's suggestion it should be borne in mind that the proposal would involve a departure from existing U.S. policy with respect to disarmament, in that it would completely divorce the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons from other disarmament measures.

The Senator advanced his suggestion to the President as one way to meet the situation that would develop were the Soviet Union clearly on the verge of breaking off the current negotiations in Geneva, rather than as a substantive proposal to be made during the course of the negotiations.

The President directs that special note be taken of the fact that the proposal would permit the continuation of both underground tests and tests in outer space, while ceasing only atmospheric tests for a stated period, as for example, three years.

I will be in touch with your respective offices very shortly with a view to determining a satisfactory and expeditious method of meeting the President's requirement.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Memorandum From Gore to Eisenhower

November 19, 1958

In the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Tests, two essentials are involved: (1) the moral and political position of the U.S. and, (2) U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the Soviets.

The U.S. delegation would seem to be negotiating toward an unattainable goal. If so, we must face the prospect of a failure of the conference, for which we would suffer propaganda blame, or an unfavorable agreement.

The Russians plainly seek to pressure the U.S. and the U.K. into agreeing to stop all tests for all time without accepting effective inspection. If they fail in this, they will seek to blame the U.S. for failure of the conference. Soviet success in either respect would be detrimental to U.S. interest.

Mounting fears of radioactive contamination of the air is Russia's most powerful propaganda weapon against us.

The U.S. can strengthen her moral and political position by seizing the initiative to stop radioactive contamination of the world's

atmosphere. This can be done without the establishment of the cumbersome, if not entirely impractical, system of inspection and control proposed by the experts. Presently installed systems have already demonstrated technical efficiency in detection of atmospheric detonations.

It is respectfully suggested, therefore, that the President announce the unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere for a specific period, say three years, ask similar action by other nuclear powers and suggest that the Geneva Conference proceed immediately to negotiate a treaty among the nuclear powers for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.

Thereafter, the conference can proceed to negotiate for the discontinuance of other types of nuclear weapon tests—underground, outer space and sub-oceanic—with an adequate system of inspection and control, making the necessary exceptions for “threshold” and space tests. Technicians have advised that it is possible to develop improved low-yield weapons through underground tests and that it may be possible to conduct tests beyond the earth's atmosphere. The argument for cessation of these types of tests is essentially an argument for disarmament and can be considered as a part of the whole involved problem of disarmament.

The course of action herein recommended has the possibility of bringing three important advantages to the United States: (1) an improvement of the moral and political position of the U.S. in the world; (2) the drawing of a clear distinction between the anti-social contamination of the atmosphere for which the United States is being sorely blamed, on the one hand, and other types of nuclear weapons tests, on the other; (3) possibly laying the groundwork for a successful conference at Geneva, or, at least, mitigating or saving the United States from blame for its failure.

Since the conference evolved from the President's pronouncement of August 22, there is no way that the U.S. can be disassociated from either the success or the failure of the conference. Our prestige and responsibility are involved.

Moreover, one important forward step toward peace and international cooperation might lead to others in our time.

402. Memorandum From Herter to Gray¹

Washington, December 17, 1958

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore

In response to your memorandum of November 26 to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian, there has been prepared by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament the enclosed "Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore". This report has the concurrence of this Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and Dr. Killian's office. Chairman McCone has indicated he will transmit the comments of his agency in a separate memorandum.

C.A.H.
Acting Secretary

Enclosure**Report by Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament**

December 15, 1958

*EVALUATION OF TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL
BY SENATOR GORE*

Report by Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament

On November 19, following a call on the President on November 17, Senator Gore submitted a memorandum to the President outlining a proposal for U.S. action on suspension of nuclear weapons tests. This proposal calls for a new U.S. position at the Geneva Conference on the Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests consisting of a Presidential announcement of "unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere" for perhaps three years, a call for similar action by other nuclear powers, and a call for the Geneva Conference to proceed immediately with negotiation of a treaty for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.

¹ Source: Transmits an interagency evaluation of a test suspension proposal by Sen. Gore. Confidential. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament.

Senator Gore's proposal is based on the stated assumptions that:

1. Present U.S. goals at the Conference are unattainable.
2. Nuclear testing to date has caused an "antisocial contamination of the atmosphere" which has led to world-wide fear of fall-out which is Russia's most powerful propaganda weapon against the United States.
3. Present detection systems are technically efficient in the detection of atmospheric detonations.

The Working Group considers that the Gore proposal would not be a sound position for the United States to take at this time. Although the assumptions listed above are inaccurate, the proposal has some elements which may be useful in developing a fall-back position in the event that the current negotiations fail.

Comment on Assumptions. There is no reason to believe at this time that U.S. objectives in the Conference are unattainable. The basic U.S. objective is a two-fold one: to obtain an agreement for suspension of nuclear tests under effective international control, or to expose the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept international control as the basis for failure to reach agreement if this is the result of the Conference. It is not possible at present to say that an agreement will not be reached despite current unacceptable Soviet positions, since serious negotiation has just commenced and the Soviet Union professes to accept the report of the Geneva Experts on a control system. We remain confident on the basis of discussion so far that, if the Conference breaks down, the blame will clearly rest on the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet Union has used fear of radioactive fallout as a propaganda weapon, world-wide concern with nuclear testing is not confined to this one aspect. The discontinuance of nuclear testing is seen more and more as an important first step toward disarmament. A proposal for anything less than stopping all nuclear weapons tests would evoke an immediate Soviet charge that we were motivated primarily by a desire to evade a suspension, and would not serve as a basis for negotiation with the Soviet Union.

The present nuclear test detection system is not adequate for monitoring atmospheric tests. The Geneva technical conference clearly established the requirement for stations within the Soviet Union if atmospheric bursts down to 1 kiloton are to be detected.

The Gore Proposal as a U.S. Position Now. In view of these considerations it would be undesirable for the United States to advance the Gore proposals at this time. We would give the Soviet Union an excuse to escape from showing its true position on acceptance of international controls and it would be unlikely to have major propaganda value. It would almost certainly lead to a break in negotiations advantageous to the Soviet Union and would thus remove such chance as there is of obtaining international inspection within the Soviet Union. The USSR would accuse the U.S. of walking away from the stated positions in mid-negotiation.

The Gore Proposal as a Fall-Back Position. If the present negotiations do break down, the United States may well wish to announce a policy of moderation in future testing. Such self-imposed moderation may be prudent since, even if the blame for the break lies with the Soviet Union, increased pressure for a cessation of tests can be expected to be directed against the U.S. and the Soviet Union alike and unilateral U.S. action would cut the ground under proposals to this effect.

Further study must be given to the proper course of action. It is not clear at present that underground testing will permit satisfactory diagnostic measurement, including yields, to meet all important future test requirements. Testing in outer space will present even greater and more complex diagnostic problems.

403. Letter From McCone to Gray¹

Washington, December 19, 1958

Dear Mr. Gray:

Attached is a copy of a classified memorandum from the General Manager to me which summarizes the Atomic Energy Commission's views on a number of issues which have arisen at Geneva. This includes item 5, page 2, which reflects the Commission's views on the Gore Proposal.

Also, I am attaching a copy of a TELEX sent to me from Livermore by Commissioner Libby and Dr. Teller on July 25, 1958.

You will note that the TELEX sets forth two alternate plans for reducing weapons test programs by agreement with other nuclear powers. The second of the two plans parallels the Gore proposal. When these two plans were put forth by me it was concluded that since the Geneva Technical Conference was exploring complete suspension, the introduction of the ideas set forth in the TELEX would not be timely.

The Atomic Energy Commission adheres to the validity of either proposal contained in the Libby TELEX, but questions any arrangement of a "unilateral nature". We suggest that a suspension be put into effect only by bilateral or multilateral treaty which provides, among

¹ Source: Conveys AEC views on issues that have arisen in nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret; Defense Information. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament.

other things, positive assurances gained through agreed inspection procedures that the agreement will be maintained by all parties.

Sincerely yours,

John A. McCone
Chairman

Attachment

Memorandum From AEC General Manager to McCone

Washington, December 5, 1958

SUBJECT

Instructions of the Commission Relative to Test Cessation Issues

1. The following paragraphs summarize my understanding of the Commission conclusions reached after a series of Commission and staff deliberations. The information within parentheses is to be used only in discussions among the principals.

2. *Link to Disarmament.* The Commission believes that a decision as to whether or not the linkage with disarmament progress should be dropped is *not* a matter of Commission responsibility. Rather, this is a matter lying within the purview of the State Department. The Commission would point out, however, that cessation without a link to disarmament would mean the continuation of the armament race with an attendant evolutionary development of weapons which could not be fully effective without nuclear testing. It would hope that, if the link were not expressed in an action article of the treaty, the President's objective in this regard as contained in his announcement of August 22 would be incorporated in the treaty preamble. The answer to be made to the British in regard to this issue is a matter also for State to decide. Again, however, the Commission would hope that a way could be found to secure support for incorporation in the preamble.

3. *The Period of Suspension.* An indefinite period of suspension in place of the year-to-year provision would be satisfactory provided:

- (a) Suspension is definitely linked to the detection system, and
- (b) Any party to the Treaty can withdraw if the detection system is not properly installed and satisfactorily operating in the opinion of the complaining party.

Note: The Commission is concerned about engaging in a Treaty in a new area of this type without adequate privileges for reconsideration should basic conditions change. However, this is in the province of the Department of State.

4. *Tie between the Control System and Cessation.* The Commission believes that the Treaty documentation should establish the link between control system and cessation and that link should be definitive, unmistakable, and irrevocable. The Commission would like to see the specific provisions for the control system and the agreement for cessation in a single document. Whether it is necessary that it be in one document or in two lies within the province of the State Department. The Commission would repeat that, even if in two documents, the link must be "definitive, unmistakable, and irrevocable."

5. *The Gore Proposal.* The Commission is in agreement that an immediate unilateral proposal as set forth by Senator Gore would not be desirable. They are in agreement also that, if an announcement along this line is to be made later, it should not be a unilateral declaration but a proposed international agreement, and that the time of making should be at the time of deadlock or breakdown of the current Geneva discussions. (The Commission believes that we should seek a multilateral controlled ban on atmospheric tests as an immediate and practical and enforceable objective. This, as we understand it, is very similar to Senator Gore's proposal.)

6. *Limitation of Test Cessation to Controllable Tests.* The Commission believes that whatever happens at Geneva we must not agree to a ban on tests which cannot be controlled. We must recognize the threshold problem for underground tests and also the outer space detection problem as both involving thresholds of detectability.

Analysis of the underground shots in the HARDTACK II series indicates that the questions of both detectability and identification of subterranean nuclear explosions are substantially more difficult than previously assumed on the basis of the RAINIER shot, the only information available to the Geneva Technical meeting. The increase in difficulty is of a magnitude such as to raise additional substantial questions of the practicality of an inspection system which includes underground shots; the problems of difficulty of staffing; quality of staffing, cooperation by all nations, expense, etc., are compounded by the recent data. It may well be, therefore, that the only practical detection system at this time is one that is restricted to the detection and control of atmospheric nuclear explosions only.

7. The Commission is concerned by the fact that prolonged negotiations during which we continue to suspend all U.S. tests might have the practical effect of making the test ban permanent with no opportunity of establishing controls or other necessary conditions.

On November 7, the President said in part, "If there is not shortly a corresponding renunciation by the Soviet Union, the United States will be obliged to reconsider its position." The Soviet Union has not in the intervening time declared its intention of refraining from further nuclear tests during the discussions at Geneva. A clear statement of our

intentions during the reminder of the negotiation period and during the installation of the control system should be made in the near future. Alternatively, a terminal date for the negotiation should be established.

8. The following two earlier points should be raised by the Chairman at the meeting with the principals:

(a) The advisability of taking this matter out of the staff level and settling between the principals to prevent leakage.

(b) To alleviate the growing concern that U.K. policies in several areas differ from those of the U.S., take positive action with the British to secure an agreed position on the following:

(1) Link to the control system.

(2) Duration (or right to withdraw).

(3) Link (if any) to disarmament.

(4) Geographic areas outside of the boundaries of those countries currently discussing test cessation, such as Red China and North Africa.

General Manager

404. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, December 30, 1958

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Dept. of State
Acting Secretary
Ambassador
Wadsworth
Mr. Farley—S/AE
Mr. Kohler—EUR
Mr. Spiers—S/AE
Mr. Toon—EUR
Mr. Baker—S/AE
Mr. Morris—S/AE

White House
Dr. James Killian
Dr. James Fisk
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Bromley Smith
Atomic Energy Comm.
Mr. McCone
Dr. Kavanagh
Dr. English

CIA
Mr. Amory
USIA
Mr. Allen
Dept. of Defense
Mr. Irwin
General Byers
General Loper

¹ Source: U.S. position in nuclear test suspension talks; Hardtack II data. Secret. 13 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12–3058.

Mr. Herter referred to the first item on the agenda for the meeting (Tab A), noting that the U.K. has again pressed the State Department for a decision on the issue of abandoning a link to disarmament in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. He recalled that this matter had previously been discussed in an Interdepartmental Working Group after receipt of the U.S. Delegation's recommendation that we revise our position as the U.K. suggested, and that all interested agencies but the Department of Defense had agreed with the Delegation's recommendation. He noted that the U.K. had wished to make a major public announcement of the proposed change in position. He inquired whether the Department of Defense had considered this question further and whether a unanimous recommendation might be made to the President on the matter. *Mr. Irwin* said that Secretary McElroy was out of town and he had not been able to discuss the matter with him. However, the joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to the proposed policy shift. *General Loper* said that he had discussed the question with *Mr. Quarles* who maintained his previous position that the link should not be dropped. *Mr. Herter* said that if this position were confirmed, we should arrange for a meeting with the President to present the varying views as soon as possible.

In response to *Mr. Irwin's* inquiry regarding the pros and cons of the issue, *Ambassador Wadsworth* said that our present position left us very vulnerable to Soviet propaganda and provided a screen behind which the Soviets could always retreat when they wished to evade coming to grips with the issue of control. On the one hand we are seeking to write precise control provisions into the treaty and on the other insisting on the vaguest sort of expression of relationship with disarmament, where it was impossible for us to be specific in response to Soviet probing as to just what we mean. The Delegation felt that there was no real way to fit generalized provisions about disarmament progress into a treaty dealing with another specific issue, test cessation, which we claim is not a disarmament measure. Also our best chance of keeping the British firm on controls is to meet them on the disarmament link point, which they consider academic in nature, and untenable before public opinion.

Mr. McCone said that the Atomic Energy Commission viewed this question as one lying within the responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense. His personal view was that we should not attempt to write the criteria of disarmament progress into an article of the treaty, in view of our inability to be specific, but that some mention should be made of disarmament, as an objective rather than as a condition, in a preamble to the treaty. Lack of disarmament progress should not constitute a reason for dissolving the treaty. He felt that the preamble in the Soviet draft, which dealt only with nuclear disarmament, provided a good entry for similar preamble extended to cover other disarmament aspects in our own draft. *Dr. Killian* said that he agreed with the

position taken by Mr. McCone. *Mr. Irwin* said that he would discuss this matter with the Secretary of Defense and let Mr. Herter know as soon as possible whether Defense was prepared to change its position.

Mr. Herter raised the question whether, if the proposed change in position is made, it should be made with great public fanfare as the British seemed to prefer. *Ambassador Wadsworth*, *Mr. Allen*, and *Mr. Irwin* agreed that the concession should be made as routinely as possible in the course of negotiations and with a minimum of hue and cry which could be taken to imply that the President's August 22 position was wrong. *Mr. Farley* noted that one of our major objectives in the current negotiations was to gain Soviet agreement to an effective control system. Our change in position could be justified on the grounds that Soviet acceptance of the controls sought constitutes a most important step forward which in itself makes future progress in disarmament more possible. Thus it is not a case of our previous position being wrong but simply a recognition that the objective of disarmament progress could in reality best be served by conclusion of an agreement on nuclear tests with firm control provisions. There will be adequate protection for U.S. interest, since it would be possible to withdraw from the treaty if the Soviets obstruct operation of the control system.

General Loper asked whether it would not be possible to postpone a decision on the link until a later stage, since it would not be necessary to discuss the duration article until near the end of the negotiations. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said that he had been giving the question of general tactics in the negotiations further thought over the holidays and felt that our best procedure now would be to move ahead and table all of the remaining articles of our draft treaty, seeking agreement on as many of these as possible, and by-passing for the time-being some of the more difficult issues such as the question of unanimity. We are presently vulnerable to Soviet charges that we have not given a clear idea of the total scope of the treaty we propose. Furthermore, it would be to our advantage to be free to come back at will to some of these difficult issues, such as that of the "veto", at a later stage since these were the issues on which any breakoff would be favorable to the U.S. *Mr. Herter* agreed that the U.S. would be in a far better public relations position if a breakoff in the negotiations occurred on the question of controls than it would if the break were to be on the matter of relationship to disarmament. *Mr. Irwin* said that if the decision were made to break the link, the Department of Defense would prefer to see this policy change played in a low key and with a view to making the most of it as a bargaining counter in the negotiations.

Passing to the second item of the agenda, *Mr. Herter* asked Dr. Kilian to explain the nature and implications of the new data relating to detection and identification of underground tests obtained in the

HARDTACK II test series of October 1958. *Dr. Killian* presented the preliminary report attached as Tab B.

Dr. Fisk, in response to a question from *Mr. Irwin* explained that the new data were considerably more reliable than the Rainier data on which the Experts' Report had been based and which involved only one underground test. However, there is still a large element of uncertainty, and further testing might produce data which could change present calculations either upward or downward. The Rainier data was not presented last summer in a way which would preclude us from reopening the question of underground detection on the basis of the new data. It was agreed that the new data was such that it required the U.S. to reopen the question.

Mr. McCone referred to the letter of December 23 transmitting AEC views on the new data (Tab C) and asked whether the new data indicated that a larger number of smaller underground shots would not be detected than previously thought. *Dr. Fisk* replied that the number would be somewhat larger than before, but noted that the HARDTACK II data does not indicate much change in detectability of underground nuclear explosions. The significant change in capability relates to identification.

Mr. Herter said that from present accounts the Soviet Delegation seems to consider the Geneva Report as definitive and asked Ambassador Wadsworth how he would expect them to react to a reopening of the underground question. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said he thought that they would initially be suspicious of our motives, but that if approached in the proper manner probably accept our data as accurate. An appropriate approach might be to request an informal meeting on Monday, January 5, at which a U.S. scientist could explain the new data and provide the Soviet Delegation with a summary of our findings. He could then propose that the Conference set up a group of experts to deal with this new information, concurrently with the political negotiations.

Mr. McCone expressed concern that this information, which is already known to some newspaper people, might appear publicly prior to its presentation to the Soviet Delegation. *Mr. Gray* added that not only do we have to worry about the newsmen who are aware of the HARDTACK II data but also we must consider our obligation to the U.S. public who consider the Geneva Report as an authoritative treatment of the question of detecting nuclear tests. *Dr. Killian* said he felt an announcement should be made very soon, that any statement should be drafted with great care, should be concurred in by the agencies concerned, and should be drawn so as not to damage our negotiating position. *Mr. Herter* said he felt that the information should not be released publicly prior to its presentation to the Soviet Delegation and that to do so would cast doubt upon our motivations.

Mr. McCone said he felt we should be guided by the advice of the negotiators and take the calculated risk that an approach to the Soviet Delegation on Monday would be possible before the story appears in the American press. He stated that even though there would be considerable concern in several quarters, including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, if this information had leaked to the press before it had been made available officially, for the sake of good faith with the Soviets it would be well to take this calculated risk of delaying an announcement of the HARDTACK II data until after an approach to the Soviets on Monday.

It was agreed that (1) Ambassador Wadsworth would seek an informal meeting with the Soviet Delegation on Monday at which Dr. Romney of AFOAT-1 would present the HARDTACK II data. Ambassador Wadsworth would then suggest that the Conference establish a working group of experts in this field to consider the implications of the new data; (2) on Tuesday an announcement would be made in this country setting forth the results of the observations of the HARDTACK II explosions as facts without setting forth any particular conclusions, pointing out that the U.S. Delegation is prepared to discuss the data which supplements the limited data available to the Conference of Experts last summer and also indicating that this data may make it possible to improve upon the capability of the system designed this past summer.

Dr. Killian indicated that he will establish a technical committee here in Washington to study the implications of the HARDTACK II data more carefully. This committee would consist of several senior seismologists, geophysicists and others familiar with the phenomena associated with underground explosions and would also consider alternate seismic techniques for discriminating between earthquakes and nuclear explosions and possibilities for improving the instrumentation of such installations. The Group approved the following terms of reference proposed by Dr. Killian:

“The Panel should determine whether it would be possible within the present state of seismic technology to improve the capabilities of the system recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts to detect and identify seismic events as either earthquakes or explosions without increasing the number of manned control posts in the system. The Panel’s investigation should include, but need not be limited to, the following:

(a) improvement or augmentation of equipment at control posts in the agreed Geneva system; (b) augmentation of the system with a more closely spaced grid of small, completely automatic seismic detectors; and (c) utilization of criteria other than the first motion of the P wave to identify events as earthquakes (or as explosions).

“The Panel should also recommend a research and test program to evaluate any specific proposals advanced to improve the system as

well as to advance the state of the art in this field. The Panel should indicate the extent to which nuclear tests would be required in this test program."

Mr. Herter asked how airtight a control system was necessary. *Mr. Irwin* replied that we would be fairly well protected by a method of random inspection under which the Soviets would not know when a particular event would be inspected. *Mr. McCone* asked whether the new data would cause any difficulties with Annex 1 which is based on the Report of the Conference of Experts. *Mr. Keeny* replied that Annex 1 on the control system as drafted should cause no difficulties, since there is provision for inspection of all unidentified events above 5 KT regardless of number and 20% of those below this figure. In fact, he thought that when it became apparent to the Soviet Delegation that the number of unidentified events would rise considerably from the figure anticipated in the Geneva Report, they would probably be quite willing to carefully examine possibilities of reducing this number of potential inspections by various techniques including perhaps establishment of a threshold.

In response to a question by *Mr. Herter* as to our tactics should the Soviets reject the new data and maintain the continuing validity of the Experts' Report, *Mr. Farley* said we could then stand fast on the requirements of inspection. He felt, however, that the Soviet politicians would be quick to realize that the implications of the new data would have to be considered now, rather than after they had signed a treaty committing themselves to a large number of inspections.

Mr. Herter noted that since we are committed to monitoring underground tests, we seem to be faced with the necessity of either an increased number of inspections of unidentified events, establishment of a threshold or improvements in instrument techniques or number of control posts. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said the Soviets would surely answer any suggestion for a threshold with heavy propaganda that this showed the U.S. had never been sincere about wanting to stop nuclear tests. *Dr. Killian*, however, suggested that the Soviets themselves might find a higher threshold advantageous. *General Loper* said that Secretary Quarles felt a threshold might be the best solution to the problem.

Mr. McCone said he wished to express the concern of the AEC about the effect on our testing program of overly prolonged negotiations which involve de facto suspension without an agreement. He urged that thought be given to alternatives and to what action we might take should the Soviets resume testing.

Tab A**Agenda**

It is suggested that the meeting scheduled for December 30 consider three items in connection with the Geneva nuclear test negotiations:

1. *The link with disarmament.*

The U.S. Delegation and the U.K. have both strongly urged that the element of the President's August 22 statement tying continuation of test suspension to disarmament progress be abandoned. This question has been considered in the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament, and representatives of all interested agencies other than the Department of Defense have indicated no objection to the recommendations of the U.S. Delegation.

Suggested action: that the Department of State prepare a memorandum to the President seeking his approval of the abandonment of the disarmament link.

2. *Implications of new data on detection and identification of underground tests.*

A working group of seismologists convened by AFOAT-1 has reviewed the seismic data obtained during HARDTACK II and has concluded that the problem of detecting and identifying underground explosions is more difficult than is indicated in the Geneva Conference of Experts Report. Although based on admittedly inadequate data, the Working Group concludes that "statements by the Geneva Conference of Experts concerning the detection and identification of earthquakes equivalent to 5 KT apply more nearly to about 20 KT."

Suggested action: that Dr. Killian undertake to review the Geneva system to study possible modifications to improve system capability, and the Department of State, coordinating with other agencies, prepare instructions to the Delegation to propose a technical working group of the USSR, U.S. and U.K. to review this data with a view to recommending modifications on the system and a program of joint U.S.–U.K.–USSR underground tests to provide further data under varying conditions on this problem.

3. *Fallback Positions.*

The U.S. should develop a plan which could serve as an alternative proposal to a complete breakdown in the Geneva talks. We should consider proposing in this event an immediate end to atmospheric tests with the simple inspection system this would require, and charging the control organ created by such agreement to undertake research and

study with a view to developing a system which would allow the end of high altitude and underground tests as well. Whereas this would not be a negotiable proposition at this time, a proposal cast in these terms might be accepted by the USSR if the only clear alternative is complete breakdown.

Suggested action: as a basis for further consideration of this problem, the Department of Defense's AFOAT-1 should be asked to design a minimum inspection system to monitor an agreement to end all atmospheric tests.

Tab B

Report Prepared by the President's Science Advisory Committee

Washington, undated

POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS IN THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Alternatives Which Need to be Considered as a Result of Test Results Obtained in October on Underground Nuclear Tests

New Data and Implications

The new seismic data resulting from the Hardtack II series of tests (October 1958) alter the quantitative conclusions relating to underground tests reached by the "Geneva Conference of Experts." While the qualitative basis for seeking the initial technical agreements and for continuing in the present Geneva negotiations appear to be unchanged, detection and identification will be more difficult than had been expected.

The new observations are the following:

1. The maximum amplitude of the seismic signal is approximately 60% of that expected, based on the Rainier data.
2. The "First Motion" of the seismic signal, relative to the seismic signal, is smaller than anticipated (at distances greater than 2,000 KM).
3. The new data are more reliable, being based on observation at more stations and greater distances.

As a result of the new data:

1. The range of detection is decreased for explosions of a given yield.

2. Identification of earthquakes by the method of "First Motion" is less reliable than previously estimated. This result implies a requirement for a considerably larger number of inspections.

Alternatives to be Considered

Since there is clear agreement among informed scientists that significant modifications are necessary in that section of the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts which deals with underground tests, it is important to examine the possible modifications in U.S. policy which these changes in the estimated capabilities of the system will necessitate. The alternatives presented below are all based on the premises that the United States will continue to be firm in insisting on the necessity of proper controls of any test agreement and that we will continue to seek agreement with the Soviets on some form of test discontinuance or limitation.

Alternative No. 1—Discontinue all tests in the atmosphere. The AEC has stated this position in the following way:

"(1) to adhere rigidly to the principle that control of any test cessation agreement is essential and that only those tests which are detectable and identifiable are to be prohibited by treaty. Under no conditions shall the relaxation of the requirements of the control system antecede policy changes regarding the scope of the tests being suspended.

"(2) Negotiate as a first step, beginning at the appropriate time after the resumption of negotiations, a treaty for the cessation of atmospheric tests.

"(3) To postpone for later negotiation a treaty applying to underground and outer space tests after further investigation of the technical problems involved in their detection. The U.S. should be willing to discuss these problems to the extent desired by Russia during current negotiations.

"(4) To propose meanwhile international cooperation (with the Control Commission if established) in this investigation to the extent of conducting for the Commission necessary experiments and in making available to the Commission or other appropriate authority the results of national nuclear experiments whose results bear upon the detection and identification problems at issue.

"(5) To preserve the right to develop non-military applications of nuclear explosives."

This position would initially eliminate the problem of detecting underground tests (as well as tests at great distances from the earth) by permitting such tests. This would answer the worldwide concern about fallout hazard. However, unless subsequent phases were carried out, it would fail to accomplish the other objectives of a test suspension since

by itself it would probably, in the long run, have little effect on weapon development and would not require a control system that would have any significant impact on the Soviet Bloc.

Alternative No. 2—Modify “Geneva” System to Improve Capabilities.

It would be possible to modify the “Geneva” System in a manner which would substantially improve the capabilities of the system. This might be accomplished if one of more of the following steps were adopted:

1. Increase the number of seismographs at each control post in the Geneva System (e.g. An increase in seismographs from 10 to 100 might improve the signal to noise ratio for detection by a factor of 3).
2. Halve the seismic grid spacing by adding unmanned, seismic-only stations using the same number of seismographs as in the main control posts.
3. Augment the agreed-upon grid of manned control posts with a much closer spaced grid (e.g., 100–150 KM) of small, unmanned seismographs which would telemeter information.
4. Increase the number of inspections.
5. Develop other presently promising techniques to identify earthquakes and to discriminate between explosions and earthquakes.

A carefully-engineered modification of the present system, including some combination of the above concepts, could restore or even better the effectiveness of the system proposed at Geneva.

Alternative No. 3—More Effective Use of Inspection in “Geneva” System.

It would be possible to provide at least some level of deterrence down to 1 KT or below with the present “Geneva” system by a more effective use of onsite inspections. This might be accomplished by employing some variation of one or more of the following procedures:

- a) Establish a graduated, decreasing scale for the percentage of unidentified events which would be inspected on a random basis in different yield ranges (e.g., 100% over 20 KT; 25% 20–10 KT; 10% 10–5 KT; 2% 5–1 KT; 1/2% less than 1 KT.)
- b) Establish weighted inspection procedure focused on the nuclear powers and possibly their principal allies (e.g., in areas outside the nuclear powers and possibly their principal allies reduce the percentage of events inspected by a factor of 4 and undertake no inspections on a routine basis below 5 KT).
- c) Increase the number of inspections substantially over the number previously contemplated by simplifying the inspection procedure and only undertaking exhaustive examinations when an initial survey indicated the possibility of suspicious activity.

This position has the advantage of not requiring the reopening of any of the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts; however,

it clearly involves a greater risk that the Soviet Union might attempt clandestine tests than either Alternative No. 1 or No. 2. The extent to which such a system would in fact deter tests is a complex judgment which cannot be made on technical grounds alone.

Alternative No. 4—Permit Underground Testing Below a “Threshold”.

The present “Geneva” system as well as the modification of it suggested in Alternative No. 2 and No. 3 can clearly provide much more secure control of nuclear testing if underground tests are permitted below a “threshold” yield. This procedure would minimize the intangible factor of deterrence upon which a complete prohibition must ultimately rest. There is no unique “threshold” yield to associate with any of these systems. The level of the threshold might vary between 1 and 20 KT and would be set by the objects sought in negotiating an agreement and the amount of risk deemed “acceptable”. A 20 KT threshold would involve relatively little risk of violation but also would permit substantial weapon development and would provide little basis for inspection. A 5 KT threshold would involve greater risk of violation, assuming it was not subject to 100 percent inspection; however, it would permit less weapon development, probably would exclude “n”th power tests, and would provide the basis for extensive inspection. A 1 KT threshold would involve substantially greater risk since clearly only a small fraction of events in 1 to 5 KT range could be inspected; however, such a threshold would permit only limited weapon development in areas probably primarily of interest to U.S., would almost certainly exclude “n”th power tests, and would provide the basis for very extensive inspection.

Alternative No. 5—No Restrictions on Nuclear Tests.

A policy decision to avoid any agreement which would prohibit nuclear testing in any form would permit unrestricted weapon development and would accomplish none of the objectives of a test suspension. It would avoid the risk, considered substantial by some, that underground testing will in fact prove inadequate both for large yields and for diagnostic measurements at all yields.

Tab C

Letter From Vance to Herter

Washington, December 23, 1958

My dear Mr. Under Secretary:

The seismological results from the underground nuclear weapons tests conducted in Nevada during October show that the conclusions of

the Conference of Experts on the possibility of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions require re-examination.

In fact, early analysis of these data show that the detection capability of the system for underground explosions probably is much less than was thought to be the case last summer. Therefore, the United States position on controlled test cessation may require reshaping to fit the new facts and the consideration of this possibility is urgent since the treaty Articles and Annex I already tabled by the Western delegations may need serious revision.

Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission concludes that in the light of:

(1) the seriously limited capability of the control system proposed by the Conference of Experts based on present knowledge as applied to underground and very high altitude nuclear explosions;

(2) the adequacy of the Conference of Experts' proposals for control of atmospheric testing;

(3) the fact that radioactive fallout is caused principally by atmospheric tests—the only type readily controllable at this time;

it should propose to you that the revised U.S. position should be:

(1) to adhere rigidly to the principle that control of any test cessation agreement is essential and that only those tests which are detectable and identifiable are to be prohibited by treaty. Under no conditions shall the relaxation of the requirements of the control system antecede policy changes regarding the scope of the tests being suspended.

(2) Negotiate as a first step, beginning at the appropriate time after the resumption of negotiations, a treaty for the cessation of atmospheric tests.

(3) To postpone for later negotiation a treaty applying to underground and outer space tests after further investigation of the technical problems involved in their detection. The U.S. should be willing to discuss these problems to the extent desired by Russia during current negotiations.

(4) To propose meanwhile international cooperation (with the Control Commission if established) in this investigation to the extent of conducting for the Commission necessary experiments and in making available to the Commission or other appropriate authority the results of national nuclear experiments whose results bear upon the detection and identification problems at issue.

(5) To preserve the right to develop non-military applications of nuclear explosives.

Sincerely yours,

*/s/ H.S. Vance
Acting Chairman*

405. Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement¹

Washington, January 7, 1959

1. The Panel on Seismic Improvement (PSI), appointed by the Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee, met in Washington on January 6 and 7, 1959, to review measures whereby it "would be reasonably feasible within the present state of seismic technology to improve the capabilities of the system recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts to detect and to identify seismic events as either earthquakes or explosions without increasing the number of manned control posts in the system."

2. The capabilities of the Geneva system with regard to underground tests have recently been reevaluated by another Panel on the basis of new data from the underground tests at HARDTACK II. The PSI did not attempt to evaluate further the specific capability of the Geneva System. The proposals recommended herein would increase the estimated capabilities of the Geneva System. It is noted that the data on nuclear shots used in these estimates was from Rainier and HARDTACK II and thus has all the limitations of that small sample of nuclear test conditions. The PSI has not concerned itself with the possible seismic effects of nuclear tests under different conditions or the possibilities of concealment by decoupling or other techniques.

3. The Geneva System of seismic identification places principal reliance on the assessment of a single phenomenon, i.e. the direction of displacement of the first arrival of the P-wave in a specified network of seismic instruments. The PSI considered a variety of seismic phenomena and techniques which have been suggested to increase the capability of the Geneva System without adding manned control posts, including:

- (a) Evaluation of the first motion of the P-wave with aid of approximate inverse transfer functions.
- (b) Surface wave phenomena using long-period instruments.
- (c) Unmanned, auxiliary seismic stations.
- (d) Larger arrays of seismometers at manned control posts.
- (e) Improvements from increased knowledge of the transmission properties of the earth by experience in operation of the system.
- (f) After shocks as a diagnostic feature.
- (g) Radiation asymmetry at the source.
- (h) Use of computers in data analysis.
- (i) Use of higher frequency seismic signals.

¹ Source: Suggests improvements to detection systems. Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament.

- (j) Detectors on ocean bottom.
- (k) Detectors in deep hole.
- (l) Diagnostic possibilities of microseisms.
- (m) Focal depth of disturbances.

5. [4.] On the basis of its review of the above techniques, the PSI believes that the following four promising approaches are within the present limits of technology and should be considered:

(a) *Analysis of long-period surface waves.* The capability of the Geneva System for the identification as earthquakes of seismic events equivalent to 5 kilotons or larger by the analysis of long-period surface waves is conservatively estimated at 25% and may be much larger.

(b) *Network of unmanned auxiliary seismic stations.* A triangular network of such unmanned stations is suggested, spaced 170 km apart between the stations of the 1000 km grid proposed in Geneva for the seismic regions of the world. If this network were installed and effectively operated, it would very greatly increase the capability of the Geneva system for identifying as earthquakes those seismic events occurring in interior areas and corresponding in energy to underground tests equivalent to one kiloton or larger.

(c) *Larger arrays of seismometers at manned control posts.* It is reasonably certain that the replacement of 10 distributed seismometers per control post as recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts with arrays of approximately 100 distributed seismometers would increase the signal to noise ratio by a factor of from 1.5 to 2.5. This would substantially increase the capability of the system to identify small seismic events as natural earthquakes.

(d) *Detectors in deep holes.* A detection method which employs a seismometer in a hole at a depth of several thousand feet is being investigated at the present time. The method offers possibilities for improving the detectability of small signals by a factor of the order of ten, provided that the technological problems of operating instruments at the required depths can be solved. The results to date are incomplete but encouraging. If the factor of ten can in fact be achieved, it would drastically increase the capability of the system to identify small seismic events as natural earthquakes. More definitive results are expected by mid 1959.

The proposals (a), (b), and (c), above, are discussed more fully in the appendix attached.

6. The PSI invites attention to the fact that detection of aftershocks by specially and immediately implaced seismometers can be used by an inspection party as an aid in establishing that an unidentified seismic event was in fact a natural earthquake.

7. The PSI believes that seismic research has not in the past been supported as strongly as many other areas of science. Vigorous research

in seismology is certain to produce many improvements that cannot now be predicted. It is certain that this would lead to an improvement in detection capabilities. The PSI will shortly report its detailed recommendations concerning research in seismology.

8. The PSI urges that sample detection networks be established without delay as representative systems to disclose operational and design problems and provide a firmer basis for the assessment of detection capabilities.

9. The Geneva Conference of Experts recommended supplying new instruments to the existing world network of seismic stations. The PSI believes that this recommendation should be implemented within the next year even if it must be done unilaterally by the U.S.

Lloyd V. Berkner (*Chairman*)

Victor H. Benioff

Hans A. Bethe

John Gerrard

David T. Griggs

Jack H. Hamilton

Julius P. Molnar

Jack E. Oliver

Frank Press

Carl F. Romney

Kenneth Street, Jr.

John W. Tukey

Appendix

I. Analysis of Long-Period Surface Waves

Long-period seismograph data (periods greater than 5 seconds) available from HARDTACK II and natural earthquakes suggest additional criteria for the identification of seismic events as natural earthquakes. In the yield range 5KT–23 KT, stations at distances up to at least 3500 km can provide the necessary data, in the absence of microseismic storms. The capability of the Geneva System for the identification as earthquakes of seismic events equivalent to 5 kilotons or larger by the analysis of long period surface waves is conservatively estimated at 25% and may be much larger. Estimates of capabilities are based on observations with instruments not designed for this purpose. The use of specifically designed equipment should further improve the estimates of capabilities.

On the basis of present technology, it is concluded that the following techniques are available:

a) *Love-Rayleigh wave amplitude ratio.* A preliminary study of amplitude ratio of Love waves to Rayleigh waves for periods greater than about 10 sec. from earthquakes and underground explosions has been conducted at the Lamont Geological Observatory at Palisades, New York. The results indicate that in the equivalent magnitude range 5 KT–23 KT a single station at a distance of 3500 km or less can identify about 10% of seismic events as natural earthquakes. Data from stations in appreciable different azimuths are relatively independent and so increase the probability of identification significantly but not above some as yet undetermined limit.

b) *Spectra of surface waves recorded on long period, horizontal component seismographs.* Data from Palisades, Pasadena, and Berkley indicate a systematic difference in the long period spectra of earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. Although the effect is striking, it is not possible to quote the capability of this method at this time except to estimate that identification of earthquakes from a network of stations is no worse than 10% and the upper limit is open.

The possibility exists that further results can be obtained in the immediate future by additional studies of the amplitude ratio for Love-Rayleigh waves and its aximuthal dependence for earthquakes. This will provide additional data to verify the estimate of 10% identification of earthquakes and examine the possibility of increasing this figure.

II. *Network of Unmanned Auxiliary Seismic Stations*

Interpolation of unmanned automatic seismic stations into the grid of control posts of the Geneva plan gives promise of providing significantly greater information on weak seismic events, corresponding in intensity to one kiloton. A triangular network of such unmanned stations is suggested, spaced 170 km apart between the stations of the 1000 km grid proposed in Geneva for the seismic regions of the world. In such a network, a one kiloton shot coupled seismically to the same degree as Rainier, Logan, and Blanca would give 50 millimicron amplitudes or higher for first motion of P-waves at nine stations on the average. Thus data from single vertical-component seismometers disposed in such a network would suffice to detect first motion with reasonable certainty.

The practical problems of installing such a network may be estimated by noting that the spacings mentioned above imply having 35 auxiliary stations per main station and that the maximum communication distance between a main and auxiliary station is 600 km. Each auxiliary station would require a seismometer, a recording device (for providing a permanent record), a clock, a radio transmitter, a source of electric power, and probably a data storage device which will permit compressed data transmission as required. The cost of the technical

apparatus needed for a single station, when manufactured in large quantities, might be ten to thirty thousand dollars. Access roads (or helicopter pads), installation and related costs may run the total costs up considerably higher, depending on local conditions. Periodic maintenance and record retrieval would probably be required at 30 to 60 day intervals.

The need for this network of auxiliary stations is clearly greatest in the areas of the world where earthquakes occur with high frequency. It might be acceptable to limit application of the network only to these areas, possibly 20% of the land surface of the world. Also one could tailor power and communication arrangements (possibly using wire lines in some places) according to the local facilities available.

If this network could be installed and effectively operated, it would very greatly increase the capability of the Geneva System for identifying those seismic events which are earthquakes, occurring in interior areas and corresponding in intensity to underground one kiloton or larger shots. The practical difficulties of installation, maintenance, and operation of the system, especially in remote areas, should not, however, be underestimated, and the possibilities for occasional spoofing must be recognized.

III. Larger Arrays of Seismometers at Manned Control Posts.

On the basis of present knowledge, replacing 10 distributed seismometers in a 3 km \times 3 km square as recommended for each control post in the Geneva System by 100 distributed seismometers in the same square would affect the signal to noise ratio at frequencies near 1 cycle per second as follows using specifiable techniques:

(1) It is reasonably certain that an improvement at most stations by a factor of between 1.5 to 2.5 will be obtained;

(2) There is reason to hope for improvements in the range from 2.0 to 2.5;

(3) Increases from 10 to 10k stations should provide improvement by a factor from $k^{0.2}$ to $k^{0.4}$ for $k = 10$.

(4) Data which can be obtained within one month will provide a much firmer estimate of what may be expected. The data to be obtained include, most importantly, data on coherence of noise at station separations of 150 to 1500 feet, and secondarily, data on dependence of typical noise levels on wind velocity.

(5) When more is known about noise characteristics, it may well be possible to gain further improvement by applying other analytical techniques to a 100 seismometer array.

406. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Wadsworth and Herter¹

January 9, 1959, 1:55 p.m.

Ambassador Wadsworth telephoned from Geneva, saying his call was in the nature of an S.O.S.—not a panicky one but a considered one. The situation there is now one where the other people came back to focus on duration. The Ambassador has been stalling on duration and in so doing has been piling up unnecessary suspicions at a time when we should be showing movement. He emphasized the fact that they really needed help.

I said we tried to get it settled this week. The President just finished his State of the Union Message. An appointment has been set for 9:00 a.m. Monday morning and we would shoot word to him immediately after. The Ambassador did not think there was any question as to what the answer will be, and I said I didn't think so either. I said we were having a session with the Secretary and Mr. McCone this afternoon and that I thought McCone wanted to discuss the fall-back position which he felt we are likely to be coming to. Ambassador Wadsworth felt it was important to work out something on that basis for possible later use. However, he said they have to have something that will show some movement to hold them another week or so. He added that he knew how things work but that he was really yelling for help; he would appreciate it if I would pass his request on to the people who have to make the final decisions; and that the whole point is we have to strengthen our own situation. I said we could get something to him by telephone on Monday and Wadsworth thought this was a wonderful idea.

I asked how things were otherwise and Wadsworth said that today's session was mild and short. I said I understood that the Killian group had come up with 3 or 4 ways on what we want accomplished without increasing the number of posts too much. It is mostly scientific data. Wadsworth said that would re-establish us as bona fide. They have so much suspicion. I added that it follows pretty much their line that science will show the way, and Wadsworth thought there was something in that.

Wadsworth ended by saying that he just wanted to convey the sense of urgency there; that they can stall but it just does not look good on the record. I said we would do our best.

Christian A. Herter

¹Source: Need for decisions on U.S. position in cessation of nuclear testing talks. No classification marking. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 110.12-HE/1-959.

407. Letter From Eisenhower to Macmillan¹

Washington, January 12, 1959

Dear Harold:

I have now had an opportunity to think about your letter on our position in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations and to discuss it with some of my advisors.

We have considered the course of the negotiations to date as well as the points you set forth and we are prepared to drop our insistence that any agreement we may reach with the Russians have in it an explicit requirement that cessation of nuclear tests depend on disarmament progress. I agree with you that to a certain extent this link is an academic one since, as you point out, the central issue is whether we now have an opportunity to get the Russians to accept a real control system. Certainly, if the Russians were to accept the kind of controls which we both believe are necessary, this very fact would mean that one of the principal bars to future progress in disarmament would have been removed. This is a point we might well make in explaining our attitude on this question.

Although, on the basis of the progress to date, it seems to me that the prospects are not bright that the Russians will accept an effective control organization in the current negotiations, I agree that our public position would be much better if we remove as a point of contention the issue of the link to disarmament, which the Russians may use as a screen to evade accepting responsibility for failure in the negotiations or to evade facing up to the control problem.

I believe that we can propose in the negotiations that we accept as a principle that the ban on weapons tests would be indefinite in duration. The arrangement, we believe, should include schedules for the construction and operation of the control system. Withdrawal from or suspension of the treaty would be possible if on annual review it were found that the control system was not being installed on schedule or not being operated properly. If desirable, we will agree to the first annual review being held two years after the treaty enters into force; thereafter, the review automatically would be on an annual basis.

Obstruction or violation of the agreement itself would, of course, be cause for withdrawal.

¹Source: Agrees to drop linkage of cessation of nuclear testing to progress on disarmament. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan.

I believe that it would be unwise to give this change in position any undue publicity by making it the subject of a public announcement at this time. However, I believe that we should in the negotiations exploit our flexibility on this question every way possible to put pressure on the other side to make concessions.

I have requested Foster to discuss with your people how best to put forward this position in the negotiations.

As ever,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

408. Memorandum From Gray to Eisenhower¹

Washington, January 13, 1959

SUBJECT

Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Testing

The attached memorandum summarizes the views of the Executive Departments and Agencies as to Senator Albert Gore's proposal for a position which the United States might take in the event it appeared that the negotiations were on the verge of a breakdown. However, consideration has also been given to the proposal as one of substance which might be made in the current negotiations.

In summary, Senator Gore suggested an approach to consist of a Presidential announcement of (a) "unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere" for perhaps three years, (b) a call for similar action by other nuclear powers, and (c) a suggestion that the Geneva Conference concentrate on the negotiation of a limited treaty for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.

You will recall that when Senator Gore made his proposal to you orally, you assured him that his suggestion would be given most careful evaluation by the appropriate Government officials. This has been done. The task, however, has been complicated by the fact that the negotiating position of the United States is being continually affected by day-to-day developments in the Russian negotiating position at the Geneva Conference. Even now, it is *not* clear, as Senator Gore believed at the time he

¹ Source: Advises against Gore proposal on nuclear testing at this time. Confidential. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

spoke with you, that the U.S. Delegation seems to be negotiating toward an unattainable goal, and that therefore the U.S. must face the prospect of failure to obtain our present objectives at the Conference. This seems to me to be especially true in the light of your decision to break the link with other disarmament measures, an action which seemed vital by our delegation to continued successful negotiation.

The officials who advise you with regard to the Geneva Conference agree that the United States should not now advance the Gore proposal. All agree, however, that the Gore suggestion should be considered as one of the alternatives if the time comes when developments in Geneva necessitate consideration of a change in the existing U.S. position summarized in your statement of August 22.

It would be my hope that if you feel it necessary to reply further to Senator Gore, the reply could be handled in such a way as to discourage discussion by public officials of alternatives to our present position at Geneva, at least until the Russian negotiators have made clearer the position which they will take on the proposals we have advanced at the Conference. Senator Gore is being kept currently informed by State Department officials of discussions within the U.S. Government with respect to our Geneva position. He could be assured by you that at such time as it appears to the responsible officials that the Russians are not prepared to agree to a treaty acceptable to us, his suggestion would be considered, along with others, in deciding future U.S. policy toward nuclear testing.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Attachment

EVALUATION OF TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL BY SENATOR GORE²

1. The Gore Proposal as a U.S. Position to Take in Geneva Now

a. The U.S. should not advance the Gore proposal at this time because:

(1) It would give the USSR an excuse to escape from revealing its true position on acceptance of international controls on testing.

² The views contained in the first two numbered paragraphs of this memorandum are those of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The views of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission are summarized in the final paragraph. [Footnote is in the original.]

(2) It would almost certainly lead to a break in negotiations, thereby destroying such chance as there is of obtaining acceptable international inspection within the USSR. It would permit the USSR to charge the United States with a desire to evade a test suspension and of walking away from stated basic positions in mid-negotiations.

2. The Gore Proposal as a Fallback Position

a. If the present Geneva negotiations break down, the United States may desire to announce a policy of moderation in future testing. Such self-imposed moderation may be prudent because, even if the blame for the break in negotiation lies with the Soviet Union, increased pressure of public opinion for a cessation of tests can be expected to be directed against the U.S. and the USSR. Unilateral U.S. action *limiting* tests would cut the ground under proposals to cease *all* nuclear weapons tests.

b. Further study must be given to the proper course of action. The Gore proposal contains elements which may be useful in developing a fallback position in the event that current negotiations fail.

3. The Position of the AEC on the Gore Proposal

The Atomic Energy Commission agrees with the substance of the arguments made above. However, the Commission believes that the United States should seek as an immediate, practical and enforceable objective, a multilateral controlled ban on atmospheric tests. The Commission opposes a unilateral declaration by the United States to cease all but atmospheric tests. It prefers that a cessation of atmospheric tests come as the result of a multilateral treaty which provides for agreed inspection procedures adequate to insure that the agreement will be observed by all parties.

409. Telegram Nusup 157 to Geneva for Wadsworth¹

Washington, January 16, 1959, 7:21 p.m.

For Wadsworth. In afternoon talk with Mikoyan the Secretary raised matter Geneva talks on cessation nuclear tests. He reiterated US desire achieve agreement. He expressed understanding Mikoyan's misgiving over introduction new data on detection underground tests.

¹Source: Account of Dulles' conversation with Mikoyan on cessation of nuclear testing. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1659.

Secretary also said US could understand Soviet attitude on voting and thought presentation as offered by Soviet delegation of list items they believed should be subject unanimity might well assist resolution this problem but similarly hoped Soviets understood our inability accept any arrangement which would frustrate effective operation control system. He expressed hope Soviets would continue talks and in process find proof their misgivings unfounded. Mikoyan indicated entirely willing continue and commented that agreement if reached on this subject should prove stepping stone to further agreements.

Dulles

410. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, January 16, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Chairman McCone
General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said that Sir Edwin Plowden, who had been his host in the United Kingdom in November, is coming to the United States about 1 March for two or three days to visit atomic installations. He asked if the President would be agreeable to attending a luncheon or dinner for him. The President said he would prefer to have a stag luncheon, suggesting the date of March 2, with the British Ambassador also present.

Mr. McCone next reported to the President that the British wished to buy a substantial quantity of refined atomic materials. Defense, State and the Commission agree on the desirability of supplying them. The materials amount to some fourteen tons of plutonium, and in the longer range a contract for a supply of U-235 for the next 10–12 years (thus avoiding British necessity to build a gaseous diffusion plant) with initial acquisitions from us of the order of about fourteen tons. The British would like to pay for the plutonium (to be available in the near future) in cash, and to pay for the U-235 over a longer period with plutonium. The President asked what ratio would be used in

¹Source: U.S.–U.K. nuclear cooperation, Department of Defense plutonium requirements, domestic nuclear power, thermocouples to power satellites, sales of U-235 to IAEA. No classification marking. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

accepting plutonium for our U-235. Mr. McCone said we are proposing a ratio of 1 to 1, and the British are proposing a ratio of 2½ to 1; he thought we could, and should, settle out for a ratio of 2 to 1. The President asked if this appeared to be a good trade from the standpoint of availability of the two products, and Mr. McCone said it is very definitely so, inasmuch as our needs for plutonium are rising, with small weapons. He added that State and Defense agree on this. The President said the proposition looked generally satisfactory to him. Mr. McCone added that there had been some talk by the British regarding obtaining weapons; this would have involved the need to seek a change in our law, which is better avoided, since problems would then arise with the French and Italians.

Mr. McCone said that, the President having approved this action, he would take it up with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The President raised the question whether the Executive Branch is becoming too subservient to that Committee. Mr. McCone said that so far the relationship is satisfactory. He assured the President that he is not going to let them invade Executive prerogatives and asked the President to have confidence in him that he will not let the Joint Committee push him around. The President indicated agreement on this basis.

Mr. McCone said he would then pursue the matter of exchange with the British. The President asked that, in writing up the agreement, Mr. McCone make sure that State, Defense, Budget and the Attorney General are in concurrence. Mr. McCone said this would be done inasmuch as a change in the bilateral agreement would be necessary.

Mr. McCone next raised the matter of the new production reactor at Hanford; since his last talk with the President Defense has submitted ten-year requirements for atomic weapons. To meet the need it first seemed there would be necessity to build two new reactors in addition to the receipts from the United Kingdom. However, by raising the power level at Hanford, the need will be reduced to one reactor. The President stated strongly that he would not accept these requirements as the basis for any actions until he had seen them. Mr. McCone said that the requirements as submitted by Secretary Quarles, on the scale of 100, corresponded to a figure of 110 recommended by General Twining and between 125 and 200 recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President said that the requirements are not authoritative until he had approved them. He challenged the Defense thinking, saying they are trying to get themselves into an incredible position—of having enough to destroy every conceivable target all over the world, plus a three-fold reserve. The patterns of target destruction are fantastic. So many ground bursts are included as to bring certain damage to the United States. He recalled that the determination for many years was that there

were only seventy targets, the destruction of which would bring the Soviet Union to defeat.

Mr. McCone pointed out that we have the authority and the funds for this new reactor as a result of last year's legislative action. The President asked if plutonium is useful for fueling power reactors. Mr. McCone indicated it had a certain usefulness but could not replace U-235. The President said he is more worried about the unrealistic attitude of our top military men than the specific proposal he was considering, and Mr. McCone acknowledged that they talk about megaton explosions as though they are almost nothing. The President asked whether, with more efficient weapons, the trend is toward using less plutonium. Mr. McCone said this trend is offset by the trend towards small and clean weapons which take more plutonium. Finally, the President said he supposed that we have to go ahead with the construction of the reactor. Mr. McCone pointed out that he has not funded the convertible feature; he is trying to get that out of the proposal. He had had this studied by Stone and Webster, and they had recommended against it. The President said he is against the convertible feature. By the time we were ready to make use of that, he was confident that our technology would be advanced so far that we would no longer want to use this particular model. He asked Mr. McCone to try to get this provision out.

Mr. McCone then turned to the subject of power reactors. Four or five big ones are now being built. The electricity being produced by them will run 12–18 mills per kilowatt hours, in cost. In Mr. McCone's view, best progress will be found through testing out a lot of technology in prototypes; he doesn't want to build big plants, but would like to build four or five small ones to prove out and advance the art. At the present time the Government gives R & D assistance and waives fuel costs. The prototypes should be on existing power lines and should be built by power companies. He proposed that we give them some assistance on capital costs on a few prototypes but that we not help on large plants. For our own economy, with but few exceptions, we do not need atomic energy power in the foreseeable future. But to keep the United States in the race industrially and internationally we do need to carry out development, and this would be a good program for the purpose. The President asked what kind of money would be involved. Mr. McCone said he did not know precisely. He is trying to work this out. A prototype producing 50,000 kilowatts, costing about \$8 million, seemed to be in the order of magnitude. He said he was talking only in a preliminary way at this time, but that he had received an excellent report, in which Mr. James Black as well as others had participated. The President said he was a little disturbed over the suggestion, since it seemed to be another venture in the direction of public power, and was fearful that Congress would want to put these power plants into the

TVA and Bonneville systems. Mr. McCone thought that by having this program with the President's support it would be possible to head off this tendency. He said he had talked to Mr. Stans about the matter, and that Mr. Stans had no objection.

Mr. McCone next recalled that the President had pushed the IAEA from the outset, and had offered them 5,000 kg. of U-235. A price had never been set; however, the law provides that it cannot be less than the domestic price. The Soviets, who have made no offer of their own, have been doing a great deal of criticizing on the grounds that we are seeking to make a profit. Mr. Cole wants the price to be no more than the domestic price. Mr. McCone recommended that the matter be settled by fixing the price at the domestic price, which meets the law and also meets Mr. Cole's suggestion. The President said he saw nothing wrong with that.

Mr. McCone next told the President he wanted to demonstrate to him a technical breakthrough in the production of power from atomic sources. At this point he had General Keirn, Colonel Armstrong and Colonel Anderson set up a device for the generation of electricity, by means of thermocouples, from heat provided by an alpha-emitting radioactive isotope (of polonium, although cerium is planned for future models). This device, weighing five pounds, was operating at the level of five watts of power. The output would drop to one-half of this figure in 138 days for a polonium source and approximately 280 days for cerium, these periods being the "half life" of these radioactive elements. While the production of the current model cost \$15,000 for the device, plus approximately \$30,000 for the polonium, the future practical models are expected to decline in cost to approximately \$200 for the device and \$600 for the cerium power source; weight can be reduced from five pounds to approximately three pounds.

The immediate application of this device is as a power source in a satellite. The best possible batteries to provide a similar amount of power over a similar period would weigh 300 times as much as this device. However, one of the most striking features is that these thermocouples, employing different "doped" telluride compounds, have attained an efficiency of 8-10% in converting heat to electric energy with no moving parts. Any other heat source could also be used and small atomic reactors, as little as six inches on a side, are being developed as power sources for future applications.

The President was extremely interested in all of this. After thorough discussion of the matter, photographs were taken, and at the President's request Mr. Hagerty arranged for General Keirn and his associates to meet with the press and explain the device to them.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

411. Letter From Herter to Killian¹

Washington, January 16, 1959

Dear Jim:

The first Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, transmitted with your memorandum of January 12, is most encouraging. We wish to endorse their continued study of this problem.

It is most important that there be prepared as soon as possible a version of the report suitable for transmission to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva and to the American public. As you know, the Soviets are very suspicious of our motives in tabling the seismic data from Hardtack II. Moreover, world public opinion has tended to view this move by the U.S. as an indication that we are anxious to forestall the successful conclusion of an agreement on nuclear testing. By giving the Soviet delegation these preliminary findings we may be able in some measure to convince them of the sincerity of our concern about the problem of underground detection and of our positive efforts to find solutions.

I understand that the four approaches suggested by the panel are under further study and that the evaluation of their effectiveness expressed in the report is tentative. Pending the results of this study it would be most useful for our tactical planning to have a quantitative analysis of the effect of these four approaches on the capabilities of the Geneva system, as suggested in your memorandum. We therefore urge that AFOAT-1 be requested to undertake such an analysis. It is further urged that any possible research on the applicability of these four techniques be carried out by the appropriate agencies as rapidly as is feasible.

I am aware of the serious concern expressed by many scientists, and reflected in the Panel Report, that the data available from Rainier and Hardtack II constitute a severely limited sample of possible nuclear test conditions. Serious consideration should therefore be given to carrying out further underground explosions, both HE and nuclear, for the purpose of improving our knowledge in this field. Our estimate is that such a program aimed at providing a sounder basis for the detection system to be agreed upon by our negotiators in Geneva would probably be acceptable to international public opinion if we offered to carry it out jointly with the USSR and under international observation. Any

¹ Source: Urges version of seismic improvement report be prepared to present to the Soviet Union, further testing be conducted. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Nuclear Test Suspension, Seismic Data.

Soviet objection that such a proposed program was merely a means for furthering our own weapons development program could be countered by proposing that they supply the nuclear devices for use in underground detonations. Furthermore, I believe the necessity for such a program is sufficiently important that, if the Soviet Union will not agree to participate, the United States should be prepared to proceed alone.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

Chris
Under Secretary

412. Letter From McCone to Herter¹

Washington, January 19, 1959

My dear Chris:

I have been thinking a great deal of our talk at the OCB luncheon Wednesday and I am writing you this personal letter so that you will understand my very deep concern over the trend of the Geneva negotiations.

There seems to be complete agreement within scientific circles in this country that the detection system proposed by the technical experts in Geneva is inadequate. However, there is a difference of opinion among reputable and informed scientists as to whether the system can be improved sufficiently by additional, better, and different types of stations and instrumentation so that it can, with assurance, detect and identify nuclear explosions of the proportions indicated in the Geneva technical report. Dr. Teller made a persuasive argument in his testimony before the Joint Committee that the present system can not reliably identify explosions of appreciable size, perhaps not even those as high as 100 kilotons. Furthermore, he explained how nuclear underground explosions could be camouflaged, so that even the 100 kiloton threshold is subject to question.

¹Source: Urges change in negotiating objectives until more reliable detection system developed. Personal. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Khrushchev Exchange.

You may recall that Dr. Teller has from the beginning warned of the difficulty of identifying underground nuclear explosions.

The improvements suggested by the Committee recently appointed by Dr. Killian unquestionably will improve the capability of the system, but many of these proposed improvements are theoretical and untried. However, the proposed array of unmanned stations to be scattered throughout the world would require periodic and frequent maintenance. Unless this is done by international maintenance teams, the stations could be readily tampered with so that they would be of questionable value.

Another very important point which must always be borne in mind is the fact that the Nevada tests, including HARDTACK II, are not conclusive because they were conducted in only one area and in one geological formation. No one knows what would happen in the way of seismic disturbances, for example, if shots were made in granite formation.

I feel that the statements made by competent scientists concerning the inadequacy of the proposed detection system have been and will continue to be accepted as valid by many people within the Government, by responsible members of the House and Senate on both sides of the aisle and by a large segment of the American people.

From evidence now submitted I seriously question that the technology of the detection of underground shots is sufficiently advanced for us to enter, at this time, into arrangements with the Soviets barring such explosions. The keystone of such an arrangement must be strong assurance through effective detection, identification and inspection, that all parties to the agreement will live up to its terms, and this criteria cannot be met unless a very high threshold is agreed upon.

This brings me to the second point; namely, the dangers of proceeding much further with our negotiations on the present basis.

I am deeply sympathetic with your expressed desire that we must determine, by pursuing these negotiations, whether the Soviets will accept an inspection system within their own territory which might lead to further penetration of the Iron Curtain. I agree with you that this is an important point.

I further agree with you that a breakdown of negotiations over the issue of adequate inspection would cause criticism of the Soviets by much of the world. I think the Soviets realize this, and I do not think they will let the negotiations break down on this point.

On the other hand, the Soviets may go the limit to accept inspection stations, possibly even to the point of finding some way around the veto issue. Mikoyan indicated as much to Stassen. In going this route, however, they would insist on the inadequate detection system agreed

to last summer in Geneva. By unexpectedly accepting such a system, the Soviets could place us in the position of either going along with a dangerous agreement or backing away for reasons extremely difficult, if not impossible, to explain to the world.

Our position would then be most awkward. Strong voices would argue convincingly that the system is inadequate and that the criteria of "fool-proof inspection" has not been met. I conclude from the testimony last week on the Hill that almost any agreed threshold would be questioned by the Congress. Certainly, the validity of a 20 kiloton threshold would be vigorously attacked by some very knowledgeable and respected people. I fear, also, that the American public would in time feel they had been misled by our Government.

I therefore feel, Chris, that we are moving along a very dangerous course in this negotiation. While I do not wish to inject myself into "quarter-backing" the negotiation, I urge in all sincerity that you find a way at this time to alter the course of the negotiations along the lines expressed in our letter to you of December 23, 1958.

To summarize our position, we propose taking the initiative at Geneva with a positive two-phase program. First, we would urge an agreement with the nuclear powers to suspend atmospheric tests and to establish an adequate detection system to insure compliance. Such a system would be relatively simple and inexpensive, and would be dependable because of our very extensive experience over a period of years with this type of detection. Moreover, this step would eliminate the fallout issue.

Second, conduct more underground tests as quickly as possible and in diverse geographical and geological environments to seek solid information on identification and detection of underground nuclear explosions. From this information we could determine whether a system could be designed in which we would have sufficient confidence to negotiate for a complete test cessation.

This program of experimentation could be a joint effort by the parties to the treaty, or could be done by the parties individually with international inspection and with all data developed being shared among the participating nations.

Sincerely yours,

John A. McCone

413. Letter From Herter to Killian¹

Washington, January 23, 1959

Dear Jim:

As you know the draft technical annex tabled by our delegation in Geneva on 16 December left open the question of what techniques would be included for the detection of high altitude explosions. Our delegation suggested to the Russians that a technical working group consider the problem of high altitude detection in view of the fact that the conference of experts last summer did not recommend any specific techniques for inclusion in the control system. Our delegation has asked for instructions on how this problem should be handled in the negotiations.

It appears to us that there are two possible approaches to this problem:

1. We could press for inclusion now of specific provisions for detecting high altitude explosions based on such knowledge as we have at present. Responsibility for recommended changes or improvements in the system could be vested in the control commission in the light of further information and experience.

2. We could omit any specific high altitude detection system from the treaty but give the control commission responsibility for developing such a system within a given period of time. In this event the right of withdrawal would have to be protected if the commission were unable to agree on an appropriate high altitude detection system.

The Department of Defense has advised us that they do not favor incorporating provisions for high altitude detection at the present time, and thus apparently would prefer the second alternative. The Soviet delegation in Geneva has generally taken the position that the control commission should bear responsibility for the development of changes in or additions to the system and that for the present we should proceed on the basis of the Experts' report. In order to prepare for a governmental decision on which course to take I would like to request that you convene a suitable panel of experts to consider this question in the light of the relevant technical factors. I believe it would be useful if such a group, in the course of their considerations, could look into the feasibility of conducting usefully instrumented outer space nuclear tests, both on the part of the Soviet Union and ourselves, within the next two four-year periods, the firmness of the information presently available on which to base a high altitude detection system, and the possible implications for

¹Source: Proposes panel of experts to examine detection of high altitude tests. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2359.

United States security of a decision to omit specific provisions for high altitude detection from a nuclear test ban agreement for an initial period.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

/S/ **Christian A. Herter**
Under Secretary

414. Note From Smith to Gray¹

Washington, January 26, 1959

MR. GRAY

Attached are the pertinent papers and a briefing memorandum covering them for use at the meeting of the principals Monday, January 26, at 2 p.m., in Mr. Herter's office.

It is my understanding that the State Department will not have a paper to discuss, but will use Mr. Herter's reply to Mr. Killian as the basis of its discussion of how to handle the Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement.

Bromley

Attachment

Memorandum From Smith to Gray

Washington, January 26, 1959

Summarized below are the views of those agencies which have commented on the Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement:

1. State (Mr. Herter)

a. Publish substance of the Report as soon as possible.

b. Also inform Soviets in Geneva in order to overcome suspicion aroused by presentation of seismic data from Hardtack II.

¹ Source: Transmits papers for meeting on seismic improvement. Confidential. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

c. Ask AFOAT–1 to make an quantitative analysis of the effect on the capabilities of the Geneva System if the suggested improvements listed in the Report were implemented.

d. Conduct underground explosions, jointly with the Russians or, unilaterally, if they refuse, to learn more about detection of underground expositions.

2. *Defense (Mr. McElroy)*

a. Accept a treaty covering cessation of only such underground tests identifiable by the Geneva System (20KT) without requiring an unworkable number of on-site investigations.

b. Suspension threshold could be lowered (1) if the USSR accepts in a treaty a detection system better than the Geneva System and (2) when improvements in the system resulting from a vigorous development program are installed and operating.

3. *AEC (Mr. McCone)*

a. Geneva System is inadequate.

b. Scientists differ as to effect of Panel's suggested improvements. Further experimentation required to establish the facts.

c. Unless threshold is very high, no system can be relied upon to detect underground tests of a specific yield.

d. U.S. should propose to the Russians now a treaty limited to a suspension of atmospheric tests and a detection system covering such tests.

e. Underground tests should be conducted to obtain information needed to develop a detection system in which all could have confidence.

4. *USIA (Mr. George Allen)*

a. Do not publish Report now because of possibility of confusing the public.

b. There is insufficient scientific basis for negotiating a cessation of underground tests.

c. Propose to the Russians now a cessation of only above-ground tests. When research is more complete, proceed with system to enforce cessation of all tests.

Attached is a summary of a speech made by Senator Humphrey in the Senate on January 20 (pgs. 5–6 of State Department Summary).

Bromley Smith

Attachment

Memorandum From Killian to Multiple Recipients

Washington, January 19, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable Christian A. Herter
The Honorable Donald A. Quarles
The Honorable John A. McCone
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
The Honorable Gordon Gray
The Honorable George Allen

I am forwarding for your information the attached comments on the first report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, dated 7 January 1959. As you know, the comments were prepared in response to a request in my letter dated 12 January 1959 transmitting copies of the Panel report. I believe that these comments, together with those I received from you, will provide a useful basis for any future discussion we may have on this report.

Since the report in question must be considered as privileged information, I would suggest that the attached comments be handled on a limited distribution basis.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

Attachment

Letter From Herter to Killian

Washington, January 16, 1959

Dear Jim:

The first Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, transmitted with your memorandum of January 12, is most encouraging. We wish to endorse their continued study of this problem.

It is most important that there be prepared as soon as possible a version of the report suitable for transmission to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva and to the American public. As you know, the Soviets are very suspicious of our motives in tabling the seismic data from Hardtack II. Moreover, world public opinion has tended to view this move by the U.S. as an indication that we are anxious to forestall the successful conclusion of an agreement on nuclear testing. By giving the Soviet delegation these preliminary findings we may be able in

some measure to convince them of the sincerity of our concern about the problem of underground detection and of our positive efforts to find solutions.

I understand that the four approaches suggested by the panel are under further study and that the evaluation of their effectiveness expressed in the report is tentative. Pending the results of this study it would be most useful for our tactical planning to have a quantitative analysis of the effect of these four approaches on the capabilities of the Geneva system, as suggested in your memorandum. We therefore urge that AFOAT–1 be requested to undertake such an analysis. It is further urged that any possible research on the applicability of these four techniques be carried out by the appropriate agencies as rapidly as is feasible.

I am aware of the serious concern expressed by many scientists, and reflected in the Panel Report, that the data available from Rainier and Hardtack II constitute a severely limited sample of possible nuclear test conditions. Serious consideration should therefore be given to carrying out further underground explosions, both HE and nuclear, for the purpose of improving our knowledge in this field. Our estimate is that such a program aimed at providing a sounder basis for the detection system to be agreed upon by our negotiators in Geneva would probably be acceptable to international public opinion if we offered to carry it out jointly with the USSR and under international observation. Any Soviet objection that such a proposed program was merely a means for furthering our own weapons development program could be countered by proposing that they supply the nuclear devices for use in underground detonations. Furthermore, I believe the necessity for such a program is sufficiently important that, if the Soviet Union will not agree to participate, the United States should be prepared to proceed alone.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

Chris
Under Secretary

Attachment

Memorandum From McElroy to Killian

Washington, January 16, 1959

SUBJECT

First Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement

In Secretary Quarles' absence I am replying to your memorandum on the above subject addressed to him on January 12, 1959, in which

you requested his comments on the subject of the report. Inasmuch as the report is strictly technical in nature, prepared by recognized experts in the field, I feel it would be somewhat presumptuous on my part to comment on the technical feasibility of the several measures suggested for improving the capabilities of the Geneva System. I agree that an appropriate next step would be the preparation of a quantitative analysis of the effect of these measures and am prepared to have AFOAT-1 make such an analysis if you so desire.

I believe it worthwhile to note that the estimated effectiveness of the several improvements proposed by the panel is based largely on theoretical considerations and may be subject at this to the same faults as the initial estimates of capabilities of the Geneva system. I am concerned as to the possibility that under the pressures generated by the present Geneva negotiations we may be induced to make commitments or to place unjustified reliance on prospective improvements based on inadequate data. Even if the improvements are subsequently determined to be effective to the degree they may now be estimated, they may be found politically or economically impractical to apply. Thus, it seems most important to me that the United States must not accept an inadequate system on the assumption, that future improvements will make it adequate.

It is quite certain that vigorous research in seismology will produce important improvements; however, I believe it would be very unwise to postulate any specific degree of improvement either in time or as to quality as a basis for committing ourselves to an expanded system calling for a definite level of detection and identification. For that reason it is my view that the following principles which have been previously supported by the Department of Defense should govern our negotiations as regards the suspension of underground tests:

(a) The treaty should provide only for the cessation of such underground tests as we believe to be identifiable by the Geneva System (on the order of 20 KT) without requiring an unreasonable or unworkable number of on-site investigations. Obviously, if the USSR can be induced to accept a better system as an element of the treaty, the threshold would be lowered to accord with our best estimate of the system's capabilities.

(b) The Control Commission should be charged with the conduct of a vigorous development program to improve the system and the suspension threshold should be progressively lowered as the improvements are installed and in operation.

Neil H. McElroy

415. Telegram Supnu 230 From Geneva¹

Geneva, January 27, 1959, 1 p.m.

Supnu 230. Ref Nusup 174. For Herter (S) from Wadsworth.

I fully agree we must concentrate on control issues. I believe our public position on these is excellent. The Brit yesterday took lead in putting forward our ideas on staffing a control organization in a way which showed clearly how effectively this could work in contrast to the Sov position of self-inspection. The Sov delegate was obviously at a loss and floundered for reply. We have started to build our case on workable inspections and should have no trouble in exposing the absurdities of the present Sov position. On the veto also I think we are in a strong spot and can at the proper time further strengthen our position by suggestions of a composition of the control commission which would give some voice to "non-committed" countries.

I am honestly not able to reach a firm conclusion on whether the Soviets will eventually accept the right kind of control organization. Their statements and tactics, particularly since the recess, seem to point the other way, but I am still clinging to the idea that for some reason they want a treaty, perhaps even on respectable terms, and that they may possibly come around to it if our public position is kept strong. Their post-recess tactics may in fact be for any of three purposes: to prepare for a break; to try to bring pressure on West to compromise in order "to save conference"; or to build up to a major "concession" their part.

As far as keeping propaganda advantage goes, and this is essential whether there is eventually to be a treaty or a break, the only hazards I see are the questions of duration and of threshold. The threshold problem need not come up soon, and in any case is not raised by the remainder of our draft treaty. So I will give you my thoughts on this question later. The duration problem is immediate. We have been helped enormously by our dropping of the disarmament link. We can now say quite rightly that duration only hinges on controls. But we still have the weak points, as far as public position goes, of the year-by-year basis and the unilateral right of withdrawal. The Sov line in and outside of the meetings has been to attack these points, particularly the year-by-year, and to demand that we make it clear whether we hold to these positions by tabling a duration article. They have

¹ Source: Urges tabling proposed duration clause of draft nuclear testing cessation treaty. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2759.

worked to show that delay on our part in tabling an article is a stall and is evidence, together with our introduction of the new data, of our desire to frustrate agreement. They might even have some real suspicion that this is the case.

There are two alternative courses. We can table our presently authorized duration article, along with the other draft articles of our treaty, and get away from the accusations and suspicions of stalling by accepting whatever disadvantages there may be in repeating once again our present position on year-by-year unilateral withdrawal. The other articles give the Soviets no particular issue since the line they have taken on peaceful uses removes this as a major point of argument. Or we can hold up tabling and continue to follow the line which we have been taking for the past three weeks that control issues should be discussed before the question of duration. I believe that it will be easier to keep the focus on controls if we table the article. There is an immediate link back to controls since Tsarapkin has promised the list of items on which the Soviets will want unanimity in the Control Commission (that is, veto) as soon as we table a duration article. And tabling of the article does not rob us of any of the arguments we have been using that the control org should in any case be discussed first. These arguments would be harder to use effectively if we do not table and are open to daily charges of stalling and of obstruction. Too much delay may well cause Tsarapkin to refuse to talk controls.

I have never asked for a change in the duration article which would base the right of withdrawal upon a Commission finding, such as the text which appears in the last para of Nusup 150. I have thought that such an article, which would remove the target of a year-by-year unilateral withdrawal, might be even more difficult in terms of inter-agency feelings and the Congress, than the kind of implicit rather than explicit right of withdrawal which I have supported the UK in asking for. Foster and you are the only ones who can judge whether such a change, to relying on a commission finding, would be either wise or practical. If such a change were possible, it would, I think, make our position on duration publicly unassailable and leave us in a position where the Soviets could not possibly avoid the control issues.

I have not talked of such an article with the Brit because I did not want to raise unnecessary difficulties for you, but they, I am sure, would be delighted. And I should say that whether or not there is any change in the duration article, Ormsby-Gore believes strongly that we should table it immediately since he is [illegible in the original] more convinced than I am that this is the better way to keep the discussions where we want them.

I do not think in considering this last suggestion of a change you should be too much influenced by the possibility that the Soviets

might break if we table our present duration clause. There is, of course, always the chance that they might be looking for a pretext and might take this as an opportunity. And in addition to the recent Sov Govt's statement, the Russians here have been making noises to the Brit and ourselves which are obviously calculated to give us the idea that they may be thinking of winding up the conf. But my personal assessment really is that they probably will not break in the immediate future. My guess is that we will have a few more weeks to go anyway, and I am confident that we can keep the focus on the issues of control.

Villard

416. Telegram Nusup 184 to Geneva¹

Washington, January 28, 1959, 8:24. p.m.

Nasup 184. Department appreciates considerations outlined SUPNU 230 and USDel belief that we may now or soon be more vulnerable if we do not table duration article than if we do, in view fact that our present position is fully on public record and that we are open to charges of stalling and unwillingness show our full position. Accordingly USDel may, in its discretion, table further articles, including duration, in accordance previous approved texts if USDel, in light changing negotiating situation, continues feel that this would be best tactic to preserve most favorable U.S. position in negotiations. Department's concern is that we do not make it easy for Soviets to shift discussion to other issues now that their feet are to the fire on controls as indicated SUPNU 232. Department believes other articles, do not involve any major issues and that peaceful uses article in its present form would be hard for Soviets to attack as providing way for covert evasion weapons test prohibition.

Paragraph 2 of duration article as authorized NUSUP 172 should be amended by substituting "finds" for "considers".

Department believes that before tabling duration article USDel should refuse to be drawn into substantive discussion this question and should make following points:

¹ Source: Approves tabling duration clause. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-2759.

1. We expect Soviets give us concurrently promised list issues on which they would wish to have unanimity principle applied (as reported SUPNU 207).

2. Reiterate (along lines Department January 24 statement) that control issue and not matter of duration is key question and that if effective controls can be agreed then duration problem can be readily solved.

3. To undercut possible attack on unilateral withdrawal provision USDel should state in tabling we willing explore at appropriate time any reasonable approaches to problem ineffective operation control system but that we must first know the nature of control system before it would be fruitful to get into details here.

Department will continue to examine here possibility revising present paras 1 and 2 duration article with either U.K. draft or paragraph (F) NUSUP 150.

Dulles

417. Memorandum of Conversation Among John Foster Dulles, Department of State Officials, and Nuclear Advisory Panel Members¹

Washington, January 30, 1959

SUBJECT

[illegible in the original] Arms Control Negotiations and Policy

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Under Secretary Herter
Mr. Holmes—S
Mr. Farley—S/AE
Mr. William Foster

General Gruenther
Mr. Lovett
Mr. McCloy
General Smith

1. Nuclear Test Suspensions Negotiations.

The Secretary said that the Soviet Union was currently taking a rigid line on matters relating to inspection and control, but that U.S. and U.K.

¹ Source: Nuclear test suspension negotiations, surprise attack safeguards. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1-3059.

negotiators were holding firm against the veto and self-inspection. The position is awkward because of the new U.S. technical data indicating uncertainties in detection procedures for underground nuclear explosions. If there is a breakdown in the negotiations, however, we want it to come as a result of an unreasonable Soviet attitude toward sound control procedures, not as a result of a shift in the U.S.–U.K. objective of suspending nuclear weapons tests under effective control. If we were to abandon the Geneva experts' report, agreed to this summer after technical discussions held at the initiative of the United States, we would be in a very bad posture.

Mr. Lovett observed that the technical basis on which the U.S. was negotiating appeared to be undermined and it might be desirable to clarify and change the U.S. position rather than rely on our ability to handle the negotiations in a way which would lead to a Soviet break. Mr. Foster said that he understood the U.S. scientists believed that the capabilities of the Geneva control system could be restored. Mr. McCloy said that it appeared to be a case of normal scientific chance and uncertainty rather than error in fact or judgement. The Secretary said that the problem was under active study and that after the scientific restudy is completed any necessary Presidential review of our position would be made.

Mr. Lovett said that he felt there was a growing concern among the sophisticated public that we might be in an untenable and possibly dangerous position and that any control system which could be negotiated might have unacceptable risks and loopholes. Mr. Dulles said that unfortunately this public impression was difficult to deal with since the real answer to it had to be given by explaining our negotiating position and tactics with the Soviet Union, which in turn would prejudice the position of our negotiators as it became public. We are presently in the position of a poker player with someone standing behind him holding up a mirror to show his hand to the opposition. However, our situation is sound and we will play out the negotiation despite the criticism. Mr. Farley pointed out that we were not relying merely on the likely Soviet rejection of effective control and inspection procedures. The Geneva experts' report provides a basic principle which has not been challenged: namely, that seismic events which cannot be recognized as earthquakes through scientific equipment alone must be checked on-the-spot by inspection teams. The only thing that has been questioned is their estimate of the number of seismic events which scientific instruments could identify as earthquakes, an estimate which apparently was too optimistic. However, that factual estimate, which was accurate on the basis of the then available information, has no binding force; the binding principle is that on-the-spot inspection must decide the cases which are unresolved by reading the instrument. Thus we are protected and the Russians if anything are under greater pressure arising from the greater number of on-the-spot inspections.

All four of the advisers strongly endorsed the principle that we must keep the pressure on the Soviet Union to show its basic position on international staffing of control posts, on majority vote in the Control Commission, and similar issues, and that we should not let them escape this pressure by prematurely changing our proposals.

2. Surprise Attack Safeguards.

Mr. Foster said that it was wrong to think that the Geneva discussions on surprise attack safeguards were futile because they failed to reach agreements. He urged study of the key documents published by the United Nations. Among the mains he listed were:

- a. Some useful intelligence on Soviet military thinking;
- b. Exposure of the Soviet thinking on inspection techniques, which was accomplished by their tabling of a proposal for obviously inadequate inspection measures in a zone 800 kilometers on either side of the dividing line in Europe;
- c. The complete unanimity achieved among the five Western states which participated, and the very considerable education of many of the experts from other countries;
- d. The greater appreciation we ourselves achieved of the value of inspection, whether partial or comprehensive.

Mr. Foster said that he thought Soviet attitudes as revealed during the discussions gave us useful information as to what the Soviet Union attaches value to, and thus as to where we may be able to bargain with advantage in future discussions. The Soviets attach great importance to secrecy. This is not just a psychopathic attitude toward the outside world but a very valuable military asset. In effect their ability to keep their missile bases secret is the equivalent of being able to harden them against attack. The Soviet Union also feels very strongly about Germany and the threat a reunified Germany might come to constitute for the Soviet Union and its security.

Also apparent, Mr. Foster said, was a broad acceptance by Soviet experts of the belief that there must be a concentration of ground forces before a major surprise attack is launched. General Gruenther and General Smith were skeptical that this represented the real thinking of Soviet policy makers. It might be the belief of the experts who were chosen to go to the Geneva talks, but it appeared unlikely in view of Soviet missile achievements that this position was taken for any reason other than as an attempt to evade inspection of missiles.

Mr. Foster continued that the Soviets also showed great self-confidence and even arrogance regarding their missile achievements and their economic growth. It was possible in view of this growing strength that the Soviet interest in the surprise attack problem was no more than an effort to keep us talking while they keep gaining. It is also possible that there is some possibility of agreement on mutually advantageous measures. Otherwise the future over the next ten to fifteen years is bleak. Even many of the officers from the Department of Defense who were on

the staff of the U.S. delegation are now interested in exploring possibilities of agreement.

Mr. Dulles said that he had been disappointed that so little progress toward agreement was made in the December talks. He thought that the area of surprise attack safeguards was one which offered some prospects for agreement. He did not expect that there would be substantial reduction of armaments by detailed agreement. There must be confidence before arms can be reduced. Surprise attack safeguards might contribute to mutual assurance that an attack was unlikely, and thus lead indirectly to reduction in the arms burden.

Mr. Foster said that it was a consensus among participants in the discussions that it would be useless to resume the talks on the narrow technical-military basis to which the delegation had been restricted in its instructions. He thought, however, that broader exploration of possible limitations on armaments in conjunction with inspection and observation measures might be fruitful and in the U.S. interest. This might include, for example, analysis of a hypothetical basis of political agreements such as the proposed Rapacki plan. We should be able to show the unsoundness of such schemes, and at the same time make progress toward mutual understanding of the characteristics of sound measures.

Mr. Lovett questioned whether surprise attack talks could be resumed at this time on the broader basis recommended by Mr. Foster. The Berlin and German questions are now crucial ones. He was finding in his contacts with European business people that many of them were looking sympathetically at the Rapacki plan. The Secretary thought that any U.S. studies preparatory to possible resumption of surprise attack talks might take account of and be pointed toward problems of Germany and European security. General Gruenther agreed that studies should be undertaken promptly and said that he assumed such studies were under way in connection with missile negotiations on Berlin and on proposals for "thinning out" in Germany. The Secretary said that there had been studies but only by the Department of Defense and General Norstad rather than by a broader and more flexible group. It was conceivable in present circumstances that some kind of zone in the middle of Europe might be acceptable if that was the price for a reunified Germany.

Mr. Foster pointed out that we might well be thinning out our forces in Europe on economy and if this was the case we ought to consider how we could bargain in such a way as to get something in return. Mr. McCloy pointed out that the study so far of the Draper Committee had not shown any disposition on the part of Norstad or the Department of Defense to reduce force requirements in Europe.

Mr. McCloy, having just returned from a trip to Europe, gave an assessment of his impressions as follows: He found the situation in England uncertain and in some ways reminiscent of the tendency toward compromise so prominent in the days of Neville Chamberlain.

He realized that Macmillan is himself a strong and able man but that he was being strongly influenced at this time with respect to the problems of Europe because of impending elections and his preoccupation with retaining power.

He has looked into the situation in France, and particularly that of NATO, and held a rather pessimistic view of the present effectiveness of the alliance because of the remote and difficult attitude of General de Gaulle. He remarked that Chancellor Adenauer had not recovered as quickly from his recent illness as he had in previous instances in the past, that he was somewhat remote from public opinion in Germany and that the men surrounding him were loath to tell the Chancellor unpleasant things because of the risk of displeasing him and hence lessening the chance of any one of them becoming Dr. Adenauer's heir apparent. Mr. McCloy remarked that there was no government in Italy and that recent shifts in Italian political parties had disrupted the precarious balance which has maintained middle-of-the-road and pro-Western governments for some time. He felt that in the light of this situation the Russian attitude toward Germany, and particularly Berlin, represented a serious and even dangerous situation.

The Secretary expressed general agreement with Mr. McCloy's assessment and posed the question as to whether or not the United States should exert vigorous leadership in order to pull the West together to meet the situation. All of the members of the Advisory Committee and Mr. William Foster emphatically advised in the affirmative.

418. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Farley¹

February 1, 1959, 5:10 p.m.

Sec read proposed cable to Wadsworth to F. F. said he had two comments. (1) the Soviets did table their list of the subjects on which they wanted a vote by unanimity of the 3 powers. There were 6 or 8 items, no real surprises. They wanted it on all major decisions. (2) it was a close thing as to whether Wadsworth's judgment was right, that it might leave them the excuse we were stalling. Sec said he did not know about the Soviet list, does it provide for veto power on all major issues? Sec asked why that had not been played up. F. said it happened the last

¹ Source: Soviet veto proposal in nuclear testing suspension talks. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

thing on Friday; F. hoped they would hammer on that from now on. Sec said it gave us a good position to force the issue. F. said the only remaining question was the one raised in the Sec's cable—has he made an explicit promise re the duration article. Sec said he would like to be informed about the business of the veto power in the control council. F. said he would get it to him first thing Monday morning. F. said it covered any decision to send in inspection team, find a state in violation, appointment of principal staff. F. said they really have a double veto, because there is also veto by the one who is to be inspected.

419. Telegram 1165 to Geneva¹

Washington, February 1, 1959, 7:15 p.m.

For Wadsworth. Personal from Secretary. Regret that I cannot share your confidence that best way “to clear the decks” for focusing attention on veto and nationality of control staff will be to table remaining draft articles of the treaty. I realize that this is a close question and that from your standpoint there may be advantage in getting rid of accusation of stalling. However it seems to me that the tabling of remaining articles will almost certainly provide Soviets with opportunity to raise new issues and to prevent focusing of attention on key issues of control. Furthermore in view of list of matters where Soviet demands veto power in Control Commission we now have an unassailable position to focus attention on this matter. You will therefore, pending further instructions, abstain from tabling any further articles. Meanwhile please advise me whether you have any explicit agreement with Soviets that you would table draft of article on duration as soon as they tabled their article on veto power in Control Council.

I realize that no control system can be absolutely “fool proof” and that we must count upon the chance of detection being sufficiently great as not to justify gamble of treaty violation. If however Soviet view about the control machinery prevails then even that risk would be minimized. It is apparent that Soviets want the Korean type of inspection system which we know to be futile.

I shall probably be discussing this situation with Macmillan on Wednesday.

Dulles

¹ Source: No further clauses to be tabled in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2–159.

420. Letter From McCone to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, February 2, 1959

Dear Foster:

With further reference to our letter of December 23, 1958, addressed to the Under Secretary of State and signed by Acting Chairman Vance, and to the press release of January 5, 1959, by the President's Science Advisory Committee, and to the report of January 7, 1959, by the Panel on Seismic Improvement chaired by Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, the Atomic Energy Commission believes that it should convey to you at this time our views with respect to the position of the U.S. in the negotiations now in progress in Geneva.

There seems to be complete agreement within scientific circles in this country that the detection system proposed last summer by the Conference of Experts in Geneva is inadequate in the light of data subsequently developed from the HARDTACK series of tests in Nevada in October. However, there is a difference of opinion among informed scientists as to whether the system can be improved sufficiently by additional, better and different types of stations and instrumentations so that it can with assurance detect and identify nuclear explosions of the proportions indicated by the Geneva Conference of Experts in their Report.

The improvements recently suggested by the Panel on Seismic Improvement unquestionably would improve the capabilities of the system, but many of these proposed improvements are as yet only theoretical. The Panel listed "four promising approaches" that are "within the present limits of technology" and pointed out that vigorous research in seismology is indicated. With respect to one of the recommendations, namely, placing seismometers in holes at depths of several thousand feet, it said:

"The method offers possibilities for improving the detectability of small signals by a factor of the order of ten, *provided that the technological problems of operating instruments at the required depths can be solved.*" (Underscoring supplied).²

Also, the Panel made, inter alia, the following statements:

"It is noted that the data on nuclear Shots used in these estimates was from Rainier and HARDTACK II and thus has all the limitations of that small sample of nuclear test conditions. The PSI has not concerned

¹ Source: U.S. should not agree to cessation of tests that cannot be reliably detected. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-259.

² Printed here as italics.

itself with the possible seismic effects of nuclear tests under different conditions or the possibilities of concealment by decoupling of other techniques."

"The PSI urges that sample detection networks be established without delay as representative systems to disclose operational and design problems and provide a firmer basis for the assessment of detection capabilities."

The Commission hopes that an experimental and testing program to prove or disprove the feasibility of the improvements suggested by the Panel could be conducted and evaluated in less than a year.

Additional reports from further studies by the PSI will further develop the views of experts on the capabilities of the system as improved. However, there are several areas of uncertainty recognized by the PSI in its first report which only additional tests or firings can clear up. An example of great significance is the whole question of the effect of shots in differing geological formations and geographical areas. All tests to date have been in volcanic tuff in the Nevada test site and hence tests in other areas are clearly indicated.

The Atomic Energy Commission has consistently held, as indeed have all Departments of the Government, that the keystone of any acceptable international arrangement must be dependable assurances through effective detection, identification and inspection that all parties to the agreement will live up to its terms. The Commission believes that the technology of detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions is not sufficiently proven at this time for us to enter into arrangements with the Soviets now for the discontinuance of underground test explosions; and the same is true of nuclear test explosions in outer space.

The Commission believes that: first, the U.S. position in the current negotiations in Geneva should be directed so as to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations on minor or purely technical issues and, second, avoidance of our being placed in a position of acceptance of an agreement based upon a seriously inadequate detection system.

To this end we urge your consideration of the following:

First, we would propose that we seek agreement with the nuclear powers to discontinue atmospheric nuclear weapons tests forthwith and to establish promptly an adequate detection and identification system to insure compliance. To consider that such a system could be relatively simple, and acceptably dependable, and its adoption would involve fewer serious issues than are now under debate in Geneva. The discontinuance of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests would eliminate the fallout issue and thereby deprive the Soviets of one of their most effective propaganda themes.

Second, we would propose that we would agree to collaborate in improving the capabilities of the Geneva control system looking toward the inclusion at a later date of underground and outer space tests in the Treaty. In the meantime, nuclear weapons testing in outer space and underground would be permitted without restrictions. Additionally, a

series of special underground tests in diverse geographical and geological environments and a few tests in outer space would be carried out as promptly as possible. These special tests in outer space and underground could be a joint effort by the nuclear powers or they could be carried out unilaterally by the nuclear powers under international inspection; in either case, all data developed should be shared among the nuclear powers.

From such a special test series, together with an intensive program for the improvement of seismic and outer space detection techniques, we could determine the dependability of a detection and identification system in which we would have sufficient confidence to negotiate for a broader test cessation over an indefinite period of time.

My fellow-Commissioners and I feel that we would be remiss in our duties if we failed to inform you of our views as outlined above. In so doing, however, we wish to reaffirm our recognition of the fact that the formulation and direction of the foreign policies of our Government are the responsibility of the Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours,

John
Chairman

421. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100-5-59

Washington, February 3, 1959

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FREE WORLD AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the effects of increasing capabilities for nuclear warfare on public attitudes and behavior and on national policies in the Communist Bloc and the Free World.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The impressive developments in nuclear weapons delivery systems over the past year or so have not produced basic changes in popular attitudes in the non-Communist world. These attitudes continue to

¹ Source: "Implications for the Free World and the Communist Bloc of Growing Nuclear Capabilities." Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR-NIE Files.

reflect a mixture of apathy and fatalistic resignation, fear of the consequences of nuclear war and, particularly in Western Europe, acceptance of nuclear weapons as essential to defense and national status and prestige. In the main, peoples and governments appear to be making a gradual and steady adjustment to the threats inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons and we believe that future developments are not likely to produce any sudden or marked changes in present attitudes and policies. (*Paras. 9–10, 49*)

2. It is possible, however, that the wedding of nuclear explosives with ballistic missiles will produce fundamental shifts in these attitudes and official policies. Such changes could come with little warning in the midst of a crisis situation which served to crystallize the ferment, fears, or newly formulated concepts of the age. (*Para. 56*)

3. Opposition to the testing of nuclear weapons continues strong throughout the world, especially in Japan, India, and in parts of Western Europe. But in most Western countries this opposition is subordinated to the view that nuclear weapons are essential to defense and that a test ban should be made effective by measures of inspection and control. There is great interest in disarmament, including various propositions for disengagement, as a means of reducing tensions and the dangers of war. By-and-large, the public demands caution in situations involving the risk of great power involvement and there is considerable support for UN intervention to observe, control and police areas in which there is a threat to the peace. (*Paras 13–14, 22–24*)

4. Most non-Communist governments display similar attitudes of caution and concern over the nuclear situation. In Asia and the Middle East the nuclear situation continues to reinforce neutralist sentiments which derive from cultural and other factors. The Western European governments are highly sensitive to popular pressures for measures to reduce the dangers of war, and they consider it necessary, and even desirable to explore possibilities for negotiations with the USSR. (*Paras. 35, 38–40*)

5. Nevertheless, Soviet pressures and advances in weapons technology have not caused these governments, and others in the Free World depending on the US deterrent, to alter their posture or alignment. Many governments, including those of the NATO powers, are able to lead the public to accept the proposition that participation in an alliance whose strategy rests on the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent is the best guarantee of security. (*Paras. 32–33*)

6. The rapid pace of technological development will create serious problems for the US and the world. There may be doubts as to who has the lead in modern weapons, and it may become increasingly difficult to convince the peoples and governments of Western Europe—and other parts of the world—that the deterrent is in fact effective. Fears of

a surprise or "pre-emptive" Soviet attack may grow. In those nations which depend upon the US for protection, fears may also increase as to whether the US remains willing to risk general nuclear war in order to defend their vital interests. In view of the foregoing, certain nations might lean toward neutralism in an effort to gain security through accommodation. (*Paras. 50–52*)

7. A period of rapid change in weapons development and of uncertainty as to the relative balance of military power could put an increasing premium on striking the first blow. As the time period required for preparation of a devastating attack diminishes, the problem of interpreting the intent of the other side—particularly during periods of crisis when precautionary military activities had been initiated by both sides—will become even more critical. The relatively greater certainty of retaliation resulting from the development of mobile missile systems or hardened sites would strengthen the operation of the deterrent on either side. Even so, either side might decide that the deterrent effect of the other side's strength or posture was outweighed by the necessity to launch the first strike as the best hope for survival.² (*Paras. 53–54*)

8. Barring an effective disarmament agreement, there will probably be a gradual spread of nuclear capabilities to some additional countries. Nevertheless, we do not foresee any early lessening of the present strong political and psychological restraints on their use. (*Paras. 48, 57*)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

9. The destructive power of nuclear weapons has long been in the public consciousness. However, the advances in delivery capability represented by the satellites and by the missile test programs appear to the world as reflecting a new dimension in the threat. The opinion is widely held that the time is near at hand when hasty action, perhaps as a result of a faulty estimate of the intentions of the opposing side, can unleash a devastating attack with high-yield weapons delivered by ballistic missiles. The world was not prepared for Sputnik and the compound reaction of admiration, shock, and apprehension was profound. The reassessment of national policies touched off by this evidence of Soviet technological capability is still in progress.

10. However, with over a year's perspective since Sputnik it can be said that no great and sudden changes in attitudes or policies have as

² For reservations of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, regarding this conclusion, see footnote to paragraph 54. [Footnote is in the original.]

yet occurred as a result of the recent demonstrations of growing nuclear capabilities. In fact, the evidence available indicates that peoples and governments are becoming more steady in their reactions to technological advances in the nuclear weapons field. In general, there appears to be a greater degree of fatalism and a greater realization that there are no quick and easy solutions, and that it is necessary to work within the context of familiar institutions and methods for an easing of the nuclear threat.

II. POPULAR REACTIONS AND ATTITUDES

A. The Non-Communist World

11. There is considerable unanimity in world opinion on several general propositions with respect to the implications of growing nuclear capabilities. For example, the popular belief in the non-Communist world is that the testing of nuclear weapons involves some degree of risk to the human race; the general assumption around the world now is that large-scale hostilities between the two great powers would almost certainly mean nuclear war; and practically all people believe that a general nuclear war would be a disaster to mankind. Despite this unanimity on certain general propositions, the revulsion against nuclear weapons is not a dynamic force of even strength throughout the world and there are widely differing views as between regions and even within many individual countries with respect to the measures necessary or possible to deal with the problems of the nuclear age.

12. Broadly speaking, however, it is possible to distinguish between two major trends in popular attitudes toward nuclear weapons. In the Western world and in a few nations in Asia the dominant trend is toward reluctant acceptance of the fact that nuclear weapons are necessary for the common defense. In much of Asia and the Middle East the dominant trend among those who hold any opinions on nuclear weapons is to emphasize the dangers inherent in their existence and to press for their control or outlawing without particular regard to the complicated problems of Free World defense and security.

13. In Western Europe and the Americas there continues to be some opposition to the testing of nuclear weapons on the ground that it constitutes a danger to human life. Nevertheless, this concern has not produced wide-spread and strong pressures for an immediate and unconditional ban on tests. This may be due in part to apathy, but it also reflects a fairly widespread acceptance among informed people of the view that some risks in testing are essential to Western defense and of the proposition that a permanent test ban should be made effective by measures of inspection and control.

14. Attitudes towards other aspects of the nuclear weapons control problem follow a similar pattern in the West. There is great interest in

disarmament, including propositions for "nuclear free zones" and disengagement schemes. There is hope that sincere and prolonged negotiations might bear fruit, reducing the danger of war and the economic burdens of defense. Even in Western Europe important voices demand that the terms for safeguards be scaled down, and some risks and possible loss of military advantage be accepted so that the circle might be broken and real progress made toward controls and disarmament. Nevertheless, Soviet proposals are generally viewed with skepticism and suspicion and there are no strong pressures for large-scale concessions merely to reach agreement.

15. Barring an effective disarmament agreement, the Western public generally sees no alternative to a defense strategy based primarily on the nuclear deterrent. Initially, at least, the public in Western Europe believed that a nuclear defense strategy offered a means of holding down the economic and social costs that would otherwise have been necessary in maintaining large and ready conventional forces. With the Soviet advances in nuclear weapons capabilities has come recognition that the West must not lag behind in weapons technology if the deterrent is to remain effective.

16. Fears that the US might withdraw from Europe at some future date or prove unwilling to risk war in defense of Western European interests also have been elements influencing public opinion in favor of national programs for the development of nuclear weapons. National pride and the desire to gain great power status and to exert greater influence on US policy have been important factors in France and the UK tending to override basic fears of the weapons.

17. The launching of Sputnik I occasioned considerable soul searching in the West. There were fears that the USSR had moved ahead of the US in nuclear delivery capabilities and in this situation neutralism, and even pacifism gained some ground in Western Europe. But confidence in the deterrent strength of the West has been somewhat restored by post Sputnik progress in US missile development. For the most part, the public in the NATO area and in other countries relying on the US deterrent believe that it is still effective, and that alliance or alignment remains the best guarantee of their security.

18. Throughout much of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia the people generally lack knowledge concerning nuclear weapons and perceive only dimly their implications. Many of these peoples are fearful of the consequences of nuclear war, concerned over the effects of testing, in favor of nuclear disarmament, and opposed to any stationing of nuclear weapons in their countries.

19. But for the most part they are not faced with concrete issues and tend to be apathetic toward the more general problems. They tend to feel that the nuclear problem is involved in the great power struggle

over which they have no control, or they are so deeply involved in struggles for independence or livelihood that they have little time to reflect on world problems. People in these areas tend to accept and follow, usually passively, the positions taken by their leaders.

20. Informed circles in Latin America have evidenced deep concern over the dangers of nuclear war, and there is much interest throughout the area in disarmament. Nevertheless, while desiring that the US take a more flexible position on disarmament, a majority of the informed persons in Latin America generally recognize the importance to their own security of the US deterrent. Even in Mexico, where one of the highest levels of radioactivity in the world has aroused popular concern, there is no great pressure for a suspension of tests.

21. In the Arab world and much of Southeast Asia, informed circles emphasize the dangers of the nuclear situation, without much regard for the problems of defense in the non-Communist world. They see this situation as part of the great power struggle which could get out of hand with the small nations as probable victims. They hope, by remaining neutral, to escape this threat and they attempt to exert pressures on the great powers to accept controls on testing and nuclear weapons. Their views on the merits of any proposition tend to be colored by a pre-existing distrust of the West, and they are frequently more inclined to accept the seemingly reasonable Soviet proposals than those of the West.

22. India and Japan remain exceptional cases in Asia in the depth of popular concern over the nuclear situation. While the masses in India have only the vaguest notion of nuclear matters, Nehru's warnings have made some impression. The Japanese, the only people to have experienced a nuclear attack, have developed what amounts to a national phobia regarding the use or testing of nuclear weapons. In Japan no one can escape the deluge of comment and exhortation on the subject, at times including daily radio bulletins on the fallout-count. Opposition to testing is vocal and insistent in both countries and there is relatively little concern, except in limited circles in Japan, that a test ban or other controls be backed with adequate safeguards. Neither the Indian nor the Japanese public want their countries to have anything to do with nuclear weapons, although there may be a softening in the Japanese attitude in the future as Japan develops a potential to produce its own weapons, or if there are indications that Communist China possesses nuclear weapons. The peoples of both nations would view the use of nuclear weapons in almost any circumstances as an unmitigated disaster.

23. Nevertheless, even in India and Japan, the public has become a bit more discerning in its evaluation of Bloc propaganda on nuclear issues over the past year. Soviet advances in weapons technology

have had a sobering effect, and the more truculent tone of Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda—some of it directed at these two countries—has reminded Japan, and to some extent India, that their security is bound up with the fate of the non-Communist world and with the US deterrent. At the same time there is evidence that the press and informed circles recognize that Soviet propaganda on test bans and disarmament does not always correspond to Soviet actions. There was a strong reaction in both countries to the USSR's resumption of tests in 1958. The *Times of India* stated that the USSR prefers "paper agreement and declarations unsupported by actualities" and complained that Khrushchev is more interested in striking attractive poses than in getting on with the difficult task of genuine disarmament. However, these trends toward a more discerning view of the Soviet position have not resulted in greater support for the Western position; the US and West are still criticized for what is generally believed to be excessive rigidity and caution in insisting on inspection and controls.

24. In all regions of the non-Communist world, the fears with respect to the nuclear situation show most clearly during periods of high tension and crises. There is generally very little confidence that any but the smallest wars would be fought without nuclear weapons and little faith that such wars could be contained. Strong pressures are exerted against any nation moving unilaterally in a local situation where its actions could eventually involve other friends or allies. There is considerable support for UN intervention to observe, control, and police areas in which there is a threat to the peace.

25. In popular thinking about local wars little attention has been given to the possible implications of small (under one KT) nuclear weapons. The prevailing view appears to be that there is little difference between large and small weapons in terms of the difficulties involved in limiting the conflict or in the nondesirability of their use. The public is generally not impressed by distinctions between "clean" and "dirty" weapons.

26. Not all believe that small wars involving nuclear weapons would lead inevitably to big wars. There is, for example, a small but vocal group in the UK which has advanced the thesis that the balance of nuclear power among the great powers would serve to enforce caution in any local conflict involving great power interests, whether or not nuclear weapons were used. According to this theory, both sides would appreciate that the costs of total satisfaction in the local conflict might be the progressive raising of the ante to the general war level. Given this appreciation, there would follow a tacit understanding to limit objectives and to restrain the tests of arms and wills to the local area, as in the Korean War.

27. Finally, it should be said that there are various groups in the world, perhaps most articulate in India, who believe that the strategy of deterrence and the piling up of armaments can have only one end—nuclear holocaust. A small group in the UK which holds such views has been actively promoting an old ideal, pacifism, updated for the nuclear age. This group advocates the unilateral scrapping of all Western nuclear armaments, depending on moral strength to deter and overcome Soviet military strength and its materialistic philosophy. To date, however, pacifism has relatively few adherents and has not caught the imagination of youth to the extent that it did in the early 1930's.

B. The Sino-Bloc Bloc

28. There is little positive information available with respect to popular attitudes within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We believe that the people on the mainland of China know little more than they are told by the regime about nuclear weapons. If this is true, only informed and sophisticated circles would have a realistic understanding of the power of nuclear weapons and of the West, both of which have been derided as "Paper Tigers." While the Chinese Communist leaders have reportedly mentioned in private the possibility of 300,000,000 casualties on the mainland in the event of nuclear warfare, they have publicly emphasized that the Socialist bloc would triumph and that the cause of world communism would be advanced if the imperialists should start a nuclear war. In any event, the regime appears capable of limiting the expression of any fears concerning nuclear war that may exist.

29. The experience of numerous observers in the USSR indicates that there is widespread concern over the chances of war. However, the people appear largely convinced that their government is working sincerely for peace and disarmament.

III. EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES

A. The Non-Communist World

30. The development of nuclear capabilities has exerted a pervasive influence on the foreign policies of practically all nations; on some nations the influence has been profound. Even those governments in areas far removed from the likely centers of possible nuclear conflict are sensitive to the dangers and possible world-wide consequences of nuclear war. The existence of nuclear weapons and the pressure of public opinion have served to make most governments more cautious in the defense of national interests; the dangers of nuclear war have given spur to efforts to negotiate various agreements with the Bloc to reduce tensions and the dangers of war; and nuclear weapons developments have brought forth important changes in defense policies.

31. Nevertheless, it is difficult to isolate and weigh precisely the influence of the nuclear weapons situation, even in the case of defense

policy. National policies reflect the working of other important factors—the basic incompatibility of Communist and Free World objectives, the reduced power position of Western Europe as compared with the US and the USSR, the dependence of much of the non-Communist world on the US for strategic security, and the continuing search of the peoples and governments in the former colonial areas for a solution to insecurity, want, and the problems of modernizing their societies.

32. To date European governments have supported the theory that allied forces must be prepared to maintain and use nuclear weapons as an essential support on which they depend in meeting Soviet pressures. Although Norway and Denmark have declined to accept IRBM sites on their territories, they have joined all the other NATO nations in affirming the strategic necessity for a nuclear defense system. In Italy agreements to install IRBMs were in process of completion when the Fanfani government fell. In France negotiations towards this end were stalled by nationalist trends in French policy which have been intensified by de Gaulle's advent to power and not by any basic opposition on the part of the government to nuclear weapons. Even West Germany, which has been subject to a broad range of Soviet threats, including total devastation if it were to permit nuclear weapons on its territory, has approved in principle the equipping of the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons. Significantly, however, most of the governments involved have proceeded with the utmost delicacy, and have attempted where possible to minimize publicity or public discussion of the IRBM question.

33. Soviet technological advances have not frightened the Western allies into isolation from the US because by-and-large they recognize their ultimate dependence on US protection. But there has been increased concern on the part of some Europeans for the protection of their own local interests independent of their role in the over-all Western defense system.

34. The UK has pushed ahead with its program of developing some deterrent nuclear forces of its own and France is seeking to join the "nuclear club." While there has been some criticism from the British Labor Party over what is described as excessive investment in the nuclear field, this has caused no fundamental turning away from the principal strategy of nuclear deterrence. Recent British defense ministry thinking may indicate, however, that the government is increasingly concerned that there may be insufficient conventional capabilities for limited war situations. There appears to be a tendency in official circles to divide military problems into those which deal with nuclear armament, and those, usually pertaining to traditional British interests outside the NATO area, which do not.

35. Although the NATO governments are determined to maintain a strong and unified defense (at least to the extent that the economic

costs are politically feasible) most remain sensitive to popular pressures for nuclear controls, for disarmament, and for caution in the defense of national interests. While generally able to lead public opinion on issues considered vital, European governments find it necessary, and even desirable, to explore possibilities for negotiations with the USSR, to examine all Soviet proposals, and to choose carefully the propitious political moment for announcing the adoption of any policy which might be attacked as contributing to an increase in international tensions.

36. Moreover, the European governments themselves are extremely sensitive to the dangers of war and are little inclined to support military actions, or otherwise to take a positive position in situations which do not involve their vital interests. At the same time, they are more than ever concerned that their advice and counsel be heard by the US, so that actions will not be carried out unilaterally having ultimate consequences for all. Particularly in France, there is a strong desire for a greater voice in Western policy.

37. The Canadian Government also fully accepts the implications of reliance on nuclear weapons and of alliance with the US. However, Canada desires that the UN be given a greater role and increased capabilities as a mediator and policeman in local disputes, and that disarmament negotiations be pursued more vigorously. Canada has been particularly sensitive to unilateral UK actions during the Suez crisis and to US actions in the Taiwan Straits.

38. It is particularly difficult to assess the impact of the nuclear weapons situation on the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa. While fear of involvement in nuclear war has been a factor in Arab attitudes towards Western bases, especially in Morocco, these attitudes are primarily motivated by Arab nationalism and local political considerations. Nasser may believe that a nuclear stalemate exists which provides him greater opportunity to maneuver between East and West and greater latitude in subverting the Arab world. But he is probably also concerned over the prospect of the Middle East being turned into a nuclear battleground through miscalculation on his own part or by the West or the USSR. Moreover, his initiative, or lack thereof, in most situations is almost certainly influenced by a host of other considerations which outweigh thoughts about nuclear weapons.

39. Developments in nuclear capabilities over the past year served to convince the Indian Government even more of the basic wisdom of its neutralist foreign policy, which derives from historical, cultural, and religious factors as well as from an obsession with the consequences of nuclear war. The people provide strong support for the official view that pacts and alliances increase tensions and that the nuclear armaments race only insures a greater catastrophe at some future time when heightened tensions and a fatal miscalculation may result in general

war. The government's concern that disarmament be tackled as a priority world problem has been intensified by the advent of ICBMs. While recognizing that practical security problems are involved in the disarmament issue, the Indian Government exerts every effort to encourage both the US and USSR to make gestures and concessions that might lead in time to substantial disarmament agreements.

40. The Japanese Government continues to rely on US deterrent power for security. Developments in Soviet nuclear capabilities have not weakened its determination to remain allied with the US. At the same time, the strong popular revulsion to nuclear weapons and awareness of Japan's vulnerability to nuclear attack have impelled the government to take measures to minimize the risks of Japan's involvement in nuclear warfare. In pursuit of this objective the government opposes the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan and seeks revision of the US-Japanese Security Treaty to give Japan a veto over the operational use of US bases. We believe that the Japanese Government would consent to the use of US bases in Japan for the launching of air attacks, nuclear or otherwise, against targets on the mainland of Asia only if Japanese leaders were convinced that Japan itself were directly threatened.³

B. The Sino-Soviet Bloc

41. Soviet thinking and foreign and military policy have been strongly influenced by a growing appreciation of the power of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders have made strong efforts to build a substantial nuclear capability of their own, but they have continued to maintain and strengthen a broad range of nonnuclear capabilities.⁴

42. They have also tried to reduce the military and political usefulness of US nuclear capabilities by attempting to make US overseas bases untenable and by increasing the inhibitions attached to any use of nuclear weapons. Recognizing the world-wide fear of nuclear war, the USSR has sought to garb itself with slogans of "peace," to adopt attractive and simplified positions on disarmament, and to emphasize the dangers that go with any association with the US defense effort.

43. The development of nuclear weapons and their potential for devastation in war probably played a major role in the 1956 revision in Communist doctrine, which now holds that military conflict with the capitalist states is no longer "fatally inevitable." This revision was

³ For fuller treatment see NIE 41-58. "Probable Developments in Japan's International Orientation," 23 December 1958. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ For a fuller discussion of Soviet strategy see paragraphs 99-117 of NIE 11-4-58, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963," 23 December 1958. [Footnote is in the original.]

part and parcel of a new emphasis on political means of struggle which became increasingly evident after the death of Stalin.

44. The USSR's activities in its struggle with the West continue to be manifest principally in the political and economic realms. The image of military strength resulting from Soviet advances is, however, an integral part of the setting in which the USSR pursues this struggle. Moscow evidently regards its real and presumed military strength as a significant asset in political warfare. Soviet leaders probably estimate that if they launched a general war at present, even with surprise nuclear attacks, the USSR would suffer unacceptable damage from US nuclear retaliation. On the other hand, they are probably confident that their own nuclear capabilities, even though not as great as those of the US, have grown to the point where they constitute a powerful deterrent to the US. It is therefore probable that in the Soviet view both sides are now militarily deterred from deliberately initiating an all-out nuclear war or from reacting to any crisis in a manner which would gravely risk such a war, unless vital national interests at home or abroad were considered to be in jeopardy. However, we believe the Soviet leaders do not exclude the possibility of nuclear war resulting from accident or miscalculation.

45. While we believe that the Soviet leaders do not at present intend to pursue their objectives by employing their own forces, they will recognize, particularly in consequence of the policies they are pursuing to compel a retraction of Western power by political means, that situations might arise in which the use of force would seem essential to one side or the other. In such situations the Soviets would prefer to provide logistic and other support for local operations in which only non-Soviet forces participated directly. Their objectives in such operations would be limited, and they would seek to avoid direct Soviet involvement, to limit the geographic area of engagement, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by either side.

46. Soviet planners probably consider, however, that such limitations might be impossible in some instances, and that encounters between their own and Western forces might result. In this event, they would prefer to minimize the amount of force employed in such situations in order to limit the scale of conflict and the degree of their own involvement as much as possible. For example, they would almost certainly wish to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. In deciding whether to employ their own forces in any particular local situation the Soviets would have to balance the risk of provoking a train of counteractions, possibly leading to general war, against the stakes involved in the area of local conflict. They probably believe that the West's military posture and doctrine rest increasingly upon the use of nuclear weapons, even in limited wars. But they probably also view their own nuclear

deterrent capabilities as already having raised the threshold at which the West would react in such a manner. Thus, they probably believe that the opportunities for pressures against Western positions and for bluff have been enhanced.

47. The Chinese Communist leaders were among the first to proclaim that Sputnik shifted the strategic balance of power decisively in favor of the Bloc and they have been calling for a more assertive policy to exploit this alleged shift. Moreover, their propaganda line has been that a nuclear war would mean only the final defeat of capitalism. Nevertheless, we believe that Chinese Communist conduct in the Taiwan Straits situation is evidence that they are sensitive to the nuclear power of the US.

IV. PROBABLE TRENDS IN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES

48. Barring an effective disarmament agreement, the people and governments of the world will almost certainly be confronted with a continued growth in nuclear weapons capabilities. Technological advances will bring a further diversification of weapons types and some reduction in the costs of production of certain nuclear weapon systems. In this situation there will probably be a gradual spread of nuclear capabilities to "fourth countries."

49. The continuation of the nuclear armaments race and the development of nuclear capabilities by "fourth countries" will occasion fresh outbursts of concern throughout the world. There will almost certainly be, from time to time, renewed and vigorous demands for a cessation of nuclear tests and for measures to control the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. But the dominant trend in public attitudes will probably be one of apathy or resigned acceptance of the existence and development of nuclear capabilities. In the main, peoples and governments are conditioned to living with the threat inherent in the existence of modern nuclear weapons, and we believe that future developments in the nuclear weapons situation are not likely to produce any sudden or marked changes in present attitudes or policies over the next few years.

50. Nevertheless the development of nuclear weapon systems of increasing range, accuracy, and sophistication will continue to influence strongly the conduct of foreign policies. There will probably be a tendency to caution, and if possible to compromise, in disputes which might involve the interests of the great powers and precipitate nuclear war. Neutralism may become increasingly attractive as a means of escaping responsibility for and involvement in the great power struggle between the US and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, although the extent to which this will occur will depend upon a number of contingent developments.

51. Developments in US policies and nuclear capabilities will have great effects on the policies of both those nations committed to the West and the countries which already are neutralist. The entire non-Communist world will watch closely for any sign that the US deterrent is becoming less effective because of technological factors or that US determination to stand beside the exposed and threatened areas of the world is weakening. If members of the Western Alliance came to believe that the US was using technological advances to reduce its military presence overseas it would become increasingly difficult to convince the peoples and governments of Western Europe and Asia that the US remained willing to defend their interests. In this case, a further development of the present trend toward a hard line in Soviet policy leading to increased fears of the changes of general war might cause some members of the Western Alliance to weaken their commitments to the Alliance. Particularly in those countries which might have developed a modest nuclear deterrent of their own, there might be a disposition to flirt with the idea of neutrality. Certain nations around the periphery of the Bloc might lean toward the Bloc in an effort to gain security through accommodation. A belief in the West that the US had fallen behind could contribute to neutralist trends and greatly complicate the problem of maintaining a firm united front against Soviet probes and pressures.

52. If US technological advances and policies lead the Free World to remain confident that the US will defend local interests against Soviet aggression, Soviet efforts to exploit their own growing capabilities could have the opposite effect. Soviet probes and pressures could continue, as in the past, to serve to convince the people of Western Europe that neutralism, unless supported by a formidable indigenous nuclear capability, offered no surcease from Soviet pressures nor a workable substitute for common defense. A similar reaction might develop in Japan, which has generally reacted stoutly to Russian threats. Indian leaders at the national level are already showing increasing concern over the external and internal Communist threat. They probably see in recent criticism of their policies in the Communist press indications of less sympathetic and cordial state relations. We believe that privately, at least, they may adopt a less critical attitude toward Western defense measures and might show greater understanding for Western suspicions of Soviet behavior. Similar tendencies will probably develop in the UAR if the USSR continues to countenance, if not actively to support, serious subversive efforts in Syria and Iraq.

53. At the same time, the development of offensive and defensive weapon systems will complicate the problem of assessing the relative balance of military power and the effectiveness of deterrent forces at any given moment. It is possible that one side or the other will believe itself to possess a temporary and substantial military advantage when it does not, or will believe that it is substantially inferior when it is not.

Such beliefs could have a profound influence on the conduct of national policies and on the world situation. The complexities of this situation and the many unknown factors involved will make for continuing and growing uncertainties.

54. A period of rapid change in weapons development and of uncertainty as to the relative balance of military power could put an increasing premium on striking the first blow. As the time period required for preparation of a devastating attack diminishes, the problem of interpreting the intent of the other side—particularly during periods of crisis when precautionary military activities had been initiated by both sides—will become even more critical. The relatively greater certainty of retaliation resulting from the development of mobile missile systems or hardened sites would strengthen the operation of the deterrent on both sides. Even so, either side might decide that the deterrent effect of the other side's strength or posture was outweighed by the necessity to launch the first strike as the best hope for survival.⁵

55. We are unable to reach any confident judgments on the probable reactions of peoples and governments in the event general war between the US and the USSR appeared imminent. Under some contingencies, there would be no time for public opinion to operate; the actions of the governments would depend on quick judgments.

56. In a situation of a more gradual buildup of tensions, Soviet threats might induce widespread anxiety and consternation. Unless confidence in the ultimate effectiveness of the Western deterrent could be maintained, the USSR might be able to induce several of the less resolute governments in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia to proclaim their neutrality and to deny the US access to bases or military facilities in their territories. Fundamental changes in popular attitudes and official policies could come with little warning in the midst of a crisis situation. Such changes might also come about as a result of unexpected demonstrations of the effect of an important technological breakthrough.

⁵ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, would prefer that this paragraph be deleted but would accept its inclusion if the following language were added:

"In any case, we do not believe that the Soviet leaders are content with the *status quo*, either in the military or political field. They will almost certainly push ahead in their efforts to achieve a clear military superiority over the US. But despite further improvement in Soviet capabilities over the next five years, we believe it unlikely that the USSR will become confident that it can attack the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return. This judgment assumes the maintenance and improvement of US armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough of major military significance."

The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would recommend inclusion of this additional language in the body of the estimate without qualification. [Footnote is in the original.]

57. Although some additional nations will probably obtain nuclear weapons in one way or another, there will almost certainly continue to be strong moral and political inhibitions on their use. Indications are that the people of Western Europe would approve their use in the defense of vital interests, particularly to defend against local or general Communist attacks in the European area. But we believe that fears of the consequences of nuclear war are so deep and profound that no European government would actually accede to the use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts anywhere until efforts at a negotiated settlement had clearly failed or a critical blow to Western security appeared imminent or had actually been struck.

58. It is possible, however, that development of extremely low-yield weapons might bring, in time, a substantial shift in public attitudes so that use of such weapons would be viewed as proper in local conflicts. But we do not foresee an early lessening of the political and psychological restraints on the use of nuclear weapons.

422. Telegram Secto 9 From London¹

London, February 5, 1959, 3 p.m.

Secto 9. Re Secto 7. Secretary this morning discussed with Lloyd and Ormsby-Gore, and subsequently with Macmillan, tactics in nuclear test negotiations. The Secretary noted our “basic charter” on controls matter is as President had expressed it to Macmillan, that central issue is whether Russians will accept a real controls system, and re duration that we can accept in principle that ban on tests would be indefinite, withdrawal from or suspension of treaty being possible if controls system not being installed on schedule or not being operated properly.

Although Ormsby-Gore initially suggested US and UK committed to introducing duration article, and failure to do so might permit Russians to evade discussion on controls, Secretary read Supnu 243 as indicating we are not, repeat not, so committed.

Reviewing language of draft duration article Secretary and Lloyd agreed it questionable whether necessary to specify right of

¹ Source: Account of John Foster Dulles’ discussions with Ormsby-Gore and Lloyd on nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Niact. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-559.

withdrawal, because this an inherent right in any agreement in event of its violation. Secretary said State Department legal experts would study whether Article One, as now agreed in Geneva does not cover point adequately, obviating need for reference to withdrawal in any duration article.

In the end the British agreed that the object of our agreeing to break the link between testing and disarmament had been to focus on control; therefore we will now concentrate on that issue, deferring introduction of duration article until we see whether Soviets will move from their present position on controls and veto; meanwhile on standby basis reexamining between ourselves draft duration article. It was also agreed with the Prime Minister that if conference comes to breaking point on control issue we must find effective ways to dramatize the point, such as taking it to the United Nations or considering letters from Prime Minister and President Eisenhower to Khrushchev.

Regarding the "fall back position" the Secretary mentioned last night re reciprocal forbearance with continuing negotiations on control, it was also agreed that this matter will have the further urgent study that it needs.

Dulles

423. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Dulles and Greene¹

February 11, 1959, 9:55 a.m.

The Secretary said on the phone re the nuclear suspension test talks in Geneva that it made no difference about the composition as long as they had the veto power. The Secretary said he was not sure but what we should call Wadsworth home and advertise the fact what he is coming home about, indicating it is not worthwhile to carry out talks any longer. The Secretary said if you call the talks off you have the question of having to make a counterproposal—one less farreaching in scope or maybe even unilateral. We propose to do this and we hope the Soviets do the same. That has been McCone's idea and also more or

¹ Source: Possibility of breaking off nuclear testing suspension talks. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

less Senator Gore's idea. Mr. Greene mentioned whether we would do this in a letter to Khrushchev. The Secretary mentioned the following language:

In view of your position on veto power and all other substantive aspects of control there is, therefore, no alternative but to advise the course of action on the one hand which will not require controls but which, on the other hand, will spare mankind against the growing race of nuclear extermination. Therefore, we propose for the time being, and until further notice, not to have any more explosions and to confine any explosions to underground. We hope you will do the same. If you will do the same, then at least the main concern of mankind will be satisfied. If you don't do it, then we will have to reconsider.

Mr. Greene mentioned this (above) was more or less as the Secretary had explored with Macmillan.

The Secretary said he would imagine Mr. Herter would have some ideas. Mr. Greene said that Mr. Dillon was following this matter closely. The Secretary suggested calling Herter by phone on the matter.

The Secretary said we should consult with some of the Congressional leaders on this thing.

Mr. Greene, to the Secretary's question re Mr. Merchant's apology, said that Mr. Hoghland had addressed himself to this at staff meeting this morning, saying that the *Post* reporters had been inaccurate in their account. Hays was in a very unfortunate frame of mind, etc. Mr. Greene said he had not been able to talk to Macomber about this. Mr. Macomber was tied up elsewhere.

Mr. Greene reported the draft to the Soviets had finally gone to NATO. It would probably be delivered the first part of next week.

424. Letter From Herter to McCone¹

Washington, February 16, 1959

Dear John:

We have carefully considered the views and recommendations set forth in your letter of February 2 to Secretary Dulles concerning the

¹ Source: Rejects AEC position on nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-259.

current Geneva negotiations on suspension of nuclear weapon tests. This letter confirms the position expressed by Mr. Dulles in his meeting with you on January 30, and by Mr. Dillon during a further discussion on February 12.

We understand and appreciate the difficulties involved in working out an adequate technical system for detecting and identifying certain types of nuclear explosions. We continue to believe, nevertheless, that the over-riding need at the present time is to maintain pressure on the Soviet Union with regard to the key political issues of the organization and functioning of the Control Organization. So long as the Soviets maintain their demands for a veto and for staffing of control posts in the Soviet Union with their own nationals, no technical control system, whatever its capabilities, could be effective.

Your suggestion for an agreement involving atmospheric testing only as an initial step is, as you know, one which we believe should be reserved as a possible full-back position for use in the event the present effort fails.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

/S/ **Christian A. Herter**
Acting Secretary

425. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 17, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Kohler—EUR
Mr. Spiers—S/AE

Sir. Harold Caccia—U.K. Ambassador
Mr. John Roper—U.K. Embassy

Mr. Herter said that he had asked for this meeting to reiterate our view about the necessity of Western firmness on the control issues in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. There had been no apparent

¹ Source: U.S. firm position on control issues in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-1759.

softening in the Russian position on the questions at issue and we felt there should be no softening in our own position. He wanted to emphasize that the U.S. could not consider compromises in its position on the basic control questions, since to do so would run the risk of producing a treaty which the Senate would not consent to ratify. There was also a strong feeling on our part that the inspection provisions which might be adopted in the present negotiations would serve as a precedent for future arms control arrangements and thus bore an importance beyond the immediate situation. He thought it well to re-emphasize this position prior to Mr. Macmillan's visit to Moscow.

Ambassador Caccia said that the subject would undoubtedly be raised by the Soviets with the Prime Minister and that he would transmit Mr. Herter's views, which he thought were sound and represented the approach agreed upon between the Secretary and the Prime Minister during the former's recent visit to London. Sir Harold then raised the question of the Department's reactions to the memorandum which Mr. Roper had delivered to Mr. Farley on February 10 containing U.K. suggestions on how to deal with two of the points in the Soviet veto list. Without getting into the details of the British suggestions, Mr. Herter observed that he felt generally we should not advance proposals for getting around the current impasse but rather should see if the Soviets were prepared to moderate their own position in any respect.

(After the meeting Mr. Herter authorized Mr. Spiers to discuss our detailed comments on the British memorandum with the U.K. Embassy.)

426. Letter From Macmillan to Eisenhower¹

London, February 20, 1959

TEXT OF MESSAGE

My dear Friend,

Before I leave for Moscow, I want to tell you once again how much importance I attach to the conference at Geneva on nuclear tests, and how much I hope it may prove possible for us to reach an agreement on this subject with the Russians.

¹ Source: Extols virtue of agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

Any agreement is bound to include certain disadvantages and risks. The main disadvantage, of course, is the handicap an agreement would impose on our ability to improve the nuclear deterrent. The main risk is that the Russians would find some means of evading the agreement, which we could not do. You and I both know how serious this disadvantage and this risk would be. What we have to do, it seems to me, is to judge and balance up whether the advantages an agreement might bring to us would outweigh the disadvantage and risk it would entail.

I will not make any attempt in this message to estimate the disadvantage and the risk. But I do want to tell you that I am very deeply impressed by the advantages which an agreement might bring us. I think it would do three things, each of which would be very important. It would reduce tension. It would hinder the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. And it would provide a pilot scheme and a precedent for controls in other fields.

How much would all this be worth to us? I want to tell you that I myself sincerely believe it would be worth the extra risk involved in our accepting something less than perfect control. Perfect control is in any case almost impossible in theory and quite impossible in practice. It seems to me that if we can create a control system which involves a sufficient degree of risk to a potential violator that he cannot get away undetected with a violation of the armament, then we shall have done enough to justify our accepting the [illegible in the original] and risks involved. This seemed to be Foster's view when he was with us two weeks ago.

I have the impression the Russians still want an agreement. The most likely explanation seems to me to be that they are concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and they dislike the mounting cost of these nuclear programs. So do both of us; and to that extent we have a common interest with the Russians. Whatever be their motive, I feel we still have some prospect of reaching agreement with them, provided they drop some of their present demands and provided we insist only on such a degree of inspection and control as is necessary. While we must certainly press them to go further than they have so far shown themselves ready to go, I think we must remember that they have already come some way toward accepting foreign control, further indeed I think than either you or I would have expected a year ago. The French have a saying that the better is the enemy of the good; I think it applies to our present position in relation to this conference.

Do not think for one moment that I am ready to compromise on essentials. I agree entirely that we cannot accept the present Soviet position under which they would retain a veto over the crucial operations of the control system, in particular the despatch of inspection teams. On this, and on the related question of a veto over findings of a violation

of the agreement, our people put some ideas to your people in Washington last week. They were designed to build into the agreement an automatic right for us (and the Russians) to have inspections. But as clearly neither of us will be physically able to inspect every unidentified event, we felt it would be necessary to agree on some annual upper limit of inspections.

I am sorry to say your people have expressed a good many reservations about this plan. They seem to have thought of it as a concession to the Russians. I regard it as just the opposite, because its purpose is, while protecting all our essential requirements, to nail them down on the veto, and to make their position in asking for a veto still more untenable.

I have no doubt this conference will be mentioned while I am in Moscow. You can rely on me to press Khrushchev hard about the veto.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Harold

427. Memorandum From Eisenhower to Herter¹

Washington, February 21, 1959

I attach a copy of a message have just received from Harold Macmillan. Since he is now in Moscow, I am uncertain as to whether or not he expects an answer, particularly in view of the closing sentence of his message.

The message seems to be ambiguous. Mr. Macmillan speaks of his readiness to accept something less than “perfect control.” Both Foster and I have already indicated that we do not press for an elaboration of the mechanics of an inspectional system so that we could be sure that any nuclear explosion, no matter how small its size nor where exploded, could be detected. But we are insistent that such stations as are agreed upon be allowed to function without interference from the government in those territory the stations are set up. In any agreement to which we would be a party, we cannot countenance a veto

¹ Source: Comments on Macmillan message on nuclear test suspension negotiations. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.

either in the establishment of the detection system or in the carrying out of procedures and examinations authorized by the agreed plan.

We have already agreed that the cessation of tests need not be connected with any feature of disarmament, but we must be quite clear that our arrangements must operate so effectively that they give to each side the assurance that the inspections will be freely and honestly carried out and in accordance with the agreed plan.

If you believe that we should send anything to Macmillan while he is still in Moscow, please let me know.

D.D.E.

428. Memorandum From Herter to Eisenhower¹

Washington, February 22, 1959

SUBJECT

Reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's Message of February 20

I enclose a suggested reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's letter of February 20 to you about our position in the Geneva nuclear test suspension negotiations.

If you approve the response I propose to pass it to the British Embassy on Monday morning for transmission to the Prime Minister in Moscow.

Acting Secretary

¹Source: Transmits proposed reply to Macmillan letter. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2259.

Enclosure

Suggested Letter From Eisenhower

February 22, 1959

Dear Harold:

I agree with the points you make in your message of February 20 about the importance of the negotiations in Geneva and the advantages which would come to us from a sound agreement. I agree also that perfect control is impossible, both in theory and in practice. However, I am firmly convinced that it would be folly for us now to relax our position in any way; the Soviets are making no signs of movement toward us on the crucial issues.

I concur that an agreement with the USSR on nuclear testing will establish a precedent for controls in other fields. This point concerns me very much. It reinforces the need to continue to press the USSR for a satisfactory agreement on fundamentals before moving to other issues. The important points are the way inspection is organized and the procedures to insure rapid dispatch of inspection teams. We cannot accept any impediments to dispatch of inspection teams. We must be careful that the staffing pattern of the control posts is not such as to interfere with the integrity of the collection and transmission of data. We must be sure that the voting procedures do not legalize obstruction of the operations of the control system. I am sure that you will agree with me that on these points we must be absolutely firm.

Our fear about your proposal for setting an annual upper limit on inspections is that it would get us into negotiations on numbers without agreement on the basic elements of inspection and control. Further, there would be ever-increasing pressure on us, once we accepted the upper limits principle, to go lower and lower until there would no longer be an acceptable level of deterrence. Therefore, I believe we should contemplate no proposals of this type until and unless the important points I have described above are satisfactorily settled.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

429. Telegram Supnu 294 from Geneva¹

Geneva, February 23, 1959, 2 p.m.

Supnu 294. Following are US del ideas on how a possible recess might be handled and what might be done after a recess:

1. As outlined in Supnu 293 we believe final days of conference should be focused on veto. We would then envisage statement by Western delegations that failure to achieve agreement on central issues of control, namely, veto, staffing, inspections, demonstrated necessity to recess conference and report to individual governments to see what further measures might be devised to assist agreement on these key issues. Statement could include idea that Soviets had obviously not yet been convinced of reasonableness Western position on control by US and UK delegations; therefore desirable to refer issues to wider international forum in order to secure the judgment of world community. Therefore Western delegations expected their governments would call for meeting of UN Disarmament Commission.

2. Letters from President and UK Prime Minister to Khrushchev could be used to dramatize Soviet intransigence on basic issues. If letters sent before planned recess and did not contain specific reference to stopping conference Soviets would have opening for reply which might make it difficult not further prolong negotiations. On other hand it might not be desirable to have call for recess first made by Presidential letter. Accordingly delegation tends believe letter from President should be sent on heels of rather than before recess.

3. In separate message we will outline our ideas on fallback position with regard to tests. In general we think it will be useful if announcement could be made that for some period of time US would forego that kind of tests for which there now exist adequate means of detection without an international control system. This would of course mean atmospheric tests. It would also be helpful if US announced that in addition to underground weapons development tests it was going to undertake underground testing in attempt further to develop knowledge of how effective controls of such tests might best be established and would solicit Soviet cooperation in studies along this line. US could reserve right to test at high altitudes if adequate measures for control this type test not found and agreed. Point elimination of atmospheric tests would remove radioactivity hazard might perhaps not necessarily be made in initial announcement but could of course be used to elicit

¹ Source: U.S. Delegation ideas on handling a recess in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2-2359.

favorable response US position. Question of timing announcement of such a fall-back position requires consideration. On balance delegation believes that it would be better to have such announcement made immediately after recess and probably in Presidential letter. It would then have maximum impact in lessening disappointments occasioned by recess of Geneva negotiations. If announcement were deferred until close of Disarmament Commission meeting we would also be exposed to pressures for various different kinds of schemes and would not have advantage of starting out with own proposal.

4. We do not believe a meeting of Disarmament Commission can be avoided in any event and also think it could serve useful purpose from US point of view. Accordingly believe US and UK should take initiative in calling for Disarmament Commission meeting to consider results of negotiation thus far. Believe it might be difficult to get resolution in Disarmament Commission which clearly states acceptable basis for resumption of negotiations. Accordingly tentatively believe type of resolution should be sought which gives general endorsement importance effective international control and suggests that governments concerned attempt to reach agreed basis for further negotiations.

5. We believe some merit in idea appearing to keep negotiations going by some continuing discussion through diplomatic channels. Such discussion might be labelled as devoted to purpose of establishing sound basis for resumption negotiations and in particular for achieving preliminary agreements on basic issue of control adequate to warrant resumption Geneva talks. Call for further negotiations through diplomatic channels might therefore be included in Disarmament Commission resolution.

6. Believe some consideration should be given to utility consideration question resumption of negotiations in proposed Foreign Ministers meeting in German problem. It might be difficult to find good reason for not having discussion this question on the side by three powers concerned at such a meeting if Soviets or members DC proposed such discussion. If it were desired to avoid such discussion at Foreign Minister meeting possibility might be explored having disarmament meeting begin two weeks or so after beginning Foreign Ministers meeting rather than shortly after recess. If on other hand no major objection to discussing question on side at Foreign Ministers meeting this might be used as one response to kind of resolution in Disarmament Commission suggested above.

Villard

430. Letter From Herter to Goodpaster¹

Washington, February 25, 1959

Dear Andy:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a message from Prime Minister Selwyn Lloyd which I received from the British Embassy this morning at the same time that a copy of the message from the Prime Minister to the President was delivered. I think the President will want to see it because it has some connection with the latter message.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter
Acting Secretary

Enclosure

Message From Lloyd to Herter

Washington, February 25, 1959

Dear Chris:

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has asked me to give you the information in the enclosed note on points which have so far arisen in the discussions with the Soviet leaders on disarmament. This note does not cover the topics dealt with in the Prime Minister's message of last night to the President of which I enclose a copy.

Yours ever,

/s/ Sammy

Attachment

Note From the British Embassy

DISARMAMENT

The Russians have responded to all suggestions about control by revealing a positive mania about Western intelligence activities directed against them under cover of proposals for inspection and control.

¹Source: Transmits message from Lloyd to Herter providing a readout of Macmillan's talks in Moscow. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous Memos.

We have discussed the Nuclear Tests Conference, surprise attack and disarmament in general. On the Nuclear Test Conference it has been made very clear to the Russians that if they maintain their veto proposals in their present form, there will be no agreement. Mr. Khrushchev in return has made it clear that he is not interested in an agreement under which only nuclear tests conducted in the atmosphere would be prohibited.

On the cut-off, Khrushchev has been pressed hard to express some willingness to agree to discuss it. At first he showed extreme reluctance saying that without prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons it would be unacceptable. Later on he went a bit further saying that the matter could be looked into; he would like to exchange views on it and hear more about it, for it was an interesting problem.

On surprise attack, our exchanges have revealed no change in the Soviet position. They have argued pretty effectively against priority for a technical approach in this field. Khrushchev's conclusion was that the positions of the two sides were far apart, and perhaps a start should be made somewhere else. At no time has he pressed for a resumption of the surprise attack conference.

We had a long discussion on the best method of approaching general disarmament talks. Somewhat contrary to our expectations, the Russians have not in any way pressed that such talks should be held, nor hinted that they have new general proposals to put forward.

Khrushchev said he was sceptical of the utility of the 82-member U.N. Disarmament Committee or for that matter of any other committee that might be set up. He would be ready to agree to setting up a sub committee of that committee provided it was on a basis of parity. But he thought that to do so would be a waste of time and a fraud on public opinion. It would produce only a marathon in the field of the talks. He thought that the Heads of Governments must set the ball rolling by agreeing on the principles which the experts could then work out.

Khrushchev has indulged in a lot of general and sweeping statements about his readiness and even anxiety for total disarmament, remarking for instance that the Soviet Union was quite ready to give up armed forces altogether and have only a militia for internal security provided everyone else does likewise. Then everybody could control and inspect everybody else as much as they liked. He has described the objective to be sought as that of discovering "a mutual interest in some system of security which would be to the advantage of both sides."

In fact there has been no real give on the Russian side at all, but Khrushchev's approach has been serious and, from his point of view, realistic.

The use of outer space for peaceful purposes has not so far been mentioned.

431. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 25, 1959, 9:25 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

The President asked Dr. Killian to talk to Mr. Herter concerning our minimum position on inspection in connection with the negotiations on suspension of atomic testing now under way in Geneva. Specifically, he is to examine the limits of the position which might be acceptable to us.

For example, they should consider the acceptability of a system adequate to give assurance against atmospheric shots and underground shots above a certain size. Under this concept, the suspension of tests would be limited to these particular modes.

Dr. Killian said he would go into the matter with Mr. Herter.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower request to Killian to talk to Herter about inspection in connection with nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series.

432. Telegram Supnu 310 From Geneva¹

Geneva, March 1, 1959, 1 p.m.

Supnu 310. Eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth.

It is important to our position that we be able to present a draft treaty article on duration. We should do this well before a possible recess. This means that if there is any possibility of an early recess, we should table a draft article this coming week.

There have been various drafts on such an article considered from time to time, and I am well aware of the difficulties you face with other agencies in getting agreement on an article which will help rather than

¹ Source: Desirability of tabling article on duration. Secret; Priority. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-159.

hurt our public position. I also thoroughly understand the necessity of not proposing a draft which we could not live with if eventually there is a treaty, but I do think that it is possible to have a draft which is simple and which at the same time fully protects all our interests.

I strongly recommend that we propose a one-sentence article along the following lines:

Begin verbatim text.

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, provided the provisions of the treaty and its annexes are being fulfilled and observed.

End verbatim text.

I know there are some who argue that there should be explicit mention of the inherent right to withdraw from a treaty if another party does not observe it. I personally am not persuaded of the merit of these arguments. But if it is necessary to make explicit mention of the right of withdrawal, the language I have suggested could be modified to read as follows:

Begin verbatim text.

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a party to be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the treaty and its annexes (including the timely installation and expective operation of the control system) are not being fulfilled and observed.

End verbatim text.

At first sight I know that my suggested language seems to be a radical departure from the complex versions that we have been thinking about up until now. But I do hope it will be given close study because I sincerely believe that it not only would help our public position but that it would also provide us adequate protection if we were to reach agreement. The phrase about the provisions of the treaty and annexes being “fulfilled and observed” provides a basis for unilateral withdrawal in the contingencies of: violation of the treaty by a weapons test; obstruction of the installation or operation of the Control Organization by a party to the treaty; and also failure of any country such as Communist China to adhere to the treaty by the time such adherence has been specified in any agreed phasing provisions of the treaty.

I realize the text I suggest does not cover the problems of suspending the obligations of the treaty in the event there is failure to achieve revisions of the treaty which may be required in the future if the agreed control system does not operate satisfactorily. The text also does not provide for suspension of obligations or other measures to be taken in the event there is nuclear explosion in the territory of a country which is not a party to the treaty. But neither of these contingencies really needs to be covered in a draft duration article. The appropriate time to

put forward treaty language to take care of these contingencies has not yet arrived and omission of such provisions now does not in any way preclude us from introducing them at a subsequent state if the negotiations either continue or are renewed after a recess. Provisions of this type could be put forward at a later time, possibly in a separate article dealing with how the Control Commission might make reviews of the effectiveness of the control system. Largely because of the unresolved question of just how we are going to handle the problem of threshold, we will not at any time while we are here state that we have tabled all the articles that we propose. We will always say that there may be further articles which we may recommend in the light of further discussions. Accordingly, we will not be precluded from tabling additional articles or additions to our present draft articles later on if necessary.

I hope very much you will agree with my suggestion that we slim down a duration article and put forward as a simple one-sentence text. And I hope that you will be able to secure agreement to such a text from the other agencies concerned. I am sure we would have no difficulties at all in getting the British to go along with such an article.

I believe that Khrushchev's recent speech has made our position here look better than ever. It should also assist us greatly in securing agreement from the British to recess the present negotiations. The one thing we really need to round out our position is a duration article. We need one quickly. I think the kind of article I have suggested would help us immensely.

Villard

433. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

JCSM-71-59

Washington, March 2, 1959

SUBJECT

Surprise Attack Study Group (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum, dated 23 January 1959, by the Military Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate and

¹Source: Conveys JCS views on formation of a group to study problems of surprise attack. Secret. 5 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman's File.

submit comments on a proposal by the Secretary of State concerning the formation of an inter-governmental ad hoc group to prepare a study of the problems of surprise attack and related disarmament proposals.

2. The recent Geneva Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack was suspended with recognition that revised terms of reference were needed before the Conference could reconvene. The State Department proposes that the U.S. approach on the surprise attack problem should be broadened to include arms control measures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that U.S. preparations for a new series of meetings require different terms of reference than those proposed by the Secretary of State.

3. The national security implications of the various arms control measures, that could be considered in a new and less restricted conference on surprise attack, appear to demand, as a first step, a broad U.S. review of disarmament matters from a wider viewpoint than that of surprise attack alone. Such a review would provide a basis for evaluating the surprise attack threat in terms of other threats to U.S. security, and for determining what effect the attainment of safeguards against surprise attack would have upon the over-all U.S. defense posture.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that:

a. In view of the actions separating the Arctic Zone proposal, outer space considerations, suspension of nuclear weapons tests, and technical discussions on surprise attack from the August 29, 1957 Four Power disarmament package, there is an urgent need to review existing U.S. disarmament policy for consistency with these actions and national security requirements. The Disarmament Policy Review Working Group, which initiated such a review on 7 April 1958, should complete its action and propose necessary revisions. Within the framework of the revised policy, U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures including safeguards against surprise attack, could be developed by the proposed ad hoc study group. If, however, political considerations preclude completion of an over-all review of our present disarmament policy, by the Disarmament Policy Review Working Group, within the apparent time limitations, it may be necessary to develop U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures within the framework of existing disarmament policy.

b. The objective of the study proposed by the Secretary of State should be limited to the development of recommended U.S. positions on disarmament measures within current U.S. disarmament policy. The surprise attack problem should be considered within this context. The reverse approach would be unwise since the surprise attack problem is but one element of U.S. disarmament policy. Such an approach might lead to conclusions which are unacceptable within the framework of over-all basic national security policy.

c. Current U.S. disarmament policy does not include limitations on combat readiness of U.S. forces and limitations on deployment or operations. The Study Group proposed by the Secretary of State should restrict its considerations of measures which might place limitations on the combat readiness of U.S. forces to the development of

data necessary to counter proposals of this nature that have been or are likely to be made by other parties.

d. The draft terms of reference for a Study Group on Disarmament Measures, attached hereto, should be substituted for the terms of reference for a Study Group on Increasing Protection Against Surprise Attack, proposed by the Secretary of State.

e. In the event that Mr. William C. Foster is not available to direct the Study Group, a senior U.S. Military Officer should be appointed. However, if Mr. William C. Foster, or an individual of similar stature, should assume the responsibility of the Chairman of the Study Group, a senior U.S. Military Officer should be designated as the Director of the Study Group Staff. In any event, the consultants should include at least one military officer.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/S/ Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

Appendix

PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE AD HOC STUDY GROUP ON DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1. The objective of the Study Group is to develop detailed proposed U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures for possible use by a U.S. delegation to an international conference.

2. The study group will be guided in its work by the following:

a. U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures will be developed within existing U.S. disarmament policy.

b. U.S. positions on disarmament measures will maintain, as a minimum, the relative U.S. national defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc.

c. U.S. positions relative to disarmament measures which might reduce the combat readiness of U.S. forces and their weapons systems will be developed only for the purpose of countering such measures should they be proposed by other nations.

3. Specifically, the Study Group shall accomplish the following tasks:

a. Identify specific and verifiable disarmament measures which might reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, to include reductions of armed forces and armaments. These measures should be applied to each type of weapons system, together with its using organization; first within limited geographic areas where friction exists or is likely to develop, and then to progressively enlarge geographic areas, finally encompassing all militarily significant nations.

b. Design systems for verifying adherence to the measures identified under subparagraph 3 *a* above. Specify the type numbers, and source of verification personnel, their organization for verification

duties, the conditions required to be met in order for verification personnel to be effective, the equipment requirements, and the initial and recurring costs of the verification systems.

c. Evaluate the possible impact of the measures and systems discussed in subparagraphs 3 *a* and *b* above on U.S. national security interests. Assess the effect of such measures and systems on U.S. deterrent and retaliatory capabilities. Identify those measures and systems which are inimical to U.S. national security; those which are conditionally acceptable and the conditions for acceptance; and those which are clearly advantageous to the United States.

d. Identify U.S. unilateral measures which would be required to avoid a reduction in the U.S. national security position relative to Soviet Bloc nations in the event the measures and systems discussed in subparagraphs 3 *a* and *b* above, were incorporated in an international agreement and implemented.

4. The Study Group shall be furnished necessary military and technical data pertinent to this study and shall receive all necessary assistance and cooperation from the Departments and Agencies of the Government.

5. The Director of the Study Group shall submit a final report of the work of the study group to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group by _____ 1959.

434. Telegram Supnu 319 From Geneva¹

Geneva, March 5, 1959, 3 p.m.

Supnu 319. Eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth.

I am somewhat disturbed by the tenor of certain newspaper stories concerning "Western agreement" with certain elements of the Soviet veto list, particularly as to possible congressional reaction to such stories. Luther Reid has tried hard to inculcate the correspondents here with the difference between the right of veto on the Control Commission and the acceptance of the necessity for unanimity in a few other parts of the treaty. However, the few stories to which I have reference make no distinction in this regard and give the impression that we have yielded to Soviet insistence on a whole series of vetoes in the Control Commission.

¹ Source: Expresses concern with news reports that U.S. and U.K. have agreed to Soviet veto list. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-559.

I feel sure that Department is taking adequate measures to reassure certain key people on the Hill as to exactly what we have agreed to, but suggest that before too long it might be appropriate for Phil Farley to hold a background press conference in which these and other points might be made in order to clarify the U.S. position.

As can be seen from verbatims, both U.S. and U.K. delegations have been sparing no pains to make sure that Soviet distortions of the record on this are corrected immediately, and as of yesterday we received Tsarapkin's assurance that he understood our position perfectly. This, of course, will not stop Soviet propagandists from making whatever hay they may wish to in broadcasts and articles emanating from Moscow, but I would like to feel that the appropriate people in Washington know in advance that such propaganda is distorted and that we have not yielded a single principle in this veto business. As you know better than anyone, denial of a charge by a Senator is 100 times harder than obviating the necessity for the charge by giving him the full picture.

Villard

435. Telegram Supnu 323 From Geneva¹

Geneva, March 8, 1959, 5 p.m.

Supnu 323. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. On assumption that no firm decision on recess will be agreed with British until after Macmillan's Washington visit we face here a difficult tactical situation. We have been keeping focus on control issues for a long time. And in the course of the past two weeks we have also been filling out the U.S. position by tabling articles. We expect to table the last important articles, duration and review, Monday. There is not much that we can say now about the control issues that does not get us into danger of either erosion of our position or premature discussion of dangerous issues. There are already pressures from the British for compromises on staffing and inspections and for ways around the veto. In connection with inspection we are already skirting the edges of the tricky issues of threshold and phasing. And in all of this we are hampered right now by difficulties in our local relations with our British colleagues. We are clearly at

¹ Source: Seeks advice on tactics in nuclear test suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-859.

a point where we must find ways to avoid the dangers to which we are exposed. Essentially it is a problem of how to mark time until the basic decisions are made in Washington and London.

There are three different ways of marking time which we might follow. The simplest would be to call for a recess of two or three weeks with a definite date set for resumption. We could do this on the basis that Macmillan's discussions in Moscow need to be considered in Washington before the conference here can go ahead. I do not think this course would prejudice whatever decision off may be adopted with respect to stopping or going on with the conference.

It is, of course, not probable that the Soviets would agree to such a course without a good deal of propaganda as to why we are suggesting it. It is however pretty clear to the public already that the conference is in fact awaiting decisions which will depend upon the outcome of discussions while Macmillan is in Washington and it might therefore not be too difficult to justify a temporary recess publicly, by frank recognition of this fact.

The second possibility is to reduce our schedule of meetings over the next three weeks as much as we can. We have in fact already begun to do this. We secured Soviet agreement to having no meeting Friday and we can do this from time to time in the coming fortnight. Even if the Soviets refused to cancel particular meetings, this tactic still has an advantage since their refusal puts the responsibility of talking on them. However this course gives the Soviets the choice of what we talk about and to that extent is disadvantageous. Even with a reduced schedule we might be faced with eight to ten meetings during the next three weeks in which Western initiative and control would be difficult to maintain.

Finally we could relax somewhat our present sharp focus on control issues and begin talking about the minor things involved in the draft treaty articles that we have already tabled. This would help to avoid the danger of getting prematurely into too detailed discussions on control but would at the same time relax pressures on the Soviets on the key control issues. It would also involve the risk that the Soviets might agree to some of the minor articles which could create a misleading impression of progress in the negotiations and create some awkwardness if our decision is to end up soon.

On balance I believe that from our point of view here a recess of two or three weeks would be the least disadvantageous course of action. I realize that of course you have to take into consideration factors broader than those which influence our thinking here.

Whatever course of action we follow there is one difficulty which I hope we can resolve just as soon as possible. We have of course been careful not to say anything to our British colleagues here about the possibility of a wind-up of this conference. I believe, however, they clearly

sense the fact that we in the past two weeks have not been able to talk with them as frankly as we previously have. We have the impression that as a natural consequence the British delegation here is holding out some of their thinking and not telling us everything that is going on. In spite of some differences of approach we have, during these negotiations, enjoyed the advantage of full and frank cooperation with our British opposite numbers. The fact that we cannot be completely frank with them at this juncture is hurting us now. I hope that in the next day or so we can be authorized to tell them something which will enable them to understand why we must wait for further decisions before we get into some of the questions which they are eager to discuss. I should think it would be at least possible for me to say that we cannot really do anything at all here until after Macmillan's Washington visit. I would hope it would also be possible for me to tell them that there is serious consideration going on in Washington as to whether it is worthwhile to continue the conference at this stage.

Villard

436. Telegram Supnu 325 From Geneva¹

Geneva, March 9, 1959, 7 p.m.

Supnu 325. Eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth. Reference: Supnu 323.

The Sovs today gave what was evidently intended to be an indication of interest in either reducing the number of our scheduled meetings or of having an early recess.

After the regular meeting members of SovDel buttonholed difference members of USDel informally. They all asked whether we thought regular daily meetings were useful since there was obviously so little to talk about now. Tsarapkin asked US staff member what we thought about cutting down meetings to one or two a week and to another member of USDel question was asked what about two meetings a month. Usachev asked Stelle and me what our thinking was about time off for Easter, expressed opinion "US would need perhaps a month to find out where it was going".

¹ Source: Suggests a recess in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-959.

Significance of these Sov questions may of course be primarily along lines of trying to find out what we are going to do and specifically whether early break by US in prospect. But it is difficult to interpret questions as not also indicating possible sov receptivity to idea of recess for period of Macmillan's talks and Easter.

Accordingly we feel today that it might be easier than we had assumed yesterday to secure Sov agreement to a recess of three weeks or so after the next few days.

Since Easter comes on the 29th of month it would seem easy to justify a recess until at least a few days after that date.

As a matter of fact if there is any possibility that the UK position in Washington talks is such that we find it necessary to continue these negotiations for considerable period a recess which lasted for some time after the end of Macmillan visit would be highly opportune. In that event we would need through consultation and decisions as to how we were going to proceed. I feel justified by the Russian questions today and by the possible contingency that there might be a decision for further negotiations to put more strongly the recommendation for an immediate recess with a resumption date which I put forward in my yesterday's message.

Villard

437. Telegram Supnu 328 From Geneva¹

Geneva, March 10, 1959, 6 p.m.

Supnu 328. Eyes only for Herter from Wadsworth.

Attitude of SovDel continues be most friendly and inclined be confidential. In three separate conversations this afternoon after plenary session following points raised and indications made.

1. Tsarapkin approached me and brought up subject of headquarters staffing in most friendly and cooperative way, after which he inquired concerning US plans for tabling further articles and virtually admitted he had no instructions for definite action. Also welcomed idea

¹ Source: Further indications Soviets would agree to a recess. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1059.

no meeting tomorrow, although I carefully did not bring up subject in form of US proposal. He admitted to both Sir Michael Wright and me that about all he was prepared to do in immediate future was to "sit and listen".

2. Vorontsov approached Stelle and indicated same general lack of instructions for constructive activity; jocularly suggested that US and UK get together and resolve their differences; gave indication Sov Del appreciated and sympathized US Del would have to await Macmillan trip Washington before major issues could be decided.

3. Akalovsky overheard Usachev (Sov Del) approach Narayanan (Secretariat) with question re "Easter vacation" plans. Narayanan replied that of course usual procedure Secretariat would be to take off Good Friday and Easter Monday, whereupon Usachev said something about starting Easter vacation on or about the 20th March. Narayanan then noted that this would give Secretariat chance to catch up fully on final version verbatims prior to return after recess.

These additional straws in wind reinforce US Del's conviction that Sov Del definitely stalling for time and would not be averse either drastic reduction in number of plenary meetings or outright recess of considerable length over Easter. They are obviously just "going through motions" and asking questions in order kill time during sessions.

Villard

438. Memorandum From Beckler to Killian¹

Washington, March 11, 1959

SUBJECT

Thoughts on Geneva Follow-Up

1. The conclusions of the Panel on Seismic Improvement with respect to the possibility of concealing underground nuclear tests have fundamentally altered the U.S. position in the Geneva conference. For it now appears that even if the Soviets were to accept our conditions for the monitoring of nuclear testing, there is insufficient technical basis for assuming that a reasonable detection network can be devised to assure high confidence in the detection of clandestine tests. One possible exception to this is the fact that automatic detectors in sufficient density in seismic areas might give high probability of detecting intentionally concealed nuclear tests. Although this possibility needs further investigation and study, it is not clear that we would be prepared to seriously advance this system without actual tests of its reliability and non-jammability. Further, such a system may be unacceptable to the Soviets because of the number of inspections required of the detector sites to assure continuous operation of the stations.

Because the conclusion on concealment fundamentally alters the U.S. position at Geneva, it might be well to reinforce the technical conclusion with further examination by other experts. There were only a few members of the Panel who could professionally participate in the conclusion. It would also be well to involve British experts, such as Penney, not only because of his technical competence but because the conclusion on concealment would undermine the British position in Geneva. It may not be possible to improve the technical basis of the conclusion because the imperfectness of the medium involved, i.e. the earth, will undoubtedly require testing under actual environments to check out the theory.

2. This new development seriously weakens the psychological advantage of the U.S. that might otherwise accrue if we were to break on the basis of the veto issue. It can no longer be maintained that the U.S. would be willing to continue the discussions if the Soviets were to capitulate on the veto issue. Hence, the Soviets would have a good chance of convincing world opinion that U.S. distrust of Soviet motives coupled with an insecure technical position prompted the U.S. to break.

¹ Source: Mitigating effects of withdrawal from nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.

3. Nonetheless, it would seem inevitable that the U.S. must now withdraw or recess from further discussions leading to acceptance of a specific control system until further technical information is at hand that will permit definition of capability of the system in the face of possible concealment through underground and outer space testing. Whether the withdrawal is in the form of a break or recess depends upon the political advantages of dwelling on the veto issue as opposed to leaving a grain of hope that the U.S. has not abandoned the possibility of agreement of an adequate safeguarded inspection plan.

4. Despite the negativeness of a withdrawal of the Geneva discussions, I believe that it is possible to counteract this impression to some extent by working toward a positive program:

a. Propose an agreement (possibly through the U.N.) that all nuclear powers restrict future testing of nuclear weapons in such a way as to avoid further build-up of radioactive contamination in the atmosphere, i.e. underground or at a sufficient distance from the earth.

Because of the unresolved differences of technical opinion between Los Alamos and Livermore on the ability to get adequate diagnostic information from underground testing, it would appear desirable to have an early technical examination of this problem before proposing agreement on underground testing.

b. Consideration should be given to proposing a cooperative research and development program, including U.S., U.K., and USSR, which is designed to further determine effects of nuclear weapons under different geophysical environments and the development of improved equipments for detection of nuclear detonations in such environments. There may be military security aspects that would limit such cooperation, i.e. the need to reveal design information in order to determine detectability, but it is believed that there will be adequate opportunity for a cooperative program without serious compromise of security information. If such a cooperative program were to be seriously considered, it would have to be developed in some detail before final decision on such a proposal.

5. I feel that withdrawal from Geneva coupled with the two positive approaches indicated above will avert a good deal of the pessimism that would attend the failure of the Geneva conference. It could be pointed out that although more work needs to be done to establish the capabilities of detection systems, the U.S. would not be willing regardless of the outcome of such tests to accept a veto by the USSR over the right of inspection of unidentified events. However, it could be pointed out that the U.S. believes that some of the Soviet concerns over inspection could be mitigated by improvement of the detection system to reduce the number of on-site inspections required to identify events as natural or artificial. Through a cooperative research and development program it may be possible for the U.S., U.K., and USSR to draw closer together in defining a system that the Soviets would have sufficient confidence in as to overcome their insistence on the right of veto.

439. Note From Caccia to Herter¹

Washington, March 13, 1959

Dear Chris,

I enclose for your personal information a copy of a letter from the Prime Minister which I have delivered to the President.

Your sincerely

Harold Caccia

Enclosure

Message From Macmillan to Eisenhower

March 13, 1959

TEXT OF MESSAGE

Dear Friend,

I promised to send you an answer as soon as possible to your message of March 9 about the Nuclear Tests Conference.

I have thought over your suggestion carefully. While I would prefer the Conference to carry on with its work, I am prepared to agree that it might recess for a while. I entirely support your view that it must not be a sharp or complete break, and in arranging for any recess, I feel we must take great care to ensure that it is not misinterpreted by the public (and is incapable of being misrepresented by the Russians) as revealing a desire on the part of our two Governments to break off negotiations. I think we both feel that if we can get agreement with the Russians at Geneva on acceptable conditions it would be of real advantage to us all.

I think that in order to prevent our purposes from being misunderstood the recess should occur at a time when it would seem natural. Easter would provide such an occasion, and this suggests a break from March 26. However, I would like to suggest instead that we should aim at a recess from March 20. This would not strain too much the use of Easter as the occasion, but would have the advantage that I should not yet be back from my visit to you. Thus the Russians would have no

¹ Source: Transmits a copy of a letter from Macmillan to Eisenhower agreeing to a recess of nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower.

reason to expect before the recess a formal proposal on the lines of the idea which as I told you in my message of February 24 I had discussed very tentatively and non-committally with Khrushchev, for they must know that I shall want to discuss it with you. A recess beginning only just before Easter and after I am back from Washington would be more awkward.

I suggest therefore that we plan for a recess of three weeks starting from March 20. I think it is most important that at the time of recess we should announce the date of re-assembly, although we might have it in mind to considerably reduce the tempo of the negotiations when they start again. The case would then be an exact parallel to the Christmas recess, when as you remember no anxiety was expressed in any quarter that we might be working for a break.

No doubt you are aware of articles now appearing in the press and suggesting that the Western powers do not want an agreement at Geneva. If we were to recess without a date for re-assembly this speculation would inevitably increase, and we should find ourselves in a bad public position. We do not want people to draw a parallel with the Surprise Attack Conference, which recessed before Christmas without setting a time for its re-assembly; I think the public concludes that the Conference has not died.

Your delegation in Geneva has no doubt reported to you that the Russians there have been making tentative enquiries about the possibilities of a recess. So far our delegation has not had similar enquiries. But I conclude that it might be possible for a recess to be arranged by the three delegations at Geneva. I think this would be a better way to arrange it than by our writing to Khrushchev, because I fear that if we did so he would seize the opportunity to publish a propaganda reply misrepresenting our proposal.

I agree with you that we could profit by a recess to make plain to the world at large the principle which is essential to a sound and acceptable agreement: "an effective international control system not subject to veto or obstruction", as you rightly put it. But I doubt whether it would be wise to have the status of the negotiations discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As our Embassy has told your officials, we are not sure that neutral nations will be so easily convinced of the rightness of the whole of our present position as it stands on the record of the Conference. At any rate, even if we were to secure a favourable verdict in the Disarmament Commission I do not see how, that would help us at Geneva. I think it would on the contrary be likely to make the Russians more difficult and obstinate.

Finally, I must mention a point in your letter with which I do not altogether agree. I do not think that the tentative suggestions which I made to Khrushchev have led the Russians at Geneva to show any

sign that they think we are weakening on the idea of the veto or on the question of controls. I made it clear that we could not accept a veto on the despatch of inspection teams, and that my ideas were designed to do away with the veto on inspection. We attach the utmost importance to control in disarmament matters, and I think that the suggestions I made on inspections do not in any way compromise the principles for further disarmament agreements.

I agree that our suspension of testing should be maintained during the recess. But perhaps the point need not be made to the Russians unless they ask.

I look forward to having your comments soon. If we are to secure a recess from March 20 we shall need to send instructions to our delegations in Geneva promptly.

With warm regards,
As ever,

Harold

Attachment

Message From Eisenhower to Macmillan

March 11, 1959

Dear Harold:

Thank you very much for your informative note after your Paris meeting. The only disagreement that I would have with your description as Eighteenth Century is that I place the period in the "Early Nineteenth."

From what you said I feel there must be some hope of getting a little better expression of intention with respect to De Gaulle's participation in NATO and the use of his Fleet.

I am eagerly looking forward to your arrival, and I only wish that I could take you to a sunny climate rather than to ask you to endure some more of the winter weather that you have encountered during your many travels.

With warm regard,
As ever,

IKE

440. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 13, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian
General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian said that further study had disclosed possible ways of decoupling a seismic signal from an atomic explosion. The use of large cavities would be a way of doing this. For each kiloton of yield a cavity of about 100,000 cubic meters (i.e., about 100 feet in radius) would be required. From the standpoint of monitoring, this presents a very real loophole, in that it becomes difficult to set any kind of a threshold for detectable tests. Accordingly, agreements to suspend testing in the atmosphere, and to limit testing to explosions outside the atmosphere, would seem to be indicated.

It is also technically possible to conduct weapons tests in outer space out to about 180 million miles. Conceivably a satellite detection system could be established that would be capable of detecting unshielded tests out to that distance, but this could be countered by shielding of weapons with lead shields that would prevent detection of tests up to several hundreds of kilotons.

In summary, a system with a low threshold cannot be guaranteed.

The President said he may want to have a session of a couple of hours' duration with Macmillan here next week. He would want Dr. Killian to come up by helicopter.

The President added that he takes with some seriousness Khrushchev's statement that the Soviets are not testing small weapons. He added that this is being carefully studied at his request.

Dr. Killian said that if the Geneva talks should be recessed for political reasons, there are technical reasons supporting a decision to leave open the possibility of exploring techniques of monitoring and inspection, and in particular to see if agreement can be reached on conducting some tests to observe their effects and detectability.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Technical aspects of detecting nuclear testing. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on March 17.

441. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 17, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter
General Goodpaster

The President said there seems to be growing evidence that testing is having bad physiological effects. He referred to recent articles about contamination by strontium 90. He is coming to the conclusion that our position should be that we will not test in the atmosphere. We will leave the underground and outer space tests out of any treaty. His thinking was that we should go for a system which both sides agree would work. To do so we would have to agree that small weapons could be tested under ground and in outer space. In his mind the biggest gain to be derived from such an agreement is the establishment of a system that could operate without veto, on a basis in which both sides could have confidence.

The President said he thought the scientists will in due time come to the position that the large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the northern hemisphere is an impossible solution to military problems. He thinks we must come to a test ban not as extensive as initially planned. Governor Herter said we are studying many combinations. He thought that perhaps we should take out of the treaty any coverage of the underground tests and refer that matter to the United Nations, simply agreeing to atmospheric testing. He thought, however, the Soviets would disagree to this proposal since they are more interested in sweeping pronunciamientos than in tightly designed systems. The President said if we don't try to get an agreement that gives the right of inspection, we really have nothing.

The President next asked as to the status of the Surprise Attack negotiations. Mr. Herter said that he felt that some further studies should be made on the basis of which the negotiations could then go forward. Defense, however, is resisting this proposal at least to the extent that they do not wish studies made by the same group that was in Geneva, but rather by the established agencies. The President asked Mr. Herter for a memorandum on this matter.

The President next suggested that Mr. Herter ask Ambassador Caccia what the British want to take up while they are at Camp David, and

¹ Source: Nuclear testing suspension talks, surprise attack negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on March 20.

Mr. Herter said he would do so. The President pointed out that we can bring additional people up by helicopter while the meetings are going on, but that he felt that the large staffs should be held in Washington.

In concluding, the President said that what would be of value in our negotiations with the Russians is to get anything on which the two sides will agree to in which each has the right to inspect and satisfy itself regarding the performance of the other, even if it is a tiny thing like withdrawal from a twenty-mile zone. If either side has a complaint, it could then bring the matter right out into the open.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

442. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1959, 5:20–5:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary
Governor Herter

Prime Minister Macmillan
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

Our conversation was somewhat rambling and some of it purely anecdotal. The following matters of substance, however, were covered.

I remarked rather jocularly that the press seems to be playing the outcome of the Camp David talks as a “triumph” for the Prime Minister. He and the President both said there is no basis in fact for any such inference.

We discussed the next steps in connection with our reply to the Soviet note of March 2. The President attached importance to getting this reply cleared with the other NATO Governments in Paris and delivered and published prior to his press conference on Wednesday; the Prime Minister shared this view as he expected to have to make a statement in Parliament the same day. I said that I thought it not unlikely the French Government would raise some objection, resulting in delay, primarily to demonstrate their independence of the British and Americans.

¹ Source: German peace treaty; Egyptian-Iraqi relations; nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Personal and Private. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

We discussed the question of composition of prospective meetings with the Soviets, and Mr. Herter recalled that on the question of the German peace treaty, the Soviets had suggested 26 nations be participants. I said, however, that the Soviets had said that if there was an agreement on the full conference that they would then be willing to have a preliminary Four Power conference on this subject, eliminating all other participation in the preliminary meeting.

The President said that over the week end the group had discussed the whole gamut of Soviet probings for weak spots in the free world position. He and the Prime Minister then recounted some of the discussion about the Middle East.

It was the view of Macmillan and Lloyd that Nasser by attempting to array the Arab world against Kassem was forcing him into the hands of the Communists. Actually he was not pro-Communist and had not done anything to intensify his links with Communism during the past few months. The British felt that some one intermediary should be sought who would try to mediate a *modus vivendi* between Nasser and Kassem, whereby both states would exist within the Arab world, without the UAR attempting to dominate or absorb Iraq. I said Italy would perhaps like to play some such role. Lloyd said the Lebanese were, he thought, making this attempt.

I said I felt it was somewhat ominous that we know nothing about what the Soviets were doing in relation to Iraq and Iran. It seemed to me that it was inevitable that they were doing something and that they had momentous plans, and that our lack of any knowledge should not be taken as proof that nothing was going on, but rather should make us more alert.

On the Geneva test suspension negotiations, the President and the Prime Minister noted that the latter attached importance to finding some way to keep these negotiations going after they resume on April 13. He hoped that they could spin out at least until a Foreign Ministers meeting with the Soviets. The President indicated his readiness to conclude an agreement suspending atmospheric tests; he recounted some of the briefing Dr. Killian had given the group at Camp David. This had led him to conclude that any explosion greater than 10 kilotons could be detected; he thought that it might be possible to get Soviet agreement on unmanned instrument detection stations. The reported Soviet "agreement" to our Duration Article makes it appear possible that the Soviets might make further concessions.

I recalled that we have made provision for effective mobile controls the *sine qua non* of any agreement.

The Prime Minister noted that our most recent scientific information suggests that there is a risk of disadvantage to us if the Soviets suddenly give in on the veto issue. Nevertheless, he thought that our gain

would so outweigh any such disadvantage that we ought to assume the risk. The President said that he thought even an agreement limited to atmospheric tests, and including as few as three or four control posts, would be better than no agreement at all. I said that I thought that while our scientists can advise us on the size, composition and nature of controls, they are not in a position to make the required judgment as to the overall value to us of the establishment of mobile control personnel behind the Iron Curtain.

The President said that while he thought there was a clear understanding on both sides as to the different points of view and matters of agreement, the officials would attempt to work out an agreed statement embodying the conclusions. I remarked it would be at this point that the trouble would begin. Macmillan said that what they had in mind was not so much a substantive paper as a procedural paper to cover who was to do what and where. The President said he planned to get together with Macmillan at 4 o'clock Monday afternoon to clear up any final ambiguities, and that the Prime Minister was leaving at 8:30 Tuesday morning.

I referred briefly to my own plans to return to the hospital for a couple of days and the prospect that I might be discharged on Wednesday.

John Foster Dulles

443. Memorandum for the File by McCone¹

Washington, March 23, 1959

Discussion with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd
at Luncheon on March 23, 1959
at British Embassy

After reviewing the March 21st meeting at Camp David on the Geneva Conference, Mr. Lloyd stated he hoped that we would support their proposal for a limited number of on-site inspections as a logical means of solving the impasse on the inspection and veto issue. In answer to a question, Lloyd stated that he felt that 50 inspections per year would be a good number and, in his opinion, about all that the scientists would wish to undertake.

¹ Source: Discussion with Lloyd on nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.

I stated that we did not look with favor on the plan because it would inevitably bring up the issue of the number of inspections with the Soviets unquestionably proposing a very low number, and with our side suggesting a number adequate for reasonable safeguard assurances. I further stated that because of the possibilities of “decoupling effects” together with the general inadequacies of the Geneva system, for reasons explained by Dr. Killian, the number of on-site inspections would necessarily have to be very high to satisfy us. I pointed out that the original Geneva report indicated over one hundred unidentifiable events, later data revised this to about one thousand, and the “decoupling” might raise the figure much higher. Additionally, it seemed to me that an argument over the number of inspections might place us in a bad posture in public opinion.

Lloyd then discussed the possibilities of agreeing to suspension of atmospheric shots only with a very simple and “veto-proof” detection system coupled with a decision to study the underground and high altitude problems for a time, and come to an agreement in these areas when technology is further advanced. I supported this idea stating that I felt Macmillan’s suggestion to me at the conclusion of Saturday’s meeting, that such a proposal might be withheld until the Summit Conference, was an appealing idea. Lloyd said that he had proposed to Macmillan that the Geneva negotiators draft a memorandum setting forth the areas of agreement and the areas of disagreement (the veto being the most important one) and refer the disagreements to the Summit Conference because the Geneva negotiators could not come to agreement. Lloyd left me with the impression he would press for this as a desirable procedure to be followed.

I then asked Lloyd to clarify remarks he made Saturday afternoon concerning the “threshold”. He stated that the British felt that we were negotiating a *complete suspension* and in doing so recognized the detection system *would not be absolute* and that tests in the very low yields *could not be detected* but, nevertheless, they *would* be suspended under the agreement. Lloyd stated that it was his impression and conviction that if the Soviets on April 13 decide they will accept our proposal then we would be foreclosed from any underground testing for the duration of the treaty. He thought that we could not now bring up the “threshold.” I stated his remarks on Saturday had led me to the conclusion that he felt this way, but that *it did not represent our* viewpoint as we felt the threshold problem *was still* to be discussed and concluded.

I think this represents a very important difference of viewpoint between the United States and the British which should be resolved promptly.

444. Memorandum From Berkner to Killian¹

March 24, 1959

SUBJECT

Concealment of Underground Explosions

The Panel on Seismic Improvement, appointed by the Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee, considered the general problem of the concealment of underground nuclear tests at its meeting on 5 and 6 March 1959. The Panel reviewed various proposed methods of concealing underground nuclear tests. The Panel concluded that, on the basis of present knowledge, the most promising approach was the method of reducing the distant seismic signal from an underground explosion by suitable design of the shot chamber. The Panel, therefore, examined this proposal in detail.

The enclosed report by the Panel, "Certain Aspects of the Concealment of Underground Explosions," summarizes the preliminary theoretical analysis of this particular method as well as the possible limitations and deficiencies of the theory. On the basis of this preliminary theoretical analysis, available experimental information, and other practical considerations, the Panel arrived at the following general conclusion on concealment which was included as paragraph 4 (f) in the summary report of the Panel's findings, "Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement," dated March 16, 1959:

"In considering the problem of concealment, the PSI has examined the possibilities of reducing the magnitude of the seismic signal from a nuclear explosion by means of suitable design of the shot chamber. The PSI concludes that it would be possible by this technique to reduce the seismic signal by a factor of ten or more. The seismic signal from one Hardtack II shot (Evans) was ten times less than that from another shot (Tamalpais) of approximately the same yield although no attempt was made to reduce the signal. Moreover, preliminary theoretical studies have shown that it is possible in principle by this technique to reduce the seismic signal from a given yield by a much greater factor than this. In view of the many complexities involved, it is necessary that this theory be tested with appropriately designed experiments to determine how large a decoupling factor can actually be realized in practice. While many of these tests can be carried out with high explosives, complete evaluation of the theory probably cannot be made without nuclear explosions. All possible seismic instrumentation should be employed in connection with such

¹ Source: Transmits report on concealment of underground explosions. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.

tests to assure that adequate data is obtained to assess the phenomena involved and possibly to discover some characteristics which might allow long range detection of such decoupled tests."

(signed)

Lloyd V. Berkner

Chairman, Panel on Seismic Improvement

Enclosure

Report Prepared by the Panel on Seismic Improvement

March 24, 1959

Certain Aspects of the Concealment of Underground Explosions

1. *Method.* It is proposed to reduce the seismic signal from an underground explosion by setting the explosion off in an underground cavity of such size that the pressure on the wall of the cavity never exceeds the plastic yield stress of the surrounding medium. To reduce the pressure on the wall, it is proposed to fill the cavity with gas in such a manner that the explosive force is transmitted by radiation rather than by a gas shock. This requires a light gas such as hydrogen, or reduced gas pressure, or both.

2. *Estimate of Seismic Signal.* The seismic signal generated in the medium has been estimated by applying the theory of elasticity to the medium. This is justified, as the medium never suffers a non-elastic deformation. Elastic theory permits us to calculate the energy per unit frequency $E(\nu)$ for which we find

$$\sqrt{E(\nu)} = \frac{3}{\sqrt{2\pi} \delta^{1/2} c^{5/2}} W(\gamma - 1) \omega \quad (1)$$

where δ is the density of the medium, c its sound velocity, W the energy released in the explosion, γ refers to the equation of the state of the gas and ω is the circular frequency.

It will be noted that (1) is independent of the radius of the hole; once the hole is big enough to insure elasticity of the medium, it no longer matters how big it is chosen. It is further seen that the amplitude of the elastic wave which is proportional to (1) is directly proportional to the energy released and is also proportional to the frequency. The latter dependence will hold as long as the frequency is less than the characteristic frequency of the hole, c/R , where R is

the radius of the hole; the dependence on ω insures small amplitude for low frequency.

We have compared the result (1) with the empirical result from the Rainier experiment. It can be shown again from elastic theory that

$$\sqrt{E(v)} = \sqrt{\frac{\kappa \pi \delta}{c}} r^2 D \omega. \quad (2)$$

where D is the total displacement of the rock measured at a distance r from the explosion. It has been assumed that ω is less than the critical frequency of the wave generated by the explosion, which in the case of Rainier was about $\omega \times = 25 \text{ sec}^{-1}$. In the Rainier experiment, D was observed to be 15 cm. at $r = 110 \text{ m}$. Using this information and the theoretical equation (1) and assuming the medium in which the hole is made to be hard rock of $\delta = 2$, $c = 5 \text{ km/sec}$, we find that the signal (1) is about 700 times smaller than the signal (2).

3. *Detectability.* In the Geneva net of stations one has to rely on receiving signals at distances more than 2000 km. At such distances only frequencies of less than 1 cps can be easily received. If we apply the theoretical factor of 700 and if we assume that the Geneva net can detect explosions of 5 kt and above, then explosions in a cavity could be concealed up to yields of 3.5 megatons. There are other limitations which make it very difficult to use this method of concealment for such large explosions, particularly the size and cost of the required hole which will be discussed below.

If there were a net of auxiliary stations of spacing 170 km, it is expected such a net could detect first motion from 1 kt explosions. Moreover, such a group of stations respond to high frequencies of the order of 10 cps. In this case, the frequency is higher than the critical frequency of an unconcealed 1 kt explosion. Generally in Rainier surroundings the critical frequency is about

$$\omega_x = 5 W^{-1/3} \text{ cps} \quad (3)$$

where W is in kilotons. If $v > v_x$, the concealment factor is reduced to

$$700 \frac{v_x}{v} \quad (4)$$

and therefore at 1 kt to 350. In this case an explosion of 350 kt can be made to look like 1 kt and will therefore be just detectable.

4. *Limitations of the Method.*

a. *Radiation wave.* It seems important to avoid an appreciable material shock wave in the cavity, and thus to use gas at reduced density as described above.

b. *Temperature at wall.* In a cavity designed to have 50 atmospheres static pressure and air at 1/100 normal density, the temperature will

be 10 ev. Such a high temperature may remove solid material from the cavity surface which would come off with appreciable momentum and thus might give a recoil to the wall, which would increase the seismic wave. Estimates indicate that this ablation of the wall is probably not important. If it should turn out to be appreciable, it could be minimized by providing thin foils inside the cavity to absorb some of the heat.

c. *Plastic deformation.* It is important that the wall suffer no appreciable plastic deformation. The elastic behavior of rock is not known to us sufficiently to assess the limitation which this puts on the pressure in the cavity. Experiments would be important.

d. *Cracks in rock.* If the rock wall has cracks that are likely to open on application of internal pressure, this would eliminate the hoop stresses around the cavity and would permit very much larger expansion of the cavity radius. This would increase the signal transmitted to a distance in proportion to the expansion. We are entirely ignorant on the occurrence of cracks in rock, and here again only experiment can determine the limitations from this cause. We believe that it should be permissible in any case to apply a pressure equal to the lithostatic ambient pressure which is about 1 atmosphere per 5 meters depth. It is suggested that salt may be particularly free of cracks, especially if it is leached out by water.

5. *Maximum permissible pressure.* We do not know the maximum pressure in the cavity which is permissible to insure elastic behaviour of the rock. It is important to know this pressure because the cavity volume is inversely proportional to the pressure, and the cost of excavating the cavity will be approximately proportional to its volume. If we assume that 50 atmospheres is a permissible pressure, the required radius will be 33 meters for 1 kt which corresponds to a volume of 150,000 cubic meters.

6. *Deficiencies in the theory.* The following deficiencies in the theory are known to us which can probably be removed by further theoretical work:

a. The generation of surface waves, in particular of a long period, has not been investigated. These waves may be important for detection.

b. The ablation of the surface of the cavity due to high temperature must be determined, in order to assess whether it is necessary to provide foils.

c. A calculation should be made of the effect of shocks in the gas in the cavity. Also, the impulse carried by the expanding bomb material should be considered.

d. It is somewhat remarkable that the shock predicted by our theory is about 30 times less than earth shock observed from air explosions of the same yield. This paradox should be cleared up.

7. *Construction of Cavity.* A hole of one million cubic meters would be required to contain an explosion of about 7 kilotons at 50 atmospheres pressure. One method of obtaining a hole of this size, which has been looked into in a preliminary manner, is to wash it out in a large salt dome. Salt is believed to have the required properties of high strength and freedom from cracks. In addition, there is some experience with excavating large holes in salt by dissolving out the solid material. The principal problem is to locate a salt dome near an adequate supply of water. (This can be sea water.)

An estimate of the cost of excavating such a cavity on an urgent time scale was made in another connection. It was estimated that it would require 6 months to a year to do the excavation and would cost between 4 and 7 million dollars so that the cost is about a million dollars per kiloton if the pressure has to be held to 50 atmospheres. It is probably possible to reduce the cost by increasing the time required, and a much more thorough investigation should be made to establish more accurate costs.

It may be possible to use ice instead of salt for the containing media. This possibility should be investigated since it would increase the availability of sites and may decrease the cost.

8. *Test Requirements.* Because of the potential effect on the capability of a detection system, the Panel recommends an immediate experimental and theoretical program to evaluate quantitatively the possible decoupling by means of a properly designed cavity. The program should include an extensive series of HE tests leading up to full-scale nuclear shots. The HE tests should be closely coordinated with theoretical predictions to provide valuable information for the design of a nuclear test. Final verification that all of the conditions for decoupling are satisfied will undoubtedly require full-scale nuclear shots.

9. *Other Methods.* The Panel has briefly considered a variety of additional concealment methods. These included: the use of noise cover from large earthquakes, from after shock sequences, from artificial explosions, from volcanic explosion, and from local meteorological conditions; the location of test sites to take advantage of such noise cover and to minimize the effectiveness of the control net; the introduction of confusing signals into the network by an explosion pattern; the effect of geologic structures on wave propagation; the possible effects of the surface reflection from flat and curved surfaces

on the initial P wave at distant stations; the possibility of decreasing the initial compression and accentuating the subsequent rarefaction by an array of explosion points; the possibility of producing an initial rarefaction wave by venting a large cavity of high pressure gas in the vicinity of the nuclear explosion; the possibility of venting an underground explosion chamber into tunnels. A quantitative evaluation of these methods requires an extensive experimental and theoretical program. The preliminary examination suggests that many of these methods will make detection and identification substantially more difficult than tests under Rainier conditions. In general, the methods seem to have somewhat compensating disadvantages. Of the many possibilities, the Panel recommends special emphasis in the immediate future be given to the study of the effect of the surface on underground explosions and the possibility of venting the explosion chamber into underground tunnels.

Lloyd V. Berkner, *Chairman*

Hugo Benioff

Hans A. Bethe

W. Maurice Ewing

John Gerrard

David T. Griggs

Jack H. Hamilton

Warren Heckrotte

Montgomery Johnson

Albert Latter

Julius P. Molnar

Walter H. Munk

Jack E. Oliver

Frank Press

Carl F. Romney

Kenneth Street, Jr.

John W. Tukey

445. Memorandum for Killian¹

Washington, March 26, 1959

SUBJECT

Recommendations by Panels on High Altitude Detection and Seismic Improvement

The following recommendations were made by the Panel on High Altitude Detection:

1. We recommend that direct responsibility be assigned for continuing detailed engineering study of the nuclear space test detection system including laboratory development of instrumentation. We should like to emphasize that this need is independent of any pending decisions on the status of the nuclear test program.

2. We recommend that more detailed measurements of space radiations should be incorporated in the satellite and space-probe schedule than are now planned.

3. We recommend that a study be undertaken to consider the detection system (including satellites) required to obtain information on Soviet space tests for intelligence purposes if such tests are legal.

4. We recommend that a brief study be initiated immediately to analyze the compatibility of the missiles and pay-loads considered in this report.

The following principal recommendations are drawn from the reports of the Panel on Seismic Improvement:

1. Steps should be taken to initiate a research program in seismology directed toward the fundamental problems involved in the detection and identification of underground tests. While this program should make use of existing private, university, and government laboratories, it should be viewed as a single package, centrally directed and funded and reviewed by an appropriate advisory committee of scientists.

2. Steps should be taken to initiate a "system development" program, including development of new equipment, actual field trials of significant elements of the system and the planning of operational procedures. Responsibility for "system development" should be assigned to a single, central laboratory.

3. An experimental test program should be undertaken immediately to obtain data under different environmental conditions and to test theories on the possibilities of concealment. While many of these tests can be carried out with HE, complete evaluation probably cannot be made without nuclear explosions.

¹ Source: Recommendations by the Panel on High Altitude Detection and the Panel on Seismic Improvement. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear-Hi-Alt. Misc.

446. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, March 26, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

<i>Dept. of State</i>	<i>White House</i>	<i>CIA</i>
Mr. Herter	Dr. Killian	Mr. Dulles
Ambassador Wadsworth	Mr. Gray	Mr. Brent
Mr. Farley—S/AE	Mr. Keeny	
Mr. Spiers—S/AE		<i>Dept. of Defense</i>
Mr. Baker—S/AE	AEC	Mr. Quarles
	Mr. McCone	
	Mr. Foster	

Mr. Herter said that the purpose of the meeting was to consider our approach at the April 13 resumption of the Geneva negotiations, in the light particularly of the Macmillan-Eisenhower talks and of the recent technical studies completed by Mr. Killian at State Department request. *Mr. Herter* said that there had been considerable discussion during the Macmillan visit of the nuclear test negotiations and that this seemed to be, next to the Summit meeting, the problem of greatest interest to the U.K. Macmillan attaches the greatest importance to reaching some agreement on nuclear tests with the Soviet Union, although he appears to be firm with respect to our position on the veto. *Mr. Herter* said that both Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd had attempted to get our agreement to the idea Macmillan had put to Khrushchev for a ceiling on inspections as a way around the veto problem. Selwyn Lloyd had suggested to Herter the number of 100 inspections per year. However, the U.S. representatives had resisted this suggestion, since adoption of this approach would throw us directly into discussion of the technical issues which would have to be solved before any sound number could be agreed. The second Macmillan suggestion had been that if it proved impossible to get the Soviets to change their position on the veto, the conference would recess after adoption of an agreed report to Governments outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement, with the thought that this subject would be discussed at a Summit conference. Since the U.S. would not accept the idea of an automatic Summit conference, this suggestion has little appeal for us. Accordingly, the

¹ Source: Negotiating tactics for nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

only agreement reached was that there would be further scientific and diplomatic discussions prior to the April 13 resumption. Sir William Penny and Sir Edward Bullard would arrive in Washington on April 2 for the scientific discussions on the Berkner and Panofsky reports. We have a stiff deadline which will require early decisions within the U.S. Government on the approach to be taken on April 13. It was agreed that Dr. Killian would bear the responsibility for conducting the scientific discussions with the British representatives and that the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC would have representatives at these discussions.

Mr. Herter then described the views of the Secretary and the President on the future course of the negotiations. The President feels that any detection system that could be devised would be imperfect and that even if there were no agreed threshold, we should be prepared to reach agreement with the Soviets if they give in on the veto. The President feels that we need to be sure only that there is a reasonable level of deterrence. *Mr. Herter* then read from a memorandum prepared by Mr. Dulles on a subsequent meeting with the President and the Prime Minister, in which Mr. Dulles said that effective mobile inspection would be a sine quo non of agreement. This would be of great political importance. Whereas our scientists can advise us on the size, composition and nature of controls, they are not in a position to make the required judgment as to the over-all value to us of the establishment of mobile control personnel behind the Iron Curtain. Both the President and the Secretary consider this element of the Geneva negotiations of extreme importance for future progress in disarmament. *Dr. Killian* and *Mr. McCone* agreed with this and *Dr. Killian* observed that the problem is how the objective could be accomplished, and what imperfections would be acceptable.

Mr. Herter said that there were two contingencies which must be considered. The first was to consider our position in the event that the Russians stick on the veto. In this case we must decide what our fall-back position would be and when it might be presented. The second contingency would arise in the event that the Soviet Union gave in on the veto. In this case we would have to face the question of how much imperfection we could accept and whether it would be necessary to press for a threshold. *Dr. Killian* said that the British suggestion on the ceiling on inspections would represent a possible approach if it were coupled with a threshold. He said also that we would have to have experimentation in order to test the practical possibilities of concealment by decoupling which were now only theoretical. *Mr. Quarles* said that we should not drop the possibility of a threshold, although he recognized the validity of the tactics of not taking the initiative in proposing it.

Mr. McCone said that he was disturbed by the idea of “deterrence” and thought that this was a new concept which had not been previously discussed. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said that this had been an integral part of our approach from the beginning. *Mr. Farley* said that it had become apparent in his appearances before the Joint Committee and the Humphrey Subcommittee that the inability to achieve 100 percent perfection was recognized. He described the approach presently set forth in the U.S. Annex to the Treaty which involved inspection of only 20% of the unidentified events below five kilotons. The question was not whether the principle of deterrence was acceptable, but what constituted adequate deterrence. *Mr. Herter* said that a decision on the degree of deterrence which we could accept would need to be made only in the event of a change in the Soviet position on the veto. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said that such a change was a distinct possibility in view of the adoption by the conference of a duration article which made withdrawal easy.

Referring to the two contingencies he had described, *Mr. Herter* said that in the event of Soviet sticking on the veto he would prefer to have President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan propose by letter an agreement limited initially to atmospheric tests. He did not personally believe this should be proposed during the course of the present negotiations, but that it should be done immediately after a recess in the negotiations. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said it might be possible after the return of the Delegation to Geneva, when it became apparent that the Soviet position had not changed, to recess the negotiations for this purpose. In any event he did not believe that we should seek an abrupt break in the negotiations, since it would be easy for the Soviets to make it appear that we were responsible for such a break.

Mr. Herter then raised the question of whether we should move to a unilateral cessation of atmospheric tests if the Soviets turned this proposal down. *Dr. Killian* said that this would mean giving up the chance to make a beginning step in arms control. He felt this point was of overwhelming importance since new technological developments in the weapons field will increase the uncertainties and instabilities of the present world situation, and with it the hazards of war. The only way out of this dangerous situation was through some monitored armaments accommodation with the Soviets, and we should not give up this important objective lightly. *Mr. Quarles* said that he agreed with this view. *Dr. Killian* went on to say that the changing situation with regard to the technical aspects of detection and the possibilities of evading detection created a situation which perhaps led to the desirability of seeking an agreement on atmospheric tests first. This initial step could be done, he felt, without giving up the ultimate objective of an

agreement with the Soviet Union to end all tests. This loss might be the consequence of moving to a unilateral proposal. *Mr. Herter* agreed that we could propose to continue negotiations towards the ending of all tests, along with an offer to stop atmospheric tests as the first part of a package. *Dr. Killian* felt that we should not let insistence on mobile inspection hold up whatever progress was possible on limited measures where it was not required. We should do whatever we could on the basis of what was now feasible and should seek an evolutionary development of an inspection system which would extend to cover all tests. *Mr. McCone* said that the AEC would support such an approach. *Ambassador Wadsworth* suggested that the objective should be to seek cessation of all tests as agreement was reached on the appropriate inspection provisions. As part of this approach we could suggest collaboration on a program of underground tests to test improvements in the detection system.

Dr. Killian said that we should arrange for an urgent analysis of whether underground tests would really be useful to the U.S. or to anybody. There was a serious difference of opinion in the scientific community on this point. Another technical problem in connection with ending atmospheric tests was to obtain a definition of where the atmosphere ended, since fallout could result from tests at very high altitudes. *Mr. McCone* said that the AEC was looking into this latter question urgently at State Department request.

After a discussion of whether mobile inspection, even on a very limited basis, would be needed as a part of an atmospheric test agreement, *Dr. Killian* said that the uncertainties without mobile inspection would be minor, and that we should not let the genuine USSR fear of inspection as an instrument of espionage prevent us from getting agreement on atmospheric testing. *Mr. Herter* said that we would be right back where we started if we insisted on mobile inspection in this connection.

The meeting concluded with a discussion about whether the information in the Berkner and Panofsky panel reports should be made public or available to the Congress. It was agreed that the information would be kept classified and that it would be preferable to make available the Panofsky report, which contained Restricted Data, only to the Joint Committee. Consideration should be given to making available the Berkner report and the non-Restricted Data parts of the Panofsky report to the Humphrey Subcommittee on a private basis.

447. Letter From Quarles to Herter¹

Washington, March 26, 1959

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to the 26 February meeting of principals of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Disarmament, at which it was agreed that a Working Group from our staffs would proceed to develop a fall-back position for guidance of the U.S. Delegation and for use in the event of failure to reach agreement at the current Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

It is the view of the Department of Defense that an important first step in developing a fall-back position in the present situation should be the clarification of our basic policy on nuclear weapons test suspension. Then, within the concepts of that policy, the various possible fall-back positions would be explored.

As discussed at the last meeting of the principals, it was understood by the Department of Defense that the following concepts were accepted as a basis for future U.S. policy on nuclear weapon tests in these circumstances:

1. As a result of the Soviet Government conducting a series of nuclear weapons tests 1–3 November 1958 the United States was released from the voluntary suspension announced by the President on 22 August 1958. Nevertheless, the United States should continue to abide by its voluntary suspension until 31 October 1959, with the possible exception of some underground tests to gain data for improving the proposed detection and identification system. (If the USSR should resume testing during this period, our policy should be reviewed in light of the circumstances at that time.)

2. After 31 October 1959, the U.S. should reserve the right to test as we deem necessary, until such time as there is an agreement to discontinue specific types of tests under effective control.

3. The U.S. should take no further unilateral action to deny to ourselves the right to test.

4. The U.S. should enter into no further arrangements whereby we would agree to suspend any types of tests, even though the USSR would do likewise, in the absence of agreement on an effective control system.

¹ Source: U.S. position at resumed nuclear test suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.

5. The U.S. should continue to support agreement to discontinue any types of tests which can and will be controlled effectively by an agreed control system.

6. Any fall-back position:

- a. should be consistent with the foregoing concepts, and
- b. should not be characterized as a change in present policy, but rather as an effort within the context of our present policy to seek agreement for discontinuance of any tests which can be effectively controlled.

It is now understood that agreement on the above concepts, as presented in the Working Group by Department of Defense representatives, is not reflected in the Working Group's evaluation of possible fall-back positions. If the Department of Defense is correct in understanding that these concepts were accepted by the principals at the 26 February meeting, it is considered that the Working Group should be so informed. If that assumption by the Department of Defense is incorrect, then it is recommended that the principals meet at an early date to determine policy concepts for guidance of the Working Group in their consideration of possible fall-back positions.

It is also recommended that our fall-back position be resolved before the end of the present recess on 13 April, in view of possible termination of the Geneva Conference soon thereafter.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

Donald A. Quarles

Acting

Copies to:

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, Central intelligence Agency
Special Assistant to The President for Science and Technology
Special Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy

448. Memorandum From Killian to the Department of State¹

March 31, 1959

SUBJECT

Modification in the Memorandum of Conversation, dated March 26, 1959, on the subject of "Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations"

In the statement attributed to me at the bottom of page 3, I would suggest that the wording be modified as follows:

"Dr. Killian suggested that we should seek a better understanding of the extent to which underground tests would be practical in terms of increased cost, extended development times and yield limitations. There is some difference of technical opinion at the present time about the problems involved in conducting underground tests."

J.R. Killian, Jr.
*Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology*

¹ Source: Suggests change to memorandum of conversation of March 26, 1959. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.

449. Memorandum From Killian to Eisenhower¹

Washington, March 31, 1959

SUBJECT

Technical Factors Relating to Arms Limitation and to the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Cessation

In the attached memorandum I have outlined the principal technical factors which may have a bearing on policy decisions affecting nuclear test negotiations.

On the chance that you may find this summary statement of some help as background material, I send it along but I hasten to point out

¹ Source: Technical factors relating to arms limitation and to the Geneva conference on nuclear test cessation. Secret. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Killian, James R., 1957.

that the views expressed have not been coordinated with the Departments of State or Defense nor with the Atomic Energy Commission.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

Attachment

Memorandum by Killian

March 30, 1959

MEMORANDUM ON SOME TECHNICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN POLICY DECISIONS ON ARMS LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING

The recess of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests with a stated date (April 13) for reconvening, requires the United States Government to re-examine its policy positions with respect to these negotiations.

This memorandum deals with my personal summary of the technical considerations which have a bearing on these policy questions. In discussing the technical factors, I recognize that they probably are of secondary importance to political and policy objectives.

Trends in Military Technology

Let me first point out how current trends in military technology emphasize the urgent importance of arms limitation of some kind. While deeply convinced that we must be unremittingly alert to keep ahead in our military technology, I also must conclude, in the light of factors mentioned below, that I see little opportunity to simplify the complexity of our military technology, to reduce the burden of defense, or to achieve a stable condition by means of military technology alone. On the contrary, the trend of technological measures and countermeasures will steadily complicate our defense, augment instability, and increase the cost of maintaining the relative strength we need.

We see this trend clearly revealed in our needs to make our strategic striking power, both aircraft and missiles, less vulnerable to surprise by dispersal, hardening, and shorter reaction times (including ground alert and possibly some degree of air alert). We see it clearly in the changing requirements of air and missile defense as typified by the problems associated with the Sage system and Bomarc, with Nike-Zeus, ballistic missile early warning systems, antisubmarine warfare systems, and with requirements for more comprehensive communications systems.

We see further evidence in the effort to improve the yield-to-weight ratio of atomic weapons, and in the developing program for using space and space vehicles for military purposes. The possibilities for military technology in modifying the geophysical environment of the earth are illustrated in the possibilities (remote) now envisaged for weather modification and by the results of Argus and other high-altitude experiments.

As military technology moves toward more systems operating on a global scale, and as it begins to make use of extraterrestrial space and effects, and as the time-scale becomes more condensed, we face the requirement for weapons systems, offensive and defensive, of increasing performance and complexity. Because of rapid technological change, we see the new systems overlapping with quickly obsolescing older ones and we see the consequent possibilities of systems being piled upon systems.

As complexity increases, the chances for error or aberrations on the part of humans and machines grow greater, and the consequences of such errors and aberrations (e.g., accidental war) become enormous. The shortened time-scale also reduces the opportunity for careful judgment by increasing the rewards for spontaneous response.

The overriding technological fact, however, is the continued build-up of improved high-performance nuclear weapons on both sides to make possible catastrophic effects if they are used in massive attacks.

Another technical factor involving uncertainties is the problem of fallout. The biological effects of radiation involve uncertainties, particularly in the genetic area, and we may possibly face a growing body of sober scientific judgment that the fallout hazard is greater than we now believe.

The profound over-all effect of these trends points to the great urgency and importance of our diligently and creatively seeking methods of arms limitation—limitation which will not weaken our position relative to the Soviets.

Some Technical Aspects of Arms Limitation

If progress is to be made in *any* kind of arms limitation (such as reducing the hazard of surprise attack or limiting the production of fissionable material or any other form of limitation), the agreements for such limitation will have to be accompanied by some form of monitoring to assure both sides that agreements are being carried out. We have so far held steadfastly to the principle that arms limitations agreements must be monitored. If we are to achieve such agreements and preserve this principle, then we will certainly be faced with the design of monitoring and inspection systems that will have to fulfill technical, military and political requirements.

While the discontinuance or limitation of nuclear tests are not, except in a limited way, disarmament measures, they do have a special importance in establishing the principle and techniques and practice of monitoring agreements. On the technical side, and perhaps on the military and political sides too, we have given more study and thought to monitoring and inspection systems for the control of nuclear tests than we have for any aspect of arms limitation. We probably have a better chance for arriving at some acceptable arrangement for monitoring and inspection of nuclear tests than we have for any other form of arms limitation. This was illustrated by the difficulties encountered in the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack. A monitoring and *inspection* system for nuclear tests is likely to be simpler and more achievable than a monitoring and inspection system for surprise attack. We are not only further advanced in the technical aspects of the problem, but we have large pressures of world opinion favoring the achievement of such an agreement.

What Do We Do About the Geneva Negotiations?

Let me now turn specifically to the problems associated with our negotiations on the limitation or discontinuance of nuclear tests. We must recognize that new data secured in the Hardtack II tests, together with conclusions reached in recent studies on underground testing and on testing in outer space, leave us in a position where the system agreed to last summer at the Conference of Experts involves more substantial and significant uncertainties than believed at the time. While the Panel on Seismic Improvement has concluded that the Geneva system can be substantially restored to its originally-conceived capability, they also concluded that by deliberate concealment it would be possible to reduce the signal from an underground explosion by a factor of 10 or more and that, in theory at least, the signal might be reduced by a much larger factor than this. It is, therefore, impossible—without further tests—to give any firm estimate of the capability of the Geneva system for underground tests. This does not mean that such a firm estimate may not be achievable in the foreseeable future.

The Panel on High Altitude Detection indicated the technical feasibility of testing in outer space, as well as the technical feasibility of a system to detect these tests. Such a system would have a detection threshold which would be as high as a few hundred kilotons if the violator of the agreement resorted to very expensive measures to try to achieve concealment.

The reports of these two panels represent as good a discussion of the technical possibilities as could be achieved in the time available. They emphasize that continuing studies and experiments on a reasonable scale are needed for the further understanding of test detection and for the

understanding of concealment possibilities. It was clear from the findings of both panels that attempts to conceal tests, either underground or in outer space, would be very costly.

The Concept of Probability or Calculated Risk

In our policy-making, we should recognize that no technological system is going to be perfect or absolute in its performance. We must consider the effect of such technological inspection systems in terms of probability and consider their restraining value on the basis of an estimated probability to detect within stipulated limits.

In a world of rapidly-changing technology, it may be impossible to devise fool-proof monitoring systems—either for nuclear test cessation or for other forms of agreed arms limitation. The most that these systems may accomplish will be to make evasion very costly and very uncertain. These may be the principal functions of monitoring systems. Hence, if they are to be of maximum use to us, they would have to be supplemented by highly-developed intelligence systems of our own and with appropriate military measures.

Political-Technical Factors in Geneva Negotiations

The current Geneva negotiations indicate that there are very great difficulties in reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets on the critical questions of voting, staffing, and inspection. The present Soviet position on these questions is clearly unacceptable since it would eliminate even the deterrent effect of the Geneva System. We should not seek to find our way out of the present impasse in Geneva by relaxing our requirements on the critical political aspects of the control organization.

It would, therefore, seem desirable at this stage to draw back from our original efforts to achieve a system as comprehensive as that discussed by the Geneva Conference of Experts last summer and to settle for some more limited form of test agreement that would simplify both the technical and political requirements of the control organization. The most obvious possible alternative approach would be to seek an agreement which would provide for no testing in the atmosphere but would permit testing underground and at high altitudes. The timing and method of introducing this alternative is not dealt with here.

It would seem important that if we seek to agree to exclude atmospheric testing that we propose doing so by formal agreement (rather than by unilateral action) which involves some system of monitoring and which thus preserves the principle of monitoring and, perhaps, inspection and provides experience with such a system.

Such an agreement might include specific provisions for a phased, evolutionary extension of the test ban to include coverage of testing

underground and at high altitudes when controls adequate to detect such tests become technically available. Research to develop this more extensive control organization might well be made a responsibility of the control organization itself.

If our decision is to proceed in this direction, it is important that we make an early technical analysis to determine what we mean by the "atmosphere." In view of the present discussion about fallout from the stratosphere, it seems clear that a system to limit testing to the troposphere will neither solve the fallout problem nor alleviate public concern about this problem. Some radioactivity will return to earth from tests conducted out to a distance of many thousands of miles. The limit of the "atmosphere" will probably be difficult to establish.

It is also possible that an agreement not to test in the atmosphere might be accompanied by an agreement to conduct explosions in outer space only under internationally-supervised conditions, or alternatively, it is possible to define somewhat sharply the outer limits of the atmosphere and assume that unilaterally-planned testing will take place beyond that altitude. There are other kinds of technical problems that would need to be resolved, such as the conduct of explosions lightly covered with earth, or explosions under water.

It is reasonably certain, however, that these technical matters can be satisfactorily resolved from the U.S. point of view and that it would be possible to suggest a monitoring system that would be relatively simple and that would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the requirement for inspection teams and the fear that they would be used for purposes of espionage.

However, before proposing such an agreement, I believe we should know, more clearly than we do now, the effect of this type of agreement on our own weapons program. Specifically, estimates should be made as to the additional costs involved and the usefulness of data obtained if our test program were to continue at its present rate and all tests were conducted either underground or in outer space. In addition, we should examine carefully the effect of an atmosphere test ban on our anti-intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system testing.

Sustained Disarmament Studies

The complexities inherent in understanding the monitoring of arms limitation agreements and the great importance of our achieving a thorough understanding of what is to our advantage or disadvantage suggest the importance to the United States of undertaking systematic and sustained studies of the technical, military, and political aspects of arms limitation. Our experience in the Geneva Conference on Reducing the Hazards of Surprise Attack pointed up the deficiencies of ad hoc and hurried preparation for such negotiations.

Even though an agreement for limited nuclear test cessation remains our first goal, we should look beyond this. We might well direct our studies and planning toward a possible reduction in the advanced means or *delivery* of nuclear weapons. This may be a more practical objective than control of nuclear weapons stockpiles and production.

A small but important beginning was made in this direction by the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack. The failure of this conference should not deter further efforts. It seems especially urgent that we proceed with further studies of ways to reduce the hazards of surprise attack.

We must also undertake studies and experiments to improve our capacity to detect tests other than in the atmosphere (as, for example, in outer space), even if we achieve no agreements. The research and experiments recommended by the Panel on Seismic Improvement and the Panel on High Altitude Detection should be carefully considered and followed up as a part of our long-term effort to advance the technology of detection.

Summary

The trends in military technology, together with the threat of catastrophic war, in the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems emphasize the overwhelming importance of seeking sound ways of limiting armaments. The possibilities of uncertainties in scientific estimates of biological effects of radiation hazards should be kept in mind in formulating policy.

Since any kind of arms limitation will probably have to be accompanied by a monitoring system, it is important to establish the principle of monitoring and inspection and to achieve an agreement which will give us experience in monitoring. The monitoring of nuclear tests has received more study and is more thoroughly understood than any other arms limitation monitoring. This is an added reason for seeking an agreement for the limitation of atomic tests.

It would seem technically feasible to achieve a sound agreement that would involve the stoppage of tests in the atmosphere, this stoppage to be subject to monitoring through an agreement. Such an agreement might provide for the evolutionary development of improved detection systems for underground and outer-space testing. If we are to seek this kind of modified test limitation agreement, we should at once clarify the technical premises for such an agreement.

We also need to organize and pursue on a sustained basis creative efforts to understand the technical, military, and political aspects of arms limitation of other kinds than nuclear tests cessation.

D.E.

450. Memorandum of Conversation¹

USDel/MC/12

Washington, April 4, 1959, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom:
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir William Penney
Mr. John Roper

Department of State:
Mr. Christian Herter
Amb. James J. Wadsworth
Mr. Philip J. Farley—S/AE
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers

Mr. Lloyd suggested that the discussion begin with a consideration of our position when the Geneva nuclear test negotiations resume April 13. *Mr. Herter* asked Sir William Penney to report on his impressions of the technical position he found in his discussion with U.S. scientists this week. *Sir William* said that the most important issue related to the possibilities of decoupling or concealment. He said that he had carefully reviewed the theoretical treatment of the U.S. scientists which he found accurate and "almost certainly right". However, there were many uncertainties in geophysics and it was impossible to tell whether what was theoretically possible would be possible in practice. He strongly supported the idea of a testing program to check on the theoretical possibilities of decoupling as well as on improvements in instrumentation worked out by Berkner and his panel. He did not know whether nuclear tests should be part of this program or whether high explosive detonations would be sufficient. This was a question with many political implications.

Mr. Lloyd said that, as he understood it, it now appeared that there would be no certainty of detecting underground tests under 50 kilotons or more. *Mr. Herter* said that this brought us to the problem of what our position would be if the Soviets dropped their veto demands, and whether there would be a sufficient deterrent to violation to make it possible for us to accept the agreement. *Mr. Herter* said that we had this afternoon despatched a letter from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan regarding our position on April 13, a copy of which he handed to Mr. Lloyd. After reading the letter *Mr. Lloyd* asked whether the following sentence in the draft letter to Khrushchev was not somewhat disingenuous: "If you are prepared

¹ Source: Nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

to change your present position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can of course proceed promptly to conclude negotiation of a comprehensive agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests." *Mr. Herter* said that if the USSR were to change its position on the points cited, the U.S. would be willing to negotiate an agreement on the cessation of all tests. We had never thought a fool-proof agreement possible. What we were seeking to create was a level of risk for the potential violator sufficient to deter him from violating. He pointed out that we were now, under the terms of the Annex we had proposed in Geneva, prepared to accept inspection of 20 per cent of the underground tests below 5 kilotons. This was a concrete example of the approach of deterrence. *Mr. Lloyd* said that he considered this a quite adequate level for deterrence. *Mr. William Penney* and *Amb. Caccia* thought the general approach presented in the letter to Macmillan was excellent.

Mr. Herter then handed *Mr. Lloyd* copies of a draft statement to be made by *Amb. Wadsworth* at the opening meeting. He explained that this statement had not been fully cleared within the U.S. Government, but that it would be useful to the British in understanding the approach we suggest.

Sir William Penney said that in his view the basic question to be answered if this approach were taken was whether we would resume underground testing. If this was the case the position might be difficult to put across, since it would be pictured as a stratagem intended to permit continued weapons testing. *Mr. Herter* said that we would certainly not resume underground testing before October 31. *Sir William* suggested that the Soviets would also claim that there needed to be no further controls than those already in existence if the agreement were limited to atmospheric tests. A final technical question which would need to be resolved would be the definition of the upper limit of the atmosphere. He was satisfied with the American position of using the 50 kilometer figure set forth in the Genova experts' report, but felt it would be necessary also to state that we would do no extra-atmospheric testing while we were working out the control schemes.

Mr. Lloyd stated that the British would give careful study to the American suggestions and respond promptly.

451. Memorandum From Herter to Eisenhower¹

Washington, April 4, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

I am enclosing for your consideration a draft letter to Prime Minister Macmillan suggesting the position we should take when the Geneva nuclear test negotiations resume on April 13th.

This letter proposes that on the day the negotiations resume we state our willingness, if the Soviets continue to be unready to abandon their position on the veto over mobile inspection, to agree to put the test ban into effect in stages. The first step would be a ban on tests in the earth's atmosphere under simple controls, and underground and outer space tests would be suspended also when agreement is reached in these negotiations or in the control commission on the required control measures for these tests. At the same time we would reaffirm our readiness to reach agreement on a full test ban, if the USSR is ready to abandon its position on the veto and its refusal to consider the relevant technical problems of underground and outer space test detection.

You have already approved the atmospheric test ban proposal as a fallback position. The proposed letter sets forth the reasons for which we believe the proposal should be made on the first day of the Conference.

If you approve this letter, I will discuss this matter with Selwyn Lloyd on Saturday, April 4th.

Christian A. Herter
Acting Secretary of State

Enclosure**Draft Letter From Eisenhower and Macmillan to Khrushchev**

April 4, 1959

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Today the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests are resuming. During the recess I have considered where

¹ Source: Transmits a draft letter to Macmillan suggesting a position to take in nuclear test suspension negotiations. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, April 1959.

we stand in these negotiations and what the prospects are for the successful conclusion which I earnestly desire. I have also talked with Prime Minister Macmillan, who reported to me on his frank discussions of this matter with you.

The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We believe that this would be an important step toward reduction of international tensions and would open the way to further agreement on substantial measures of disarmament.

[Illegible in the original] Such an agreement must, however, be subject to fully effective safeguards to insure the security interests of all parties, and we believe that present proposals of the Soviet Union fall short of providing assurance of the type of effective control in which all parties can have confidence. Therefore no basis for agreement is now in sight.

In my view these negotiations must not be permitted completely to fail. If indeed the Soviet Union insists on the veto on the fact-finding activities of the control system with regard to possible underground detonations, I believe that there is a way in which we can hold fast to the progress already made in these negotiations and no longer delay in putting into effect the initial agreements which are within our grasp. Could we not, Mr. Chairman, put the agreement into effect in phases beginning with a prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere? This would require a simplified control system not involving the mobile on-site inspection which has created the major stumbling block in the negotiations so far.

My representative is putting forward this suggestion in Geneva today. I urge your serious consideration of this possible course of action. If you are prepared to change your present position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection and on early discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can of course proceed promptly to conclude negotiations of a comprehensive agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. If you are not yet ready to go this far, then I propose that we take the first and readily attainable step while the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer space tests are being resolved. If we could agree to such initial implementation of the first phase of a test suspension agreement, our negotiators could continue to explore with new hope the political and technical problems involved in extending the agreement as quickly as possible to cover all nuclear weapons tests. In the meanwhile, the world would have assurance that nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere with their attendant addition to levels of radio-activity had been discontinued, and we would be gaining practical experience and confidence in the operation of an international control system.

I trust that one of these paths to agreement will commend itself to you and permit the resuming negotiations to make at least an initial response to the hopes of mankind.

End message to Mr. K.

Enclosure

Draft Letter From Eisenhower to Macmillan

Dear Harold:

One of the most heartening aspects of our talks here was the accord we found in our strong convictions as to the importance of the negotiations in Geneva for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. These talks offer the one early possibility for a first step toward enforceable disarmament and toward control over the future development and spread of modern means of destruction.

I have been giving further thought to what we might do to revitalize these negotiations. I believe it is important to give a note of hope to the talks. We cannot achieve this merely by resuming interminable wranglings over the veto and the composition of inspection teams. If that is what faces our negotiators, then I think there will be increasing discouragement in our own countries and throughout the world.

What we might do is make clear immediately that these important differences in approach need not be a bar to putting into effect promptly the elements of a control system which are not in dispute—control posts and agreed aircraft flights, together with the banning of the atmospheric tests which these elements can adequately monitor. As fast as the political and technical problems of monitoring underground and outer space tests are worked out, an initial agreement would, of course, be broadened to include these also.

What I propose is the very opposite of an ultimatum. We would make clear by our statements and actions that we are prepared and determined to continue negotiating a comprehensive test suspension agreement. We would simply be offering a way to get started promptly in a limited area of agreement, if the Soviets remain adamant on the veto. Indeed, between us, I think that advancing such a reasonable alternative course of action may be the only effective way to test the real Soviet position on the veto.

The Soviets are no doubt considering their own moves. We should act when talks resume on April 13th if we are to retain leadership and to take action to restore a sense of purpose and hope in the negotiations.

Our representatives might make carefully prepared statements at the opening session in Geneva on April 13th, recapitulating the progress and difficulties in the negotiations, and pointing out the possibility of action to capitalize immediately on the areas of agreement already reached or in prospect.

Simultaneously letters from you and me to Premier Khrushchev, perhaps along the lines of the enclosed draft, might be delivered in Moscow endorsing the approach. In order that our suggestion might not seem to be advanced as a propagandistic gesture, it might be made privately and released publicly only after sufficient time for a Soviet response—unless, of course, a premature leak forces our hand.

These thoughts are being discussed here with Selwyn and your Embassy. Because I believe we have an opportunity to give a new and sounder impulse to these negotiations, I wanted to bring them to your attention directly and to hear your views.

With warm regard

As ever,

452. Telegram 8816 to London¹

Washington, April 4, 1959, 3:38 p.m.

8816. Following is text of message to Prime Minister Macmillan from President for immediate delivery. Advise date and time of delivery.

QUOTE. April 4, 1959

Dear Harold:

One of the most heartening aspects of our talks here was the accord we found in our strong convictions as to the importance of the negotiations in Geneva for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. These talks offer the one early possibility for a first step toward enforceable disarmament and toward control over the future development and spread of modern means of destruction.

I have been giving further thought to what we might do to revitalize these negotiations. I believe it is important to give a note of hope

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan on nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan.

to the talks. We cannot achieve this merely by resuming interminable wranglings over the veto and the composition of inspection teams. If that is what faces our negotiators then I think there will be increasing discouragement in our own countries and throughout the world.

What we might do is make clear immediately that these important differences in approach need not be a bar to putting into effect promptly the elements of a control system which are not in dispute—control posts and agreed aircraft flights, together with the banning of the atmospheric tests which these elements can adequately monitor. As fast as the political and technical problems of monitoring underground and outer space tests are worked out, an initial agreement would, of course, be broadened to include these also.

What I propose is the very opposite of an ultimatum. We would make clear by our statements and actions that we are prepared and determined to continue negotiating a comprehensive test suspension agreement. We would simply be offering a way to get started promptly in a limited area of agreement, if the Soviets remain adamant on the veto. Indeed, between us, I think that advancing such a reasonable alternative course of action may be the only effective way to test the real Soviet position on the veto.

The Soviets are no doubt considering their own moves. We should act when talks resume on April 13, if we are to retain leadership and to take action to restore a sense of purpose and hope in the negotiations. Our representatives might make carefully prepared statements at the opening session in Geneva on April 13, recapitulating the progress and difficulties in the negotiations, and pointing out the possibility of action to capitalize immediately on the areas of agreement already reached or in prospect.

Simultaneously letters from you and me to Premier Khrushchev, perhaps along the lines of the enclosed draft, might be delivered in Moscow endorsing the approach. In order that our suggestion might not seem to be advanced as a propagandistic gesture, it might be made privately and released publicly only after sufficient time for a Soviet response—unless, of course, a premature leak forces our hand.

These thoughts are being discussed here with Selwyn and your Embassy. Because I believe we have an opportunity to give a new and sounder impulse to these negotiations, I wanted to bring them to your attention directly and to hear your views.

With warm regard

As ever,

Ike

Enclosure

Draft Letter to Khrushchev

DRAFT LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Today the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests are resuming. During the recess I have considered where we stand in these negotiations and what the prospects are for the successful conclusion which I earnestly desire. I have also talked with Prime Minister Macmillan, who reported to me on his frank discussions of this matter with you.

The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We believe that this would be an important step toward reduction of international tensions and would open the way to further agreement on substantial measures of disarmament.

Such an agreement must, however, be subject to fully effective safeguards to insure the security interests of all parties, and we believe that present proposals of the Soviet Union fall short of providing assurance of the type of effective control in which all parties can have confidence. Therefore, no basis for agreement is now in sight.

In my view, these negotiations must not be permitted completely to fail. If indeed the Soviet Union insists on the veto on the fact finding activities of the control system with regard to possible underground detonations, I believe there is a way in which we can hold fast to the progress already made in these negotiations and no longer delay in putting into effect the initial agreements which are within our grasp. Could we not, Mr. Chairman, put the agreement into effect in phases beginning with a prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere? This would require a simplified control system not involving the mobile on-site inspection which has created the major stumbling block in the negotiations so far.

My representative is putting forward this suggestion in Geneva today. I urge your serious consideration of this possible course of action. If you are prepared to change your present position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can of course proceed promptly to conclude negotiation of a comprehensive agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. If you are not yet ready to go this far, then I propose that we take the first and readily attainable step while the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer space tests are being resolved. If we could agree to such initial implementation of the first phase of a test suspension agreement, our negotiators could continue to explore with new hope the

political and technical problems involved in extending the agreement as quickly as possible to cover all nuclear weapons tests. In the meanwhile, the world would have assurance that nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere with their attendant addition to levels of radioactivity had been discontinued, and we would be gaining practical experience and confidence in the operation of an international control system.

I trust that one of these paths to agreement will commend itself to you and permit the resuming negotiations to make at least an initial response to the hopes of mankind. UNQUOTE.

OBSERVE PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Herter
Acting

453. Letter From McCone to Herter¹

Washington, April 4, 1959

Dear Chris:

I have noted your letter of March 28 to the President reporting on our meeting of the previous day during which we discussed the Geneva negotiations.

I agree with points 1 and 2 as stated in your letter. With respect to point 3, the final sentence in the paragraph concerns me. This sentence states, "A limited program for underground testing, perhaps under international participation, might be undertaken as part of this effort to see whether the problem of detecting underground tests might be simplified." While we agree completely with the idea of international participation in a program to prove underground detection methods, we feel that during this period when investigations are being made and improved monitoring systems developed and installed, we must be free to carry out essential weapons tests which are not forbidden by treaty and which do not contribute to atmospheric fallout.

To do otherwise would permit the Soviets unrestricted latitude for weapons development through underground, and possibly higher altitude, testing during a period when we would be deprived by our own injunction of opportunity to advance our own weapons program. I

¹ Source: Believes U.S. should test during interim period; U.S. should not accept a detection system that only deters testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-459.

thought all in the meeting were agreed on this point. However, the wording of the sentence of your letter as noted above gives me concern that some might feel that the testing during the period of experimentation would be limited to shots made solely and exclusively for the purpose of developing the detection system. Mr. Farley tells me this was not the intent of this sentence in paragraph 3 but, nevertheless, I felt you should be advised of the AEC position which we feel must be maintained by our negotiators because of the very important weapons developments that will accrue to either side from tests during the two or three year period set aside for experimentation and research.

Your item 4 at the top of page 2 concerns us. It seems to establish the principle of accepting a very inadequate monitoring system on the theory that, because the system may detect a forbidden explosion, a party to the treaty will be deterred from violation. If you will recall, I said at the meeting, and several others agreed, that it seemed to me it would be a major departure if we were to accept a system having just sufficient capability to act as merely a “deterrent” in lieu of an effective monitoring and inspection system. This idea departs from authoritative statements, all of which have supported the idea that we shall accept the suspension of such tests as can be policed by an effective monitoring system that would have a high probability of proving any violation. If we are now to accept the “deterrent” theory, we are talking about something very different which will call for a change in our public position as well as our representation to Congress.

The Commission feels that such a move would be a serious mistake and we urge that our negotiators in Geneva be instructed not to accept an arrangement based on the theory of “deterrence” rather than adequate policing.

Our notes on the meeting listed as inconclusive discussions covering the following topics: a treaty based upon “an effective inspection system” as compared to one that was deemed to be “an effective deterrent”. — From these notes you can see that we did not feel there was agreement in the meeting on the so-called “deterrent theory”.

We consider these two matters I have discussed above to be of the utmost importance. We recommend, therefore, that your letter to the President of March 28 be supplemented to reflect these points.

Sincerely,

John A. McCone

454. Memorandum From Killian to Gray¹

Washington, April 7, 1959

SUBJECT

Limitation and Control of Armaments

At its meeting on 16 and 17 March 1959, the President's Science Advisory Committee considered the need for developing a more thorough understanding of the military and technical aspects of international agreements aimed at the limitation and control of armaments. The Committee was deeply concerned by the fact that at present no organization within the United States Government is conducting systematic and continuing studies on this problem, which the Committee recognized as one of great importance and complexity.

The Committee was impressed by the requirements for technical studies on the limitation and control of armaments, not only to understand the effectiveness of available technical means for carrying out possible inspection and control concepts but also to understand the implications of the objectives desired and the effects on national security of the various measures that might be proposed to attain these objectives. The Committee concluded that in considering these problems it is necessary not only to cover existing military forces and inspection techniques but also to lay great stress on the effect of changing technology on military forces and operations and on the techniques of monitoring agreements.

The Geneva Conferences on Surprise Attack and the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests have demonstrated the great importance of adequate preparation for discussion of these complex problems at international conferences. The various departments of government and the scientific community cooperated exceedingly well in the technical studies undertaken immediately prior to these conferences. It is clear, however, that it is not possible either to understand specific proposals and alternatives adequately or to develop an integrated national policy on the limitation and control of armaments by means of such periodic ad hoc studies conducted under the pressure of impending negotiations.

An effective study program on this problem should not be limited to purely theoretical considerations but should include the conduct of research and experimentation in order to permit the development and evaluation of technical means for control and inspection. As a specific example, the recommendations in the recent reports by the Panel on

¹ Source: Recommends systematic study on military and technical aspects of arms control. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

Seismic Improvement and the Panel on High Altitude Detection clearly demonstrate the need for a program of creative research and experimentation if the capabilities and limitations of systems designed to detect and identify nuclear explosions are to be adequately understood.

While the Committee's immediate concern is with the scientific and technical aspects of this problem, it recognizes that the understanding of this problem from the point of view of national security requires the integrated study of a combination of military, technical, and political factors. It seems clear that there is no single department in government with the combination of technical, military, and political resources to study all of these factors in depth or arrive at fully integrated judgments on the entire problem. The resulting organizational problems must be successfully resolved in order for studies in this area to be really responsive to the needs of policy decisions on questions of the limitation and control of armaments.

The President's Science Advisory Committee recommends that steps be taken to initiate a sustained program of systematic study, including appropriate research and experimentation, on the military and technical aspects of possible international agreements concerned with the limitation and control of armaments and that consideration be given to the manner in which this program can be most effectively organized and conducted.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

455. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 7, 1959

SUBJECT

Surprise Attack Study

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Mr. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Quarles outlined the thinking of the Department of Defense regarding the proposed surprise attack study, as presented in his letter

¹ Source: Discussion of proposed surprise attack study. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

of March 10 to the Secretary of State. He emphasized particularly the way in which the proposed terms of reference for the surprise attack study broadened out into basic disarmament issues and the need for a review of present U.S. disarmament policy. He stressed also the special interest of the Departments of State and Defense in disarmament matters.

Mr. Herter said that he personally had come to the conclusion that it was important to have a review of U.S. disarmament policy. A very practical problem was that it was difficult for the State Department to release the type of officer needed for such a fundamental policy review in view of the existing demands on the personnel of the Department and the limitations of funds. For this reason, among others, the Department had been eager to take advantage of the interest shown by Mr. William Foster in pursuing the avenues of study opened up during the surprise attack conference with the Soviet Union and the preceding period of preparation. Mr. Farley pointed out that the Department's proposal for a study specifically directed at the surprise attack problem was motivated by the considerations that the surprise attack talks with the Soviet Union were formally in recess rather than broken off and that we needed to be prepared in event there was occasion to resume them; in addition, the study would be useful since it bore on many of the problems now being considered in connection with the European security aspects of forthcoming negotiations.

Mr. Quarles expressed appreciation for the staffing problem for any broad disarmament review. He thought that the Department of Defense might be able to help in finding the funds for outside consultants or participants and that studies which the State Department desired might be placed with such organizations as the Rand Corporation if State Department funds for this purpose were not available. With regard to Mr. Farley's point, he raised the possibility that, in the broad disarmament policy review, special early attention might be given to the surprise attack aspects.

Mr. Herter suggested that as a next steps a draft terms of reference be drawn up for a broad disarmament policy review.

456. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 7, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Mr. Farley, S/AE

Mr. Quarles read through the letter of April 4 from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan, enclosing a draft letter to Khrushchev on the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. Mr. Quarles said that, as Mr. Herter and Mr. Farley were aware, he personally had reservations regarding the proposed tactics of suggesting the possibility of a controlled agreement for suspension of atmospheric tests. He thought that our present public posture was excellent and that introducing this modified proposal would enable the Soviet Union to “shift the monkey to our backs” and place the blame for failure to reach a comprehensive test suspension on us. Mr. Herter said that he felt, with increased concern about fallout and the Soviet obstinacy on the veto, the Soviet Union would be placed in a very difficult position if we made this modified proposal.

Mr. Herter summarized for Mr. Quarles his conversation with the President regarding the philosophy of “deterrence” with regard to an adequate control system for a nuclear test suspension.

¹ Source: Letter to Macmillan; concept of deterrence. Secret; Limited Distribution. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

457. Letter From Herter to McCone¹

Washington, April 8, 1959

Dear John:

I appreciate your bringing to my attention the points in your letter of April 4, which are very important ones in our thinking about the next steps in the Geneva negotiations.

You ask the intent of the sentence in my letter to the President of March 28 which states "A limited program for underground testing, perhaps under international participation, might be undertaken as part of this effort to see whether the problem of detecting underground tests might be simplified." This sentence was included in order to record the principle that, in event of an atmospheric test ban, there should be underground nuclear experiments in order to learn more about the detection problem. There was absolutely no intention to imply that we had agreed tests would be conducted for no other purpose. If there were to be a limited agreement for suspension of atmospheric tests, the United States would of course retain freedom of action to conduct any underground tests which we found necessary.

Your second point, which relates to the question of what constitutes an adequate policing system for a test suspension agreement, appears to reflect some misunderstanding of our view. Certainly we do not support what you refer to as the "principle of accepting a very inadequate monitoring system", nor do we believe that "deterrence" is different from "adequate policing." Any acceptable agreement must provide for an adequate and effective monitoring and inspection system. In devising an "adequate" monitoring system, however, we believe that we cannot aim for an unachievable 100% fool-proof system but rather for an effective system which will deter any other nation from attempting violation by the knowledge that there is a high probability that the system would detect any effort to violate.

Having learned of your concern on this point, I took the occasion of my call on the President on the morning of April 6 to tell him about it. You will be reassured to know that he too considers an adequate and effective monitoring system to be one which has a high enough probability of detecting any attempted violation that it deters a potential violator.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Chris
Acting Secretary

¹ Source: Response to McCone letter: U.S. would retain right to conduct underground tests, detection systems. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Gray to Goodpaster

Washington, April 9, 1959

You no doubt have copies of this further exchange of correspondence. However, please note Mr. Herter's statement about having informed the President.

Do you think that the President is sufficiently informed about the potential serious difference of view in this matter? I agree with Mr. McCone that there may be a great difference between a system of "deterrents" and a system providing adequate inspection and control.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Memorandum From Calhoun to Gray

Washington, April 8, 1959

There are enclosed for your information copies of AEC Chairman McCone's letter of April 4 to the Acting Secretary of State and of the latter's reply of April 8 concerning nuclear test suspension. A copy of the Acting Secretary's letter of March 28 to the President is also enclosed.

458. Record of Telephone Conversations Between Herter and Goodpaster and Eisenhower and Herter¹

April 10, 1959

5:30—*Gen. Goodpaster* telephoned and said he had explained to the President as best he could what position our friend is taking and he is at a loss to understand why they are doing this. The President

¹ Source: Discussion of Macmillan proposal on nuclear testing. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

thinks he is thinking of this additional provision because he anticipates Khrushchev will turn down the President's proposal. Then, if he does turn it down, evidently due to our friend's home situation and the election coming up, he does not feel he can let the thing break up. In any event, the President is very concerned about it and does not think they are on sound ground. Goodpaster said the President had questioned whether there was an agreement on the 50 kilometers. CAH said we did agree on that. (2) Goodpaster said the President will be in early tomorrow, around 7:30, and if we have our draft reply ready for his consideration he had told Arch Calhoun to send it over and Goodpaster will make communications arrangements for it. CAH said we hope to have the draft within about half an hour. (3) Discussed Macmillan's statement that he would be willing to send a brief message. CAH said Macmillan is not reserving the right to veto the thing, merely to talk to us again about it.

5:55—*The President* telephoned. Said that this statement of Macmillan's position is different from the previous one, and he doesn't think we can object too much to this because he says "three powers". Also doesn't think our people can object too much if there is no atmospheric pollution. CAH said his understanding is that Macmillan would like to come back and go over the thing again in the event of their being a refusal to agree on the atmospheric. President reiterated he is now of the disposition it would not hurt us too much; looks with favor on the proposal as now laid before us. CAH said we hope to have a draft reply ready shortly; thinks we should say that if they do refuse to do anything on the atmospheric tests, we would consider again Macmillan's suggestion.

459. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, April 15, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

¹ Source: Macmillan proposal to offer unilateral moratorium on underground and outer space testing while negotiations on those issues are underway. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-1559.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>Department of State</i>	<i>The White House</i>	<i>Atomic Energy Commission</i>
G—Mr. Murphy	Mr. Gray	Mr. McCone
EUR—Mr. Kohler	Dr. Killian	Mr. Gardner
S/AE—Mr. Farley	Mr. Beckler	
Mr. Baker		<i>Central Intelligence Agency</i>
Mr. Morris	<i>Department of Defense</i>	Mr. Dulles
S/S—Mr. Berg	Mr. Quarles	Dr. Scoville
	General Fox	

In Mr. Herter's absence *Mr. Farley* explained that during the course of consultations with the U.K. last week regarding the phased approach to a test cessation agreement presented by Amb. Wadsworth in Geneva on Monday, Prime Minister Macmillan had proposed to President Eisenhower that we supplement our proposal for a first step inspected agreement on the cessation of atmospheric tests by offering a unilateral moratorium on testing underground and in outer space for a finite period while further negotiations on extension of the agreement to these areas are in progress. The State Department felt that such a move at this time would not be wise from a negotiating point of view and Mr. Herter had so recommended to the President. The President accepted Mr. Herter's recommendation but noted agreement with Prime Minister Macmillan that such a course of action might have to be reconsidered at some point. The President had therefore directed that the British proposal receive urgent and objective consideration within the US Government.

Mr. Farley said that staff personnel of the agencies concerned had attempted to identify the considerations bearing on this question as reflected in the paper which had been distributed to each of the principals as a guide for this morning's discussion.

Mr. Quarles said that, speaking for the Department of Defense, he found the considerations outlined in the staff paper appropriate but felt that the conclusions reflected an overly sympathetic attitude toward the British proposal. *Mr. McCone* said that the AEC would have considerable concern about any such proposal which would stop our testing underground or in outer space in the absence of adequate assurance that the Soviet Union was likewise refraining from such tests. He explained that the effect on the weapons laboratories of any *temporary* one or two-year suspension of nuclear tests would be quite far-reaching. Whereas if a permanent cessation of tests came into effect, new missions could be assigned and the staffs could be reorganized, temporary cessation would make such reorganization extremely difficult. It would be almost impossible to retain the teams presently working together at the laboratories in the absence of firm goals for their work. Once these groups had dispersed it would be extremely difficult to reassemble them.

Mr. McCone noted that the proposed Humphrey-Fulbright joint resolution concerning the negotiations had been discussed at an

executive session of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy yesterday. Some members of the Committee had felt that the language of the resolution and particularly that of the preamble seemed to give the impression that the U.S. was headed toward nuclear disarmament rather than overall disarmament including conventional forces. Some members also had felt that it would be highly unwise for the U.S. to stop underground and high altitude testing until our present needs for weapons development in the anti-missile and small-weapons fields had been satisfied and that therefore we should agree now only to a cessation of atmospheric testing. *Mr. McCone* said that he had notified Senator Fulbright, and had so informed the Joint Committee, that the AEC supports the proposed joint resolution but felt that the specific language should be reviewed carefully in order to avoid any wrong impressions. He said he mentioned this matter at the present time to indicate that the Macmillan proposal would probably meet resistance among some members of Congress.

Mr. Farley suggested that it might be more forthright if the staff paper could quote AEC and possibly DOD judgement as to the relevant factors pertaining to problems with the laboratories, necessary research and desired weapons tests in relation to the Macmillan proposal. It was agreed that the AEC and the DOD would undertake to prepare suitable language for inclusion in the paper.

Mr. Quarles said he felt the tactical situation with regard to any unilateral action such as proposed by the U.K. should be considered before any firm conclusions as to its desirability were drawn. He felt that the U.S. should not join with the Soviet Union in any suspension of nuclear testing for which no control is planned. He would suggest that the U.S. adopt the position that as long as the negotiators are continuing to seek controls for a total agreement we will continue to abstain from all nuclear testing until the October 31, 1959 date previously announced by the President, and that we will examine our course of action at that time in the light of the situation which then exists. He believed that this would be as far as the U.S. should move without risking damage to its own overall security position.

Dr. Killian suggested that urgent consideration be given to the question of what would be our policy toward future tests in the atmosphere in the event we do not reach agreement with the Soviet Union at the present negotiations to ban such tests.

Mr. Farley noted that we had not pressed for any firm understanding within the Government on this question because we felt that the Soviet reaction to the April 13 proposal and the course of these negotiations as well as the Foreign Ministers meeting during the next month or two would have considerable bearing on any decision we might make.

Mr. Quarles said that he felt that we should continue our unilateral abstention until October 31 and then if no progress toward agreement is evident we might announce that we will abstain unilaterally from atmospheric testing indefinitely but that we consider ourselves free to conduct such non-contaminating tests as our security interests may require. Such a move would seem to be the best combination of cold war tactics and technical requisites. It would undoubtedly be more expensive to do all our testing in the underground and outer space environments, but he felt it would be better to bear such expense than to continue to bear the onus of contaminating the atmosphere. If such a policy were too difficult in terms of development requirements it might be modified by limiting atmospheric tests to a certain amount of radiation. *Mr. Quarles* said that in any event he felt we should reserve any such announcement until October 31.

Dr. Killian said he wished to emphasize the importance of obtaining better and more solid factual information on the usefulness of underground tests. He noted that there was considerable difference of opinion between Los Alamos and Livermore on this question and that AFSWP was skeptical of the usefulness of tests in this environment. Similar attention should be given, he felt, to the question of testing beyond the 50 kilometer altitude limit now being discussed for our atmospheric proposal since there seems to be a real problem of fallout from explosions beyond this altitude. *Mr. McCone* and *Mr. Quarles* agreed that these questions should be urgently studied and that the mechanics for such study would be discussed further with *Dr. Killian*. Similarly, the problem of further exploratory programs to further our knowledge of detection of underground and outer space tests would be coordinated with *Dr. Killian*.

Mr. McCone noted that he was often asked whether a total cessation of nuclear tests would not involve foreclosing the possibility of development of an anti-missile missile system.

Mr. Quarles said that “foreclose” was perhaps too strong a word but that he felt that if we could make no further nuclear tests we would seriously prejudice the possibility of developing an effective anti-missile missile system. *Dr. Killian* pointed out, however, and *Mr. Quarles* agreed, that the primary technical problems now standing in the way of an anti-missile missile system were engineering rather than nuclear and that we do now have a warhead which could be used with such a system.

Mr. McCone said that if the U.S. depends to a large extent for its security on defense against incoming missiles he wondered how we could justify any stoppage of nuclear tests in the high altitude area. He thought that the public had been convinced of the need for protection against attacking aircraft and that an anti-missile system would be looked at in the same light.

460. Letter From Killian to Herter¹

April 18, 1959

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have transmitted to Gordon Gray the attached recommendation of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The view it expresses is essentially what I have discussed with you on several occasions.

The Committee did not suggest how these studies should be organized or what their terms of reference should be, but it is strong in its conviction, based upon experience we have had in providing technical studies to support the Geneva negotiations on test suspension and surprise attack, that we need to achieve better preparation and deeper understanding of some of the technical problems involved in the whole arms limitation area.

Yours sincerely,

J.R. Killian, Jr.

Attachment

**Memorandum Prepared by the President's Science
Advisory Committee**

March 16, 1959

ARMS LIMITATION FOLLOW-UP STUDIES

This memo has been prepared to stimulate the interest of the PSAC in taking an active role in the initiation and in support of sustained activities dealing with the military-technical aspects of international agreements aimed at reducing the threat of war. It is an aim of our national policy to preserve and enhance the security of United States through agreements whose objectives are the reduction of international tension, the reduction of the threat of war and the reduction of the burdens of the arms race.

This memo is concerned with the ways to improve the efforts for implementation of this policy through agreements for inspection and monitoring of armed forces, for arms limitations and for arms

¹ Source: Transmits President's Science Advisory Committee's recommendation for arms control studies. Confidential. 10 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Surprise Attack, Miscellaneous.

reductions. The two recent conferences in Geneva have demonstrated anew the extreme importance of preparation prior to such conferences, i.e, the need of acquisition of a clear understanding of the objectives desired and of the actual effects of various measures that might be proposed to attain the objectives. The need for a continuing development effort to provide the technical means for support of inspection and controls has also been clearly demonstrated. The most obvious demonstration of this need is, of course, the detection of underground nuclear tests.

To achieve the needed understanding it is not sufficient to consider the existing military forces and to devise means for reducing their threat to peace, while preserving the military security of United States. Rather, one has to look into the future and anticipate the effects of changing technology on military forces and operations; one must consider the effects of changing technology on the feasibility and on techniques of the monitoring of military forces, as well as on the usefulness of an early warning of an impending attack; further, one must devise detailed integrated patterns and time tables for agreements (somewhat like weapon systems are designed from component parts), whose objective should be the enhancement of the security of United States in the sense defined above by the national policy. That sense we interpret more broadly than simple enhancement of our military power because though the reduction of the threat of war may be brought about by an enhancement of our military power, it can certainly be assisted by other factors as well.

While the emphasis in the preceding paragraph was on military-technical matters, it is essential to recognize that the ultimate objectives of the agreements we seek are political and that political considerations are of the greatest importance in finding mutually acceptable patterns of agreement. Thus it is clear that the preparation for future international conferences must include the study of military, technological and political factors. It is a task which is best carried out by an inter-departmental or non-departmental body rather than a necessarily slanted single department.

Agreements which in principle might reduce the threat of war and reduce the armaments race are of several types. Starting with the least ambitious they may be classified as:

I. Agreements for partial inspection of armed forces. The partiality of inspection may arise from the geographic limitations of the zones to which inspection is limited or from deliberately incomplete but world-wide inspection. The incompleteness itself may be of two kinds. For instance inspection may apply to only one kind of military activities (e.g. nuclear weapons tests) or only one type of inspection mechanism may be agreed to (e.g. the "Open Skies" proposal of the President). The objectives of such agreements may be to provide "strategic" warring

of the other side's activities (which certainly applies to the nuclear tests) or to provide timely warning of preparations and launching of an attack (which could have been the effect of the "Open Skies" agreement if the attack were to be launched by conventional ground or sea forces). Neither objective may be attainable with rather limited agreements, but they may still be valuable for political reasons, e.g., the building of mutual confidence, the experimentation with inspection in essentially unfriendly countries, etc.

II. Agreements for comprehensive monitoring of armed forces. The word comprehensive implies here that no geographic limits are set on the inspection apparatus. As regards the thoroughness of inspection, however, some limits must be set, as their absence would imply a virtually complete surrender of sovereignty by contracting parties, not a likely event. The immediate objectives of such inspection schemes are strategic information and possibly "early" warning in a tactical sense; the ultimate objectives are reduction of tensions and of the arms race.

III. Partial arms limitation agreements. It is our national policy not to accept any such agreements unless the compliance is monitored. The nature of the monitoring, however, should vary greatly depending on what is the nature of the limitations (e.g. that of the improved nuclear weapons in the test cessation proposal). There may be other factors which should influence our choice of the severity of monitoring. For instance, agreements where the agreed-to monitoring apparatus is the sole mechanism for detecting non-compliance and where the non-compliance can lead to drastic changes in the balance of power before detection, call for especially strict monitoring, etc.

IV. Comprehensive arms reduction, i.e. disarmament, agreements. The world we live in is such that ambitious disarmament proposals seem much less realistic than even the more modest steps indicated above, but some understanding of the comprehensive plans should be acquired, in order to insure that the more modest plans could be molded so as not to conflict with the comprehensive plans.

Any one of the agreements broadly indicated above contains many inputs, of military, technical and political nature. In the following we shall indicate some of them, insofar as we have become aware of them in preparing for and then participating in the Geneva conference on the prevention of surprise attacks.

Effective inspection and monitoring of military forces inevitably provides the inspecting side with strategically important information on the disposition, state of readiness, etc. of the inspected forces. If suitably designed, it may also supply the inspecting side with early warning of the impending attack. However, as the speed of the attack increases with changing military technology (e. g. the trend from ground forces to long range fast bombers and then to ballistic missiles) the

advance warning of an attack gives the defender ever less time to make the attack ineffective. Since the probability of circumstances in which the United States would carry out a surprise attack is extremely remote, we must be concerned, lest an inspection scheme provide our potential enemies with such strategic information as to make their attack more effective, without giving us sufficient additional warning to counteract the effects of previous disclosure of information regarding our forces. This point requires careful study, whether one considers the inspection schemes alone or adds to them arms limitation measures.

In the schemes involving inspection alone, it appears preferable to focus the monitoring on operational forces and weapon systems, but as the schemes are expanded to include arms limitation agreements, monitoring may also include manufacturing and/or development activities, or even may be limited to one or both of them. These are complex problems, certainly not well understood at present.

Involved in all inspection schemes are a host of military-technical problems. To mention but a few: (a) the development and evaluation of various monitoring techniques as applied to particular weapon systems (e.g. the effectiveness of aerial photography in detecting operational missile sites); (b) the "rights and privileges" and the freedom of access of the inspectors. Surely some limits must be set on them as otherwise the schemes would not be acceptable even to us, not to mention the USSR, but these limits must be so chosen as to introduce the least interference with the objectives of the plan; (c) communications from inspectors to data evaluation centers become a serious problem when hours or minutes become decisive and also the problem of authentication of these messages needs study; (d) the handling of the data at the centers and their transmission to decision centers have not been worked out; these are not trivial problems already because of the danger of false alarms and the consequent possible increase of tensions, the reverse of what the scheme is designed to achieve; (e) especially in comprehensive inspection systems the inspecting staffs, with logistic support, seem to run to tens of thousands; these are expensive schemes even if the best use is made of technical aids. This consideration alone suggests a consideration of a change from the concept of the complete inspection of all forces to that of random sampling, a principle which has been effectively used in many industrial situations; (f) distinction in the degree of monitoring is probably required between strictly offensive and largely or wholly defensive forces and weapon systems; (g) an even more difficult problem is the devising of monitoring schemes which, even in the case of a failure of the built-in early warning, tend to protect retaliatory forces of the attacked side and thus stabilize peace by mutual deterrents.

These are some of the problems in which the technical inputs are especially strong. Many other problems have stronger military and political emphasis, although still involving technical considerations. For instance, the choice of geographic zones for "trial" inspection schemes involves not only the political, and strategic considerations, but also those of ever changing military technology and of technical aspects of inspection. The USSR delegates in Geneva emphasized their unalterable opposition to even the discussion of any schemes involving monitoring alone, without arms limitation measures. It would appear desirable to determine whether, from the point of view of the USSR, with its emphasis on military secrecy, the inspection schemes alone are indeed as disadvantageous as their delegates implied. If that is the case, it needs to be determined whether it is to our political advantage to propose nonetheless such schemes in conferences or to abandon them. In the latter case the technical work indicated in the preceding may take a somewhat different slant.

The discussion of the last few pages, we hope, justifies our conviction that the study of the whole area must be done by a staff that represents not only the military but also the technical and political competence. We hope also that this discussion gave some indication of the variety and complexity of the problems involved. It is our belief that the complexity is so great that to rely on ad hoc study groups preparing each particular conference is to our national disadvantage. What is needed, we believe, is a sustained effort on a significant level, in order to have available the required information and technology when a suitable opportunity for an agreement is in prospect and also to have on hand a competent staff trained in the problems involved, so as to have the best possible on-the-spot advice when conferences do take place. This certainly would be needed in the eventuality that the USSR seriously enters the discussions of some agreements and comes forth with proposals of its own.

It is not the purpose of the present memo to present a detailed organizational plan for a continuing study of the problems outlined above. However, certain features of a desirable organization can now be indicated. We deem it desirable to have this organization set up on a non-departmental basis. The organization itself might consist of a full time director with a modest administrative and technical staff and a board of consultants, whose advice would be seriously weighed in planning activities and whose opinion would add weight to the conclusions reached. It goes without saying that a budget must be provided, to support activities outside of the director's office, as well as this office itself. These activities, which are the essence of the concept being proposed, fall into three categories:

(a) Studies and development under contract by private institutions and corporations on specific aspects of the broad area encompassed. Examples of possible contractors might be the RAND Corp., Lincoln Lab, STL, JPL, ORO, ITEC, Russian Research Center at Harvard, etc.

(b) Studies and development on request of the suggested organization and possibly with the transfer of funds, by several departments which have active interests in the problems, e.g. studies by groups setup in the State Dept, Defense Dept or in AEC.

(c) Conferences of limited duration (but perhaps as long as the entire academic summer vacation) in which competent people from government departments concerned (e.g. Defense and State), from groups engaged in continuing studies under (a) and competent “outsiders” take part. The main purpose of such conferences would be the integration of data obtained under (a) and (b) and the planning of future work.

461. Memorandum From Herter to Eisenhower¹

Washington, April 20, 1959

SUBJECT

Voluntary Temporary Moratorium on Underground and High Altitude Tests

On April 11 you directed that the interested agencies give urgent consideration to Prime Minister Macmillan’s proposal that we offer to accompany a controlled agreement for suspension of atmospheric tests with a temporary moratorium on other nuclear weapons tests provided the Soviet Union did likewise.

This question has been carefully examined with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. We have concluded that proposing an extended uncontrolled moratorium on outer space and underground tests, even if the Soviets agree to negotiate controlled suspension of atmospheric tests, is an undesirable course of action at the present time. Such a proposal would undercut our basic principle of effective control, and would be unlikely to increase Soviet interest in serious negotiations.

¹ Source: Recommends against Macmillan proposal for moratorium on underground and space nuclear testing. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.

Consideration of this question has served to draw attention to the urgent need for decisions on United States nuclear testing policy in the event negotiations are unsuccessful or reach agreement only on controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. We have agreed that studies looking toward such decisions should be initiated promptly and should embrace future requirements for nuclear weapons testing, improvement of methods of detection, fall-out considerations, and factors of cost and practicability involved in testing underground and in outer space. Arrangements for these studies are being worked out by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Acting Secretary

Attachment

Proposal

Washington, April 17, 1959

VOLUNTARY TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON UNDERGROUND AND HIGH ALTITUDE TESTS

PROBLEM

To consider whether it would be in the U.S. interest to offer to accompany a controlled suspension of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests with a voluntary one to two year moratorium on underground and high altitude nuclear weapons tests, provided the Soviet Union does the same.

BACKGROUND

During preparation of the proposal put forward on April 13 at Geneva by the U.S. and U.N. delegations, a possible additional feature was considered. While this additional element was not included in the April 13 proposal, it was agreed that it would be given further urgent study by the U.S. against the possibility that the Soviet reaction to the April 13 proposal might be such as to justify reconsideration of the decision not to include it.

The additional proposal was put forward in the following terms. The Russians will probably be very disinclined to reach any agreement falling short of a complete ban on all tests. They will argue for a complete ban on grounds of general principle and say that anything short of it will be unsatisfactory and unfair. The U.S. and the U.K. might meet this objection by announcing that they would be prepared, provided the Soviets are likewise to refrain for a period from the entry into force of the initial agreement from conducting tests underground and above 50 kilometers. This moratorium would be a voluntary arrangement outside any formal agreement—thus preserving the important

principle that the agreement itself should only commit us to steps which we know can be controlled. The U.S.–U.N. hope would be that during this moratorium period scientific advances would [illegible in the original] agreement with the President on a ban extended to cover further explosions. The moratorium should not exclude the possibility of conducting experimental nuclear explosions underground jointly with the Russians or under international control, so obtain necessary data for developing a control system. There is presumably a reasonable prospect that scientific advances will enable us to move further before long. The period of moratorium should thus be either one or two years.

It might of course be argued that during this period of one or two years the U.S. and U.K. would be bound by their voluntary abstention, while the Russians might carry out experiments undetected. Against that, the U.K. suggests, the points can be made first, that we do not know whether the Russians are in fact doing underground tests; and, second, even if we got a comprehensive test suspension it would take well over a year to install the control system, during all of which time the Russians could cheat if they wished to; and third, this risk is inherent in the present moratorium which has been in force since the Geneva conference began. Thus it is suggested that we would not lose very much and we might make a considerable impact upon public opinion.

DISCUSSION:

1. *Effect upon public opinion.* Such a move would be viewed favorably by that segment of public opinion which welcomes any move toward the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It would provide an effective answer to Soviet charges that we have proposed an atmospheric test ban because we never really intended to stop all tests. On the other hand, it could create the impression that effective international controls are not really necessary and to this extent weaken public support for the U.S. position on controls.

Since the U.S. and U.K. have suspended tests for the time being—without the Soviet Union having felt it necessary to make a similar explicit renunciation—our public posture is not now vulnerable. If challenged as to long range testing plans, the U.S. and U.K. can point out that they are not now testing and that it is up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate its intentions in serious negotiation for an atmospheric test ban rather than for the U.S. and U.K., without any *quid pro quo*, to answer for the indefinite future.

2. *Effect upon negotiations.* While such a move might increase the chance of Soviet acceptance of an atmospheric test ban, it would weaken our position seriously in negotiation for a complete test cessation under effective control. Once we were committed to a complete suspension, the pressure would be on us to withhold testing even if there were no progress in negotiations for extending the control system. Yet what the U.S. and U.K. want is to put pressure on the Soviets to extend controls in order to get other tests brought to a halt. This can best be done if the U.S.

and U.K. do not reduce their bargaining power voluntarily. Moreover, any appearance of acquiescence in the Soviet view that an agreed suspension of tests can be undertaken without controls would correspondingly weaken our bargaining position in insisting upon such controls.

3. *U.S. Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Tests.* The U.S. has important needs for further nuclear weapons tests: to improve existing design (particularly in the small warheads field); to develop new or improved designs (particularly in the ballistic and anti-ballistic missile field) to improve the safety of certain designs; and to examine further the phenomena revealed by the Johnson Island and ARGUS firings.

4. *Relative ability of the U.S. and USSR to carry out weapons improvement (or [illegible in the original]) tests under the proposed arrangement.* If the proposed arrangement was adopted, it would not be possible for the United States to conduct nuclear weapons tests. The USSR might not be inhibited to the same degree and could undertake [illegible in the original] they believed undetectable. It would be difficult for us to carry out nuclear tests for improvement of the detection system (or for peaceful purposes) that would not carry with them the possibility that the Soviets would conduct nuclear weapons tests under these guises.

5. *U.S. Congressional and public reaction.* Public and Congressional support for moves which might advance the objective of first step agreements toward an inspected test cessation should be weighed against distrust in these quarters of any arrangement with the USSR which does not embody effective controls.

6. *Effect on laboratories and developmental programs.* In the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense, while the potential of the weapons laboratories has been affected only slightly up to now, it is probable that deterioration will proceed rapidly if the U.S. should commit itself to the proposed further one or two year moratorium. Although current programs which are in advanced stages of development and which are based to large degree on devices already tested will proceed relatively unaffected, it is most probable that a one or two year voluntary suspension of this type will greatly accelerate the trend of scientific personnel away from the long-range weapons development programs. Once these people are dispersed, their reassembly into an effective scientific organization [illegible in the original] virtually impossible in absence of extreme emergency.

It will be extremely difficult for the laboratories to plan new development [illegible in the original] without knowing, at an early date, in what environment, if any, testing would be permitted. A development program without testing is, of course, in itself a most difficult undertaking. The voluntary ban would further delay any decision as to the basis on which weapons development is to proceed. Also, there might be difficulties in securing adequate appropriations for continuation of weapons research or resuming a weapons testing program after a prolonged voluntary suspension.

7. *Need for further studies.* The following matters relating to the conduct of future nuclear tests should be studied as early as possible so that an early decision on future nuclear testing policy can be reached well in advance of the expiration of the present one-year voluntary withholding of nuclear testing:

- a. Requirements for additional nuclear weapons testing.
- b. The feasibility and practicability of underground testing including the cost and timing of test programs.
- c. The problems of testing in the earth's atmosphere above the detection limits of the Geneva System including the problems of radioactive fallout and the definition of the upper limits of the atmosphere in relation to the fallout problem.
- d. The organization and test program needed to explore the problems of underground test concealment, improvement of seismic detection, and system studies for detection of tests in the upper atmosphere and outer space.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of these factors it is suggested:

1. That proposing an extended uncontrolled moratorium on outer space and underground tests represents an undesirable course of action at the present time, and that the United States should adhere to the policy set forth in the August 29 and November 7 White House announcement concerning a voluntary nuclear test suspension.

2. That studies relating to future requirements for nuclear testing, the improvement of methods of detection of nuclear tests, the fallout problem, and factors of cost and practicability involved in testing underground and in outer space should be undertaken promptly so that decisions can be reached on future nuclear testing policy as soon as possible and well in advance of the expiration of the present one-year voluntary withholding of nuclear testing.

462. Telegram Supnu 382 From Geneva¹

Geneva, April 22, 1959, 3 p.m.

Supnu 382. For Herter from Wadsworth. Reference: Nusup 307.

I think your message covers very well what we should do in response to various approaches the Russians might take. I personally think that what is most likely is that Russians will not give clear acceptance or

¹ Source: Negotiating tactics at nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2259.

rejection of either of alternatives suggestions we have made and that they will not make any major new proposals on basic issues in next few days. So line of action that we will probably have to follow is the one you have laid out in next to last paragraph of your telegram.

We may meet Soviet objections to idea of formal recess before Foreign Ministers meeting but I do not think they will press these objections and, in any case, we will be in a strong position just to say that time terms of resumed negotiations should be set by our Foreign Ministers. The fact that no one can accurately foretell how long the Foreign Ministers meeting will last will in itself help us avoid setting a date for re-opening our conference at the time that we recess.

The only point on which I differ, and I think this is a very important point, is on question on how we handle staffing issue. I agree completely that we should try to play down the staffing issue and have it not appear as equal in importance to inspection and the veto. But I sincerely believe the only way we can do this, in present situation, is to make a limited movement from our present position. I think all we really have to do is to say that since the Soviets have now agreed that the business of control is really carried out by actual technical staff, and since they have abandoned their previous idea of controllers, we have decided to accept the idea of having a strictly limited number of host country nationals in the control posts. The number should be strictly limited so as to guard against any obstruction of the control function. But the presence of a limited number of host country nationals could be justified on grounds that host country also has an interest in seeing that control posts operate properly.

I would not expect that we would expose ourselves to any detailed negotiations on the staffing issue. And I would not put forward any specific formula on staffing. But I think some movement off our present staffing position is required to give plausibility to our claim that this issue can be resolved and to clearly remove it as one of the decisive issues. If we continue to stand pat on staffing I am afraid any talks at Foreign Minister level will be cluttered up by Soviet challenges on this point. Some slight modification of our previous position will avert the risk of Gromyko emphasizing this issue and thus cutting into efforts you have in mind to focus attention sharply on Soviet intransigence on basic control issues of veto and inspection.

Otherwise I agree that we are in first rate position to put our proposition squarely to the Russians and put on them the onus for any breakdown or lack of progress in negotiations.

As I have said, I think the tactics you have outlined are sound and if I am authorized to make the kind of statement on staffing that I have suggested, I am sure we can handle the situation so that you will have a strong and clear position to field when you meet with the other Foreign Ministers.

I am sending a separate message on the details of tactics we would like to follow over the next two weeks.

463. Telegram Supnu 383 From Geneva¹

Geneva, April 22, 1959, 3 p.m.

Supnu 383. Believe Soviets will probably continue their line of hinting willingness to make compromises as part of the continuing negotiations but without actually making any substantive changes in position. They will claim the possibility of significant progress in the negotiations has been proved by the Soviet shift on staffing and the adoption of a number of articles and that in view of this there is no real reason to consider a shift in direction.

We have been thinking about how best to maneuver the Soviets into more of a yes or no position in next two weeks on the alternatives we have presented. We believe that the best tactic is for us to let the Soviets exhaust the supply of non-controversial articles, most of which apply to either of our alternatives, periodically emphasizing that these are all really peripheral matters. By letting them do this, we commit them more and more to our basic framework. This will inevitably focus attention more sharply on the issues at the heart of our treaty, e.g., voting procedures and on-site inspection. While this process is going on we will begin to fill out the details of our staged alternative, first in a general descriptive statement, and then when the Department's views on Supnu 365 are received, perhaps by tabling as a single document a treaty draft for the staged approach. We will then have two alternative documents on the table, each of which will include a good number of articles which have been agreed. This will let us play up in more concrete terms the choice we are putting to the Soviets, and just what is involved in each. At this point it will be difficult for the Soviets to maintain any [garble] sense of movement in the negotiations, and the real issues to be solved can be spotlighted with little risk of anything else getting in the way.

We believe these tactics in line with those outlined Nusup 307.

With respect to question release modified version Berkner report, the view would depend on how problem of para 4 (f) treated since we would wish avoid situation where Soviets could misinterpret any move for recess as being motivated by desire to break off negotiations and that our revelation further technical difficulties demonstrated true nature our intentions. Would prefer have any specific treatment question new data or theories re decoupling postponed until Soviets accept our proposal for technical discussion.

Villard

¹ Source: Negotiating tactics at nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2259.

464. Telegram Supnu 401 From Geneva¹

Geneva, April 29, 1959, noon

Supnu 401. Paris for the Secretary. On basis Tsarapkin performance yesterday, it appears that Soviets will probably move quickly to reply to questions we have posed on Khrushchev-Macmillan proposal and that their answers may be clear and to the point. They have already stated flatly that in context of quota agreement they are prepared to drop veto and requirement for commission decision on dispatch inspection teams. They have indicated that agreement on criteria which would qualify events for inspection will not present major problem. They have bought concept of permanent inspection teams. They will probably be prepared negotiate on composite inspection teams. They have opposed idea that quota should have relationship to number of unidentified events and have stated clearly that they thought size of quota was a political decision. They might, however, make point that if we feel so inclined there is nothing to prevent us from basing our "political" position on size of quota on "technical" factors of number of unidentified events and capabilities of system. In sum it begins to look as if Soviets will shortly demonstrate that they have really adopted Macmillan plan and will be in position to stress this in their propaganda. Accordingly we are quickly approaching point where we will have to decide what US position on Macmillan approach is to be.

In considering Macmillan approach Department may wish give thought possibility of adding to quota suggestion provision for periodic revision quota number. In first two years of actual operation of treaty time taken to construct control posts and to bring them into operation will mean that there will be relatively few events in any case which would justify inspection under criteria as presently contained Annex I. For the first two years of treaty size of quota is therefore not of major practical importance. If there were provision for periodic review of quota number and agreement on annual quota for succeeding year, and if moreover this provision were so phrased as to provide basis for withdrawal from treaty if agreement not reached USDel believes Macmillan approach might be more palatable. In separate telegram USDel is sending illustrative draft of type of review provision which might be considered.

¹ Source: Soviets seem to adopt Macmillan quota proposals. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4-2959.

If Washington decides that we should go along with Macmillan approach we will need to know what kind of initial quota would be acceptable. Recommend thinking on this point be urgently undertaken.

Villard

465. Memorandum From Panofsky to Killian¹

Washington, May 1, 1959

SUBJECT

Preliminary Findings of the Working Group of the Panel on High Altitude Detection

At a meeting on 1 May 1959, a Working Group of the Panel on High Altitude Detection considered the problem of identifying nuclear explosions in the region between 50 and 100,000 kilometers. This region was chosen since it was believed this would eliminate the problems of both fallout and communications disturbances.

The Working Group came to the following preliminary conclusions:

1) *Detection* of unshielded bombs of low yield at distances of 100,000 kilometers is possible with high confidence from terrestrial stations by means of both direct emission of light and fluorescence of the upper atmosphere induced by bomb x-rays. Cloud cover will probably not reduce this capability substantially.

2) *Identification* should involve signals arising from some other effect than thermal radiation alone. Of the various possibilities, radar backscatter may be particularly significant since it does not necessarily depend on the thermal x-rays emitted from the bomb as do most of the other effects. Other identification aids are: a) magnetic field perturbations, b) modification of the Van Allen radiation as measured in a satellite, c) ionospheric perturbations, and d) direct radio signal.

3) Special problems exist in the very low altitude range (50–200 kilometers) where only one ground station might “see” (line of sight) the explosion. Consideration will be given to this problem.

4) Current judgment is that concealment of direct light emission is difficult but that concealment of the x-rays which give fluorescence radiation and ionospheric disturbances could be effective.

¹Source: Preliminary findings of the working group on high altitude detection. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear-Hi-Alt-Misc.

Individual members of the Working Group will prepare detailed papers on each of these methods which will be submitted to the Chairman within two weeks. These papers will present estimates of the capabilities, and, if possible, the availability and costs of each of these systems. A final meeting of the Working Group will be held within a month to prepare a general report covering the detailed conclusions on this problem.

Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky
*Chairman, Panel on High
Altitude Detection*

466. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 5, 1959

Gordon Gray gave me several comments concerning Secretary Herter's memorandum of April 27th on disarmament policy review, indicating that they had been discussed with Dr. Killian, who seemed to be at least in general agreement with them:

There is a question of bringing into the study personnel outside the established governmental departments. Dr. Killian thinks this is very much needed: it is doubtful that State has been thinking in these terms.

The terms of reference seem rather long and comprehensive. Questions No. 2 and 5 in particular seem to be rather far-reaching and not susceptible of definite treatment.

If such a study is to be conducted with any great promise of success, it should have the President's support and commitment. In addition, there would be no point in going into it unless Defense, not only at top level but at military level, were quite serious about it.

It is worth considering whether this should not be initiated with an NSC action. Perhaps the terms of reference should bear the stamp of the NSC. If this were done, a NSC meeting with the JCS and the Service Secretaries present might be a desirable way to start the project off.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹Source: Gray's comments on Department of State proposal for disarmament policy review. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.

467. Telegram Supnu 433 From Geneva¹

Geneva, May 14, 1959, 7 p.m.

Supnu 433. Following is text memorandum worked out ad referendum at US–UK staff level after Gromyko–Herter–Lloyd meeting reported separately.

“The Foreign Ministers of the USSR, UK, and USA have exchanged views on the position reached in the Conf for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The three FonMins recognised that technical aspects of questions outstanding at the conf require further study. The three FonMins agreed that their technical representatives should meet in Geneva on June 1, 1959 to consider, in the light of the most recent scientific and technical information available:

I. Recommendations for techniques for detecting nuclear explosions at altitudes above 50 kilometres and in outer space;

II. Recommendations for improving methods of distinguishing between underground explosions and earthquakes;

III. Recommendations for specific technical criteria which must be satisfied by data from the control system before an inspection can be undertaken.

The three FonMins agreed that their technical representatives should be requested to report to the Conf for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests at the earliest possible date, and in any case to make an interim report to the Conf when it resumes its meetings on June 8 1959.”

Since USDel technical staff other than Northrup has left, request Dept comments on suggested terms of reference in time to allow transmittal above text to Sov Del tomorrow.

Above has not yet been seen by Secretary.

Villard

¹ Source: Transmits text of proposed communiqué on nuclear test ban. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5–1459.

468. Telegram Secto 67 From Herter at Geneva¹

Geneva, May 18, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 67. Secretary met with Lloyd (U.K.) today re Soviet refusal technical discussions capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. Following is approved summary conversation: Lloyd mentioned three points: (1) Whether we should continue to press Gromyko on acceptance technical talks as requested in discussion with him; (2) whether we should agree to technical discussions on high altitude alone, and (3) extent of further discussions nuclear testing at Foreign Minister level during this conference.

Secretary stated Gromyko owes us an explanation because in discussion on May 14, he seemed to go quite far toward accepting wide-range technical talks.

With respect to high altitude alone, Secretary stated he did not think we should accept at this time. Secretary and Lloyd agreed that there should be no extensive talks with Gromyko on nuclear testing during Foreign Minister's conference. Secretary pointed out that it could be Gromyko's intention to use minor concessions on testing during Foreign Minister conference as basis necessary progress for summit.

Lloyd briefly discussed status U.S.-U.K. positions outstanding issues. It was agreed much work remains to be done by both U.S.-U.K. staffs in developing respective positions and in developing jointly-agreed positions outstanding issues. It was agreed Secretary would approach Gromyko for meeting at noon May 19 to again seek agreement for technical talks high altitude, capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. It was agreed that if Gromyko accepts, U.S.-U.K. scientists should meet London or Washington several days before technical talks with U.S.S.R.

Herter

¹ Source: Account of talk with Lloyd on Soviet refusal of technical discussions on seismic detection, criteria for inspections. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.1-GE/5-1859.

469. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, May 19, 1959, 11 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Killian, Dr. Bacher, Dr. Baker
Dr. Bethe, Dr. Bronk, Dr. Chance
Dr. Fisk, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Land
Dr. Piore, Dr. Purcell, Dr. Rabi
Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Smith, Dr. Weiss
Dr. Wiesner, Dr. Dryden, Dr. Hill
Dr. Scoville, Dr. Waterman, Dr. York
Mr. Beckler, Major Eisenhower
General Goodpaster

The President welcomed the group. Dr. Killian asked if he had any points he wanted to bring to the attention of the group, which had not met with him for some months. The President said he did not. He hoped they would continue their study of means of simplifying and making more effective the control of governmental research activities, and eliminating duplication. He referred to a troublesome amendment by Senator Russell to the Military Construction Bill, under which Congress would authorize on an annual basis programs for specific aircraft and missiles. Dr. Killian mentioned that the Congress is doing this in relation to the space program, and the result is to delay these programs considerably. Dr. Dryden confirmed this.

Dr. Killian said the group had two matters they wanted to bring to the President's attention. As to the first, they were impressed by the great and growing complexity of our military technology, by the reduction in the time scale, both of possible conflict and of weapons development, by the rapid obsolescence of weapons types, and by the overlapping of different systems. All this seems to mean an increase in the cost of weapons, and a lack of stability in military relations between nations. On the point of obsolescence, the President commented that once we have an effective standardized item, we should proceed by gradually replacing it, but not by scrapping such items as soon as an improved type of item is available. Dr. Killian agreed with this philosophy. He added that dispersal programs, quickened response and improved alarm and alert systems add to the same tendency. The group was much impressed with this point and wanted to propose to the President that they think the United States should tackle the arms control problem anew. From the standpoint of the group, what they want is a

¹ Source: Technical basis of disarmament; international exchange of scientific information. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

systematic and rigorous feeding in of technical factors involved in arms control. The President asked if Dr. Killian felt that any additional charter or directive from him was needed to carry this out, expressing agreement with the principle. He added that, just as military men succeed as they work themselves out of a job, the scientists should be working themselves out of the job of devoting their talents to military weapons systems.

At Dr. Killian's request, Dr. Land carried forward the discussion of the subject. He said first that he was grateful for the President's support of scientific activity since the group first met with him about a year and a half ago. The whole attitude of the country has been turned around in the few months, and the President's personal part in this has been the decisive factor.

(At this point a note was brought in which the President read aloud to the group, indicating that Admiral Strauss' nomination had been reported favorably out of committee by a margin of one vote; there was no generally shared reaction from the scientists.)

Dr. Land went on to say that the problem is, while using science for military ends, also to recognize in a practical way the obligation of science to bring about abundance, well-being, a better life, etc. He therefore asks whether something could be done to dramatize scientific efforts in behalf of arms control. He said that if scientists talk to our military people about arms control, they are immediately suspect as being soft or indifferent to security—even if they are the very scientists who have made great contributions to military technology. There is every reason why the United States should take initiative on arms control, and scientists should be permitted to contribute all ideas they can—as to how to control armaments and make a better life for everyone. His specific request is for the President to work with the scientists to advance and foster arms control. The President said that if the scientists can help to show concrete ways to make progress on arms control, he will be most grateful and glad to join in the process.

Dr. Wiesner next spoke, pointing out that this is a very large problem, some aspects of which caused him great concern while he was at Geneva. Our national effort in such fields as the disarmament field seems to be characterized by too slow decisions, too many conflicting objectives, and inadequate management and study of the problem. He is convinced that arms control needs study in detail. For example, he felt that U.S. policy makers, prior to the U.S. commitment last year to suspend testing, were woefully uninformed on the problem, at least in respect to any degree of detail. He said the inevitable consequence is overconservatism in negotiation. He said there is no continuing development of technical background and studies for disarmament. Accordingly, our group went to Geneva with quite inadequate technical and

political preparation. He felt that until we have such studies we cannot go into this subject seriously.

The President recalled that beginning three or four years ago he had the idea of stopping atmospheric tests. He encountered enormous resistance and found very little support initially. The lesson is that the great task is to bring thinking along, since in a democracy public opinion weighs so heavily. He did not think that we need big bodies studying these questions. Rather the need is for a few basic, good ideas. He thought that a small sub-committee may usefully be set up to develop the technical basis for disarmament. Dr. Killian commented that this effort would tie in very closely with the terms of reference submitted to the President by Mr. Herter in relation to the whole question of disarmament.

Dr. Killian said the second item the group had in mind to discuss with the President had been the subject of a study of a panel under Dr. Bronk. The idea is one of greatly enlarged international exchange of scientific information. Dr. Bronk said that the scientists think they are especially well positioned to build international understanding. He thought that they could contribute to a better understanding of the U.S. by foreign countries as a country devoted to freedom and well-being of its people. As an example, he suggested exploring the possibility of encouraging young people to give several years of their lives to service abroad in technical and scientific fields, including the teaching of science and technical subjects. He thought there is need for an overhauling of the concept of exchange of scientific information between the United States and countries abroad. For example, he thought the "quid pro quo principle" applying to the exchange of people is too restrictive to guide the exchange of scientific information.

The President said he certainly agreed in principle but would ask how the group considered that thinking should be organized on this matter so as to get qualified people working on it. In other words, what is the next step. That is what he would like to hear.

Dr. Rabi, at Dr. Killian's request, reported that he had visited in Russia for six days. He had been well received and relationships were excellent. He said he had visited a large nuclear accelerator at Dubna (?) of about one-half mile diameter. This is being run as an international laboratory with personnel from many of the satellite nations working together as a team. He thought that perhaps the United States is failing to use some of its facilities in a way that would promote better international relations. What he had in mind was the possibility of making the Brookhaven Laboratory or the Lawrence Laboratory a "Pan-American" facility. He said that the NATO Science Committee, after a slow start, is beginning to see the light. It is necessary for the U.S. to keep up the

pressure and the initiative with a flow of new ideas and provision of a large fraction of the funds.

The President repeated that as to the principle, he was in accord. He felt he could do something to help if the project is shaped up in a concrete way. Dr. Rabi pointed out that other nations participating should pay for part of the operation. This would add to their self-respect. Dr. Piore said that a radio-astronomy laboratory just now coming into operation might be a very useful place to apply this. The South Americans, for example, have no facilities in this field. The President said he simply asked that the group work up a concrete plan.

He then spoke on what he termed the basic truth to which he always comes back. He said we have got to find an answer to cooperating closely with other countries, "or else." He did not think we could carry forward the heavy burdens for armaments that we are now supporting. Inevitably we would have to go to controls throughout our society, or at the least to bureaucratic domination. He thought that all of the suggestions made indicated promising ways for progress, and challenged the scientists to show ways to go forward beyond what our military and political leaders are able to conceive. The crux, however, is to organize these efforts. He said he does not believe that the Soviets want war, but pointed out that Khrushchev is quite ready to engage in military bluffs to advance Soviet foreign policy. Dr. Rabi pointed out that he thinks neither country is seriously thinking about going to war, commenting on rows of apartments being built that he saw in Russia.

The President said he is ready to do anything he could to join in such an activity. Dr. Wiesner referred to the great lack of public understanding of the issues. The public, he said, thinks of test suspension as being dangerous to our well-being (which he considers to be an incorrect judgment). The President picked up this point, saying that his greatest obsession is just this problem. He thinks the most important thing for people today is to get the American people to understand the basic factors of international and domestic issues. Such an understanding is the indispensable firm base from which governmental action can be undertaken. This is a terribly difficult task, however—not to be accomplished simply by saying it needs to be done. He mentioned many of the efforts that he makes to form and lead public opinion.

As the group dispersed, the President asked how the proposal for the linear accelerator is progressing. Dr. Killian said the paper work is in good shape and AEC is at the point of putting the proposal to the Congress.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

470. Telegram Tosec 144 to Herter at Geneva¹

Washington, May 29, 1959, 8:57 p.m.

Tosec 144. For Herter from Dillon: From Acting Secretary. Next following telegram is draft tactics paper for resumption nuclear test negotiations June 8 which was developed by interagency working group and which I have authorized as basis initiating consultations with UK.

Objective proposed tactics is to follow-up probing Soviet position technical aspects and veto requirements for inspection as initiated by Wadsworth just before recess and in particular to resume pressure on Soviets for discussion technical issues identified in conversations you and Lloyd had with Gromyko.

We anticipate Soviets will continue to be unwilling to engage in discussion underground detection and our tactics contemplate exerting pressure by tabling at outset conclusions Berkner Panel studies outer space detection and supporting study documents. To avoid appearance of raising new obstacles to agreement we would table these technical findings to demonstrate value US-UK proposal in present draft Annex I for inspection of all unidentified events of 5 kt and above, and 20 percent of those under 5 kt. This would have advantage of not REPEAT NOT appearing retreat from past treaty proposals and yet supporting our position on need for substantial number of inspections and for building some flexibility into treaty in view of uncertainties present knowledge and likelihood improvement in system.

Important consideration in planning introduce technical studies immediately on resumption negotiations is increasing pressure here from Congress and the press for publication studies on underground and outer space testing and detection. Pressure arises from both those alleging State Department hiding information showing detection such tests impractical and those believing studies lead to conclusions simplifying detection problem. Much of substance of studies is coming out in garbled form in view of access of large number panel members as well as key Congressional committees. We believe that introduction into negotiations and subsequent release will give us best chance of putting proper interpretation on results these studies. Still unresolved is question whether concept of "perfect hole" for concealment underground explosions should be tabled and published. While we are reluctant to reveal this concept in view possible usefulness to Soviets,

¹ Source: Negotiating tactics for resumption of nuclear test ban talks. Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-2959.

only way cope with allegations this concept is proven one which vitiates test suspension agreement may be to reveal all its difficulties and uncertainties.

High altitude study nearing completion and will be passed UK for study as soon as available. At that time will make arrangements for appropriate consultation US and UK scientists in advance of any discussion with Soviets this matter.

Dillon
Acting

471. Telegram Tosec 145 to Herter at Geneva¹

Washington, May 29, 1959, 8:57 p.m.

Draft Tactics Paper for Nuclear Test Negotiations

Upon resumption nuclear test negotiations June 8 Department believes USDEL should pursue tactics along following lines, incorporating substance of following in comprehensive opening statement in order maintain control debate.

(1) USDEL should establish continuity by recalling Wadsworth statement May 8. Should continue place focus on questions needing solution if effective control to be achieved continuing tactics along lines outlined NUSUP 337 in defining issues and eliciting SOV response to questions bearing on technical and organizational elements effective control.

(2) In this connection delegation should welcome Soviet readiness to discuss high altitude detection and should propose establishment technical working group this subject to convene Geneva June 15. US will suggest Term of Reference for this study. Make clear that we consider this to be only one of the three technical areas essential to clarify the problems associated with the establishment of effective control system and our willingness to discuss high altitude problem should not be interpreted as abandonment efforts to explore other technical aspects control system identified by Lloyd and Secretary. Objectives of technical discussion should be to recommend specific

¹Source: Transmits draft tactics paper for nuclear test ban negotiations. Secret; Limited Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5-2959.

instrumentation and spacing requirements for ground based elements of high altitude detection and identification system for tests above 50 kilometers to be installed in control posts established in first phase and to make recommendations as specifically as possible re satellite detection system to be developed and installed at later date. USDEL may undertake to provide names of US panel members in advance of meeting and should propose report to conference within one week of date group convened.

(3) USDEL should indicate disappointment that Soviet delegation has thus far been unwilling enter into technical discussion on assessment of capabilities for detection and identification seismic events and recommendations of methods for improving these capabilities. Should express hope that upon clarification US–UK proposals as to purpose and task such group SOVDEL will reconsider its position.

(4) USDEL should state that US has, as indicated January 5, continued its studies of implications of new seismic data for control provisions to be incorporated in treaty. US scientists have considered in light of all pertinent data concerning the capability of detection and identification system (1) certain improvements to detection and identification system that might be achieved within range of existing technology, (2) potential of further improvement through program of seismic research and (3) question of decoupling as it relates to capabilities for detection and identification of underground tests. USDEL should table for consideration revised declassified version Berkner Report of Panel on Seismic improvement together with annex on concealment. Should also table detailed studies covering major possibilities for improvements and possibilities for advancement of science of seismology in fields directly related to detection problem. Should point out that contrary to SOV charges study of these reports and recommendations will demonstrate their constructive purpose. They do not recommend additional control posts; implementation of these recommendations would increase the capacity of the system to identify seismic events and in this respect serve to limit the number of inspections required for effective control. If these recommendations for improved instrumentation are considered and agreed in light of latest technical data, it would not be necessary to reach any precisely agreed reassessment of capabilities of system as such. This unnecessary in light US formula for determining number of on-site inspections contained Annex I which takes into account changing capabilities of system. Because formula is based on percentage relationship to unidentified events, it is self-adjusting according to number such events that develop in practice. USDEL should renew proposal technical consideration capabilities for detection and

identification seismic events and recommendation of methods for improving these capabilities. Should point out US in such talks would answer any inquiries from other Dels re data submitted and would expect receive and consider any comparable data furnished by other Dels as background for recommendations. Purpose of talks would be reach agreed recommendations for improvements in instrumentation initial system. Effect of these improvements would clearly be in interest all parties concerned since they would serve to limit need for on-site inspection.

(5) The question of recommendations for specific technical criteria which must be satisfied by data from control system before an inspection can be undertaken, USDEL should table working paper outlining US ideas of criteria that would be used in connection formula set forth US Annex I. Should state if USSR finds ideas expressed in working paper acceptable we see no necessity for technical working group. If not, however, would propose discuss and seek resolve any differences in technical working group.

(6) USDEL should point out technical data present both uncertainties as to detection capabilities that remain to be resolved and potentialities for significant improvement in the system. Uncertainties and potentialities point equally to fact that program of research and development and provisions for results of such development to be incorporated in system are of real importance. In this connection US welcomes statements of SOVDEL indicating willingness consider results of future scientific research in Control Commission. US will further elaborate views this question in subsequent meetings.

(7) Referring to US undertaking to consider carefully SOV proposal for quota inspections USDEL should state that while such consideration cannot be carried very far until clarification received on questions posed earlier meetings USDEL observes, however, that US-UK proposal in Annex I wherein number inspections governed by number unidentified events deals far more realistically with existing uncertainties and potentialities for improvement than does Soviet proposal. US-UK formula is self-adjusting on basis experience, provides clear incentive for improvement of detection capabilities. Because of self-adjusting feature which percentage basis affords results of program of joint research and experimentation such as US proposal April 13 would be readily reflected in reduced level of inspections, which would not be case in quota approach.

(8) USDEL should indicate that as a part of its review of questions before conference it has prepared revisions of draft Articles VI and IX which will be tabled in short time. Redrafts attempt define more clearly relationship between Commission and administrator, involve new

wording re staffing which takes into account US position stated May 8 and contain clearer definition role of Commission and Administrator with respect to research, review and improvement of System.

(9) USDel should again refer to questions raised in meeting of May 8 and recall President Eisenhower's letter of May 5 in which he indicated that if Soviet position had not in fact changed on basic issues he would urge renewed consideration phased approach beginning with agreement discontinue atmospheric tests.

(NOTE: Above draft tactics paper furnished for background information USDEL here in event initiation consultations with UK here leads to questions from Lloyd or others on UKDEL.)

Dillon
Acting

472. Memorandum From Irwin to Herter¹

Geneva, June 8, 1959

SUBJECT

Mr. Wilcox's Memorandum of June 1, 1959,
Subject: Resumption of General Disarmament Talks

Mr. Wilcox's memorandum raises several points of interest to the Defense Department. In discussing possible negotiations within the enlarged UN Disarmament Commission, he speaks of the possibility of establishing "various sub-groups on certain aspects of our original package and, in particular, surprise attack". Again referring to the possibility of talks outside the framework of the UN, he suggests that "talks on, for example, surprise attack, could be undertaken in a political framework rather than the past technical approach".

As you know, the Defense Department has opposed separating specific disarmament subjects out from the original 1957 Disarmament Package. Certain subjects, such as, Tests Suspension, Surprise Attack, Outer Space, have been discussed apart from general disarmament negotiations. The Defense Department hopes no other topics will be

¹ Source: Department of Defense reservations on resumption of general disarmament talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Disarmament.

separated out from the 1957 Package unless the proposed State-Defense Disarmament Policy Review should determine that such could safely be undertaken. With respect to surprise attack, the Defense Department has no objection to a renewal of the technical discussions that were suspended but would be concerned over separate policy talks on surprise attack.

With respect to the forum for general disarmament negotiations, the present enlarged UN Disarmament Commission, composed of 32 members, seems most unwieldy. While we concur in the value of holding general disarmament talks under the aegis of the UN, we would be concerned that talks in the large Disarmament Commission might result in the establishment of a sub-group, whose members, other than certain NATO nations and the Soviet group, would be incompetent to deal with this complex subject and whose participation might be disadvantageous to us. If it were possible to ensure satisfactory composition of sub-groups, our concern would be largely met.

John N. Irwin, II

Copies:

Secretary McElroy
Mr. Merchant
Amb. Thompson
Mr. Becker
Mr. Berding
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Smith
Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Sullivan
Adm. Dudley

473. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 17, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Detection Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
Mr. Dillon—Acting Secretary
Mr. Farley—3/AE
Mr. Spiers—S/AE
Mr. Borg—S/S

The White House
Dr. Killian
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Keeny

Department of Defense
Under Secretary Gates
General Loper

Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. McCone
Dr. English

Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allen Dulles
Dr. Scoville

Mr. Dillon suggested that before getting to the major problem before the meeting, i.e. the level of inspection which the U.S. would require in connection with a nuclear test cessation treaty, *Dr. Killian* report on the status of preparations for the high altitude technical discussions scheduled to begin in Geneva on Monday, June 22nd. *Dr. Killian* said that the panel, which will be headed by *Dr. Panofsky* of Stanford University, has been assembled and held a preliminary meeting in California on June 15. He asked *Mr. Keeny* to report on the work accomplished and the problems faced.

Mr. Keeny identified the members of the panel and described the general approach which the group would use in discussion with the Soviets. The group planned to use the summer experts' report as a take-off point, first reviewing knowledge which had been obtained since that time. The group would cover both satellite and ground-based techniques and would avoid either minimizing or stressing the problem of concealment, attempting rather to lay out frankly the limitations and capabilities of all of the possible techniques. A plan of work has been developed and responsibility for preparation of papers has been assigned to members of the delegation. With respect to the matter of classification, AEC feels that the Restricted Data problem will present

¹ Source: High-altitude technical talks, inspections of nuclear test ban. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

no difficulty. Defense information is a more difficult problem and the Department of Defense was presently conducting a review of the second Panofsky report. *Mr. Dillon* asked *Mr. Gates* to do what he could to expedite this review.

Mr. Dillon asked about the status of consultations with the U.K. *Mr. Farley* said that the U.K. has been given the reports and that he had explored with the British Embassy the possibility of Sir William Penny chairing the British experts in view of his experience in this kind of meeting.

Mr. Keeny, continuing, said that a summary of the Panofsky reports had been prepared for public release but that the panel members were unanimous in regarding such a release as undesirable. These reports were basically different from the Berkner study in making a specific system recommendation and got into a discussion of costs. Publication of a summary would entail laying out our position in toto at the beginning of the discussion with the Soviets. There was no intention to table the reports as a whole in Geneva, and the objective was to move slowly into the problem as the U.S. experts did in last summer's meeting. Publication of a summary would be at cross purposes with this objective.

Mr. Dillon observed that there appeared to be no real public demand for the release of these reports and *Dr. Killian* and *Mr. McCone* agreed that they should not be released, in view of the circumstances described by *Mr. Keeny*, until it was clear release would not adversely affect the technical discussions.

Mr. Dillon then suggested the group turn to the inspection problem, and said that the "question to be explored was the best approach to deciding what kind of a quota the U.S. would require, and what would be the best means of making a decision under either a quota or percentage approach that a given event should be inspected. He asked *Mr. Dulles* to outline the contribution which could be made by intelligence in this process. *Mr. Dulles* said that intelligence could make a considerable contribution. Any Soviet attempt at violation would inevitably involve a large number of Soviet nationals. [text not declassified] The Soviet uncertainty about this would serve to keep them off balance. *Mr. Dulles* then reviewed a number of special ways in which the information available [text not declassified] could be applied to increase the effectiveness with which the U.S. would use any given number of inspections. After reviewing these methods *Mr. Dulles* concluded that it was possible to do enough by intelligence to make violations uncertain and dangerous, especially any violation which involved digging holes, since earth moving was easy to spot by various means. There was, of course, no guarantee that intelligence techniques would detect violations, but it must be considered an important adjunct to the system. *Mr. Dillon* asked whether the techniques described by *Mr. Dulles* could

be used without compromising our sources. *Mr. Dulles* replied that this would be the case only if the U.S. were able to select itself the events to be inspected. *Mr. Scoville* said that *Mr. Dulles'* observations pointed up the relevance of *Prof. Tukey's* thoughts on maximizing the effectiveness of a choice of inspections, and it showed how intelligence could help in assigning weights under the *Tukey* systems. *Mr. Gates* observed that a control system permitting on-site inspection in the Soviet Union would be of substantial intelligence value in itself. However, he reported that some of his people felt that there were some concealment techniques which were so simple that they would create no substantial indications which intelligence sources could pick up. The problem may be so great that intelligence will not be a help.

Dr. Killian suggested bringing a working group together to review the whole problem of inspection and the various approaches to it, as well as to study precisely what the risk would be for the U.S. if it were possible for the Soviet Union to conduct a small number of tests clandestinely. Such a group would, of course, look at the *Tukey* approach as well as at the effectiveness of the intelligence contribution. The objective would be to get a true overall picture of that problem rather than isolated bits and pieces, which are all we presently have. *Mr. McCone* agreed that such a study would be highly desirable and *Mr. Dillon* asked that *Dr. Killian* take responsibility for getting it started.

Dr. Killian observed that the Soviet proposal for selection by each side of events for inspection looks better and better the more he thought about it, and that he did not understand why the Soviets made it. He felt that if we had a budget of 100 inspections per year to use there would be a high probability of catching any violation. He felt that it was possible to reduce this number and still have a high probability, but that 100 was a reasonable figure to start with. He said he felt that any figure as smaller as 25 would not be acceptable to us. *Mr. McCone* observed that 100 inspections would allow inspection of all events above 5 kilotons and about 5 per cent of those under that figure. *Gen. Loper* said that the advantages of allowing the "other side" to choose the event to be inspected would not necessarily argue in favor of the quota approach, since it was equally applicable to making choices within a percentage. *Mr. McCone* said that the probabilities of detecting a violation appeared to be greatly improved if each side was able to choose the events to be inspected. He suggested that the *Killian* group might take various assumed numbers of allowed inspections a year, and, taking everything into account, see how effective it would be and what risks it would mean for the U.S. *Mr. Dillon* said that it was vital to have informed conclusions on these questions before we make up our minds on what to do in the negotiations. Every indication is that the Soviets will not be willing to talk about technical matters such as these but that we ourselves should still have this information as a basis for determining our own objectives.

Mr. Dillon asked *Mr. McCone* to report on his visit to Geneva. *Mr. McCone* said that he had been graciously received by Tsarapkin who then turned around and told the press that he had come to scuttle the agreement. He said that *Amb. Wadsworth* was doing a superb job, displaying great skill and patience. *Amb. Wadsworth* was troubled, however, by the degree of turnover on the delegation staff, as well as by the problem of communications, which was no doubt a temporary one caused by the heavy traffic of the Foreign Ministers meeting. *Amb. Wadsworth* continues to believe that the Soviets do want an agreement and was troubled by the message sent by the Secretary regarding the possibility of a change in direction in three or four weeks. *Mr. McCone* thought that the delegation itself felt that agreement on the April 13 proposal was, all things considered, the most desirable end result of the negotiations. The Joint Committee apparently shared this view. *Mr. McCone* said he believed, in the long run, the Soviets will be willing to discuss technical aspects of the underground problem.

Mr. McCone said he wished to raise one final point that was occasioned by an inquiry from the Joint Committee as to how often the principals meet to consider the course of negotiations. He felt that these meetings should be held quite frequently. *Mr. Dillon* agreed that they should be convened whenever there was a concrete need. *Dr. Killian* said that one of the next problems that would need discussion related to just how much of a high altitude system we will be prepared to press for, in view of the great costs involved and the conflict with other high priority satellite and missile objectives. He suggested that there should be an early meeting to discuss this problem after the staff had been able to lay out the relevant considerations.

474. Terms of Reference for Disarmament Policy Review¹

June 23, 1959

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR DISARMAMENT POLICY REVIEW

An urgent study should be undertaken jointly by the Departments of State and Defense to review and make recommendations regarding United States disarmament policy.

¹ Source: Terms of reference for disarmament policy review. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.

The basic question to be considered is whether there are comprehensive or partial measures of arms control and reduction which would contribute to the achievement of our national security objectives.

In considering this question, existing detailed United States disarmament policy and positions should be reviewed. These positions were last systematically formulated in 1957 and only relatively minor modifications have been made since that time. The last proposals for comprehensive disarmament were advanced by the United States in 1955.

In reviewing existing policy and making recommendations, such questions as the following should be considered:

1. The extent to which specific measures of arms control and reduction might contribute to our national security objectives.

2. What comprehensive arms reduction arrangements might be in the interest of the United States and the possibilities (including the technical feasibility) of achieving such a comprehensive arrangement through single or multiphased agreements.

3. What limited or partial arms control or reduction measures (including regional measures) might be in the interest of the United States, the timing and technical feasibility of such measures, and their interrelationship with each other and with a comprehensive arrangement.

4. The technical and organizational aspects of enforcement. Full attention should be given to the need for technical and military studies which would be required to have an understanding of the problem of detection, monitoring and inspection essential to any arms limitation agreement.

5. The possible role of the United Nations and appropriate U.N. organs in enforcement of disarmament agreements (particularly agreements involving radical reduction of national military establishments).

The review will take into account estimated Soviet attitudes toward various measures of arms control and reduction.

Conclusions and recommendations should be submitted by April (?), 1960.

Negotiations are currently under way with regard to nuclear test suspension, and discussions of aspects of disarmament may be anticipated in the near future in a possible Summit meeting or in competent organs of the United Nations. The results of any such negotiations and discussions should, of course, be taken into consideration during the study. The head of the study will not be expected to advise on day-to-day problems concerning international discussions which may be in process. However, his advice may be requested from time to time as matters of interest to the study arise. Priority attention should be given, within the framework of the general study, to consideration of various types of international agreements consistent with United States security interests which might reduce the danger of surprise attack, or unintentional war.

The head of the study shall be directly responsible to the Secretary of State. Government personnel and consultants selected to work on the study will be assigned to the head of the study and will be responsible to him. Organizations under contract to work on the study will also take guidance from and report their findings to the head of the study. The head of the study, in consultation with the appropriate departments and agencies, shall select the staff. He may also obtain the services of civilian consultants, and organizations such, as RAND and ORO, as he deems appropriate. The full support and assistance of appropriate departments and agencies will be provided including the assignments of qualified personnel, and all necessary data including both military and technical pertinent to the study will be made available.

475. Letter From Herter to Taylor¹

Washington, July 1, 1959

Dear General Taylor:

This is to confirm our telephone conversation of today regarding the review of U.S. disarmament policy. In accordance with our conversation, I am sending herewith a copy of the terms of reference which the President has approved.

As I told you, this study is of the utmost importance to us, as we will most certainly be involved in one way or another in arms control and limitations negotiations with the Russians in the not too distant future. Such negotiations would, of course, be in addition to the current negotiations in Geneva on the suspension of nuclear testing.

I cannot express too strongly the hope that you will find it possible to undertake the undertaken the general direction of this important review of our disarmament policy and devote such time to it as your commitments will permit.

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Requests Taylor to head disarmament policy review; includes terms of reference for review. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 611.0012/7-159.

Attachment

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TESTS OF REFERENCE FOR DISARMAMENT POLICY REVIEW

An urgent study should be undertaken jointly by the Departments of State and Defense to review and make recommendations regarding United States disarmament policy.

The basic question to be considered is whether there are comprehensive or partial measures of arms control and reduction which would contribute to the achievement of our national security objectives.

In considering this question, existing detailed United States disarmament policy and positions should be reviewed. These positions were last systematically formulated in 1957 and only relatively minor modifications have been made since that time. The last proposals for comprehensive disarmament were advanced by the United States in 1955.

In reviewing existing policy and making recommendations, such questions as the following should be considered:

1. The extent to which specific measures of arms control and reduction might contribute to our national security objectives.
2. What comprehensive arms reduction arrangements might be in the interest of the United States and the possibilities (including the technical feasibility) of achieving such a comprehensive arrangement through single or multiphased agreements.
3. What limited or partial arms control or reduction measures (including regional measures) might be in the interest of the United States, the timing and technical feasibility of such measures, and their interrelationship with each other and with a comprehensive arrangement.
4. The technical and organizational aspects of enforcement. Full attention should be given to the need for technical and military studies which would be required to have an understanding of the problem of detection, monitoring and inspection essential to any arms limitation agreement.
5. The possible role of the United Nations and appropriate U.N. organs, in enforcement of disarmament agreements (particularly agreements involving radical reduction of national military establishments).

The review will take into account estimated Soviet attitudes toward various measures of arms control and reduction.

Conclusions and recommendations should be submitted by January 1, 1960.

Negotiations are currently under way with regard to nuclear test suspension, and discussions of aspects of disarmament may be anticipated in the near future in a possible Summit meeting or in competent organs of the United Nations. The results of any such negotiations and discussions should, of course, be taken into consideration during the

study. The head of the study will not be expected to advise on day-to-day problems concerning international discussions which may be in process. However, his advice may be requested from time to time as matters of interest to the study arise. Priority attention should be given, within the framework of the general study, to consideration of various types of international agreements consistent with United States security interests which might, reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war.

The head of the study shall be directly responsible to the Secretary of State. Government personnel and consultants selected to work on the study will be assigned to the head of the study and will also take guidance from and report their findings to the head of the study. The head of the study, in consultation with the appropriate departments and agencies, shall select the staff. He may also obtain the services of civilian consultants, and organizations such as RAND and ORO, as he deems appropriate. The full support and assistance of appropriate departments and agencies will be provided including the assignments of qualified personnel, and all necessary data including both military and technical pertinent to the study will be made available.

476. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 8, 1959

SUBJECT

Visit of Congressional Group to Geneva to Observe Nuclear Test Suspension
Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

State:

The Secretary
Mr. Macomber, H
Mr. Farley, S/AE

AEC:

Mr. McCone

Senators Gore and Hickenlooper

Representatives Holifield and Van Zandt

The Secretary expressed interest in the reactions of the Congressional group during their recent trip to Geneva to observe the nuclear test

¹ Source: Congressional observer group's views on nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 033.1100/7-859.

suspension negotiations. All agreed that it had been very useful and informative.

The Secretary observed that he had never become reconciled to the fantastic elaborateness of the control system which the United States is proposing. In addition to its complexity and cost, much of its operation would involve unproductive activities which would make it extremely frustrating for the personnel engaged. From the point of view of simplicity as an initial step, he would be pleased if an initial agreement could be worked out for suspension of atmospheric tests. However, it was firm U.S. policy to exhaust all possibilities of reaching agreement on an effectively safeguarded suspension of all weapons tests.

Senator Hickenlooper said that the Congressional advisers were acquainted with Mr. McCone's letter of July 7 to the Secretary, and that they agreed in general with the report and recommendations in that letter. He commented particularly on the fact that the British were eager for any kind of agreement. The Soviet Union, while it talks of the concessions it has made, has actually not agreed to a thing of any substance in the months of negotiations to date.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry regarding Soviet attitudes, Mr. Holifield said that he had explored the inspection quota proposal with Mr. Tsarapkin. When Tsarapkin was unwilling to say what quota he proposed, Mr. Holifield had asked him whether he would accept 100 (?), 50 (?), 25 (?), 15 (?)—at which point Tsarapkin had broken in to say "not 25, not 15, but a few". Mr. Holifield observed that he generally agreed with Mr. McCone's July 7 letter. He said that he had urged Dr. Fedorov to join in nuclear detonations to test out the possibilities for detection of underground explosions, and had received an evasive but negative response.

Mr. Van Zandt said that Tsarapkin had said repeatedly to him that the Soviet Union did not trust the U.S. approach to these negotiations and considered our introduction of new data as an effort to prevent agreement. Mr. Holifield said that he had asked Usachev how the participation of Red China might be arranged, as was essential if the agreement was to be enforceable, and Usachev had stated that this was the problem of the United States. Mr. Holifield said that he recommended that in the "white paper" proposed by Mr. McCone the problem of Red China be fully treated.

The Secretary said that he believed one very important concession had been made by the Soviet Union in agreeing to the U.S.-proposed duration article which was our principal safeguard in the agreement. Senator Gore observed that even in this case the United States made the major concession by giving up the year-to-year condition it had originally stipulated.

Senator Hickenlooper said that he wished particularly to endorse Mr. McCone's proposal for a responsible, objective re-examination of

U.S. objectives in these negotiations and our continuation of them by people not previously involved. He thought that the negotiations should be recessed while this re-examination was under way and while the Foreign Ministers Conference continued. The Soviet Union clearly knew where it was going, and the U.S. could not afford to continue without a clearer definition of its own objectives and minimum requirements. He was confident that the Soviet Union would not in the end agree to a sound and effective control system and urged that we begin to bring to the fore the substantive questions which at present were not being discussed, in order to expose the true Soviet position.

The Secretary observed that it was clear the Soviet Union recognized the great military advantage the present secrecy of the Soviet regime constituted. They could not be expected to give up this secrecy for any less than a very high price.

Senator Hickenlooper said that he doubted that it was technically possible to police underground tests. Fortunately, there was a way out of a comprehensive agreement which the United States might take: This would be a voluntary stoppage of tests in the atmosphere. The Secretary said that he was reluctant to give the Soviet Union anything unilaterally. He recognized that there was a widespread concern, whether soundly based or not, regarding fallout. Mr. Holifield said that his Committee had looked very carefully into all the facts concerning the danger from fallout from nuclear tests, and these facts showed that there was no present global danger.

Messrs. Hickenlooper, Holifield, and Van Zandt all commented that of course the United States should not walk out of the negotiations and thus take the crushing propaganda loss that would result for the country that broke off the negotiations. It is a familiar Russian tactic to try to outlast us and wear us down. We must be prepared to continue negotiating, but without being trapped into an unpoliced, indefinite suspension of all nuclear weapons tests.

Mr. McCone commented that one obvious Soviet objective was to try to get us to agree in principle to the inspection quota idea, so that we would then be in the unfavorable position of haggling about numbers.

Senator Gore said that he was not unsympathetic with the over-all problem of the State Department in proceeding with these negotiations in the larger context of the Foreign Ministers meeting, our relations with allies, and our efforts to make a start on disarmament. He felt, however, that there was real danger in protracted negotiations on nuclear test suspension. He referred particularly to the risks of continuing the negotiations during an election in the U.K. The Soviet Union is also gaining propaganda advantage by playing up its pretended concessions. He urged a high-level reassessment leading to establishment of firm objectives and time schedules, and an abandonment of the present drift in the U.S. approach to the negotiations. He commented that he believed

there was value to unilateral action to end atmospheric tests and thus to separate out the fallout problem from disarmament negotiations.

Senator Hickenlooper said that he wished to disagree with Mr. Hollifield's comment regarding discussion of the China problem in any "white paper" on the test suspension negotiations. He believed there should be no mention of Red China in view of the implied admission of the advantages of recognition of Red China, and in view also of his belief that a three-power agreement, the only possible first step, would be a three-power test suspension agreement among the U.S., the U.K., and the USSR.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation to the Congressional group for making the trip to Geneva and giving him the benefit of their frank views.

477. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, July 9, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of the Principals

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>	<i>DOD</i>	<i>AEC</i>
Mr. Dillon	Dr. Killian	Mr. Gates	Mr. McCone
Mr. Farley—S/AE	Dr. Kistiakowsky	General Loper	Dr. English
Mr. Spiers—S/AE	Dr. Bacher	Mr. Irwin	
Mr. Morris—S/AE	Mr. Keeny	<i>CIA</i>	
Mr. Toon—EE	Mr. Skolnikoff	Mr. Dulles	
Mr. Borg—SS	Mr. Gray	Dr. Scoville	

Mr. Gray said he thought it important that we consider how we obtain public understanding of the U.S. position and goals at the negotiations. *Mr. McCone* agreed, saying he felt strongly that there is not a good public understanding of the aims of our Government at the nuclear test negotiations. Two things have served to obscure the issue in the public

¹ Source: Public opinion; possibility of concealment of nuclear tests. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.

mind: the Soviets have taken great pains to create the impression that they have made substantial and important concessions at the negotiations; at the same time, the U.K. has repeatedly, and most recently in a Macmillan statement last week, given the impression that agreement is just around the corner. In his opinion there remain many substantial problems to be solved before an agreement can be reached. For this reason he had suggested in his letter of July 7 to Secretary Herter that a "white paper" on the U.S. position be prepared. *Mr. Dillon* said that he felt the public was fully aware of the primary U.S. objective, which is to attain agreement on a fully safeguarded, inspected suspension of nuclear weapons tests. As far as the negotiations are concerned, we should proceed rapidly to set out our views of the technical problems. For instance, we are currently preparing a working paper setting forth our concept of the technical criteria which would have to be met before an event would be identified as natural. We believe that such a course will do a great deal to clarify the technical issues with regard to underground test monitoring and would serve to "smoke out" the Soviet position.

He had discussed with Secretary Herter the question of tactics during the immediate future when the Foreign Ministers Conference will be in session. They both felt that we should not seek a recess during the Foreign Ministers Conference. This period could be used to detail our views concerning the large numbers of unidentified seismic events which would have to be dealt with—emphasizing the need to deal realistically with the inspection problem, especially as far as events below 5 kilotons are concerned—and to seek resolution of such remaining procedural and organizational problems as we can. Thus, while he felt the timing of release of such a "white paper" as *Mr. McCone* had suggested should be deferred, he agreed that we should begin preparation of such a document.

Mr. Dillon then called on *Dr. Robert F. Bacher*, Chairman of the ad hoc committee on on-site inspection, to report on the findings of his group.

Dr. Bacher reviewed the history of the underground test detection problem, touching on the considerations of the Conference of Experts last summer, the complicating data resulting from the HARDTACK II underground explosions and the recommendations of the Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvement. He emphasized that the science of seismology was largely in its infancy and, at the present state of the art, full of uncertainties. With regard to the question of concealment, he noted that decoupling theories, which had been thought to be relatively insignificant at the time of the Experts' Conference, now held forth possibilities which could change the underground detection situation completely. He emphasized, however, that the decoupling technique developed by *Dr. Albert Latter* was a very complicated and uncertain matter. This large-hole method would require an approximately 1 million-cubic-meters hole for a 10 kiloton explosion at a cost of from 2 to 4 dollars

per cubic meter, i.e., 2 to 4 million dollars. He pointed out that there is essentially no experimental information to support this theory; however, the theory has stood up against severe theoretical scrutiny. It is expected that the HE experiments scheduled to begin in the near future by the AEC ought to be able to shed considerable light on the validity of the theory. There will remain, of course, other problems since no one knows whether a hole of the size suggested could hold together or whether there would be physical deviations from the experience with experiments in salt mines when dealing with a homogeneous medium such as would be used for an actual clandestine test.

Our thinking since last summer has been that inspection of a certain percentage of unidentified events should take place. Recently, however, the concept of an annual quota of on-site inspections has been introduced, first by British Prime Minister Macmillan and subsequently by Soviet Premier Khrushchev. His group, which met July 1–2, had been called upon to study the problems in inspection bearing on determination of a percentage or quota for inspection and to estimate the likelihood of detection which could be achieved by various percentages or quotas. Obviously after only such a short time he could not present a complete and detailed report on this complicated problem, but could merely sketch out the preliminary conclusions reached by the group. He noted that although there remained differences of opinion among the members of the Panel, he felt it was possible at this time to report some reasonably firm conclusions.

He noted that in dealing with the over-all underground problem, there were three major variables: (1) the ability to identify an underground event as natural on the basis of instrument readings; (2) the number of annual inspections which would be available in a quota; and (3) the probability of finding and proving a violation by on-site inspection. A factor of improvement in any of these variables would improve the over-all situation by the same factor. Actually, the bulk of events above 5 kiloton equivalent would be identified by the Experts' system. It was only when one dipped below the 5 kiloton range that large problems arose.

He explained that the Panel had taken three equivalent seismic yield ranges—0.5 to 2 KT, 2 to 5 KT and greater than 5 KT. In each area they had assumed three different kinds of coupling: (a) the Rainier coupling; (b) decoupling by a factor of 4; and (c) decoupling by a factor of 10. (Because of the uncertainty of the Latter method, which theoretically could give larger decoupling factors, this was not considered.) Applied to these figures were a factor of delimitation of areas of concern derived from intelligence considerations, a factor stating, the percentage of events which would be inspected, a factor indicating the probability of proof that a violation had occurred and finally a factor indicating the increased probability of detection which would result from a test series rather than an individual clandestine test. The resulting numbers

gave a probability that a given violation would be caught. He noted particularly that the most difficult of these several factors was the probability-of-proof factor of which our knowledge was deficient. This was extremely important since the final result of detection probability is directly proportional to this probability-of-proof factor.

Dr. Bacher summarized the following conclusions indicated by the panel's discussion:

1. If large decoupling factors prove to be possible using the Latter technique, we will then be driven back essentially to reliance on intelligence, since the network will have very little capability of detecting such events, much less identifying them. However, he personally felt that the possibility of constructing holes for tests larger than 10 KT was extremely speculative.

2. The probability of being caught in a violation in the low-yield ranges is most heavily dependent on the effectiveness of the actual on-site inspection procedure since the other factors have less influence than in the higher yield ranges.

3. Urgent study of the following problems is needed: (a) experimental testing of the Latter decoupling theory; (b) operational study of effective inspection techniques; (c) a hard look at the possibility of using unmanned seismic stations on a 150 to 170 kilometer network. This could be the main solution to the decoupling problem. If such a network were used rather than the Geneva system, the identification capability would be improved greatly since the network would reach down to the 50-ton range. He noted that the use of such stations is common in seismology; of course, in a control system such units would require telemetry capability and would be difficult to make tamper-proof.

Dr. Killian said he felt that the results of this quick study made clear that underground detection problem is very difficult. He emphasized, however, that these analyses were very much on the conservative side and that the situation might in actuality be very much better.

Mr. Dillon said he was impressed with the fact that the real problem existed in the lower yields and that in the higher yield range we seemed to be much better off. *Mr. McCone* noted that this fact raised again the question of whether we should propose a yield threshold for the agreement. *Mr. Keeny* pointed out that the Experts' Report had itself estimated a capability for underground events of only 5 kilotons and above and had not claimed to have such capabilities in the smaller yield range.

Mr. Gates asked whether experimentation on weapons development in size below 5 kilotons was not very expensive. *McCone* agreed that it was quite expensive in terms of fissionable materials.

Referring to his recent trip to Geneva, *Mr. McCone* said that the Soviet Delegate, Ambassador Tsarapkin, had told him that his country

could never accept the concept of unmanned seismic stations so closely spaced because of the large numbers involved and the need for servicing. *Dr. Bacher* pointed out that although a large number of such slave stations would be required, they would almost entirely do away with the inspection problem since such a network would identify almost all earthquakes without such inspection.

Mr. Dillon asked what we might do to improve the state of our knowledge of on-site inspection techniques. *Dr. Scoville* replied that a great deal of work had been done last fall and that there was no question but that there were possible technical and detective methods to find underground nuclear explosions. He felt that it would be most useful if the AEC could prepare a study on ways in which tests could be hidden and minimum amount of diagnostic instrumentation which would be needed. Then, the “detectives” could pit their wits against the “hidlers”. *Dr. Bacher* agreed that the HARDTACK II events had been very easy to find. However, no particular effort was made to conceal these shots.

In response to *Mr. Irwin’s* question as to whether the Berkner recommendations for 100 seismometers at each control post would be practical, *Dr. Bacher* explained that it was common in the oil industry to use arrays of 1,000 such units, *Dr. Killian* stressed that in general the Berkner estimates had deliberately been very conservative.

Mr. Dillon asked whether *Dr. Killian* thought we had enough information to set forth for the President in lay language the present state of the problem. *Dr. Killian* said he thought that we can certainly give him a reasonable estimate of the implications of this latest study on our overall position. It was agreed that *Dr. Killian* would undertake to prepare such a paper.

Dr. Killian said he would like to suggest a possible over-all conclusion based on *Dr. Bacher’s* report. He said that it would seem, on the basis of the existing state of knowledge and without further experiments, that the soundest course for us would be to accept an atmospheric test cessation alone until we get further data on the underground problem. He said that he would be willing to suggest that this ought to be our position. *Mr. Farley* said that he understood *Dr. Killian* to be suggesting that we adopt such a position ourselves as the only realistic approach, but in our tactics at the negotiations and with regard to the public, we must be careful to prepare a logical and detailed case supporting such a course. *Dr. Killian* and *Mr. McCone* agreed.

Mr. Dillon called the attention of the group to the cost estimates previously circulated by the State Department and asked that the principals look carefully at the implications of such large costs.

In response to a suggestion by *Mr. McCone* that it might be advisable to recess the negotiations, *Mr. Dillon* said Secretary Herter wished to avoid any consideration of the test cessation issue in the Foreign Ministers Meeting and for this reason had decided that it would be wisest

not to recess the negotiations while the Foreign Ministers are in Geneva. *Mr. Irwin* said he thought that it would be wisest if the Conference would recess in order to save the ammunition provided by the various issues, such as numbers of unidentified events, etc., for use in presenting any solution such as the threshold approach or the atmospheric-cessation-only-approach. *Mr. Dillon* said that in the light of the discussion at the meeting today, he and the Secretary would reconsider this point.

After *Dr. Killian* had reminded the group that when the Latter concealment theory is proven to be feasible or infeasible, we would again be faced with a new set of circumstances on underground testing, *Mr. McCone* said that the AEC expected to finish the HE experiments designed to test out the theory by the beginning of September.

Mr. Keeny then gave a brief review of the proceedings at the technical discussions on high altitude detection held in Geneva the last two weeks. He said that essentially the Soviet Union has agreed to our entire position on a system for monitoring the high altitude environment, including our assessment on shielding. The only area in which he felt they would not agree was the use of ground-based back scatter radar, since they maintained this equipment had dangerous potential for intelligence gathering on their missile program.

478. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 10, 1959

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Suspension Talks

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
The Viscount Hood, British Minister
The Secretary
Livingston T. Merchant, Asst. Secretary, EUR

During the course of a call on the Secretary on another matter, the British Ambassador inquired whether there was any new development which he should report to Selwyn Lloyd concerning the nuclear test suspension negotiations.

¹ Source: Nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-1059. Drafted on July 22.

The Secretary replied that he would like to run up a warning flag in connection with the underground tests. The Scientific Committee had met yesterday and reviewed recently developed technical information on the detection of underground tests. The report was very discouraging. It made clear, however, that more underground tests must be carried out in order to reach any firm conclusion as to the detection possibilities of any existent system. The Secretary said he had not yet had the opportunity himself of going over the report but that he would be discussing it in Geneva with Mr. Lloyd.

On the matter of high altitude testing, the Secretary said that the experts' talks on this subject in Geneva seemed to be going well. He said his tentative conclusion was that it may be necessary to settle for an agreement limited to atmospheric tests while continuing negotiation on those underground. He said he had very much in mind the problem of securing approval by the Senate of any control system which had so low detection capability as to raise doubts as to its effectiveness even as a deterrent.

479. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, July 16, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of the Principals

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>	<i>D.O.D.</i>	<i>A.E.C.</i>
Mr. Dillon	Mr. Gray	Gen. Loper	Mr. McCone
Mr. Kohler—EUR	Dr. Kistiakowsky	Gen. Fox	Mr. English
Mr. Farley—S/AE	Mr. Keeny	Mr. Knight	Col. Sherrill
Mr. Spiers—S/AE			
Mr. Blanchet—S/AE		<i>CIA</i>	
Mr. Fessenden—S/AE		Mr. Dulles	
Mr. Borg—S/S		Mr. Brent	

Mr. Dillon explained that the meeting had been called to follow up the discussion on July 9 and was concerned with two problems: the

¹ Source: Technical aspects of nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy.

presentation to the President of a simplified version of the report made by Dr. Bacher at the July 9 meeting; and secondly, recommendations as to what action should be taken in the light of the technical situation. He then asked Dr. Kistiakowsky what the status of the preparations for the submission to the President was and whether the report contemplated departed appreciably from Dr. Bacher's comments last week.

Dr. Kistiakowsky replied the paper would be ready for presentation early next week. He said that it would not depart appreciably from Dr. Bacher's remarks except in the avoidance of detail and the addition of visual aids. There had been no further meetings of the Panel. It was apparent that some of the findings reported by Dr. Bacher were technically supported while others were necessarily guesswork. He particularly noted the "P factor", i.e., the estimated probability that an inspection party could actually determine the nature of a suspicious event. On this point there was great disagreement among the Panel members and agreement only on the point that there was no basis for reaching a firm estimate. *Mr. Dillon* interjected that this appeared to lend weight to the view that there was a need for additional experimentation. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* explained that experimentation would not contribute to a more precise evaluation of this factor since it involved unpredictable considerations like the skill of the investigators, how much information we might have of the area concerned from intelligence, etc. *Mr. Dulles* remarked that the conversation on July 9 had been largely confined to technical considerations and had not considered the psychological factors. It had not gone into how the Soviets would assess the risk of attempting evasion.

Mr. Dillon referred to the draft course of action (attached) circulated at the outset of the meeting. He commented that we should not alter our public position regarding our ultimate objective of a safeguarded test suspension, during a period in which we would ascertain whether we could, in fact, devise adequate safeguards for a discontinuance of tests. *Mr. McCone* said it was his impression on reading the paper that we were drifting away from the position of requiring adequate safeguards. *Mr. Dillon* replied that this was not our intention. *Mr. Dillon* then reviewed each of the recommendations of the paper in turn, calling particular attention to paragraph d concerning a U.S. declaration of willingness to withhold nuclear tests underground while an experimental program to clear up present uncertainties was being conducted.

Mr. McCone and General Loper noted that the estimate in the paper in paragraph c-5 that such a program could be conducted in two to three years was out of line with Dr. Northrup's estimate of three to five years. *Mr. Dillon* said that this number would of course be changed to whatever the actual estimate was. *General Loper* then took exception to the statement of the problem at the outset of the paper which placed too

great weight on the problem of the concealment of underground nuclear explosions. If this problem were solved there would still be the matter of detection of underground testing in the lower yield ranges where the deterrence factor was very small. He also questioned the recommendation in paragraph d that we should agree not to test underground, suggesting that the language should be changed to "refrain from testing in the atmosphere" so that there would be no contamination from radioactive fallout. He maintained that this had been the President's idea all along. *Mr. Dillon* suggested that this paragraph be bracketed for the President's decision and said that the statement of the problem would be generalized to take care of General Loper's objection.

Dr. Kistiakowsky then gave a further account of the technical presentation that would be made to the President. He explained that there had been two key assumptions in *Dr. Bacher's* presentation of July 9: that decoupling by a factor of 10 would be feasible and that probability of success in on-site inspections was very low. If these assumptions were set aside, the picture was very much as it was at the end of the experts' discussions in 1958, provided that the improved instruments recommended by the Berkner Panel were incorporated into the system. The weight of these two assumptions would be brought out in a series of charts in which, by means of bar graphs, probability of detection would be plotted against detonations of different yield under varying assumptions as to the number of on-site inspections which could be carried out. One chart also showed the situation which would occur if decoupling should be feasible to the extent of reducing amplitude by a factor of 200.

At the request of *Mr. Dillon* *General Loper* then reported on a joint AEC–DOD study on what action should be taken to follow up the main recommendations of the Berkner Panel. He said that the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) had recommended that there should be applied research on the evolution of early improvements on the detection of underground tests and secondly that there should in addition be fundamental research in seismology. New projects in both fields had been recommended, and the recommendations had been submitted to *Dr. York* for review. A panel had been selected to examine the projects recommended and subsequently to advise AFTAC on the carrying out of these projects. AFTAC has already begun to accumulate Soviet periodicals on seismology and to establish contacts with U.S. laboratories working on allied fields. He said that the funding had not been settled but that the expenses had been estimated at \$22.8 million for the first year and \$30 million for the second year. *General Loper* noted parenthetically that AEC could look for assistance from the Department of Defense in the amount of \$375,000 for work on the salt dome and granite experiments. *McCone* at this point inquired

whether the Panel believed that it could make a real contribution to solving the problem—whether it could come up with recommendations which would make a real difference in the system. He suggested that the Panel's recommendations would require very close examination, citing again Dr. Northrup's opinion that three to five years would be necessary and that even under these circumstances there might not be successful results. *General Loper* said that this was why AFTAC had emphasized the need for fundamental advances in seismology. He explained that AFTAC had under consideration the establishment of a model station to test the deep-hole equipment, long-period equipment and other improved equipment.

In response to Mr. Dillon's request, *Mr. McCone* then reported on a study of the AEC and DOD on the requirement for additional weapons tests, including the feasibility and cost of conducting them underground. McCone said that it had been prepared by a committee composed of a representative of the Division of Military Applications in the U.S. Air Force; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy; the Manager of the AEC installation at Albuquerque; the Directors of the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories; and the Vice President of the Sandia Corporation. He said that the report set out various areas in which improvements, some of them of a dramatic nature, could be made in both low and high yields, in the refinement of the Polaris warhead and in the development of the Minute Man warhead. It projected a series of desirable underground tests extending into Fiscal Year 1960 and costing \$50 million. It also projected other tests in the upper atmosphere which would cost \$500 million to \$775 million. *Mr. Dillon* asked what, in general, were the assumptions as to what could be done underground. *Colonel Sherrill* said they had arbitrarily limited the underground testing in the first instance to 50 KT. It might be possible to go higher than this but this would be impossible to determine without the benefit of further underground testing. They had programmed two tests which could go up to 130 KT if preliminary testing in lower yields should prove it feasible to go this high. *Mr. McCone* then read the conclusions of the report that further testing was necessary to develop "new concepts"; to explore the possibility of warheads for mobile ICBMs and effects tests for the study of high altitude defense; to develop high assurance and predictability in various weapons and to contribute to the further development of the anti-ICBMs warhead and anti-submarine weapons, as well as weapons with improved characteristics for use over land surfaces. *Mr. McCone* said that there was a supplementary statement by Dr. Teller as well as an amplification by the Department of Defense. This report pointed up the seriousness of the question before the present group.

Mr. Dillon asked whether all the principals would be available next week for the meeting with the President. *Mr. McCone* said that he would be away on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, but that someone else could represent him if there were reasons for going ahead with the meeting. *Mr. Dillon* indicated the meeting would be postponed until *Mr. McCone's* return.

General Loper then raised the question of proposed instructions to the U.S. Delegation in Geneva concerning staffing. He said that he recognized that the position which the delegation was instructed to take was fundamentally sound, but he questioned on tactical grounds the wisdom of taking this position at this stage of the negotiations. *Mr. Dillon* and *Mr. Farley* outlined the reasons for going ahead on the discussion of staffing. *Mr. McCone* expressed the view that from his observation of the situation in Geneva it would be bad to try to stop further discussion on the staffing problem. He suggested that we might, however, in putting forth our position on staffing make clear that this was a peripheral issue in the negotiations and that the central issue lay elsewhere. It was agreed that *Mr. Knight* would discuss the matter with *Mr. McElroy* and call back in the evening.

Mr. McCone then stated that he did not think that the Tab A of the paper under discussion should go forward to the President, since the points included were matters of dispute. *Mr. Dillon* said that they had been attached as a tab for the information of the meeting participants rather than the President.

Attachment

Draft Course of Action

Problem. To outline a specific course of action in the event of a Presidential decision that the newly-developed theoretical techniques for concealment of underground nuclear explosions invalidate the Geneva Experts' system to such a degree that agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban would, on balance, involve an unacceptable security risk for the U.S., at least prior to conduct and assessment of further research and experimentation.

Possible Course of Action. The following course of action, which is proposed for discussion with the U.K. after Presidential approval, would do most to minimize adverse reaction and accord with the considerations and basic objectives outlined in Tab A.

a) The Secretary to inform Lloyd of our present views, and offer an immediate visit by a U.S. technical team headed by Dr. Bacher to the U.K. to satisfy U.K. questions. (We should be prepared for a U.K. conclusion that the political advantages to be gained from agreement far outweigh the technical uncertainties involved. In addition the U.K. is

likely to resist a change in position while the Foreign Ministers Conference is under way and so long as a Summit Conference is a possibility.)

b) Secretary Herter and Lloyd to advise Gromyko in Geneva that we are seriously concerned about Soviet unwillingness to join in reconsidering the effectiveness of the Geneva system for dealing with underground tests in the low yield ranges and that, in spite of the progress which the negotiators have made, we will be unable to agree to a comprehensive ban until there is a solution of this problem. Gromyko should be made to understand that our public and Congressional opinion will not accept an agreement which is not technically sound, and that we cannot longer defer facing up to this problem. Secretary Herter to offer that Dr. Bacher visit Geneva or Moscow to review the technical considerations with Dr. Feodorov or other Soviet scientists.

c) If, as is to be expected, the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the proposed technical reassessment despite this demarche, Wadsworth should be instructed to state in the meeting that the United States, short of finding ways of overcoming the technical uncertainties, no longer believes it possible to agree to a full test ban.

1) This would be preceded by a presentation in the meeting, by Dr. Bacher, of our full analysis of the technical situation.

2) This action would be coordinated with a message from Eisenhower to Khrushchev designed to authenticate this position.

3) If the USSR under this pressure, agrees to the proposed reassessment, the conclusions of the Bacher Panel and the Latter theory will stand up under Soviet technical criticism, and thus will provide even stronger justification for our action. If the USSR continues to refuse, it will bear the onus of ignoring the difficulties we have described in specific terms.

4) In either event we should introduce a draft treaty for a phased approach similar to that developed subsequent to the April 13 proposal, preserving as many as possible of the now agreed elements of the control system but extending to high altitude tests on the basis of the recent agreement in this area.

5) Concurrently, we should propose a concrete program of research and experimentation, to be conducted cooperatively over a definite period (2-3 years), designed to answer the present uncertainties about underground detection capabilities. The treaty would include provision for extending the ban to underground tests, perhaps in stages, as soon as effective control is proven possible by further study and experimentation. The initial stage might be to prohibit underground tests creating a seismic signal larger than 10-20 KT if this is deemed feasible.

d) In order to emphasize that the objective of the U.S. is to develop a sound system and not to find a pretext to resume testing, the U.S. should declare readiness for its part to withhold nuclear weapons tests underground while the experimental program is being conducted, provided the USSR agreed to this approach, to cooperate in the research program, and undertook a similar declaration on its own part. (We anticipate that without this provision it will probably not be possible to obtain U.K. concurrence to the outlined course of action.)

e) If the USSR does not accept this proposal, the President should issue a statement recalling the U.S. delegation temporarily, announcing

the intention to undertake the experimental program unilaterally (or jointly with the U.K.) and proposing resumption of negotiations as soon as the program produces results sufficient to warrant this action. In this event we should refrain from conducting any tests in the atmosphere and limit ourselves to a modest and restricted program of underground weapons tests conducted with an absolute minimum of publicity. (We must anticipate Soviet and U.K. declarations of intent not to conduct any testing.)

Considerations. Any plan of action for a change in U.S. position with respect to the Geneva negotiations must be developed with the following considerations in mind:

a) The need to minimize the impression that the U.S. is seeking to evade agreement with the USSR now that it has become more of a practical possibility, or that the U.S. is seeking a pretext for resumption of nuclear weapons testing.

b) The necessity for full, candid and effective exposition of the reasons for our position.

c) The importance of holding on to such advances in Soviet willingness to accept international control and inspection as have been made during the course of these negotiations.

d) The importance of not prejudicing the possibilities of success in, or even the meaningful conduct of further disarmament negotiations.

e) The importance of avoiding a major policy split with the U.K., in which there is extreme internal pressure to obtain a successful result in the current negotiations.

f) The danger of unilateral Soviet forswearing of all nuclear weapons tests as a likely response to a U.S. shift in position, and the consequent propaganda gain for the USSR.

g) The implications which a change in the prospects for an agreement on testing could have on other current or prospective negotiations with the USSR.

Basic Objectives. The U.S. initially decided to seek an agreement on suspension of nuclear tests for a number of reasons, which remain cogent:

a) A desire to combat the image of the U.S. as a military-minded nation, indifferent to world fears about nuclear war and world hopes that some means might be found to cope with the threat of modern arms.

b) To attack the 4th country problem, limiting the development of independent nuclear weapons production capabilities.

c) To break the 12-year disarmament impasse by taking an immediately practical first step that might make subsequent steps come easier.

d) To penetrate the Iron Curtain and force Soviet acceptance of the idea of international control.

e) To demonstrate to the world as well as to the Soviet Union U.S. willingness to seek sound agreements with the USSR and to probe the sincerity of Soviet professions of a desire for relaxation of tensions.

f) To freeze the status of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, insofar as possible, while it is still behind ours.

g) To counter a successful Soviet propaganda drive which enabled it to pose as champion of peace on this issue, and to forestall an unequivocal UN call for test cessation with or without controls.

h) In achieving these objectives, at the same time to dispose of the "fallout" issue which was stigmatizing the nuclear weapons on which we relied.

It is necessary to insure that any course of action adopted does not mean a reversal of the U.S. position or adoption of an obviously unnegotiable one which would mean a setback to the chance of achieving these objectives. If through a change in our position we convince others we are no longer interested in an agreement on nuclear tests there could be a serious impact on the confidence of our allies and of uncommitted countries in the U.S. as a responsible power which seeks an alternative to an arms race.

In view of these considerations and the history of the negotiations so far, the U.S. must be prepared to deal frankly and fully with the technical factors which we believe justify a change in our objectives. It would be unwise to base such a change on Soviet recalcitrance in the negotiations, since the gap between the Soviet and Western positions at present, though substantial, may well be bridgeable by further persistent effort. The Soviets have made substantial changes in position during the negotiations and have moved closer to our concept of international control than ever before in the long history of disarmament negotiations. There is no longer a clear, dramatic difference between the Soviet and Western positions on key issues. Initially the Soviets maintained that controls were unnecessary and, finally, during the 1958 Experts' Conference accepted in toto the U.S. position on the full range of control methods which we deemed technically necessary. This Soviet acceptance of our proposals was duplicated during the recently concluded high altitude technical discussions. Accordingly, we believe that in order to be plausible we must clearly base any change in position on technical difficulties not foreseen last summer, which we must try jointly to overcome before we can be confident that a comprehensive test ban is in fact enforceable. We must be prepared, in particular, to explain the Latter concealment theory and its implications. This is the major new development justifying reassessment, since it was recognized as far back as the Experts' Conference that underground events in the low yield ranges would be difficult to identify and that below some point (which now appears to be about .7 KT) some would go undetected. This level of risk has been considered acceptable, given the limited motivation for cheating in these ranges.

480. Memorandum From Killian to Kistiakowsky¹

Washington, July 20, 1959

I wish to put into this memorandum the suggestion that I made to you verbally for modifying the position paper for the Geneva Test Cessation Conference which you showed to me on Sunday and which was presented by the Department of State at the meeting of principals on Thursday.

My suggestion is this: that as a first step in a plan to propose a phased and evolutionary test ban, we seek to introduce into the Geneva discussions the whole problem of the Latter Hole. In doing this we would first of all make a complete disclosure of the concept and theory with a complete discussion of the uncertainties that we feel this introduces into the monitoring of underground tests. Next we should propose an agreement to conduct test experiments to gain solid evidence about the effects of the Latter Hole. These should include nuclear tests. Without nuclear tests, I doubt very much whether any experimentation is going to be convincing as to whether the theory is right or wrong or partially right.

A first step such as the one I propose would seem to put us in a more advantageous position. If the Soviets accepted the proposal for such tests, there could be a clear possibility of gaining more solid experimental evidence to proceed with further discussions of a monitoring system, in a manner which would make it clear to the world that we were troubled by the uncertainty which has been introduced by this new concept and that also we were anxious to get the facts and let them fall as they may.

If the Soviets refuse to agree to such a proposal, our position would seem to me to be much stronger before the world in that we have sincerely sought to make an effort to meet the technical uncertainties head on with information fully available to both sides.

If such a program of testing and experimentation to find the facts about the Latter Hole do proceed, we would then be in a much more solid position to determine what our next step should be. If, for example, the experiments support the theory of the Latter Hole and indicated very large decoupling factors, we might have to conclude that a second phase involving detection of underground tests might have to be drastically modified or even dropped. If, however, the tests showed

¹ Source: Proposes discussing Latter Hole in nuclear test suspension talks. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy.

that the decoupling factors are much smaller than those which theory indicates might be possible, we would have a solid technical base for looking at systems for detection of underground tests.

The step which I propose and describe is included in the State Department proposed position paper, but my plan puts it in a somewhat different setting and changes the timing. We would make such a proposal as I describe first, and then defer our decisions as to whether we propose an atmospheric ban as the first phase of an evolutionary plan.

One question that will have to be met in appraising my proposal is the time required to conduct such nuclear tests and the effect of the time required on our own planning. If it was agreed that we were to make such a proposal and if consequently the proposal were accepted, I think that we would be operating under a sense of urgency to make such a test and get the facts as soon as possible. I would hope that this could be a matter of two years rather than three to five years.

Whatever we now decide to do, I hope very much that we will cling to our policy of seeking to establish the principle of monitoring. We now know that monitoring systems are more complex than originally supposed, but I am not convinced that this additional complexity invalidates the concept of monitoring. I am convinced that the principle of monitoring is so important for any progressive development of arms limitation policies and procedures that we ought to pursue the effort to design and get agreement on monitoring systems with great determination. We have gone deeply into the technical aspects of nuclear test monitoring and inspection, and it may well be that we have a greater opportunity to reach sound agreements about this particular kind of monitoring system than we could expect in the future to reach with any other aspect of arms limitation.

More fundamental even than this is the importance in my view of making headway, however slight, in the development of methods of arms limitation which still provides adequately for the security of the United States. Despite all of the difficulties and frustrations that are inherent in the current negotiations, I still believe that these negotiations are worth continuing and warrant our being persistent and patient in seeking to achieve progress and further results.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

481. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/164

Geneva, July 29, 1959, 1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary

U.S.S.R
Mr. Gromyko

SUBJECT

Disarmament Negotiations

After the discussion on Geneva Conference matters following lunch today, the Secretary raised with Gromyko the questions of renewing disarmament negotiations. He said that he was prepared now to discuss with Gromyko his ideas on a suitable form for carrying on negotiations which are now in suspension. The Secretary's view would be the negotiating group should be small, and he had understood from Gromyko's conversation with Secretary General Hammarskjold that he shared this view. It was clear to the Secretary that if the negotiating group is to be a workable organ, membership in it should be restricted to parties with a high degree of technical competence and with a real sense of responsibility with regard to the disarmament problem. The Secretary would prefer therefore that the negotiating body not include neutral countries since, for the most part, they are lacking in the requisite technical competence and their presence therefore would probably [illegible in the original] the discussions. The Secretary [illegible in the original] the United States, the United Kingdom [illegible in the original] the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia [illegible in the original] which to consider the Secretary [illegible in the original] could lunch with him Friday or Saturday [illegible in the original] to carry on their discussion of the problem.

¹ Source: Resumption of disarmament negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

482. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, July 29, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary Dillon
Mr. Charles Coolidge
General Goodpaster

Mr. Dillon said he was there to introduce Mr. Coolidge to the President in a new capacity, that of Director of the study of Disarmament which the President had recently approved. The President expressed his gratification that Mr. Coolidge was bringing his extended experience in security affairs back to the government to lead this study.

Mr. Coolidge said his ideas on disarmament are still pretty meager. It seemed to be something that everyone is for but for which it is very hard to find specific effective things to do. He said he did not intend to establish any big task forces, but thought he would take advantage of what has already been done. His staff he expected to include four from Defense, four from State, two or three from the scientific community, one from CIA and one from AEC, at least initially. The President supported this approach, commenting that our normal experience is that these projects are over-organized, to the extent that they become bureaucratic. His thought is that the key is a few people with good ideas and imagination. Mr. Coolidge said he had talked with Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Killian and Mr. Allen Dulles to get their thinking, and would certainly be searching for ideas wherever they could be found.

The President said that one of the difficulties is that it is hard to get timely response even where we see some action possibilities. He recalled that he had thought some two years ago that it would have been a good idea to discontinue atmospheric testing. The Soviets probably would not have agreed, since they have insisted on banning all types of testing, but we would have improved our situation greatly without ruling out tests that were really essential. In the long run, he said he feels we cannot go beyond the ban on atmospheric testing since inspection against ground testing is too uncertain, and inspection against high altitude testing will probably be too costly. He felt that there is great value to be gained through the elimination of certain types of arms from certain areas. The virtue is that we thereby establish inspection systems, and it is from these that he expects progress in the international field to be achieved. After further discussion of the difficulties involved in the disarmament approach, Mr. Coolidge and the President agreed that the only thing to do is to stay with it and do the best we can.

¹ Source: Disarmament study. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

The President again thanked Mr. Coolidge for taking on this assignment. At this point Mr. Coolidge left the President's office.

The President then cleared a proposed message to Prime Minister Macmillan and gave it to Mr. Dillon for final editing and dispatch. He followed this with a message to Khrushchev with the same instructions. Mr. Dillon suggested delivering the message to Macmillan through Lord Hood and the one to Khrushchev through Ambassador Menshikov here in Washington, and the President agreed.

Mr. Dillon recommended for the President's approval the designation of Mr. Dowling as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the State Department. He mentioned that the international organization for the support of NATO is planning to designate a new head, and asked if the President would see any objection to Mr. Harriman's taking that post, which is an entirely private position. The President said he did not think this was a matter which needed to be brought to him, and would therefore have no objection.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

483. Telegram Cahto 188 From Herter at Geneva¹

Geneva, July 31, 1959, 10 p.m.

Cahto 188. Re Tocah 211, following are Wadsworth views on recess.

1. While recess until conclusion of Killian talks would be highly desirable from many standpoints. USdel is rather at loss to find reasonable justification for requesting one which will wash with Russians and world opinion. Soviets are already deeply suspicious re United States attitude toward treaty. They have made this quite clear in their repeated probing for United States answer to their quota proposal. Unless desirability of recess can be very clearly demonstrated, any attempt to obtain one likely be met by Soviet allegations re United States intentions and refusal go along on agreed basis.

Alternative of spacing out meetings and slowing down tempo of work seems to us preferable. Recently conference has averaged only three meetings per week. If United Kingdom agreed we could move ahead at

¹ Source: Wadsworth's views on recess of nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/7-3159.

about this rate or slower on number of uncompleted matters, all of which would have to be negotiated in any event, even for limited treaty.

3. Believe following tactics would permit United States to maintain reasonable posture for about two weeks:

A) Continue as during last five weeks to limit meeting schedule on basis ad hoc arrangements to three or less per week.

B) Continue staffing discussion, dealing with thirds proposal, question of nationality of head of post, and United States views re exclusion host country nationals from inspection groups.

C) Continue discussion preparatory commission, Annex III, seeking clarification of Soviet position and definition of any issues of disagreement.

D) Table Annex II on privileges and immunities for discussion if this can be agreed with United Kingdom.

E) Table if possible amendments to treaty to incorporate high altitude provisions as recommended Supnu 563.

F) Continue discussion of veto, especially as regards budgetary, administrative and logistic questions.

G) Deal with minor matters which are still pending such as depositary government, disposition of records of Experts' discussions re high altitude detection, and amendments relating to choice of Vienna as headquarters.

H) Consider definitions and disputes articles when agreement reached with United Kingdom these matters.

Foregoing assumes high altitude provisions and Annex II can be readied for presentation within week. In any case it would of course be most helpful to Wadsworth if conversations with British could be started and carried through as quickly as possible.

Herter

484. Telegram Cahto 201 From Herter at Geneva¹

Geneva, August 3, 1959, 7 p.m.

Cahto 201. For the Acting Secretary. Wadsworth and I met with Lloyd, Wright, Laskey and Morgan of UKdel August 1 and informed the group about latest schedule of Killian and his group re coming

¹ Source: Discussions with U.K. on nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-359.

to London. Lloyd indicated this was acceptable to them, not knowing at the moment where Penney was. He thought that if their scientists agreed with the latest U.S. findings and with a two to three year research and experimentation program that the UK might agree that we cannot accept disarmament agreements which cannot be controlled; i.e., we could not yet sign treaty banning underground tests.

Lloyd expressed considerable concern about impact of present US plan on the General Assembly. He pointed out that unless the US–UK did something about continuing the moratorium on tests other than experimentation for the detection system, we stood a good chance of receiving a resounding defeat in the Assembly. He thought that world opinion would be “aghast” if the West resumed testing, that the Irish res presented certain difficulties and that a res calling for a moratorium might even be passed. He further thought that the West’s strongest point was the Russian refusal to discuss the new seismic data and that we should play the hand on that.

I replied that I felt this would not be as serious as Lloyd thought, since most of the world objected to tests because of fall-out and the results thereof.

Lloyd pointed out that although this was true, the Soviets would be sure to make a great deal of mileage with an argument to the effect that this proved that we never had wished to have a comprehensive test ban and that the “anti-treaty forces” in Washington had won the day.

All of the above predicated on assumption that Sovs would not agree to the negotiation of a limited treaty.

On further procedural matters it was agreed that Killian-Penney group should come to Geneva from London as soon as they had reached agreement. It was thought doubtful that Federov (USSR) would return to Geneva from Moscow, but it was agreed that Western scientific position should be placed upon record by Penney and Killian. It was also agreed that Western dels should table the alternative limited treaty covering atmospheric, high altitude and underwater explosions together with an undertaking to carry out the research needed, with Russian cooperation.

Considerable conversation then ensued about the advisability of making an announcement that when, as and if research and experimentation had resulted in a detection system in which we could have confidence, the US would accept the quota idea in principle. It was generally agreed that this might be a good tactical move and that it might lead the Sovs closer to agreement to join with the West in the experimentation program.

It was agreed that we would wait until completion of London talks between Killian and Penney before setting up any rigid timetable for the future. In any event, Killian and Penney should first agree on the scientific position. We could drag out the conference until they could come to Geneva and present their data. We might then suggest a recess to allow the Russians to consider the new package. Lloyd thought we should keep the

test conf in existence and try to delay a GA rpt GA disarmament debate at least until November with the conf still in progress to that time. It was also pointed out that there is a lot of hard work to be done on the alternative draft treaty and that it would be important to receive US Govt's decision on the high altitude report which, according to UK group, had been accepted by the UK as an "acceptance as correct technical assessment."

Herter

485. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 5, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

In keeping with your announcement on August 22, 1958, of a one-year's suspension of nuclear weapons testing, I issued certain instructions concerning preparations to be made by the Department of Defense for the resumption of testing after expiration of the suspension period. Specifically, I directed that preparations be made for conducting a limited test series not earlier than February 1960 and a more comprehensive series involving overseas operations by the middle of the Calendar Year 1960. These periods were selected with due regard to the preparatory time required and on the assumption that by the middle of 1959 we would be able to make a fair evaluation of the chances of success or failure of the test cessation negotiations.

On the basis of these instructions two test series were planned; first, a single underground shot to simulate certain effects of explosions at very high altitude, as an important consideration in the design of anti-ICBM systems; second, a comprehensive overseas series to thoroughly investigate the effects of very altitude explosions on communications, radar, materiel and personnel; to further investigate safe delivery and kill distances for anti-submarine weapons and to determine the necessary characteristics of fully hardened ICBM launching sites.

No substantial expenditures for the proposed *underground test* are required at this time.

¹ Source: Plans to resume testing. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, Neil, 1959.

However, we have now reached a point when considerable sums must be expended in preparations for the more comprehensive program if it to be conducted as scheduled during Calendar Year 1960. It is estimated that between the present date and the end of October 1959 from \$30 to \$40 million would have to be committed in preparations for this test series if the presently placed operational date is to be met.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, have advised me that the data to be obtained from these tests are of great importance to the design and operational employment of the several weapons systems to which they apply. The very high altitude tests, in particular, are designed to obtain information on interruptions or blackouts of communications and other effects of nuclear explosions in a hitherto relatively unexplored environment which may be of vital importance to our future defensive posture. These high altitude explosions would also serve as a partial test of the effectiveness of the detection system recently agreed upon at the Geneva Conference.

I recognize, however, that there are many factors which may make it impracticable to arrive at a firm decision at this time concerning the resumption of testing both as to timing and as to scope. While I am extremely reluctant to foreclose the possibility of obtaining, at the earliest possible date, the much needed data to be derived from the planned test series, I have concluded that it would be unwise to embark upon the expensive preparations required until the outcome of the Geneva negotiations and its effect on future U.S. policy can be determined. Accordingly, I am issuing instructions to the effect that within the Department of Defense modest preparations for one or more underground tests in Calendar Year 1960 will continue and that preparations for the more extensive series, including underwater and high altitude tests, will be limited to maintaining test plans in a current status and to the procurement of very long lead time items only. These instructions will mean, in effect, that subject to a determination of policy *by the end of this year*, limited underground testing could be conducted in the Spring of 1960 and that a comprehensive series involving overseas operations could be conducted in the Spring of 1961.

I am aware that the Atomic Energy Commission, in response to specific weapons development requests placed by the Department of Defense and in pursuit of advances in the state of the art, has also tentatively planned a number of tests involving both underground and high altitude explosions. These development tests are of equal or greater importance to the Department of Defense than the weapons effects tests referred to above. Inasmuch as the need for these tests is being studied at your direction by Dr. Kistiakowsky, it would not appear appropriate for me to comment on the Commission's plans at this time.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

Neil McElroy

Attachment**Memorandum From John Eisenhower to Goodpaster**

Washington, August 13, 1959

In connection with the attached memorandum, Dr. Kistiakowsky asked me to check with the President whether the study referred to in the last paragraph should be expedited in order to provide a preliminary briefing to the President before departure for Europe. The President said this was not necessary, and I so informed Dr. Kistiakowsky's office.

JSDE

P.S. Dr. Kistiakowsky called after he had taken the action above. Mr. Gates is much concerned over the actions recommended herein and may feel it necessary to reclama to the President. In view of this, Dr. Kistiakowsky had decided to blitz his study anyway. I so informed the President.

486. Report of Joint U.S.–U.K. Technical Group¹

London, August 10–11, 1959

*Report of Joint US–UK Technical Group to Review Technical Aspects of
Nuclear Weapons Test Detection**UK PARTICIPANTS*

Sir William Penney
Sir Frederick Brundrett
Dr. R. Press
Mr. Hulme
Mr. Mattock
Dr. Levin
Dr. Maurice Hill
Mr. Con O'Neill
Mr. V. Macklin

US PARTICIPANTS

Dr. J. R. Killian
Dr. Hens Bethe
Dr. Herbert Scoville
Dr. Harold Brown
Dr. Albert Lotter
Dr. Carl Romney
Dr. William Ogle
Mr. Philip Farley

¹Source: "Large Hole;" satellite detection systems. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Nuclear Policy. Drafted on September 3.

The joint group of British and American technical delegates has reviewed the technical aspects of detecting nuclear weapons tests in the light of new information which has become available since the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts and has reached the following conclusions:

(1) The group accepted for joint use by the U.S. and the U.K. the table, a copy of which is given in the appendix to this report, entitled "Estimated Capability of Control System for Detecting and Identifying Seismic Disturbances in the U.S.S.R."

(2) The concept of the "large hole" has introduced a new kind of uncertainty which requires a re-examination of the control system agreed upon by the Geneva Conference of Experts. The "large hole" technique may provide a method of concealing underground explosions which cannot be detected by the system recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts. This conclusion seems inevitable unless future tests contravene the theory as developed for the "large hole".

(3) In view of the large cost and unknown feasibility of the "large hole" it is agreed that a program of engineering analysis and experimentation is desirable and necessary. The group therefore urges the prosecution and completion of high explosive tests as already planned both for the U.S. and the U.K. It further recommends that both the U.K. and the U.S. undertake engineering studies of the practicality and cost of constructing large holes and that these studies should be of such thoroughness as to give confidence in their conclusions. It is further agreed that there also should be consideration of the problems of radiation transport, of the effects of X-rays and of neutrons produced by a nuclear explosion in a large cavity.

It is a conclusion of this group that planning, (and if politically unobjectionable, execution) should proceed for a series of "large hole" tests, including complete plans for a nuclear test. This planning should include the choice of sites, the instrumentation, the method of measuring yield, the time required and the cost.

(4) Consideration should also be given to the degree of decoupling achievable in "small holes", and to alternative kinds of large cavities including the possibility of cavities including the possibility of cavities in ice and containers under water.

(5) The group notes that it is very unlikely that the engineering feasibility of decoupling by use of a "large hole" can be conclusively proven or disproven within a time shorter than a year, although high explosive tests will yield partial information within 4–6 months. Even after several years' work the question may be unresolved. Any agreement within the next few years which bans underground tests runs some risk that decoupling schemes may be able to circumvent the

experts system unless that system can be augmented in its capability by means beyond improvement of instrumentation.

(6) The group accepts the findings and recommendations of the Berkner Panel report and urges their rapid implementation. It recommends in addition that on-site inspections of selected earthquakes be undertaken as quickly as possible after these earthquakes have occurred. It is noted that such field work could appropriately be undertaken in New Zealand and California. Whenever appropriate, advantage should be taken of those underground explosions which might yield useful information for developing on-site inspection techniques.

(7) The group concluded that the only technical norms now known for the detection of explosions in large cavities would be unmanned stations of the kind discussed in the Berkner Panel report. It urges a careful technical study of the design of unmanned stations including their feasibility and associated communications and safeguarding problems. In making this comment the group emphasizes that it is not recommending at this time a political decision that unmanned stations be introduced into the Geneva discussions, since this might undermine the present proposals for manned stations.

(8) The group stresses the importance of continuing study and research for the purpose of determining new techniques for decoupling and concealment and for detection and inspection.

(9) The group recognized that there were substantial uncertainties in signal strength as a result of variations in medium, geographical and geological formations, depth of burial, etc., which in some cases could reduce the coupling below that of the Rainier event. It also recognized the difficulty of evaluating the probability that an on site inspection in the region of a concealed underground nuclear explosion would result in identification. The risk of detection may be increased by a substantial but unknown amount by the use of intelligence information in selecting the events to be inspected. The combination of all these factors makes an estimate of the capability of the system, even excluding the possible use of large holes for decoupling, very difficult below the yield level of about 20 kts. Experimentation, much of it with high explosives, could reduce some of these uncertainties. The group considers that when all the technical problems mentioned above have been fully investigated it may not be possible to offer a system which has a reliability equal to that estimated by the Geneva Conference of Experts.

(10) Although it is not possible to make a quantitative evaluation of the contribution of intelligence, it can be expected to supply assistance in determining the degree of suspiciousness of seismic events and thereby in selecting which of these events should be inspected. This assistance can be expected to be much more effective in detecting large scale unusual operations such as may be required in the construction

of a “large hole”. However, intelligence by itself cannot provide a case for carrying out an inspection. Finally intelligence will introduce an element of uncertainty into any Soviet planning for a concealed nuclear test and thereby provide a deterrent to such Soviet activities.

(11) The group noted that the satellite system and ground station equipment recommended at Geneva (10 July 1959) for the detection and identification of high altitude nuclear explosions was evaluated in that Report as incapable of detecting nuclear explosions of hundred of kts. yield which are shielded against emission of X-ray radiation at a distance of more than a few tens of millions of kilometers. Such tests are a feasible means of obtaining the necessary diagnostic data on new weapons designs and might therefore, when the relative costs of conducting them are evaluated, be preferred to the large hole by a potential violator as a method of evading the control system. If one adopts the solar satellite system which is discussed but not explicitly recommended in the Report of the Technical Working Group, the capability of the systems could be improved so as to require a violator to go several times as far.

Appendix

Estimated Capability of Control System** for Detecting
and Identifying Seismic Disturbances in the U.S.S.R.

Equivalent Yield (KT)*	Annual Numbers of Continental Earthquakes				
	Total	Detected	Undetected	Identified	Detected but Unidentified
0.5–1	1200	750	450	5	745
1–2	675	670	5	30	640
2–5	385	385	0	85	300
Above 5	290	290	0	260	30

* Assuming Rainier Coupling. [Footnote is in the original.]

** Assuming improved equipment and detection performance as suggested by the Panel on Seismic Improvement (Berkner Panel). [Footnote is in the original.]

487. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 14, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

It is my understanding that in pursuing the course of action regarding test cessation negotiations which you approved on 23 July 1959, questions have arisen concerning what action should be taken with respect to an extension of the U.S. test moratorium beyond 31 October 1959. I felt it desirable to ask the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter. Their views are inclosed herewith.

I recognize that there are many difficult and complex political problems involved in a decision on the part of the United States to resume testing in the near future. As I wrote you on 5 August 1959, the Department of Defense, in recognition of the nature of the problems, has cut back the level of preparations for future test programs which have been developed to advance our knowledge in several important areas.

The one-point safety matter discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the attached memorandum presents a situation quite apart from the area of general or specific advancements in the design and application of nuclear weapons. I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that failure to resolve this matter with a minimum delay could have military-political consequences far more serious than those which might arise from conducting the limited testing which would appear necessary to its resolution.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

Neil McElroy

Enclosure**Memorandum for McElroy**

JCSM-332-59

Washington, August 14, 1959

SUBJECT

Extension of the Current Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium (TS)

1. In accordance with your verbal request the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the effects of a possible extension of the current

¹ Source: Conveys JCS concerns about extension of nuclear test moratorium, safety of nuclear weapons. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, 1959.

suspension of nuclear weapons testing beyond the termination date of 31 October 1959 established by the President on 22 August 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that the conditions prescribed by the President at that time as a basis for further extension have not been met. They assume, therefore, that an extension beyond the initially prescribed one year period is a matter for decision by the United States and is not dictated by any existing international commitment.

2. On a number of occasions the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their firm conviction that it is contrary to the interests of the United States to impose restrictions on the development of its armaments in the absence of firm and enforceable agreements which impose equivalent or compensating restrictions on the Communist Bloc. The continuation of test suspension is such a restriction.

3. As applied to the broad area of nuclear weapons testing for the purpose of developing new weapons concepts or exploring nuclear weapons effects in unusual environments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not hold that a short term extension of the test moratorium beyond 31 October 1959 is a matter of vital consequence. However, there is a serious problem with respect to the production, deployment, and employment of a large segment of the present and early future stockpile of nuclear weapons which demands the earliest possible solution. This is the problem of a possible nuclear contribution in the event of an accidental detonation. It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this question can be answered only by actual tests and that it may be possible to conduct such tests without nuclear detonation.

4. For the following reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it imperative that nuclear weapons testing to the extent necessary to resolve the one-point safety question as regards weapons currently stockpiled and weapons under development for early stockpiling be initiated and completed as soon after 31 October 1959 as technically possible:

a. As a result of recent calculations of the probabilities and consequences involved, the Atomic Energy Commission has cut back production of the weapons in question and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have placed certain restrictions on deployment and movement of these weapons which degrade the state of readiness of both strategic and tactical forces.

b. There is a real danger that information as to the questionable nuclear safety of certain U.S. weapons will become widely known through inadvertent disclosure. The longer the present uncertainty obtains the higher the probability of such a disclosure. The U.S. public and our Allies have been repeatedly assured that our weapons are one-point safe. A rumor to the contrary could have a catastrophic effect on our ability to maintain overseas storage bases, to maintain strip alerts of air defense and retaliatory forces, to continue air alert exercises, and to continue logistic movements.

c. In the event that safety tests should have positive results, the earliest possible appraisal of the consequences of such a finding on our entire nuclear weapons posture will be essential. Involved in such an appraisal will be the need for redevelopment and refabrication programs which, in turn, may require further tests for confirmation of the results.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of Defense make known to the President their views as to the seriousness of this problem and their concern as to its earliest possible solution.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

488. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 20, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded to me a memorandum dated August 13, 1959, on the subject of phased approach to agreement for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. A copy of this memorandum is attached for your information.

In their memorandum the Joint Chiefs of Staff question the capability of a control system with existing techniques to detect and identify underwater nuclear explosions. Mr. Gates has forwarded this memorandum to Under Secretary of State Dillon and requested that an assessment of the technical matters raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be made as a matter of urgency by Dr. Kistiakowsky. Mr. Dillon has requested Dr. Kistiakowsky to undertake this study.

While I agree that a study of this problem should be made, I do not agree with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in paragraph 4 c of the attached memorandum. Because of the political and psychological implications incident to underwater testing, I do not feel that the Defense Department should support the views that such tests should be grouped with underground tests in any agreements that we might be a party to.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Secretary of State and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

Neil McElroy

¹ Source: JCS views on phased approach to agreement for the cessation of nuclear testing, underwater testing, Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, Neil, 1959.

Attachment

Memorandum From Twining to McElroy

JCSM-326-59

Washington, August 13, 1959

SUBJECT

Phased Approach to Agreement for the Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that pursuant to a decision by the President, the United States is preparing to adopt a policy of seeking a phased approach to an international agreement for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. This approach will exclude from the tests cessation agreement any ban on nuclear weapons tests underground or under the surface of inland waters which do not emit radioactivity in amounts detectable by the agreed control system. Tests underwater in the open sea or waters open to the sea such as the United States has conducted in the past would be prohibited.

2. The decision to withdraw underground nuclear weapons tests from any controlled tests cessation agreement is believed to be based on a searching inquiry into the state of the art of seismology which has cast serious doubts on our ability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions, particularly in the lower yield ranges. New data has indicated that there are techniques available which will allow concealment of such tests from seismographic detection.

3. A review of the findings of the Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvement and other papers prepared by the panel has not indicated an equal concern for our ability to detect and identify the nuclear characteristics of underwater explosions. The techniques of detection and identification for underwater explosions using seismic signals are similar to those for underground. A brief inquiry in this area has indicated that techniques for concealing underwater explosions are feasible and perhaps more readily implemented than those for concealing underground tests. Since seismic methods play a significant role in underwater detection and identification, any doubts as to the capabilities of seismic systems for underground detection should cast doubts also on the capabilities for underwater detection by these means. Hydro-acoustic methods for detection of underwater explosions are available. However, identification of the nuclear origin of an explosion is by collection of a sample of radioactive waste. For underwater explosions this is extremely difficult due to the large expanses of ocean areas even though an approximate location by seismic and hydroacoustic methods is determined.

4. With respect to this new policy, the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are as follows:

a. The state of our knowledge of underwater detection is such that any assumptions as to our capability to differentiate a nuclear explosion from other artificial seismic disturbances may result in an adverse military security position parallel to that we find ourselves in with regard to underground detection. The Soviets may be able to make underwater tests unknown to us and thus make advances in weapon technology and knowledge of weapons effects which we will deny to ourselves.

b. The United States, because of non availability of suitable deep water lakes and inland seas, might be placed at a disadvantage with respect to the Soviet Union if tests under the surface of inland waters are included in the same category as underground tests.

c. That underwater tests in general should be grouped with underground tests until such time as thorough inquiry into underwater detection techniques has confirmed a high probability of underwater detection and identification even in the event of determined efforts toward concealment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you convey the views expressed in this memorandum, as appropriate, to the President and to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining,
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

489. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy¹

JCSM-337-59

Washington, August 21, 1959

SUBJECT

Study on Nuclear Tests (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, dated 23 July 1959.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the resumption of nuclear testing to be so vital to the security of the United States that a reiteration of past

¹ Source: JCS views on necessity of nuclear testing. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.

positions is timely in view of the study now under preparation by Dr. Kistiakowsky. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. An adequate military posture for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems, which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat.

b. To attain an adequate military posture, further testing is essential in the following development programs:

(1) Small, low-yield, highly mobile weapons for tactical and ASW uses.

(2) Modern, light-weight, and instantly ready weapons of sophisticated design for use against hostile aircraft.

(3) Warheads for anti-missile uses.

(4) Deterrent and retaliatory weapons, including warheads for second generation IRBM's, ICBM's and FBM's.

(5) A family of clean weapons.

c. The investigation of weapons effects through testing is also extremely important because effects information is essential to weapon design and employment. Weapons effects information is particularly needed in the following fields:

(1) Anti-Submarine Warfare

(2) Surface War at Sea

(3) Coastal Defense Against Large Yield Weapons Burst at Sea

(4) Ballistic Missile Defense

(5) Communications and Radar Systems

(6) Air Defense

(7) Structural Design of Military Installations

(8) Tactical Land Warfare

d. Without nuclear testing, the inevitable result must be stagnation in the effectiveness of our present weapons systems and the building of a stockpile of weapons of questionable reliability and confidence. Stagnation will become evident as improved strategic missiles must be fitted with older warheads at a cost in missile performance in order to insure reliability. Weapons of untested effectiveness, particularly small tactical weapons, will have to be manufactured in greater numbers as a substitute for assured effects and performance.

e. The over-all long-range effects of a test cessation will be to the distinct disadvantage of the United States. Of equal and more immediate disadvantage would be suspension of the production of weapons and weapons material with the resultant progressive physical deterioration of the stockpile.

3. In the referenced memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised that Dr. Kistiakowsky would work with the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in coordinating a study to review the priority, validity and timing of weapons tests. In view of the potential impact of this study on the future effectiveness of U.S. military forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a most vital interest and should be kept informed of all aspects of the study. In order to insure adequate consideration of the military aspects involved, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the service of their representatives to assist in preparation of this study.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you forward this memorandum to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

490. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, August 26, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

State:	Defense:	AEC:
Mr. Dillon	Mr. McElroy	Mr. McCone
Mr. Sullivan, S/AE	General Loper	
Mr. Spiers, S/AE	Mr. Knight	White House:
Mr. Morris, S/AE	CIA:	Mr. Gray
	Mr. Dulles	Dr. Kistiakowsky
	Dr. Scoville	Dr. Killian
		Mr. Keeny

Mr. Dillon said that he had called today's meeting to provide an opportunity for Dr. Kistiakowsky to brief the principals on the report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Requirements and for Dr. Killian to report on the meeting of the Joint Group of British and American Scientists in London.

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Requirements had been convened in accordance with Action No. 2108 b(1) of the National Security Council, as approved by the President on July 20, 1959. The President had further instructed that the

¹ Source: Kistiakowsky report on nuclear test requirements. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

Panel not engage in an assessment of the relative position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Therefore, the report deals only with United States military technology and leaves open the question of our nuclear strength relative to the Soviet Union. This report should thus be considered but one input into our consideration of the over-all question of resumption of nuclear weapons tests. The following members of the Panel participated as individuals and not as representatives of their specific organizations and were selected to represent as broad an area of expertise as possible:

Dr. James W. McRae, Chairman	Honorable Herbert B. Loper
Dr. Hans A. Bethe	Dr. Carson Mark
Dr. Arthur T. Biehl	Rear Admiral Edward N. Parker
Dr. Norris E. Bradbury	Dr. Edward M. Purcell
Dr. Harold Brown	Vice Admiral John H. Sides
Dr. G. A. Fowler	Brigadier General Alfred D. Starbird
Dr. Marshall G. Holloway	Dr. Edward Teller
Dr. Richard Latter	Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner

Dr. Kistiakowsky then read the following *General Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Panel*.

"1. Certain proposed nuclear tests would appreciably increase the effectiveness of key programmed weapon systems and guarantee against the possibility of gross error in design. However, aside from the weapon safety problem, the development or military use of no presently programmed weapon system is clearly contingent on the outcome of the proposed nuclear tests."

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that whereas the AEC laboratories feel that various programmed warheads may have been amply proven out by past developmental testing, the Department of Defense would like proof tests of the finished weapons. The laboratories further believe that with additional testing it will be possible to double the yields of many of our missile warheads of a given weight. They are prepared to guarantee improvements on warhead yields on the basis of mock-up tests which would probably involve from 20 to 100 kilotons nuclear yield and which could be conducted underground. The Department of Defense, however, believes that full-scale proof tests of such improved devices would be necessary. Such large tests, of course, could not be conducted underground although they could be carried out in outer space.

Mr. McElroy asked whether the scientists indeed believe they could obtain adequate diagnostics on space tests for megaton range weapons. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that it is necessary to differentiate between the "high altitude" region which would extend out roughly to 20,000 kilometers and the "outer space" region beyond that distance. High altitude tests would be relatively easy to conduct. Our experience at Johnson Island indicated that there would be no problem in getting very extensive diagnostics even though the tests would produce highly spectacular "fireworks". To go to outer space powerful boosters will

be required. These tests will be hard to instrument since it will not be possible to send up special follower rockets containing instrumentation as was done at Johnson Island. On the other hand, the Panel felt that it would be possible to measure the yields of such tests which, after all, is what is desired from proof tests.

"2. Questions have arisen concerning the safety of certain designs in stockpile and production against the possibility of a very low yield nuclear explosion in case of accident. Highest priority in testing should be given to the experimentation involving very low yield or zero yield 'safety' shots intended to establish whether a problem really exists. It is not possible now to determine whether a satisfactory solution to the problem, if it exists, can be found in all cases without nuclear tests."

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that the questions with regard to the one-point safety of our very important weapons have arisen from calculations done recently at Los Alamos. There are three possible courses of action to resolve this problem:

(1) Safety tests of stockpile primaries could be conducted underground in a relatively brief time. If the primaries prove safe there would, of course be no nuclear yield. [text not declassified]

(2) One could use cores of stockpile design containing reduced amounts of plutonium and carry out carefully instrumented tests designed so as to preclude a nuclear explosion in excess of a predetermined yield, such as one pound TNT equivalent. This type of experiment would take more time than the first alternative but would probably result in more detailed information on the safety of present designs.

(3) One could rely on the more detailed calculations which Los Alamos is now doing and not carry out any tests. The majority of the Panel, however, felt that tests were essential. Others, mainly from LASL, felt that tests would not resolve the situation any better than carefully planned calculations. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that in any event no test can definitely *prove* that a given device is absolutely safe.

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that the results of further experimentation could be:

a. That LASL's concern is unfounded and the devices are in fact one-point safe.

b. That the devices prove to be only slightly unsafe and could be modified by the laboratories without significant further nuclear tests.

c. That the devices prove to be unsafe and thus will require complete retesting. In this case, however, one could decide to use for the devices in question a primary which is known to be one-point safe.

Dr. Kistiakowsky noted that LASL's recalculations should be completed very soon and that preliminary results seemed to be more reassuring than their previous calculations.

Mr. Dillon asked how long the second alternative for testing the safety of the questionable devices would take. General Loper thought such tests could probably be started in about two weeks from go-ahead. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that one problem would be that [text not declassified] plutonium would be scattered around by the tests. Since this is

a very toxic substance the tests would have to be conducted underground, presumably at the Nevada Testing Grounds. *Mr. McCone* said that plans for such tests presented a real problem since the press representatives closely watch the activities at the Nevada Proving Grounds, General Starbird has said he did not think it would be possible to provide a successful cover for such an operation. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said he thought that it would be possible to conduct these tests at Los Alamos in the classified areas. One would only need tunnels around 30 to 40 feet deep, which could be dug in the canyons where there is complete privacy. The shots could be billed as just more HE explosions of which dozens are set off at LASL everyday.

Mr. Dillon said he did not see any particular reason why it would not be possible to proceed with such tests at Los Alamos. They would not represent a violation of our unilateral suspension since they were not really nuclear tests. However, this would be a matter for the President to decide upon when there is an opportunity to present the issue to him.

"3. Certain proposed nuclear tests would explore new ideas which point to new applications and which, by advancing the state of the art, will also almost certainly lead to new, and presently unpredicted concepts in weapon systems and doctrine."

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the Panel had been generally unanimous in the opinion that, on the basis of past experience in weapons development, further research tests would lead to new applications. It was, of course, impossible to predict what new ideas and new information might flow from the tests now proposed. *Dr. Teller*, for one, is very enthusiastic about the possibilities.

"4. Although there is no immediate information required for specific military systems, the proposed high altitude effects tests might yield unexpected information of great technical importance."

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that our high altitude tests in 1958 [*text not declassified*]. It is clear that high frequency radio is unreliable in time of war. Further high altitude effects tests might discover new phenomena of importance.

Mr. McCone asked whether the Defense Department did not feel that immediate additional information was necessary considering the dramatic effects of high altitude shots on radar and radio. *General Loper* said that the evidence pointing to a severe disruption of high frequency communications leads to a redesign of communications system rather than to an urgent need for more information on the disruptive effect. As for the AICBM system, the other facets of this system are far less certain than the effects of the AICBM warhead on an incoming weapon.

"5. The proposed effects tests in the sea and at low altitudes would provide militarily valuable information but their results would not affect any decisions to use or not to use a proposed military capability."

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that these would be tests of devices such as the anti-submarine depth bomb, where the Department of Defense requires more information on the radiation hazards to the launching

destroyer or of the effect of water waves on coastal cities. Similarly, they are concerned about the earth shocks which would result from surface explosions and their effect on hardened missile bases. The Defense Department is, however, proceeding with their plans for the use of these weapons regardless of further effects tests. *General Loper* said that although the results of such tests would not affect any decisions to use or not to use a certain weapon they would vitally affect decisions on *how to use* and *when to use it*.

"6. Aside from tests incident to the safety problem, there is not a strong technical requirement for the conduct of any single proposed test in the immediate future. Failure to reach a decision now to conduct proposed nuclear tests within a year and to proceed with plans and preparations on this basis would postpone the achievement of anticipated improvements in weapon system effectiveness and the evolution of new ideas."

Mr. McElroy noted that some of the proposed testing could have a major effect on the reduction of costs of our nuclear arsenal.

"7. The major objectives of the proposed nuclear tests could be achieved by contained underground shots except for certain high yield development tests and the weapon effects test program. The high yield development tests could be conducted at altitudes of 500–1000 kilometers in 1961 and in space (beyond 100,000 kilometers) at considerable cost in the period from 1961 to 1965, the date for each test depending on the weight of the device."

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that one could be reasonably certain that there would be no fallout on the earth from tests conducted beyond 100,000 kilometers in space. However at, for instance, 1,000 kilometers one would have to concede that explosion products would eventually drift into the atmosphere even though this process might take a very long time.

General Discussion

General Loper said that it was not the position of the Department of Defense that everything must be proof-tested before being acceptable to the military. Rather they believe that full-scale tests of weapons are necessary in cases where the extrapolation from proven designs is quite broad. The laboratories never guarantee the performance of a device, but only indicate a degree of confidence. Thus, even in the minds of the designers there exists a possibility of gross error in weapon performance. Dr. Kistiakowsky commented that such was the situation with some of the key warheads in our stockpile.

Mr. McElroy said that he believed the development of nuclear weapons to be of far more importance to the United States than to nations with large numbers of people. Our nuclear arsenal is what permits us to be a military power. This power would be much inferior if we were reduced to reliance on our manpower armed with conventional

weapons. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* suggested that it was probably not so much a question of population as the unwillingness of Westerners to be used as canon-fodder. After all, the combined manpower of the United States and the NATO countries is greater than that of the USSR and its satellites. *Mr. Dulles* said he believed that never again would we fight with millions of soldiers in the field of battle.

Mr. McCone said that he was personally very much concerned with the moderate tone in which the general conclusions of the Ad Hoc Panel were expressed. This did not seem to accord with the very important examples of testing needs set forth in the report. He thought it very important that the principals realize that further testing could dramatically increase the yields of some of our warheads. These improvements might be extremely important to the defensive position of the United States. With regard to the one-point safety problem, he noted that if further experimentation discloses that a redesign of primaries is necessary to provide adequate safety it might be necessary to test new primaries [*text not declassified*].

Dr. Kistiakowsky commented that the Panel had seriously questioned this latter possibility because it assumed a significant decrease in the weight of guidance components.

Mr. Dillon said that if the position of the AEC laboratories that improvement in large yield weapons will be possible by underground tests of relatively low yield mock-ups is true, the United States would be in rather good shape if we agree to a ban which excluded underground tests. *Mr. McElroy* said he thought that from the Defense point of view the United States would get along all right if they were able to conduct underground tests. He believed that a limited agreement, as approved on July 23, would be reasonable in terms of the present international atmosphere. The Defense Department, however, would be deeply concerned if the present unilateral withholding of testing continued much longer.

Dr. Killian asked whether the Panel had discussed the relative value of increasing the accuracy of missile guidance and booster power as opposed to seeking to increase the warhead yields as a solution to improving the effectiveness of our ballistic missiles. This is, of course, a complex problem. The increase yield is only one factor in the equation. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that only a few members of the Panel felt that a factor of two gain in warhead yield was a life or death matter. However, if there were no further testing, one would be left with only the yields now available.

Dr. Killian said that in considering what we might gain from continued testing he thought it very important to evaluate what improvements would be possible for the Soviet Union also.

Mr. McElroy said that under conditions of no testing there develops a progressively decreasing confidence in their weapons on the part of the military.

Mr. Dillon said he thought that since large yield and even megaton weapons could be developed by means of underground testing of low yield mock-ups, it would seem that an underground ban would be dangerous. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that this would only be true if the Latter Hole theory proves workable. Even mock-up tests would involve yields [*text not declassified*]. Such yields could readily be detected by the improved Geneva system. However, although there seems to be general agreement that the Latter Hole is a sound theory, there is no experimental evidence to support the theory. It is unknown whether the large holes required could be built.

* * *

REPORT OF LONDON MEETING OF THE JOINT GROUP OF US-UK SCIENTISTS

Dr. Killian explained that the London meeting had been convened, by agreement between Secretary Herter and British Foreign Secretary Lloyd, to provide for joint US-UK review of the underground detection problem and to permit our people to present to UK scientists the considerations developed by the US technical panel under the chairmanship of *Dr. Bacher*. He said that the aim of the group had been to reach agreement on the technical factors bearing on the underground detection problem so that the responsible policy officials in both the US and UK would be able to proceed on the basis of the same technical information.

(*Dr. Killian* then read to the principals the report of the Joint Group which is attached as Appendix A to this memorandum.)

Dr. Killian said it was clear that the UK scientists were persuaded of the theoretical validity of the Latter Hole idea. However, they had real doubts as to the practical possibilities of constructing such a hole and considered urgent study of the engineering problems involved to be necessary. They were not prepared to accept the judgments of the *Bacher* group on the probability factors of actually finding evidence of an underground violation through on-site inspection nor to accept the *Bacher* group's assessment of the usefulness of intelligence. They clearly felt that it would be unwise to present the *Bacher* report to the Soviets since the judgments expressed therein could be challenged on technical grounds.

Dr. Killian said that the Latter Hole possibility for concealing underground explosions remains the most significant problem in the underground picture. Until we obtain more factual information we will remain in a state of uncertainty which cannot be resolved. It will be necessary to proceed with the recommended high energy experiments

and probably with nuclear tests, unless the high energy tests indicate a very serious defect in the theory.

In discussing the several recommendations for further research in the report of the Joint Group the principals agreed that Dr. Kistiakowsky should consult with the Department of Defense and the AEC with regard to an engineering study of the Latter Hole theory, and that the CIA should proceed with the inspection study of earthquakes and underground explosions.

Attachment:

Appendix A

491. Letter From Dillon to McElroy¹

Washington, August 28, 1959

Dear Neil:

In his letter of August 14, 1959, Deputy Secretary Gates forwarded to me a memorandum dated August 13, 1959 to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioning the capability of a control system to detect and identify underwater nuclear explosions. As requested by Mr. Gates, I suggested to Dr. Kistiakowsky that his office undertake a technical assessment of this problem.

In his reply, a copy of which is enclosed, Dr. Kistiakowsky raises some questions with respect to the concern of the Joint Chiefs and suggests that the matter be reviewed within the Department of Defense.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*/s/ Douglas
Acting Secretary*

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Kistiakowsky stating Geneva experts concluded that underwater tests could be detected. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-2559.

Enclosure**Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Dillon**

Washington, August 25, 1959

Dear Secretary Dillon:

Thank you for your letter, dated August 18, 1959, suggesting that this office undertake an assessment of the problem of detecting underwater nuclear explosions. On the basis of the information at present available to me, I do not believe that it would be feasible for my office to undertake such an assessment at this time.

As indicated in Secretary Gates' letter of 14 August to you, the Report of the Geneva Conference of Experts concluded that there was a "good probability of detecting nuclear explosions of one kiloton yield set off deep in the open ocean," and that "the on-site inspection carried out by the international control organ...would be able to identify with good probability underwater nuclear explosions with a yield of one kiloton and above." It is not clear from the memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded to you by Secretary Gates, what new information is available to question these conclusions. This capability is apparently questioned, at least in part, on the basis of limitations in the seismic method; however, it should be noted that the detection and identification of underwater tests would be based primarily upon the hydroacoustic method and the subsequent collection of radioactive debris. Although it is stated that techniques for the concealment of underwater explosions are feasible, there is no indication as to how this might be accomplished or the possible magnitude of the concealment.

If there is concern about this matter on behalf of the Department of Defense, it might be useful, as a first step, for an appropriate technical group within the Defense Department, such as AFTAC, to undertake a careful examination of those aspects of this problem which are raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the basis of such a technical study, it would be possible to determine whether there are reasons for questioning the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts.

Sincerely,

G.B. Kistiakowsky

492. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/15

London, August 28, 1959, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Mr. Gates
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Irwin
Mr. White
Mr. Farley

U. K.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
Sir Patrick Dean
Mr. Ormsby-Gore
Sir Richard Powell
Mr. Con O'Neill

SUBJECT

Disarmament

Mr. Lloyd referred to the preliminary reactions of Gromyko on August 26 when the UK, US, and French ambassadors in Moscow presented to him a draft communique on establishment of a 10-nation disarmament negotiating group. Mr. Lloyd said that he was concerned that Gromyko had said it would be “a few days” before he submitted written comments. Mr. Lloyd pointed out that it was important to settle this matter well in advance of convening of the General Assembly. He agreed with Hammarskjöld’s comment that it would be well to have the UN Disarmament Commission meet about September 8, before the General Assembly meets, so that the discussion would be handled by UN permanent representatives rather than foreign ministers. If Gromyko raises any objections in his written comments, we will, of course, have to consult among the five of us on the Western side. Time is thus very short and everything possible should be done to get an early reply from Gromyko.

The Secretary said that Khrushchev is out of Moscow and it takes a while to get a formal Soviet response in these circumstances. He commented that he attached particular importance to avoiding establishment of a new smaller Disarmament Commission or a negotiating subcommittee. He thought the best course would be continuation of the present 82-nation Disarmament Commission with the reports of the 10-nation group going direct to the large Disarmament Commission rather than to any smaller subcommittee thereof.

¹ Source: Disarmament machinery, cut-off of production of fissionable material, disarmament policy. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449.

Mr. Lloyd said that he agreed heartily and was relieved that the United States was not advancing the proposal for a 24-nation disarmament commission which had been informally discussed in Washington. However, if the 10-nation group is not formally constituted in advance of the meeting of the present Disarmament Commission, the uncertainties will be taken advantage of and we can anticipate some such move as addition of 2 seats from each of the geographic blocs.

The Secretary and Mr. Lloyd agreed that the US and UK chargés in Moscow would be instructed to inquire as to the Soviet reply on the proposed communique during the first part of the following week.

Mr. Lloyd said that he thought we should resume study of the possibility of a cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Sir William Penney was going to the United States in the latter part of September and would be prepared to talk with US experts on this problem. Sir Richard Powell remarked that the UK was interested in the inspection problem and the question whether it was technically feasible to monitor an agreement to cease fissionable materials production for other than peaceful purposes. Sir Patrick Dean said that UK studies indicated that the inspection problem would be very difficult and the opportunities for diversion would be considerable.

Mr. Lloyd commented that it had become clear several years ago that policing any agreement for elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons was technically impossible. Up to 18 months ago, however, he had thought that it was technically feasible to monitor current production of fissionable materials. Since he did not believe that there was any real chance that the Soviet Union would accept a cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, this appeared to be a good proposal to press for political effect. The Secretary said that, if there were technical uncertainties as to inspection of any such agreement, we would not want to get trapped again by advancing the proposal and have the Soviets agree to enter into negotiations only to find that our scientific base was unfirm. Accordingly he welcomed the suggestion that preliminary technical discussions of the inspection problem be initiated during the forthcoming visit of Sir William Penney, who was very highly regarded in the United States.

Mr. Lloyd asked about the current United States views on the substance of disarmament policy. The Secretary said that the President had just approved a basic review of disarmament policy under the direction of Mr. Charles Coolidge. These studies will be complete about the end of the year at which time we will be in a position to commence consultations. It was this schedule that caused us to urge that the new 10-nation negotiating group not meet until February or March. Mr. Lloyd said that, from the point of view of the cold war, this was very awkward timing. It may be possible to spin out discussions inconclusively in the

interim but we must anticipate frightful pressures to get substantive discussions under way. The Secretary said that this was not an easy subject and there were complex interrelations between disarmament policy and future military requirements and plans which must be taken into account.

Mr. Lloyd agreed that our basic security problems must be carefully considered. He urged, however, that we not forget the public opinion battle, particularly in the minds of the uncommitted countries, and that we not be too perfectionist. He remarked that the 1954 Anglo-French plan had been excellent from this point of view—though the Soviet Union pretended to accept the essentials of this plan in 1955, they did not really agree to its crucial features.

Mr. Herter said that, as one example, if we gave up nuclear weapons we would be virtually helpless against the hordes of Asiatic manpower. Mr. Lloyd said that he agreed and for that reason his Government had always insisted that nuclear and conventional forces must be cut back *pari passu*. He thought that we had not pressed the Soviet Union vigorously enough on the reduction of manpower and conventional armaments such as submarines. Mr. Herter remarked that such considerations were related to the possibility which had been touched on recently of the UK concentrating on its conventional forces and thus better complementing the US military posture.

Mr. Lloyd said that it appeared we would have to continue on the basis of the 1957 agreed Four-Power position in any disarmament discussions in the forthcoming General Assembly. The Secretary said that in any case the disarmament problem in the General Assembly was principally an emotional one.

493. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/16

London, August 30, 1959, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
The Secretary
Mr. Gates
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Farley

U.K.
The Prime Minister
Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Patrick Dean
Lord Plowden
Sir Richard Powell
Sir Norman Brook

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Negotiations

There was discussion of current technical assessments of our present and future ability to monitor nuclear test suspension. It was noted that the theoretical possibility of decoupling the signal from underground nuclear tests by a factor of hundreds had been called to the Soviets' attention at Geneva, but that the "large hole" technique for achieving this decoupling, and the implications as to the feasibility of a ban on underground tests, had not been presented.

Mr. Herter referred to the urgency of underground experiments to resolve questions of "one point safety" of United States weapons. Necessary tests might be conducted with only a high explosive detonation, but a small nuclear yield might be produced in some cases. Should they result in a detectable atomic explosion, the public explanation could attribute this occurrence to "an accident".

Both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lloyd expressed the belief that the United States would be fully justified in conducting safety tests. The President indicated his acquiescence in making the underground safety tests. The talks left unresolved the question as to whether the necessary preparations at the testing site might arouse public suspicion and what might be said publicly.

¹ Source: Monitoring nuclear testing, U.S. need for safety testing. Secret; Limit Distribution. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1449. Drafted September 2.

494. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/22

London, September 1, 1959, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Herter
Mr. Gates
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Martin
Mr. White
Mr. Farley

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Mr. Ormsby-Gore
Sir Patrick Dean
Mr. C. O'Neill

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

Nuclear Testing

Mr. Herter suggested that Mr. Farley might summarize the proposed tactics when the Geneva nuclear test negotiations resume on October 12. Mr. Farley said that, as Mr. Herter had mentioned to Mr. Lloyd just before the conclusion of the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, the United States, felt that we should face up to the serious implications of the most recent technical evaluations of our ability to detect underground tests. We should therefore state to the Soviet Union the implications of the "large hole" technique and propose both joint research and experimentation to resolve the uncertainties in monitoring techniques for a suspension of underground tests, and a limited initial agreement covering atmospheric and high altitude tests.

Mr. Lloyd recalled that the U.S. and U.K. scientists under the leadership of Dr. Killian and Dr. Penney, while agreeing that there were substantial uncertainties in the detection of underground tests and that a program of research should go ahead, had cautioned that it was doubtful that there would be any early solution of these technical uncertainties. Mr. Herter said that the only alternative tactic which we saw was to push ahead with the discussion of the inspection issue, accepting the inspection quota in principle but proposing and justifying a number of inspections so high that the Soviet Union would reject it.

Mr. Lloyd revised the recommendations of Dr. Killian and Dr. Penney for a joint U.S.–U.K. research and experimentation program on

¹ Source: Tactics for nuclear test ban talks, joint research. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D, CF 1449.

detection of underground tests, reading a summary list of nine items to be pursued. Mr. Farley said that a number of these actions were already in various stages of planning or execution. Mr. Herter asked whether the Soviet Union had shown any interest in participating in this activity. Mr. Farley recalled that at the time of tabling of the report of the Berkner Panel, the U.S. had suggested the possibility of joint research and experiment to resolve difficulties in underground detection but the Soviet Union had not been willing to discuss the new seismic data and thus had not reacted to the proposal for joint research.

Following a mention by Mr. Farley of preliminary AEC planning for possible eventual conduct of underground nuclear explosions to test the "large hole" theory, Mr. Lloyd said that the U.K. Embassy in Washington had just sent in the text of a proposed U.S. AEC-DOD press release on this program. He questioned whether more than the first general sentences were needed. Mr. Herter and Mr. Farley said that the later sections of the draft release were useful to put the program in the proper context, since they made clear that the explosions would not be for weapons development purposes, would only be conducted if a subsequent Government decision to do so was made, and were for the constructive purpose of improving knowledge of detection and identification techniques. Mr. Lloyd pointed out that the relationship to the Geneva negotiations was not spelled out, and Mr. Gates said that he thought an announcement on underground nuclear testing for this particular purpose ought to be held up until our general policy on underground nuclear weapons testing had been established. Mr. Herter said that further thought should be given to a possible offer of a joint research program with the Soviets. He said that he would see that if possible the release would be held up for future consideration.

There was then further discussion of the safety tests which the U.S. was considering. Mr. Lloyd said that it was the view of the U.K. that these tests were very important and the United States would be justified going ahead with them.

495. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, September 2, 1959

SUBJECT

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

REFERENCE

NSC 5725/1

The enclosed Report by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State on the implementation of NSC 5725/1, for the period July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959, is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Annual Progress Report by the Atomic Energy Commission

*ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSC 5725/1—PEACEFUL USES
OF ATOMIC ENERGY*

1. This report summarizes major developments during the period of July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959 under NSC 5725/1, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", dated December 13, 1957. Many of the items relate to several sections of the policy paper; the information therefore is not keyed to specific paragraphs in the policy paper.

2. The U.S. continues to lead other nations in assisting the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in other countries. During the reporting period the dominant position of the United States was strengthened in a number of areas. Of particular note was the approval and initiation by the United States and EURATOM of the joint nuclear

¹ Source: Transmits report on the implementation of NSC 5725/1, for the period July, 1958-June 30, 1959. Secret. 46 pp. NARA, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725.

power program designed to install approximately 1,000,000 electrical kilowatts of nuclear power within the EURATOM area by 1963–1965.

3. The current coal surplus in EURATOM countries and discovery of new energy reserves has lessened the urgency for developing nuclear reactors to meet the Community's immediate energy requirements. However, EURATOM is convinced that a large scale nuclear power program will be needed to meet long term needs and regards the joint effort as an important means of acquiring the experience essential to such a program.

4. Also, the United States announced in February a program for making enriched uranium fuel available for a limited number of power reactor projects on a deferred-payment basis. This program, while more modest than the EURATOM joint program, should help reduce the initial high costs of operating power reactors and should encourage the early construction abroad of reactors of U.S. design. Recent requests, however, from India and Spain indicate there will be continuing pressures from non-EURATOM countries for the United States to provide additional special incentives to stimulate the development of power reactor projects or to develop cooperative programs comparable to the EURATOM arrangements.

5. The EURATOM and deferred-payment programs, combined with the relatively advanced stage of U.S. technology and attractive guarantees that are being provided by U.S. manufacturers, have put the United States in the forefront of the expected limited market for selling power or power demonstration reactors to foreign countries. In the past year a pre-existing contract for the sale of a large-scale reactor to the SELNI electricity group in Italy was put on a firmer footing and a letter contract for an additional large scale reactor also was awarded to a U.S. company by the Italian SENN group. It is expected that these will be supplemented by other sales of large reactors as proposals are reviewed and approved under the EURATOM program. The award of the SENN project to a U.S. firm was particularly significant in that it was made as a consequence of competition with a number of proposals submitted by manufacturers in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.

6. During the year, firms in the United Kingdom contracted to sell two large reactors, one to Italy and the other to Japan.

7. During the reporting period, the Atomic Energy Commission revised its domestic nuclear power development program and presented to the Congress a series of objectives which, in addition to accelerating the U.S. civilian power program, is also geared to providing the maximum support for continued U.S. leadership in this field abroad.

8. The Second United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in September, 1958, was highly

successful. The United States held a dominant role generally through the quality and number of its technical papers and impressive technical exhibits. The latter was regarded as the finest scientific exhibition ever assembled. The U.S. representative at the Second Geneva Conference proposed that a third conference of the same general character be held in another three-year period.

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency made modest progress in the past year in a number of areas. Further work needs to be done, however, to strengthen its organization, technical staff, programs and financial resources, and to increase the level of support from member countries. The expectation that the Agency will play an important role in safeguarding and distributing materials so as to assure and promote their peaceful uses still holds even though a number of states now appear adverse to submitting to Agency safeguards or working through the agency.

10. The Agency has established for itself a significant role in the exchange of atomic information and as a forum for dealing with problems of an international character, notably in the fields of health and safety.

11. During the past year, the United States continued to provide comprehensive support to the IAEA. Examples are the offer to fund the costs associated with building the Agency's analytical laboratory in Vienna; financing half of the Agency's operating budget; continuous advice on all Agency operations; furnishing top flight experts for various Agency symposia and advisory panels, and assisting in the planning of the Agency's future program at the Second General Conference held in the fall of 1958.

12. Some concern has been expressed that the continued use of bilateral agreement system adopted by the member states most advanced technologically to channel and promote cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear energy, undercuts the role of the Agency. The bilaterals generally were in use before the IAEA was established and have been effective in the Atoms for Peace program. It does not appear that there will be major changes in this system in the immediate future. However, it is hoped that as the Agency gains stature, experience, and more support from its membership that a re-evaluation of the bilateral systems will result in the Agency taking over larger areas of cooperation.

13. Agency operations continue to be handicapped by the present unrealistic statutory relationship between the Board of Governors and the Secretariat which results in routine administrative matters, often of a minor nature, being brought to the Board for decision. The more complex problems that would be raised in any attempt at this time to revise the Agency Statute and Rules of Procedure have made it inadvisable to press for a remedy.

14. Agency safeguards were considered formally for the first time at the June Board meeting. Debate centered on general principles, and, as in the past, the opposition to safeguards was ably led by the Indian Governor. Action was deferred until the September meeting. The Soviet Union did not participate actively.

15. During the reporting period, progress was made in formulating a U.S. position for implementing the safeguards provisions in the U.S. bilateral agreements for cooperation and on IAEA safeguards proposals. This position is being developed in consultation with Western suppliers of materials and progress has been made toward achieving a common approach. To maintain an effective international safeguard system it is essential that this common front be achieved and held, particularly with respect to the sale of natural uranium which is now in world-wide surplus. [All the major uranium producers in the Free World, except France, have indicated a willingness (although commitments have not yet been made) to join in a common front if all the others do so. These same countries, including France, have joined with the United States in developing a common position regarding the specific type of safeguard procedures the International Atomic Energy Agency should develop in the near future. The agreed-upon procedures are concerned with immediate requirements and will be expanded as larger and more complex facilities materialize. The Soviet Union position, particularly with respect to applying safeguards to underdeveloped countries, is not known at this time although the USSR has claimed a "no strings attached" policy in supplying material to the Soviet Bloc.]² (Bracketed portion Conf.-DI)

16. Most of the bilateral negotiations now involve amendments to extend or modify the terms of existing agreements, which now cover most of the countries having an interest in cooperating with the United States. The cooperation provided for in these agreements is being effectively carried out, and consists mainly of exchanging or training personnel, disseminating reports, transferring materials, and exporting reactors manufactured by U.S. industry.

17. The emergence of the IAEA and various regional groups has initiated a reassessment of the bilateral program to determine whether relatively greater emphasis should be put on these multilateral institutions. The United States hopes to negotiate a general agreement with EURATOM and its member states that, insofar as possible, would transfer from the member states to EURATOM rights and obligations now contained in the individual bilateral agreements between the member states and the U.S. In addition present areas of US-EURATOM cooperation would be expanded wherever desirable.

² Brackets are in the original.

18. Other aspects of the Atoms for Peace Program include continued leadership of U.S. firms in exporting research reactors; steady increase in special nuclear materials transferred to friendly nations (see Appendix "E") and further expansion and specialization of training facilities available to foreign nationals (see Appendix "B"). Seventeen research reactors manufactured by U.S. firms are now in operation overseas and 16 more are under construction. In addition, five contracts or letters of intent involving foreign sale by U.S. firms of power or small-scale power demonstration reactors were executed. A total of 286 kilograms of contained U-235 has been distributed overseas for peaceful purposes and as of June 30, 1959, 238 foreign nationals were working or receiving individual training experience at AEC installations.

19. The United Kingdom atomic power program is either on or ahead of schedule and is expected to achieve the goal of 5000–6000 MW by 1966. There is the possibility that in the next year or two a new or extended program will be formulated. [Current information available on the U.S.S.R. program confirms earlier estimates that there has been slippage in the power program but Soviet capabilities in the power reactor field are advancing steadily. Although the U.S.S.R., on the basis of its over-all nuclear technology, is believed capable of building nuclear power submarines, the only verified nuclear propulsion project is the icebreaker "Lenin", reportedly essentially complete but not yet in operation.³ The French program is developing rapidly with two gaseous diffusion pilot plants for U-235 and a plutonium separation chemical reprocessing plant now in operation. The first full-scale nuclear power plant is scheduled to come in late in 1959 or early in 1960.]⁴ (Bracketed portion Secret DI) Additionally, the French have shown interest in the centrifuge method of isotope separation, particularly its development in West Germany, and have offered to buy the German-made centrifuges—presumably for use in the French weapons program. (The centrifuge method makes U-235 production possible with a smaller capital outlay.) While German financial interests reportedly favor the sale, other German opinion is hopeful of assurance that the gas centrifuges will be used only for peaceful purposes. CONF. DI.

20. The attached Annex describes the progress made in the Atoms-for-Peace program and identifies a number of other problems that will require further study. However, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State do not believe any revision to the NSC 5725/1 policy paper is required at this time.

³ On July 11, 1959, First Deputy Premier F.R. Koslov when at Shippingport, told Admiral Rickover that the Soviets were building nuclear powered submarines. During Rickover's subsequent visit to the U.S.S.R. in August 1959, this subject was not mentioned, and no further Information was obtained. SECRET DI. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Brackets are in the original.

Attachment

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*ANNEX TO ANNUAL REPORT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSC 5725/1—PEACEFUL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY*

*I. UNITED STATES FOREIGN PROGRAM: REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BILATERAL
ARRANGEMENTS*

1. *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).* Establishment of the IAEA was an outgrowth of President Eisenhower’s address before the United Nations Assembly on December 8, 1953. Agency progress to date has been primarily due to the interest and support of the United States. Its ultimate success will depend on its ability to acquire fuller support from other members through competence and effectiveness in its sphere of activities. There has been some encouraging progress in this direction during the reporting period.

2. On May 11, 1959, the Agency signed its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States permitting it to draw on the approximately 5,000 kilograms of U-235 offered by President Eisenhower in 1956. Supply agreements with the USSR (for 50 kilograms) and the U.K. (20 kilograms) were signed on the same date. Canada has donated three tons of natural uranium to the IAEA for use in the first project (a 10 MW Japanese research reactor) involving transfer of reactor fuel under Agency safeguards.

3. The Agency also decided to defer construction of a research reactor in view of the plans of Austria to make its own reactor facilities available to the Agency. Accordingly, the major share of funds involved in the previous U.S. offer to support an Agency reactor project was reallocated and will be applied to constructing and equipping the Agency’s central analytical laboratory. This laboratory is to be used to support the Agency’s statutory functions, primarily in the health and safeguards field.

4. At the Second General Conference of the IAEA, held in the fall of 1958, the Chairman of the U.S. delegation indicated that the U.S., as

time and experience progressed and consistent with its existing obligations, would look to the Agency as the major institutional channel through which its international peaceful use programs would be carried forward. Chairman McCone also suggested that the Agency:

a. Inaugurate a major program of training, research, and application in the field of radioisotopes;

b. Intensify its efforts to develop international standards, codes, and regulations for the safe transportation, handling, and use of radioactive materials and the disposal of radioactive wastes; press forward with safety codes relating to reactor operation, reactor siting, and the protection of atomic energy workers; and, devote its attention to the problem of third-party liability;

c. Serve as a central coordinating body for training personnel;

d. Initiate an intensive survey of existing power reactor types and the criteria for introducing them into new areas, including the means by which the Agency could accelerate the availability of nuclear power within reasonable economic dimensions;

e. Continue to develop into a major center for the acquisition, collection, and the distribution of scientific information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. (In this regard, the U.S. suggested that future Geneva Conferences be held under Agency auspices, and that the Agency serve as the medium for freely exchanging information on controlled fusion research.)

5. The U.S. also indicated its intention to explore with the Agency the development of a program whereby specific research projects for the U.S. could be assigned to the Agency which, in turn, would develop contracts with institutions throughout the world.

6. Progress was made in these and other areas over the past year. The most notable accomplishments have been in the field of training. The Agency's program of providing fellowships for study in the peaceful applications of atomic energy has been well received. Roughly 300 applications for Agency fellowships have been received from individuals in about 30 countries. Most of these have indicated a preference for study in the United States. The Atomic Energy Commission is intensively studying the problems associated with meeting its responsibilities in this area, including the security aspects associated with receiving Soviet Bloc applicants in Commission installations.

7. Other areas of important work and progress in IAEA activities include: stimulating radioisotope uses by providing courses and advisory missions to member states and sponsoring conferences on radioisotope applications; identifying and resolving, through expert panels and conferences, some major international problems involved in transport and handling of materials, waste disposal, and assuring adequate treatment of third-party liability, and developing a proposed system for assuring that materials used under Agency auspices are applied only to peaceful purposes.

8. It is particularly notable that at the Second General Conference, the Government of Japan announced that it was willing to have the safeguards provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States administered by the Agency when the latter can undertake this service. It is hoped that other nations will make similar declarations.

9. *EURATOM*. During the last year, the U.S.–*EURATOM* joint nuclear power program was approved and initiated, and an appropriate U.S.–*EURATOM* Agreement for Cooperation covering the needs of the program came into effect in February of 1959. This program is regarded as a major contribution towards the strengthening of European unity and development of close ties between representatives of European and American nuclear science and technology in advancing peaceful uses of atomic energy.

10. The major objective of the joint program is the installation, within the next four to six years in the *EURATOM* area, of approximately one million kilowatts of nuclear generating capacity using reactor types carried to an advanced stage of development within the United States. The current goal is to have these projects completed by December 31, 1963, except that completion of the projects may be deferred to 1965 to allow for the incorporation of reactors of a more improved and advanced design. The reactor program is to be accompanied by a ten-year joint research and development effort which will be aimed at improving the performance of the reactors involved and in realizing savings and improvements in the associated fuel cycle.

11. The research and development program, which will be carried out in both the Community and the U.S., will be financed by equal contributions from the AEC and *EURATOM* and is expected to cost \$100 million for the first five years.

12. Invitations for the Research and Development and reactor phases of the program were issued in December of 1958 and in April of 1959, respectively. Approximately 200 proposals and letters of intent covering research or development projects have been received. These are now being reviewed by a joint U.S.–*EURATOM* Research and Development Board which has been constituted in Brussels to select the proposals and coordinate the administration of this phase of the program.

13. Reactor proposals are to be received by October 20, 1959. This will allow sufficient time for review and selection to permit the necessary authorizations to be obtained during the next session of Congress. It is expected that these projects initially will be screened by a Joint Reactor Board which will prepare suitable recommendations for the *EURATOM* Commission and the USAEC. As of May 11, five European utility groups indicated their intention to submit proposals for projects to be completed by 1963, and two concerns expressed intention

to submit proposals for projects to be completed by 1965. If acceptable, these proposals should permit the goal of one million kilowatts to be realized.

14. Reactor projects selected will be eligible to receive the following special incentives which are designed to minimize the major uncertainties associated with operating nuclear power plants today:

a. AEC guarantees (for a 10-year operating period) designed to limit financial risks arising from the cost of fabricating fuel elements and from failure of the elements to meet a predetermined life;

b. A long-term assurance of an adequate nuclear fuel supply available under deferred-payment at prices offered U.S. industry;

c. An assurance for a 10-year period of a defined market for the plutonium recovered from the reactors;

d. Long-term, capital loans to cover a portion of the plant construction costs, and

e. A long-term assurance by the United States that chemical reprocessing services will be available under terms comparable to those offered U.S. reactor operators.

15. Over the past year it became apparent that the joint program, as well as other nuclear power programs in Western Europe, face a problem not anticipated a year ago. This is due to an acute over-supply of coal in Western Europe; an apparent easing of the tensions in the Middle East; discovery of new oil reserves throughout the world, discovery of sizeable natural gas reserves in the Sahara and some slowing of economic growth with consequent lowering of energy requirements. These developments have tended to temper the long-term estimates as to amount of nuclear power that will be required to meet the over-all energy deficit in Europe and to lessen the enthusiasm in some quarters for proceeding with the joint U.S.-EURATOM program on a "crash" basis.

16. The long term effect on the planning for future European energy requirements of these factors, (referred to in Paragraph 15) especially new oil and gas reserves, is difficult to appraise at the present time. Much will depend on the potential of nuclear power development to reduce power costs and on the political stability of North Africa and the Middle East. The joint U.S.-EURATOM program is regarded as an important first step to provide experience for only large-scale effect that may follow.

17. The Community made progress in other areas over the past year. Basic regulations have been published for safeguards and health physics; a draft third-party liability convention has been prepared; negotiations are under way to establish several joint research centers. The EURATOM supply agency, which will be accountable under the Treaty for all special nuclear materials, is being organized and, probably will begin operations in October 1959. Internationally, EURATOM has executed agreements

with the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Negotiations are under way with Canada and Brazil. None of these agreements envision a program of cooperation as extensive as that with the United States.

18. In the months ahead, EURATOM will concentrate most of its activities on the joint program. The EURATOM Treaty, however, as well as the agreements in effect between the United States and the Community, and the U.S. and the member states of EURATOM, contemplate that there will be renegotiations to expand the areas of cooperation with EURATOM and to effect appropriate transfer of the rights and obligations in the individual agreements of the member states to EURATOM. These negotiations are expected to be initiated shortly, and to be completed during 1960. Some of the member states, notably France, have expressed misgivings about the renegotiations and have made it clear that a transfer of responsibilities that would necessitate their having to channel all of their individual cooperative activities with the United States through the EURATOM organization would be opposed. It has been explained to these States that they still will be free to deal directly with the U.S. on matters pertaining to the technical direction of their national programs and that the renegotiation is designed to take into account the responsibilities vested in EURATOM by its Treaty.

19. In anticipation of their increased responsibilities in dealing with EURATOM, the USAEC and the Department of State are augmenting the staff of the United States Mission, seven professional-level AEC staff, plus two State Department officers and an Export-Import Bank representative under the direction of a "Deputy for EURATOM Affairs" who will be a senior AEC official.

Other Multilateral or Regional Activities

20. *Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC)*. On April 22, the Organization of American States approved the statute of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission. The IANEC will serve as a center of consultation for the OAS member states and to facilitate cooperation among them in promoting the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Its major responsibilities include: Assisting member republics in coordinated planning for research and training; furthering the exchange of scientific and technical information; organizing conferences and other meetings; recommending measures to promote the training of scientists and technicians; recommending public health safeguards; requesting, when deemed advisable, the cooperation of public and private institutions in contributing to nuclear development programs in OAS countries and undertaking studies within its sphere of responsibility.

21. *Asian Nuclear Center*. In accordance with paragraph 38 of NSC 5725/1, the Department of State and the USAEC previously developed

a plan for construction of a less costly Asian Nuclear Center, possibly to be associated with the Colombo Plan and the IAEA. A review of present conditions has indicated that the establishment of even a less costly Asian Nuclear Center is not justified at the present time. As reported previously, the Asian countries are not prepared to give such an institution sufficient financial support. Continued study will be directed toward determining whether an alternate regional scheme is technically and politically desirable. (Conf.-DI)

22. It should be noted that the Philippines hope to develop a national program which will have regional appeal. The experience with the Asian Nuclear Center has demonstrated that the successful formulation of a regional center is almost entirely dependent upon the vigor and enthusiasm with which the idea is supported by the member states involved.

23. *Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)*. The European Nuclear Energy Agency of the OEEC continued to make progress on a number of joint projects. The design of the "Eurochemic" joint processing plant to be built at Mol, Belgium, is proceeding with substantial technical advice from the United States. In addition, in March, 12 European countries, under OEEC auspices, signed an agreement to cooperate in the U.K. "Dragon Project", a high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor to be constructed at Winfrith Heath at an approximate cost of \$38 million.

24. The OEEC also has made important progress in drafting a convention to cover third-party liability. (See paragraph 36.)

25. *Puerto Rico Nuclear Center*. The Puerto Rico Nuclear Center was established in cooperation with the University of Puerto Rico for the purpose of offering nuclear training in the Spanish language to students from Latin American countries. Of the 182 enrollees at the Center since it began, 42 were from 18 Latin American countries. Most of those took short-term courses. Students in the full-length Nuclear Technology Courses increased from two completing the 1958-59 session to eight in the 1959-60 session now under way. It is assumed that, as more specialized nuclear facilities become available and as the Center acquires more technical stature, it will attract more students from the region. Continued study is being devoted to the question of how the United States can accelerate this process.

26. *Bilateral Arrangements*. The extent of U.S. participation in the Atoms-for-Peace program abroad indicated by the fact that 43 bilateral agreements are in effect with 41 countries, and the City of West Berlin. (Switzerland has two agreements.) Of these, 13 are for power and 30 for research. This is in addition to the special agreements that have been signed with EURATOM and the IAEA. An Agreement Status Table is attached as Appendix "A".

27. It is not anticipated that a significant number of additional countries will enter bilateral agreements with the United States. The trend is to amend current research agreements to increase the amounts and enrichment of special nuclear material made available or to replace research agreements with more comprehensive power bilaterals.

II. OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S. PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

28. *New Fuel Policies.* In the past year, the United States developed a program for making enriched power reactor fuel available on a deferred-payment basis to individual countries, multilateral groups and the IAEA. This plan will serve to reduce the initial heavy costs for nuclear power plants and was designed primarily for non-EURATOM countries. It will be restricted to projects with a combined generating capacity of up to 500,000 kilowatts. To be eligible, reactor plants must be completed before June 30, 1964. In addition, the AEC will permit the lease of heavy water for use in domestic or foreign research, medical or testing reactors (previously transferred only on a sale basis), and lease of enriched uranium for foreign subcritical assemblies, exponential assemblies, and reactor experiments. These actions should contribute to foreign research and development programs.

29. *Safeguards to Prevent Diversion of Materials to Military Uses.* During the reporting period, the United States participated in several meetings for developing agreement among the western supplier countries on the application of safeguards to exports, to bilateral agreements, and for use by the Western Powers when these matters are considered in the International Atomic Energy Agency. Major uranium producers, without final commitment, have indicated they are prepared to apply agreed-upon safeguards if other suppliers do so. The French are reserving on the question of applying safeguards to their bilateral activities although they have joined with the other powers in endorsing the type of system to be applied by the IAEA. ([illegible in the original] portion Secret DI—Remainder Conf. DI)

30. The U.S. policy is that safeguard procedures should be developed on an evolutionary basis (rather than in detail for all anticipated cases beforehand) with attention first devoted to the immediate (and also simpler) cases. Later procedures will be developed for the larger and more complex facilities. This approach is designed to enhance the political acceptability of necessary safeguards actions and to take full advantage of technological developments which may ease the burden of applying an adequate system to the more complex and different cases.

31. It is improbable that facilities coming into operation during the next year or two will require more than periodic visits and audits. As it looks now, the safeguard system may require resident inspectors

at complex installations such as chemical processing plants. General procedures have been developed and inspections are being made for reactors up to 100 MWT.

32. The U.S. has encouraged development of a safeguards system by the International Atomic Energy Agency and has assisted the Agency by supplying comments for use in the preparation of the IAEA safeguards manual. At the suggestion of the Western Powers the proposed IAEA safeguards are being revised to assure that they conform to the "evolutionary approach."

33. In all these discussions, we have emphasized our interest in transferring to the IAEA, wherever practicable, the administration of the safeguards rights provided by our existing bilateral agreements. Also, we are assisting EURATOM in the development of its regional safeguard system and there is a mutual interest in making it compatible with IAEA procedures.

34. Certain materials, principally uranium, are achieving the status of common articles of commerce whose supply has exceeded demand. This makes the development of a common position favoring the continued imposition of safeguards to such materials increasingly difficult. (See Paragraph 15 in Report).

35. *Third-Party Liability.* One of the major problems facing the Atoms-for-Peace program relates to the necessity of reaching an effective international understanding concerning (1) the extent of liability which is to apply to those who supply nuclear facilities, the operation of which can have a harmful effect on persons and property, and (2) the protection provided the general public from nuclear hazards. U.S. manufacturers wish to be assured that their risks in exporting nuclear equipment overseas will be kept as nearly as possible within reasonable levels. Lack of effective resolution of this problem could materially interfere with U.S. efforts to sell nuclear power equipment abroad and could affect adversely the U.S. participation in the Joint EURATOM-AEC program.

36. During the past year, there has been a notable increase in work on this problem. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), has prepared a draft convention for submission to its member states. Under this convention, the operator of a nuclear facility would be held absolutely liable if a nuclear accident damaging third parties occurred, but the liability would be limited to [illegible in the original] million. However, a member state could increase the liability or decrease it to a minimum of \$5 million as to installations in its territory.

37. The EURATOM Commission has recommended to its Council of Ministers a convention supplementing that of the OEEC, which would raise the level of operator liability to \$100 million unless a higher amount is established by a member country. There is a provision for state indemnification of the operator for liability incurred beyond a

certain level of insurable risk. Provision is also made for the states of the EURATOM Community jointly to assume responsibility for compensation in cases where the damage exceeds state indemnification, by some means not yet developed.

38. *Training.* Training of foreign nationals in nuclear science and technology has been one of the outstanding contributions of the Atoms-for-Peace program. Since the lack of suitably trained personnel could be a major impediment to advances, in the nuclear field, the U.S. has continued and expanded an aggressive program to meet foreign requirements.

39. In addition to the increasing opportunities provided by U.S. colleges and universities, the United States encourages nuclear training of foreign nationals through AEC-sponsored formal courses of instruction, by providing individual training programs at Commission-sponsored installations, and by supplying U.S. scientists and engineers to teach and work in foreign countries.

40. Ten formal courses or arrangements for training, with a total capacity of 424, are now open under AEC auspices to nationals of other countries (see Appendix "B"). One thousand and twenty-one foreign nationals have taken advantage of these opportunities. In addition, since 1956, the AEC has helped arrange individual programs for over 800 foreign nationals. As of June 1959, [illegible in the original] foreign nationals were working and receiving individual training experience within AEC installations.

41. There is a growing need for more specialized individual training. To avoid duplicating the type of instruction available at universities and to raise the level and degree of highly specialized training offered by the AEC, the program at the International School at Argonne will be reoriented in 1960.

42. *Research Reactor and Equipment Grants.* The program for making grants to foreign countries for research reactor projects has made steady progress. Nineteen \$350,000 grants have been awarded to date. The number of requests for reactor grants are diminishing as more countries come under the program.

43. An additional grant program for the acquisition of various types of nuclear laboratory and related equipment was initiated last year. Fifteen grants totaling \$1,363,000 were approved for 12 countries. This program potentially could be of great use to the underdeveloped countries since it is flexible and can cover a variety of less costly items that may be individually tailored to country needs.

Conferences

44. *Geneva Conference.* The Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva, Switzerland in September 1958, was the largest scientific gathering of its kind ever convened.

45. More than a third of the 2,135 papers submitted came from the United States; and of the 722 papers selected by the U.N. for oral presentation, [illegible in the original] were from the U.S. This was more than twice as many as presented by the U.S.S.R. (99) or the United Kingdom ([illegible in the original]) and three times as many as presented by France (58). The United States was the only nation to be represented by at least one speaker in every session on the agenda.

46. The United States Technical Exhibit was an outstanding attraction and was attended by slightly over 100,000 people. The impressive array of full-sized laboratories, reactors, and thermonuclear devices operated by the scientists who built them, captured the attention of both delegates and the general public.

47. The U.S. film program excelled those of other nations in technical content and compared favorably with all others in quality of presentation. Of the 51 technical films presented by the U.N., 17 were furnished by the U.S. Additionally, in the exhibit the U.S. displayed 26 short films on specialized subjects in four language to more than 15,000 persons.

48. A Commercial Exhibit also was held in downtown Geneva during the Geneva Conference. More than 50 private U.S. companies participated with the AEC in organizing an impressive display of commercial activity in the U.S. in the atomic energy field. Of the 13 countries represented in this exhibit, the U.S. Exhibit was exceeded in size only by those of Great Britain and France and compared favorably in quality with those of all other nations.

49. At news conferences, the U.S. Delegation went on record at Geneva as favoring another large conference in 1961 and suggesting that it be held under IAEA auspices. The reaction was not favorable and in its official report, the U.S. Delegation recommended that the matter of size and sponsorship be studied further by the Department of State in cooperation with appropriate authorities. The U.S. Delegation to the Second IAEA General Conference at Vienna in September, 1958, took the position that any future conferences on nuclear science and technology of the type held at Geneva should be under IAEA sponsorship. In December 1958, the United Nations General Assembly directed the UN Secretary General and his Scientific Advisory Committee to evaluate the Second Conference with respect to the need, nature and timing of similar conferences in this field.

50. *Rome Conference and Exhibit.* The United States mounted an exhibit at the 1958 Rome Exposition and Congress on Nuclear Energy which included an operating low power research reactor. The display, well received by participants and public, was awarded first prize by the Congress.

51. *Second Inter-American Symposium.* Following the favorable response to the Inter-American Symposium on peaceful uses of nuclear energy at Brookhaven, in May of 1957, the Organization of American States, supported by a grant from Mutual Security Funds, sponsored a Second Inter-American Symposium, June 1–5, at Buenos Aires with the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission as co-host. Applications of nuclear energy to the life sciences featured the agenda and 26 of the 38 papers were presented by scientists from Latin American countries. Seventeen of the 21 OAS member states were represented among the more than 200 participants and observers.

52. *Tokyo Exhibit.* The USAEC presented a nuclear energy exhibit at the Tokyo, Japan, International Trade Fair, May 5–22, 1959. It featured an operating training and research reactor and an operating SNAP III thermoelectric generator.

53. *Other Conferences.* During the period July 1, 1958–June 30, 1959, the U.S. sponsored or participated in eight other international scientific congresses, conferences, or symposia dealing with the Atoms-for-Peace program.

III. U.S. DOMESTIC PROGRAM

54. *Power Reactors.* In October of 1958, the Chairman of the AEC appointed a special Ad Hoc Committee to perform an intensive evaluation of the Commission's reactor development program. This committee permitted its report in January 1959 and set forth a number of recommendations dealing with the technical program as well as general policy. The Commission has utilized these recommendations, along with those contained in other industrial and governmental surveys, in the formulation of an updated series of objectives for its civilian power program. These objectives, as outlined by Chairman McCone in recent Congressional hearings, are:

a. To reduce the cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with power from fossil fuels in high energy cost areas of this country within 10 years;

b. To assist friendly nations now having high energy costs to achieve competitive levels in about 5 years. This assistance is to be extended mainly through clearly defined programs of cooperation;

c. To maintain the U.S. position of leadership in the technology of nuclear power for civilian use;

d. To achieve a further reduction in the cost of nuclear power in order to increase the economic benefits and extend these benefits to wider areas, and

e. To develop breeder-type reactors to make full use of the nuclear energy latent in both uranium and thorium, recognizing that U-235 alone may not be sufficiently plentiful to meet all needs over the long range.

55. In the course of civilian power reactor development, there has emerged a program under which the many reactor concepts are separable into four categories on the basis of their potential to achieve economically competitive nuclear power.

56. First category: Reactor concepts which at this time seem to offer the greatest possibility of early achievement of nuclear power costs competitive with costs from fossil-fueled plants, at least in high power cost areas of the United States and abroad. Included are pressurized-water, boiling-water, organic-cooled, and certain gas-cooled reactors. Generally, these are the systems which have evoked the greatest interest in Europe and Japan.

57. Second category: Reactor concepts which probably will not produce low-cost power in the near future, but which have potential advantages which may ultimately overcome the early lead of those of the first category. Included here are reactors which use heavy water as a moderator-coolant or as a moderator alone, the liquid-metal-cooled reactors, and some of the more advanced gas-cooled reactors.

58. Third category: Reactor types which seem at this time to offer very great potential advantages but which require extensive additional technical development before these advantages can be demonstrated or disproved. These include the more long range reactor types, such as the pebble-bed and fluidized-bed concepts.

59. Fourth category: Reactor concepts whose basic objectives and major promise lie in their potential ability to produce more fissionable material than they burn and to do so at a rate sufficiently great to allow this country's nuclear fuel resources to keep up with the projected growth of its nuclear power demands. Such concepts would embrace the sodium-cooled, fast-breeder reactor, for the U-Pu system; and the thermal-breeder reactor for the Thorium-U-233 system.

60. Major emphasis in the immediate future will be placed on bringing the concepts in the first category above to a point where they become established as the basis of a nuclear power industry both in the United States and abroad. As the developmental and prototype program proceeds to the point where this objective is being realized, the emphasis will shift to concepts in the succeeding categories, always with the idea of placing major emphasis on those concepts which offer the greatest promise of early and outstanding success.

61. We recently reached a point in reactor development where we can be more selective in deciding which reactor concepts to carry forward into intensive and expensive hardware development, which reactors to continue under research and development, and which concepts to lay aside.

62. Thus, each major development effort in the AEC power reactor program has been analyzed or re-examined with the over-all program objectives in mind. As a result, two projects involving insufficiently developed concepts were dropped from the Power Demonstration Reactor Program during the past year and additional effort was being placed behind more promising reactor types. One of these is the heavy water moderated concept. Although not well advanced in this country, this particular reactor system is of special interest abroad because such reactors can use natural uranium and do not have to rely on expensive uranium-enriching plants. With this in mind, the AEC is working towards a more extensive cooperative program with Canada which has two heavy-water-moderated experimental reactors in operation. These reactors have provided extensive irradiation services for some of the U.S. heavy-water program activities.

63. The special interest of other countries in natural-uranium-type reactors has brought participation of other groups in the U.S. program. Representatives of Sweden, EURATOM, and the OEEC were among those taking part in a recent heavy-water design study.

64. U.S. development of the gas-cooled reactor concept, certain aspects of which has been greatly advanced by the British, is also being accelerated. Two gas-cooled power reactor projects are included in the FY 1960 program rather than one. In addition, the proposed FY 1960 program includes an advanced boiling-water prototype reactor, an experimental organic-cooled reactor, a low-temperature process heat reactor, and a small-sized power reactor suitable for use by public utilities and for the export market. The Commission feels that small power plants of 5 to 40 electrical megawatts, if proven economic, would fulfill important power requirements associated with underdeveloped foreign areas as well as supply power to isolated high-cost fuel areas within the U.S.

65. *Maritime Reactor Program.* Of great interest abroad and closely related to the civilian power effort is the joint AEC-Maritime Administration program for development of nuclear propulsion for merchant ships. This program centers around the design and construction of the N.S. *Savannah*, a nuclear-powered merchant ship now under construction at the Camden, New Jersey, yard of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation. The vessel's pressurized-water nuclear propulsion plant is being designed and fabricated by Babcock and Wilcox Co. It is to be launched on July 21 and initial operation is scheduled for the early part of 1960.

66. The *Savannah* is being constructed not only to acquire actual experience in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear merchant vessels, but to provide a means of identifying and resolving the many international legal and regulatory problems associated with

placing such a vessel into world commerce. Third-party liability studies now in progress are directed in part toward facilitating the movement of nuclear-propelled ships.

67. Associated with the *Savannah* project are supporting activities such as crew training, health, safety, and environment studies, and the development and construction of servicing and repair facilities.

68. The joint AEC-MA program also includes research, development, and preliminary design work for a 60,000 deadweight-ton tanker using a boiling-water reactor plant. A longer range program to develop a marine nuclear plant consisting of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor coupled with a closed-cycle gas turbine has been stated. This program could lead to the started construction and operation of a land-based prototype by 1963. Also under way are technical and economic studies of other reactor systems showing promise for marine use; investigations into advanced vessel designs; and development of more efficient and economic methods for constructing nuclear ships.

69. Interest in nuclear ship propulsion is strong among countries who traditionally have major shipbuilding operations. [As of this time, the only known application of nuclear propulsion in the U.S.S.R. is in the icebreaker "Lenin".]⁵ (Bracketed portion Secret-DI)

70. *Plowshare Program.* The program for applying nuclear explosions to peaceful purposes is still in an early stage of development. A number of applications under study could make significant contribution to the Atoms-for-Peace program although further experimentation is required before this is an assurance. It is expected that there will be ample experimentation in the United States prior to application overseas.

71. The more promising possible peaceful uses of nuclear explosives are: civil engineering or excavation applications, recovery of natural resources (such as oil and minerals), industrial uses (such as production of power and isotopes), and in basic research investigations. Projects now underway or under such serious consideration are the following: *Chariot*, to get data on excavation applications; *Oxcart*, to obtain data on fundamental principles such as the relation between depth of burial, and physical effects such as containment of fallout; oil shales to determine the feasibility of using nuclear explosives in recovering oil from oil shales (several American oil companies have expressed a desire to participate in and contribute to this experiment); tar sands to determine the feasibility of using nuclear explosives in recovering oil from the Athabaska tar sands in Alberta, Canada (Richfield Oil Company has offered to pay for this experiment but AEC participation is contingent

⁵ Brackets are in the original.

upon Canadian Government approval); and *Gnome* to obtain basic data on power and isotope production.

IV. SELECTED COUNTRY SUMMARIES

72. *Canada.* The Canadian program for developing natural uranium, heavy-water, power reactors has expanded and future plans have been put on a firmer footing. Construction of the 20 MWE nuclear power demonstration reactor (NPD) scheduled for operation in 1961 near Chalk River has progressed satisfactorily. Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., has proposed to the Canadian Government that it proceed with the detailed design and construction of a large (200 MWE) reactor similar in design to NPD. The plant is to be built and operated by 1964 in the Ontario public utility system.

73. The Canadians also have become very interested in natural uranium, heavy-water-moderated reactors cooled either by organic fluids or heavy-water steam. A feasibility study on the organic-cooled-type has been initiated. The close U.S.-Canadian cooperation has continued and an increased cooperative heavy-water reactor program is planned.

74. *France.* Except for the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, France has the largest and most diversified atomic energy program in Western Europe today. The notable advances during the past year were: (Secret-DI)

a. *Plutonium Production.* A plutonium separation chemical reprocessing plant, has been in continuous operation at Marcoule since January 1959 after experiencing considerable difficulties. The French G-1 reactor, in operation since January 1956, produces 12 kilograms of Pu per year at design level of 40 MW thermal. The French G-2 reactor at Marcoule, which went critical in July 1958, produces 40 kgs of plutonium per year at design level of 150 MW thermal. A third production reactor identical to G-2 reached criticality early in June 1959. (Secret-DI)

b. *U-235 Production Capacity.* Two pilot plants each with 12 active stages are now in operation. In January 1959 construction of a full-scale separation plant at Pierrelatte was initiated. This plant will have an estimated production capacity of 4 kgs of U-235 per day in 1962 and 10 kgs per day of U-235 in 1965. (Secret-DI)

c. *Reactors.* Electricite de France, the French National Power Company, is scheduled to complete EDP-1, the first full-scale (63 MWE) power reactor in France, late in 1959 or early in 1960. The United States has furnished fuel for several French research reactors and the French materials testing reactor during the past year.

75. *India.* Heavy emphasis is being put on achieving national self-sufficiency in personnel and materials. A 1,000 kw pool-type research reactor, designed and built in India and fueled by enriched uranium supplied by the United Kingdom, has been in operation 35 months. Work on India's second reactor, a 30 MWT NRX-type test reactor, is scheduled

for completion in 1959. Canada is providing technical assistance for the construction and the U.S. has provided the heavy water. (OUO)

76. While no power plants are in operation, it is planned to have a million KWE generating capacity available by 1966 from reactors using natural uranium provided by domestic sources. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission also has recently made overtures concerning a joint Indian-U.S. cooperative program involving reactors using U.S.-enriched uranium. The United States is prepared to explore this further. (OUO)

77. *Japan*. A 10-year comprehensive U.S.-Japanese Agreement for Cooperation came into effect during December of 1958. The Japanese also entered into a power agreement with the U.K. Japan has selected the General Electric Company as builder of a 10-MWE-type power demonstration reactor. British General Electric has been chosen as contractor for the first full-scaled power reactor (a 150 MWE advanced Calder Hall reactor).

78. *United Kingdom Nuclear Energy Program*. The U.K. nuclear energy program has been established on a broad basis and is one of the three most highly advanced programs in the world. Over the past year there has been substantial progress in all areas of the program with notable emphasis on the field of nuclear power. The U.K. heads all other countries in domestic nuclear power construction with approximately 300 MWE to be installed by the end of 1959; and about 1400 MWE under construction, with an additional 500 MWE station authorized for Wales with construction to begin sometime this year.

79. The official nuclear power program is either on or ahead of schedule and is expected to realize the national goal of 5000-6000 MW by 1966. There is a possibility that within the next year or two a new (or extended) program will have been formulated. Decision in this respect will be affected by (a) experience gained with the generation of reactors now operating or under construction, (b) progress made with the advanced gas-cooled reactor and other concepts under study, and (3) a further evaluation of domestic economic needs.

80. In June 1958, the U.K. Nuclear Power Plant Company, one of the UKAEA industrial consortia members, signed an agreement with the Italian Company, Agip Nucleare, for collaboration in the construction of a Calder-Hall-type 200 MW station in Italy. Another consortia member, General Electric Company-Simmons Carves Group, has contracted to build a gas-cooled power reactor plant in Japan. The UKAEA will supply fuel for these stations. Thus far, these are the only two power plants sold by the U.K., and it is becoming somewhat apparent that the commercial exploitation of nuclear power by U.K. industry overseas is beginning to be adversely affected by the lack of a reactor with a greater commercial potential than the gas-cooled type.

81. This is further aggravated by the recent programs that have been initiated by the U.S. to provide special incentives to reactors using U.S. design. The rapid commercial development of an atomic energy industry in the U.S., coupled with the liberal technological information policy of the U.S., is precipitating a considerable turning of U.K. nuclear industry to U.S. firms for commercial arrangements which will enable them to expand their export marketing output beyond that afforded by the present and foreseeable U.K. AEC program.

82. These factors have combined to bring some tensions at the political level between the United States and the United Kingdom since the British have felt that the EURATOM and deferred-payment programs have put them at an unfair disadvantage. The British have stressed the mutual interest of the U.K. and the U.S. in avoiding any subsidy race in competition in the international nuclear power market. However, it has not affected the close and varied U.S.–U.K. cooperation at the technical level. (Conf.-DI)

83. Paragraph 51 of last year's report noted that there was a U.S.–U.K. problem in reconciling the different policies relating to the dissemination of information prevailing in the two countries. The United Kingdom has not found it possible to provide freely to the United States information of commercial sensitivity which is developed with public funds since such data normally are sold in the United Kingdom. The extent of this problem is not as great as was thought originally since the amount of data in this category is substantially less than was originally contemplated.

84. *U.S.S.R.* The U.S.S.R.'s capabilities in the power reactor fields are advancing rapidly, and a considerable amount of original and interesting work on reactor and reactor component development has been performed; however, no Soviet breakthroughs have occurred. Their rate of reactor construction confirms our earlier estimate that this program has slipped substantially below its original goals announced in 1956 of 2000–2500 MWE by 1960. The latest over-all estimate is that, as now projected, the U.S.S.R. will have a capacity of about 2000 MWE by 1963. Information given Admiral Hyman G. Rickover on his August 1959 trip to the Soviet Union confirmed the considerable slippage in the original goal. For example, Admiral Rickover reported that only two of the four 100 MWE boiling water reactors are under construction at Belloyarsh with operation expected in 1961. He also was told the two 210 MWE pressurized water reactors (presumably at the Voronezh station) are due for completion in 1961.

85. The nuclear power programs of the United States and the U.S.S.R. involved the same general reactor types. As in the U.S., the first large power stations will be cooled with ordinary water. The Soviets also are developing experimental power reactors up to about 50 MWE,

using various coolants. However, the U.S.S.R. is concentrating on the construction of large power stations employing a limited number of reactor designs, with a much smaller effort in purely experimental reactors; while the U.S. is building smaller stations which will use a greater variety of reactor types.

86. The only firmly identified U.S.S.R. application of nuclear energy for propulsion (see Koslov statement to Rickover—footnote to paragraph 19 of Report on Page 7) is the icebreaker “Lenin” which is essentially complete. Admiral Rickover was told on his aforementioned visits that the Soviets expected the “Lenin” test to be completed by the end of 1959. With respect to the Koslov statement, it is believed that the U.S.S.R. on the basis of its over-all nuclear technology, has been capable for several years of building nuclear submarines, but no such construction has been verified. (SECRET DI)

87. A major effort is being made to increase the size, number, and variety of devices for controlled thermonuclear research. The status of Soviet work in this field is roughly comparable to that of the U.S. and the U.K.

88. In 1955, the U.S.S.R. announced a program of atomic aid to the satellites. Research reactors, cyclotrons, and equipment for research with radioisotopes are sold to the satellite countries and technical training is provided. Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary have received 2,000 kilowatt research reactors and Communist China has received a 6,500–10,000 kilowatt reactor. All Sino-Soviet Bloc countries have membership in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubna and they may send scientists to study and work in its laboratory, which employs some of the most advanced nuclear research equipment in the U.S.S.R. (UNC)

89. The most significant programs of assistance outside the Soviet Bloc have been directed to Yugoslavia where the U.S.S.R. has assisted in the construction of a research reactor, and Egypt where a research reactor and supporting equipment have been provided. (UNC)

90. Soviet offers of technical assistance, including in some cases nuclear equipment and training have been made to numerous other non-Bloc countries including Norway, Japan, Lebanon, Australia, Chile, Burma, Indonesia, Iran, Thailand, Syria, Greece, Mexico, Afghanistan, and most recently, Iraq. (UNC) Iraq has recently been offered a reactor and is hoping to obtain the machine as a gift. (Secret-DI)

91. The training and research institutes at which the U.S.S.R. will accept trainees sponsored by the IAEA have been specified. These include leading universities and research institutes. None of these installations is directly connected with the Soviet Atomic Energy Program. (Secret-DI)

Appendix “A”*DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**STATUS OF ARMAMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AS OF
JUNE 30, 1959*

Cumulative Numbers				
Countries	Armaments	Country	Scope of Exchange	Effective Date
1	1	Argentina	Research	July 29, 1955
2	2	*Australia	Research & Power	May 28, 1957
3	3	Austria	Research	Jul 13, 1956
4	4	*Belgium	Research & Power	Jul 21, 1955
5	5	Brazil	Research	Aug, 3, 1955
6	6	*Canada	Research & Power	Jul 21, 1955
7	7	Chile	Research	Aug 8, 1955
8	8	China, Rep.of	Research	Jul 18, 1955
9	9	Colombia	Research	Jul 19, 1955
10	10	Cuba	Research	Oct 10, 1957
11	11	Denmark	Research	Jul 25, 1955
12	12	Dominican Rep.	Research	Dec 21, 1956
13	13	Ecuador	Research	Feb 6, 1958
14	14	France	Research & Power	Nov 20, 1956
15	15	Germany, Fed. Rep.	Research & Power	Aug 7, 1957
	16	W. Berlin, City	Research	Aug 1, 1957
16	17	Greece	Research	Aug 4, 1955
17	18	Guatemala	Research	Apr 22, 1957
18	19	Iran	Research	Apr 27, 1959
19	20	Ireland	Research	Jul 9, 1958
20	21	Israel	Research	Jul 12, 1955
21	22	Italy	Research & Power	Apr 15, 1958
22	23	Japan	Research & Power	Dec 5, 1958
23	24	Korea, Rep. of	Research	Feb 3, 1956
24	25	Lebanon	Research	Jul 18, 1955

Cumulative Numbers Countries	Armaments	Country	Scope of Exchange	Effective Date
25	26	*Netherlands	Research & Power	Aug 8, 1957
26	27	New Zealand	Research	Aug 29, 1956
27	28	Nicaragua	Research	Mar 7, 1956
28	29	Norway	Research & Power	Jun 10, 1957
29	30	Pakistan	Research	Aug 11, 1955
30	31	Peru	Research	Jan 25, 1956
31	32	Philippines	Research	Jul 27, 1955
32	33	Portugal	Research	Jul 21, 1955
33	34	South Africa	Research & Power	Aug 22, 1957
34	35	Spain	Research & Power	Feb 12, 1958
35	36	Sweden	Research	Jan. 18, 1956
36	37	Switzerland	Research	Jul 18, 1955
	38	*Switzerland	Power	Jan 29, 1957
37	39	Thailand	Research	Mar 13, 1956
38	40	Turkey	Research	Jun 10, 1955
39	41	*United Kingdom	Research & Power	Jul 21, 1955
40	42	Uruguay	Research	Jan 13, 1956
41	43	Venezuela	Research	Jul 21, 1955
42	44	Viet-Nam	Research	Jul 1, 1959
SIGNED AND IN RATIFICATION PROCESS AS OF MAY 1959				Date Signed
—	45	Brazil	Power	Jul 31, 1957
43	46	Costa Rica	Research	May 18, 1956
—	—	Cuba	Research & Power	Sept 9, 1958
44	47	Iraq	Research	Jun 7, 1957
45	48	Panama	Research	Jun 24, 1959
—	—	Peru	Research & Power	Jul 19, 1957
—	—	Venezuela	Research & Power	Oct 8, 1958

SUMMARY: In effect: 31 research and 13 power agreements with 42 countries & West Berlin.

Signed : 4 research and 4 power with 3 more countries. (3 to supersede existing records).

* : Clarification armaments [Footnote is in the original.]

SPECIAL AGREEMENTS

	<u>Scope of Exchange</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>
EURATOM	Joint Nuclear Power Program	Effective	Feb. 18, 1959
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . . .	Supply of Materials, etc.	Signed	May 11, 1959
Canada	Mutual Defense Purposes	Signed	May 22, 1959
France	Mutual Defense Purposes, etc.	Signed	May 7, 1959
Greece	Mutual Defense Purposes	Signed	May 6, 1959
Netherlands	Mutual Defense Purposes	Signed	May 6, 1959
Turkey	Mutual Defense Purposes	Signed	May 5, 1959
United Kingdom	Mutual Defense Purposes	Effective	Aug 4, 1958
	*Amendment to this agreement	Signed	May 7, 1959
West Germany	Mutual Defense Purposes	Signed	May 5, 1959

*Classified Agreements. [Footnote is in the original.]

Appendix “B”*COURSES OR ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAINING IN WHICH FOREIGN NATIONALS MAY PARTICIPATE*

1. International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering (Argonne National Laboratory)
2. Radioisotope Techniques Course (Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies)
3. Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (the University of Puerto Rico)
4. The Reactor Operations Supervisor Course (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
5. The Reactor Hazards Course (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
6. Radiochemical and Counting Procedures Course (New York Health & Safety Laboratory)
7. Uranium Geology, Exploitation and Mining Training (Grand Junction Operations Office)
8. Reactor Engineer Officer Training Course—N.S. Savannah (Babcock & Wilcox)
9. N.S. Savannah Construction Observation Program (New York Shipbuilding Corp.)
10. Shippingport Power Reactor Operators School (Duquesne Power & Light Co.)

Appendix "C"

RESEARCH REACTOR GRANTS (May 30, 1956 – June 30, 1959) UPDATE					
Country	Type	Power (Thermal)	Mfgr	Est. Project Cost (Millions)	
1. Brazil ¹ Sao Paulo	Pool	5 Mw.	Babcock and Wilcox	\$1.3	
2. Spain* Madrid	Pool	3 "	International General Electric	\$1.0	
3. Netherlands [illegible in the original]	Tank	25 "	American Car and Foundry	\$3.9	
4. Denmark [illegible in the original]	Tank	5 "	Foster-Wheeler	\$1.4	
5. Japan [illegible in the original]	Tank	10 "	American Machine and Foundry	\$1.5	
6. Portugal Lisbon	Pool	1 "	"	\$[illegible in the original] \$5.0	
7. Venezuela Caracas	Pool	3 "	International General Electric	\$5.0	
8. Italy* Ispira	Tank	5 "	American Car and Foundry	\$5.6	
9. Greece Aghia Parasherri	Pool	1 "	American Machine and Foundry	\$[illegible in the original] \$4.3	
10. Sweden Studsvik	Tank	30 "	American Car and Foundry	\$4.3	
11. Israel Rehovoth	Pool	1 "	American Machine and Foundry	\$1.4	

<i>Country</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Power (Thermal)</i>	<i>Mfgr</i>	<i>Est. Project Cost (Millions)</i>
12. West Germany Munich	Pool	1"	American Machine and Foundry	\$3.1
13. Belgium Mol	Tank	25" ²	(Centre d'Eludes de l'Energie Nucleaire. (Nuclear Development Associates. International General Electric	\$10.0
14. China Hainchiue	Pool	1"	American Machine and Foundry	\$1.0
15. Austria Vienna	Tank	5" ¹	Norstom	\$4.0
15. Norway Kjeller	Pool	10 Kw.	General Atomic	\$0.8
17. Korea [illegible in the original]	Tank	300"	Curtis-Wright	[illegible in the original]
18. Thailand Bangkok	Pool	1 Mw.	General Atomic	\$0.82
19. Viet-Nam Delat	Tank	100 Mw.		\$0.75
Total Grants—\$6,650,000				
Cost of Projects Assisted—\$47,270,000				

¹ Grant Paid [Footnote is in the original.]

² Convertible to [illegible in the original] MW. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Convertible to 50 MW [Footnote is in the original.]

Appendix "D"

SUMMARY OF COUNTRY POWER PROGRAMS
(Net output in Electrical Kilowatts)

Country	End of Calendar Year											
	1958 (Actual) MW(e)	1959 MW(e)	1960 MW(e)	1961 MW(e)	1962 MW(e)	1963 MW(e)	1964 MW(e)	1965 MW(e)	1966 MW(e)	1967 MW(e)	1970 MW(e)	1975 MW(e)
Belgium			10			300				550		1200
France								850				8000
Germany (West)								500				6000
Italy					320	650		1500				6000
Japan								600				7000
Netherlands								400			1200	3000
United Kingdom	300								5000– 6000			
U.S.S.R.					2000							
U.S.	75.5	75.5	202.9	828.3	[illeg- ible in the origi- nal]	1157.3						

Appendix "E"

MATERIALS ESTIMATES TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES OCTOBER 1958 THRU MARCH 1959

TIME DATED	COUNTRY	URANIUM			OTHER MATERIALS	TYPE OF TRANSACTION	PURPOSE & REMARKS
		KG. U-235	ENRICH- MENT U-235				
Sept. 16	Switzerland	0.661	20	—		Sale	ACN-201 Reactor U. of Geneva
Sept. 30	Canada	—	—	100 lbs. Heavy Water		Sale	AECL
Oct. 29	Switzerland	.778	20	—		Sale	ACN-211 Reactor U. of Basle
Nov. 1 Nov. 2	France	55.221	1.5	—		Lease	UO ₂ Powder for Alize Reactor
Nov. 3	Germany	—	—	9 tons Heavy Water		Sale	Kernreaktor
Nov. 12	Belgium	—	—	American 241 Curium 244		Gift	Research Liegr U. Milligram quantity
Nov. 19 Nov. 21	Norway Denmark	1.304 4.495	1.5 90	— —		Sale Lease	Halden Reactor Riso DR-2 Reactor

URANIUM

TIME DATED	COUNTRY	KG. U-235	ENRICH- MENT U-235	OTHER MATERIALS	TYPE OF TRANSACTION	PURPOSE & REMARKS
Dec. 3	Denmark	1.683	90	—	Lease	Riso DR-2 Reactor
Dec. 9	Belgium	1.986	20	—	Sale	U. of Lovanin Belgian [illegible in the original] TRIGA Reactor
Dec. 12	Brazil	5.729	20	—	Lease	Sao Paulo Reactor
Dec. 19	Spain	(a)	90	—	Sale	Fission counter material for Monclea reactor
Dec. 20	Denmark	(a)	90	—	Sale	Fission counter material
Jan. 7	Australia	4.433	90	—	Sale	Research
Jan. 14	France	0.01	99	—	Sale	Research
Jan. 14	Switzerland	0.05	20	—	Sale	U. of Basle
Jan. 19	United Kingdom	—	—	U-233	Gift	Cross section measurements
Jan. 26	Canada	3.883	90	—	Lease	McMasters U. Reactor
Jan. 26	Canada	(a)	90	—	Sale	Material for two fission counters

URANIUM

TIME DATED	COUNTRY	KG. U-235	ENRICHMENT U-235	OTHER MATERIALS	TYPE OF TRANSACTION	PURPOSE & REMARKS
Feb. 10	Canada	—	—	0.5 tons Heavy Water	Sale	AECL
Feb. 12	Italy	4.356	20	—	Lease	Ispra Reactor
Feb. 20	Canada	—	—	0.5 tons Heavy Water	Sale	AECL
Feb. 25	France	1.533	3.5	—	Lease	UO ₂ Powder for Alize Reactor
Feb. 27	Germany	—	—	Depleted U.	Sale	Research 20 grams
Mar. 3	Italy	(a)	90	—	Sale	Ispra Flux mapping Device
Mar. 6	Canada	—	—	20 tons Heavy Water	Sale	AECL
Mar 13	France	—	—	Depleted U.	Sale	115 grams metal foil for research
Mar 23	United Kingdom	(a)	Normal	—	Exchange	Research
Apr 8	Norway	0.226	1.5	—	Sale	Halden Reactor

(a)— amount less than 10 grams [Footnote is in the original.]

URANIUM

TIME DATED	COUNTRY	KG. U-235	ENRICHMENT U-235	OTHER MATERIALS	TYPE OF TRANSACTION	PURPOSE & REMARKS
Apr 9	France	3.753	19.87	—	Lease	Triton Reactor
Apr 24	France	5.935	3.5	—	Lease	For ALIZE fuel fabrication
May 6	France	6.994	3.5	—	Lease	same as above
May 13	Holland	Normal U slugs		—	Lease	University of Delft
May 21	Germany	5.991	19.82	—	Lease	Siemens reactor
May 20	Canada	2.794	90.	—	Sale	Research
May 22	Canada	2.174	90.	—	Sale	Research
May 25	Japan	(a)	20	—	Lease	Fission Counter
June 3	France	2.451	3.5	—	Lease	ALIZE
June 10	France	—	—	NP-237	Gift	Research 1 mg
June 10	Denmark	—	—	NP-237	Gift	Research 1 mg
June 10	France	—	—	Depleted Uranium 500 grams	Gift	Research
June 3	France	5.339	20	—	Lease	Minerva Reactor

URANIUM						
TIME DATED	COUNTRY	KG. U-235	ENRICH- MENT U-235	OTHER MATERIALS	TYPE OF TRANSACTION	PURPOSE & REMARKS
June 9–10–11	Belgium	3.675	90	—	Sale	BR-2 test reactor
June 12	Canada	2.052	90	—	Lease	McMaster Univ. reactor
June 12	Italy	—	—	Depleted U ²³⁵ 500 grams	Sale	Research
June 6	Italy	2.332	20	—	Lease	Fuel for TRIGA
June 6	Italy	(a)	90	—	Sale	Fission Counter-TRIGA
June 15	France	6.597	20%	—	Lease	Fuel For Melusine & Triton
June 18	Israel	—	—	Am 241 NP-237	Gift	Research
June 18	Belgium	—	—	AM 241	Gift	Research
June 19	France	2.901	20%	—	Lease	Fuel For Melusine & Triton
June 19	Sweden	(a)	90	—	Sale	Material for fission counters

496. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11-9A-59

Washington, September 8, 1959

**PROBABLE SOVIET POSITION ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TESTING²****THE PROBLEM**

To assess the relative weight of weapons requirements and other considerations in determining the Soviet position on further nuclear testing, and to estimate the Soviet attitudes toward complete discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing and toward limited discontinuance.³

THE ESTIMATE

1. Broadly speaking, the considerations which lie behind the Soviet position on further nuclear testing are of three kinds: technical, strategic, and political. Technical considerations have to do with the stage of research and development in which the Soviets find themselves with respect to nuclear weapons—how urgent do they consider the necessity of further testing in order to round out their arsenal of nuclear weapons, to improve the economy or efficiency of those they have, or to realize the potential of new devices? Strategic considerations relate to the effect of further testing on the world balance of military power—how far do the Soviets believe they would derive advantage or disadvantage in this respect from either a resumption or a discontinuance of nuclear testing? Political considerations have to do with the advantages which the Soviets might see for themselves in a continuance of their strong propagandists stand against further testing, and with the longer-range benefits which they might hope for if an agreed discontinuance of nuclear testing could be established as the first step towards other agreements. We propose to discuss each of these considerations briefly, and to estimate how the Soviets weigh them against each other in arriving at their position.

2. The Soviets now have available a wide spectrum of fission and thermonuclear weapon types. Their test series have shown that they

¹ Source: "Probable Soviet Position on Nuclear Weapons Testing." Secret; Restricted Data. 11 pp. DOS, INR Files.

² See NIE 11-6-58. "The Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament," dated 24 June 1958 (Secret), for a fuller discussion of the arguments which are summarized in the present paper. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Limited discontinuance would ban for an indefinite period any testing in the atmosphere and outer space, on the earth's surface, and underwater; only contained underground tests would be sanctioned. [Footnote is in the original.]

could obtain yields ranging from less than three KT from fission devices to eight MT from thermonuclear devices. They thus can produce weapons suitable for tactical ground force use and naval employment as well as for a wide range of aircraft and missile delivery systems. This capability probably included efficient use of nuclear materials in air defense warheads. Significant improvements in stockpiled weapons are certainly being made as a direct result of the tests completed in 1958.

3. An analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons progress does indicate that there are several areas in which the USSR might desire to conduct further tests. These areas include: (a) high altitude or space tests related to AICBM effects or proof tests; (b) tests of low-yield, light, tactical devices; (c) tests directed toward materially increasing fissionable material economy; (d) tests of “clean” devices; and (e) tests of thermonuclear weapons with yields above eight MT. In addition, refinement of existing designs would be desirable in any test series.

4. Almost certainly there are pressures in the Soviet Union, on both technical and military grounds, for continued nuclear testing in some or all of these fields. Over the long-run the Soviet nuclear weapon design and development capabilities could only be marginally improved without further tests. However, the available spectrum of nuclear weapons is probably adequate to meet their basic military requirements. On balance, we believe that the Soviets currently estimate that the technical potentialities for weapons improvement would make further testing desirable, but do not provide an overriding requirement for the resumption of tests at this time.⁴

5. From the strategic point of view, the Soviets probably believe that a continuation of nuclear testing by both sides would be unlikely to alter the relationship of military power between the US and the USSR in any decisive way. In any case, they are almost certainly unable to estimate with confidence that a continuance of nuclear testing would operate to their advantage rather than to that of the US. They may believe that, despite certain US superiorities in weapons technology, a stabilization of nuclear weapons technology at present levels of development would serve Soviet military interests better than would a continuance of testing by both sides. On these grounds, therefore, we think that the Soviets almost certainly are willing, though not necessarily anxious, to have both sides cease testing.

6. From a political point of view, total discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing would mark a major step in the Soviet effort to single out nuclear weapons as different from and more repugnant than other weapons. It would crown with success the long public Soviet demand

⁴ For further discussion of the technical aspects see the Annex to this estimate. [Footnote is in the original.]

for a test ban and raise the prestige of the USSR. It would thus serve long-range strategic and political aims by providing a springboard for intensified agitation against further deployment of nuclear weapons abroad, against initiating the use of nuclear weapons in any situation, and even for a complete ban. Even though the Soviet leaders would probably see little prospect of involving the West in negotiations on these issues and still less prospect of getting agreement, they would calculate that by focusing renewed attention on them, they could generate political problems within the free world and inhibit Western defense activities. Any resulting relaxation of Western defense efforts, any divisions within NATO and any progress toward a climate inhibiting Western use of nuclear weapons would be viewed by the Soviets as important gains.

7. A total discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing would inhibit other countries, including Communist China, from persisting in efforts to develop their own nuclear weapons. The Soviets would welcome the fact that the problem created within the Western Alliance by French desires to pursue a weapons development program would be intensified. While Communist China would probably press for acquisition of a nuclear capability, the Soviets presumably believe that they could meet this pressure by promising to provide appropriate nuclear support to China, and by arguing that as a next step they would work toward the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Eurasia.⁵

8. In sum, then, we believe that the Soviets see no overriding current technical requirement for continued nuclear weapons tests, and no assurance that they would improve their relative military position by such tests (assuming, of course, that tests were resumed by both sides). Accordingly, we believe that the major factor now determining the Soviet position on further nuclear testing is their evaluation of the political and propaganda gains to be expected from a discontinuance of tests. We believe that in their opinion these gains would be considerable, and in the long run would contribute substantially to their strategic objective of weakening the US both militarily and politically, outweighing any immediate technical and military advantages to be derived from a resumption of testing.

9. It follows from the above conclusion that the Soviets would prefer a total discontinuance and would be cool to a limited one. However, they could calculate that a surface, atmospheric and space test ban would still permit them to stigmatize nuclear weapons to a degree, and thus to gain some of the advantages of the complete ban. A limited restriction on nuclear testing which permitted underground tests would allow the

⁵ For further discussion of Chinese nuclear capabilities and Sino-Soviet nuclear arrangements, see NIE 13-59, "Communist China," paragraphs 74 and 83 through 86, dated 28 July (Secret). [Footnote is in the original.]

USSR to realize some of the potentialities for further weapons development, though with greater expense and difficulty than under conditions of unrestricted testing. (Such an agreement would, of course, also permit the US and UK to improve their weapons, and in time would allow other nations to develop nuclear weapons.) While it is therefore possible that the Soviets would agree to a limited discontinuance with controls—especially if the alternative were a rupture in negotiations—we believe it highly unlikely. The chances are better that they would settle for a limited discontinuance without international controls.

10. We believe it most probable that the USSR will continue to press for a total discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, capitalizing upon the approval which this course of action receives in many parts of the world. We think, moreover, that the Soviets will agree to a total ban on weapons tests, with international controls, provided that they succeed in holding inspection monitoring to what they regard as an acceptable limit in terms of their stringent requirements for state security. Pending such an agreement they will continue their propaganda against tests. We do not believe that, for the time being, the Soviets will resume testing (in the absence of an agreed ban) unless and until the US does so; in effect, therefore, they would have a continued moratorium without controls.

11. With the alternatives open to them, we believe that the Soviets would prefer not to risk entering into an internationally controlled agreement with the prior intention to evade it by illicit weapons tests. If they regarded the need for testing as so great, they would instead probably defer an agreement or agree to a limited ban. If conditions changed subsequent to an agreement, so that they believed that significant gains could be realized from renewed testing, they would have to weigh these potential gains against the likelihood and consequences of detection. It is unlikely that the Soviets would risk what they regarded as an appreciable chance of detection and disclosure of illicit tests. However, if they came to believe that an overriding necessity for testing had arisen, they would probably renew testing, employing some gambit such as accusing a Western power of breaking the agreement, seeking to justify their renewed testing as retaliatory action to meet new and legitimate defensive requirements. If Communist China were not covered by the agreement, the Soviets might resort to testing on Chinese Communist territory.

12. If a considerable period elapses without an agreed nuclear test ban, the willingness of the Soviets to forego testing may change. The evolution of military requirements for new advanced weapons systems, or the recognized possibility of a technical breakthrough in the laboratories, might create in the USSR much stronger pressures for resumption of tests than we believe now exist there. These pressures could persuade the Soviet leaders that an agreed test ban was no longer

to the advantage of the USSR, or possibly that a limited discontinuance of tests, rather than a total ban, was desirable.

Annex

SOVIET TECHNICAL MOTIVATIONS TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

SUMMARY

1. With the completion of their 1958 test series, the Soviets have available a wide spectrum of fission and thermonuclear weapons which are probably adequate to meet their basic military requirements. This spectrum includes devices suitable for ground force and naval employment as well as for a wide range of aircraft and missile delivery systems. This capability also probably includes efficient air defense warheads, pre-initiation proof primaries for some thermonuclear weapons, and thermonuclear warheads yielding from 200 KT to 8 MT.

2. Based upon the nuclear weapon development and test capabilities evidenced by the Soviets to date, we estimate that with resumed unlimited testing they could increase their thermonuclear yields, improve yield-to-weight ratios and economy of fissionable materials in their weapons, and overcome any lack of knowledge of high altitude effects. They could also develop new weapons to satisfy future military requirements for advanced weapons systems.

3. Under an atmospheric and outer space test ban, the Soviets are capable of a major development effort but the advances would be somewhat slower and they would be unable to close any gap that might exist between the US and Soviet knowledge of high altitude effects. We have no evidence that the Soviets have conducted deep underground nuclear tests, and we estimate that they have not done so. However, the conduct of such tests to include the collection of adequate diagnostic information is fully within their technical capabilities.

4. If no further nuclear testing occurs, their over-all nuclear weapon development capabilities could only be marginally improved.

5. The Soviets are technically capable of conducting clandestine underground tests in violation of a complete nuclear test ban and at present have a unique missile capability for clandestine nuclear test attempts in outer space. Some significant design progress could be achieved if several limited test series were conducted, particularly in very low yield weapons and in over-all fissionable material economy.

6. An analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons progress indicates that there are several areas in which reasonably adequate tests may not have been conducted to date and which probably create technical pressures within the USSR for the resumption of nuclear tests. These include:

(1) high altitude or space tests related to AICBM effects or proof tests; (2) tests of low-yield, light, tactical devices; (3) tests directed toward materially increasing fissionable material economy; (4) tests of “clean” devices; and (5) tests of thermonuclear weapons with yields above 8 MT. We estimate that at present these areas do not provide, either individually or collectively, an overriding technical motivation to resume testing. On the other hand, the evolution of military requirements for new advanced weapons systems or a possible technical break-through in the nuclear weapons laboratories could create in any or all of these technical areas much stronger pressures for the resumption of nuclear tests.

7. Resumption of nuclear testing by the US would intensify technical motivations for the Soviets to resume testing.

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

1. An assessment of Soviet technical motivations to resume nuclear testing, whether or not a test cessation agreement is negotiated, must consider the present state of Soviet weapon art, current and future Soviet requirements for improvement in their nuclear weapons, and likely Soviet assessment of the technical capabilities of existing and proposed test detection and identification systems. Soviet capabilities for undetected evasion of a test ban will be considered in this discussion in light of two assumptions: first, that only contained sub-surface tests will be allowed—i.e., those in which no venting into the atmosphere occurs; and second, that a complete test ban with the necessary inspection components will be in effect.

CAPABILITIES OF DETECTION SYSTEMS

*[text not declassified]*⁶

METHODS OF EVADING DETECTION

5. The effectiveness of all the detection systems given above are dependent upon Soviet knowledge of and ability to employ the technical means of decreasing the likelihood of detection. These means

⁶Decoupling is a test technique for underground explosions which is designed to reduce the amount of energy going into the seismic signal. Decoupling may theoretically be accomplished by detonating the device in a large underground cavity or hole, the dimensions and shape of which are dependent upon the anticipated yield. [Footnote is in the original.]

include such possible techniques as decoupling of subsurface explosions to reduce the seismic signal produced, shielding of space detonations to reduce the radiations emitted by the nuclear explosion, and positioning the explosion either at extremely large distances in outer space or behind planetary bodies for concealment. Such techniques have been made known to the Soviets, and it is within their capability to exploit them.

6. All of the methods above will increase the time and expenditure required for testing and decrease the amount, or at least make difficult the attainment, of diagnostic information desired from each test. Nevertheless, should the Soviets choose to risk detection and exposure, technical information could be gained by testing under these conditions permitting further progress in nuclear weapons development.

PRESENT STATE OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

7. Since the preparation of SNIE 11-7-57, *Feasibility and Likelihood of Soviet Evasion of a Nuclear Test Moratorium*, dated 10 December 1957, the Soviets have conducted two extensive series of nuclear tests. These series include a total of 32 tests which were detected between 28 December 1957 and 3 November 1958.⁷

8. These two test series included devices yielding from less than 3 KT to nearly 8 MT. [text not declassified]^{8 9 10}

9. Estimates of present and future Soviet thermonuclear weapon stockpiling capacities are summarized in FIGURE I.¹¹

SOVIET REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE TESTS

10. Future Soviet requirements for nuclear tests are dependent upon military requirements on which adequate intelligence does not exist. However, the characteristics of the varied nuclear test devices that have been detected clearly indicate that the Soviet military planners have a wide spectrum of modern nuclear weapon designs available to them for all of the weapons systems we estimate that they possess. Furthermore, we estimate that with the possible exception of non-spherical implosion systems there is virtually no major principle of weapon design which the US exclusively holds. However, members of the Soviet Delegation

⁷ See NIE 11-2-58, *The Soviet Atomic Energy Program*, 16 June 1960. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ [Footnote not declassified.]

⁹ The use of thermonuclear fuels to increase the neutron environment of fissionable materials to provide a significant increase in fission yield. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Warheads capable of producing the design yield despite the presence of a strong, steady neutron flux. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ Based on NIE 11-2-58, *The Soviet Atomic Energy Program*, 16 June 1958. [Footnote is in the original.]

to the current Geneva Conference on the Discontinuation of Nuclear Weapons Tests have admitted informally that there is military pressure within the USSR for the resumption of nuclear tests.

11. There are five discernible areas wherein adequate tests may not have been conducted to date which must be evaluated both collectively and singly:

a. *Tests related to AICBM effects or proof tests at altitudes well above the tropopause (higher than approximately 30,000 feet) or in space.* [text not declassified] a large volume of information has been published on US high altitude tests, which may reduce Soviet requirements for high altitude effects data.

b. *Tests of low-yield, light, tactical devices weighing less than 100 pounds, including non-spherical implosion systems.* The Soviets have conducted at least 15 tests with yields of about 5 KT or less, including some which were not detected by the USAEDS. However, none of these tests are believed to involve devices weighing less than about 200 pounds. Therefore, we believe that they seriously lag behind US capabilities, particularly in fractional KT weapons and non-spherical implosion system.

c. *Tests directed toward materially increasing the economy of missile materials, particularly in the larger TN devices.* Soviet nuclear weapons in the higher yield ranges consume large amounts of fissionable materials, and it is well within Soviet capability to achieve substantial economics by further testing.

d. *Clean Devices.* We have detected only one Soviet full-scale clean experiment (JOE 68, 20 October 1968). Additional tests will be required if the Soviets desire clean weapons in any yield range.

e. *Thermonuclear Weapon with yields above 8 MT.* The highest yield Soviet tests detected to date have been 6.1 and 7.5 MT. They are capable of scaling this device up to at least 12 MT at a considerable cost in weight and fissionable materials. Any requirement for such very high yield devices would probably necessitate testing in the 10–20 MT yield range.

12. In addition, the refinement of existing designs should be included as a desirable requirement in any test series.

POSSIBLE TEST PROGRAMS

13. Table I presents our estimate of Soviet technical potentialities for nuclear weapons development under three conditions; (a) continued unlimited testing, (b) a partial test ban, and (c) a complete test ban. (Detailed related cost estimates are impracticable in light of the scant knowledge available on the expense of evasion techniques, thus we have only attempted to indicate relative magnitudes.)

POSSIBLE GAINS WITHOUT TESTING

14. One should not conclude that the Soviet nuclear weapons program will be immobilized if no tests are conducted. Significant improvements in stockpiled weapons are certainly being made as a direct result of the test series completed in 1958. Future laboratory studies of nuclear materials in contained environments and in amounts not

sufficient to produce a significant nuclear yield can also contribute to some advancement of the weapon art, particularly for small, low-yield devices. Improvement in delivery hardware and techniques can materially increase the military effectiveness of the present Soviet nuclear stockpile. Redesign based on theoretical studies may be made to a limited extent, but we believe the Soviets would hesitate to stockpile new designs without proof-testing them. Successful espionage against the West might permit isolated advances in the Soviet program.

TECHNICAL MOTIVATIONS TO RESUME TESTING

15. We believe that the five areas requiring further tests, as listed in paragraph 11, create technical pressures within the USSR for the resumption of nuclear tests. However, we do not believe these areas currently provide an overriding technical motivation to resume testing. Under a nuclear test ban the Soviets will continue to pursue the development of improved weapons systems and the study of improved nuclear weapons technology. Over a period of a few years the evolution of military requirements for new advanced weapons systems and improved nuclear devices could create in any or all of these technical areas much stronger pressures for the resumption of nuclear tests.

16. There is always a possibility that as a result of laboratory research which is beyond our capacity to predict, the Soviets may foresee a technical breakthrough leading to a major improvement in nuclear weapons design. This possibility appears remote; however, should it occur, it could produce with the passage of time a very strong technical motivation for the Soviets to resume testing.

17. Resumption of nuclear testing by the US would intensify technical motivations for the Soviets to resume testing.

18. If the US resumes underground nuclear tests for the specific purpose of acquiring further technical information on seismic effects pertinent to the control of a complete test ban, this probably will also promote demands within the Soviet Union for resumption of testing. However, the Soviets would probably refrain from testing until they have made capital of any potential propaganda advantage. If the Soviets, in time, conduct similar tests, we believe they would certainly exploit them for weapons development information.

TABLE 1
POSSIBLE SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST PROGRAMS


	UNLIMITED TESTING			ATMOSPHERIC AND OUTER SPACE TEST BAN			COMPLETE TEST BAN			
Possible Technical Gain	Increase in economy for large TN weapons and some increase in yield-to-weight ratios for all classes of weapons. Additional effects data in all environments. Proof tests of all devices intended for stockpile. Development of small, fractional-KT weapons.			Increase in economy for large TN weapons and some increase in yield-to-weight ratios for all classes of weapons. Proof tests of devices yielding less than about ½ MT. Clandestine outer space tests would allow limited numbers of proof tests of devices yielding more than ½ MT.			Progress somewhat slower but relatively unhampered in the less than 1 KT category. In higher yield range, progress much slower and limited by risk and cost to a few critical developments. Progress in TN development very limited.			
Detection Possibility	AIR & SURFACE	SUBSURFACE	UHA ¹ & SPACE	AIR & SURFACE	SUB-SURFACE	UHA ¹ & SPACE	AIR & SURFACE	SUBSURFACE	UHA ¹ & SPACE	
USAEADS	Good to Excel- lent for > 5 KT	Poor to none	Poor to none	Same as for unlimited testing			Same as for unlimited testing			
USAEADS & STDS ²	Good to Excel- lent for > 5 KT	Poor to none	Fair to good	Same as for unlimited testing			Same as for unlimited testing			
Geneva Experts Control System ³				ATMOSPHERIC	UHA & SPACE		YIELD	SUBSURFACE	SUBSURFACE DECOUPLED	UHA AND SPACE
				Good to Excellent	Fair to good		<1 KT	Poor	None	Poor
							1-25 KT	Poor to fair	None to poor	Fair to poor
							>25 KT	Good to excellent	None to poor	Poor to good
Increase in Test Cost	None over present			Large for High-yield Moderate for Low-yield			Moderate for <1 KT Moderate to extremely large for 1-25 KT Extremely large for >25 KT			

¹ UHA: Ultra high altitude (about 100 to 10,000 miles from the earth). [Footnote is in the original.]

² STDS: Space Test Detection System (3 to 8 years to become operational). [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Operational 3 to 8 years after treaty. [Footnote is in the original.]

FIGURE 1
ESTIMATED SOVIET THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILING POTENTIAL
(BASED ON UNLIMITED TESTING)



497. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower¹

Washington, September 14, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

In response to the specific request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am attaching the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs in which they reiterate their past positions on the importance of nuclear tests.

In the light of world opinion and public concern over the hazards of atmospheric testing. I cannot support a position in favor of the resumption of relatively unlimited testing. I do, however, want to express to you my own view that a continued development of nuclear weapons is of such far-reaching importance to this country that I feel that we should (a) adopt a negotiating position with respect to a possible agreement on the suspension of testing under which underground testing would be permissible, and (b) resume underground testing after December 31st, 1959, unless by that time a comprehensive test suspension agreement had been concluded.

If we proceed as I have proposed above, I believe that our position can be kept consistent with world opinion that further atmospheric contamination is unacceptable and at the same time permit our scientists to exercise the full range of their ingenuity in the use of underground testing for weapons development.

In connection with the matter of test resumption, I refer to my letter to you of August 14th, 1959, in which I pointed out a particular problem dealing with the safety of certain important weapons now in stockpile and scheduled for continued production in relatively large numbers. It is my understanding that it is highly probable a number of tests will be required before the need for design changes can be determined and that if rectification is required, some low yield proof tests may be necessary. As a critical matter now affecting our state of readiness and apart from the longer range developments referred to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this problem merits special consideration in establishing our course of action for the immediate future.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

¹ Source: Transmits JCS views on nuclear testing and makes his own recommendation that underground testing should resume. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel, Disarmament Policy, 1959.

Attachment

Memorandum From Goodpaster to McElroy

Washington, September 14, 1959

The President has read your letter of September fourteenth on the subject of nuclear testing, as well as the Joint Chief of Staff memorandum of August twenty-first on the same subject, which was enclosed.

He asked me to advise you that he has asked that the views in these documents be made available to the "Committee of Principles" which is considering questions relating to any resumption of nuclear testing, to be borne in mind in their further consideration of the subject, and to receive specific attention in further reports to or meetings with the President on this matter.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA
Staff Secretary

Attachment

**Memorandum From Gray to Dillon, Gates, McCone, Allen
Dulles, and Kistiakowsky**

Washington, September 16, 1959

Please note the attached documents which should be considered in the next meeting of the principals.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

498. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, September 22, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dillon, Mr. Farley, Mr. Allen Dulles, Secretary Gates, Admiral Burke, Mr. McCone, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Persons, General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky began by presenting to the President the results of the work of the panel appointed to consider nuclear test requirements from the standpoint of the progress of our own military technology. He stressed that it was not a study of the comparative positions and needs of the United States and the Soviets. He said that the panel was drawn from representatives of interested agencies. He then read the conclusions of the panel's work, accompanying this with a commentary of his own views.

In scope, the study covered weapons improvement and proof firing, one point safety considerations, questions of new concepts and new devices, high altitude effect shots, and effects of low altitude and undersea shots. The ensuing discussion focused on the one point safety questions.

Mr. Gates said in this regard that Defense would like to see a decision to proceed with one point safety experimentation by the "creep" method. Initial firings would involve no nuclear reaction. Subsequent firings would increase the likelihood of nuclear reaction and permit it to occur up to a determined point, such as a yield equivalent to that of an explosion of one pound of TNT. Mr. McCone said he was not certain that the control could be quite that accurate but thought it could be held to a few pounds. Mr. Gates commented that this could be a series of high explosive experiments, involving an accidental one-pound nuclear yield at the very end.

Mr. Dillon commented on two points. First, public reaction in the UK might be very difficult if it were to become publicly known that we were worried regarding the safety of our weapons. The second question is the effect on our statement that we will not conduct nuclear weapons tests before the first of the year. If we can make it stick that these are experiments rather than tests, he saw no problem. Also, if they are conducted at Los Alamos he saw no problem, whereas if they are conducted at Nevada, they seemed likely to become weapons tests. The Soviets would then charge bad faith. We must not call them safety tests,

¹ Source: One-point safety testing; nuclear reactor for Dutch submarine; exchange of reactor information with the Soviet Union. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted September 24.

since this name would alarm world opinion. He was aware that there are technical questions regarding preparations and the speed of conducting the firings that are of importance.

Mr. McCone said he thought that a certain amount of attention will be attracted to the firings at either place. At Los Alamos there is one point of concern. We will be putting a sizeable number of kilograms of plutonium into the ground. It is conceivable that a fissure might occur such that a leaching of plutonium into the water table would introduce a degree of poison over a large area. This is not true in Nevada, since the sub-surface water is trapped there. He said the AEC could start quickly at either place. If a decision were made to wait for the first firing until after the first of the year, he would want to go ahead with advance preparations now. He agreed on the "creep" method, commenting that 25-30 experiments will be required. He thought there would be less publicity from use of Los Alamos than from use of Nevada. It has, however, the one possible bad feature that he mentioned. There is one further possible source of difficulty—involving a special kind of ignition in the pit, but he felt that could be dealt with by precautionary measures.

The President said the question in his mind is whether we are making laboratory experiments or are testing. If the former is the case, this goes along all the time and he saw no need to make a big fuss about it. It was clear to him that the nuclear effect, if any, would be so extremely slight that we should avoid the use of the word "tests" at all. Mr. Dillon added that we should avoid any reference to "weapons" in any press release. Mr. Gates thought that the firings could be very clearly justified on the basis of experimental research. Dr. Kistiakowsky concurred that it would be intellectually honest to do so, providing there is a strong injunction to design the experiments so as to avoid any possibility of explosion. Mr. Dillon thought that if this is too fine a line we should make preparations now and conduct the firings after January first. The President thought that it is not too difficult to make the distinction Dr. Kistiakowsky was speaking of. Mr. Gates pointed out that we could conduct the first few firings since these would have no chance whatsoever of any nuclear contribution. Admiral Burke added that by having a few of these now, we are not making an abrupt change after January first. The President said that the words "weapons" and "tests" should be avoided. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that it seemed desirable not to have a public statement. The President said that these experiments are going on all the time, and he saw no need for a public statement. He did not believe that the experiments should be conducted in Nevada. Mr. Gates said that most of the AEC people seemed unconcerned about the remote possibility of contaminating the water table.

The President said he is convinced of one thing and that is that no free country can go back to atmospheric testing. World opinion—the adverse effect of alienating free world countries—would stop it. However, he could not see why we could not conduct experiments underground for

safety purposes. He recognized that firing large weapons out 500 miles or more would be a different question from atmospheric testing.

Dr. Kistiakowsky asked if these HE firings could be conducted in the big steel ball that he understands is at Los Alamos. Mr. McCone said too many shots are required, and too much time is needed between shots to decontaminate the ball. The President thought that, with each shot, we should find out a good deal more about the probability of any accidental explosion. Mr. Dillon observed that even if we start now to prepare for and conduct the experiments, none involving nuclear release would occur until after January first.

Mr. Dillon said that the next subject the group wished to take up had to do with the application of the Netherlands for an agreement for atomic cooperation involving a nuclear submarine. They wished to purchase the nuclear elements thereof. This question started with the Heads of Government meeting in Paris in December 1957. Secretary Dulles and Admiral Strauss made the statement that the U.S. would seek legislation to make possible such cooperation. Subsequently, we got the legislation, and the Dutch asked for this cooperation on two submarines they are building for SACLANT's anti-submarine force. We have checked the Dutch fund estimates, and technical proficiency, and their security system, and they are qualified on all counts. We have stalled on this, but feel that we are really committed. Defense, State and SACLANT support the proposal, but the AEC does not want to extend cooperation in nuclear submarines to anyone beyond the United Kingdom and Canada. It appears that Admiral Strauss did not have Commission approval to offer cooperation, and now the AEC does not want to recommend it. The President said the controlling point is that we said we would seek to arrange for such cooperation, and subsequently obtain the necessary legislation.

Mr. McCone said that the AEC must certify to the President that the proposed cooperation will promote and not constitute a risk to the common defense. He doubts whether the Dutch proposal would promote the common defense, but recognizes this is a problem for Defense to determine. The real point in his mind is that the more widely we extend this information, the wider is the risk of its compromise. Admiral Rickover, on his recent trip to Russia, concluded that the Soviets will not have a successful submarine for some time to come. The AEC feels that the best interest of the United States would be served by keeping this information close. They feel that if the Dutch obtain it, other countries will approach us for it—other countries where security is not so tight.

The President said that the North Atlantic countries are a coalition trying to develop weapon systems and doctrine for common defense. Indeed it is hard to ask the Dutch to put their effort into building anti-submarine forces on an outmoded type. He asked whether we are going to do everything that is technically advanced and further whether we are going to break up the alliance. These are the choices, he feels. The real

question is what is the importance of secrecy in relation to the importance of our alliance. The only argument that has weight in his opinion is that other countries will press us in ways we find hard to resist and that we have less confidence in the security of these other countries.

Mr. Dillon said that each country must be considered by itself. The French, Italians and Germans have asked for this cooperation. The French, whose atomic activity is penetrated by Communists, now say they will transfer this project to their Navy, which is secure. However, their lack of cooperation in NATO affairs led us to inform them that we could not go ahead on this project—that the Congress would not approve. As to Germany, they can build only 350-ton submarines under the Brussels Treaty, so the question does not arise for the present. The Italians have asked for preliminary talks but they do not have an appreciation of costs and technical operating requirements. They are not thinking of paying for a submarine and since we do not intend to give them one, we have a good “out.”

Mr. McCone recalled that we have given enriched uranium to the French for a land-based prototype. Perhaps a year from now the Russians will have a nuclear submarine system. At present we have an apparent lead. The President recalled that Khrushchev had said he is stopping the building of cruisers while continuing the construction of submarines and mine sweepers. Admiral Burke added that they are building destroyers and PT boats also.

Mr. Dillon recalled that Foreign Minister Luns of the Netherlands is here now. He saw Mr. McElroy a few days ago and will see Mr. Herter shortly. He is making a big point of the nuclear submarine. Mr. Dillon feels we cannot go back on our previous statements. Admiral Burke said that the Dutch will assign this ship to SACLANT once it is built. He said they are very desirous of keeping up a good Navy.

The President said that personally he thought we should do what the Dutch ask. He didn't know about the AEC view, but thought that Mr. McCone should talk to his colleagues. If we have allies we must treat them like allies. He recalled how the U.S. broke faith with the British on atomic agreements after we got what they had to offer. Mr. McCone recognized that, in the final analysis, the determination is the President's to make. AEC simply recommends. The President said that he recognized that there is risk, but pointed out that there is risk in everything we do. He did not think the risk in giving secrets to the Dutch is very great. Mr. Allen Dulles confirmed that Dutch security is as good as any in Europe. Admiral Burke said that a nuclear submarine costs twice as much to build as a conventional ship and requires an extra year of construction. The President asked Mr. McCone to see the AEC people and tell them his views. We do not want nuclear submarines spread all over the world, but we talked this matter over in NATO and took our decision very deliberately. The President said he doubted the Dutch

would get all of the secrets right away in any event. Mr. McCone said we could tell them we would build a submarine for them. However, he realized that the Dutch would like to build as much themselves as they can in order to hold the cost down.

Finally, Mr. Dillon said he wanted to mention the matter of the proposal for exchange of atomic reactor information with the Soviets. The President asked whether this type of exchange is not what the IAEA was created for. Mr. McCone said there was need for guidance for himself and others participating in the discussions, both as to the exchange of information and as to exchange of visits. Yemel'yanov has asked Mr. McCone to visit the Soviet Union, and Yemel'yanov would then want to return the visit, inspecting our "peaceful use" reactors and our fusion experiments. Mr. McCone agreed that the exchanges should be under the aegis of the IAEA and said that he thought Mr. Yemel'yanov shared this view. Mr. Yemel'yanov has stressed how expensive the Soviets are finding the use of atomic energy for power, and has also stated that neither country can afford wasteful duplication of the other's efforts in this field. Mr. Yemel'yanov also apparently proposed to Dr. Teller the building of a joint scientific facility—probably a nuclear laboratory in Vienna. With regard to thermonuclear fusion experiments, Yemel'yanov's suggestion was that the Russians put twenty to thirty scientists in our laboratories and we put twenty to thirty in theirs. The whole area of high energy physics is a promising one for such joint inquiry.

The President asked if we had this kind of cooperation with the British. Mr. McCone said we have a complete exchange of information with them in these fields. The President suggested that our participants in these discussions should chiefly do a lot of listening. Mr. Dillon asked that the discussions be kept within the framework of the IAEA or the Lacy-Zarubin agreement. The President said he saw no reason why this cannot be done through the IAEA. At the same time he thought we should take a close look at what information we make available. The Russian scientist wants to see our plants, and have us see his. The President wondered whether the Russians could hold out their more advanced activities. Mr. McCone said that they could, in contrast to us, since our program is public knowledge. He had no doubt they would hold out anything that we have not achieved. Mr. McCone stated that we of course would give them only unclassified information, although they would see some advances in materials which they have not yet achieved.

The President asked whether the people in the AEC think this type of exchange is a good thing. Mr. McCone said that they did, more so in fact than he did. Mr. Dillon commented that whatever we see is a gain.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that the Soviets have shown some embarrassment over their program, since it has been cut back so drastically from their earlier, unrealistic goals. Admiral Burke commented that we should not fraternize too closely with them. Our allies will think we are weakening with regard to the Communist threat.

Summing up, the President said he saw no objection to our talking with the Russians and getting a clearer idea of just what they have in mind. He was not sure Khrushchev would want to talk about this question at Camp David. The President said he is afraid that Khrushchev will occupy the time at Camp David in unproductive haranguing. He is more likely to do so in a large group. The President would like to limit the group to Khrushchev and Gromyko in addition to Herter and himself, but supposed this would not be possible. He would like to exclude Menshikov, who seems to be "bad news" and is untrustworthy. He thought we must bring out that the Russian itinerary, and schedule of events, were worked up strictly by the Russians, and they have the responsibility for what was on or not on the schedule during his travels around the country.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

499. Memorandum From Coolidge to Herter¹

September 29, 1959

Pursuant to the terms of reference establishing the Joint *Disarmament* Study, you have requested my advice on the merits of the proposal that nuclear weapons be completely eliminated.

A. The proposal has impressive merits:

(1) It has an enormous emotional and, therefore, political appeal. The threat of annihilation by nuclear warfare is removed, not only for the people of the United States but for the people of many other nations.

(2) The proposal practically eliminates the dangers of surprise intercontinental attack and of accidental war. These dangers are bad enough at the present and will get worse as ICBMs replace bombers.

(3) The proposal would mean that the homeland of the United States would be comparatively safe, so the great productive superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union could be brought to bear to win World War III as it did in World Wars I and II.

(4) The proposal has considerable logic. The Soviets have been ahead right along in the conventional arms race. They are on the point of catching up and for a time will probably be ahead of us in the nuclear race, as they get ICBMs in quantity before we do. It makes no sense to

¹ Source: Elimination of nuclear weapons. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Coolidge, Charles A.

insist on being behind in two races. Rather it is logical to call off one race and to concentrate on at least drawing even in the other race. We can draw even in the conventional race by building up our conventional capability and that of our Allies to equal the Soviet capability, or by equalizing conventional capability by agreement with or without a UN police force. In this connection it should be noted that an equal number of men for the Soviet Bloc and NATO would give the Soviets a great advantage because of their geographical situation, their spartan standards and their tighter command.

(5) The elimination of nuclear weapons might well stimulate our NATO Allies to increase their efforts in conventional forces, commensurate with the improvement in their economic situation which has occurred since the early days of NATO, though it is possible that NATO might collapse once the umbrella of our nuclear capability is removed.

(6) The elimination of nuclear weapons accompanied by the limitation of other arms would meet the Soviet condition of total disarmament, when they have said there will be no block to complete freedom to inspect within the Soviet Union.

(7) The proposal would force us to give up our reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, which is becoming an increasingly ineffective deterrent to local wars.

(8) Obviously, much money would be saved in the discontinuance of the expensive production, research and development of nuclear weapons and the expense of accomplishing the necessary hardening, dispersal, mobility, etc. of our nuclear retaliatory force to meet the Soviet ICBM threat. But this saving might prove non-existent for a period, in view of the necessary changes in our armed forces outlined in B 3) below.

(9) The proposal is broad and comparatively simple in concept and is thus less likely to become bogged down than are minor measures.

B. In spite of its impressive advantages, this proposal has a number of serious disadvantages:

1) Such technical information as is available to me is to the effect that, while it is possible to devise a system which will detect the diversion of significant amounts of nuclear material produced in the future from peaceful purposes to weapons, it is not possible to devise a system which will monitor the liquidation of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or materials with sufficient reliability to prevent the concealment of a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to be decisive in the outcome of a major war. Perhaps a new study could develop an adequate system, but considering the vast wastes of Russia and its Satellites (let alone Red China), the probability does not look bright. Considering the continued production of plutonium by "Atoms for Peace" reactors and the continued production of delivery vehicles in the Outer Space program, the problems these two inspection systems must overcome are indeed formidable. Incidentally these factors mean that the

elimination of nuclear weapons by the "have" nations would have only a marginal effect in preventing the spread of such a capability to the "have not" nations, unless all nations similarly agreed.

2) Unless inspection is essentially airtight, the risk to the security of the United States is great, because even 100 clandestine ICBMs of high yield would be a most serious threat. Theoretically this could be offset by depositing with the UN a substantial quantity of nuclear weapons for release on the discovery of the existence of clandestine missiles in the hands of the Soviets. But realistically the time necessary to obtain the release of the UN missiles might be fatal to us and the UN missiles would probably be the first target of the Soviets' missiles. Further if such a deposit was made for release to us, a similar deposit would have to be made for release to the Soviets and there would be danger that the Soviets would seize and fire that deposit, so that they would not even need clandestine missiles.

3) The abolition of nuclear weapons would require replacing most of our air force and navy, and the rearming of our ground forces, since our planes, vessels and ground force armaments are all designed for nuclear weapons and would be highly inefficient without them. This would produce a serious gap in our defense posture and would probably cost so much as to more than offset the saving outlined in A(8) above.

4) With the nuclear deterrent removed, the size of small wars might well tend to increase. Also the tendency to start a large war would be greater.

5) Once a large war started, all bets would be off, and with the material and vehicles at hand, it would not take the Soviets or ourselves long to manufacture a substantial number of nuclear ICBMs, so that all our efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons would have been largely in vain.

6) The loss of nuclear capability by us would create a serious danger in the Far East. Conventional air attacks by Red China on Formosa would be difficult to prevent. Even if the Red Chinese could be confined to the mainland, it would be most difficult to stop them from taking over all of South East Asia.

7) An airtight inspection of us might be unacceptable from the point of view of domestic politics and security.

8) In view of the improbability of technical experts being able to come up with an inspection system which would satisfy us, to make this proposal the core of the United States position on disarmament would expose us to the accusation that we were merely making a play for publicity and had no intention of going through with it. This in the long run would do us more harm than letting the Soviets get away with their present favorable publicity.

C. Is the proposal "jumping out the window for fear of falling out", as one military man has put it, or is it a wise and major step forward—assuming of course a favorable report by the experts? It depends on whether the risks to the United States security are substantially greater under the proposal than if we rely on mutual deterrence with such

minor disarmament measures, if any, as are possible to attain. Unless the risks are substantially greater, we should obviously adopt the proposal in view of its many desirable features.

I cannot pose as an expert in balancing these risks, but it seems to me that the risks of the proposal are substantially greater. Perhaps, if the Soviets alone were involved, it might be wise to go ahead with the proposal, but with Red China in the picture there are just too many possibilities of a slip up through sabotage or otherwise, in the complicated international machinery we would have to setup to police both nuclear and conventional arms control, for me to bring myself to believe that it is wise to surrender all our nuclear capability at this time. Attempting to set the clock back is fraught with too many uncertainties. It seems to me the best we can do is to put it up to the Soviets to devise an adequate inspection system for detecting breaches of an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons and indicate an open mind on the possibility of their ultimate elimination.

While I have consulted my staff on the general proposition of eliminating nuclear weapons and believe that the consensus of their opinions does not differ materially from the foregoing, this memorandum expresses my own personal views.

Charles A. Coolidge

500. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Dillon and Kistiakowsky¹

October 6, 1959, 6:25 p.m.

Regarding nuclear tests suspension, CDD said that before we can change our basic position from the one we had in earlier discussions it would be necessary to have further experimentation before we could be certain about what would be an effective control system. He said if the Russians agree to 200 teams and inspections a year, the necessary staffing, and to abandoning veto on budget that would be fine—but that would be so unexpected that we really don't think we have to take it into account. Dr. K. said he was not enthusiastic about a meeting of experts because if people who go there are honest and not biased, they will not be able to defend defeatism that situation is dramatically different than in 1958. Dr. K. said that although a figure of \$5 million for

¹ Source: Control system for suspension of nuclear testing. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

2 kilotons is indicated, this does not include any instrumentation or anything else and that since the whole thing is purely theoretical concept, it would be ridiculous to base our policy on such a figure.

CDD said he feels that after the technical details are settled we will then have to decide whether we need a substantial number of inspection teams—he said someone told him there are only 2 or 3 places in the Soviet Union where they had seismic disturbances and in this case many teams would be a strong deterrent. Dr. K. said he doesn't know how many we would need—that this would depend on a political and not a technical decision. CDD said he agreed with Amb. Wadsworth when he said we should have effective control, sufficient to deter them from holding tests to any great extent (they might make one test, but controls would keep them from holding a series of tests). Dr K. said the people in Defense do not agree with our thinking and CDD said this is because they have been led to believe that there is no possibility of any sort of reasonable control and that the situation is quite different than in 1958. Dr. K. said that technically the situation is not different, but that a new factor is being considered, i.e. What is the chance of getting there and not finding an event that actually did happen? He said that factor is not technical—it is a guess and can't be brought up at Geneva.

Dr. K. said he thinks one of the primary jobs for Charlie Coolidge is to try to find out what we mean by adequate inspection—this question should be brought up to the President. CDD said he thinks there would be a difference of opinion between us and the people at the Pentagon if, for instance, it were decided that 125 inspections were necessary—they would say no and we might say yes. He said he thinks it is best to go ahead with the technical details now and later decide how many inspections would be necessary.

Attachment

Covering Note

Washington, October 9, 1959

Conversation Between Under Secretary and Dr. Kistiakowsky on Nuclear Test Question

Attached for the information of your principal are notes of a telephone conversation between the Under Secretary and Dr. Kistiakowsky on October 6 regarding an effective control system for an agreement on nuclear test suspension.

C.A. Borg
S/S-RO

501. Memorandum From Keeny to Kistiakowsky¹

Washington, October 15, 1959

SUBJECT

Suggested Course of Action for U.S. Delegation in Nuclear Test Negotiations

Attached is a copy of the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the forthcoming continuation of the Nuclear Test Negotiations as approved by Dillon and a copy of a letter from Gates to Dillon commenting on these instructions. Dillon has informed Gates that his suggested change in the “objective” will not be incorporated in the instructions. I learned privately that the original letter from Defense as prepared by Irwin was considerably stronger and that Gates has toned it down before signing.

With regard to the instructions, I consider them acceptable in view of present policy decision. However, the delegation can probably count on some real trouble since it cannot state any quota that would be acceptable to U.S. If pressed on this by Soviets as it probably will be, the Delegation will have problem in maintaining illusion that we would accept comprehensive treaty if Soviets were only reasonable on inspections.

Attachment

Instructions for the U.S. Delegation

Washington, October 14, 1959

Suggested Course of Action for U.S. Delegation
In Nuclear Test Negotiations

Objective

Upon resumption of the nuclear test negotiations in Geneva, the objective of the U.S. Delegation will be to direct the negotiations so as to place the United States, by December 1, in a favorable position to table a phased treaty in accordance with the Presidential decision of July 23. Without exposing our hand at present, the U.S. Delegation should seek

¹ Source: Comment on instructions to U.S. delegation to nuclear test ban negotiations. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy 59.

to demonstrate in a decisive way the Soviet attitude toward the technical and political requirements of effective international control.

Tactics

In order to accomplish this objective, the delegation should demonstrate clearly the uncertainties, the unresolved problems, and the specific requirements of effective control (particularly as regards underground detection in the light of new technical data) and Soviet unwillingness to meet even minimal essentials of control. For this purpose it is necessary to discuss the requirements of effective control in terms of technical data from seismic measurements (and their interpretation), relating to detection and identification of underground disturbances; the effectiveness of various levels of inspection; uncertainties to be resolved; and the possibilities and uncertainties of system improvements. While principal emphasis should be put on the new technical data and the underground test detection and identification problem, unacceptable Soviet positions on the veto, on staffing, on freedom of access, and possibly on phasing, should also be highlighted in order that the technical issue will not be the sole basis for subsequent U.S. action and in order not to forewarn the Soviets of our intentions.

Timing

Timing is of the utmost importance if we are to put ourselves in a position to make a definitive move and avoid further indefinite inconclusive negotiations. The program on resumption might take generally the following lines:

(a) Recall Soviet unwillingness to face up to the implications of the new data and again propose technical discussion of these data.

(b) Even if this is not accepted, the delegation should immediately embark upon a full exposition of our own analysis of the new data and the problem of on-site inspection. While we could not use the full Bacher panel type of quantitative analysis, in view of the necessity to omit the intelligence factor and the arbitrariness of the numerical probabilities assigned to the success of on-site inspection, the general assessment of the number of unidentified events even with Berkner improvements and the level and freedom of inspection required to have any substantial chance of identification could be extensively presented. The technical presentations should be sufficiently of [illegible in the original] raw data and descriptions of instrumentation employed to discredit completely any future Soviet efforts to sustain allegations that the United States has not supplied sufficient information to permit full evaluation and discussion of the new seismic data. The presentation should include a discussion of decoupling possibilities, including the theory of the Latter hole technique. It should also include a technical justification for whatever treaty language we provide on high altitude detection. The approach would be not to present or defend a specific U.S. number of inspections, but to expose the unreasonableness of the Soviet claim to favor effective inspection while at the same time accepting only "a few" annual

on-site inspections. We should highlight the Soviet refusal to discuss the relationship of level of inspection to technical facts: accept improvements required to restore even in part the estimated capabilities of the system designed by the Geneva Experts in 1958; discuss the latest available instrumentation and supply data or join in experimental efforts to improve detection capabilities.

Our line on the Soviet proposal for a predetermined number of annual inspections [illegible in the original] would be (as in the President's May 5 letter to Khrushchev) that the principle of not inspecting every unidentified event is not an issue in view of our similar original position in our draft Annex I limiting inspection to a percentage of unidentified events. Our objection is to the Soviet view that the number of inspections is based entirely on political and not on technical considerations.

(c) We would follow or intersperse our presentation on the detection problem with summary speeches on the veto, on staffing (in this case particularly a "signing off" speech in view of the line already taken by Ambassador Wadsworth that we have reached our final position on this matter); and freedom of access of inspectors (preferably accompanying this by introduction of Annex II on Privileges and Immunities).

502. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1959

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

State Department

Secretary Herter

Amb. Wadsworth

Mr. Charles A. Sullivan—S/AE

Mr. Ronald I. Spiers—S/AE

United Kingdom

Mr. David Ormsby-Gore—Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs

Amb. Caccia—British Embassy

Mr. Charles Wiggin—British Embassy

The Secretary said that he understood that Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked for this meeting to discuss the U.S. position paper for the October 27 resumption of nuclear test negotiations. *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* said that the U.K. felt that the tactics in the paper were "exactly right" but that the British had reservations about our ability to continue with these tactics

¹ Source: Tabling a limited treaty in nuclear test negotiations. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

until December 1 without weakening rather than strengthening our position. The British felt that we should aim for an earlier tabling of a phased agreement and a statement that our basic position is that effective control over underground testing is not possible at the present time. The British felt that there was some danger in creating the impression that if only the USSR were reasonable, e.g., if it would agree to a sufficient number of inspections, the problem would be solved. We should state frankly that our present knowledge permits us only to accept a ban on atmospheric, underwater, and high altitude tests. The U.K. furthermore felt that the limited treaty should be tabled in about two or three weeks after resumption of negotiations. We have already effectively pinned the Russians down on the questions of veto and staffing and there is little to be gained by further discussion of these issues. If we go back to the negotiations in the way the U.S. suggests, we will be accused of dragging them out unduly, and as the present Dec. 31 deadline on the U.S. testing moratorium is neared, there will be increasing pressure on the U.S. to declare its intentions about future testing.

Secretary Herter said that the Dec. 1 date was an outside limit. Our feeling was that we should get the technical data on the record whether or not the Soviets agree to discuss it. We do not have a definite date in mind for tabling the limited treaty, but do feel that we should call on the USSR once more to evaluate the data. We must take pains to make clear that we are not being frivolous or trying to back away from an underground test ban, but simply that we cannot run the risk of having the U.S. Senate reject the treaty because our scientists will not testify that it provides for adequate controls over underground testing. The Secretary inquired as to the status of the phased treaty. *Mr. Sullivan* and *Mr. Spiers* reported that a copy of one of the latest drafts had been given to the U.K. in Geneva but that there were several unresolved issues within the U.S. Government in connection with it. Also there were several articles, including the Annex on privileges and immunities, which were applicable to the limited treaty but which had not yet been worked out with the U.K. in connection with the comprehensive treaty. The present treaty draft included all of the controls, except on-site inspection, which would be required in the comprehensive treaty. *The Secretary* asked whether it would not be possible to provide only for a very limited control system in the phased treaty. *Mr. Spiers* explained that the theory had been that the treaty would look forward to the installation of the complete system in phases and that seismic instrumentation would be included for the purpose of facilitating research on underground detection. He pointed out that the initial phase would amount to a simple control system and that the Commission would have authority to postpone, substitute for, or not install the subsequent phases. The ban would apply to underground tests only when the Commission, with

the concurrence of the permanent members, agreed that the controls were adequate.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said the British position was that when the limited treaty was tabled we should propose a specific joint research program on underground detection. If the USSR accepted the phased treaty approach and the research program, we would declare our intention not to resume underground tests pending the carrying out of the agreed research. *The Secretary* said that the latter point would give the U.S. real trouble since our feeling was that this would give the Soviet Union a de facto comprehensive test ban without adequate underground controls or provision for on-site inspection. *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* said that if there were no such moratorium the USSR would not accept the phased treaty. *Amb. Caccia* said that the U.S. would not need to declare this moratorium but could in practice simply refrain from conducting underground tests. Since the USSR has stated that they would not be the first to resume testing, there would therefore be a de facto moratorium.

Speaking of the matters which could be discussed by the delegations upon resumption of negotiations, *the Secretary* inquired as to the status of the peaceful uses explosion issue and wondered whether we should not press the Soviet Union further on this point. *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* said that this question had been agreed in principle with the USSR and there was little reason to press the Soviet Union on details at this point. He recalled that the remaining issues involved parity in the number of explosions which could take place and the "black box" concept. *Amb. Wadsworth* recalled that *Mr. McCone* had indicated that we could probably drop the "black box" idea and that, if so, we could agree to drop this in return for Soviet abandonment of the parity idea. *The Secretary* estimated that we could easily clear this matter up within the U.S. Government if this were the only issue remaining.

Returning to the question of the voluntary moratorium, *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* observed that the U.S. would be in a bad position to resume testing if the limited treaty were proposed, and that the U.N. would put pressure on the U.S. to refrain from further testing while negotiations on a limited treaty proceeded. *The Secretary* said that this would be a problem for the U.S. to deal with. *Mr. Sullivan* asked whether the British would be inclined to declare their intention not to conduct further tests if the U.S. were not able to do likewise. *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* said that the U.K. would have to consider this situation very carefully but that he did not believe resumption of testing by the U.K. was a practical possibility. He said that the U.K. was strongly convinced that the Soviet Union would not accept a limited treaty unless all tests were ended. The Russians have made an impressive number

of concessions in the course of the current negotiations in order to stop fourth-country weapons developments. They would not be willing to agree to the level of international control to which they now appear to be committed if underground nuclear testing were to be permitted. Thus the West would be giving up the possibility of achieving agreement with the Soviet Union on even a limited measure of international control, with all that this implies for future progress in disarmament and for the improvement of East-West relations. *The Secretary* observed that the longer the moratorium continued the more difficult it would be ever to resume testing. It was necessary for the U.S. to retain its freedom of action in this respect. *Amb. Wadsworth* wondered whether it would not be better to accept the present system with all of its uncertainties but with on-site inspection than to give up this provision and to refrain from testing anyhow.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that that would weaken our position on the fundamental principle of the necessity for effective control which will be of overwhelming importance in future disarmament negotiations. What we should now say is that in certain environments effective control is possible, but that through no fault of any of the parties in the negotiations it now appears that this is not the case with respect to underground tests. We should therefore pursue joint research in this area; while we are working together in such a research program we would mutually refrain from conducting any tests. He said that he felt that even under the present system the USSR would not in fact conduct tests in violation of the agreement and that there would be a severe deterrent to such testing. However, it was impossible to prove scientifically that a violator would be caught. Therefore we must operate in the light of present uncertainties. *Mr. Spiers* pointed out that under the present treaty we would be accepting a substantial period during which controls would not be in actual operation but during which the obligation not to test would apply. *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* said that a voluntary moratorium during the research program period would not be a substantial departure from our present position.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that the U.K. was concerned about the position we would be in if the Soviet Union made further concessions on the control system. We would then have to decide whether, after these concessions were made, we could then declare an underground ban unacceptable or whether we would have to insist on a figure for on-site inspections which was far beyond anything we could practically undertake. The position could be an embarrassing one.

The Secretary said that we should hasten our preparations for the tabling of a limited treaty so that we would be in a position to decide to do so within the next two or three weeks. He suggested that this

might be discussed with the U.K. at the working level and that an inter-departmental meeting be held in the near future to iron out the remaining policy differences within the U.S. Government. *Mr. Ormsby-Gore* then reverted to the question of the terms of the accompanying offer on a voluntary moratorium. He said that it was perhaps not necessary from a tactical point of view to make this offer precisely at the time of tabling the treaty. However, we should have a prior decision that this offer would be made if the USSR, as it probably would, rejects the idea of a limited treaty, rather than run the risk of losing the first chance we have had since the war to get a practical arms control agreement. *The Secretary* said that he could not be pinned down on this matter at the present time.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore then inquired as to how the problem of high altitude tests would be dealt with in the limited treaty. *Mr. Sullivan* said that in the present draft the ban would extend to all tests except those underground and that provision is made for high altitude controls. He said that the technical agencies in the Government regarded outer space testing as too expensive to be practical and that he therefore did not see any great problem in dealing with this issue within the Government. *Mr. Spiers* pointed out that the uncertainties and imperfections in the high altitude detection system were no more far-fetched than those obtaining in the case of underground tests. There were possibilities for conducting shielded tests behind the moon and the sun, and whereas such tests might be prohibitively expensive, so might the construction of the "Latter hole". Accordingly, some of our people felt that it would be illogical to accept these uncertainties in connection with high altitude testing at the same time that we were unwilling to accept equal uncertainties underground.

Suggested Distribution:

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S/AE (3 copies)

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Defense – Mr. Gates

AEC – Mr. McCone

CIA – Mr. Dulles

White House – Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Gray

Amembassy London – Amb. Whitney

US Del, Geneva – Amb. Wadsworth

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503. Memorandum From Starbird to McCone¹

Washington, October 26, 1959

SUBJECT

AEC POSITION RELATIVE TO TESTING

I am extremely disturbed over the effect that the current position of the Commission may have on our long range weapon program and on the treaty negotiations. Specifically, I make reference to the Commission's current position to the effect that we should place ourselves in a position by 1 January where the U.S. is free to resume underground testing, but without the U.S. Government's taking immediately any decision to so test (or making announcement of intent). I realize that I am focused on our weapons problems but I have tried to be balanced in my outlook and to support completely Commission decisions and desires without further argument. However, I believe I would be remiss if I did not point out what I believe is a wrong course. I believe the Commission should advocate that the U.S. should:

- a. Take a decision now to resume underground testing as soon as practical after 1 January.
- b. When the President (or other U.S. spokesman) informs Khrushchev that we can only consider now an atmospheric treaty, he similarly announce we are making preparations to resume underground testing as of some early future date.
- c. We take strong and positive action now with the British to gain support for this approach, using as tactfully as possible our weapon (and submarine) cooperation as a pry.

¹ Source: Recommends U.S. resumption of underground testing. Secret; Personal. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 3.

The steps taken in the last 1½ years by the U.S. in test cessation negotiations have been without complete agreement internally within the U.S. as to our plan and long range objectives, and without agreement with the British as to objective. They have been taken generally in the hope of securing some transitory propaganda advantage or in a scramble to avoid immediate propaganda loss (or direct conflict with the British). Because of a lack of objective and plan, we have gradually weakened our flexibility and ability to outlaw only that which can be controlled. Unfortunately, too, we have placed ourselves in a most difficult position relative to resuming an activity we need and which we know is not monitorable,—underground testing. To recall some of these steps:

May–August 1958—We initiated and carried out technical discussions of test monitoring as a separate disarmament issue. Our agreed objective was to test the Soviets’ willingness to reach realistic technical agreement on disarmament issues. (The U.S. belief was that they would not proceed reasonably, would break off the Conference, and we would gain propaganda advantage therefrom.) Though the Soviets were not reasonable, publicly they appeared reasonable enough so we could not break off the Conference. As a result:

August 1958—We believed world opinion thought the technical agreement indicated progress was possible in test cessation and this was a step toward disarmament. We had to do something. Therefore, we announced a one-year moratorium and willingness to negotiate. Our real objective was to get out of a jam, but translated it was to: test willingness of Soviets to “open up” to realistic inspection; or to show the world they wouldn’t. [We knew lower yield, useful, underground tests were unmonitorable, so we planned to retreat to a threshold concept if the Soviets proved reasonable.]²

August 1958–January 1959—We realized from new data that underground monitoring was most difficult, if not impossible. We presented data in hope that this would help our case but without firm plan of how. We realized, too, that U.K. was less firm than we, but did not press to get agreed plan or objective.

February–March 1959—Macmillan suggested to Soviets quota plan. I believe (though am not sure) we had some warning of his new approach. We did not block it, probably to avoid discrediting Macmillan.

April 1959—We finally proposed the atmospheric only treaty but were quickly countered by the “quota” and “a few.” We dropped further negotiations on this because: we could not discredit Macmillan; but must continue to show progress. The world thought we were making progress.

² All brackets are in the original.

May–July 1959—From the Bacher study all U.S. Principals finally realized a quota system would be ineffective, and the President approved this conclusion. In July (as in April) the U.S. decided again our objective must be to negotiate limited treaty and revert to underground testing until controllable. We avoided announcing (or implying) this intent because: we could not secure U.K. agreement; did not want to discredit Macmillan; but must continue to avoid break in negotiations. The world thought further progress was being made in negotiating an agreement.

September 1959—We announced extension of moratorium to 31 December to let Lodge escort Khrushchev and give time for further negotiation. All U.S. Principals at meeting when this extension was announced stated that objective had not changed from July 23rd, i.e., to negotiate limited treaty and revert to the unmonitored underground testing, and to set the stage for accomplishing this as soon as possible.

Now—We are returning to Geneva without agreement on what we are really trying to achieve. The U.S. and U.K. are pulling in opposite directions. Within the U.S., staff representatives of agencies are fighting to gain their agencies' separate ends. [For examples: State to show progress in disarmament negotiations without tangling with USSR or U.K. no matter the effect on weapon preparedness; CIA to get inspection teams into Russia even though this necessitates a comprehensive treaty; DoD to retain the possibility of a wide range of testing; and AEC to retain the possibility of underground test only.]

The key issue which needs resolution, if our negotiations are to proceed without aimless wandering, depends in the answer to one question. We know now (and all agencies and apparently U.K. agree) that we cannot monitor effectively all useful underground testing. Faced by this fact this question is: "Should our objective be to revert as soon as possible to underground testing; or are the political dangers of reverting so great as to be unacceptable?"

a. Until this question is answered, we cannot draft our public presentations to show: that we are only proceeding as the world public desires most (cessation of all tests); or that we must proceed somewhat against international desires (underground testing and why).

b. Until it is answered, our people of different agencies (as well as the U.K.) will continue to pull in opposite directions. Through plan or inadvertence, more and more small events will occur which reduce our ability to adopt one course or the other.

c. Passage of time will force us more and more into a position where we must accept the moratorium,—where the world expects us to find a solution under which there will be no more testing.

There are some arguments put forth to show that there is danger to announcing and reverting to underground testing. These are:

a. This could provide the Soviets with opportunity to break off negotiations of a first agreement, accusing us of bad faith. It might if the Soviet objective is to proceed as rapidly as possible to a "banning of the bomb." It should not if their objective is a first step toward monitored disarmament. We should be able to show this.

b. If we revert to underground testing, the Soviets may start unrestricted testing again accusing us as the provocateurs. This is a possibility, but world opinion (if it really fears fallout, as it apparently does) would probably attack them much more than the U.S.

c. The Soviets would gain more than we through any form of limited but legalized testing (particularly if they cheat a little). This depends entirely on the energy and effort we would put on the testing we can do, as compared with what the Soviets would be willing to do.

There are, in my opinion, much greater dangers in not announcing that we intend to proceed with such tests:

a. As already stated, our opportunity to resume testing becomes less and less as time passes, and events compromise our flexibility. With the passage of sufficient time we shall be in a position where we must accept perpetual cessation without any realistic control.

b. As long as we avoid announcement that we "intend to resume," we shall avoid a showdown with the U.K. (and some of our own agencies) on this issue. Unfortunately, this will lead the U.K. (and some U.S. members) to continue to hunt for reasons why decision must be pushed further back. More unfortunately (and in view of fact negotiations must proceed), it will permit them to put forth steps which further compromise our freedom of action.

c. Unfortunately, too, our defense planning (and the defensive systems in development) are proceeding on the basis of warheads which should be tested. Without test we are being forced to compromise,—in some cases on yield, but in other cases on schedules of stockpile entry, reliability and safety. It is the latter that bothers one most, and it is happening.

d. We know there are many warhead advances which we could make with underground test, but which we cannot without. Some of these could give us new systems of defense which we lack now. People will disagree now as to the importance of these future developments (as they did in 1946 when we strove to improve atomic weapons and in 1952 to develop TN). Yet, to me these are definite possibilities which if we lose we may be very sorry about later. The McRae Committee met to determine whether there was need for further test. It has been stated that it concluded we need not test again immediately. This is just not what the Committee found. In brief, it found: no defense system in development would go without a warhead because of lack of test (this was a foregone conclusion, for none are placed in development until we can promise a warhead); systems in development could be appreciably increased in effectiveness by test; other warheads were possible with test (but not without) which should lead "almost certainly" to new concepts in weapon systems and doctrine; decision must be taken immediately that U.S. will resume test, and test be resumed within a year (and report was in early August), if we were not to suffer postponement of achieving new capabilities. It should be remembered that

this was a subcommittee of the PSAC and that the PSAC has advocated for over two years (and tried to justify) complete cessation.

In summary, if we, in truth, really desire to retain a freedom to test underground as required, we must announce that we are proceeding with preparations to resume as of a particular date. As long as we do not, the various opponents to resumption (and particularly the British) will attempt to: delay the decision; develop all possible reasons why we should not resume; take steps (knowingly or inadvertently) which would further tie our hands; and to decrease thereby our flexibility until that flexibility disappears entirely. It is for these reasons I respectfully recommend the Commission reconsider its position taken two weeks ago.

Alfred D. Starbird

Brigadier General, USA

Director of Military Application

504. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, October 27, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. McCone, General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said that he had spent nine days in the Soviet Union on the inspection of their peaceful atomic activities. The Soviets had kept him going constantly. He had five top AEC scientists with him. Mrs. McCone also accompanied him.

He said he had visited the ice breaker *Lenin* and had been taken out for a five-hour trip on it. The President asked what the scientists said about its power plant, recalling that Admiral Rickover, on his return, had said that it is not very advanced and advised the JCAE that we should therefore hold back on giving submarine information to our allies, lest it leak to the Russians. Mr. McCone said that the scientists told him that the *Lenin* power plant was excellent. The ship is splendidly

¹ Source: McCone's visit to the Soviet Union; Yemelyanov visit to U.S.; Dutch request for nuclear submarine; discussion with Macmillan on nuclear testing negotiations; U.K. purchase of U-235. Secret; Restricted Data. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

built in every detail. He said there is some indication the Soviets are not doing so well with the power plants on their submarines.

Mr. McCone then said that he was taken through six atomic institutes or laboratories. Generally their power program appears to be behind ours, and has been cut back markedly from their own schedules. He was told that they have slowed down in order to see how the first few plants do, and take advantage of what they can learn from them. He said their work on controlled thermonuclear fusion is very good and that they have acted very fast in this field whenever decisions are taken. They are essentially following our course, and characteristically building on a larger scale the things we are building first on a smaller scale. In the area of high energy physics, they are showing a lot of activity. This is a very expensive field, and he found opinion among them that the nations of the world could advantageously get together on this in order to save costly duplication.

He said their level of competence in nuclear matters is quite high, their scientists are good, and started work quite early in this field. Their work began in the late twenties and early thirties and has carried on since. It is quite clear that their accomplishments are by no means attributable to "stealing our secrets," although they may have gained marginal advantage from time to time on specific details in this way.

The Soviets treat their scientists extremely well, giving them various incentives, and various special things such as houses, added income, etc. The scientists have direct access to Khrushchev when required. Their plan of organization in the scientific field is very good. It is built around their Academy of Science, which has shown itself able to do things very fast and to focus attention on selected objects. At the present time top quality scientists are in atomic and missile activities, and their very best scientists are in the field of space. Repeatedly they have shown that they can do things in a fraction of the time we take—one-fifth to one-third is by no means unusual.

Mr. McCone said that he noticed that they are using some Red Army soldiers on construction work. He was told that where they do this they pay these individuals the difference between soldiers' pay and the pay of construction people. He said their instrumentation and electronics are very good. He did not see their computers or have a chance to observe their computer techniques directly, but they must be quite excellent in view of the results they are achieving.

He said he looked for any evidence relating to a nuclear-powered aircraft, and could only conclude that they are carrying it at the level of a research rather than a development or prototype program.

In summarizing regarding peaceful uses of atomic energy, he said he thought their level of effort is roughly comparable to ours. They are

not as far advanced as we are in any area. He sees no sign of any "break through" unless it might be in a highly secret aircraft project.

He said he is laying out a comparable schedule for Dr. Yemelyanov when he comes to the United States. He said that Yemelyanov wants to go further in the exchange of information than we have yet gone. Mr. McCone said that he had had Mr. Garthoff of CIA in his party and was confident he had obtained a great deal of information. He said the party went to the Ukraine, to Krivoi Rog. He was told he was the first American that had ever been there. He visited a uranium ore mine there. Also, he was taken into a mill where metal is extracted from the ore. He was told that he was the first foreigner that had ever been there. No visitor even from the satellites had previously been permitted in. Mr. McCone said that he asked for statistical information concerning their output. This was not available but Yemelyanov said he would bring it to him when he comes to the United States.

Mr. McCone then talked about the possible next phase in this field of activity. He thought that there could be exchange visits of our scientists to their non-secret installations and vice versa. The President suggested putting a few scientists in each other's plants to work there for up to a year or so. Mr. McCone thought a year might be rather long but that six months might be feasible. He commented that there are some places where we could not have them for more than a visit, because they would be in too close association with our people who are in secret activities. In addition, the President thought we could jointly build some new facilities—such as those involved in high energy physics. Mr. McCone said the Russians have indicated they desire to do this as a possible third step. The President said this whole project looked good to him and asked Mr. McCone to talk to the State Department about it. He thought such facilities could perhaps be built in Vienna near the IAEA.

Mr. McCone said he did not, on his visit, see anyone outside of scientific or atomic figures. The President asked him to talk to the State Department with the thought of bringing Yemelyanov in to see him, so that the President could question him as to what he thought he had learned or accomplished through the visit. Perhaps the fact that this is an action which does not simply reciprocate what Mr. McCone did in Russia will have some impact.

The President said he understood the Dutch feel that we are dragging our feet regarding their request for information and assistance in building a nuclear submarine. He said there is no finer group than the Dutch in NATO. Mr. McCone said the problem is that the French will demand this when we have given it to the Dutch. The President said that he didn't mind this, since we could make clear to the French that the reason we are not giving them the same information and assistance

is that their cooperation in NATO has not justified it. Mr. McCone said that if the Dutch would purchase the submarine, or even the power plant, rather than obtaining the information and building it themselves, the problem would not be too difficult. It would help us if they would wait a while for the information. He said he would try to work the matter out with State, adding that his fellow Commissioners and the JCAE are very tough on this question.

Mr. McCone said he had also stopped in Great Britain and that Lord Plowden will be here next month. The President asked Mr. McCone to be sure to bring him in. Mr. McCone said he had talked with Mr. Macmillan regarding the problem of testing. Mr. Macmillan said he was ready to have an agreement limited to the banning of atmospheric testing, provided there was a gentleman's understanding that underground testing would also be stopped unilaterally. The President said he wants very much to stop testing, but he cannot see how unilateral cessation would be acceptable. He did not know how he could gain the assurance that he thinks we would need.

Mr. McCone said that in the mine in the Ukraine that he visited there were a dozen places where a one to two kiloton weapon could be set off without our ever knowing it. Through such tests they could move into a "death ray" type of weapon. The President expressed his interest about this type of weapon, asking as to its range of effectiveness. Mr. McCone said that it is effective over a radius of 1500–2000 yards. Blast effect is so localized as to be almost negligible. High-energy radiation would kill anyone within that radius. There would be no fall-out under one design and very limited fall-out under the other. I told the President we had some information on this and would get it to him.

Mr. McCone said the British would like to work out a long-range plan for the purchase of U-235 from us. Their plant is very expensive and they would like to close it down. Regarding atomic power plants, the President said he thought the best course would be to build no more plants for a while, to wait for improvements to come along through research, and to gain experience. Mr. McCone said we are studying various future lines of possible development. To follow any single line will cost in the order of \$350 to \$500 million to bring it to a stage of producing competitive power. This is a most important study, now well advanced, and he expects it to cut down on the number of alternative concepts under consideration and development. The President said one trouble is that the scientists get many ideas and then tend to want to carry them all along much too far. It is desirable to cut down unpromising lines of effort earlier.

Mr. McCone said that he was taught a lesson by the Soviet Academy of Science. They move their people around very readily, and thereby

channel energies and shorten times of development. He thought the Soviets would be ahead of us, for example, when we get to a one and one-half million pound thrust space vehicle. The President said we are trying to do many things at once, scattering our effort and spreading contracts all over rather than having someone giving direction and setting priorities.

Mr. McCone said that, following this trip, he has for the first time been thinking that it may be desirable to put the President's Science Advisory Committee, the AEC, the NASA and certain other laboratories into one national scientific organization.

Mr. McCone finally commented that he found EURATOM disappointing in some respects. The thinking of the people is good but Europe now has a surplus rather than a shortage of conventional fuels—oil and coal—and the atomic power development is going slow. He had the impression that the EURATOM people do not consider it to be so urgent, and in this he agrees.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

505. Letter From Gates to Dillon¹

Washington, October 28, 1959

Dear Douglas:

You will recall that in the letter of September 29, 1959, the Department of Defense recommended that the U.S. seek at Geneva a phased treaty providing in the initial phase for a ban only on nuclear weapon tests in the earth's accessible atmosphere. In connection with high altitude nuclear explosions, it was noted that the detection system recommended by the experts at Geneva in July 1959 is based primarily on theory, and the Department of Defense is concerned that the United States may accede prematurely to a system which subsequent experimentation may prove to be inadequate for its purpose. It was

¹ Source: Question of a lack of effective system to detect high-altitude tests; includes summary of engineering studies. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy 59.

considered that the uncertainties warrant further exploration before the United States undertakes an international commitment to ban tests in this environment.

On June 26, 1959, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (AE) requested the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, to conduct studies of a system for the detection and identification of high altitude explosions for the purpose of providing guidance to the U.S. Delegation in Geneva. Engineering studies are being conducted under the direction of the Advanced Research Projects Agency; a preliminary summary of their findings and conclusions to date is attached hereto. Of particular pertinence is the statement: "Theoretical estimates of detection capability are sufficiently promising to justify a comprehensive and time consuming research and development program. They are not sufficient to permit at this time any firm estimate of capabilities upon which to base national policy in the decision of whether or not nuclear tests in space can be reliably controlled." The attached engineering study was based on the assumption that all facilities, costs and manpower required were in addition to any existing U.S. capabilities.

Consideration of the summary of these studies has reinforced the view of the Department of Defense that the United States should not, at this time, agree to a ban on very high altitude tests which would depend for its enforcement upon a detection system of uncertain capabilities. There is a further consideration that, before these capabilities could be proved out, an extensive and extremely costly program of experimentation would be required.

In view of the work now in progress in formulating the U.S. draft of a phased treaty, which will require a final determination as to what the United States should propose in such a treaty in the initial phase, it is recommended that the principals of the members of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament meet at an early date with a view to arriving at a decision with respect to this problem.

Representatives of the Department of Defense would be prepared to present a short oral briefing to the principals, setting forth the salient aspects of the studies which have been made.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas S. Gates
Deputy

Copies to:

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Special Assistant to President for Science and Technology
Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs
Assistant to SecDef (Atomic Energy)
Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commander, AFTAC

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

Capabilities and Limitations of a System of Ground Stations and
Satellite Based Detectors for the Detection and Identification of
Nuclear Explosions at High Altitude and in Space

1. The Technical Working Group on the detection of high altitude nuclear explosions on 15 July 1959 reported its findings to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests in terms of an assessment of capabilities and limitations of possible techniques for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes above the earth and recommendation of techniques and instrumentation for consideration by the Conference for inclusion in the detection and identification system. Based on recommendations by Dr. Panofsky, head of the US representatives to the Technical Working Group, the Department of State requested the Department of Defense to conduct an engineering study of a system for the detection and identification of high altitude nuclear explosions for the purpose of providing guidance to the US Delegation upon its return to Geneva in October 1959.

2. The Advanced Research Projects Agency issued work orders to the Army Ballistics Missile Agency and to the Ballistic Missile Division of the AF and Space Technology Laboratory to conduct such studies.

3. On 15 October, ARPA invited the AFTAC to join with ARPA in listening to the reports of ABMA and BMD/STL and to jointly evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the proposed system for detecting and identifying high altitude nuclear explosions.

4. The problem of providing guidance to the State Department divides itself naturally into two major areas:

a. Determination of the engineering feasibility, costs, manpower and time factors involved in establishing a high altitude detection system including ground and satellite systems.

b. A scientific study of each of the detection techniques recommended at Geneva to evaluate their capability to detect nuclear explosions in various ranges of space as a function of distance, and yield of the explosion.

5. In the short time available to conduct this study, it was not considered possible to second guess the Experts' theoretical estimates of range capabilities of the independent techniques. A final reliable determination of the potential detection ranges depends upon the sensitivity which might be achieved by the detectors, the character of radiation from nuclear explosions as a function of range, and the natural radiation background which may exist throughout the orbits contemplated for detection satellites. It is relatively straightforward theoretically to calculate the intensity of X-rays, neutrons and gammas from nuclear explosions as a function of distance from the explosion in space. It is not possible, however, to say what the background radiation will be without an extensive and time consuming research, nor is it possible to state at this time what types of detection instruments may be practical for use in satellites and exactly what their detection sensitivity will be since this is intimately associated with the level of background radiation in the space environment and in some cases with the detailed characteristics of the detectors themselves which will not be determined except through careful research and development.

6. The principal contribution of this preliminary study, therefore, has been in 4.a. above, namely, the engineering problems associated with establishing the satellite and ground platforms at which instruments for detection recommended by the technical group would be established.

7. This report, therefore, will present a summary of those engineering studies as well as an evaluation of system capability on the assumption that the ranges of the detection theoretically estimated or assumed by the Technical Working Group at Geneva are confirmed by subsequent comprehensive research programs.

8. Systems of satellites considered were those recommended by the Panofsky Working Group at Geneva. They include the Argus Satellite System of two satellites at an orbit radius of approximately 1,000 kilometers for detecting electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field. A near earth satellite system was considered to include 8 to 10 satellites in circular orbits of about 700 kilometers in radius. A far earth satellite system was considered with 6 satellites equally spaced around circular orbits of 50,000 kilometers or larger. Finally, a system of 4 solar

satellites in orbits approximating that of the earth around the sun was considered.

9. Eight to ten satellites in near earth orbits will not provide complete coverage of the entire surface of the earth. The far earth satellite system can be made operational at almost the same time as a near earth system. The combination of poor coverage by the near earth system and evidence that a far earth system could be installed in about the same length of time prompts the decision that no effort should be wasted on establishing a system of near earth satellites.

10. The overall satellite system considered practical from an engineering standpoint only consists of the Argus Satellite System, the Far Earth Satellite System, and the Solar Satellite System. The engineering studies conducted at ABMA and STL indicate that the Argus system could be operational in the third year from "go ahead"; the far earth system could be operational at the end of the fourth year or beginning of the fifth year, and the solar satellite system could be operational about the middle of the fifth year from "go ahead".

11. The total cost of the three satellite systems would be approximately \$1,200,000,000. The annual operational cost was estimated to be \$100 million dollars per year. Limitations and capability of the solar satellite system will be presented in following paragraphs. Because of those limitations, the following cost figures are presented for the Argus and far earth satellite systems only. For this limited system the total cost would be about \$650,000,000 and the annual operating cost would be approximately \$60,000,000 per year.

12. Manpower requirements for launching teams, tracking stations, and control and analysis of the satellite systems would be of the order of 1200 people.

13. The engineering study included estimates of cost, manpower, and time factors for detection equipment to be placed at the 170 control posts of the Geneva Experts' system. The cost included two optical detectors, backscatter radar, and cosmic noise receivers, but excludes cost of building control posts. The total cost for the terrestrial system at control posts is estimated at about \$120,000,000 with an annual operating cost of about \$30,000,000. A total of over 2100 personnel would be required to operate the high altitude detection techniques at control posts.

14. In evaluating just how the various ground detectors and satellite based detectors would be integrated into an effective control system, we have applied one basic principal which has guided the United States throughout its experience with detection system design over the past eleven years. Briefly, this principal is that reliable detection and identification of nuclear explosions requires recordings from a

minimum of two independent physical techniques and preferably three or more independent measurements. Reference to the chart of capabilities of high altitude detection techniques attached to this report makes possible the following conclusions concerning possible capability of the high altitude detection system assuming that present theoretical estimates of detection range are confirmed by research program estimated to take a minimum of three years to accomplish.

a. A system including the recommended techniques at 170 control posts plus the Argus and far earth satellite system may possibly provide a reliable detection capability for nuclear explosions of 1 megaton or larger at distances of 10^5 and possibly 10^6 kilometers from the earth.

b. For explosions as small as 1 kiloton, this system could provide reliable detection by several independent techniques to distances of only 10^4 kilometers from the earth.

c. At all distances beyond 10^5 to 10^6 kilometers (approximately the orbit of the moon), only a single technique possesses the theoretical range to detect nuclear explosions at these vast distances from the earth. This technique based on X-radiation from the device is highly vulnerable to shielding considered feasible by our scientists. Its maximum range is estimated as about 100,000,000 kilometers for a shielded 1 megaton nuclear device. The solar satellite system suggested by the Panofsky high altitude working group, therefore, could be instrumented only for X-ray detection. Since the radius of the orbit of the earth around the sun is about 150,000,000 kilometers, the X-ray technique, having a range of only 100,000,000 kilometers for shielded 1 megaton devices would not be able to detect explosions behind the sun or behind the moon even if one were willing to accept the result of a single pulse of X-rays unsupported by any additional measurement as an adequate detection capability. It can only be concluded at this time that a system of solar satellites does not serve the purpose of providing reliable detection of nuclear explosions which might be detonated in the earth's orbit beyond the range of the near earth satellite system (approximately the distance of the moon).

15. Theoretical estimates of detection capability are sufficiently promising to justify a comprehensive and time consuming research and development program. They are not sufficient to permit at this time any firm estimate of capabilities upon which to base national policy in the decision of whether or not nuclear tests in space can be reliably controlled.

16. SUMMARY. It is not possible at this time to state with confidence the capabilities of a system for detecting nuclear explosions in space. It appears probable that given a minimum of three years of research and development that a reliable system for detecting shielded nuclear explosions in space out to about the moon may be possible in about five years at a cost of about three-quarters of a billion dollars for installation and about 90 million dollars a year

for operation. If theoretical prediction that the short pulse of X-rays expected from nuclear explosions is unique to such a source and is not present as a result of natural causes, and if convincing evidence that pulses of X-rays from solar activity could not be used by a violator to detonate a nuclear device and thus screen the resulting short pulse of X-rays by the longer duration pulses of X-rays from natural sources, and if such evidence could be considered sufficient without independent confirmation by other techniques such as gamma rays or neutrons, it is possible that in about five years confidence might be established that a solar satellite system could be relied upon to detect nuclear explosions in space roughly circumscribed by the earth's orbit around the sun.

17. *CONCLUSIONS*: The engineering studies indicate

a. At least three years of research are required to establish the feasibility of a system to detect nuclear explosions in space.


b. Adequate redundancy of recordings to insure reliability of detection can be obtained only for shielded explosions of 1 megaton out about as far as the moon.

c. A system to detect 1 megaton shielded nuclear explosions between the earth and the moon if proved feasible by a comprehensive research program can be installed in about five years at a cost of about three-quarters of a billion dollars.

d. Detection of nuclear explosions in space beyond the moon will depend upon whether or not research proves that a single short pulse of X-rays is unique to a nuclear explosion and cannot be concealed in some way by a violator.

e. If proved feasible a solar satellite system instrumented for measuring X-rays only for detecting unshielded explosions of 1 megaton in space roughly circumscribed by the earth's orbit could be installed for about one half a billion dollars additional to the cost of the system described in 17.c.

CAPABILITIES OF HIGH ALTITUDE DETECTION TECHNIQUES



506. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 3, 1959

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Secretary's Disarmament Advisers

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

Secretary Herter

Mr. Philip Farley—S/AE

Mr. Ronald Spiers—S/AE

Joint Disarmament Study

Mr. Charles Coolidge

Panel of Advisers

Mr. Robert Lovett

Mr. John McCloy

Mr. Alfred Gruenther

Mr. William Foster

Dr. James Killian

D.O.D.

Mr. Irwin

Secretary Herter expressed his appreciation that the Panel was willing to continue to give him the benefit of the advice which Secretary Dulles had found useful. He stated that there were several recent developments in the disarmament field which made it particularly appropriate to hold a further meeting of the group at this point.

Secretary Herter said that we would soon be engaged in substantive disarmament negotiations, and explained the origins of the ten-nation disarmament committee which had been agreed with the Russians at Geneva and which was scheduled to meet early in 1960. The fact that the U.N. yesterday referred the proposals which it had before it to this group for consideration assured that these negotiations would be the center of attention. Another early problem in disarmament would be the Summit meeting. As the Panel was aware, Adenauer held that disarmament was the most important subject for consideration at such a meeting and that all agreed disarmament would have to be discussed. The Secretary himself felt that it would be best not to have the ten-nation committee meet before the Summit, but rather that its commencement should be scheduled so it would receive its directives from the Summit. In preparation for these meetings Mr. Coolidge had been asked by the President and the Secretary to coordinate a joint Department of Defense-Department of State study and come up with policy recommendations. Finally there was the matter of the nuclear test negotiations which had been going on for a year. There was the problem of the U.K. moving ahead of us in our position in these negotiations, as well as newly discovered technical difficulties in detecting underground tests. Generally, we are faced with the feeling on the part of

¹ Source: Nuclear test negotiations, stability of deterrence requires greater conventional force. Secret; Limit Distribution. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

most nations that we are moving into an era when progress in disarmament is essential. Although there are varying degrees of skepticism about the possibilities of such progress, there is a very real fear of the continuation of the present arms race. The Soviet proposal on complete and general disarmament makes it more important that we have positive proposals of our own to present.

The Secretary suggested that the group first be briefed by Mr. Farley on the nuclear test negotiations, after which Mr. Coolidge could present his own thinking on the broader disarmament problem.

Mr. Farley stated that we faced an unpleasant dilemma in the test negotiations, which began their second year yesterday. There has been a general rapprochement of the public positions of both sides. Although numerous differences remain to be worked out, those differences are no longer sharply defined in the public mind. The Macmillan proposal for a quota of inspections has let the Soviet Union obscure the differences between us in this key area.

A central problem relates to monitoring of underground tests. This problem assumed new dimensions with the difficulties disclosed by the new data we obtained during our last test series. Thus we face a situation where as many as 200 annual inspections might be required to obtain adequate deterrence, even if the effectiveness of concealment methods does not prove out. The U.K. agrees with us that the problem of policing underground tests is a difficult one. They also agree that the most desirable outcome for the negotiations at this stage would be a phased agreement beginning with a prohibition of the contaminating tests which are easiest to police, e.g., atmospheric and under water. However, the U.K. believes that the only way to get the USSR to agree to a limited approach is to couple it with a three-year voluntary suspension of underground tests while we do further research on the control problem. This difference of view between us and the U.K. is now reaching a crucial stage. In the meantime it has become apparent to the Soviets that we are setting the stage for a shift in position by unilaterally setting forth our own technical analysis of the problem. *The Secretary* explained that the 1958 Experts' report conclusions were based on one underground nuclear test. Unhappily, our own further tests put us in the very difficult position of having to back away from the agreed report. The USSR, on the other hand, insists on sticking with the 1958 technical conclusions. We made this mistake in perfectly good faith. Our fear is that if we agreed to what we now believe amounts to inadequate control the Senate would reject the agreement. Mr. Farley said that we believed that it was important to finish presenting our technical conclusions. Then we will be face to face with the question of whether we are going ahead with a proposal for a limited treaty and either resume tests or declare our freedom of action with respect to further testing. If this

is the route we take, our problem will be to bring the U.K. along with us and to accept the adverse impact of world opinion, which has been taking a more optimistic view of these negotiations and the prospects of disarmament in general. The dilemma we face is a difficult one. We either accept what is perhaps less than adequate policing or incur the political liabilities consequent upon a change in position.

In response to a query by Mr. Coolidge on how Communist China would fit into an agreement, *Mr. Farley* explained that the treaty would last so long as the system it provided for was being installed on schedule and that the schedule called for installation of control positions in China in the second phase. Accordingly, if it proved impossible to extend the treaty to China there would be a basis for U.S. withdrawal.

General Gruenther referred to the strength of feeling he had encountered in his own experience on the subject of nuclear testing. He felt that we had not succeeded in explaining our position on this issue both at home and abroad. He referred to the public position taken by Senators Humphrey and Kennedy in favor of a comprehensive test ban. The opposition to testing has become increasingly more apparent in the Red Cross for a long time. We are losing the battle of public opinion abroad, and particularly in Oriental countries where the problem of strontium 90 is felt more acutely because of the predominance of cereal foods. Whereas we scored a technical victory in the vote on this issue at the New Delhi Conference, it was clearly apparent that the mass of opinion was against us. The world premiere of the motion picture "On the Beach", scheduled for December 17, would increase our problems even more; it is an effective and well-done anti-nuclear war plea that would have a great impact on public opinion. He has spoken to many people at home who feel that our emphasis on the difficulties of underground detection is nothing more than a device to get out of the negotiations (e.g., George McGee and Senator Anderson). If our own people do not believe in the honesty of our intentions, we cannot blame the British. We have not been able even remotely to convince the *Washington Post* that our position is an honest one. Our present difficulties are compounded by our own previous inability to get through to the public. Our opinion at home is not united and world opinion is fast moving against us on this issue.

The Secretary asked Dr. Killian to explain the technical situation with respect to underground tests. *Dr. Killian* described the Latter hole, indicating that whereas it was at present only a theoretical possibility it represented a real uncertainty in our ability to cope with underground tests. Although it is enormously expensive and complicated and no one will know whether it will be feasible from an engineering standpoint until appropriate tests have been performed, it could undermine the whole control system if it works. The U.K. feels

that this is the major factor which has changed since the 1958 Experts' report. Furthermore, the new data from Hardtack II may not be conclusive and further experimentation is needed. The Berkner Panel felt that it was possible to restore the effectiveness of the Geneva system to compensate for the new data, but not for the Latter hole. *Mr. Gruen-ther* agreed that the large hole was a new element, adding that we in effect know about the other uncertainties before we decided to negotiate at Geneva, even though there may have been some shift in the efficiency of detection since then. *Mr. Lovett* agreed with the strength of public feeling on this issue, stating that after Gov. Rockefeller made his recent radio statement on underground tests the broadcasting company's switchboards "lit up like a Christmas tree" with callers protesting the Governor's position.

Mr. McCloy said that it appeared to him from Dr. Killian's descriptions that the difficulties of constructing the big hole were almost insurmountable and asked whether we really believed that this was a feasible evasion method for the Soviets to use. *Mr. Farley* noted that the unit of measurement for the Latter hole was football fields.

The Secretary described the instructions under which the U.S. delegation was currently operating and said that the delegation was charged with laying out the scientific material as part of the record preparatory to tabling a limited treaty. It is difficult to foresee whether we will be able to resolve our problems with the U.K., and he personally thought it might be better to have a poor inspection system for underground tests than a de facto suspension by moratorium with nothing in return. *Mr. McCloy* asked for the assessment of U.K. motivations. *The Secretary* said that the British attached a great deal of importance to achieving inspection in the USSR and felt that this would represent a break-through on the whole disarmament problem. In addition to this, Macmillan keenly feels the strength of British public opinion on this issue and is, above all, aware of U.K. vulnerability to nuclear weapons. *Mr. Farley* said that, in sum, the British felt that the technical uncertainties of the situation did not outweigh the political advantages to be obtained. *The Secretary* said that it would be difficult for us to proceed on our present course of action if the British would not go along with us. In addition, Khrushchev has said that he does not care anything about developing small nuclear weapons. The USSR is interested in stopping further refinement of U.S. stockpiles and there is every indication that they would refuse a partial treaty. He observed that on the basis of the McRae report it was hard for a layman to see any urgency in the resumption of testing, although he recognized that Defense and AEC did not share this view. *Dr. Killian* stated that it was important to get the large-hole theory to the public as quickly as possible.

Turning to the problems of broader disarmament, *the Secretary* explained the possibility of the U.S. having to withdraw some of its troops from Europe because of the balance of payments deficit, and that he had asked Mr. Coolidge to determine how this possible need might be turned into a disarmament quid pro quo.

Mr. Coolidge said that he had several general points he wished to make first. We are now faced with a broad and dramatic Soviet proposal and he felt that if our only answer consisted of proposals for small steps we would look bad in world opinion. In addition to such small-step proposals, therefore, he felt that it was sound for the U.S. to develop a long-range goal with which we could associate ourselves. He suggested the following formulation:

- "1. No nuclear weapons should remain in the control of any nation.
- "2. An adequate international peace force should be established to operate under effective international law with increased jurisdiction in the World Court.
- "3. National military establishments should be reduced to the point where no single nation can effectively oppose the international peace force."

Mr. Lovett stated that he felt it would be a fatal error to go forward with a program such as this on the basis only of mutual trust. Mr. Coolidge said that he was not proposing this and that these three points should simply be regarded as a statement of an ultimate goal. Mr. McCloy agreed that we should have such a goal and that it was a necessity if we were to get public opinion moving in our direction. The only alternative to complete disarmament may be total destruction. Dr. Killian said that he believed this was a persuasive statement, although he questioned making nuclear weapons elimination the first point. Mr. Foster agreed and suggested that point No. 2 be stressed. *The Secretary* recalled that our problem with point No. 1 was that no one had been able to find a means of detecting hidden nuclear weapons. He said that our general problem in this field is to find a starting point where we can test out Soviet *bona fides*. In this connection he mentioned the Norstad plan as a possibility. The French and Germans have always objected to the idea of small inspection zones in Europe, but the Secretary felt that this was the simplest test he could conceive. Such a zone might be combined with reductions on the part of both sides. Mr. Foster agreed with the idea of trading troop redeployments for a lifting of the Iron Curtain. *The Secretary* said that the President was disturbed that we have not been able to do anything to liquidate our "temporary" forces in Europe and that there was a general impatience with the rigidity of the Germans particularly, who wished to maintain the status quo. Mr. Lovett said that something along the lines that Mr. Coolidge proposed would serve a very useful purpose.

Mr. Coolidge said that another problem with which his group was concerned was the situation we might face after a few years when both

the U.S. and USSR will have ICBMs in quantity. Our key problem is what we can do to insure stability in the missile age. He had seen no alternative to mutual deterrence, but effort must be made to insure stability of this deterrence. In such a situation he felt that we would have to have stronger conventional forces or we could be nibbled away by the USSR while each side was paralyzed by the thought of counter-destruction if missiles were used. *Mr. Foster* agreed with this statement of the problem and said that our trading position was growing progressively weaker. The foundation for a stable deterrent was a more intensive defense effort on our own part. It is necessary to have a secure deterrent at all levels and this would require a build-up in our ability to fight conventional wars. *Dr. Killian* said that he was coming to the conclusion that the initial step toward arms reduction was creation of a better balanced and more adequate U.S. defense establishment. *Mr. Gruenther* agreed, saying that in order to proceed with disarmament we will have to increase our defense expenditures.

Mr. McCloy said that withdrawal of any U.S. troops from European forces before a Summit meeting would be the worst possible move we could make. *Mr. Gruenther* agreed, adding that because of the possibility of press leaks, which would be inevitable after such a decision, it would be almost impossible to secure a quid for the quo of troop reductions. *The Secretary* said he understood that the pressure to do this before the Western Summit was now off. *Mr. Irwin* emphasized that there had been no decision on this matter and that it had been raised merely as a warning signal.

The Secretary suggested that the advisers meet again early in December prior to the President's trip to Europe and stated that Mr. Farley would make arrangements for a specific date.

507. Memorandum for the Record by Haskins¹

November 30, 1959

SUBJECT

Planning Board Meeting with Charles A. Coolidge

On Tuesday, November 10, the Planning Board met with Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, who has been appointed by the President to

¹ Source: Planning Board meeting with Coolidge. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament, General.

head a joint review on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense of U.S. disarmament policy, and two members of his staff, Mr. Guido Perera and Admiral Davis. The purpose of the meeting was to hear from Mr. Coolidge a reflection of the preliminary thinking which he had gone through and to solicit any ideas which members of the Planning Board as individuals might have.

Mr. Coolidge began by saying that the U.S. must make some general far-reaching proposals and place them in an attractive setting; it is useless, he said, to put forward picayune measures. He said that we should declare what we ultimately hope to get and suggested the following four general objectives:

- (1) No nuclear weapons in the control of any individual nation
- (2) An international police force equipped with nuclear weapons
- (3) A World Court with increased jurisdiction
- (4) Reduction of national forces to a point where no nation could oppose the international police force (Robert Amory later suggested that the fourth objective should refer not only to "no nation," but also "no likely combination of nations;" Mr. Coolidge agreed).

Mr. Coolidge said that of course these objectives represented a piece of "pie in the sky" today, but that he was thinking of an ultimate goals statement as something to vie with the Soviet "pie in the sky" proposal.

He suggested that we try to build on what we have got; that is, for example, that we use the United Nations. He did observe that the existing UN police force was badly mixed up.

He spoke in general terms of a codification of existing procedures as being a desirable early step, pointing out that it would not raise inspection problems. He said that a group at the Harvard Law School was studying the matter.

In discussing Soviet capabilities, he referred to the "missile gap." He said that the Soviets would have ICBMs in quantity before the U.S. and that then the DEW line will be no good at all. He said that the information he had was that the Soviets in their strategic missiles concept are relying more on mobility than upon base hardening.

He then spoke of the theory of a balance of mutual deterrence. Under this theory, there would be a sufficient number of defensive missiles remaining after an attack (as a result of base hardening or mobility or a combination of both) to permit a counter-attack upon the Soviet Union. He said that achieving such mutual deterrence would accelerate the arms race for a while, but that once we get the required number of missiles, a plateau would be reached and then defense expenditures could be reduced.

He touched briefly on the possibility of a partial disengagement of ground forces in Europe, whereby there might be a thinning out of

Communist forces in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and a concomitant thinning out of NATO forces.

He also referred to the so-called “nth” country problem and said that an excellent working paper on it had been prepared for the JCS.

He readily admitted that we cannot get to the goals unless and until there is a method of detecting clandestine nuclear detonations. He said that even the Russians had now admitted that there were insufficient means of detecting underground nuclear explosions.

Charles A. Haskins

508. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 1, 1959

SUBJECT

Meeting of Secretary's Disarmament Advisers

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

Secretary Herter

Mr. Eaton

Mr. Farley—S/AE

Mr. Spiers—S/AE

D.O.D.

Secretary Gates

Panel of Disarmament Advisers

Mr. John McCloy

Mr. William Foster

Dr. James Killian

Gen. Alfred Gruenther

A.E.C.

Mr. McCone

Joint Disarmament Study

Mr. Coolidge

The Secretary said that several important developments had taken place since the group had met last on November 3, 1959 in connection with both the nuclear test talks and our general preparations for further disarmament negotiations in 1960. He introduced Mr. Frederick Eaton whose appointment as U.S. representative to the ten-nation disarmament committee would be announced by the White House on Thursday. He asked Mr. Farley first to report on the most recent developments in the nuclear test talks.

Mr. Farley said that since the group last met the most important development had been Soviet acceptance of the technical discussions

¹ Source: Developments in nuclear test talks, Coolidge report, troop withdrawals from Europe, Norstad plan. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

on underground test detection for which we had been pressing since last January. Agreement was finally reached after considerable negotiation on terms of reference for the technical talks and the meeting began on November 25 in Geneva. So far no important developments had taken place in these talks, which have consisted to date mainly of a presentation and defense of the new seismic data by the U.S. representative, Dr. Fisk. The Soviets have hinted that they also possess new data. At the end of these talks we will have the problem of determining how the conclusions reached will affect our future course of action. Our prior decision was we had no alternative but to press for a phased treaty in view of Soviet refusal to consider the implications of the new data. As a result of Soviet willingness to undertake these talks we have reaffirmed our objective of reaching a comprehensive agreement provided that the risks involved are acceptable. Consequently it will not be known until the returns are in from Geneva whether we will have to revert to a phased proposal or can proceed to a full test ban. In response to a question by *Mr. Coolidge* about our position on high altitude testing, *Mr. Farley* described the capabilities and limitations of the system worked out by the technical group which met in Geneva earlier in the year. Our final position on inclusion of a high-altitude ban in the treaty will also have to await the outcome of the present technical talks. If we have to go back to a phased approach omitting underground tests from the initial ban it may be decided that it is illogical to accept the uncertainties in our capabilities with respect to outer space tests while we are unwilling to accept them with respect to underground tests. If we determine that the risks involved in proscribing underground tests are acceptable we would probably reach the same conclusions with respect to high altitude testing.

Mr. Coolidge asked whether if peaceful use of outer space were to be a major U.S. objective in the new disarmament talks this would have an impact on our ability to police outer space tests. *Mr. Farley* said that if a system were agreed upon to monitor all objects leaving the earth's atmosphere and to permit pre-inspection of these objects we would not have to set up a separate outer space detection system.

Mr. Coolidge said that he thought any proposal he made with respect to peaceful use of outer space should initially be limited to orbiting vehicles and not include missiles. In these circumstances no contribution could be made to the policing of an outer space test ban.

Secretary Herter reported that in the NSC discussion this morning Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled the conclusions that had been reached in a study two years ago that a ban on missiles testing would be contrary to U.S. interests at the time. He felt that enough had happened in the intervening time to warrant a restudy of this problem. *Dr. Killian* agreed that such a restudy was needed. With respect to orbiting vehicles he felt that

there was little practical military use for such objects in the foreseeable future. The key problem was missiles.

Reverting to the weapons test negotiation *Secretary Herter* said that his feeling about the strength of public opinion on this issue had been re-enforced by a discussion with Amb. Phleger who was our representative in the Antarctica treaty negotiations which concluded today. Amb. Phleger had said that it would not have been possible to conclude the treaty unless we had agreed on a ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear testing in the area. The Latin Americans, the New Zealanders, Australians and others had strong feelings on this question and felt that domestic public opinion regarded this as the most important issue today.

At Secretary Herter's request *Mr. McCone* reported on his conversations with Emelyanov on his recent trip to the Soviet Union and subsequently during Emelyanov's trip here. Emelyanov apparently took quite seriously Mr. McCone's statement that the U.S. could not accept a weapons test ban treaty unless the USSR agreed to technical talks and Mr. McCone estimated that this may have had something to do with the reversal of the Soviet position on this question. Emelyanov had discoursed at length on the developments in the USSR since Stalin's death. He took the position that there had been great changes in Soviet objectives and methods since that time and that Khrushchev was strongly motivated by three basic premises: that the victory of Communism would come about by popular choice and not by force, that war is to be avoided at all costs, and the need for the fastest possible economic development of the USSR. Emelyanov believed that Khrushchev was sincere and genuine in his desire to reach agreements with the U.S. such as in the nuclear testing field, although he was still having difficulty with the remainder of the old apparatus inherited from Stalin, among whom he named Tsarapkin and Sobolev. Mr. McCone told Emelyanov that we would have to have assurances from our scientists on the adequacy of control and that we would agree to ban tests only in those areas in which control was adequate. We will agree to end any tests that are within range of detection, whether this includes the whole range of testing or only down to a specified level. The main objectives are controls corresponding to the measures to be taken, relief of public concern over radiation hazards, and to make a start which can be built upon for further disarmament. Emelyanov said that he agreed in general with this approach and that he would take it up with his government. Emelyanov also stated that after talking with Drs. Teller and Weinberg about Project Plowshare he was less suspicious than he had been about our intentions in pressing the idea of peaceful uses explosions. Emelyanov had also stated that some people in the USSR had favored agreeing to a ban on atmospheric tests on the grounds that the U.S. would not go

along. On the general subject of disarmament Emelyanov had agreed completely that control and disarmament had to go together and that neither could be contemplated without the other. After disarmament was complete the Soviet Union was prepared to allow anyone to go any place in the USSR. This might be easier for the USSR than for the U.S. to accept, since they did not have commercial secrets to protect. He had said also that the USSR had conducted no underground tests and that they did not intend to. Khrushchev had decided not to develop tactical nuclear weapons even though the Soviet military was opposed to this position. Mr. McCone said that he was convinced that in the final analysis the Soviet Union would accept the phased approach if we pressed it.

At the Secretary's request *Mr. Farley* explained our position with regard to continuation of the voluntary suspension. The convening of the technical meeting made it less likely that we would reach a crucial point in the negotiations by the end of the year. The way has been paved, by a statement made by Amb. Lodge on November 19 at the General Assembly, for a further continuation of the moratorium on a short-term basis. Lodge had emphasized that controlled suspension was our objective and that we did not intend to fall into the trap of an indefinite uncontrolled moratorium which would reduce our bargaining power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. *Secretary Herter* stated that he did not believe it would be necessary to show our hand on this question or to make any final decisions until the very last minute. *Mr. McCone* agreed and said that he supported the position expressed by the Secretary at a recent press conference that the moratorium should be continued on a week-to-week basis.

Secretary Herter then asked Mr. Coolidge to present to the group the review of his thinking that he had outlined in the morning to the NSC.

Mr. Coolidge recalled that at the previous meeting he had stated his conviction that the U.S. should offer a long-range disarmament goal and should put forward also specific immediate steps which would provide a test of Soviet intentions and present the fewest possible of the complications involved in "package" approaches. He distributed the following statement as an expression of the long-term goal:

"The present policy of the United States on arms control matters should be to favor verifiable arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law; namely, a world in which:

1. Rules of international law prohibiting armed conflict between nations shall be in effect, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by an adequate international peace force.

2. National military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the international peace force, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be in the control of any nation."

Secretary Herter reported that the President was generally favorable to this type of a statement.

Mr. Coolidge continued by outlining the immediate steps which we might propose which he characterized as constituting "2½" measures. The half measure consisted of pursuing the present Geneva negotiations to a successful conclusion. The others would be, first, to propose a system to insure that all vehicles entering orbit were used for peaceful purposes only. The second would be the Norstad plan, involving the establishment of an inspection zone with joint air and ground inspection teams and overlapping radar in an area covering Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This would be combined with a freeze on non-indigenous forces at their present levels. When the system was installed and working we would propose a thinning out of troops in the area. This proposal would be presented as a disarmament plan which would give us working experience in inspection techniques. This proposal would also take advantage of our probable need to withdraw two or three divisions from Europe due to our balance of payments difficulties. He recognized, on the other hand, that this proposal would create great difficulties with deGaulle and Adenauer. *Mr. Foster* supported the European zone idea and stated that he had informally sounded out Jules Moch on the Norstad plan. Moch had told him that he personally favored this approach although his government did not. He thought that a proposal along these lines would be negotiable with the USSR. *Secretary Herter* said that he supported this kind of proposal because he believed that it was the best way to test whether the Soviets really meant business in disarmament.

Secretary Gates said that his concern about this suggestion stemmed from its similarity to the disengagement proposals which had been put forth by Mr. Kennan and which had frightened the Germans terribly. *Mr. McCloy* said that he would be extremely worried about putting forward a proposal such as Mr. Coolidge had outlined. *Secretary Herter* pointed out that a less specific version of this proposal had been incorporated in the Western Peace Plan and had been accepted by our allies in this context. He recognized that a substantial difference was made by the fact that then it was connected with reunification of Germany and that there will be great difficulties with Adenauer in taking it out of this context. *Mr. Coolidge* observed that Norstad was more strongly in favor than ever of his inspection zone ideas but felt that they should not be combined initially with a thinning out proposal. *Secretary Herter* said that Norstad would be willing to agree that IRBMs not be stationed in the zone but that he wanted no other restrictions on deployment of weapons or men.

Secretary Gates said that we were faced with the choice of either reducing our manpower or having a bigger defense budget. We were

presently spending \$22½ billion for Personnel and Maintenance and Operation and this was entirely out of balance with other expenditures. This factor was considerably more important than the balance of payments problem. It would be impossible to reduce our overall forces without withdrawing some troops from Europe. *Mr. Foster* said that the Norstad plan would allow us to get started on establishing inspection and control, which was of extreme importance. *Secretary Gates* said that we could proceed on the present basis for another fiscal year only. He acknowledged that the President feels strongly on this subject, believing that our troops were sent to Europe for emergency purposes only and the situation had now become frozen. He himself believed that it was a misuse of forces to keep so many men in Europe. *Mr. McCloy* said that the Germans would take this as an abandonment by the U.S. and that it would be a very bad tactical error to pull out forces prior to the Summit. *Secretary Gates* said that there was now no intention to reduce European forces during the next calendar year.

Dr. Killian inquired whether the Coolidge group had looked into the problem of achieving stable deterrence. *Mr. Coolidge* said that his conclusion was that one of our overwhelmingly important objectives was to work for an invulnerable retaliatory force. *Secretary Gates* said that studies recently completed in the Department of Defense show that between now and 1963 neither side could win a war without striking first. The importance of pre-emptive attack would grow continuously between now and this period. This projection held good even taking into consideration our plans for base hardening, development of Polaris, increasing mobility and the use of storable liquid and solid fuels. *Dr. Killian* said that he had reached the conclusion that we will be in the best stance to achieve progress in disarmament when we have gotten ourselves into a position where we can take risks that we cannot now accept because any surprise attack would leave us unable to retaliate. We can only accomplish this by increasing our defense expenditures. *Secretary Gates* said that he expected to spend a good part of the next year before the Congress justifying our present defense budget.

Returning to the preliminary conclusions of his review of disarmament policy *Mr. Coolidge* said that the possibilities of developing an international police force appeared to be quite barren given the attitude of the majority of U.N. members. Thus he felt the only immediate steps which could be taken towards Part I of the general goal he had outlined would be (a) to regularize U.N. procedure for appointing a U.N. "presence" in troubled areas and adding the power in U.N. teams to mediate disputes; (b) reviving and pressing for codification and development of international law; (c) repealing the Connally amendment and agreeing that disputes on the interpretation of the language in treaties must be submitted to the World Court.

Secretary Herter explained the timing requirements for development of our disarmament position. He would like to be able to deal with some specifics such as the Norstad plan at the Western Summit meeting December 19. It is not yet decided when the ten-nation committee will meet since we prefer to have it begin in May, after the Summit, whereas our allies prefer to have it start before the Summit. We are prepared, if they press the point, to agree to convening March 15, although we believe the group could do nothing but “putter” until after the Summit. *Secretary Herter* said he was very disturbed at our lack of specific ideas on disarmament. The Russians have a position, the British and French both have specific ideas, although the first stages of the British plan seem to be restricted to “study groups” and the French plan starts out with “good faith declarations”. The smaller nations of NATO look to us to take the lead in this field and we cannot fail them.

Mr. McCloy said that he was still disturbed about the Norstad Plan. It was not a small step. Politically it had the greatest implications of just about anything we could propose. It is not a question of numbers of men, but of the concept of disengagement. It would mark the beginning of the collapse of our whole forward strategy. *Secretary Herter* said that we must have concrete suggestions to present. He was impatient with the Germans and their generally negative attitude. They continuously stress the importance and the priority of disarmament but have never presented a single useful idea. With respect to the Norstad plan he thought it was primarily a question of presentation. It must be put forward in a way that does not appear to the Germans as the beginning of their neutralization. *Mr. Foster* repeated that in his view there was a great deal of logic behind the Norstad idea. He agreed that we could not afford to keep the same number of troops in Europe as we have today. *General Gruenther* said that he thought we could sell the idea of reducing U.S. forces. The Norstad plan would have some military advantages but he was afraid of its psychological impact on our allies.

Secretary Herter said that there were limits to the numbers of men we could pull out from Europe, both for the reason *Gen. Gruenther* had stated and because the only substitute for our troops would be new German divisions so long as French forces were occupied with the Algerian conflict. We would soon reach a point where many of our allies would be nervous about the number of Germans under arms. It was clear to him that the Russians also were genuinely afraid of a strongly armed Germany. *Mr. Foster* strongly endorsed the last remark.

Dr. Killian reiterated his conviction that *Mr. Coolidge* should look closely at the advantages and disadvantages of controlling missile testing. It is quite possible that if we made such a proposal now it would come into effect only after we have had a chance to better our capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet Union but before we had reached a point of no

return on missile control and before weapons such as the small mobile Minuteman were developed. *Secretary Gates* said that he thought it might be as much as five years before we were in this position and that Defense would oppose such a ban. *Dr. Killian* said that he thought the American public was not aware and should be made aware that the U.S. can never again have a supremacy deterrent as it did when it had the monopoly on nuclear weapons. The best we can get is a system of mutual deterrence and it is illusory to think we have a capability for keeping military supremacy. Our major and most crucial problem in the years ahead is to make sure that this system of mutual deterrence was a stable one both through arms control measures and unilateral action to increase the invulnerability of our retaliatory power.

509. Record of Cabinet Meeting by Starbird¹

Washington, December 11, 1959

RECORD OF CABINET MEETING, 11 DECEMBER 1959 *CONSIDERATION OF TEST MORATORIUM NEGOTIATIONS*

1. Those in attendance included: the Vice President; Secretary Herter; Mr. Gordon Gray; Mr. Dulles; Mr. Allen; Attorney General Rogers; Mr. McCone; General Persons; Mr. Farley; Dr. English; General Loper; General Fox; and General Starbird.

2. Mr. Gordon Gray and Secretary Herter introduced the meeting. They stated that consideration of the subject at this meeting was informational in nature and not intended to make decision. The primary reason for the consideration at this time was the fact that the announced moratorium expires on 31 December; a decision must be taken by the President immediately after his return as to what would be the U.S. announced policy to apply thereafter.

3. Secretary Herter then gave a summary account of the negotiations to date. Somewhat to our surprise the Soviets agreed in August 1958 in the Conference of Experts to a system for the monitoring of testing. With regard to monitoring underground tests, the system's capabilities had to be evaluated largely on the basis of only one underground nuclear shot. Later in HARDTACK II (in October 1958) several underground shots

¹Source: Nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Restricted Data. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing. Drafted on December 14.

were fired. These revealed that the capability of the Geneva Conference of Experts' system was less than had been earlier thought. The President proposed an "atmospheric only" ban but this the Soviets refused. Our officially announced period of moratorium for negotiation was for one year—through October 31, 1959, but was extended later to December 31. When we realized from the HARDTACK II data that the system had a lesser capability than originally thought we insisted that there must be joint technical discussions of this new data. If satisfactory technical discussions could not be carried through, we might have reverted to a limited treaty. The Soviets resisted this strongly. However, finally they "caved in" and there is now underway at Geneva a technical discussion of the underground problem. We are receiving detailed reports on the Technical Conference. They are of such complex nature that it is hard for a layman to understand them. It does appear that we have presented all of our new data and that the detailed elements are now being discussed. There is some pessimism as to what may emerge from these discussions. Secretary Herter then asked Chairman McCone if he desired to add any comments to this summary.

4. Mr. McCone stated that he thought it was too early to tell whether or not any agreements would come from the present technical discussions. The Soviets had obviously been caught off balance by our presentation on decoupling. Our people are apparently doing a good job of presenting their data. In the earlier high altitude conference, the Soviets had held back from any agreement initially but had finally reached agreement on many elements of the high altitude detection report. Mr. McCone then explained that there were three serious questions with regard to underground testing.

a. What could the Geneva Conference of Experts' system (even with improvements) actually detect and identify and what would be the number and procedures of inspection for those events detected but not identified?

b. Could decoupling by a major factor be accomplished? If this could be done, quite large shots could be made to look so small that they would not be noticed.

c. Third and finally, how effective could be a system of on-site inspection in actually proving that a nuclear event had occurred? There was a great deal of difference of opinion in this regard.

5. Thereafter a rather general discussion occurred on various aspects of the problem. The more significant items that were brought out are as follows:

a. As to necessity for the U.S. testing, Secretary Gates spoke at length: both on the necessity for conducting certain safety experiments right away; and on the long-range benefit to our military position from devices we could develop but would have to test. With regard to the former, he brought out that certain restrictions apply to certain of our

weapons. The experiment to answer certain questions in this regard had been approved by the President but we did not know how to handle the public relations aspects without serious propaganda danger during the presently announced moratorium period. He felt these experiments should go forward as quickly as possible after 1 January. With regard to the later and broader aspect, he pointed out the dependence of our military posture on nuclear warheads. He illustrated gains by explaining that the so-called [*text not declassified*] systems that might be developed.

b. The Vice President stated that he knew there were differences of opinion among the scientists as to what we could gain from testing. He asked Dr. Kistiakowsky's opinion. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that a Panel covering only possible U.S. gains from testing had concluded: the greatest and most urgent problem was that of answering the safety questions; that there was no necessity for immediate testing to meet the requirements of systems currently in development.²

c. Mr. Dulles commented in answer to a question that we had no indication that the Soviets were currently testing.

d. Secretary Herter explained that one thing that handicapped us in knowing what to do was the general lack of clear and consistent scientific indication as to exactly what were the capabilities of the monitoring system,—that opinions differed. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that the scientists could advise that shots above a few kilotons should be detectable and identifiable (if decoupling were not considered). He stated further that below a few kilotons they would advise that the system would not be fully reliable; also that if decoupling worked much greater shots could be concealed but decoupling was expensive. He mentioned that there had been already certain improvements in the instrumentation which would improve the system. When Secretary Gates indicated that a very extensive program (Vela) was necessary to prove out the detection system, Dr. Kistiakowsky indicated that this was not the purpose of the project. The main purpose was that of improvement of system instrumentation already existent to permit a system of improved capabilities. Beyond describing the capabilities in the manner shown the scientist could not go. It was up to those concerned with policy to decide what should be the nature of the agreement considering the capabilities and limitations of the system.

e. Mr. Allen commented to the effect that perhaps we should take a system of the 20 control posts only, and without on-site inspection. After all, if the control posts detected questionable events and these were revealed publicly perhaps this would deter violations. All Principals connected that they believed that this would not be adequate deterrence but without discussing in full. Mr. Herter believed this would give up an advantage for which we were bargaining (presumably some real inspection in Russia).

f. Mr. McCone explained that perhaps a logical answer to our situation was to propose a threshold system. In explanation, if the detection scheme were capable with its on-site inspection of effectively monitoring, for example, blasts of 10 KT and above, then we would agree to

² Note: This was only a part of the Panel's finding, of course. The total finding went on to the general effect that warheads for systems in development could be improved significantly through testing and that other systems of great promise should be possible if testing were permitted. [Footnote is in the original.]

forego such blasts but not forego those that were of yield less than 10 KT. Decoupling introduced somewhat of a problem but this might not be insurmountable. He brought out that it was the original intent of the U.S. at the time the negotiations began in October of last year to introduce at the appropriate time the threshold concept. Such introduction had not yet occurred. Mr. McCone also read what he believed should be the announcement made by the President just before 31 December. A copy of this is enclosed.

g. Later Mr. McCone said he wished that there was a way that the U.S. could take the initiative. He suggested that we announce we would forego all atmospheric tests but would consider ourselves free to revert at any time to underground testing should it be required. Secretary Herter doubted the Soviets would accept this. In answer to query, he mentioned the British continually indicated they would be prepared to accept a more limited system than the U.S. desired. In answer to a specific query of the Vice President as to whether Mr. McCone believed that we could work out with the Soviets an agreement permitting underground testing, Mr. McCone replied in the negative.

6. The Vice President commented to the following effect during the general discussion. It appeared to him that there were three possible courses and that there were strong supporters of the three. Those courses were: to revert in the near future to underground testing; to forego for an extended period (whether it be stated as on a “week-to-week” basis or otherwise) all testing and without any inspection system; or to take whatever inspection system could be negotiated in return for a comprehensive system. He believed this would be the way the President would look at the matter when he returns. As to the first of these approaches (revert in the near future to underground testing) he felt that the President would be in a most difficult position to announce this, at least in the early future immediately after his present good-will trip. He and others mentioned successive events of the future which might dictate again and again against an announcement at that time that we were reverting to testing,—the Summit Conference, the President’s trip to Russia, and the U.S. election. We might in actuality then find ourselves in a position where we had only one of the other two choices.

7. The Vice President pointed out that the President on his return would have many things that would have to be done in a short time. He asked Mr. Gordon Gray to complete a memorandum for record which could be given to the President, or used in connection with informing the President of these discussions.

Alfred D. Starbird

Brigadier General, USA

Director of Military Application

Enclosure

Announcement

510. Memorandum of Meeting¹

Washington, December 11, 1959, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Present: The Vice President, General Persons, Secretary Herter, Mr. Farley, Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Douglas, General Loper, General Fox, Secretary Anderson, Attorney General Rogers, Chairman McCone, General Starbird, Dr. English, Director Dulles, Dr. Scoville, Director Allen, Dr. Kistiakowsky and Gordon Gray

Mr. Gray opened the meeting by indicating that the Vice President had wanted to have a discussion of the moratorium on nuclear testing. Mr. Gray suggested that the Secretary of State might give a general summary of the situation and that Mr. McCone might follow up in more detail, particularly with respect to the technical discussions now in progress in Geneva.

The Vice President made it clear that the purpose of the meeting was not to arrive at any decisions but perhaps to help in arriving at recommendations to be made to the President upon his return. He was concerned about timing and about the necessity which would confront the President immediately after his return to decide as to what would be the U.S. announced policy to apply after the expiration of the moratorium on 31 December.

Mr. Herter said that of course the principal problem was with respect to a decision as to what we do after the first of the year. The question is whether we extend the moratorium.

Mr. Herter then gave a summary account of negotiations to date. Somewhat to our surprise the Soviets agreed in August 1958 in the Conference of Experts to a system for the monitoring of testing. With regard to monitoring underground tests, the system's capabilities had to be evaluated largely on the basis of only one underground nuclear shot.

Later in HARDTACK II (in October 1958) several underground shots were fired. These revealed that the capability of the Geneva Conference of Experts' system was less than had been earlier thought. The President proposed an "atmospheric only" ban but this the Soviets refused. Our officially announced period of moratorium for negotiation was initially for one year—through October 31, 1959, but was extended later to December 31. When we realized from the HARDTACK II

¹ Source: Moratorium on nuclear testing. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.

data that the system had a lesser capability than originally thought we insisted that there must be joint technical discussions of this new data. If satisfactory technical discussions could not be carried through, we might have reverted to a limited treaty. The Soviets resisted this strongly. However, finally they “caved in” and there is now underway at Geneva a technical discussion of the underground problem. We are receiving detailed reports on the Technical Conference. They are of such a complex nature that it is hard for a layman to understand them and Secretary Herter confessed that he could not ascertain from the cables whether we are or are not making progress in the discussions.

Mr. McCone then spoke, suggesting that there are essentially three serious problems with regard to underground testing:

1. The question of the adequacy of a detection system. For example, what could the Geneva Conference of Experts’ system, even with improvements, actually detect and identify and what would be the number and procedures of inspection of those events detected but not identified?

2. The problem of on-site inspection. This problem itself contains two questions: first, one of criteria for inspection (in which the Soviet effort seems to be to establish criteria which in effect will prevent inspection) and second, a question of what we can do when we get to the site.

3. The problem of decoupling. For example, could decoupling by major factor be accomplished? If this could be done, quite large shots could be made to look so small that they would not be noticed.

Mr. McCone said that he did not think we could now draw conclusions as to the outcome of the technical discussions but he doesn’t now see any real prospect of a common approach. The Soviets had obviously been caught off-balance by our presentation on decoupling. Our people are apparently doing a good job of presenting their data. However, Mr. McCone said that one could never be sure that agreement could not be reached. He recalled in the earlier high altitude conference the Soviets had held back from any agreement initially but had finally reached agreement on many elements of the high altitude detection report.

Mr. Herter then spoke again to the question of timing. He pointed out that it was probable that somewhere between the 18th and 21st there would begin a recess until January 4. This has not been definitely agreed but seems to be the consensus of all parties.

Secretary Herter stated that if it turns out that we just cannot agree with the USSR, we are prepared to lay on the table a phased agreement which would immediately ban atmospheric tests alone. However, in any event, we are faced with the question of what to recommend to the President concerning the moratorium which expires on December 31.

Mr. Herter expressed the view that we should make no commitment as to any definite time for the further withholding of underground tests and that in our own minds we should really think in terms of continuing the moratorium on a week-to-week basis. However, he felt that we should publicly say that we have no present intention of resuming testing but reserve the right to do so.

At this point the Vice President said that on the basis of conversations that he had had with many people, he felt that there were three main points of view. He said that there are first those who want to begin underground testing now; second, there are those who feel that we should never resume tests; and third, there are those who feel we should not resume if we get what he described as a foolproof agreement.

To the Vice President the real question was this: Do we resume testing if the Soviets make an offer which is inadequate from our point of view but which may seem plausible to the world?

The Vice President expressed a reservation in his mind about the week-to-week principle pointing out that this might by reason of negotiations and other world developments in effect mean an indefinite moratorium.

Mr. Gates at this point pointed out that our whole defense rests on nuclear weapons. He also said that we must be able to experiment with weapons for safety purposes and we have a problem of definition within a definition. Is, he asked, the release of nuclear energy tantamount to weapons testing? He pointed out that we had been long prepared to engage in experimentation for safety purposes which would perhaps result in a release of nuclear energy but that there had always been some reason to postpone this experimentation, such as the Khrushchev visit and the Eisenhower trip. There might continue to be reason to avoid announcing resumption of tests by reason of the Western Summit Meeting, the East-West Summit meeting, the Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union, U.S. elections, etc.

The Vice President then pointed out that the President will soon return as a sort of international "prince of peace" and the realities of the situation lead him to believe that the President simply cannot within say, sixty days, order tests on any basis including underground unless in the meantime the Soviets do something egregious. He pointed out that public opinion hangs over us all the time and he would want to raise this question: If we should by reason of public relations have a moratorium in effect, do we then take the best inspection system we can settle for?

Mr. McCone then referred to the safety problem. He acknowledged that the percentage of danger is small but it is there nevertheless and it is imperative that we have experimentation which unfortunately will result in the release of some nuclear energy.

Mr. McCone then pointed out that he had discussed the threshold theory with Mr. Vasily Emelyanov and that Mr. Emelyanov did not seem to object. Indeed, he said that Mr. Emelyanov had told him that at one time the Soviets were prepared to propose a ban on atmospheric testing alone on the basis that the U.S. would reject it and propaganda advantage would result. Later they had been afraid that we would accept it and hence did not propose it. Mr. Emelyanov promised to consult his Government with respect to the threshold principle but there had been no further word.

Mr. McCone expressed the view that perhaps the logical answer to our situation was to propose a threshold system. In explanation, if the detection system were capable, with its on-site inspection, of effectively monitoring, for example, blasts of 10 KT and above then we would agree to forego such blasts but not forego those that were of a yield of less than 10 KT. Decoupling introduced something of a problem but this might not be insurmountable. In any event, Mr. McCone expressed the hope that the Technical Conference would bring in the threshold theory or develop so as to permit us to bring it in.

Mr. McCone then asked if we could agree that we would extend the moratorium on a week-to-week basis. Mr. Herter said it would be better to put it on a basis of no present intention to resume testing. The week-to-week concept would be our own private approach.

At this point then Mr. McCone read a proposed announcement a copy of which is attached. No copies were circulated and the announcement was not discussed in detail.

The Vice President said that he knew there were differences of opinion among scientists with respect to the military necessity of early resumption of tests and suggested that Dr. Kistiakowsky speak to this point. Dr. Kistiakowsky described the McRae Panel report and its conclusion that the greatest and most urgent problem was answering the safety questions and there was no necessity for immediate testing to meet the requirements of systems currently in development. However, he acknowledged that this was not a net evaluation and did not take into account the state of the art in the Soviet Union.

The Vice President then asked about such developments as the neutron weapons and asked whether these could be developed without further testing. It was agreed that they could not be. Mr. Gates then observed that these weapons, including the development of clean small weapons [*text not declassified*], were of considerable importance to the national security. Dr. Kistiakowsky described more in detail what the neutron weapon is.

The Attorney General asked if we had any evidence that the Soviets were now or had been engaged in underground testing. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there was no evidence whatsoever. The Attorney

General then asked whether, if we did not continue testing and the Soviets did, would this put us at a military disadvantage. The consensus was that we would be so disadvantaged. The Attorney General then observed that history would judge the policy makers rather harshly if it ultimately developed that we were withholding testing and the Soviets were not and we had thereby suffered a military disadvantage.

Mr. Herter then adverted to the seeming paradox of the fact that the uncertainty which runs like a thread through this whole matter might redound to our advantage. He pointed out that as the discussion in the meeting had indicated, there was no absolutely foolproof system. In view of the fact that one cannot be sure of avoiding detection, this uncertainty may act in a sense more as a deterrent than would absolute certainty at certain levels because the Soviets would not know exactly what could be detected and identified.

At this point, Mr. Gates pointed out that although this was not a budget discussion we must bear in mind that the kind of an inspection system we were discussing would cost large sums of money and would take a long period of time to install. When Secretary Gates indicated that a very extensive program (VELA) was necessary to prove out the detection system and develop instrumentation, Dr. Kistiakowsky indicated that this was not the purpose of the project. Instrumentation is available. The main purpose is that of improvement of system instrumentation already existent to permit a system of improved capabilities.

Mr. McCone repeated that it would take several years to install the system and in the meantime there would be a deterioration of the atomic stockpile and of the laboratories. He wished also, he said, to raise two other issues: first the question of Communist China and second the Ormsby-Gore talk. With respect to Communist China he pointed out that here was a vast land area where underground testing could be conducted at will without adequate detection and inspection. He said that his reference to the Ormsby-Gore talk was the Department of State cable dated December 9 from Wadsworth, outlining what Mr. McCone described as a very ominous and disturbing conversation with Mr. Ormsby-Gore of the UK, in effect suggesting that we might have to depart from our traditional position of "no disarmament without thoroughly effective control." (Cable attached)

Mr. McCone wondered whether we were getting ourselves into a position of policy control by the UK. He invited Mr. Herter to comment on these points.

Mr. Herter replied that from the beginning it was apparent that the UK wishes to reach an agreement. This was true before their recent elections and continues to be true. The UK, he said, was prepared to make many concessions which we have not been prepared to make. Indeed, they want us to declare another moratorium. Mr. Herter said

that the British would probably do this on their own part and there was nothing we could do to stop them. With respect to Communist China, Mr. Herter pointed out that we have a treaty article which would seek to include Communist China. However, there was no point in tabling that until the three powers agree among themselves.

Mr. McCone pointed out that by reason of information the British are getting from us, they do not need to continue their own test program.

At this point there was a discussion of the state of the art of seismology.

Secretary Herter commented that one thing that handicapped us in knowing what to do was the general lack of clear and consistent scientific indication as to exactly what were the capabilities of the monitoring system. He said there were differing opinions. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that the scientists could advise that shots above a few kilotons should be detectable and identifiable. He said further that below a few kilotons they could advise that the system would not be fully reliable. Also, if decoupling worked, much greater shots could be concealed. He indicated that there had already been certain improvements in the instrumentation which would improve the system. However, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that beyond describing the capabilities of the system, the scientists could not go. It was up to those concerned with policy to decide the nature of the agreement, considering the capabilities and limitations of the system. With particular reference to decoupling, Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that if we accept the notion of decoupling then regardless of what the experts agree in their present discussions, we will not have an adequate system. The question is, he thought, whether we really believe the Soviets will undertake this costly and difficult operation for evasion purposes. He indicated the range of costs of a big hole of \$20–50 million. To underscore his point, he said that it was possible to conduct a test behind the moon in the outer atmosphere but raised the question of whether it was realistic to suppose that anyone would really attempt it.

Mr. Allen expressed the view that perhaps we should take a system of the 20 control posts only and without on-site inspection. After all, he said, if the control post detected questionable events and these were revealed publicly perhaps this would deter violations. There seemed to be no agreement on this point.

Mr. McCone then asked if we could not work out of the dilemma by taking the initiative; why don't we come out and say that we won't test in the atmosphere—period. Mr. Herter expressed his view that this would not be wise because he feels that we should get something for such a declaration in the way of an inspection system.

Mr. McCone then reported on the meeting he had had with some members of the Joint Committee on the preceding day. He said that

probably an 80% majority of the Committee wish us to resume testing right after January 1st.

Mr. Gray then said that he wished to point out that we were really perhaps talking about two different problems—one was the experimentation for safety tests which might release some nuclear energy but which could be treated as experimentation for safety purposes and not as the resumption of weapons testing—second, was the question of the resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. Gray said that it seemed to him that there was a consensus that as long as the negotiations are going on and indeed in any event for the foreseeable future the political problems confronting the State Department would prevent the President from announcing a resumption of nuclear testing. However, if the safety problem was as great as those responsible for defense said it was then in the interest of national security the President might feel it essential to go ahead with the experimentation.

Mr. Herter then said that the State Department had been ready and willing for these experiments to be undertaken. He said that Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that they could be described as experiments and not testing. However, said Mr. Herter, the Defense Department had resisted this; he thought perhaps because it could be used as a lever for an agreement to resume testing. Mr. Gates denied this as a Defense Department position but Mr. Herter reiterated that he had understood this rather clearly from Mr. Irwin.

At this point, Mr. McCone broke in to say that it was not the Defense Department which was resisting proceeding with the experiments under the presently announced moratorium, but the AEC. He said that if this work were done at the laboratories where there was a sophisticated press it would be impossible to avoid headline stories which would describe the experiments as nuclear weapons testing. This, he pointed out, would be for the Soviets, propaganda-wise, the equivalent of an actual resumption of testing. He therefore was opposed to proceeding under the current moratorium with these experiments because no way could be found to conduct them without the release at some point of nuclear energy.

Mr. Gray said there appears to him to be one major question which we weren't facing up to and that was this: Would the continuing international political situation be such that in fact we would never resume testing? Mr. Herter observed that the State Department was not recommending such a position. Mr. Gray responded that he did not suggest that anyone was recommending such a position but as a practical matter was this not a possibility? If so, we would have an uncontrolled moratorium and if this were to be inevitable (and he expressed the hope that it would not be) then would not we want to face the decision

of taking the best system we could negotiate even if it turned out to have only primarily intelligence values?

The Vice President said that what all of this suggested to him is that perhaps some decisions which one might think could be indefinitely postponed might have to be made rather early upon the President's return. He asked Mr. Gray to complete a memorandum for record which could be given to the President, or used in connection with informing the President of these discussions.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

511. Telegram From Harold Brown to McCone¹

Washington, December 26, 1959

A. I would summarize the happenings and results of technical working group No. 2 as follows:

1. The Soviets accepted the suggested instrumental changes and ideas for future improvements. They rejected the HARDTACK II results and other conclusions about seismic detection and identification. They also refused to accept the U.S. Delegation formulation of criteria for eligibility of seismic events for inspection, which stretched the technical situation as far as we felt we could go in the direction of optimism without allowing most or all small nuclear explosions underground to be mistakenly identified as earthquakes by the criteria. There was thus no agreement nor any narrowing of the gap between US and USSR on any technical item of substance. The UK, though strongly wanting some kind of agreed report, was substantially in accord technically with the final US report.

2. The contrast between the honesty of the US Delegation and the subordination of technical evaluation to political requirements on the part of the Soviets was very evident. For example, while agreeing to the correctness of the very large decoupling factor of the large hole in private, they denied it at the formal sessions. They made an extremely dishonest presentation to the question of magnitudes, purporting to show that there were only a fifth as many earthquakes of size equivalent to a given

¹ Source: Results of technical working group no. 2: foolproof detection impossible, U.S. should resume testing. Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone: Papers, Test File, Dec. 1959.

nuclear explosion as believed by the Conference of Experts, but offered to leave things as they were in 1958, showing that they did not take their own purportedly scientific position seriously. Most important of all, they made it clear that they would accept a set of criteria only if these criteria eliminated almost all earthquakes from eligibility from inspection, whether or not this was justified by the technical situation. The U.S. Delegation, when it found that it could change its criteria so as to eliminate more natural events without too much risk of misidentification of explosions, did so. The Soviets presented, and stuck to, criteria which would certainly have identified all the underground HARDTACK explosions as earthquakes and made them ineligible for inspection. This kind of behavior indicates that inspection by technical agreement in the international control organization would never occur under the proposed treaty, and is one of most discouraging things about the negotiations to date.

3. It is clear from the work of the US technical group during the past five weeks that the system capability is considerably less than believed even a few months ago.

a. The criteria, which were as liberal as we felt could be agreed, leave almost all seismic events equivalent to 5 KT with RAINIER coupling unidentified, and even at some tens of KT a large fraction will be unidentified and, therefore, eligible for inspection. Though the aids of selection are expected to improve this situation considerably, no one can guarantee this, or say how much. This can be found out only through several years of research, and at the end of this time there is a good chance that as many new questions will have been raised as old ones answered.

b. On the other hand, preliminary calculations by Bethe and others, as well as by the Soviets, indicate that a decoupling factor of several (perhaps even five) can be achieved by choosing a different medium, (e.g. granite, which is everywhere) instead of the RAINIER tuff, or a greater burial depth, or a different geography. Though we have no exact calculations and therefore made only a reference to "considerable variation of amplitude" in the report this could mean that instead of for 5 KT, the statement that almost no equivalent earthquakes are identified by their seismic signals applies to 15 or 20 KT. That is, magnitude 4.4 may mean 15 or 20 KT instead of 5 KT.

c. On-site inspection is now agreed by the US technical people to be very difficult, that is, its probability of success may be very small. The failure of geophysical techniques "forces us to place very much greater reliance on aerial, ground, and underground visual and photographic surveys directed toward the observation and detection both of geologic and terrain disturbances as well as those of unusual human activity. Both of these kinds of evidence may be greatly diminished or possibly even completely eliminated in some cases by careful planning on the part of a potential violator."

The Soviets maintain that the experts' report says that on-site inspection has a hundred percent chance of success. They persisted in this with the statement that drilling would always find debris even after Bethe pointed out that the area to be inspected was so much larger than the dimensions of the radioactive region from an explosion that it

would take fifty thousand years to find by that method. No statement about inspection appears in our final report, because it was felt that the subject is non-quantitative, and the statements about it in the experts' report cannot be contradicted. However, it is clear that Soviet and US interpretations are very far apart.

It developed that the probable area of location of a seismic event is more nearly 2,000 square kilometers than the 200 given (though qualified) in the experts' report. The U.S. Delegation tried to allow in its criteria for 500 square kilometers where necessary. The Soviets wanted to consider everything not located to within 200 square kilometers ineligible for inspection, which would eliminate almost every event. If the inspection area is only a fraction of that within which the event is actually located, this situation alone reduces the probability of success to at most 10 or 20 percent, independent of efforts to conceal the evidence.

d. The large hole decoupling proved to be, by the evidence of engineers who have washed out large holes by solution mining, much easier than had been thought. Multiple pump operation could produce a 75 kiloton hole in as little as two years for less than \$20,000,000. In connection with the use of intelligence to find such activities, it is of interest that during most of the construction period only a two man crew would be required.

B. My own ideas on the procedure to pursue now are as follows:

1. We have been negotiating for some time on a comprehensive ban with the idea that the difficulties of policing underground (and deep space) tests would lead the Soviets to suggest or at least acquiesce easily to a threshold idea. It is obvious that they will not do so without great pressure from us. The disagreed conclusions of technical working group No. 2 provide the US with the best opportunity we may ever have to make clear to the world that the proposed control system does not in fact control underground (or space) explosions at all, below some yield (or beyond some distance). This has never been made clear to the world or US public, nor has the fact that no radioactive hazard exists from such explosions. Both of these ideas must be given wide publicity, no matter what our policy on testing may be, simply because they are true and important.

2. If world public opinion (or our opinion of what world public opinion is) makes all testing impossible for the US even though the Soviet Union may test clandestinely, then it is better to withhold testing unilaterally and not have the control system, because the presence of the inadequate control system would:

a. Lead to a false sense of reassurance. The public would not realize that the Soviets might very well be testing, while without the system they would realize it.

b. Serve as a "first step" toward other inadequate control systems to monitor real disarmament agreements which would place the US in very grave peril by depending on Soviet good intentions for our continued existence.

c. Generate extreme tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by channeling inspections into the most sensitive areas and efforts of the Soviets, the system must rely on intelligence and intelligence will

invariably point to the most sensitive areas, without knowing whether they contain nuclear test activities or something else.

3. The U.S. should propose a ban covering the atmosphere, space out to 100,000 kilometers, and underground for yields higher than about 100 or 150 kilotons. The underground situation could be handled by setting a magnitude of about 5.5, which the explosions could not exceed. A big hole to handle much more than 100 to 150 kilotons is still considered very expensive and time consuming, and so developments necessitating such yields would be made very much harder, if it is felt important to inhibit them. A few inspections a year would be enough for events above magnitude 5.5 (I estimate there are only a few tens of such events per year in the Soviet Union), and smaller events would be ineligible for inspection.

4. To avoid Soviet stalling on such a proposal, the U.S. should announce that it now reserves the right to carry out such explosions at any time, and will do so whenever it is ready and its defense needs demand. The actual execution could await an educational plan of the kind described in *B.1* above which should be accomplished in a few months. If an actual military development shot is considered too embarrassing at the moment, the DITCHDICGER experiment might be carried out with the statement that in the absence of an agreement and a detection system, everything is completely a matter of trust, and that the world can trust us when we say that this shot has only peaceful aims. The Soviets have hitherto been able to deflect U.S. attempts at a limited treaty merely by ignoring them, and letting the U.K. put pressure on us to continue negotiating on a comprehensive ban which we know to be technically incapable of being monitored. Another eighteen months of this kind of activity must be avoided, and the announcement that we are no longer bound to refrain from testing would help avoid it. Even more effective would be an early resumption of low-yield underground tests following an educational campaign, which would put real pressure on the Soviets to reach an agreement consistent with the capabilities of the control system.

5. It may be that the U.S. would lose more in allied and neutral opinion by resuming tests than it stands to lose by a gradual weakening of our military strength. However, one should remember that this deterioration could well make us unable to defend either ourselves from a massive attack by denying us the ability to retaliate with mobile missiles which could survive, or to defend our allied and the neutrals with effective weapons of limited war. I find it hard to believe that we cannot explain our case to the rest of the world well enough to reduce to acceptable proportions the propaganda losses following upon a refusal to accept a comprehensive treaty which is not accompanied by a comprehensive control system.

I think we can make our case. To do so, however, we must take a strong line insisting on a threshold or a limited treaty, corresponding

to the capabilities of the system. We must stick to that line. We must let the U.K. know that we mean it and that we expect them to support us in what they know to be technically justified. Finally, we must let the Soviets know that this is our final offer, and that we do not intend to continue the present uncontrolled ban. We can best do this by resuming tests which are allowed under the arrangement we propose without waiting for the conference to act on it, otherwise the Soviets will inevitably decide we are bluffing. The disagreed conclusions of technical working group two, particularly on criteria, provide a logical public justification for such a policy on the part of the U.S. The justification has existed for some time within the Government, where the facts have been known, but we are unlikely to have again as good a peg for a strong and positive policy as has been provided by the results of the technical discussions during the past month in Geneva.

512. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 28, 1959

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Cessation Policy

PARTICIPANTS

WHITE HOUSE
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Keeney

AEC
Mr. McCone
Gen. Luedecke
Dr. English

CIA
Gen. Cabell
Mr. Brent

State
Secretary Herter
Ambassador Wadsworth
Under Secretary Dillon
Mr. Farley—S/AE
Mr. Sullivan—
S/AE
Mr. Spiers—S/AE
Mr. Dean—SOV

DOD
Secretary Gates
General Twining
General Loper
General Fox
Mr. Knight

OTHERS
Dr. James Fisk—
President Bell
Telephone Labs
Mr. Frederick Eaton

¹ Source: No agreement with the Soviet Union on technical detection criteria, position to take in resumed negotiations, decision on testing. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

The Secretary said that a number of significant things had occurred in connection with the Geneva negotiations since the last meeting of principals. The technical working group had resulted in a largely disagreed report. The Secretary asked Dr. Fisk to describe the impasse that had been reached and to give his appraisal of the technical situation. *Dr. Fisk* reviewed the course of the meeting, describing the position that the U.S. had taken on the new Hardtack data, the "big hole" decoupling possibilities, system improvements and technical criteria establishing eligibility for on-site inspection. Dr. Fisk said that it was obvious from the outset of the meetings that the Soviet delegation was operating under strict political instructions and it proved extremely difficult to center the arguments on strictly technical considerations. The Soviets never consented to informal meetings until the end of the talks and even then their representatives were under severe constraints. This was unlike the situation that prevailed in the summer of 1958 where informal sessions proved most useful. The meeting ended without any agreement on the US data or its implications. Whereas the Soviets accepted the "big hole" theory they challenged its feasibility and the lack of experimental foundation. Dr. Fisk interpolated that his own first reaction to the big hole had been that it was a bizarre idea. He now felt that it looked more feasible than he had first thought, if constructed in salt domes. The Soviets agreed with all of the improvements we suggested and in general with anything which was optimistic. There was no agreement on criteria, although at some points the Soviet and US drafts coincided. Under the terms of our criteria a large majority of seismic events would be eligible for inspection. The Soviet approach would allow inspection only of highly suspicious events, such as those occurring in aseismic areas. Our delegation took the position that it was impossible to assign degrees of suspiciousness. Dr. Fisk said that he found it significant that the Soviet Annex to the final report does not contain the Soviet criteria proposals and that this must mean they themselves recognize that their position is absurd and that it would fall apart when subjected to objective technical scrutiny. Dr. Fisk continued that despite the failure to reach agreement the meeting had resulted in a far broader understanding on the part of all participants of the technical problems involved in underground detection. All of the US data is now on the record. He referred to the fact that Federov had blasted the US presentation at the last meeting and that he, Dr. Fisk, had tried to answer him on the spot. The effectiveness of our response could no doubt be improved. In general Dr. Fisk felt there was little doubt that the USSR genuinely wanted a treaty but they would not admit anything which makes the problem of detection look more difficult than it did in 1958. Sir William Penney of the UK delegation was in almost total agreement with the US position. The UK annex to the report was only slightly different in its emphasis on minor points.

The Secretary said that the Soviet annex was a nasty document and reflected on the integrity of our scientific team. He felt consideration should be given to how we might most effectively answer the Soviet attack. He said that we were now confronted with the problem of where we go from here and referred to the decision which had been made when the Soviets accepted the technical talks that we would review our position in the light of the conclusions of the technical meetings. Under the US criteria 90 per cent of the events which were detected would be inspectable and this would amount to a very large number. There would be thousands of events of 1 kiloton and above and the problem would be immense. *Dr. Fisk* agreed but stated that auxiliary information, when used by experts, could reduce by a factor of two or more the events which might have to be subject to inspection. However, this still left a very large number.

The Secretary said that there were several different ways of proceeding. First, we could press the Soviets further to accept our criteria. The second would be to get agreement on a quota of inspections sufficiently high to provide an adequate deterrent. *Amb. Wadsworth* felt that the Soviets might take our criteria but that they would not go very high on the numbers. *The Secretary* was concerned by our lack of a sound basis to defend before the Senate an agreement which provided practically no deterrence to violations in lower yield underground tests. We were confronted with two questions in connection with tomorrow's meeting with the President. First, what should we recommend to the President with respect to the extension of the moratorium which expires December 31. Second, what direction should the negotiations take upon reconvening January 12. He recalled that there had been a prior decision to table a limited treaty and that this had been reversed when the Soviets accepted the technical talks. Given this background he felt that there were two courses open. The first was to give up any attempt to control underground testing altogether. The second was to reconcile ourselves to accepting less than adequate. A third approach which had been suggested appealed to him more than either of these alternatives, namely, to propose a threshold (expressed in terms of seismic magnitude rather than kiloton yield) above which underground tests would be banned. He asked *Dr. Fisk* to comment on the feasibility of this approach. *Dr. Fisk* said that there is a difference in view between ourselves and the Russians on the correlation between yield of an explosion and seismic amplitude, but there appeared to be general agreement among seismologists on the relationship between signal amplitude and seismic intensity. *Mr. McCone* said he thought that the approach was a feasible one.

Secretary Gates suggested that one way to combine our objectives of establishing a new direction and rebutting the Soviet attack on our scientists would be to draft and despatch a Presidential letter deploring

the attack, referring to the lack of technical agreement and suggesting reversion to a phased treaty such as had been put forward on April 13. *The Secretary* said that he saw two practical dangers that had to be balanced in deciding what to do in the present negotiations. The first is that we should avoid concluding a treaty that does not hold water. On the other hand we must recognize that we live in a world that does not like nuclear testing and our procedure will have to take this reality into account. This is why he felt that the threshold idea offers the best possibility. The world wants us to exert all possible efforts to reach an agreement and the threshold principle, which would ban underground tests in the highest yield ranges, would be supportable in public opinion. We would take the position that the arbitrary position of the Soviets and their refusal to engage in objective technical discussions left us no alternative but this approach. At the same time we would propose a joint research program and express the hope that further work would allow us gradually to achieve the objective of pushing the threshold down. If the Russians reject this suggestion the onus for failure will be on them and we will be in a much better position vis-a-vis world public opinion with respect to resumption of our own testing. *General Cabell* said that the Soviets have played the technical talks break down in a low key and that their propaganda had emphasized the areas of agreement which had been reached and de-emphasized the areas of disagreement. *The Secretary* said that this confirmed his view that they genuinely want to reach an agreement and that we should take advantage of this desire.

Mr. McCone said that he was disturbed about leaving unanswered the Soviet attack on our scientific presentation which he felt should be brought into public perspective promptly. *Dr. Fisk* said that he hoped we would avoid having this degenerate into a name-calling contest and felt that it would be more effective to play this quietly. *Mr. Farley* said that we might emphasize that the Soviet name-calling was an indication that they had been unable to counter our technical arguments and that we should put out again the technical facts which had led us to the conclusions we had reached.

The Secretary said that he liked Secretary Gates' idea of a letter from the President. *Mr. McCone* agreed and said that he also felt that threshold suggestion would have appeal if it were technically practical. *Secretary Gates* felt that the threshold idea could be mentioned in the letter but that it did not need to be made as a proposal. *Dr. Fisk* said that there were some technical problems with the threshold proposal, such as our ability to set out a procedure to determine an average magnitude value when confronted with scattered seismograms, each of which had a slightly different amplitude. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that he felt it would be practical to put forward the threshold proposal as long as the threshold were tied to magnitude, as the Secretary had suggested,

rather than to yield. *Dr. Fisk* said that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that if it is difficult to write criteria for on-site inspection, it will be even more difficult to establish the criteria in terms of instrument reading for a threshold. If this were the direction decided upon early and careful study would be required.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the threshold proposal could be sweetened by proposing advance notification of any underground tests conducted below the threshold, and if provision were made to use these tests as part of a research program to advance the art of seismology which could lead to a gradual reduction in the threshold. *Secretary Gates* said that this proposal made good sense.

In connection with the drafting of a Presidential letter *Dr. Kistiakowsky* observed that it would be best to avoid going deeply into technical considerations and that it would be best to issue a factual statement to which the President could refer. *Mr. Farley* suggested that the President might say he had instructed the scientists to go to Geneva to conduct a free and objective scientific inquiry and that thereafter his attention had been drawn to *Federov's* intemperate attack. He had then asked the scientists to report to him on this matter and he was transmitting the report to *Khrushchev* under cover of the latter. This approach would get far more public attention for our position than the Soviet attack had received. *Mr. McCone* reiterated that we should take early initiative with a factual statement which *Dr. Fisk* and his group might prepare.

The Secretary asked *Dr. Fisk* how long it would take to get a scientific study of the feasibility of the threshold. *Dr. Fisk* said that he thought a week would suffice once the appropriate seismologists and staticians had been assembled. *The Secretary* asked that such a study be made as a matter of priority. If the study concluded that it was not feasible to suggest a threshold we would have to re-examine the position we would take in the negotiations. *Secretary Gates* suggested again that it would be better not to propose a threshold but to suggest only that this possibility be jointly studied. *The Secretary* disagreed, stating that it was far better to make a firm proposal. This would provide a basis for demanding a modest number of inspections. In any case it would be better to take what we can get in terms of a ban on underground tests than to abandon the objective entirely.

The Secretary referred to the need to make a public announcement regarding our future testing policy. He preferred a statement to the effect that we had no plans to resume testing, that we were presently studying the documents from the technical discussions, and that we would state our position on the question in the future. *Mr. Gray* suggested that we should announce that we would not engage in atmospheric testing but that we would reserve the right to resume underground tests. *The Secretary* said that this would reduce *Amb. Wadsworth's* bargaining

power in Geneva to the vanishing point if it became necessary to propose a phased treaty. *Secretary Gates* agreed. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said that he would prefer continuation of the week-to-week extension to Mr. Gray's proposal.

The Secretary said that there was a further alternative course of action which had not been considered and that was to take up the Tsarapkin suggestion that the full system be installed and a temporary ban on underground tests be put into effect for a two or three year period. He was personally not keen on this alternative although it may have to be considered in view of the British position. It is clear that the U.K. will split with us when it comes to actual resumption of testing. *Mr. McCone* observed that the British could afford this position only because they get weapons data from us. *The Secretary* said that the question of resumption of testing had to be considered in the light of the importance for us of further underground testing. Whereas this is essentially a political decision we need to have the technical facts available. He recognized that it was difficult to answer the point that you never know what further testing may produce and that important technical break-throughs, presently unforeseen, may materialize. *General Twining* said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they were now prepared to accept an adequately controlled cessation of tests, had always thought that any cessation was a big mistake. The Chiefs felt that once tests were stopped we would never be able to resume them. He was convinced that they were right in this assessment. *Mr. McCone* said that the AEC was not prepared to comment on the need for further U.S. testing but could state that a nation which was free to conduct underground tests could make significant technological advances in a period of three years.

The Secretary said that he would like to stick with the threshold proposal. This had tremendous political advantages for us in showing that we were willing to go as far as we possibly could even in the face of the obstinacy displayed by the Soviets in the technical talks. This would be far better for us publicly than an immediate resumption of testing. *Mr. McCone* agreed. He stated that a group of scientists were scheduled soon to meet at Pasadena and that this might offer an opportunity to get a quick assessment of the feasibility of a threshold. He added that Dr. Brown of Livermore had supported the threshold idea. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that he felt that the difficulties to which Dr. Fisk had alluded could be minimized if the treaty were drafted to say that no tests would be conducted which would produce a signal larger than magnitude, say, 5.0. At the same time we would state unilaterally that we would not test above a certain yield, say, 20 kilotons, that would allow us a sufficient margin of error. *Dr. Fisk* agreed that with a "guard band" concept of this type many of the difficulties would be reduced. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* stated

also that our first proposal did not need to spell out all of the details but could be made in fairly general terms. *Under Secretary Dillon* said that we did not have to have a firm proposal by January 12, although we should work out the technical details as quickly as possible. *Ambassador Wadsworth* said that we should prepare our position during the recess on other outstanding points which would give us momentum in the meetings in case there was a delay in presenting our new position. We should aim at presenting a counter “package” proposal of our own on these issues.

The Secretary then reviewed the order of presentation for the meeting with the President tomorrow, observing that there appeared to be general agreement on the course of action we should follow.

513. Memorandum From McCone to the AEC General Manager¹

December 29, 1959

On Monday, December 23, Secretaries Herter, Gates, Dillon, General Twining, General Cabell (representing Mr. Dulles) and the writer met with Dr. Fisk for the purpose of reviewing the results of the technical conference at Geneva and also determining recommendations to be made to the President concerning (a) the handling of the test moratorium after December 31, and (b) guidelines to be followed by Ambassador Wadsworth when the Geneva conference resumes on January 12.

On Tuesday, December 23, the some group met with the President at Augusta to discuss the above subjects and to receive the President's directive concerning the policies to be followed.

It was decided:

1. The United States policy with respect to test moratorium which expires December 31, should be as outlined in the attached press release made by the President at Augusta this morning.

2. It is our desire to genuinely seek agreement on test suspension under satisfactory conditions of inspection and control.

3. Since it appears impractical to arrange proper safeguards for small underground explosions, Dr. Fisk's scientific group are to

¹ Source: Details decision made by the President on U.S. position in nuclear testing ban talks. Secret; Personal. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Test File, March 1960.

immediately explore and report the feasibility of establishing a threshold (which might be relatively high) and possibly would be expressed in terms of seismograph readings.

4. If it is possible to deal with the question of the threshold in this way or otherwise then the delegation will be instructed to seek a treaty which would ban atmospheric testing and underground testing above the agreed threshold with no prohibition on testing below the agreed threshold level. It is recognized that there is the risk of "cheating" by decoupling, but it was felt that this might be an acceptable risk if all conditions would be satisfactorily met which would include, among other things, the installation of adequate number of properly instrumented detection stations and an agreement on a reasonable number of unrestricted on-site inspections.

Note: Further discussion of the risks inherent in decoupling are not necessarily foreclosed.

5. If the Fisk scientific group report that the establishment of a threshold is not feasible then Ambassador Wadsworth will be instructed to seek an atmospheric treaty with no prohibition whatsoever on underground testing.

6. Under both 4 and 5 above it would be agreed that when and as technological improvements permit extending the area of suspension then the treaty will be amended to include such expanded areas. Special emphasis will be placed on the intention of the United States to continue research and to perfect detection methods for the purpose of expanding the agreed areas of suspension.

7. Throughout both meetings indignation was expressed by all parties over the intemperance of the Soviet scientists' comments at the conclusion of the Geneva technical conference. These statements are to be refuted by Dr. Fisk through public release of the verbatim transcripts of pertinent parts of the conference. Furthermore, the intemperate conduct of the Soviet scientists will be forcefully brought to the attention of the Soviet government through appropriate channels.

John A. McCone

cc: Commissioner Graham
Commissioner Flobarg
Commissioner Williams

Attachment

Press Release

514. Telegram 5162 to London¹

Washington, January 7, 1960, 12:28 p.m.

5162. VERBATIM TEXT. Deliver immediately to Foreign Secretary Lloyd following message from Acting Secretary. Advise date and time of delivery.

QUOTE.

January 6, 1960

Dear Selwyn:

Since the adjournment on December 19 of the Nuclear Test Cessation negotiations in Geneva, we have been devoting much thought to the situation created by the Soviet refusal to acknowledge the technical facts regarding the problem of underground detection and identification. This refusal and the discourteous manner in which our scientists were treated have given us a good deal of concern. I am enclosing for your personal information a copy of a letter which Chris sent to Gromyko just before he left town for a short vacation. Gromyko was informed on delivery of the letter that we have no present intention of making it public. So far we have had no response.

Both the British and American scientific delegations were in accord that the capabilities of the control system recommended by the experts in 1958 are not as great as previously believed. As long as the Soviet Union refuses to concur in this evaluation of our difficulties, we find ourselves without any basis for attempting to reach agreement in the political conference on the provisions of a comprehensive treaty which, while taking the problems fully into account, would, at the same time, seek to overcome them.

In these circumstances, we feel that upon the resumption of the talks on January 12, we should press the Soviet delegation to accommodate itself to the scientific facts as we see them. In particular, we should stress that it is both logically and practically impossible to proceed with negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty without a set of agreed criteria and without established procedures for initiating and carrying out on-site inspections. We are opposed to any reconvening of the technical working group; any necessary technical questions might

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Dillon to Lloyd outlining U.S. position in resumed nuclear test suspension talks. Confidential; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

be discussed either at the political conference itself, or in such *ad hoc* sub-groups as it may prove desirable to set up.

We cannot, of course, now predict how the Soviet delegation will react to such an approach, but their reaction should indicate the area of agreement now possible between the two sides. If the Soviets do not prove to be forthcoming within a week or two, we feel that there is no alternative but to revert to some sort of phased treaty. We naturally have very much in mind our proposal of last April that we negotiate a phased treaty to be applicable initially to atmospheric tests, with a correspondingly simplified control system. At the same time, we believe that if it should prove technically feasible, it might be advantageous for the Western position, before proceeding to this scheme, to advocate a treaty including a limited underground ban above a prescribed threshold.

Our specialists in this matter are now studying whether it would be technically feasible to define a threshold in terms of seismic magnitude. By putting the threshold in magnitude instead of kiloton values, we would avoid disputes with the Soviets both about the proper scale for converting explosion yields into seismograph readings and about large cavity decoupling. The Soviet objective of keeping the number of inspections to a minimum would mean that they would bear part of the burden for whatever threshold might be adopted. As you remember we have always maintained that there is a direct relationship between the number of unidentified events and the level of inspection required. As soon as our study is completed we will be in touch with you about our specific ideas.

We believe that a threshold approach would be an earnest of our wish to accept obligations under the treaty up to the very limit of what it is scientifically possible to control at the present time. It would be understood that, as advances were made in detection and identification techniques and agreements reached for their effective use, we would be willing progressively to lower the threshold. In addition, we might well at the outset propose a jointly agreed program of research with the USSR to speed up progress in seismology. I think you will agree that this proposal would have the additional merit, as compared with the April suggestion for a limited treaty, of providing justification for the installation and operation of a full-scale control system on the territories of the three original parties.

In the light of the major problems which remain unresolved in the technical area, we do not now consider it fruitful to push to immediate decisions on political-organizational issues. We are not now willing to deal with the Soviet "package" proposal as such, but we understand that it is sensible to continue discussions on such questions as would have to be settled in any type of treaty. The U.S. Delegation, therefore,

expects to have several new suggestions for dealing with matters such as the powers of the Commission and the Administrator. It plans to discuss these as well as the general position outlined in this letter with the U.K. Delegation in Geneva within the next few days.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Douglas Dillon
Acting Secretary

The Right Honorable
Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.
END QUOTE.

515. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, January 8, 1960

SUBJECT

Course of Action to be Pursued Upon Resumption of Nuclear Tests Conference,
January 12

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>	<i>C.I.A.</i>
Acting Secretary Dillon	Dr. Kistiakowsky	Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. Farley—S/AE	Mr. Gordon Gray	Mr. Brent
Mr. Popper—S/AE	Mr. Keeny	Dr. Scoville
Mr. Baker—S/AE		
Mr. Mark—S/AE	<i>D.O.D.</i>	<i>A.E.C.</i>
Mr. Dubs—SOV	Secretary Gates	Chairman McCone
	Gen. Loper	Gen. Starbird
	Mr. Knight	Dr. English
	Gen. Fox	Dr. Walske

Mr. Dillon referred to his letter of January 7 to Foreign Secretary Lloyd outlining in general terms the course of action to be pursued

¹ Source: Discussion of appropriate threshold for underground testing. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

upon resumption of the Geneva negotiations January 12th and noted that the main element to be filled in was the question of the threshold. He called upon Dr. Kistiakowsky to present recommendations based upon the work of a group of advisers which had met on Wednesday to consider this question.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said the group of scientists which had worked both in California and here, had concluded it is technically possible to define a threshold in terms of the magnitude of seismic events detected by the control system. He distributed copies of a definition of magnitude based upon straightforward measurements which, apart from minor quibbles, would probably be acceptable from a technical standpoint even to Soviet scientists. He said that the technical group had concluded that above a magnitude of 4.25 the definition he had distributed could be readily applied. Above magnitude 4.5 it would be possible to test safely up to about half the corresponding kiloton yield since the magnitude would be uncertain by some 0.1 to 0.2 magnitude units and the yield of a device can not be predicted in advance with complete accuracy. He said the one minor point on which they had not reached complete agreement was merely a matter of choice, namely how far out you should go with the instruments used to measure the critical magnitude. He distributed a table indicating the number of events that would be located and unidentified at various magnitudes if the U.S. definition and criteria were applied. The table is attached. He said that the group had decided to recommend, although it did not represent a purely technical judgment, that a magnitude of 4.75 would be a useful point at which to define the threshold. This magnitude corresponds to the Blanca shot in the Hardtack series, so we have a definite fix on instrument readings for this magnitude. If the Soviets stick to their own interpretation of the Hardtack data they would, under that threshold, not be able to test more than two kiloton devices. The U.S. on the basis of its interpretation would feel free to test devices up to and possibly above 10 kilotons, without the use of decoupling, in a medium comparable to that of the Rainier shot. The level of the threshold to be chosen, however, is flexible. If it is higher there is less justification for a substantial monitoring system and the U.S. position becomes correspondingly less defensible. If it is lower the number of inspections becomes quite large if a substantial deterrent is to be maintained. The incentive to undertake concealment by use of decoupling also becomes greater. He noted that it was considered technically feasible at a cost of some £25 million to construct a hole large enough to contain a 70 kiloton explosion which was not substantially larger for test purposes than the legal tests at 4.75 magnitude. Thus the 4.75 level suggested represents a compromise between these conflicting considerations. In response to questions as to what magnitude scale the 4.75 magnitude represented, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that it was based on the Gutenberg and Richter

scale as developed in 1956. The numbers of unidentified events in the table were calculated by the rigorous standards of U.S. criteria set forth at the recent technical conference. Opinion differs as to how much further a good seismologist could narrow down the choice. Estimates vary from 30 per cent to a factor of 10. A fair guess is that the unidentified shown on the table would be reduced by a factor of 2. If seismic research continues, this factor can be improved. One point on which delegation scientists were sensitive in recent technical discussions was the Soviet reminder that little had been done for improvement of the system by U.S. scientists since 1958.

He said that the group had also made non-scientific estimates of the number of inspections that might be suggested to the principals for consideration. This could be either a percentage quota or a numerical quota. The pluses and minuses of the two alternative methods of calculation include the following factors:

A percentage basis (1) affords protection against yearly variations in the number of earthquakes and existing uncertainties in our estimates, and

(2) if based only on the number of unidentified events, presents a much greater incentive to the Soviet Union to participate in improvements of the technical capabilities of the system because such improvements would reduce the number of unidentified events; and gives the Soviets an incentive to install stations in Communist China in order to reduce the number of unidentified events eligible for inspection.

A numerical basis (1) Would presumably be easier to negotiate since it accepts the quota proposal and makes the exact level of inspection clear in advance.

(2) Avoids the need for criteria on which there was no meeting of minds among Soviet-U.S. experts.

(3) Is easier to apply in practice.

(4) Is simple and understandable from the standpoint of public relations.

There are several alternative means of expressing the level of inspection.

(1) We could say 10 per cent of all located seismic events above the magnitude of 4.75 were to be inspected. This method would by-pass the criteria problem but would provide little incentive to improve the system unless the treaty also called for reductions in the number of inspections in connection with improvements.

(2) We could call for inspection of 20 per cent of all located seismic events deemed eligible for inspection by the criteria the U.S. has proposed. This proposal would be based on the proposal we have already tabled that inspection of 20 per cent of events below 5 kilotons

be inspected. If this basis for calculation were proposed, the percentage would apply to the number of events unidentified without stations in Red China until such stations would be installed.

(3) The third alternative would be to simply say that there would be 10 inspections per year.

Mr. Dillon said it makes little difference what exact level is selected within the general range *Dr. Kistiakowsky* recommends. The question depends not only on technical factors but may involve specific military needs of the Department of Defense and AEC. If, for example, from a technical standpoint we could accept a 10 kiloton threshold, and DOD had strong needs for tests in the 15 or 20 kiloton range, this factor could be taken into account. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said the group of scientists had not explicitly considered the question of U.S. testing needs in its recommendation, but that *Dr. Harold Brown* of Livermore had joined in the recommendations. He is thoroughly familiar with our testing needs and presumably took this factor into account. *Mr. Gates* said these technical questions relating to testing needs were mostly for AEC to decide. He noted that after all these complex calculations we had arrived back at the *Lloyd* proposal for 10 inspections. *Mr. Dillon* commented that *Lloyd's* 10 inspections had applied to a comprehensive ban whereas the present suggestion was for 10 inspections applied to events above approximately 20 kilotons. *General Loper* stressed that all unidentified events should be eligible for inspection. *Mr. Gates* said that just as military needs are usually over-estimated in the first instance as a margin of safety, we should play it safe in our initial proposal regarding the level of inspection. *Mr. Dillon* said that we might, in fact, need a higher deterrent factor than 20 per cent and recalled our previous proposal that all events above 5 kilotons be inspected.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said the figure of 10 would include all events we thought really suspicious after our seismologist had intelligently applied diagnostic criteria to the unidentified events.

Mr. Dillon reverted to the relationship of military needs to a threshold and commented that, if you needed a 30 kiloton shot for weapons development, this could be legitimately conducted by the use of decoupling. That would not be cheating since the size of the signal rather than the size of the explosion would be the criterion of legality. *Mr. Gray* asked whether there was any point in thinking in terms of a control system including Communist China. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that in this estimate he was looking at the column of figures calculated without stations in Communist China. He said that there might be substantial advantage stipulating that testing allowable under the threshold be accompanied by advance notification of the time and place of the tests. We could argue that this builds into the proposal a mechanism for improvement of the system. *Mr. Dillon* asked what were the prospects for progressing

to lower thresholds. He noted that Dr. Kistiakowsky said it was difficult to apply the definition below 4.25. He asked whether, for example, a threshold of 4.6 would be feasible. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said we could go even further down than 4.6 if the auxiliary criteria could be codified. He mentioned that Dr. Oliver already speaks of a factor of 10 reduction in unidentified events by unilateral application of the auxiliary criteria.

Mr. Dillon said it was important from a public relations standpoint to emphasize that one threshold would not apply forever. We should emphasize our willingness, as better methods of development are to be put into effect, to lower the threshold progressively. This could also be done by increasing the number of on-site inspections. *Mr. Gates* questioned the idea of stressing “we could do better later”, since it implies the U.S. threshold quota we now propose is too high. *Mr. McCone* said it could also be argued by the Soviets that we should call off all tests below a threshold unilaterally from the beginning.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said we still have on the books a proposal to ban all tests in outer space. There is a well established fact of gaps in detection of capabilities at great distances, even though testing at such distances would cost a great deal and could not be conducted on a large scale for some years. Our policy with respect to such a ban is, however, primarily a political rather than a technical problem. *Mr. Dillon* suggested that we might go up to 100,000 kilometers on the basis of ground based instruments instead of proposing the total ban based upon very expensive satellite systems. *Mr. McCone* said he felt the same way.

Mr. Gates said he felt he must reflect the very strong JCS concern about including an underwater ban. Political difficulties with underwater tests are much the same as with those in the atmosphere. We should not, however, propose to include such a ban at an early stage. A very real military problem is involved. Without further experimentation we simply don’t yet know how to kill a submarine with nuclear weapons without endangering the crew of the destroyer delivering the weapon. We would have to give in on the ban of underwater tests in the last analysis, but it would be unwise to begin by doing so. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* asked whether bubbles from an underwater shot could contaminate the atmosphere. *Mr. Gates* said this was not known. In addition there was the difficulty of possible decoupling of underwater shots too if you are willing to spend enough. He believed the political factors were equal to the military factors in the case of underwater explosions, but believed it was good not to start with the full offer.

Mr. Dillon noted that the JCS also wants to test in the atmosphere. *Mr. Gates* agreed but said the underwater question was somewhat different and would involve not weapons development but learning to use weapons already in our stockpile. It is a safety problem to be resolved. We don’t want to use weapons that would kill our own people.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that a 10 kt underwater shot could be conducted provided one million tons of concrete were used, were made in a structure the size of the Empire State Building, and were placed two kilometers deep in the ocean and when, of course, the Department of Defense is rich enough to do this.

Mr. Dillon said we should all go home and study the figures that had been presented and should get additional figures from *Dr. Kistiakowsky* for the intermediate ranges between 4.75 and 5. There would be no great difference to us between 4.75 and 4.85, for example, and we would need the advice of the DOD and AEC in making a choice.

Mr. McCone asked whether this was a question of adequate safeguards or if the elbow room we needed for military requirements is a legitimate consideration. *Mr. Dillon* said we could move the threshold somewhat on the latter basis. The problem with the threshold of 5 is that it may not provide sufficient justification for control systems in the Soviet Union. We have little feeling about the precise level so long as it provides adequate justification for the system we propose. The Soviet criteria would have identified events only above the Blanca range. In this sense the Soviets too were admitting a threshold of about this level, so that it would not be in a position to object too effectively to our proposal. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* noted by way of clarification that a statement that the technical situation was difficult below 4.25 applies only if we assume the Geneva system. We could go lower if the system were modified as regards either spacing or instrumentation.

Mr. McCone said that while further study is required he was in a position to make some comment even now on the threshold problem. He said that this would seem to be an extremely complicated type of negotiation; that it has many pitfalls from the negotiating point of view and that it gives *Tsarapkin* considerable room to maneuver us into an uncomfortable position. He said we should think carefully as to whether we want to start down this road at all. We should decide in advance with the UK just what kind of a treaty we are negotiating, that is, whether our aim is a comprehensive ban or whether it is our intention to stop testing only in the areas where effective safeguards can be accomplished. If the latter is agreed, both with the UK and Russians, we may safely go this way.

Mr. Dillon said he agreed that we should not get into specific numbers in the Geneva negotiations unless the Russians agreed in principle to the threshold approach. As to the level of threshold, *Mr. McCone* said that recognizing the political factors the AEC would prefer the threshold of 5 but could live with a threshold of 4.75.

Mr. Gates asked whether it is realistic to expect that, if you can test legally below a threshold, it would be politically possible to conduct an extensive test program below it—for example, 10 tests a year. *Mr. Dillon*

said he didn't think the question of whether you have a threshold would make any difference in the political reaction to a test program. [illegible in the original] would be equally concerned about underground testing whether it was permitted by a treaty with the Soviets or not. Testing would be easier with the threshold to the extent the threshold would permit us to say that we would in the future ban all tests that were controllable. The initial agreement would show our willingness and good intentions. *Mr. Farley* added that in addition, the kind of a treaty we were discussing would dispose of the pollution problem.

Mr. McCone said we now know that the threshold is technically feasible; the next question is whether it is good. *Mr. Dillon* said that he thinks it is a good approach. He believed we should say we want a phased treaty covering the atmosphere (leaving the underwater question aside for now) and underground tests above a given threshold. We should point out this approach by-passes the criteria disagreement with Soviet scientists. We should say we do not want to go into detail on the proposal until it is agreed in principle. We should not get into the outer space question unless the Soviets agree on the underground part of our proposal. Then we could say once the principle of threshold was accepted, that a comparable principle should apply in outer space. We should tell the U.K. as soon as possible what our ideas are on a specific threshold. *Mr. Gray* asked what the U.K.'s attitude would be. *Mr. Dillon* said that they may very well accept the threshold proposal. They could be expected to proclaim a moratorium on tests below the threshold and would want the U.S. to do the same. *Mr. Gray* commented that we might ask the U.K. in this case whether they would want the information from our own "immoral" tests.

Mr. Allen Dulles noted that the higher you put the threshold the fewer on-site inspection you get. *Mr. Dillon* said you wouldn't get many any way.

Mr. McCone said that a high threshold reduces the incentive for decoupling. The Soviets, he believed, would discuss a number more readily than a percentage. The Soviets might also propose that we keep the same number of inspections and move the threshold down. He said the AEC believed the simplest method would be to base inspections upon a percentage of all events located. We can couple this with a statement of willingness to renegotiate the level as detection and identification capabilities improve. We would want a higher percentage depending on whether Red China was included in the control system. In response to a question, *Mr. Keeny* said Red China was relatively more important than other areas of Asia because it was not only adjacent to the Soviet Union but adjacent to highly seismic areas within the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kistiakowsky commented on the project Vela. So far little money has been made available and little work had been done. Defense has quite recently made available \$8 million for the project. In addition to this project, however, there are two other research needs: (1) research on instrumentation for ground-based detection in outer space, and (2) research on satellite instrumentation for detection. *General Starbird* said the AEC was spending \$2 million in development of outer space instruments and another million in construction of a hole for underground tests. *General Loper* said the original memorandum of agreement last April did not appear to call for such an expensive program as called for by the more far-reaching objective stated for Project Vela which ARPA had designed.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said we needed research programs in all three fields, seismic, ground stations for high altitude detection, and satellite instrumentation. *Mr. McCone* said the AEC was making preparations for the decoupling shots but the announcement of these preparations had been delayed since November, first because of the U.N. debate and then because of the technical talks in Geneva. We could not make the announcement as easily after January 12 as now because it might result in some embarrassment to the resumed Geneva discussions. Since now seems to be the best time he proposed the text already cleared interdepartmentally should be released. *Mr. Farley* confirmed that we had no objection to the text and added this would seem to be a suitable time. *Mr. Dillon* agreed but believed the President should see it, because of his personal interest in these matters. *Mr. Gray* agreed the President should see it. *General Starbird* said that failure to make the announcement had not prevented preparations so far. They had proceeded at the Nevada test grounds under the general implication that we were merely keeping the test grounds in order. There have been no leaks so far but it would be difficult to seek sites for additional tests in Louisiana if we were unable to state our purpose.

Mr. McCone asked for discussion of the question of whether we should make the announcement at all. *Mr. Dillon* commented that the President's attitude is often "why say something if we don't have to". *Mr. Gates* said it is not a problem of DOD concern. *Mr. Dillon* said we need to go ahead and get the sites we need for additional tests, and the desirability of the announcement would seem to depend on whether the announcement was necessary in order to proceed with site selection. *Mr. McCone* said he is willing to take the risk of proceeding without announcement, but it should be taken in the recognition that at some point we will have to make the announcement after the fact. It was agreed to defer the announcement and to proceed with the selection of sites.

Mr. Dillon said the group should meet again next week after it had considered the threshold proposal advanced by *Dr. Kistiakowsky*. He said that *Mr. Merchant* would represent the Department at the meeting. In the meantime instructions to the Delegation now would be along lines of the January 6 letter to *Selwyn Lloyd*, pertinent paragraphs of which he read to the meeting.

Attachment

M	N	Nu	Nu*	Y _R
5.25	32	3	8	110
5.00	59	8	27	43
4.75	105	25	70	19
4.50	185	95	150	8
4.25	335	245	300	3.3
4.00	580	490	545	1.45

M Magnitude

N *Total number* of earthquakes in the USSR of magnitude greater than M

Nu *Number of unidentified events* in the USSR of magnitude greater than M

Nu* *Number of unidentified events* if stations are limited to USSR and US

Y_R Yield equivalent in KT for Rainer coupling

516. Memorandum for the Record by Keeny¹

Washington, January 15, 1960

SUBJECT

DOD Position Paper on Threshold for Underground Tests

1. At the Principals' meeting on January 12, Secretary Gates presented a staff paper setting forth the DOD position on the threshold for

¹ Source: Comments on Department of Defense staff paper (attached) on the threshold for underground tests. Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, NT, Threshold.

underground nuclear tests. This paper specifically criticizes the threshold proposals, which Dr. Kistiakowsky presented at the Principals' meeting on January 8 at the request of Secretary Herter and Mr. McCone, as being deficient in that "the number of inspections would be determined arbitrarily (at a comparatively low figure) without appropriate relationship to the scientific facts and the capabilities of the detection system." The proposals presented by Dr. Kistiakowsky were developed by a representative group (including Drs. H. Brown, S. English, J. Oliver, W. Panofsky, C. Romney, J. Tukey, and General A. Starbird) which considered the proposals to represent a balanced judgment properly related to the scientific facts and system capabilities.

2. The alternate threshold proposals contained in the DOD position paper essentially call for the inspection of all unidentified events above magnitude 5 (i.e., 100 per cent of all unidentified events or 50 per cent of all detected seismic events). The implication contained in the DOD position paper that this proposal is uniquely in accord with scientific facts and the capabilities of the detection system is not correct since it does not take the following factors into account:

a. An effective deterrence does not require 100 per cent coverage of all possible violations. This is particularly true in the case of nuclear tests where a series of violations rather than a single clandestine test would be required to constitute a real security threat.

b. Among the events which are not positively identified as earthquakes (by U.S. criteria), it would be possible to establish the relative degree of suspicion of various events by means of the following information:

(1) Utilization of auxiliary seismological information. There is a large amount of seismic data which, although not at present sufficiently definitive to be codified as criteria, would provide information indicative of whether an event was either an earthquake or possible explosion. This type of information would be particularly valuable in the case of the larger seismic events considered in the various threshold proposals. Although there is no agreed estimate as to the cumulative value of this auxiliary information, it would probably reduce the number of events worthy of suspicion by at least a factor of 2 (and possibly much more) and would probably focus particular attention on a relatively small number of events in the yield ranges above 4.75.

(2) Utilization of covert and overt intelligence. As long as the choice of events to be inspected in the USSR is made by the U.S., we can make use of all sources of covert intelligence as well as common sense based on geographic and geological considerations in picking the seismic events to be inspected. Since the extent of our intelligence capabilities are presumably not known by the USSR with certainty, the unpredictable aspect of this factor would in itself probably constitute a significant deterrent.

3. The DOD position paper directly criticizes the approach to inspection which would require "the East and West to act unilaterally in selecting the events to be inspected in the host countries' territory,"

on the grounds that this would degrade the authority of the International Control organization. It is precisely this ability to chose events for inspection that will provide the maximum deterrent effect since it would permit the unrestricted use of all of the information discussed above (i.e., auxiliary seismic information as well as overt and covert intelligence) and would remove debate on the validity of individual inspection operations from the international organization. The original U.S. proposals on inspection procedures were based on "random" selection since the concept of selection by the other country or side was not considered negotiable. However, this concept of selection has now been advanced by the Soviets themselves.

4. The threshold concept is presumably being considered by the Principals with the hope of discovering a formula which might have some chance of being negotiable with the USSR (reasonable deterrence coupled with low level of inspection), and at the same time, would establish clearly in world opinion that the U.S. is attempting to extend the test ban as far as technical considerations will permit. It must be recognized that any threshold proposal that we advance will probably be attacked by the Soviets as an attempt on our part to continue testing. The DOD proposal, however, would appear to give the Soviets particular opportunity to question our motives since it couples a relatively high threshold with the highest possible level of inspection. The question should, therefore, be asked whether the threshold proposal in this form would actually serve the basic purpose for advancing the threshold concept in connection with the present Geneva Negotiations.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

DOD Staff Paper Presented at the January 12 Principals' Meeting

PROPOSED POSITION OF THE UNDERGROUND THRESHOLD

1. With regard to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing, the United States Government has taken the position that the level of inspections must bear an appropriate relationship to the scientific facts and the detection capabilities of the Control System. The USSR representatives, on the other hand, have insisted that the number of inspections must be small, despite the scientific data which indicates that the unidentified events will be numerous. The failure of the recent Technical Conference to achieve agreement on the U.S. criteria which would establish eligibility for inspection also prevented

agreement as to the number of unidentified events which might occur. Without agreement on criteria, some other basis for initiating an inspection would have to be devised. Dr. Kistiakowsky has set forth three alternatives, two of which would seem to require agreement on criteria and the third susceptible of application without such agreement. All of the alternatives have one deficiency in common—the number of inspections would be determined arbitrarily (at a comparatively low figure) without appropriate relationship to the scientific facts and the capabilities of the detection system.

2. Upon review of the threshold concept as applied to underground test ban prepared under Dr. Kistiakowsky's direction, the DOD is of the opinion that it would be to the best interests of the U.S. to withhold the introduction of this concept until or unless it had been clearly demonstrated that the USSR (and possibly the U.K.) will not agree on the inspection criteria established by the U.S. technical group or accept a treaty confined to atmospheric tests. The following reasons are cited: Under the threshold concept, one of two procedures is possible, i.e., to select events to be inspected on the basis of the "characteristics" of instrument readings (criteria), or on the basis of a percentage of the total events. If the Soviets refuse to accept the U.S. criteria, we will be led into a compromise of our best scientific data and thus establish a bad precedent for future disarmament negotiations as well as invite the prospects of adverse Congressional and public reaction. If we suggest a percentage of the total events in order to eliminate the criteria problem, we will introduce a very undesirable factor, namely, the necessity for the East and West to act unilaterally in selecting the events to be inspected in the host countries' territory, thus degrading the authority of the International Control organization. Obviously, if there is no agreement on inspection criteria, there would be no agreement on which events should be eliminated as natural occurrences.

3. The Department of Defense believes that the threshold concept in terms of the magnitude of the seismic events contains uncertainties and ambiguities which detract from its desirability for immediate application without further validation. Further, recognizing the uncertainties in natural and possible artificial decoupling, the proposal does not seek to regulate underground testing to any specific maximum yield but only to make it incumbent upon the signators to the treaty to conduct their operations in such a way as to avoid an instrumental response exceeding the agreed magnitude.

4. If, however, it is decided to be in our over-all interest to advance this concept as a proposal, it is considered that the threshold should be set to meet the following objectives:

a. The threshold should be high enough to require only the number of inspections which would be feasible within the practical limitations

of the numbers of inspection groups and their operations which can be supported by the System.

b. The number of inspections must bear an appropriate relationship to the scientific facts, taking into account the best scientific data bearing on the problem; and

c. The threshold should be high enough to permit certain developmental tests should the United States at some time decide to undertake such tests.

5. The question, therefore, is what threshold in terms of the magnitude of the seismic waves generated by an earthquake should be adapted to assure that the foregoing objectives would be attained. Accepting the following tabulation as representing the best U.S. estimates of the data shown and adopting the assumption that Communist China will not accept stations on its territories, it is apparent from the fourth column that a magnitude of 5.00 is about the minimum that could be adopted taking account of the considerations stated above.

M	N	Nu	Nu*	YR
5.25	32	3	8	110
5.00	59	8	27	43
4.75	105	25	70	19
4.50	185	95	150	8
4.25	335	245	300	3.3
4.00	580	490	545	1.45

M Magnitude

N *Total number of earthquakes in the USSR of magnitude greater than M*

Nu *Number of unidentified events in the USSR of magnitude greater than M*

Nu* *Number of unidentified events if stations are limited to USSR and US*

YR Yield equivalent in KT for Rainer coupling

6. In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the following position be established with respect to the inclusion of a threshold for underground tests in a phased treaty:

a. There shall be agreement with the inspection criteria proposed by the U.S. and this criteria shall be written into the treaty.

b. In the first phase of the treaty, no signator nation shall conduct underground tests above a threshold which shall be defined in terms of the magnitude of seismic waves recorded at the locations and in manners specified in the treaty.

c. The initial threshold shall be magnitude of 5.00 as calculated by the Gutenberg and Richter 1956 formula.

d. All events of magnitude greater than 5.00 shall be analyzed in accordance with the agreed inspection criteria and *all* those events not thus identified as natural events shall be eligible for inspection.

7. In the event that the Soviets refuse to accept the U.S. inspection criteria as presented by Dr. Fisk and his Technical Group, the following modifications of the above should be introduced:

a. Same as Paragraph 6(b) above.

b. Same as Paragraph 6(c) above.

c. 50% of all detected events of magnitude of 5.00 shall be subject to inspection. For those events occurring in the U.S. or in territories under the control of the U.S. or U.K., the USSR shall have the option of designating the events to be inspected; and for events occurring in the USSR the selection shall rest with the U.S.-U.K.

8. In either of the above propositions the further condition should be added that the Control Commission will maintain a continuing study and analysis of the feasibility of improving the quality of the detection system and shall from time to time report to the signator nations its recommendations as to improvements to be installed and the corresponding threshold to be adopted. The installation of improvements and the adoption of thresholds below or above those specified in the initial agreement shall be subject to the unanimous agreement of the signator nations.

9. If the Soviets do not agree to any of the foregoing proposals involving a threshold, a phased treaty confined initially to atmospheric tests should be proposed.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by Kistiakowsky

Washington, January 8, 1960

THRESHOLD FOR UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

I. *Definition of Threshold*

It is technically possible to define a "threshold" for underground nuclear explosions in terms of the magnitudes of the seismic events detected by the Control System. There are several ways in which magnitude might be defined for this purpose. A detailed definition of magnitude based on the use of short period P waves has been prepared (see attachment). This definition could be used operationally in a straightforward manner to define magnitude above about 4.25. Above about magnitude 4.5, the apparent magnitude by this definition corresponding to a

given explosion under fixed coupling conditions could vary between ± 0.1 and ± 0.2 magnitude units. This corresponds to about a ± 25 per cent variation in equivalent yield. It would, therefore, probably be possible to test with confidence nuclear explosions with at least 50 per cent of the yield permitted by the threshold in particular coupling conditions. To avoid accidentally exceeding the threshold, a tester could “creep up” to this 50 per cent level of the threshold by means of a series of smaller explosions. It is to be emphasized that it is difficult to assign a kiloton equivalent to a particular magnitude since, (quite aside from the very large decoupling factors possible in large cavities), this value could vary by a factor of two or more depending on particular medium coupling conditions. In addition, it should be noted that the Soviet report to Technical Working Group 2 differs substantially from that of the U.S. in evaluating the seismic magnitude of specific U.S. nuclear tests.

II. *Quantitative Analysis of Thresholds*

Estimates of the total number of seismic events and the number of unidentified seismic events above various magnitudes in the USSR, based on the earthquake statistics and criteria in the U.S. report to Technical Working Group 2, are summarized in the following Table. (The estimates used are preliminary calculations by the Livermore Laboratory reduced uniformly by 25 per cent in order to conform with previous AFTAC assumptions as to the percentage of world-wide earthquakes which would occur in the USSR.)

TABLE

m	N	N_u	N_u^*	Y_R
5.25	32	3	8	110
5.00	59	8	27	43
4.75	105	25	70	19
4.50	185	95	150	8
4.25	335	245	300	3.3
4.00	580	490	545	1.45

m	Magnitude
N	Total number of earthquakes in the USSR of magnitude greater than M
N_u	Number of unidentified events in the USSR of magnitude greater than M
N_u^*	Number of unidentified events if stations are limited to the USSR and US
Y_R	Yield equivalent in KT for Rainier coupling

In considering this Table, the following points should be noted:

1. The average annual number of earthquakes becomes increasingly uncertain with decreasing magnitude and in the lower magnitude ranges is probably uncertain by a factor of two.

2. The estimates represent the *average* number of annual events and there are actually significant variations in the number of annual events.

3. The ability of the system to identify events within the USSR is dependent upon the extent to which the Control System is installed outside the USSR and would be significantly reduced if stations were not installed elsewhere in Asia.

4. Soviet and U.S. scientists disagree significantly on the values for the equivalent yield with Rainier coupling (Y_R). [*text not declassified*]

III. *Level of Threshold*

The establishment of a particular magnitude level as a test threshold presents a difficult problem which is not primarily technical in nature. A judgment on this problem must be based on consideration of such factors as the following:

1. If, on the one hand, the threshold is established on too high a level:

(a) Higher yield underground explosions which could probably be controlled with reasonable effectiveness would be legalized.

(b) There would be little or no justification for inspection.

(c) Support of U.S. position on test control issue in world opinion would presumably be weakened.

2. If, on the other hand, the threshold is established at too low a level:

(a) Number of inspections would either be too large or effectiveness of control would be reduced.

(b) System would have little or no capability of reducing number or eligible events in lower range of permitted magnitudes.

(c) The incentive to undertake concealment by large cavity decoupling would be increased.

In balance, it is concluded that magnitude 4.75 constitutes the best compromise among the above factors. In addition, it should be noted that we have direct measurements from the Blanca explosion corresponding to this magnitude under Rainier coupling conditions.

IV. *Number vs. Percentage Quota*

The eligibility of events for inspection under any magnitude threshold can be determined on either a numerical quota or percentage quota basis. The comparative advantages of these two methods are as follows:

1. *Percentage Quota*

a. Covers uncertainties in estimates and yearly fluctuations in number of seismic events.

b. If based on unidentified events:

- (1) Presents much greater incentive than numerical quota for Soviets to improve technical capabilities of system;
- (2) Presents stronger incentive to Soviets to include China in system in order to reduce number of eligible events in USSR;
- (3) Eliminates possible Soviet argument that there are too few unidentified events for a particular numerical quota; and
- (4) Same percentage can apply to different thresholds.

2. *Number Quota*

- a. Easier to negotiate since essentially accepts Soviet quota concept and indicates clearly level of inspection to be conducted.
- b. Independent of changes in criteria of eligibility for inspection or could be applied against all events independent of criteria.
- c. Somewhat easier to apply.
- d. Possibly more effective from point of view of public relations as representing simple, understandable proposal.

V. *Suggested Position*

Technically, there appear to be three reasonable approaches to a threshold proposal based on magnitude 4.75 seismic events:

1. Require inspection of 10 per cent of all located seismic events with magnitude above 4.75. Since the number of located seismic events of this size in the Soviet Union is 105, this would result on the average in approximately 10 on-site inspections per year. This proposal could bypass the lack of agreement on the criteria for eligibility of inspection.

2. If the Soviets are willing to accept the U.S. criteria for determining the eligibility of seismic events for inspection, require inspection of 20% of all located seismic events with magnitude above 4.75 which are deemed eligible for inspection. Since the number of unidentified seismic events above magnitude 4.75 is estimated to be between 25 and 70, depending on the extent of installation of the system on a world-wide basis, this proposal would result in an average annual level of inspection between 5 and 14.

3. Establish a quota of 10 inspections per year which could be applied against either the total number of located seismic events or the number of unidentified events with magnitudes greater than 4.75.

Technically, the proposals based on the use of percentages, particularly the first proposal (i.e., 10 per cent of all located seismic events above magnitude 4.75), appear to be the safer course in view of the uncertainties in the estimates of the number of seismic events. However, the quota proposal would probably give the same general level of deterrence and might have advantages from the point of view of negotiability and public relations.

Attachment

SUGGESTED THRESHOLD DEFINITION

1. A seismic event shall qualify for consideration by the Control System if its seismic waves are as large as, or larger than, the seismic waves recorded from an earthquake of magnitude 4.75 as determined by the procedure given in paragraph 2 below.

2. The method for determining magnitude is as follows:

a. From the seismograms of each control post which detects signals from the event in question for which A is measurable as defined below and for which the epicentral distance is greater than 16° and less than 36° to 90°², determine whether or not the magnitude m, according to:

$$m = \log \frac{A^{1.5}}{GT} \quad (\text{Gutenberg \& Richler, 1956})$$

is greater than 4.75

In the above formula, the symbols are defined as follows:

A = half of the maximum peak positive to negative amplitude (displacement), measured in microns, in the first three cycles of the P waves, as recorded by a vertical seismograph of the type described in paragraph 3 below. For the purpose of this computation, signals are considered to be detectable and measurable to sufficient accuracy if A is 3 times the peak noise amplitude during the preceding few minutes.

T = the time, measured in seconds, between the peak displacement (used in determining A) and the next following peak.

G = the steady-state magnification of the seismograph at period T. Q is given as a function of distance in Table 1.

b. If the apparent magnitude exceeds 4.75 at half, or more than half, of the control posts specified in 2a above, the event is judged to have a magnitude of 4.75 or more.

3. The vertical seismograph used for measuring A, as defined in paragraph 2a above, shall be a short period seismograph with characteristics which will permit operation of single seismographs at quiet stations with magnification greater than 10⁶ at the frequency of peak response. It may, in particular, conform to the specifications in GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/9, Annex IV, page 12.

²(The most desirable cut-off distance for data to be used in determining magnitude under this definition is still under consideration.) [Footnote is in the original.]

Table I

(Sample)	
Distance	G
16°	5.92
17°	5.95
18°	5.98
19°	6.02
20°	6.05
.	.
.	.
.	.
90°	7.03

Note: 1° =111. 11 Km

517. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 18, 1960

SUBJECT

Preparations for Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>France</i>
Secretary Herter	Amb. Heeney	Amb. Alphanand
Mr. Kohler—EUR	Gen. Durns—Canadian	Mr. Lebel
Mr. Eaton—U.S. Representative, Ten-Nation Talks	Representative, Ten-Nation Talks	Mr. Pelan
Mr. Sullivan—S/AE	Mr. Rae	<i>U.K.</i>
Mr. Spiers—S/AE	Mr. McCordick	Amb. Caccia
	Mr. Campbell	Miss Brown
		<i>Italy</i>
		Amb. Brosio
		Mr. Perrone—[illegible in the original]
		Mr. Petri—[illegible in the original]

¹Source: Preparations for ten-nation disarmament talks. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

The Secretary said that the purpose of the present meeting was to give some direction to the meeting of disarmament representatives which would convene next Monday. The present group should be regarded as a steering committee unrelated to any of the others set up for Summit preparations. The group would continue in existence after the disarmament talks begin to assess the progress which takes place between now and the Summit in order to discuss and decide on what problems relating to disarmament might be raised at the Summit. He did not foresee the need to decide on any more meetings of the present group at this time. Generally the disarmament experts could work directly on their own, reporting as appropriate to their governments and directly to NAC on the progress of their work. *Ambassador Brosio* agreed and suggested that the meeting of the group of Ambassadors could be reconvened at the end of February, at which time they would make a general assessment of the progress made by the experts. *Ambassador Heeney* said that he had not thought of this as a formal group but simply as an ad hoc meeting. He hesitated to accept the idea of the Ambassadors "assessing" the work of the disarmament group. He would prefer that arrangements be kept informal and flexible. *The Secretary* agreed and suggested that it might be useful to meet occasionally when the Geneva negotiations had begun. He suggested that the primary task was to determine in most general form what the disarmament representatives could most usefully discuss. First, there was the question of Western objectives in the negotiation. He said that the U.S. would have a draft objectives paper to submit at the opening meeting on the 25th. *Ambassador Caccia* agreed that this should be the first item. He had been instructed to put forward a proposal in this connection, i.e., that our objective should be to present a comprehensive plan as an alternative to Mr. Khrushchev's and, with it, specific suggestions for limited steps which would constitute a first phase. He was instructed to distribute such a paper at the present meeting (Tab A). The purpose of the limited first steps was to counter the idea that nothing could be done unless everything was done. *The Secretary* agreed with this thought, observing that we must test Soviet good faith by simple measures which would be characterized as leading to specifically identified goals. *Ambassador Alphant* said that this was in line with French views and that they would themselves submit a more elaborate working paper on the 25th. *Ambassador Brosio* said that the Italian Government was also working on a paper which accorded with the views which have been expressed and that they hoped to have it ready for the working meetings.

Secretary Herter said that since the Soviets will try to have discussion based on their own proposal, we should be prepared with a coordinated position on the Soviet plan. The first step might be to exchange analyses of Khrushchev's proposal. *Ambassador Caccia* said that one of our major objectives should be to prepare an agreed critique of this proposal.

Ambassador Caccia suggested three additional items for consideration by the disarmament representatives: (1) the working methods which the delegations would follow during the Geneva sessions; (2) the opening tactics for the meetings on March 15; (3) procedure on consultation with NAC during the preparatory work and the ten-power meetings. *Secretary Herter* agreed with these items, noting that there might be some discussion of the third point here.

Ambassador Alphand said that techniques and general political questions should be discussed at the Ambassadorial level and not on the "technical level". *Ambassador Heeney* said that he thought the meeting on the 25th should not be characterized as a meeting of "experts". *Ambassador Caccia* said that Under Secretary O'Neill would represent the U.K. at the preliminary meetings and suggested that the date of February 8th be set for a meeting of heads of delegation to review the work of the deputies. Mr. Ormsby-Gore would be prepared to come to Washington at that time. The heads of delegation should also plan to meet in Geneva a few days before the actual convening of the Ten-Nation session. *Secretary Herter* said that we should aim for February 8th for the heads of delegation meeting with the proviso that it could be changed if necessary to the 15th. The earlier the target date the more pressure there would be to complete our work. *Ambassador Brosio* concurred, noting that Ambassador Cavalletti would initially head the Italian delegation and that Mr. Martino would be prepared to come to Washington on February 8th. *Ambassador Heeney* said that General Burns would be here on the 25th and would head the Canadian delegation throughout the meeting. *Secretary Herter* said that he was not prepared to get into a discussion of substance at the present time and wished to note that the U.S. wanted to avoid presenting a completely frozen comprehensive package plan. He wished to have separable first step measures which we could suggest and he reserved judgment on the desirability of presenting a program in which there is a fixed commitment to move ahead all the way to the end. *Ambassador Caccia* agreed that the group should have the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan with separable first steps.

Secretary Herter suggested that the U.S. provide Ambassador Durgess with a resume of today's session to use as a basis for reporting to NAC. *Ambassador Caccia* agreed, but stated that the committee of disarmament representatives should decide on their own procedures for consulting and reporting to NAC. He raised the question of the press line that should be used at the conclusion of today's session. It was agreed that no formal communique would be issued and that each delegation would state that the Ambassadors and the Secretary reviewed procedural arrangements for next Monday's meeting.

Ambassador Brosio suggested that the disarmament representatives should also discuss the implication of Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet

speech and how the West should react to it. Consideration should be given to the possibility of counteracting the Soviet move with unilateral measures of our own. *Ambassador Heeney* said that Canada felt some helpful work could be done by the NATO international staff which could be fed into the working group. The Canadians were considering making such a suggestion in Paris next Wednesday.

Tab A

Revised United Kingdom Comprehensive Plan

FIRST STAGE

(i) The endorsement of any agreement which might be reached by the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

(ii) Study and initial establishment of an international disarmament organization.

(iii) Collection of information by the international disarmament organization on present levels of forces, including conventional armaments possessed by various powers, followed by restriction or first stage reduction of armed forces of the United Kingdom and the United States, USSR, and France to agreed maximum limits. The collection of information would be based on declarations (to be completed in the first stage) by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria. The information would cover existing conventional equipment and armaments, pertaining to land, sea, and air forces.

(iv) Consequent upon such reduction, placing by these States in storage depots within their territories and under the supervision of the disarmament organization, of specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

(v) Prior notification to the disarmament organization of launching programmes for missiles according to certain predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and reports on launching operations, including information on the location of launching sites. Notification of flight plans of satellites, international arrangements for tracking and for exchange of resultant information.

(vi) A technical conference on the possibility of controlling the stopping of production of fissile material for weapons purposes and on the possibility of the transfer, under control, of existing stocks of such fissile material (whether fabricated into weapons or not) to non-weapon uses.

(vii) A conference on measures to prevent the launching of surprise attack. This conference would consider the political as well as the technical aspects of measures against surprise attack.

(viii) A technical conference to study a system to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purpose only.

(ix) Study of the arrangements required for the international authority which will have to be set up in order to preserve world peace as purely national armaments diminish.

The first stage shall be completed, if possible, within one year; the second stage shall then start.

SECOND STAGE

(i) A world conference shall be convened to determine the levels to which all States shall reduce their forces and armaments in the final stage.

(ii) Progressive establishment of international disarmament organization.

(iii) Progressive reduction of existing conventional armaments and military man-power through adequately safeguarded arrangements for international control (levels to be agreed) and collection of information relating to manufacture of conventional armaments and equipment of all kinds.

(iv) All states producing fissile material to make full declarations on all plants producing it and their capacity. Introduction of the “cut-off” of production of fissile material for weapons purposes, conditional upon specified progress on conventional disarmament.

(v) Reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons by successive transfers, under international supervision, of existing military stocks of fissile material (whether fabricated into weapons or not) to non-weapon uses.

(vi) Missile launchings to be subject to prior notification and on-the-spot control. International tracking system to be installed.

(vii) Progressive establishment of inspection against surprise attack.

(viii) Agreement on the establishment of a system to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

(ix) Joint study of the control of a ban on the manufacture of biological and chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(x) First stages in the establishment of the international authority required to preserve world peace.

The timing of the start of the final stage shall be decided by agreement among the States concerned.

FINAL STAGE

Comprehensive disarmament by all powers under effective international control including:

(i) A ban on the manufacture of nuclear, chemical, biological, or other weapons of mass destruction.

(ii) A ban on the use of outer space for military purposes.

(iii) A ban on the use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

(iv) Destruction of all military missiles. Control over manufacture of rockets and satellites.

(v) Establishment of effective international control over military budgets.

(vi) Completion of the establishment of the international authority to preserve world peace.

(vii) Measures, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to control existing stocks of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction with a view to their elimination.

(viii) As progress is made on such control and elimination, final reduction of conventional armaments and military man-power to the levels required for internal security purposes and the fulfilment of the

obligation of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter. Destruction of surplus armaments.

(ix) Control over manufacture of all types of armaments to ensure that production is limited to that required for (viii) only.

518. Note From Calhoun to Goodpaster¹

Washington, January 18, 1960

Enclosed is a copy of Selwyn Lloyd's letter of January 14, 1960 to the Secretary and a copy of the covering letter addressed to Livingston T. Merchant by Ambassador Hood.

Enclosure

Covering Letter From Head to Merchant

Washington, January 15, 1960

My dear Livie

I have received the enclosed message for Mr. Herter from Mr. Lloyd in reply to Mr. Dillon's letter of January 6 about the Nuclear Tests Conference.

As I know that the Secretary is still away I am sending the message to you so that you can give it preliminary consideration in anticipation of his return,

Yours [illegible in the original]

Sammy
(Hood)

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Lloyd to Herter on position on nuclear test talks. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, State Mepeco Cables.

Enclosure

Letter From Lloyd to Herter

January 14, 1960

TEXT OF MESSAGE

Dear Chris,

I was most grateful for Doug Dillon's letter of January 6 outlining your ideas on how we should proceed in the Nuclear Test Conference. I am sending this reply to you as he is now in Paris.

To deal with a lesser point first, I agree that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to reconvene the technical working group at present.

On the major point, I also agree with you that if we have not succeeded in getting the Russians to budge from the position they took up in the technical conference before Christmas, we have little chance of securing a treaty under which a ban on all tests would be effectively policed from the outset. Clearly a limited treaty which goes beyond what you contemplated last April by banning at least certain underground tests is an advance on what you then had in mind, and to that extent we welcome your idea. As a result of the agreed technical report of last summer I imagine you would also be prepared to include a ban on high-altitude tests. Furthermore your proposal to define a threshold in terms of seismic magnitude rather than in kiloton yield strikes me as ingenious. It will, as you say, eliminate a lot of argument and should I think put the Russians in a somewhat difficult position. After their argument that a seismic magnitude of 4.75 represents the equivalent of a yield of 1.7 kt, the acceptance of your proposal, if you should choose the figure of 4.75, will mean that the Russians are being offered what on their own figures they should admit is nearly a comprehensive treaty, whatever our own reservations on this particular magnitude.

Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that the Russians (who are quite capable of instructing their scientists to make a *volte face* to agree with you that a seismic magnitude of 4.75 is, after all, the equivalent to a yield of 20 kt) will not look at any proposal that does not ban all tests, at least temporarily. If we were to insist on a treaty which left open the possibility of underground testing below a specified magnitude, I think the Russians would break off negotiations. What is more, they

would proclaim vociferously that they had broken on a Western proposal which they would represent as showing the West to be insincere in its protestations of a desire to stop all tests. They would say that they were being asked to accept a considerable measure of control on Russian territory at great cost, while the Western Powers continued to develop their nuclear weapon potential by underground testing. I am afraid that the odium for failure to reach an agreement would thus fall on the West. Unjust though this would be, I do not think that in the present state of world opinion, particularly as manifested in the last session of the General Assembly, we can afford to allow this to happen. I know full well that the underground tests which under your proposal would still be permissible contribute nothing to fallout, but I am afraid this argument carries little weight with the large numbers who believe all nuclear tests should now cease.

There is a further consideration. The Russians have declared that they will not be the first to resume tests. If, however, some underground testing remained permissible and the Western Powers decided to resume tests, then it is certain that the Russians would follow suit, and I doubt whether they would confine themselves to underground tests. I have explained to you before now my fear that even in that case much of the odium would fall on whatever power had been the first to resume tests of any kind. But quite apart from that: are we really sure that it is we rather than the Russians who stand to gain more in military terms from a further round of testing? The indications are that, for us the improvement to be derived from further testing may be marginal. If, as we believe, we are at present ahead of the Russians, would they not be likely to diminish our lead if we gave them the chance to resume testing? These considerations, together with others familiar to you, persuade me that it is much in our interest, in spite of all the scientific difficulties, to come to some arrangement with the Russians under which all tests should cease.

As you know, when the President first advanced your proposal for a limited treaty last April, the Prime Minister told him that he thought it would be necessary to offer a moratorium on underground tests for one or two years. The President did not feel able to accept such a suggestion then, but the Prime Minister said he might have to revert to the proposal. Under the terms of your new suggestion it would be appropriate to change the Prime Minister's original suggestion to one for a moratorium for a limited period on underground tests below the nominated threshold. I assume that all tests in other environments would be completely banned, provided the treaty obligations were

being fulfilled. We would maintain the important distinction of principle that the permanent ban would apply only where we could be assured of effective control; while there would be no more than a temporary suspension where such control was not yet possible.

I am convinced that such a suggestion for a moratorium will in the end have to be added to your proposal, and would ask you most earnestly to consider whether you could not accept it at the outset; we have after all now had a totally uncontrolled moratorium for some fourteen months; and even if there had been no scientific reassessment and we had proceeded to an agreement entirely on the basis of the experts' report of 1958, we should have had to contemplate a period of two or three years, while control posts were built and the control system was being organised, when there would have been a virtually uncontrolled moratorium. I do not believe we should lose very much by voluntarily subscribing to a moratorium for underground tests below the threshold if we could get agreement to your new proposal. We could then, as Dillon in his letter says you contemplate, propose a joint programme of research with the Russians to speed up progress in seismology.

As I have said above, I believe that, if we do not proceed on these lines, we shall get no treaty. I think such a result would be disastrous. Not only should we lose the opportunity to get for the first time international controls operating in the Soviet Union, thus serving as a precedent for subsequent disarmament controls, but also, I fear, the prospects of success at the Ten Power Disarmament Conference would be very gravely prejudiced.

I apologise for the length of this letter.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Selwyn

519. Tabs A and B to Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹**Tab A**

Washington, January 19, 1960

*AGENDA**Meeting of Principals of Disarmament Working Group**Tuesday, January 19, 1960 5:00 PM Room 5104 New State*

1. Should the US advance a proposal based on a signal strength threshold in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations? If so,
2. What should be the level of the threshold?
3. What should be the level or number of inspections?
4. Should a specific threshold level and a specific level of inspection be proposed at Geneva now?

Tab B*DRAFT INSTRUCTION*

Within the general framework course of action stated by Dillon letter of January 6 to Foreign Secretary Lloyd USDel may after coordination with UK explore in general terms with USSR following approach based upon a signal strength threshold for underground tests. In presenting proposal USDel should from outset reaffirm and make clearly understood US position that it will agree to cessation of nuclear weapons test explosions only in environments where adequate safeguards can be applied. In discussion with UK USDel should draw as required on technical paper provided at the meeting of principals January 8. Unless SOVS show interest in agreement on basis principles outlined USDel should not enter into detailed technical discussion with USSR on methods of calculating magnitudes, kiloton equivalents of various magnitudes, exact criteria to be employed in locating events, or number of unidentified events at various levels which would result from application US criteria for identification except insofar as specified in para 6 below. If SOVS show such interest USDel should seek further instructions on presentation these technical considerations.

In presenting proposal USDel should point out that in absence technical basis for establishment and operation control system covering all

¹ Source: Agenda of Working Group meeting and draft instruction on threshold to U.S. delegation to nuclear test talks. Memorandum of Conversation is Print Document 240. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

underground nuclear explosions, US nevertheless desires consolidate in treaty existing areas of agreement on cessation of nuclear weapons test explosions in environments to which adequate and agreed controls can now be extended. Proposal should be advanced as constructive approach to impasse in which we find ourselves as result continuing wide areas technical disagreement reflected report Technical Working Group II. Proposal for threshold approach represents (a) evidence US willingness seek test cessation in areas that can be adequately monitored (b) way to bypass existing disagreements between US and Soviet scientists on criteria for identification of underground events by basing inspections on events located by system (c) way to achieve a workable agreement despite existing disagreement and limitations as to detection and identification capabilities in lower yield ranges and disagreements on equivalent kiloton yields of events of given seismic magnitudes (d) way to move by phased approach as rapidly as technically feasible toward more comprehensive ban through lowering [or eliminating]² threshold as methods of detection and identification were improved by research.

USDel should outline key elements of proposal as including following:

1. US proposes phased treaty including in its first phase ban on underground nuclear explosions above a lower limit or threshold defined in term of magnitudes of seismic events detected by control system.

2. Proposal would be carried out under arrangements whereby number of inspections would be directly related to number of events above agreed threshold. Thus within the limits of technical capabilities, selection of appropriate threshold would depend in part upon level of inspection acceptable to USSR.

3. Treaty should provide for lowering threshold as system capabilities are improved through utilization of improved techniques, instrumentation and criteria or higher level of inspection. Program of joint research, including nuclear detonations as required, to improve detection and identification capabilities of system and develop improved criteria should be instituted as rapidly as it can be agreed; it could be continued by control commission when it is established. If USSR does not agree to join us, US feels obligated to proceed unilaterally in development of improved detection systems making use of nuclear detonations as required.

4. US believes agreement on criteria proposed by its technical experts in TWG II for use in at least initial phase would help meet SCV concerns as to wide range of events against which agreed level of inspection could be applied, since it would narrow number of events

² AEC recommends deletion. [Footnote and brackets are in the original.]

eligible for inspection as far as technically feasible at present time. If these criteria employed, US would propose agreed level of inspection apply only to events remaining unidentified by control organization after application these criteria. If, however, agreement cannot now be reached on criteria for identification, US would propose as way around this difficulty that agreed level of inspection apply to all events located by system.

5. US proposes that level of inspection be expressed as percentage of events above agreed threshold magnitude that remain unidentified after control commission has applied criteria proposed by US scientists at TWG II. This would reduce number of events eligible for inspection to lowest figure consistent with existing scientific information. It is, moreover, a formula which will automatically reduce the number of inspections as improvements in techniques and criteria are developed. If agreement on criteria for identification is not yet possible, however, US proposes that pending such agreement the level of inspection be expressed as percentage of total events above agreed threshold magnitude which are located by the system. USDel should recall US has also made clear in past that whether level of inspection should be expressed as percentage quota or numerical quota is of secondary importance in comparison to basic requirement that level of inspection should bear appropriate relationship to scientific facts and detection capabilities. Accordingly US would also be willing, if USSR prefers, to express the level of inspection in numerical terms based on a calculation of an agreed percentage in relation to the latest scientific estimates of numbers of located events or unidentified events it has presented to the conference. Since this would tend to re-open existing scientific disagreement which might otherwise be avoided, however, we would propose not to enter into a complex technical negotiation upon this basis unless a broad understanding in principle on the proposed approach can be agreed.

6. As a specific example of the application of the proposed approach, the US should propose a threshold of magnitude 4.75. Above this threshold 20% of all events unidentified by US criteria or alternatively 10% of all events located by the system would be subject to inspection. Depending upon whether agreement on criteria can be reached, all located events or all unidentified events would be eligible for inspection. On the basis of our best estimates this basis for inspection would result in from 10 to 20 inspections per year in the Soviet Union.

7. In answer to questions which will arise concerning certain matters our position would be as follows: you should, in your private coordination with the UK representative ahead of presentation, point out these:

a. Relative to our accepting a moratorium on weapon testing below the threshold, the US will not accept such a moratorium and would be free to resume such testing when its national security so dictated.

b. Relative to high altitude testing we would plan on “an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to the greatest height to which effective controls can under present circumstances be extended.” If ground stations only were agreed, no higher than 100,000 KM. If Argus and far earth satellite systems are installed, no more than 300,000 KM.

520. Letter From Gates to Herter¹

Washington, January 19, 1960

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The report of the Joint State Department-Defense Department Study on Disarmament, prepared under the direction of Charles A. Coolidge, has been received. This report will be referred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information and study.

Since recommendations (1) and (2) involve our own defense posture, it seems appropriate that I comment on those recommendations at this time. These subjects have been under intensive review over the past several months within the Defense Department concurrently with the studies undertaken by the committee under Mr. Coolidge’s direction.

The current defense program is consistent with the recommendations made by Mr. Coolidge concerning our overall defense posture. Our strategic delivery capability is substantially in excess of that of the Soviet Union and we are taking all practicable steps to further increase the invulnerability of our strategic delivery forces. Our program relies on a whole complex of related resources, each of which in various degrees contributes to the establishment and maintenance of an assured retaliatory capability.

We are not now operating an airborne alert of any significance because we do not believe it necessary. The Air Force is planning a more extensive alert capability for the heavy bomber force and we are purchasing extra engines and spare parts to expand this program, as well as training the heavy bomber wings in the conduct of an airborne alert. This capability could be exercised if needed.

¹ Source: Transmits joint State Department-Defense Department study on disarmament prepared under Coolidge’s direction. Secret. 73 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.

At the same time, the Department of Defense is taking steps to improve the modernization of the conventional capability of both our armed forces and those of our allies—the latter, of course, through the assistance rendered by the Foreign Aid Program. We are confident that we are in a position to deal effectively with limited wars which our strategic capabilities might not deter. We do not, of course, envisage any situation short of general war in which significant numbers of our forces would be directly involved in any conflict with those of the USSR.

I will forward to you in the near future the Defense Department comments on those aspects of the Coolidge report not concerned with our defense posture, after we have had further time to study the recommendations contained in the report.

Sincerely,

Thomas S. Gates

Attachment

January 6, 1960

Mr. Dillon will initiate preparation of 2 memos—

—1 fr Sec Def to Sec State “after [illegible in the original]

a Post not responsive to directive—[illegible in the original]

b Doesn’t agree with judgments + conclusions

—2 fr Sec State to Eaton

—refer advisory study to be available to Eaton in prep of [illegible in the original]

Bring Eaton pm before NSC—[illegible in the original]

Attachment

Draft Statement by a State Department press spokesman

The State Department has received the report of the Joint Disarmament Study headed by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge. This report was prepared by Mr. Coolidge for submission jointly to the Secretaries of State and Defense as a working paper to aid them in preparing a recommended disarmament policy prior to the forthcoming ten power conference at Geneva about March 15th. Final formulation of U.S. disarmament policy will of course be the responsibility of the President with the advice of the National Security Council. The State Department does not intend any release regarding the substance of the report and its recommendations, which are now under study.

Attachment

Report of the Joint Disarmament Study

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ANNEX	Subject
A	Terms of Reference, List of Joint Disarmament Study Personnel, etc.
B	Stable Balance of Deterrence and Arms Control
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D	Cut-off of Nuclear Production
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F	Comments on Proposals of the Soviet Union, the UN and France
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H	Draft Resolution for General Assembly Re Codification
I	Problems of International Law Enforcement
J	Draft Resolution for General Assembly Re Corps of [illegible in the original]
K	Further Arms Control Studies

BRIEF SUMMARY OF REPORT

The United States must strengthen its overall defense posture before significant arms control measures can be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and should proceed to do so, even if it will require a substantial increase in defense expenditures.

In particular, the United States should strengthen its conventional capability, and should make its strategic retaliatory force highly invulnerable in order to establish and maintain a stable balance of deterrence against intercontinental nuclear war. Until a stable balance of deterrence is established, the United States should not negotiate measures which limit its strategic nuclear capability. Therefore, however, the United States might find it advantageous to negotiate agreements which would enhance this stability and permit a levelling off of the arms race.

Comprehensive proposals calling for disarmament in phased stages, with an obligation to move from one stage to another, should be avoided. Instead, the U.S. should establish a broad ultimate goal for disarmament, namely, world peace under enforceable law, and should prepare for immediate negotiations only modest steps toward that goal, in order to test the intentions of the Soviets and actually to accomplish at least something.

Specially, the U.S. should take the following actions:—

Measures to Limit National Capabilities

1. Completion of the current negotiations on the production of nuclear tests, preferably excluding underground tests from the prohibition.

2. Propose a limited inspection zone against surprise ground attack in Europe, in aid of NATO's mission.

3. Propose the prohibition of vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or maintained in outer space.

Measures to Increase International Capabilities

4. Re-energizing the development and codification of international law by the United Nations.

5. Increasing the jurisdiction and enhancing the prestige of the International Court of Justice.

6. Improving the machinery for the use of a U.N. "presence" in areas of international disputes and adding the function of mediation.

The merits of additional arms control measures are analyzed. Annexes to the report contain comments on proposals made by the Soviets and our principal Allies and, further, contain more detailed consideration of important matters dealt with in the report itself.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to the terms of reference establishing the Joint Disarmament Study by the two Departments of State and Defense, I submit to you the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study.

The terms of reference and a list of my principal assistants and of the able and devoted staff who struggled with the difficult problems presented by arms control, together with data indicating the assistance received from others, the method of operation followed and the scope of the work are attached as Annex "A."

This report is a group product in the sense that the information and ideas it contains are the result of the labors of all concerned. No effort has, however, been made to reach unanimity. While the report necessarily requires a consideration of the defense posture of the United States, a conscious effect has been made to confine the scope of the report to arms control matters, and to avoid trespassing on allied fields such as military planning, civil defense and political and economic problems.

I. BACKGROUND OF ARMS CONTROL

A. *Our Posture for Negotiating Arms Control Measures Must be Strengthened*

It is possible that current Soviet propaganda efforts in favor of peace and disarmament may reflect the beginning of a fundamental change in their thinking which could lead to reduction of the communist military threat to the Free World. It would, however, be foolish to base our policy approach to arms control upon that possibility for at least two reasons.

First, it is equally possible and far more likely that the Soviet current peace campaign is designed to lure the Free World into reducing or eliminating its military capability, so that the Soviets can pursue their

continuously reaffirmed aim of world domination without fear of a nuclear war. In a disarmed world, they could, through sheer manpower and economic measures, infiltrate, subvert, upset, dominate, and finally take over the control of Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and with Red China, the remainder of Asia—leaving one or both of the Americas to die on the vine. And there would be nothing that the Free World could do about it, except to re-arm frantically after it was probably too late. Even if the Soviets are not successful in persuading the Free World to disarm completely, any progress they can make in reducing the military capability of the Free World is so much to the good from their point of view. Until the Soviets have unmistakably demonstrated sincerity by deeds as well as words, [illegible in the original] prudence dictates that we strengthen our guard against communist aggression rather than relax it.

Second, even if the Soviets have honest motives in proposing disarmament measures, they are tough realists. Should our posture and that of our allies deteriorate relative to the Soviet's posture during the extended process of negotiations which lie ahead, this would lower any real incentives which [illegible in the original] for the Soviets to accept meaningful arms controls with proper safeguards. As realists, they tend to regard agreements as confirmations of existing facts, not as promises to do something which goes further than facts. Hence, when the facts change for the worse from our point of view, so will the agreements we are likely to get out of the Soviets.

[illegible in the original] that the basic premise of our approach to arms control must be to address the Soviets from a position in which our defense posture is strong and our capacity for effective political action is unimpaired. And this should be so whether we take the gloomy view of stressing the difficulties involved in arms control negotiations with the Soviets, or take the brighter view of explaining the hopeful possibilities of [illegible in the original] useful agreements.

A glance at the [illegible in the original] indicates that our situation for negotiating meaningful arms control measures is deteriorating. Our relative defense posture during the early sixties—the period with which the coming disarmament talks will be most concerned—will be less favorable than it has been since World War II. At the risk of over-simplification, weaknesses in our defense posture present three major problems:

1. *Intercontinental War*—While the U.S. had a monopoly in nuclear weapons, there was little danger of intercontinental war. The Soviets had no chance of [illegible in the original]. Even after the Soviets acquired nuclear bombs in quantity, the danger of a nuclear war was limited by our large stockpile and our superior delivery systems, in the form of the numbers and quality of the manned bombers of SAC (Strategic Air Command) and their ability to strike from, or recover

to [illegible in the original] bases. The enormous advantage to the Soviets of surprise attack was [illegible in the original] by working from the DEW Line (Distant Early Warning Line). Thus, while the danger was much greater than when the U.S. had a nuclear monopoly, the nuclear capability of the U.S. which could survive a surprise attack appeared sufficient to inflict such severe damage on the Soviets as to deter them from starting an intercontinental war.

The development by the Soviets of intercontinental ballistic missiles has changed this situation very much for the worse. While the Soviets probably have not at the moment many ICBM's, within the next two years or so they may have a sufficient number to knock out most of SAC and destroy our principal cities in a surprise attack. And we may receive little or no warning. Even when BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) is completed, and even if it functions as effectively as its designers expect, the amount of warning it will give will be measured in minutes. Further, there is as yet no known defense against ICBM's, and the technical problems involved in creating a reliable defense against them seem enormously difficult. And the threat of shorter range missiles launched from Soviet submarines may be almost as serious.

This Soviet capability will exist even after the U.S. has acquired ICBM's in quantity. But in the interim, assuming that the Soviets have them in quantity and we have not, the situation will be grave. This interim period is frequently referred to as "the missile gap." Our military leaders are fully aware of the situation and are endeavoring to counter it by such measures as keeping a part of FEC continuously in the air.

Ultimately we would [illegible in the original] greatly if we could persuade the Soviets to [illegible in the original] agreement to give up missiles entirely. For the time being, however, we can neither expect them to give up their strong card, nor does reliable inspection of an agreement to do so presently appear feasible. Therefore, this report envisages that we will press forward with unilateral measures to shorten the duration of the missile gap, rather than counting upon arms controls to do so, and addresses itself primarily to the situation when both the Soviets and ourselves have ICBM's in quantity.

2. *Limited War*—The Soviets have been superior to the U.S. in conventional forces since we unilaterally reduced ours immediately after World War II. We are endeavoring to affect this superiority by various measures, including regional alliances, military aid programs, maintenance of some mobile forces and arming with tactical nuclear weapons. We are supplying certain of our NATO allies with the vehicles of nuclear weapons under arrangements whereby the U.S. retains control of the warheads. Our best information is that the Soviets are probably equipping their own forces with tactical nuclear weapons, but not as yet their satellites or Red China.

The superiority of the Soviets and Red China in conventional and para-military forces, combined with their geographic position, results in a situation unfavorable to us in terms of dealing with aggression when for various reasons we might be unwilling to use our nuclear weapons.

It seems clear that, in addition to regional alliances and military aid programs designed to strengthen indigenous forces in areas where limited wars might occur, we must be able to back up our allies with conventional forces to a degree which will make our willingness to intervene in limited wars credible both to our allies and to our enemies, whether or not we use nuclear weapons. While it is beyond the scope of this report to recommend the level and armament of forces required for this purpose, it is readily apparent that our conventional capability must be increased if we are to be able to deal effectively with limited wars which our strategic capabilities are not expected to deter, and if we are to be in a sound position to negotiate meaningful arms control measures with the Soviets.

3. *Economic*—As distinguished from our military posture outlined above, the U.S. has had, and still has, impressive superiority over the Soviets on the economic side. Its productive capacity and wealth are still much greater than the Soviets. This can be used to advantage in arms control matters—by enabling us if the Soviets drive us too hard, to spend more money on defense than they can.

However, rapid technological development plus rising costs are increasing the cost of our weapons at a disconcerting rate. It therefore appears necessary to increase the military budget substantially, until the defects in our defense posture are cured. This is a political rather than an economic problem, but it should be faced.

For the first time, a strictly economic problem has recently appeared, namely, an unfavorable balance of international payments. This could subject us to heavy pressures to reduce our overseas military establishments and foreign aid, which in turn might have a material adverse effect on arms control negotiations. It is not clear at the moment how serious this problem may prove to be.

Conclusion—In weighing the factors outlined above in connection with intercontinental war, limited war and economic problems, the conclusion seems inescapable that defects in our defense posture will result in our negotiating arms control measures with the Soviets from an unfavorable position, and that we are not likely to achieve significant results from such negotiations unless and until our posture is improved or there is a fundamental change in the world situation.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 1

Irrespective of the nature of arms control proposals made at the coming negotiations, the United States should increase its effort to close

the missile gap and otherwise promptly to remedy defects in its overall defense posture.

B. The Rational of Arms Control

The fundamental difficulty with arms control agreements is that war is the ultimate method of settling international disputes, when settlement in countries with law or agreements has failed. And war recognizes no contractual restraints. In a sense, therefore, war is a negation of the entire concept of a binding agreement. Hence, agreements to forbid war or to limit war making capabilities, though made in the time of peace, border on the field where agreements are wholly ineffective. This may account for the dismal history of past arms control agreements. Logically, therefore, it can be argued that disarmament agreements are not worth attempting—ever. Even if that gloomy view is not adopted, the considerations outlined in the preceding section seem to indicate that now's not the time for such an attempt on our part.

But the short answer is that as a political matter we cannot avoid making the attempt and making it at this time. And if we make the attempt, it must be an honest one. It, therefore, seems desirable to examine the rationale underlying arms control.

Up until now, the pressure for arms control has been largely emotional and economic—that is, political. Reduction in the risk of being subjected to the horrors of nuclear war has had, and has, a world-wide human appeal. Exploitation of this continent by the Soviets, if not countered effectively by us, could result in serious political gains for communism. Relief from the [illegible in the original] burden of defensive arms competition also has had, and has a potent economic appeal. But now, for the first time, our future in an unrestricted arms race is not a bright one from a strictly military point of view. In the age of nuclear missiles, we will not be able to buy the security we have known in the past, no matter how much money we spend. Hence, we should use our best efforts to reach arms control agreements which will slow down the race by limiting the capability of the Soviets in a manner which is conducive to our own security. Therefore, arms control should have a significant role in our military planning, and even if efforts to slow the arms race by arms control agreements do not look very promising, they should nevertheless be made from a [illegible in the original] military point of view.

But the great drive behind arms control today remains the dread of intercontinental nuclear war. The feeling is widespread that somehow a way must be found to curtail or abolish nuclear weapons. This is not primarily the result of Soviet propaganda, but rather because of widespread realization that nuclear weapons have added a danger of wholly new dimensions—the possible annihilation of a nation and destruction of its homeland.

II. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Since nuclear weapons constituted the great urge behind disarmament today, sympathetic and intense consideration has been given to the possibility that the United States might agree to measures which would lead to their elimination. This conclusion has been reluctantly reached that the United States cannot afford in the immediate future to agree to eliminate or drastically reduce its nuclear capability.

In the first place, an agreement by the Soviets to eliminate nuclear weapons could not be relied upon, because there is at present no known way of detecting hidden nuclear warheads, and less that 100 nuclear missiles with high yield warheads would put us at the mercy of the Soviets if we had surrendered ours. This problem is particularly acute with ICBMs. They consist of the nuclear warhead and the rocket vehicle. The "Atoms for Peace" program results in enriched uranium going into peaceful reactors, and plutonium—the major element of warheads—coming out. Similarly, the "Peaceful Use of Outer Space" program will result in the production and improvement of rockets of a type admirably suited for use as the vehicle for ICBM's. So two important peaceful programs greatly complicate the problem of controlling ICBMs.

In the second place, even if we could be sure that the Soviets retained no nuclear weapons, the overwhelming manpower of the Soviets and Red China requires us to retain a nuclear capability unless and until there is created a world authority capable of enforcing international law. If we now surrendered our nuclear capability, the uneasy balance of power which now exists between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet bloc would be upset, because the elimination of the risk of a major nuclear exchange would encourage the Soviets and Red China to step up their military efforts to attain their goal of Communist domination of the world.

Does all this mean that the nuclear arms race must go on unabated? Not necessarily. It seems probable that the Soviets share our desire to reduce the risk of a major nuclear war. At the moment, they apparently prefer other means for achieving world domination. But whatever their recourse, it appears [illegible in the original] for us to explore and build on this mutual desire. And there is a concept which might put a limit to the nuclear arms race, namely, the concept of a stable balance of nuclear deterrence.

III. STABLE BALANCE OF DETERRENCE

A. *Intercontinental Nuclear War*

The word "deterrence" describes a situation in which a party has the power to take action but voluntarily refrains from doing so for fear of the consequences. In the context of intercontinental war, it is usually

thought that for one nation to deter another it is necessary for the first nation to be able to defeat the other—to have military superiority. And that is indeed the most potent form of deterrence. We had that kind of deterrence when we had a nuclear monopoly. There was then, however, no balance of deterrence. Deterrence was one-sided. It prevented nuclear war because we abstained from starting such a war, not because we were deterred by the Soviets' military power.

Deterrence, however, may also exist when there is a stalemate—that is, where there is roughly a parity of nuclear power between two nations. The present situation between ourselves and the Soviets is often referred to as a “nuclear stalemate.” In such cases, deterrence is not one-sided; each deters to the other, so there is a balance of deterrence—some call it “[illegible in the original] deterrence.” But if parity must be retained in order to preserve a balance of deterrence, it will not be very stable. One side is apt to draw ahead of the other, either by making more weapons or more effective weapons.

It follows that if it is not essential to maintain parity, it will no longer be necessary for each side to keep up with the other; as the balance of deterrence will begin to acquire an element of stability. And close analysis indicates that parity is not essential. The test of deterrence is the damage which the attacker will receive, and deterrence can exist even when the defender has a lesser capability than the attacker. If the attacker will be severely damaged, he is not likely to attack even if he could destroy the defender. It is not necessary “to be there fastest with the mostest.”

The foregoing analysis of both parity and less-than-parity omits to consider the destabilizing effect of a first strike. On first thought, the advantage of striking first seems so great that there can be no stability unless the defender has a much greater force than the attacker, because the defender will have available only the weapons which survive a devastating nuclear missile attack.

On further thought, however, it is apparent that if the retaliatory force of the defender is sufficiently invulnerable so that it will take from three to five of the attacker's missiles to knock out each of the defender's missiles, then the attacker must have three to five times as many missiles before the defender's retaliatory force is completely destroyed. On a 3-to-1 basis, if the attacker has 1,800 missiles and the defender only 1,000, then the 1,800 missiles of the attacker would destroy only 600 of the defender's 1,000. The defender would be left with 400, which could inflict frightful damage on the attacker's governmental and industrial centers.

Therefore, if both sides are aware of this [illegible in the original] and make their retaliatory force sufficiently invaluable to [illegible in the original], say, a 3-to-1 ratio, through mobility, concealment, dispersal, hardening and the like, then neither will be likely to attack. A stable balance of deterrence will have been created. Once such a situation has

been created, neither side is apt to incur the enormous expense of building enough missiles to overcome the handicap of such a ratio as 3-to-1. Hence, the nuclear arms race is likely to level off at a sensible point. Just where that point should be is a matter of military-scientific judgment, but there clearly is a point where “enough is enough.”

Of course, the situation between us and the Soviets at any given moment of time will lend itself to a mathematical competition such as that outlined above. The differences in types of missiles, their accuracy and yield, the degree of their invulnerability and so on, preclude the use of mathematics. Further, the stability of the deterrence can be upset by technological advances producing greater accuracy or larger yield, or by anything else which would reduce the number of attacker’s missiles required to knock out each of the defender’s missiles. The situation, therefore, must be kept under continuous review. There is, however, no immediate problem on this score. When we have attained a high degree of invulnerability for our retaliatory force, it will be time enough to worry about the point at which we can level off.

It is concluded that the concept of a stable balance of deterrence has sufficient validity to warrant its adoption. Insofar as it works, it is a way, though admittedly an expensive one, of “banning the bomb”—not by eliminating the capability to use it, but by eliminating the willingness to use it.

It is therefore recommended:

Recommendation No. 2

The United States should urgently increase the invulnerability of its strategic retaliatory force to the point where a substantial part of that force will survive any attack the Soviets will be able to deliver.

This foregoing recommendation, like Recommendation No. 1, is not dependent on any arms control negotiations. We should attain the requisite invulnerability unilaterally. But arms control measures could at some point be helpful in understanding a subtle balance of deterrence. It is obvious that we will not be in a position to negotiate meaningful measures of arms control affecting this concept unless and until we can convince the Soviets of the merits of the concept from both their and our point of view. It is doubtful if we can to that before Recommendation No. 2 has been carried out. Nevertheless, sooner or later arms control agreements could be helpful in the following ways:

1. They could help to determine the level at which the balance of deterrence is initially established and might later reduce that level. It should however, be noted that the lower the level, the more effective the inspection system must be. At a high level, a few clandestine missiles may not be dangerous, but at a low level they might be very dangerous.

2. Technological improvements which tend to upset stability could be slowed or halted through monitored agreements to control the testing of missiles, thus enhancing stability and saving money.

Even though the occasion for fruitful negotiation with the Soviets on such arms control measures may be sometime away, the concept should underlie our thinking on disarmament measures.

According, it is recommended:—

Recommendation No. 3

The United States should accept the concept of a stable balance of deterrence as a basic principle underlying arms control measures affecting intercontinental war.

B. The Concept of Stable Balance of Deterrence Appears to Have No Significant Applicability to Limited Wars

The foregoing discussion has been addressed solely to the problem of intercontinental nuclear war. Smaller wars present a different problem. The spectrum of possible limited wars is so broad, and the number of possible participants so varied, that it is difficult to conceive of constructing an adequate system of balanced deterrence which could be stabilized, with or without arms control. Though limitations on force levels and armaments would reduce the forces available to fight limited wars, to equalize these reductions in such a way that there would be a deterrent balance in such relevant geographic area appears out of the question. And there is no such ratio between defensive and offensive weapons in limited wars as underlies the concept in intercontinental war. It is purely a question of who has the stronger forces.

Thus the concept of a stabilized balance of deterrence has little applicability to limited war. While our nuclear strategic capability has tended to hold down the size and possibly the number of limited wars, creating a stable balance of deterrence for intercontinental war does not add anything to that. Indeed, the more stable this balance, the more destabilizing may be its effect on limited war, since a potential aggressor is apt to think that both sides will try to prevent a local war from escalating into a general war, and so press limited war further than he otherwise would. On balance, it seems that the concept has no significant effect on limited wars.

A more detailed discussion of the concept of a stable balance of deterrence is continued in Annex "B."

IV. DISARMAMENT GOAL

Before turning to specific arms control measures, it seems important to determine the general direction in which we hope arms control measures will take us. It is obviously beyond the scope of this report to suggest an over-all national policy which would correspond to the

policy of world domination ascribed to the Soviets, within which arms control constitutes only one of many means of implementation, along with political, economic, ideological, and, in the Soviet case, subversive activities. But it is important that, for the field of arms control itself, an objective should be clearly stated. We should state what we ultimately hope to attain by means of arms control in order to provide a basis for our own decisions and to make our aims and motives clear to others. Further, such a statement would place in perspective initial measures of arms control which might otherwise look insignificant.

A comprehensive phased package of arms control measures is no substitute for an arms control objective. If the phases extend far enough to reach the ultimate objective, the package mixes the specific with the general, and confuses the presently attainable with the ultimate, to such an extent that the package cannot be clearly understood by the many, many people who must understand arms control measures if these measure are to be adopted. It founders on the multitude of the issues it raises. It is, under existing negotiating conditions, "biting off more than we can chew."

These considerations are of particular importance at the moment, because of the revival by the Soviets of their long-standing proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, to which they have added elimination of all standing military forces. The simplicity and sweep of these proposals require special effort on our part to place our own proposals for arms control in a setting of comparable breadth and simplicity.

Yet, the statement of our goal cannot be so broad that it loses meaning. Some specificity is required. It is too broad to state simply that the security of the United States is the goal which governs our position on arms control measures. We must be more specific and state quite precisely what it is we desire to accomplish in the long run through arms control measures. Otherwise we are in much the same position as if we had no goal; the rest of the world will be uncertain of our aims and we ourselves may hesitate and vacillate when faced with proposals by others.

The President and others have stated a simple and sweeping goal, namely, "world peace under law." Not only is this simple and sweeping, it is wholly consistent with our national tradition—the rule of law and not of men. It is, however, subject to the above objection of being too broad to be meaningful. Accordingly, it is recommended that, while adopting the goal of "world peace under law," we should spell out its main elements, as we conceive them.

Recommendation No. 4

The United States should establish the goal which it desires ultimately to reach through arms control measures and toward which it will make progress as fast as in its judgment the world situation permits.

Recommendation No. 5

The United States should favor arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law, namely, a world in which:

1. There shall be universally recognized rules of international law, which if followed will prevent all nations from initiating armed conflict with (or from aiding civil disturbances within) other nations, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement.

2. Through safeguarded international agreements, national military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be within the control of any nation.

The establishment of a long-range goal in accordance with Recommendation No. 4 is fundamental. Whether Recommendation No. 5 sets forth the most declarable form of long-range goal may be open to argument. But if changes are made, they should not substantially reduce the breadth and sweep of the goal.

The above statement of the goal does not, and should not, spell out the means by which it is to be achieved. Nothing is said as to whether the rules of international law are to be adopted by multilateral treaty or are to be enacted by a supra-national legislature. Nor is it stated whether effective enforcement is to be provided by collective security agreements, by creating the type of international peace force contemplated by the present UN Charter or by creating a frankly supra-national police force; and if the latter, what its size should be and how it is to be raised, maintained, commanded and financed. Nor is it stated whether discarded nuclear weapons should be placed under international control, used to arm a peace force or destroyed. There is even no indication as to whether the United Nations or the International Court of Justice should be used, or new organizations should be created.

The omission of these matters is not to deny that they involve many and difficult problems. Rather, the omission is but an essential characteristic of any statement of principle which is expected to remain operative for a long period of time. If means are specified in the goal, the principle is apt to fade when the means are overtaken by events or lose their realism. No one can now foresee what means can be worked out. Measures which now seem wholly unworkable may, through technological developments or changes in the world situation, gradually or even suddenly prove workable. Conversely, measures which at the moment seem workable may prove to be unnegotiable. The important thing is that the ultimate principle be kept alive and bright through all the vicissitudes of lengthy multilateral negotiations on many specific proposals.

That the problems in the way of reaching the long-range goal are many and difficult is wholly obvious. They are so many and so difficult that the goal may never be reached. That, however, should be no drawback to its adoption now. For almost two centuries, we have been working to reach the goals set forth in the United States Constitution, and we have not succeeded yet. But few would say that therefore the Constitution should not have included those goals. Progress toward the goal should be made as fast, but only as fast, as the security of the United States permits, in the light of the military capability of our probable enemies, our commitments to our allies, unsettled political problems, technological considerations and the like. The test in each case should be to adopt only those arms control measures which are compatible with the goal and which involve less risk to the security of the United States than not adopting them.

V. ARMS CONTROL MEASURES FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATION

As indicated in the preceding section, the main purpose of establishing a long-range goal is to relieve us of the necessity of presenting for negotiation a comprehensive phased package of arms control measures. Not only is such a package confusing but creates such a multiplicity of issues that negotiations bog down. Further, it commits us presently to take actions in the future which when the time comes we may not wish to take. We should be free at all times to agree only to such proposals as we are sure at the time we are willing to carry out. As applied to the existing situation, the years of fruitless negotiations suggest that it would be advisable to concentrate our efforts on comparatively few measures. Our goal calls for two types of action, one limiting national capabilities and the other building up international capability. The suggestion to concentrate on a few measures applies to both types.

Accordingly, it is recommended:—

Recommendation No. 6

The United States should take the following actions designed to limit national military capabilities:

1. Endeavour to complete the current negotiations on nuclear testing, preferably excluding underground tests from the agreement.
2. Propose at the Ten Power Conference a European zone of inspection against surprise ground attack, in aid of NATO's mission.
3. Propose at the Ten Power Conference a prohibition of vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

Recommendation No. 7

The United States should take the following actions designed to increase international capability:

4. Propose action by the United Nations to intensify the effort to develop and codify international law.

5. Repeal the so-called "Connally Amendment," and seek multilateral agreements giving the International Court of Justice, the full jurisdiction set forth in Para 2 of Article 36 of its statute.

6. Propose motion by the United Nations to improve the procedures governing the cessation of a U.N. "presence" in areas where disputes exist.

The reasons for suggesting only six measures—of which only two (the European [illegible in the original] Outer Space) would be negotiated at the coming Ten Power Conference, might appear to be based solely on negotiating tactics, which are not a part of the responsibility of this study. And in a sense this is true. But it is thought to be a part of the responsibility of this study to devise ways and means of breaking the dismal history of years of futile negotiations. The same reason which is behind the recommendation that an ultimate goal be established, in lieu of a comprehensive phased package proposal, is behind this recommendation that we confine ourselves to relatively few and simple matters. It is to see if we cannot for the first time actually accomplish something. Specifically:—

(a) Concentration on a few points brings all the prestige and power of the United States behind a few relatively simple measures. If we were to announce publicly our long-range goal objectives, the goal should act as a magnifying glass and focus heat on a few measures.² If no real progress can be made on these measures, it will reveal to us and to the world that the present peace offensive of the Soviets is no more than propaganda.

(b) Concentrating on a few points tends to confine negotiations to limits within which there is little scope for the distracting diversions at which the Soviets are so adept.

(c) Concentration is facilitated by the fact that the measures affected are not dependant on each other. They have not the interconnection which many arms control measures have—for example, the connection force levels and armaments have with each other and with military budgets.

(d) By endeavoring to achieve a few limited objectives which can be relatively easily inspected, we might achieve agreement on inspection procedures which could be helpful in later more important measures. In this connection, it should be noted that none of the selected measures involve Red China, except for inspection of underground nuclear tests.

It is realized that several of our allies have made far more ambitious proposals. In particular, the United Kingdom has proposed a series of phased stops starting principally with studies and ending with the possible abolition of nuclear weapons (see Annex "H"). In

²To emphasize this concentration, it might be desirable to "wipe the slate clean" by withdrawing all proposals we have previously made. [Footnote is in the original.]

concentrating on a few matters, we should not indicate hostility to such more ambitious proposals or indeed to some of the Soviet proposals. On the contrary, we should express interest in considering them, but only after the few measures which we have advanced have been acted upon. Otherwise, our effort to accomplish something this time is apt to meet the same fate as our prior efforts. It will founder on the diversionary tactics of the Soviets

Nevertheless, it is recognized that the very large “gap” between our long-range goal and the few measures recommended above does create a problem. Desirable as it may be to retain freedom as to how, and how fast, that gap should be filled, we may well be forced to say something about it. With that in mind, this report suggests measures which could be added to those recommended above for present negotiations. It further comments on other measures, including those currently proposed by our principal allies and by the Soviets. These comments in many cases indicate what conditions should be met before the particular proposals are adopted.

VI. FULLER CONSIDERATION OF FOREGOING AND OTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT NATIONAL CAPABILITY

A. Above Measures Recommended for Immediate Negotiation

1. Completion of Current Negotiations to Cease Nuclear Testing.

Our hand is already set to the plow in the current negotiations for an agreement to cease all nuclear testing. If that were not so, much could be said for excluding underground tests from the agreement; and it is recommended that if our commitments in these negotiations permit, the agreement should not include underground tests. In this connection, it should be noted that the inspection called for by the proposal to prohibit satellites capable of mass destruction (Proposal #3 in Recommendation No. 6. above) could be made to cover the monitoring of nuclear tests in outer space. But irrespective of what the agreement should cover, the negotiations should be pressed to a conclusion, for the success or failure of these negotiations will be an important omen as to the possibility of progress in other matters. Under the circumstances, a detailed recommendation in this report covering these negotiations seems hardly in order.

2. European Zone of Inspection Against Surprise Attack.

There should be disclosure and verification by the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviets, of the size, composition, and locations of their forces in an area described by terrain features and encompassing most of the territory of the Low Countries, Germany, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in which there is a concentration

of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The area is defined in terms of terrain features insofar as practicable, rather than national boundaries, in an effort to avoid suggesting U.S. acceptance of either the existing division of Germany or the Soviet-imposed post-World War II boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Restricting the application of the measure to the military forces of the above-named nations within the area should make it easier to avoid negotiating with the Pankow regime in East Germany.

Verification would consist of joint inspection teams—backed by aerial inspection and radar.

The proposal is described in greater detail in Annex “D.”

The reasons for selecting this proposal for immediate negotiations are:—

(a) It would lessen the possibility of a surprise ground attack in Europe and would thus aid NATO in its primary mission of defending against a European ground attack. This is an important area of the world and the area where the consequences of a surprise ground attack is the most serious.

(b) The zone is relatively small and should serve as a valuable laboratory in which to develop inspection techniques.

(c) If the information disclosed by the Soviets is found to be reliable, it would engender mutual confidence. If it is proved unreliable, we would be warned against agreeing to more serious steps.

(d) The proposal is in the same general field as the first of the five “partial” measures Khrushchev has proposed, and so indicates we have not wholly ignored his proposals.

(e) The zone does not include Soviet territory proper, and so stands a better chance of being acceptable to them, even though it is less desirable from our point of view.

(f) Anticipated objections by our allies, particularly West Germany, should be answered by the inclusion of the territory of the other NATO countries, which negates “discrimination” against Germany, and by describing the zone by terrain features rather than national boundaries. (A description by coordinates appears impracticable). The real point is that under the proposal the zone is not neutralized, not denuclearized, nor is West Germany prevented from building up its twelve divisions, nor is it required to withdraw from NATO, nor are force levels affected.

(g) While force levels are unaffected, nevertheless, if the inspection provides the anticipated increase in the security of NATO forces, a thinning out of non-indigenous forces in the zone should be practicable from a military point of view. At that time, therefore, we might be in a position to consult with our allies and jointly propose to the Soviets some thinning out.

If it should develop that adding zones in other parts of the world would make this proposal more acceptable to our allies or the Soviets, there would be no objection to doing so, provided the other zones make sense by themselves. The main purpose of aiding NATO’s mission would, however, become obscured.

3. Prohibition of Vehicles Capable of Mass Destruction from Being Placed in Orbit or Stationed in Outer Space.

The principal reason for suggesting this measure is a simple one. Twice in the past, an opportunity to control revolutionary weapons at a time when they were controllable has been missed. The first was when we had a monopoly on atomic weapons and the Soviets refused the "Baruch Plan." The second was when ICBM's were in their infancy and no agreement was reached to halt their development. Now we have an opportunity to prevent space vehicles from becoming weapons of mass destruction. We should not "miss the boat" a third time. It is highly important to forestall the extension of the nuclear arms race into outer space.

It is to be noted that the proposal is confined to space vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction. It does not include communications or reconnaissance vehicles. These are extremely important to our country. They will provide many types of information for verification of arms control agreements. Our ability to use them must not be compromised, in spite of the probable opposition of the Soviets to permitting them.

The essential first step is to obtain early agreement to the prohibition of the launching of mass destruction weapons designed to sustain themselves in space. This would not include ballistic missiles since they do not sustain themselves in space. This could be achieved through an agreement that no weapons of mass destruction would be placed in orbit or projected into sustained space flight; disclosure by registration of flight plans of all satellite sustained space flights reaching over 100 kilometers (60 miles); verification of satellite and sustained space flights, through international inspection of payloads prior to launching and inspection for undisclosed satellites and monitoring of sustained space flights above 100 kilometers through a space surveillance and tracking system.

A specific height above the earth is suggested so as to avoid running into unsettled questions of law and fact, such as the definition of "space," the limitation of national sovereignty in the areas above national terrestrial boundaries and the use of national airspace and outer space for peaceful purposes. The figure of 100 kilometers (60 miles) falls between the theoretical upper limit of continuous flight of winged aircraft based on aerodynamic force (approximately 55 miles) and the lower theoretical limit at which a satellite can exist in orbit (about 70 miles).

In the interest of speed, and because only two nations are launching space and satellite vehicles, it is probably desirable that the agreement be negotiated bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviets as a subcommittee of the Ten Power Conference. The agreement should provide that other nations might join and if, subsequent to its execution,

any nation engaged in a space program failed to do so, the parties to the agreement might withdraw.

While seeking to obtain the proposed agreement, the United States should undertake to establish its leadership in space matters unilaterally and by participation in existing international programs. To do so, emphasis might be placed on utilitarian programs, such as improved weather forecasting, communications and geophysical reconnaissance. There are areas in which the United States presently excels. This is not to imply, however, that efforts to develop more powerful propulsion systems should not be pressed. While this is being done, it might well be desirable to endeavor also to set up certain programs jointly with the Soviet Union.

The questions of law and fact, some of which are outlined above, which in the past have plagued consideration of space matters, should be set apart from arms control negotiations. They might in due course be referred to either the UN or to some other international body for resolution.

B. Other Measures Which Could Be Presently Negotiated.

As previously suggested, it is recognized that the recommendation to concentrate our efforts on the few measures recommended above may not be accepted or the attempt to do so may not be successful and that in any event it will be necessary to discuss, with our Allies at least, what we are willing to talk about next. We will have to say something about the great gap between our initial proposals and our ultimate goal.

Accordingly, this report considers measures which could be presently [illegible in the original] danger to the security of the United States.

1. Mechanics for Lessening Likelihood of War by Accident.

In the missile age the defender against an intercontinental attack may receive little or no warning. Hence the time for deciding to launch a retaliatory attack is dangerously reduced for, once launched, missiles cannot be recalled in the same manner as bombers. Under these circumstances, there is great danger of war starting from an accidental nuclear explosion or from the isolated act of an irresponsible individual or from some other ambiguous event.

It would, therefore, seem that both the Soviets and ourselves should [illegible in the original] some means of lessening that danger and that the Soviets would be willing to explore jointly with us ways of lessening the danger.

It is not clear what form the means should take. Hence, prior to discussions with the Soviets, it is hardly profitable to do more than suggest a possibility for joint exploration. This might consist of stationing in the capital of each country high ranking officers, with direct communications to their own capital, who could personally verify [illegible in the

original] ambiguous incident, such as an accidental nuclear explosion. [illegible in the original] the last country would be most anxious to aid [illegible in the original] verify the true character of the incident, so the problems [illegible in the original] by ordinary foreign [illegible in the original] in the Soviet Union would not [illegible in the original].

The ultimate might be a “purple telephone” directly connecting the Soviet Premier and the President of the United States.

The idea here suggested would be particularly important in times of heightened tension between us and the Soviets. Obviously, the time to establish the mechanics is before tension arises. It is possible that other nations would wish to participate. There appears to be no objection to a few additional participants. But the number should be kept small so that the mechanics do not become too cumbersome to be effective.

2. Preparatory Steps for Limiting Force Levels.

It clearly would be to our advantage to bring about a reduction in the conventional capability of the Soviets through a reduction in their force level. We have already unilaterally reduced our own forces to 2.5 million, and in the present state of the world it appears unsound for the U.S. to reduce its force level further. This is not so much because the Soviet's level is over 4 million as it is because of the unsolved political problems, particularly their impact on us through our commitments to other nations, and because of the menace of Red China.

Nevertheless, if the Soviets should come down to our level we might be willing to agree to a modest reduction. It seems apparent, however, that for us to propose to the Soviets that they come down to 2.5 million, while we remain stationary, is too one sided to propose. The best we can do is to say to them that if they will come down to 2.5 million, and that is verified, we will be willing to discuss with them some further reductions.

If the Soviets indicated interest in that proposition, it is not too soon to begin to study mechanics for the verification of force levels, as the British suggest. Presumably those mechanics would include furnishing the UN with inventories on force levels (and perhaps conventional arms), and the development of the technique of effective inspection by an international inspection organ, possibly using a random system of spot checks. It is a complicated matter, even though it involves but a small part of what total disarmament would involve.

While care should be taken to make it clear that we are not interested in talking force levels until the Soviets come down to a verified 2.5 million, and that even then our idea of a reduction in force levels is not large, there seems no harm in attempting presently to develop plans for verification and for the creation of an international inspection organ.

C. Measures Which, for Various Reasons Should Not be Presently Negotiated.

1. Limitation on Conventional Arms.

What has been said above about force levels applies to conventional armaments. The two go hand-in-hand. While theoretically a limitation on weapons is more effective than a limitation on men, because an unarmed man is not much of a [illegible in the original], yet the only sensible method of limiting conventional arms appears to be to tie the number of permitted weapons to the number of permitted men. Therefore, limitation of conventional arms should wait until a limit on force levels is agreed upon. The possibility of depositing arms in depots is considered separately below.

2. Limitation on Nuclear Weapons.

As previously indicated, intense thought has been given to ways and means of eliminating the principal reason behind the current world interest in disarmament, namely the dread of intercontinental nuclear weapons; the best which seems practicable is the levelling off of international nuclear capability once a stable balance of deterrence has been achieved. Neither their elimination nor other measures of control appear at this time to be consistent with the Security of the United States. Accordingly, none of the following proposals on nuclear weapons should be negotiated at this time:

a. *Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.* At the risk of repeating what has previously been said, we must retain a nuclear capability as an effect to the overwhelming manpower of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This capability must be retained unless and until effective machinery for enforcing international law is in operation. Additionally, even the Soviets admit that there is no way of detecting clandestine warheads and if we were to surrender our nuclear weapons, even 100 clandestine nuclear weapons of high yield would place us at the mercy of the Soviets. Nor is it feasible to eliminate the most dangerous type of vehicle — the missile. The "Atoms for Peace" and "Peaceful Use of Outer Space" programs seriously complicate the inspection problem. Even if an agreement for elimination could be inspected, the Soviets would certainly not agree to go back to manned bombers in which we clearly have the advantage, while we retain any nuclear capability. There therefore is nothing to negotiate on this score.

b. Limitation on Numbers of Nuclear Weapons

For the reasons given in connection with the discussion of the concept of a stable balance of nuclear deterrence, no negotiations should be undertaken on limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons until that balance is established, and then only if an adequate inspection system can be devised. Limitation of numbers, as used here, includes cut-off of production of missiles, which is an indirect way of freezing numbers.

Nor should negotiations be undertaken on limiting tactical nuclear weapons. Certainly not unless and until the conventional capability of

the Free World equals that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and maybe not even then in view of the overwhelming manpower of the Bloc.

c. Cut-off or Reduction of the Production of Nuclear Materials for Weapons.

The inspection of a cut-off of the production of nuclear materials to weapons purposes in disclosed plants appears at the moment to be practicable only if the Soviets would permit the inspectors to share in the management of the plant. Further study may devise a simpler method for effective inspection of disclosed plants without such participation in management. However, clandestine plants are not impossible, especially in view of a new German improvement in the centrifugal process. In addition, diversions of plutonium produced by electric power reactors could create a significant number of warheads, if the Soviets should embark on a sizeable atomic electric power program. These problems are more fully considered in the attached Annex E. Additionally, from our point of view it would be difficult to negotiate a cut-off and still preserve the right to continue to manufacture a certain fusible material without which a large part of our nuclear stockpile would shortly deteriorate.

Irrespective of these considerations, the controlling reason why there should at this time be no negotiations looking toward a cessation or reduction of the production of nuclear material is that we may well need our full production for the next few years in order to attain a stable balance of deterrence and for tactical weapons. The existing programs of the Department of Defense call for practically full production until 1968. This, however, is not conclusive since these programs are not necessarily designed to attain a stable balance of deterrence. The problem is accordingly complicated, involving a detailed knowledge of existing and future weapons systems, military plans and Soviet capabilities—all addressed to the rather nebulous concept of a stable balance of deterrence. The conclusion here is that no negotiations for a cut-off or reduction should be undertaken until an exhaustive study demonstrates that on balance it would be to our advantage. This study should be undertaken promptly since the proposal to reduce or cut-off nuclear production for weapons appears to be the most promising of all proposals to limit nuclear weapons.

d. Testing Intercontinental Missiles.

Study has been given, and is currently being renewed, on the desirability of seeking a cessation of the testing of missiles. The theory in favor of cessation is that by the time an agreement to cease missile testing can be negotiated and put into effect, the U.S. will have done all the testing it requires for all the missiles it needs, and hence a cut-off of testing might leave the Soviets with much the same cumbersome and relatively inaccurate early generation missiles as they now have. But, unless the renewed study discovers new considerations, the danger that delays in the development of our own missiles will leave us at the time of cut-off with "soft" and unsatisfactory missiles (so that balanced deterrence would be difficult to achieve) outweighs the possibility that the Soviets may by testing reduce the size and increase the accuracy of their missiles. The conclusion is that once we establish stable balanced deterrence, with an adequate number of relatively invulnerable

missiles, it may well be worthwhile to negotiate for a cut-off of missile testing, although study should be proven as to whether the knowledge to be gained in the development of space vehicles may not render such a cut-off largely meaningless. But until satisfactory invulnerability is attached we should not agree to a cessation of missile tests.

e. *The "Nth Country"*.

Should the U.S. presently negotiate an agreement that we will not aid any other country in obtaining a capability to manufacture nuclear weapons nor transfer nuclear weapons to it? Both are presently prohibited by the Atomic Energy Act. Presently, selected allies are training in the use of certain nuclear weapons and are furnished with the vehicles, but the nuclear warheads are stockpiled under U.S. control. The object of this arrangement is of course to offset the great Soviet superiority over NATO in conventional forces. There are those who advocate seeking an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act permitting the US to transfer nuclear weapons to selected allies or assist them in manufacturing their own nuclear weapons, and our present national policy envisages that as possibly a desirable step. On the other hand, there are many who believe that the more nations who have nuclear weapons, the greater the danger that a major nuclear war will be irresponsibly started, and the less chance there is that effective controls over nuclear weapons will ever be established. The 1957 Western Proposals included a partial limitation on the transfer of nuclear weapons after production of nuclear material for weapons purposes has ceased. Also a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 30, 1959, suggests that nations producing nuclear weapons agree not to hand over the control of such weapons to other nations.

If the Act should be amended and selected Allies should make their own nuclear weapons, it might well increase the stability of balanced deterrence between the Free World and the Soviets, and it should save considerable money. Also there are a number of nations who may well acquire a nuclear capability without our help, and if we should help them we might retain some participation in the decision of when to use them. On the other hand we would be faced with a great deal of unfavorable world opinion and, incidentally, we would lose the veto on their use which our present control over the warheads now gives us.

If we went the other way and negotiated with the Soviets an agreement not to help other nations to manufacture nuclear weapons, we would inevitably become involved in an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to them, in which case it would be exceedingly difficult to preserve our present practice of transferring the vehicles and retaining control of the warheads. Of course, if such an agreement were effective, it would present the Soviets from giving Red China a nuclear capability. But it seems likely that the Soviets will not do that for reasons of their own, unless they are badly threatened by the West, in which case they would do it anyway.

On balance it seems that in the present state of the world the existing situation is reasonably satisfactory, and that until there is a change in the world situation we should refuse to negotiate on proposals to prohibit the transfer to other nations either of the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons or the weapons themselves.

A summary of an analysis of this problem by the Rand Corporation is attached as Annex F.

3. *Foreign Bases.* The overseas bases of the U.S. which so bother the Soviets vary widely in the type. Some are SAC bases from which an attack can be launched. Others are merely for SAC recovery, after an attack. Some are only staging bases. Others support IRBMs. Still others are naval bases. And there are a number of other types besides. In fact what is a "base" as distinguished from merely a U.S. military contingent is often difficult to say.

Also, the relationships with the host countries vary widely. In some cases the host country is extremely anxious to keep our base, either for military or economic reasons, or both. In other cases the host country is reluctant and may even impose overflight or other conditions which substantially reduce the value of the base to us.

It seems probable that in the course of time we will voluntarily or otherwise abandon some of our bases. It is conceivable that our balance of payments problem might force us to abandon more than we otherwise would, for our overseas bases constitute an unfavorable item in that balance. This suggests that we should use such abandonments as ammunition with which to obtain some concessions from the Soviets in arms control negotiations.

The problem, however, is not a simple one. In so far as the abandonment of these bases would hurt our nuclear retaliatory power, they should not be abandoned. Nor should bases which are useful to support limited war operations be given up. Our supply problem for such operations, as compared with the Soviets, is bad enough even with these bases. Further, there is an important political problem: an indiscriminate surrender of our overseas bases will raise the ghost of "Fortress America". And lastly, while we may surrender some of our present bases, we may well need additional ones for new weapons systems which will strengthen our retaliatory capability.

All these considerations lead to the conclusion that no agreement should be negotiated with the Soviets which calls for any substantial or indiscriminate reduction in our overseas bases until there is a sufficient change in the situation so that the above considerations will have lost their force.

4. *Budget Controls.* There can be considerable advantage to the U.S. in obtaining budget information from the Soviets—more than they will get from receiving such information from us. But the difficulty of checking the accuracy of Soviet information means that an agreement to limit military expenditures should be regarded only as supplementing other more reliable measures of control. It would be valuable when combined with other intelligence data, but not reliable by itself. The measures here recommended for immediate

negotiation are so few and of such character that they need no such supplementing. Irrespective of that, however, we should not negotiate an agreement to limit our own military expenditures until the defects in our defense posture have been cured as recommended in Recommendation No. 1.

5. *Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare "CBR"*.

Not all CBR weapons are capable of mass destruction. For instance our police arsenals include several types of gas used merely to disable civilians temporarily. Tear gas is a common example. But insofar as CBR elements are capable of mass destruction, they should be classed for arms control purposes in the same category as nuclear weapons. Ultimately, therefore, no CBR capability should remain in national control. However, the problems of monitoring of an agreement to limit or abolish CBR when the time comes are not at all the same as monitoring limitations on nuclear weapons, nor are they the same for the different elements of CBR. In particular, the biological element requires very little in the way of plant, equipment and materials. Since this report recommends no limitations on nuclear weapons in the immediate future, these problems of CBR need not be faced at this time.

D. *Other Measures in the 1957 Western Proposals.*

The forgoing comments have covered most of the important measures contained in the Western proposals of August 29, 1947. Comments on the remainder follow:

1. *Deposit of Arms in Depots*—There is no objection in principle to the 1957 proposal (originated by the U.S.) for placing conventional arms in storage depots within the national territories of signatory states, under the supervision of an international control organization, as the levels of the forces which would use those arms are reduced. But there is a real question whether it is worth the effort to try to negotiate with the Soviets either on the principle or on the lists of armaments to be deposited. Since the arms would be deposited in national armories and either obsolete or quickly available in the event of hostilities or of violation of any other agreement limiting arms or armed forces, the proposal is largely of symbolic value and seems scarcely worth pursuing.

2. *International Control Organization* — As indicated earlier, the measures recommended for immediate negotiation do not require the creation of an over-all international control organization. They call for limited, specialized inspection mechanics, adapted to the particular measures they are to control. It may therefore be premature to negotiate the establishment of an over-all control organization. However, planning for reduction in force levels, which could be started presently (see D.2., above), might well indicate *planning* for such an international control organization. But the establishment of such an organization

involves many difficult political problems, such as the relationship of the organizations to the Security Council, its composition in the light of Soviet insistence on parity, and its voting procedure in the light of the Soviet preference for unanimity. These problems are at issue in the Geneva Nuclear Test negotiations and even though the inspection there involved is of a specialized nature, until the negotiations have terminated, it may be well to fight the battle there rather than begin it anew in a parallel form. If they result in the establishment of a Nuclear Test Organization, it may be desirable to use that organization as a nucleus for a control apparatus of wider responsibilities.

3. *Political Problems* — It is obvious that such political problems as Berlin German unification and Formosa have an important bearing on the amount of disarmament the U.S. can safely accept. No specific tie-in between arms control measures and political problems is, however, recommended. The 1957 Western proposals conditioned future steps on progress in solving political problems, and that did not prove to be a fruitful approach. In this report, the only connection between arms control measures and political problems is that political problems constitute an important element in references to the “present world situation” and the like.

4. *Movement of Armaments*—A related aspect of the 1957 Western proposals which has not yet been mentioned is the proposal that there be a study of a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments. While there may be some justification for considering arms export controls applicable to specific areas (for example, the Middle East and Africa), the general concept of control of arms traffic has serious implications for our foreign military aid program and it is better not to raise the issue at all.

5. *Suspension of the Convention*—Provision for modifying or suspending an arms control agreement should be incorporated in the agreement itself. Since future political and technological changes may render an agreement obsolete, mechanics for keeping it up to date are highly desirable. Suspension should be provided in order to protect signatories in the event of violation by one of the parties. Such provisions should be formulated in the light of the measures included in each agreement and, therefore, are not discussed in detail in this report.

E. *Comments on Current Soviet and Allied Proposals.*

To avoid repetition here, comments on the current proposals of the Soviets and our principal Allies are contained in Annex G.

F. *Red China.*

In our past disarmament proposals Red China has been mentioned by name progressively less often. She has merely been included in

general references to "other essential states". It is not suggested that Red China has been forgotten, but there is some evidence of a tendency to assume that if we can reach agreement with the Soviets our troubles are over. This tendency should be discouraged. While Red China presently appears to have no more than about 2.8 million men in her armed forces, she apparently is building up their effectiveness, and her violently aggressive and hostile attitude toward the Free World in general and the United States in particular, make it clear that we should agree to no arms control measure without careful consideration of how it leaves us with respect to Red China. This is particularly true of measures which would limit our nuclear capability. Red China must also be considered in connection with verification and inspection, whether or not she is a party to the particular arms control agreement. Otherwise the Soviets might well evade an agreement by carrying on forbidden activities in Chinese territory.

Whether or not Red China will join in any agreements which the Soviets are willing to sign is not known. The political and diplomatic problems of how negotiations with Red China should be handled are beyond the scope of this report. The point here stressed is that Red China should never be forgotten in connection with arms control agreements.

G. *Inspection.*

The all-important problem of inspection is involved in some of the measures recommended for immediate negotiation and is certain to come up frequently in connection with other measures. It deserves careful analysis.

For reasons which need no repetition here, adequate verification of compliance is a *sine qua non* to acceptable arms control agreement with the Soviets. Measures which otherwise might be acceptable cannot be accepted if performance cannot be adequately verified. On the other hand, 100% foolproof verification is rarely, if ever, possible because of technical problems, expense and acceptability to both sides. Further, the degree of accuracy necessary for verification is not the same for all arms control measures; some need less than others. It is therefore important to see if there are not some guidelines which will be helpful in determining the type of verification which particular arms control require.

It should be noted at the outset that *verification* is not the same thing as *enforcement*. Verification merely spots whether or not there has been performance of an agreement. What should be done if verification discloses a breach of the agreement is very important, but it is an entirely separate problem. The action required to offset a breach has nothing to do with the action required to detect one. Adequate verification does not make an agreement "self-enforcing".

Verification is commonly thought of as being synonymous with *inspection*. That is not strictly true, because there are arms control measures which can be verified without inspection. A large nuclear explosion in the atmosphere would be an example. Of course, if verification of a particular measure can be had without inspection it is an advantage in favor of that measure.

Nevertheless, *inspection* is the most important single method of verification, because it applies to so many important arms control measures and presents such difficult problems.

To date efforts to establish any inspection system at all have been fruitless. Some progress has recently been made in the current negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. But it is not yet clear that a satisfactory system will emerge.

The principal difficulty is the Soviet reluctance to let foreigners invade their military secrecy. While we think they are almost pathological on that score, they have been so since the days of the Czar; and it is true that this secrecy gives them a distinct military advantage. They claim our inspection proposals are merely for the purpose of "espionage". Of course, that is not the purpose, but there is no doubt that we would gather valuable intelligence from inspection tours and our present national policy recognizes that fact. Efforts should be made to weaken the Soviet position, but it will not be easy.

This situation is aggravated by the fact that our earlier proposals for the inspection of force levels and arms limitations, called for such a large number of personnel and so much transportation and communications, and were so expensive, as to be impracticable. Incidentally, they probably would not have been acceptable to our own country.

A fresh look at the problem suggests that arms control measures fall into two distinguishable categories. The first deals with the readiness of forces, such as the destruction of operational training flights, presence of warheads with delivery vehicles, and the like. These are matters of great concern in connection with surprise intercontinental attack. They require that accurate information be quickly available if the other side is to take action to offset a breach of agreement. The second category deals with more static matters, such as composition of forces, numbers and types of conventional weapons, military budgets, and the like. On such matters, information can be less precise, and time is not of the essence.

Inspection systems adapted to deal with matters in the first category pose complicated requirements in terms of numbers of inspectors, fullness of access, speedy and reliable communications, and so on. Such systems are likely to prove unacceptable to the Soviets and in arms [illegible in the original] perhaps to us also. Above all, the consequences of failure could be serious.

On the other hand, inspection may be workable and effective when applied to the second category of matters, where timelines and margin of error are not so critical. Less cumbersome inspection machinery, the use of sampling techniques supplemented by unilateral intelligence, might make such systems acceptable.

As a general criterion it would, therefore, appear that arms control measures which require elaborate inspection and in which even small scale violations could be serious, should be avoided.

It is entirely possible that further studies will devise new technologies which will simplify the inspection problem. For instance, industry uses the sampling technique of random spot checks, which with inventories and the like produces a very high probability of complete accuracy. That technique might greatly simplify inspection of arms control measures. Also technology might be able to invent helpful devices. Such studies cannot, however, be profitably pursued in a vacuum, so the terms of reference for the studies must state with some precision the particular arms control measure to be inspected.

It is also essential to take full advantage of our own unilateral intelligence capability in designing inspection systems.

Finally, a consideration which has a bearing on the negotiability of arms control proposals requiring inspection is whether or not inspection can be accomplished adequately from outside the Soviet Union. Measures which involve only inspection in the satellite countries, for example, will probably have a higher probability of Soviet acceptance.

A more detailed consideration of the problem of inspection is contained in Annex H to this report.

H. Surprise Attack and Unintentional War

The terms of reference of the Joint Study direct that priority attention be given to types of international agreements which might reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war. These subjects do not lend themselves readily to separate negotiations apart from substantive arms control measures. Since they largely involve the use of weapons, they cut across many arms control measures. The unsuccessful effort of a year ago to discuss the technical aspects of surprise attack as a separate matter illustrates the difficulty of separate treatment. Nevertheless, these two priority subjects have been kept consistently in mind and some of the measures recommended in the report are helpful either directly or indirectly.

1. *Surprise Attack.* The recommended inspection zone in Europe (page 25) is specifically designed to lessen the possibility of a surprise ground attack against NATO forces in Europe. While lessening the likelihood of surprise ground attack does not compare in importance with

preventing an intercontinental nuclear attack, Europe is clearly the most important area for preventing a surprise ground attack.

On the all important problem of preventing a surprise intercontinental nuclear attack, it is difficult to envisage any presently practicable agreement which can prevent a surprise attack in the age of ICBMs. The danger of it has increased, and so has the difficulty of preventing it. However, the creation of a stable balance of deterrence (Recommendation No. 2) will discourage a nuclear attack. Since any attack by ICBMs will presumably be a surprise attack, the deterrence against any nuclear attack is deterrence against surprise attack. Further, the use of photographing and other types of satellites should be of some help in detecting preparation for a nuclear attack. Additionally, the more inspection of other measures which can be put into effect, the greater is the chance that information indicating preparations for a surprise attack may be detected.

2. *Unintentional War*. The only recommended measure directed specifically to the prevention of accidental war is the proposed mechanics outlined on page 31. However, the creation of a high degree of invulnerability in retaliatory forces as a part of establishing a stable balance of deterrence may mean that retaliatory forces will not have to be set in motion right away. Time may be available to determine the real meaning of an ambiguous incident which will lessen the likelihood of an accidental war.

It is probable that if and as other arms control proposals than those recommended in this report came under negotiation, further measures can be worked into them which will be helpful in preventing surprise attack and unintentional war. This should be borne in mind.

It may appear that in the foregoing analysis of specific arms control measures a great deal of attention has been given to the limitations these measures would have on our own activities and that very little attention has been given to the benefits we would receive from the limitations these measures would impose on Soviet activities. Insofar as that is true, it is not because the latter has been ignored. One reason is that the problem of inspecting a number of the most important measures remain unsolved. The primary reason, however, is that we cannot afford to freeze the situation as it will exist a few years from now. We must get stronger before we can agree to measures which reduce the capabilities of ourselves and the Soviets equally; otherwise an imbalance of power in favor of the Soviets will be made permanent through arms control measures. Of course, if the Soviets should agree to verified measures which limit them more than us, then the field might open up considerably. But, at the moment, the likelihood of that does not seem great.

VII. FULLER CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO
INCREASE INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITY OUTLINED
IN RECOMMENDATION NO. 6 (P. ?)

A great deal of material has intervened in this report since measures to increase international capability were outlined in Recommendation No. 6. That is because the forum for these measures will be the UN, whereas the forum for the measures discussed in the interval will be the coming Ten Power Conference. It seems desirable to group in one place in this report the measures which will come up in the latter forum.

The thought behind the recommended measures designed to increase international capability is to build on what we have, namely the United Nations, rather than to attempt a great leap forward by making a drastic revision of the UN Charter or by creating a new organization. The steps proposed represent very modest progress toward the ultimate goal of peace under international law, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement. But they appear to be as far as can go at the moment.

While in this area we do not face the recurrent Soviet objection to inspection teams as "sabotage", there are at least as formidable difficulties in the way. One such is that to attain the ultimate goal will require either drastic changes in the Charter of the United Nations or a new world organization. Nevertheless, there is still scope under the present United Nations Charter for considerable progress before the question of making drastic changes must be faced. It seems well worthwhile to attempt to exhaust that scope, before deciding whether to advocate a drastic change.

A. Development and Codification of International Law

It is assumed by many that before any rules attain the status of international law, they must be enacted by a supra-national legislative body. This is true only in the sense that to be as effective as domestic law (in that an offender goes to jail) international law must apply to individuals and must be enforceable. To accomplish that, there must not only be a supra-national legislative body but there must be a supra-national court and, most important, a supra-national police force to seize individuals and put them in jail against the will of their government.

However, rules of conduct adopted by treaty are properly called "law", and though no one will go to jail for a violation, a court may determine whether or not the rules have been violated, and world opinion can be relied upon as an increasingly potent enforcement mechanism to induce compliance by nations. Even if progress can never be made beyond that point, it seems well worthwhile to attempt to reach it.

And there is ample room for progress under the United Nations Charter as it exists today. Article 13 calls for the development and codification of international law. Little progress on that score has been made to date, because efforts have been largely confined to codifying rules which we generally recognized as presently constituting “international law”. Little or no effort has been devoted to the development of rules which, if adopted by nation members, would restrain actions leading to armed conflict. Specifically, progress has bogged down on the definition of “aggression”. It would seem that this obstacle might be overcome by defining most if not all of the specific acts which together or singly constitute aggression, without attempting to define the conclusion represented by the word “aggression”. Domestic law generally does this by defining numerous acts which together or singly constitute a “breach of the peace”, without formulating a definition of “breach of the peace”.

However that may be, it seems well worthwhile to revive and intensify the effort to develop and codify international law. This appears of sufficient importance not only to entrust the task to the highest legal talent member nations can produce, but also to provide adequate staff assistance and to devise [illegible in the original] to ensure that progress is periodically checked and validated by periodic diplomatic conferences.

It should be noted that a valuable by-product of such an endeavor would be to increase the area of common understanding between nations which would tend to lessen tensions and perhaps provide a broad basis for real international cooperation.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 8

The United States should introduce in the General Assembly a resolution which will:

a. Establish a new organ composed of outstanding jurists, who would be required to devote full time to their duties, would be cleared for appointment by high courts, law schools, and academics, as provided in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, would be well-compensated well-staffed, and would be charged with the following duties:

(i) To codify existing principles of international law, giving priority to those principles which will make armed conflict between nations, and aiding civil disturbances within another nation, less likely.

(ii) To prepare rules not presently within the scope of international law but which, if adopted by member nations, would make armed conflict between nations, and aiding civil disturbances within another nation, less likely.

(iii) To submit the results of their work from time to time to the international diplomatic conferences described below.

(iv) To recommend the establishment of periodic diplomatic conferences of representatives of member nations to review the work of the new organ.

(v) To recommend procedures whereby the results of the work of the new organ will have the force of treaty provisions. Perhaps agreement could be presumed if no objections were made within a specific period.

A draft of such a resolution is attached as Annex J.

B. Increasing the Jurisdiction and Prestige of the World Court

Again there appears to be considerable scope within the United Nations Charter for progress. To date the International Court of Justice has had far too few cases for it to become the important instrument for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which the Charter envisages. This is not only because, as noted above, little progress has been made in developing or codifying international law, but because its jurisdiction under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court's Statute to pass upon the four important matters there enumerated³ is not firm. The so-called "Connally Amendment," which reserves to the United States the right to decide when a dispute involves domestic matters, set a precedent beclouding our declaration conferring jurisdiction on the Court which many other nations have followed.

Lastly, the Court's prestige should be increased by making sure that all members of the Court represent the highest judicial talent in each of the nations supplying members.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 9

The Connally Amendment should be repealed. International agreement should be sought for unqualified declarations under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The member of the Court appointed by the United States should at all times be of outstanding judicial ability.

It has been suggested that jurisdiction of the Court be extended to individuals, and that a system of regional inferior or "trial" courts are necessary in order to establish the facts on which the World Court may act on appeal, and also to meet the convenience of litigants. The suggestions have merit, but they would require a Charter amendment and it seems desirable to concentrate on making the present Charter work before seeking to amend it. It should be noted that a special Committee

³ Namely, interpretations of treaties, questions of international law, the existence of facts constituting a breach of agreement, and reparation for breach of agreement. [Footnote is in the original.]

of the American Bar Association is working constructively on this and related fields.

C. Progress Toward Effective Enforcement of International Law

Leaving aside fulfilling the ultimate goal by an international police force large enough to cope with the armed forces of any nation or group of nations as being too far in the future for present consideration, it seems clear that if there could be created a small mobile, well-equipped force analogous to our Marine Corps, under effective UN control, it would be of real help in the prevention of limited war and armed aggression.

It is equally clear, however, that no such force is presently practicable. Not only is the Soviet Union opposed but so are a substantial number of small nations, principally for fear of their forces becoming involved in a struggle between the two major powers. Also the problems of the recruiting, financing, supplying and commanding of even a small force are presently insoluble. Further, the UN Charter provides only for earmarking of units by member nations and even that has broken down in the face of the unrealistic composition of the Security Council and the vast differences in political concepts between nations, particularly between the Free World and the Soviets. In general, the Soviet veto in the Security Council has blockade the functioning of the UN's peace machinery.

The best that can be expected in the near future is that some UN members will continue to supply small armed forces on an *ad hoc* basis under the Uniting for Peace Resolution which by-passes the Security Council when the Council fails to act. Incidentally, it should be noted that small *ad hoc* forces have the great advantage over standing forces in being selected from nations not involved in the particular dispute.

This is a discouraging outlook for establishing effective enforcement of international law. Nevertheless impressive results have been accomplished by UN observer teams and by UN semi-military forces charged with policing borders and the like. It therefore seems worthwhile to endeavor to formalize the procedures by which such groups are brought into being, and to add to them a mediation function. If successful, this might well establish a basis of confidence which would permit further progress. Further discussion of the problems of international law enforcement is contained in Annex I.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 10

The United States should introduce in the General Assembly a resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to develop measures, for adoption by the General Assembly, which would establish a corps of observers nominated by member nations from which the Secretary

General, when authorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly, would appoint teams charged with any one or more of the following functions, subject to the consent of one or both of the parties involved as at present: (1) to determine and report the facts involved in any situation involving an actual or threatened breach of international peace; (2) to recommend measures to terminate or avoid such hostilities; (3) to act as mediators to settle such disputes; (4) to supervise the cessation of such hostilities or the measures adopted to avoid them; and (5) to assist in the administration of disputed territories.

A draft of such a resolution is attached as Annex K.

VIII. MATTERS NOT THE SUBJECT OF RECOMMENDATION

There are various matters which have a distinct bearing on the subject matter of this report, but which are beyond its scope. While no recommendations are therefore made on these matters, a few brief comments upon them may be helpful.

A. *Civil Defense.*

The only aspect of Civil Defense considered here is its effect on a stable balance of deterrence. On that it is arguable that if we and the Soviets had fallout shelters, the stability of balanced deterrence would be enhanced, since an attack would have to be more massive to give the same results as without shelters. On the other hand, the attacker would suffer less damage from retaliation and so might be more likely to attack. The result appears to be a standoff.

B. *Opening Up Soviet Society.*

In view of the Soviet's unswerving goal of world domination, any measures which tend to open up Soviet society, and eventually even alter their goal, will in the long run have a beneficial effect on disarmament, indeed may be a prerequisite to the accomplishment of significant arms control. Thus exchanges of civilians in all walks of life, cooperation on scientific projects, and the like, should be helpful to this end. Similarly, arms controls and related inspection measures might in themselves help to open up Soviet Society.

C. *Negotiations.*

There are at least two matters which seem to deserve consideration by those charged with the coming negotiations:

1. *Negotiating Margin.*

It appears that in past negotiations we have sometimes tabled proposals which reflect our ultimate position, and the recommendations in this report naturally state an ultimate position. If, however, we table proposals for negotiation in that form, we have no margin for

trading. We have no basis for the give and take which is the essence of the negotiating process. Hence the measures actually tabled at the coming negotiations should, where appropriate, ask for more or offer less than our ultimate positions or in some other manner provide the required margin.

2. Joint East West Studies.

Joint studies on technical problems may seem innocuous and desirable, not only as evidencing activity but also as an aid to assessing the merits of a particular proposal. But they carry with them a strong implication that, if the Western and Soviet experts solve the technical problems, we will agree to the proposal itself. The current negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing is an example of this. Irrespective of the merits of this particular example, it is a dangerous practice. We should be sure we are willing to go through with a proposal before we agree that experts should be convened to study the technical problems it involves.

D. Publicity.

A number of knowledgeable individuals have expressed the conviction that in the past we have been too interested in the public reaction of other nations and have neglected our own public. They maintain that the best way to obtain the understanding support of world opinion is through educating the United States public. In that connection it is suggested that we should publicize our long range goal, explain why we cannot take bigger steps toward it under present world conditions, explain the concept of stable balanced deterrence, and hammer mercilessly on the fact that deeds speak louder than words and that the United States record as a non-aggressive nation is incomparably better than that of the Soviets. For example, a comparison of our actions in liberating Cuba and the Philippines with the Soviets' actions in Hungary and the fact that we committed no aggression while we had a nuclear monopoly, make their epithet of "fear mongering" utterly absurd. Mobilizing special publicity talent for the coming negotiations would seem highly desirable.

IX. FURTHER ARMS CONTROL STUDIES

While a number of outside organizations (see Annex A) have rendered valuable help to this study, this has proved insufficient for the identification and detailed study of all issues involved. Certain issues have however been identified, work statements for their study are in the final stages of preparation for recommendation to the Departments of State and Defense is in process. These studies are described in Annex I, which also includes suggestions for additional fields for studies.

It seems clear that the successor organization to this Joint Study should be authorized to contract for substantial outside assistance if it is to cope adequately with the continuing problems of disarmament.

* * * *

While the Annexes to this report have been reviewed for consistency with this report, in case any inconsistencies remain, this report, and not the Annexes, is to govern.

The cooperation by all agencies of the Government consulted in the course of this Joint Study has been outstanding, at all levels, and is gratefully acknowledged.

Respectfully,

Charles A. Coolidge
Director

521. Telegram 5562 to London¹

Washington, January 23, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

5562. Please deliver following to Selwyn Lloyd from the Secretary. Advise date time delivery.

QUOTE January 23, 1960

Dear Selwyn:

As Mr. Dillon mentioned to you in his letter of January 6, we have been exploring possibilities for advancing in the current Geneva negotiations on nuclear tests a threshold proposal based on seismic magnitudes. We have now completed our study of this approach from a technical standpoint, and our delegation in Geneva has been authorized to discuss some specific ideas and proposals with your people there.

I was glad to note from your letter of January 14 that you welcome the threshold idea at least to the extent that it permits us to go beyond an atmospheric treaty and to ban at least certain underground tests. I am glad, too, that you have no objection to a threshold set at the level of 4.75 since that is the level we have now chosen for consideration on the basis of our technical studies.

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Herter to Lloyd on threshold proposal at nuclear test talks. Confidential. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

We, too, have been giving serious thought to the question of possible Soviet reactions to a threshold proposal. I believe, as you do, that they may well seek to extract maximum political advantage by charges that the West is seeking to put a costly inspection system in the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes and at the same time to continue a program of nuclear weapons development. Against this possibility, however, we have weighed the clear advantages of a move which represents an advance over our earlier proposal for an atmospheric treaty, which gives evidence of our willingness to agree to a test cessation in all areas that can be adequately monitored, and which offers a constructive way to by-pass existing disagreements between US and Soviet scientists on criteria and detection capabilities.

From the standpoint of world opinion, I think this new approach will point up more effectively than our earlier atmospheric proposal the idea that our purpose is not a limited treaty but a phased approach to a comprehensive treaty. I think if we emphasize the idea of progressively lowering the threshold through joint research we will be able to make this goal and the road by which we propose to achieve it somewhat clearer than we were able to do last April. Moreover, on purely technical grounds I think we are in a better public position to press for a phased treaty than we have been in the past. Both the report of the technical working group and Khrushchev's recent admission before the Supreme Soviet that modern technical equipment cannot provide absolute certainty that all underground nuclear explosions can be detected should be helpful in this regard.

On the basis of such factors as these I have come to the conclusion that the Soviets would be unlikely to use the proposal as the pretext for a break, and even less likely that it would prove advantageous to them if they should do so. The idea of the phased treaty, beginning on an even more limited basis, has already been advanced, and the idea that we could not agree to any cessation of tests which could not be effectively controlled has been a cardinal point of our public position from the outset. If a new proposal combined these elements with constructive new suggestions for getting around present technical disagreements, I doubt the Soviets could readily turn this new phased treaty proposal to their advantage. The effect of our earlier phased treaty proposal was in fact to put pressure upon the Soviets to move in a constructive direction.

I have given earnest consideration to your suggestion that the proposal be accompanied by a moratorium for a limited period of underground tests below the threshold. Despite certain public relations advantages, I believe we would have something to lose by such an uncontrolled moratorium in terms of maintaining the principle that international undertakings in the field of disarmament must be adequately controlled. We might lose militarily as well, of course, since

the Soviets would be able to test below the threshold in confidence that signal strengths would not permit inspection whatever warnings we might obtain by intelligence means.

You refer to the fact that we have already had an uncontrolled moratorium for over a year, and that two or three more years would under our present proposals be required before a control system can become fully operative. It is just this fact, that we have already been perhaps overly generous in conceding a test moratorium without effective control, that makes me feel further extensions or relaxations of our requirements for a moratorium would serve to weaken the essential principle of controlled agreements.

You refer to the question of a Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing in response to any resumption of underground tests by the western powers. I am inclined to think that this is unlikely, and that if the Soviets resumed atmospheric tests they would, whatever their excuses, bear the odium for pollution of the atmosphere. In any case the threshold proposal would not carry with it any announcement of resumption of underground tests. It would merely, in the spirit of the President's announcement of December 28, involve a statement in response to Soviet inquiries that, in accordance with the principle that we cannot agree to a cessation of tests in environments which cannot be controlled, the U.S. would be free to resume testing below the threshold when its national security interests so dictated. I have discussed this matter with the President and find that he shares this view as to the way the matter should be handled.

You mention that as a result of the agreed technical report of last summer we probably would be prepared to include a ban on high altitude tests. I think our position there should be consistent with what we say about the underground ban, and with the proposal of the President last April. At that time we suggested an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests up to the greatest height to which effective controls can under present circumstances be extended. This formula would leave for discussion, in connection with treaty language on high altitude, the question of the extent of controls and corresponding obligations we would want to include in the initial phase.

I hope that we will be able to reach agreement on this course of action in the near future, since a new western initiative at Geneva would, I think, be particularly useful at this time. I should be glad to know your reaction to the threshold proposal in light of the specifics Ambassador Wadsworth will be presenting to Sir Michael.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter UNQUOTE

Herter

522. Memoranda of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Herter¹

Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:30 a.m.

In a conversation with the President this morning, I discussed with him at some length procedures with respect to instructions for our negotiating group headed by Mr. Eaton, who meet on Monday with representatives of the other four nations involved in an effort to reach a common position before the March 15 conference with the Soviet Bloc countries in Geneva. I told him that I felt it would be a long and difficult process to achieve agreement with the Defense Department on a detailed program and that, from the point of view of proceeding, it would be best if Mr. Eaton could isolate in the discussions with our Allies points on which he or a representative of Defense who would be sitting with him, felt there might be real objections on the part of Defense. I added that, of course, when unresolved specific points came up we, together with Defense, would bring them to him for resolution.

He agreed with this procedure. He likewise agreed that we should try to work out some proposal which we could make to the Russians which would have a good public relations impact but that for the initial stages we should confine ourselves to trying to reach agreement on such matters as might be quickly implemented, and that no commitments should be made in so-called “package” form of specific steps leading from the first initial stages to the final disarmament.

Christian A. Herter

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Herter

Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:30 a.m.

The President this morning approved the draft of a disarmament objectives paper. Although we discussed at some length the question of an international police force, it was finally agreed that it would be best not to try to spell out any details and to leave the language as it stood, subject, of course, to revision in consultation with the Five-Power disarmament group. I likewise told him I would send to General Goodpaster our own communication to the Department of Defense containing some of our ideas, as well as the British specific disarmament proposals

¹ Source: Ten-nation disarmament conference; letter to Lloyd on nuclear test talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President.

which had been made at the meeting held by myself with the ambassadors of the other four nations on Monday, January 18.

Christian A. Herter

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Herter

Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:30 a.m.

In a conversation with the President this morning, he approved the draft of the letter to Selwyn Lloyd on the Nuclear Test negotiations with the inclusion of the sentence which stated that he had been consulted and approved of the policy outlined.

Christian A. Herter

523. Message From Ormsby-Gore to Herter²

January 29, 1960

Text of Message to Mr. Herter from Secretary of State

Thank you for your letter of January 23 about the Nuclear Tests Conference. Sir Michael Wright has now sent me the gist of your instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth.

I feel bound to tell you that we seem to differ considerably in our assessment of the situation.

To begin with, we believe that any proposal to the Russians which would permit the holding of tests below a given threshold would be totally unacceptable to them. If we insisted on this solution we think it might lead them to break off the negotiations. You take a different view. It has of course been a cardinal point of our public position from the outset that we could not agree to any cessation of tests which could not be effectively controlled. But Tsarapkin has repeatedly told us in Geneva that the Russians are not interested in a negotiation which will

² Source: Disagrees with threshold proposal for nuclear test talks. Confidential. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

not bring about the end of all tests. Khrushchev too has emphasized this repeatedly and I believe he means it.

Now, as I understand it, the guidance which you have sent to Ambassador Wadsworth on what he should say about tests below the threshold and at high altitude does not go beyond what you say in your letter to me. On past form I think it all too likely that the Russians will concentrate their attack on these apparent gaps in your proposals. I confess that we are not at all clear here about what precisely you have in mind on high altitude tests and tests in deep space. I am sure you will be asked at a very early stage whether you intend to start testing above a certain height, or whether you accept the report of the first technical working group, and its implications for the Treaty. On tests below the threshold you appear to rest on a statement on the lines of that which the President made on December 28 last. I am sure that this will be twisted by the Russians to imply that you have never paid more than lip service to the goal of the cessation of all tests. In short, I greatly fear that by concentrating on what you do not say and ignoring the specific proposals you put forward, the Russians will make great propaganda capital of the new move you suggest, whether or not they decide to break off negotiations altogether. They will be the better able to do this since your new proposals do not carry with them the alternative attached to the President's proposals of last April that we would still be willing to try to negotiate a comprehensive Treaty to cover all tests.

You say further that if the West should quite legitimately resume underground tests below the nominated threshold, and if the Russians were then to follow with atmospheric tests, as in my view they almost certainly would, you consider the odium would attach only to the Russians. I wish I could agree. However unpleasant the fact it would, I am sure, be generally held that the West had given the Russians the pretext for resuming and I am convinced that world opinion at large, which gets quickly agitated about fallout, would place the blame on the West. However clear it was that the Russians were causing the fallout, it would nevertheless be generally represented and believed that it was Western action that had brought this about.

You may be under the impression that my suggestion of a temporary moratorium on tests below the threshold represents a retreat from our insistence that any cessation of tests should be effectively controlled. This is not the case. What I had in mind was not a cessation of tests below the threshold but only a suspension of specified duration. We would aim during that period, as you suggest, at a programme of joint research with the Russians to lower the threshold. My suggestion does not imply an indefinite suspension of tests below whatever lower threshold we might in the meantime have achieved. This I think would preserve the principle. I also had it in mind that in proposing

a moratorium we should ask the Russians to accept some degree of inspection of events below the threshold. I do not think the Russians could reject this out of hand. Even partial control on this kind of basis would improve our position.

In commenting on my suggestion that we should incorporate a moratorium you say you think that we have perhaps been overly generous already. I do not think we need reproach ourselves with excessive generosity over the moratorium that has existed so far. After all, we accepted a time lag of this kind in good faith and with our eyes open when we took the decision to enter into negotiations in October 1958. And if we assume, as all the indications suggest, that the Russians have held no further tests since November 1958, I do not think our generosity has cost us much.

As you know, we believe that this negotiation over nuclear tests will vitally affect the future course of events in the whole field of disarmament measures. If we fail to get agreement with the Russians in the Nuclear Tests Conference I think the prospects of reaching any form of agreement with them in the Ten Power Disarmament Committee are negligible.

There is a further point. We are as worried as you over the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. A number of countries are certainly contemplating a nuclear weapons programme, and I am sure the only hope of restraining them is an agreement, to which they themselves could subscribe, which will persuade them that no one beyond the present nuclear powers in which I would now include France is going to be able to develop weapons. Development entails testing and therefore agreement on the controlled cessation of tests seems to us the quickest and most effective way of discouraging any other powers from starting on this vast enterprise.

I am extremely doubtful, as I have said before, whether we shall get agreement with the Russians unless they are convinced that we are not going to continue any form of tests. It seems to me to be well worth giving an undertaking of limited duration to suspend those tests we cannot yet control and then using that time to devise controls that will be effective over the whole spectrum. If we succeed in this, we shall have won a tremendous prize for we shall have got the Russians for the first time to accept international control on their own soil.

I ask you therefore most earnestly to consider whether you can add to the instructions you have already sent to Ambassador Wadsworth a proposal that there should be a suspension of tests of limited duration in the uncontrolled environments. These would then be progressively reduced until we have comprehensive controlled cessation.

524. Telegram 5847 to London³

Washington, February 2, 1960, 8:33 p.m.

5847. Please deliver following to Selwyn Lloyd from the Secretary. Advise date time delivery.

QUOTE February 2, 1960

Dear Selwyn:

It was good of you to give me your assessment of the situation in the nuclear tests conference and your reaction to the threshold proposal that Jerry Wadsworth has been discussing with Sir Michael Wright.

I am sorry that our views are still at variance on one or two important aspects of the proposal. I am hopeful, nevertheless, that we will be able to develop an agreed basis for proceeding in the near future.

I share fully, of course, your assessment of the significance of a test cessation for restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and of the importance of getting the Soviets to actually accept the international controls to which they are now largely committed before world opinion.

On the matter of high altitude tests, our own position does not at present go beyond the general principle I mentioned in my letter of January 23. In essence it is simply that our obligations in the initial phase should be commensurate with the controls we agree to install. I think if we accepted any commitments beyond this it would serve to undercut the principle upon which the threshold proposal is based and which it is our purpose to maintain. We have in mind, for example, cessation of tests up to a height of not more than 100,000 kilometers if installation of adequate ground based controls is agreed, and up to greater heights if installation of satellite controls is agreed. The problem is partly the practical one of weighing the costs and technological problems of control against technological capabilities for outer space during testing the first phase of the treaty. The obligations we can agree upon for underground testing also have a bearing, since it would be hard to justify the costs of, for example, a solar satellite system to prevent tests at very great distances in space during a phase of the treaty in which underground tests were not prohibited by the treaty. Accordingly, we had thought it would be best from the tactical standpoint to continue our efforts to resolve the current deadlock on the underground environment before going ahead to treaty language on outer space.

³ Source: Reply from Herter to Lloyd acknowledging differences, proposing interim steps at nuclear test talks. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

I have given further serious thought to the question of the acceptability of the threshold proposal to the Soviets, and the course of action we should pursue if it is rejected. I continue to believe that the other side could not with advantage take so immediate and drastic a step as to break off the negotiations and resume atmospheric testing, particularly in the absence of any specific announcement of our intention to resume testing. I doubt they could profit from this kind of response to a carefully considered Western proposal for circumventing technical disagreements, consolidating the broadest possible existing area of agreement, and working constructively toward extending that area of agreement. On the other hand I do agree that in the light of past positions of the Soviet Union against the holding of any tests this proposal is not likely to find ready acceptance. The issue, however, seems to me to be one of principle, namely that we should not agree to any arms control measure to which adequate controls cannot be extended. It is a principle understandable from the standpoint of world opinion, and one which I consider to be equally essential from the standpoint of this agreement and of broader future agreements in the field of disarmament. I recognize the connection between this negotiation and the ten-power disarmament negotiation. But to compromise such a principle would start the ten-power talks under poor auspices. Thus, while I share of course your doubts as to any immediate acceptability of the proposal, I consider it an essential negotiating move to narrow down and bring to a focus both the principle involved and the area of technical problems for which a resolution must be found before we can proceed to a comprehensive treaty. As you know, our purpose in entering into the technical talks in November was to seek to determine whether a sound technical basis could be found for proceeding to a comprehensive treaty. The Soviets have been far from helpful in their response, both in the technical discussions and in their more recent reiteration of the politically motivated positions taken by their scientists. I think what is needed at this stage is a proposal which poses again as clearly as possible these inescapable issues, and which confronts the Soviets with the consequences of their failure to agree to reasonable criteria or to face in a realistic way the technical problems that must be resolved. In this negotiating context I continue to feel that a moratorium proposal going beyond the limits of effective control might serve to reduce the clarity of the issues involved, to relax somewhat the pressures we need to exert upon Soviet positions and most importantly, of course, to reduce the clarity and force of the principle that agreement must be commensurate with effective controls.

I recognize fully that the position you propose draws a clear and important distinction between temporary undertakings in fields not yet subject to effective controls, and a cessation of indefinite duration in areas on which adequate controls can now be agreed. This, however,

is a somewhat different distinction from that involved in the principle of agreement to cease tests only in areas where effective controls can be provided. It is the latter principle that is the basis of U.S. policy. In addition to the soundness of this principle, it is one which cannot be compromised if Senate consent to ratification is to be achieved.

The difference between us here appears, I regret to say, to be an important one. I think it is particularly unfortunate not only that unauthorized leaks to the press during the past few weeks, which have obviously come from American sources, have occurred prior to our reaching agreement between us, but also that they have tended to point up the aspects of the proposal which will be least attractive from a public and negotiating standpoint. I hope, nevertheless, that we will be able to agree on a course of action in the near future. Since your objections do not seem to go to the threshold proposal as such but only to the question of an accompanying moratorium, perhaps we can agree that the U.S. delegation should be authorized to proceed with the proposal on the basis I have outlined. On the moratorium question perhaps we could agree to take the line that the treaty would itself contain no provision regarding tests below the threshold.

I know that this solution is far from satisfactory in its potential for Soviet maneuver to exploit any apparent difference. There have been certain differences in the past, however, in our respective unilateral statements regarding a moratorium, and they have thus far proved manageable by our respective delegations. Since there is in my view a strong need for a new Western move at Geneva at this time, I hope that with the arrival of David Ormsby-Gore we will be able to work out an agreed basis for proceeding.

Incidentally, in connection with our efforts to facilitate progress toward a comprehensive treaty I think you will be glad to learn that our existing program on underground test detection was recently augmented by an additional allocation of some seven million dollars for this fiscal year. This augmented program has already been planned in considerable detail and is getting under way at the present time.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter UNQUOTE

Herter

525. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 3, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mr. Farley, S/AE

The Secretary gave the British Ambassador a copy of his letter delivered earlier in the day in London to Selwyn Lloyd, regarding future proposals in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. After reading through the letter *Sir Harold* commented that he understood the United States was eager to put forward the threshold proposal as soon as possible but did not plan to do so until after discussions with David Ormsby-Gore early in the following week. *The Secretary* confirmed this and said that we thought it most important to have a clear agreed understanding as to how we would handle the proposal and the questions which would be raised by the Soviets.

Sir Harold said that, speaking personally, he thought that perhaps a distinction might be made between the types of testing which could be detected and controlled, and the types which could not at the present time. Wadsworth and Sir Michael Wright might propose that tests in the former category be covered by a cessation agreement to be negotiated promptly by them with Tsarapkin; tests in the undetectable category raised a political problem which was beyond their competence and which would have to be referred to the highest level, presumably at the forthcoming summit meeting. *The Secretary* said that there appeared to be no problem regarding the tests which could be detected and identified. We were, of course, ready to enter into a safeguarded agreement now ending such tests. We were also determined to pursue the test suspension further as rapidly as the technical uncertainties could be resolved. He referred to the work now under way, to the extent of seven million dollars, to resolve the technical problem of underground test detection. We were prepared to join in a coordinated research program in areas under any threshold. *Mr. Merchant* observed that *Sir Harold's* suggestion might appear to derogate from the authority of

¹ Source: Attempt to coordinate positions for nuclear test talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

our negotiators, whose instructions could be as broad as their governments chose. More importantly, we should not appear to compromise the principle of entering into disarmament agreements only when they could be adequately controlled, as would be done in implying a possible political resolution of what was essentially a control problem.

It was agreed that the Secretary would meet with the British Ambassador and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on Monday, February 8, to discuss the matter further.

526. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and McCone¹

Washington, February 3, 1960, 10:40 a.m.

Mr. McCone telephoned to say he had about 45 minutes with the President this morning, and that their talk had run along the lines of the Secretary's talk with the President yesterday. Mr. McCone said the President expressed considerable concern over the British opposition, and volunteered his recognition that if this British opposition ever got on the Hill we would have troubles on the bilaterals. The Secretary said Mr. Merchant had already run into difficulties on this yesterday. Mr. McCone said it was the Republicans who were causing the difficulties, principally Hickenlooper and Hosmer, who were probing this so-called "undue extension of Presidential authority".

The Secretary said he is going to talk very frankly to Caccia this afternoon. McCone said he mentioned the Ormsby-Gore threat to the President, and the Secretary said we had sent information on this to Goodpaster to pass along to the President. McCone said Goodpaster did report to the President and that the President had asked Goodpaster to call the Secretary to be sure we fully understood the implications of this from the standpoint of the bilaterals. The Secretary said he is going to have to see Ormsby-Gore when he arrives on Monday, and that it is a question of how far to go with him and still try to keep the confidence of the person who told us. McCone said he thinks the Secretary will just have to smoke him out by telling him this is what we are going to do and asking him what they are going to do in light of this. McCone said the President is right along with us all the way.

¹ Source: Ormsby-Gore visit. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

McCone said on the Emylanov matter, the President seemed to think it was worth exploring. McCone said he was now talking with Dr. Rabi and John Hall, and that Mr. Hall will be meeting a little later with Mr. Bohlen. McCone said they will then phone Emylanov and, if that is productive, Hall will go over there and, if that is productive, McCone will go.

McCone said he and the President had an interesting talk on the idea McCone had talked to the Secretary about, i.e., taking a plant and matching it with another plant on the cut off, with a second phase of an open sky search for another plant. McCone said he would like to see us staff this out a little with Eaton and others. The Secretary said Eaton has to be given guidance on our line of approach; what, at the present time, Eaton is still doing is trying to talk about matters of substance rather than technique on the major issues to see where we are at but, at the same time, it is a question of how this particular thing is approached. McCone said he thinks this might be something that could be done. The Secretary said it was a question in his mind whether this is leading to a complete cutoff, with this being a method of doing it bit by bit, and this being a part of the method of ascertaining whether there are any more plants or not—a part of the inspection, so to speak. McCone said this might lead to a complete cutoff and reveal all the plants, and the open skies would lead to a lot of other things, including the missile problem. The Secretary said this is where we run into problems in that they will say we want to find the launching pads instead of the plants. McCone said he would tell them that of course we want to find the pads if we are going to discuss disarmament. The Secretary said that, of course, this is the crucial thing we are driving at, but that this is the great military advantage the Soviets have and it is a question of what they may ask as a quid pro quo for their giving up this military advantage. McCone said they offered complete disarmament without any quid pro quo. The Secretary said he thinks all the way through we are up against the same fundamental difficulty, i.e. adequate inspection. The Secretary said there he thought the question of inspection ought to be considered case by case on what we are trying to handle. McCone said his theory is that our posture will be better on the 15th of March if we offer something significant and tangible; but not complete, rather than just offering to study something, and that is why he suggests this course. McCone said all we may get is one padlocked plant here and one there but it will make headlines three inches high. The Secretary said we want to give very careful study to actually laying it on the line and asking them to do the same in having so much fissionable material neutralized which is something we can afford better than they can. McCone said he had a few brief notes on this, which he could personally show the Secretary. Agreed McCone would meet the Secretary at 1:50 today and ride over to lunch with him.

527. Working Paper¹

February 8, 1960

UNITED STATES VIEWS ON CERTAIN
DISARMAMENT MEASURES

I. Ultimate Arms Limitation Goal

The objective in disarmament negotiations is to contribute, by balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control agreements, to the achievement of a secure and politically ordered world in which:—

1. There shall be universally recognized rules of international law, which, if followed, will prevent all nations from initiating armed conflict with other nations, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement.

2. Through safeguarded international agreements, national military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law.

3. An international control organization adequate to verify compliance with agreed measures of disarmament is established and operating effectively.

4. An open world, including the institution of aerial and ground inspection adequate to detect any build-up for surprise attack, large or small, has been achieved.

II. The Following Areas to Be Negotiated at This Time by the Ten Nations

1. A joint study of the composition, control, financing, etc., of an International Disarmament Control Organization, and recommendations with respect thereto.

2. Agreement to establish the International Disarmament Control Organization in the light of recommendations of the joint study group.

3. A joint study of present force levels of the various powers, including criteria for defining force level ceilings and the manner of verification thereof; and recommendations with respect thereto.

4. Agreement to establish an initial force level ceiling, in the light of the recommendations of the joint study group and upon establishment of effective verification procedures.

5. A joint study of the present levels of conventional equipment and armaments pertaining to land, sea and air forces, including criteria

¹ Source: U.S. Views on Certain Disarmament Measures. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

for defining the same and the manner of verification thereof; and recommendations with respect thereto.

6. Agreement to place in storage depots, within their own territories and under the supervision of the Control Organization, specific quantities of designated types of conventional armaments, in the light of the recommendations of the joint study group and upon the establishment of effective verification procedures.

7. A joint study of an appropriate inspection zone or zones in which there would be established one or more of the following in order to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack, including the exchange of information concerning military forces (subject to effective verification procedures, including aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, and mobile ground teams—all with specifically defined rights and authority); overlapping radar; reporting of flights for all aircraft; and establishment of appropriate communications facilities and arrangements.

8. Agreement to establish within the agreed zone or zones appropriate measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack, in the light of the recommendations of the joint study group.

9. A joint study of measures to be taken to assure that no nation shall place in orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction—including prior notification of launching and launch site inspection.

10. Joint studies of means for preserving world peace as national armaments diminish, through the further development, or creation, of international organizations; and recommendations with respect thereto.

11. Agreement to aid in the development of the means for preserving world peace through the further development, or creation, of international organizations, in the light of the recommendations of the joint study group.

(Additional items may be added under this category.)

III. Future Action Which the Ten Nations Agree Must be Taken to Attain the Ultimate Arms Limitation Goal and Which Will be Negotiated after the Completion of the Various Measures and Studies Set Forth Above

(The United States will present at an early date items for inclusion in this category.)

528. Memorandum for the File by Herter¹

Washington, February 11, 1960

SUBJECT

Disarmament

The Secretary accompanied by Mr. Farley had lunch February 11 with Secretary Gates who was accompanied by Mr. Douglas and Mr. Irwin.

Nuclear Test Detection Improvements

The Secretary said that Dr. Kistiakowsky had reported to him on the planning underway for improving seismic and high altitude detection instruments and techniques. A good deal of work is now being undertaken by Defense and AEC; Mr. Herter expressed appreciation in particular for the study which Defense is supporting on the unmanned auxiliary seismic stations. It appears however that some more money may be needed this fiscal year. In addition sizeable amounts of the order of 40 or 50 million dollars might be needed in FY 1961 particularly if development of satellite detection systems is to go ahead. Mr. Herter remarked that he was somewhat skeptical of the desirability of putting this amount of money in satellite detection methods in view of the unlikelihood of outer space testing; Mr. Douglas expressed agreement. Mr. Herter said that he expected a further report from Dr. Kistiakowsky, after which consultation might be necessary regarding possible sources of additional funds.

Mr. Gates said that Defense wanted to be helpful and could possibly find 1 to 2 million dollars more if needed. Larger amounts however would have to be released by the Bureau of the Budget.

Nuclear Cut-Off

Mr. Herter said that the policy decisions on such major elements of our disarmament position as the nuclear cut-off would have to be made very soon in view of the approach of the March Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks and the fact that we are already consulting with our allies. We need to know whether we will propose the cut-off and if it is not in our interests any longer then we need to have persuasive reasons why it cannot be advanced. He went on to say that he hoped it would be possible to continue to propose the cut-off and in addition to challenge

¹ Source: Record of discussion among Herter, Farley, Gates, Douglas, and Irwin on test detection improvements, cut-off in production of fissionable material. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/2-1160.

the Russians to match us in contributing a large number of megatons from existing stockpiles to international custody (perhaps the custody of the International Atomic Energy Agency), along the lines suggested by former AEC Commissioner Murray. Mr. Herter said that the information he had been given regarding our stockpile and the Soviet stockpile indicated that we could advantageously make such proposals. That would be the kind of dramatic move that would be highly effective. He had little expectation that the Soviet Union would go along with such proposals but if they were acceptable from the military point of view then he saw every advantage to putting them forward.

Mr. Gates and Mr. Douglas raised questions regarding the propaganda impact in view of the fact that it would presumably be well known that whatever megatonnage we proposed to contribute to international custody would be only a fraction of our stockpile and would still leave a tremendous destructive capability. They also questioned whether we could make such an initial proposal without being drawn into rapid nuclear disarmament which would leave us defenseless.

Further discussion dealt largely with tactical weapons requirements, in which both Secretary Herter and Mr. Douglas expressed real skepticism in regard to the proliferation of weapons, as indicated in the projection to 1968 given by General Loper in his briefing. Returning to the matter of a possible cut-off proposal on the production of fissionable material, Secretary Gates stated that the matter was before the Joint Chiefs and he was hurrying their report as much as possible.

C.A.H.

529. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

JCSM-51-60

Washington, February 12, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 4 February 1960, subject as above.

¹ Source: JCS views on U.S. disarmament policy. Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, NSC Special Meetings.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Department of State draft of a recommended U.S. Disarmament Policy which was submitted on 4 February 1960 for Department of Defense views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also reviewed the Department of Defense comments upon a recommended disarmament "position" previously submitted by the Department of State staff. It is apparent from a comparison of the two papers that the major objections and suggestions submitted by the Department of Defense in connection with the earlier "position" paper were not incorporated in the present "policy" paper. To the contrary, the papers are substantially identical.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the comments made by the Department of Defense. They feel that it would be unproductive to reiterate and to attempt expansion of those views in order to comment item-by-item upon the present "policy" recommendation. As an overall view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard this present Department of State draft as unsatisfactory in its substantive content; also, in their view, it is not a proper expression of arms control policy. It is, rather, a negotiating POSITION paper both in content and format and should not be accorded the stature of a policy statement. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to an appropriate U.S. arms control policy are contained in Appendix "A" hereto.

4. The necessity for formulating a U.S. negotiating position for forthcoming 10-Nation talks, with attendant pressures, may require National Security Council decisions in the very near future. Therefore, it is considered desirable to also state the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to a U.S. negotiating position—a position in keeping with their concept of an appropriate arms control policy. These views are contained in Appendix "B" hereto.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with the fundamental philosophy underlying the current approach to the arms control problem reflected in the paper submitted by the Department of State staff. Basically, this philosophy seems to regard the prime test of arms control proposals to be their negotiability, political appeal and responsiveness to the vagaries of world public opinion, rather than their tangible effects on the welfare and security of the United States. Underlying this placement of emphasis seems to be the view that arms control, per se, will facilitate the resolution of political conflict, rather than vice-versa, and that the risks of serious military disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc are intrinsically less dangerous to U.S. security than the political risks of leaving arms control negotiating initiatives in Soviet hands.

6. Concrete examples of unsound commitments to which a negotiation-oriented approach leads are to be found in measures advocated in the Department of State staff papers for immediate negotiation to: (1) reduce present force levels (without any reference to any agreed

appreciation of how this would affect U.S. security or NATO policy); (2) cease production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes (without reference to its long-range effect on U.S. military posture); and (3) cease the testing of long-range missiles (without an agreed intergovernmental appreciation of its effort on over-all security of the United States and its allies). The Joint State-Defense Study on Disarmament rejected all three of these proposals as matters for immediate negotiation because of their unfavorable impact on U.S. security. On 8 February 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, supported these views.

7. In the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the above examples point in the dangerous direction to which our arms control policy will almost certainly lead if it continues to be founded on the sacrifice of substantial security considerations to negotiating expediency.

8. It is recommended that the comments and proposals contained in this memorandum and its attachments form the basis for your reply to the Secretary of State; for use by the National Security Council in the development of a U.S. arms control policy; and as a position for negotiations at the 10-Nation Conference.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

U.S. POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL

A. General Philosophy Underlying Arms Control Policy

1. Arms control is essentially a matter of national security in the broadest sense and, as such, it is susceptible to resolution only at the highest levels of government. Most certainly, any decisions with respect to arms control can be made only after careful consideration of international relationships, national security and the effect on our broad national strategy. However, our military strategy and our force structure must inevitably be affected by any steps towards arms control. Therefore, arms control should have a significant role in our military planning, and negotiations attendant thereto should be made from an over-all security, and not political, point of view.

2. The United States should continue to conduct negotiations with the USSR, on any issue and through any appropriate channel, whenever it appears that over-all U.S. interests will be served by such negotiations. Negotiations with the USSR should be designed to help maintain Free World initiative and cohesion, to probe the intentions and expose

the meaning of Soviet policies, and to resolve specific differences on terms advantageous to the United States. All such negotiations should also be directed ultimately, toward the peaceful resolution of the basic Communist threat; but the United States should recognize that there is little prospect that the process of negotiation will eliminate this threat during the foreseeable future, and also that useful agreements on specific issues may be possible even in the absence of a general settlement. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor mutual concessions between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will afford net advantages to the United States and which will leave unimpaired the over-all security position of the Free World. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Agreement actually reached with the USSR should be dependent upon a balance of advantages and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements. Agreements affecting strength and deployment of military forces should include provisions for effective safeguards against violations and evasions.

3. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver such weapons.

4. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight and prevail in general war, should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, a danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests; that it will not pay.

5. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knock-out blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

6. Military planning of U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to

any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war.

B. Basic Objective of Arms Control Policy

The broad ultimate goal of U.S. policy of arms control is to achieve world peace under enforceable law.

C. Specific Principles of Arms Controls Policy

1. The United States will engage in arms reduction agreements after the study, testing, proving and adoption of a reliable system of inspection, reporting and control.

2. The regulation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery will be avoided except as part of the final and ultimate portion of any arms control arrangement.

3. To be acceptable to the United States any proposal for arms control should incorporate provisions to enable the United States to retain its nuclear stockpile and delivery advantage until the Communists are unable to wage war successfully against the United States and its allies because of:

a. The significant reduction of the Communist conventional forces; and

b. Major reductions of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and delivery capability; or until

c. The preservation of U.S. security can be trusted to an effective international peace enforcement arrangement.

4. Our position must be such that our Allies do not become alienated by reason of:

a. Fear that we would not lend them adequate military support in time of need; or

b. Unreasonable fear that our actions will involve them against their will in a nuclear war. (The word "unreasonable" is inserted where it is to emphasize the fact that the willingness of the United States unilaterally to go to war is essential, if the United States is to maintain its position as the leading world power. To illustrate, the United States has a variety of bilateral commitments with other nations of the world which have force, and indeed deterrent effect, only if it is clear that the United States intends to abide by these commitments without regard for the attitude of other nations).

5. In framing or accepting arms control proposals, public opinion should not of itself be considered a determinant of policy. No action should be proposed unless such action, if taken, and its foreseeable consequences, are clearly either in the interest of the United States or in no sense contrary to the interest of the United States.

6. In assessing the value and enforceability of an arms control proposal, the Soviets should be considered undeterred by adverse public opinion.

7. Unhampered research and development looms ever larger as the basis for U.S. military strength and its ability to stay ahead in the race for technical superiority. Every arms control proposal offered or accepted by the United States shall preclude the possibility of its resulting in stigmatizing the development or use of weapons systems essential to the security of the United States.

8. Any arms control proposal offered or accepted by the United States will be carefully evaluated to insure that no sacrifices of moral principle on the part of the United States are involved.

9. In seeking to achieve the objective of favorable world public opinion, the United States will place primary emphasis on the achievement of lasting rather than transient public support and will stand ready to endure immediate adverse reaction to this end.

10. No arms reduction or control proposals should be made solely for the purpose of increasing intelligence capabilities.

11. For the purpose of evaluating proposed arms restraints upon the Communist countries, the conventional and the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Communist China shall be treated as one.

12. Any Russian undertakings with respect to the performance of Red China must be backed by adequate means for the United States, on a current basis, to obtain proof of compliance.

13. We must correlate every arms control proposal in any particular negotiation with related areas of concern in other pending or programmed negotiations, with a view to assuring that the effect upon the U.S. security interest in all negotiations is beneficial and that our position is mutually consistent and logically sustainable in all negotiations.

14. In arms control negotiations the firm intention of the United States to be the world leader shall be maintained in the eyes of both friend and foe. Recent history has demonstrated that the Soviets react promptly to signs of weakness. To appear irresolute, uncertain, or fearful, is to invite aggressive probing. Not only is such probing intrinsically unacceptable, it is likely to be accompanied by Russian over-confidence that could precipitate general war. Accordingly:

a. Each proposal made by the United States shall be such as to preclude any inference that it is fearful of Soviet strength or of its own ability to be successful in any conflict within the foreseeable future.

b. Proposals postponing negotiations to a time when it is foreseeable that the United States will have less bargaining strength are unacceptable.

15. Prior to entering into joint international studies or negotiations in any particular field or facet of arms control, the necessary unilateral U.S. studies and interdepartmental consideration must be achieved so that there is a firm U.S. position which protects our security and national interest as well as a determination that the matters in question are desirable subjects for negotiation. We should subject all proposals to this criterion to preclude being committed to negotiations, the ultimate outcome of which could not or would not be in our interest. For example, negotiations aimed at a suspension of missile testing or the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would not be proper subject for negotiations.

16. We should make clear to the world that armaments result from international political tensions and that the only lasting method of reducing armaments is to reduce the causes of political tension. The resolution of major international issues must therefore precede substantive reduction of the U.S. Military Posture.

17. Comprehensive proposals calling for arms control in phased stages, with an obligation to move from one stage to another, should be avoided. Instead, the United States should establish a broad ultimate goal for arms control, namely, world peace under enforceable law, and should propose for immediate negotiations only modest steps toward that goal, in order to test the intentions of the Soviet Union and actually to accomplish at least some progress. Concentration on a few points will bring all the prestige and power of the United States behind a few relatively simple measures, confine negotiations to manageable limitation, permit agreement on one or more points in isolation, and facilitate understanding by even unsophisticated peoples.

18. Until the Soviet Union has unmistakably demonstrated sincerity by deeds as well as words, elementary prudence dictates that we strengthen our guard against the Sino-Soviet military threat rather than relax it. Any deterioration of the United States or Western military posture relative to the Sino-Soviet posture during the extended process of negotiations which lie ahead should be avoided since this would lower any real incentives which may exist for the Soviet Union to accept meaningful arms reductions and controls with proper safeguards.

19. A secure nuclear deterrent to general war must be maintained as a first priority matter. The U.S. strategy is designed to achieve the basic objective of deterring or being prepared successfully to wage general or limited war. The United States must always be able to back up its Allies with forces to a degree which will make our willingness to fight credible both to our Allies and to our enemies, recognizing that

the United States will use nuclear weapons when required to meet the nation's war objectives.

20. Progress toward the arms reduction and control goal should be made as fast, but only as fast, as the security of the United States permits, in the light of the military capability of our probable enemies, our commitments to our Allies, unsettled political problems, technological considerations and the like. The test in each case should be to adopt only those arms control measures which are compatible with the goal and which involve less risk to the security of the United States than not adopting them.

Appendix B

U.S. POSITION ON DISARMAMENT

I. Our Ultimate Arms Limitation Goal.

This U.S. objective in disarmament negotiations is to contribute, by balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control agreements, to the achievement of a secure and politically ordered world in which:

(1) There shall be universally recognized rules of international law, which, if followed, will prevent all nations from initiating armed conflict with other nations, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement.

(2) Through safeguarded international agreements, national military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law.

(3) An international control organ adequate to verify compliance with agreed measures of disarmament is established and operating effectively.

(4) An open world, including the institution of aerial and ground inspection adequate to detect any build up for surprise attack, large or small, has been achieved.

II. Steps which we are presently Prepared to Take and With Respect to which we are Presently Prepared to Negotiate and Reach Agreement.

1. Discussion of the nature and functions of the international authorities and arrangements which will be needed to preserve world peace as purely national armaments diminish. The specific objectives of the discussion should be to develop recommendations on the following matters:

- a.* Development and codification of international law.
- b.* Strengthening the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
- c.* Improvement of procedures governing the creation of a United Nations presence in areas where disputes exist.

2. An agreement to take into account, for possible application to other measures, any international control arrangements which may be established by the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

3. A joint study of an international arms control organization, followed by an agreement for the progressive establishment of this organization.

4. Collection of information by the international arms control organization on present levels of forces, including information on conventional equipment and armaments pertaining to land, sea and air forces possessed by the various powers. This would be followed by the establishment of agreed initial force level ceilings, which shall be subject to initial and continuing verification by the control organization. The collection of information would be based on declarations by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

a. Prior to establishment of initial force level ceilings there would be a mutually agreed definition of the term active military forces.

b. Initial force level ceilings for the U.S., USSR, and Communist China shall be set at 2.5 million each for active military forces. (NOTE: This figure subject to change if agree definition is not in accord with views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 3 September 1957, subject: "Disarmament Planning".)

c. Initial force level ceilings for the other Western nations, party to the negotiations, shall be set at:²

Canada _____

France _____

Italy _____

U.K. _____

d. Initial force level ceilings for Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia shall be set according to criteria mutually agreed to by the Ten-Nations.

e. Further U.S. force reductions should not be negotiated until:

(1) The USSR and Communist China have each in fact, reduced to 2.5 million in their active forces and this has been adequately verified by international inspection and control.

(2) The initial force levels for other states with significant military forces have been agreed and reduction to these levels adequately verified by international inspection and control.

5. Consequent upon the establishment and verification of initial force level ceilings, negotiations should be initiated with the objective of placing by these States in storage depots within their territories and under the supervision of the arms control organization, of specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

² To be determined during the course of Western preparations for the Ten-Nation Conference. [Footnote is in the original.]

6. Establishment of a European inspection zone (including all or an agreed part of the territory covered by Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Benelux and Denmark). Within this zone there would be an exchange of information concerning military forces, verified by aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, and mobile ground teams, all with specifically defined rights and authority, and overlapping radar.

7. If necessary to gain Western acceptance of the European inspection zone proposed in 6 above, then agree to the establishment of a zone in the USSR, a small zone in the Eastern Siberia-Alaska-Canada area, or a zone of aerial inspection in the Arctic area north of the Arctic Circle, together with appropriate arrangements for reporting flights of all aircraft within this area.

8. Prior notification to the disarmament control organization of launching programs for long range missiles according to certain predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and reports on launching operations, including information on the location of launching sites.

9. Notification of anticipated launchings of satellites, international arrangements for tracking, and exchange of resultant scientific information. Subject to a determination of the feasibility of the necessary inspection and control measures, and their implementation, an agreement to prohibit vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

10. Determination of timing and manner of extending an arms control agreement to include other States having significant military capabilities.

III. *Future Steps Required to Reach our Ultimate Goal Expressed in Some Detail which we are Prepared to Set Down at the Present Time, but as to which we are not at the Present Time Prepared to Negotiate, or Agree Nor to Place in Any Time Phase.*

(Note: The achievement of the ultimate goal can only be anticipated as the world moves concurrently toward greater stability and order and this presupposes the resolution of important East-West political conflicts, which, among others, includes the reunification of Germany as a prerequisite to the withdrawal of non-indigenous forces.)

1. Progressive extension of the international control organization in the light of accession to the arms control agreement by other States and in accordance with the expansion of inspection and control requirements.

2. Continue to completion the establishment of the international authority to preserve world peace.

3. Progressive, safeguarded reduction of national military establishments to the point where no single nation or group of nations can

effectively oppose enforcement of international law; such reductions to be phased to coincide with the build-up of international law enforcement capability to preserve world peace.

4. Collection and verification of information relating to manufacture of armaments and equipment of all kinds.

5. All states producing fissionable materials to make full declaration on all plants producing it and their capacity.

6. A joint study on (a) the possibility of the transfer, under control, of fissionable materials from national stockpiles into IAEA custody, and (b) the possibility of accounting for past production of nuclear weapons.

7. Cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, conditional upon specified progress on other arms control measures.

8. Further measures for reducing the threat of great surprise attack, including on-the-spot control and prior notification of missile launching, and the installation of an international tracking system. Extension of the inspection system to detect possible preparations for surprise attack.

9. Progressive extension of international control arrangements to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

10. A ban on the initiation of the use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

11. Progressive disposition of surplus armaments in phase with the reduction of national military establishments.

12. Control over manufacture of all type of armaments to ensure that production is limited to that required to achieve the objective stated in the ultimate U.S. goal.

IV. Joint Studies Which We Are Presently Prepared to Make With Respect to Certain Steps Referred to in Section II.

1. A study of the means of verification and control to insure that initial force level ceilings are not exceeded.

2. A study of the means of developing international authorities and arrangements for preserving world peace, including effective means of enforcement.

3. A study of the feasibility of the necessary inspection and control measures to prohibit vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

(Note: The question of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon uses is one which our allies will probably urge as a subject for joint study at this time. The U.S. should not agree to a joint international study of this problem unless or until it has been studied within our government and a firm U.S. position established after weighing all the implications. This would also apply with regard to a study on the cut-off or limitation of long-range missile testing or production.

530. Record of Telephone Conversations Between Herter and Eaton, Gates, and Farley¹

February 13, 1960, 9:50 a.m.

Mr. Eaton called and said that the Chiefs had acted and filed their report. They have a negative answer both on studying and stopping the cut-off. The Secretary said the question of study had come up. Mr. Eaton said that on the cut-off they won't even entertain the idea of a study but they will on space. Mr. Eaton said they were taking quite a beating over there. On the grounds that we don't have anything more constructive, they saw no reason for having another meeting unless we have a position to suggest. Mr. Eaton said the report was being prepared in Mr. Irwin's office and would be sent to Gates. They will agree, Mr. Eaton said, to a level of 2.5 without any verification but they will not agree to reducing it even with verification. In the missile field they won't even discuss it. The Secretary said he didn't have the report in yet. Mr. Eaton said Dr. Kistiakowsky said it would be the end of the month but Mr. Farley thinks it will be the end of next week. The Secretary said he didn't think it would prove anything one way or the other. Mr. Eaton said he had sent a questionnaire, with four questions, to Farley and Defense and had received the answers. The Secretary asked Mr. Eaton if he would dictate a memo on where he stood on these talks since he was seeing the President Monday morning. Mr. Eaton said he would have it ready tomorrow morning. Mr. Eaton suggested he come to tomorrow's meeting ahead of Mr. Gates tomorrow. The Secretary said this would be fine.

9:55 a.m. The Secretary telephoned Secretary Gates and said he understood the Joint Chiefs had a report ready for him on nuclear cut-off and force levels. Mr. Gates said he had a paper on disarmament. The Secretary said that Mr. Eaton was at the end of his tether since the other nations were saying they could not go on unless we make our position clear. He said he was seeing the President at ten on Monday and that Eaton was preparing a memo for him. They arranged a conference at the Secretary's house at 11:30 tomorrow morning. Gates suggested bringing Twining and one or two others. The Secretary said he couldn't seat very many people but that would be allright.

10:20 a.m. The Secretary telephoned Mr. Farley and reviewed briefly the two conversations with Messrs. Eaton and Gates. He told him about the meeting tomorrow and asked if he could be at his house

¹ Source: U.S. position for ten-nation disarmament talks. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

at 11:00 a.m. Mr. Farley said he would be there. Mr. Farley mentioned the French shot which had been fired this morning.

531. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and Gates¹

Washington, February 15, 1960, 4:05 p.m.

The Secretary telephoned Mr. Gates to say he had spoken to the President this morning about nuclear production cut-off and the conversation the Secretary and Mr. Gates had on this subject yesterday. The Secretary said the President wanted to decide the matter right then, but that the Secretary had asked the President not to do this since Defense and the JCS were not present. The President agreed to defer his decision, but said he wanted to have a meeting on this following the NSC on Thursday, although the Secretary said he had just had word the meeting was arranged for 9:00 a.m. Thursday to be followed by NSC at 10:00 a.m. The Secretary said the participants would be Defense, JCS, State, AEC and Allen Dulles. The Secretary said he told the President Thursday morning might be too soon for Defense, but the President wanted to go ahead and the Secretary told Mr. Gates it might be well to see where we stand at the meeting. The Secretary said the issue, as he put it to the President, was very simply is it or is it not in our interests to move on this. The Secretary said because of the prior positions taken by the U.S. Government, including past statements by the President, that if we now decide we are not going ahead we have to have a strong negative position. The Secretary said he thought it would be well before the meeting on Thursday to have a preliminary meeting at the staff level, and that Mr. Farley would be getting in touch with Defense. The Secretary said he thought what we will probably do is distribute in advance a piece of paper on which we want approval or disapproval so we can get squared away. The Secretary said he couldn't feel that more study is going to solve this problem because the JCS will be against it anyway, but the Secretary said he felt that unless this is really opposed to our national interest, we will have to be for it.

Mr. Gates said as far as he knew neither the JCS nor himself have sufficient facts to reach sound conclusions. The Secretary referred to the figures which General Loper must have and Mr. McCone's information

¹ Source: Cut-off of production of fissionable material. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

on reworkability of fissionable material. Gates reiterated his feeling that we don't have sufficient data to make an intelligent appraisal. After further discussion as to available information, Mr. Gates said perhaps he had not been informed by his own people as to what they had available, and he would look into it immediately. The Secretary said he thought Mr. Gates would find we had the essential facts.

532. Memorandum From Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower¹

February 18, 1960

SUBJECT

Government Organization for the Development of Arms Limitation and Control Policies

Last fall, following an earlier request from you to your Science Advisory Committee, its Panel on Arms Limitation and Control, chaired by Dr. Killian, prepared a recommendation regarding the preferred organization for the development of an arms limitation policy, which was then endorsed by the full Committee.

In essence our recommendation is to create an office within the Executive Office, with a director responsible to you, to be charged with the development of arms control policies. At the same time the State Department should be strengthened in this area, since it alone should have negotiating responsibility.

Having learned that you had instructed Secretary of State Herter to make to you a proposal for the required organization. I forwarded to him the attached recommendation of your Committee, which describes in detail the proposed organization and its relation to the State Department.

Recently, Secretary Herter told me that he decided not to accept our suggestion and will instead propose an organization on the staff level in the State Department. This I reported to your Science Advisory Committee, and the latter now have instructed me to bring to your attention our recommendation.

¹ Source: Government organization for the development of arms limitation and control policies. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-Organization.

I am aware that you look with disfavor upon adding new functions to the Executive Office. On the other hand, the following are among the reasons in favor of this proposal:

1. *Development of policy transcends departmental responsibilities.* Development of national policy in this area involves the complex interaction of military, political, and technical factors. These factors clearly involve the responsibilities and capabilities of several agencies of Government. Responsibility for arriving at a balanced judgment on these problems does *not* fit into the mission of any single agency of Government. Specifically, the State Department does not appear to be in a position to evaluate our present and future defense posture problems or to determine the technical requirements for adequate control of agreements.

2. *Public relations.* The formation of a special office next to the President will create a much stronger image of U.S. interest in disarmament in both world and domestic public opinion than the formation of a new staff activity in the State Department.

3. *Quality of organization.* Location in the Executive Office of the President would permit recruitment of much higher-level leadership and staff for the office than would be possible in a staff organization within the State Department. Problems involved are so complex that proper staffing is of utmost importance.

4. *Interagency support.* Location in the Executive Office of the President would greatly facilitate the process of obtaining coordinated support from the various agencies which must supply information relevant to the development of policy (e.g., Defense Department, State Department, AEC, and CIA).

5. *Direct support for the President.* The President could look to an office located within his Office for direct support in his decision-making process in this vital area of national policy.

6. *Supporting studies by Government contractors.* Development of policy will require some supporting studies best performed by Government contractors. This could be accomplished more easily and effectively by an office in the Executive Office than by an office in the State Department which has historically not used this approach and which might face Congressional opposition to such use of funds.

7. *Coordination of research and development on monitoring techniques.* It would be easier for an office located in the Executive Office, than for an office in the State Department, to coordinate the substantial research and development activities on monitoring techniques which will have to be carried out by various agencies, such as Department of Defense or the AEC.

G.B. Kistiakowsky

533. Memorandum From Farley to Merchant¹

Washington, February 19, 1960

SUBJECT

Disarmament

Five Power Talks

On February 15 the U.S. Representative submitted a paper entitled "Views on Disarmament" (TAB A). The Canadian, French, Italian and U.K. delegations took the position that a very limited one-phase disarmament program, such as the U.S. delegation paper contained was not acceptable. These four delegations favored a comprehensive plan, similar to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's U.N. proposals, setting forth the general staging of measures leading to the goal of general disarmament.

As a result of discussions during the week of February 15, several revisions were made in the U.S. paper to make it conform more closely to the general outlines of the U.K. plan. The latest revision of this paper is attached as TAB B.

The principals for France, Italy, and the U.K. are leaving Washington this weekend, and have agreed that it probably will be necessary to meet again in Paris on March 2 for further discussions of the Western position. Working groups of experts from the five delegations have met daily to discuss problems in several major areas of disarmament; they will continue to meet next week.

The German Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Grewe, appeared at his request before the five representatives on February 16. Mr. Grewe commented briefly on a disarmament paper which his government had circulated to the five delegations. Mr. Grewe said that his government expected to have its views on disarmament taken into account as the Western position is formulated and that, furthermore, it expected to be invited to participate in any Five Power discussions of zones affecting German territory.

U.S. Policy

A special meeting of the NCS was held on Thursday, February 18, to discuss the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The President decided at this meeting that the U.S. would agree to negative cut-off immediately, subject only to

¹ Source: Five-power disarmament talks; cut-off of production of fissionable material; disarmament policy. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/2-1960.

agreement and effective installation of appropriate inspection and control measures.

The Secretary of Defense, by letter dated February 17, has transmitted to the Secretary the views of the JCS on the State Department's proposed disarmament position paper. The Secretary of Defense and the JCS take issue with most proposals in the Department's paper and recommend that the Coolidge Report be submitted to the NSC for consideration as a basis for initial actions in the disarmament area.

There will be a meeting to discuss general disarmament matters at 10:30 AM on Sunday, February 21 at the Secretary's residence. Messrs. Dillon, Merchant, Eaton and Farley have been asked to attend.

534. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.-2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Herter
Mr. Dillon
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Eaton
Mr. Stelle
Mr. Farley

In a meeting at the Secretary's house certain questions identified by Mr. Eaton (Tab A) as well as a number of other policy and negotiating issues were discussed at length. The following general conclusions were reached:

a. *French Views.* Mr. Eaton said that M. Moch had warned him that the French Government could not be expected to concur in the nuclear "cut-off" unless assured of U.S. nuclear materials or weapons. He asked whether steps could be taken to bring the French around. Consideration was given to whether we might give any specific or

¹ Source: French view on cut-off; five-power working paper; negotiating tactics for ten-power talks; military force levels. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

general assurances. It was recognized that this subject was quite highly charged politically in the U.S. and that any commitments without Congressional blessing would be of little value and also risky if word of them got back to Congress. Perhaps a determined effort by the Executive to bring Congress around would at least establish our good intentions toward the French; but it had to be recognized that such an effort ran the risk not only of bitter public controversy but even of a flat Congressional bar. It was also noted that even if we satisfied the French on the cut-off, we might still find ourselves at odds with them on the issues of force levels and strategic missiles controls. The best hope appeared to be an attempt to get the French to avoid taking issue openly with us, in view of the doubt that the Soviets would accept the cut-off and the time lag in any case which might permit French fissionable materials production to go ahead and possibly a gradual change in U.S. Congressional attitudes. If the French take the attitude predicted by Moch, then Mr. Merchant, accompanied by Mr. Eaton, might have to go to Paris in an effort to bring the French around. Before embarking on this course of action (which might be done under the cover of general summit consultations), it was necessary to ascertain the basic French position. (A telegram alerting our Embassy in Paris to the problem was decided on and subsequently despatched.)

b. *Status of 5-power Working Paper.* Mr. Eaton reported that a 5-power working paper (5P/WP/15(Corr.4) 2/19/60) had been approved February 19 for referral to governments. Two principal issues were whether the "ultimate goal" should be identified as "general disarmament" or "general and complete disarmament." Our allies had tended to favor the latter formula but so far had accepted our brief version which we introduced as more realistic.

In the discussion it was agreed that the phrase "general disarmament" was more accurate and realistic and would usefully serve to distinguish in part our approach from the Soviet approach. On the other hand, the Soviet phrase was in the Camp David communique and the United Nations disarmament resolution and if our allies raised the point again we could not finally refuse. Furthermore, if the Soviets asked for the longer phrase as an agenda item—e.g., "the question of complete and general disarmament"—it would be fruitless to engage in controversy in view of the past history.

Mr. Eaton said that another question was whether the West should put up a comprehensive plan. The allies favored this, feeling that in the struggle for world opinion we had to match the Soviets in the scope of our approach. They felt that ample safeguards and check points were built into the U.K. plan, for example. The Secretary said that he had always believed we had to set forth a goal of disarmament which was as imaginative and radical as the Soviets. He doubted, however, that it was desirable to compete with the Soviets in devising elaborate

plans for every future step toward that goal. Instead he preferred to concentrate on a few simple, practical disarmament steps which might be taken now and challenge the Soviets to agree to these with adequate inspection as a way to get started and build confidence.

c. *Negotiating Approach.* Mr. Eaton said that he did not want to get into an interminable negotiation which never got to the crucial point of agreement, like the 16-month old nuclear test negotiations. He proposed to make it clear to the Soviets from the outset that the key to substantial progress was their willingness to accept adequate verification and that if they were unwilling to do business on this point he did not propose to be drawn into interminable and fruitless discussion. He wanted to be clear that this was a reasonable line and that he would not be expected for other reasons, such as the summit, to continue talking at the conference table irrespective of progress. The Secretary said that he agreed wholeheartedly with this approach, but that we must take a positive position advancing concrete measures of disarmament, and care should be exerted not to be in the position of appearing to ask for "inspection without disarmament." Mr. Eaton said that he recognized that this was a delicate hand of play, but that it was his intention to agree in general to disarmament measures which would be the subject of inspection, but to insist on a fairly detailed agreement on inspection measures before negotiating the details of the disarmament measure. Mr. Dillon said that no specific guarantee could be given in advance regarding acceptability of a break off in negotiations—particularly one before the summit. Mr. Eaton said that he fully understood this, but that the negotiating position which he would take might well require an early decision on our willingness to break off negotiations, although he would be careful not to put us in any position where we would be embarrassed by not breaking off without coming back for instructions.

d. *Force Levels.* Mr. Farley said that the most urgent policy issue remaining unresolved between State and Defense was possible reductions in military force levels. We wanted to put pressure on the Soviets to agree to mutual inspection and to use the argument that without inspection no one could know whether they indeed reduced their forces by 1.2 million. However, we could not effectively challenge them to accept inspection unless we were willing to say that acceptance of inspection by the Soviets would lead to reductions below levels presently scheduled by us and the Soviets. Furthermore, this had to be a direct challenge not complicated if possible by other conditions such as involvement of Communist China. Mr. Herter said that in his past discussions with Secretary Gates it appeared possible that Defense would agree to reductions below the 2.5 million ceiling accepted by the JCS. After a good deal of discussion of past U.S. and Western positions, Mr. Dillon asked Mr. Farley to prepare a talking paper for him which he could use in raising with Mr. Gates the question whether we could accept reductions to a level

of about 2.1 million, independent of Communist Chinese participation, provided only there was adequate inspection.

e. *NATO Consultation*. Mr. Eaton raised the question of timing of consultation with NATO. It was agreed that:

(1) The basic disarmament working paper should be submitted to the Council members by Friday, March 4. This would enable the members and governments to study the positions for some days prior to discussion in NAC on March 9. Special additional meetings could of course be held on the succeeding days, i.e., 10th, 11th, etc., if desired.

(2) There should be at least one representative of the disarmament group present and authorized to reply to questions and enter into the discussion. This might well be Mr. Eaton, who had chaired the five-power group here.

f. *Policy Questions Raised by Mr. Eaton. (Tab A)*.

(1) We will use all possible ways (Canadian good offices in NATO, Norstad approaches to de Gaulle and Adenauer, talks with Adenauer during his visit here in March) to get French and German agreement to the Norstad plan. However, if persuasion fails and particularly if Adenauer is adamant and suspicious of our motives, we will not press the plan over such opposition.

(2) We do not at present have any specific consideration we can give in return for Soviet acceptance of the Norstad inspection zone proposal. The “no nuclear arms to indigenous forces in Germany” example again involves the question of Adenauer. Moreover, this represents an important objective for the Soviets, who are not likely to give nuclear arms to the Poles and Czechs anyway.

(3) We are already barred by our domestic legislation from transferring nuclear weapons to other countries. We should not undertake a commitment with the Soviets in this regard—since they are not likely to trust other bloc members sufficiently in any case to make such transfers—except as a consequence to agreement on the nuclear cut-off.

(4) There was no conclusive position reached on IRBMs since the question of European combined production of second generation IRBMs is currently under active study. It was noted that in the past the President has been willing to envisage agreement not to station IRBMs in Germany, where there is no NATO need for weapons of this range.

(5) There was little interest in negotiating withdrawal from U.S. bases, in view of the importance of these to our strategic deterrent and the lack of symmetry between the U.S. and Soviet strategic positions which made base withdrawal difficult to match with a corresponding Soviet *quid pro quo*.

(6) There was little interest in non-aggression pacts, both because they are paper pledges and because the UN Charter already provides the necessary commitment. Such pacts also had undesirable overtones of parity. The suggestion was made that we might counter any future Soviet proposal by saying we could accept a non-aggression clause as part of an agreement for open skies inspection which would really do something to safeguard against chances of surprise aggression.

(7) Little prospects were seen of Soviet agreements on limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it seems likely the Soviets

will seek to frustrate any use of tactical nuclear weapons by refusing to accept any distinctions. Hence this is clearly not a field for initiatives.

(8) U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe is unthinkable if we are to maintain our alliances. We have no reservation about the desirability of having Soviet troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe, but in view of the proximity of the USSR this is not worth much in the way of concessions.

(9) Agreements for limitations on arms traffic are primarily political measures and are under consideration with regard to the summit in the East-West relations working group in Paris.

(10) Elimination of strategic trade controls is really not an important bargaining card nor very relevant.

(11) Any world police force would have to be related to the UN in view of the responsibilities of the UN under the United Nations Charter. While we should not disown the UN or its role here, preliminary discussion might relate to the composition, functions, etc., leaving aside the question of relationship to the UN for the time being.

(12) The proposal gestures were more relevant to the summit than to the 10-nation talks. Publicity attending the 10-nation meeting should in fact focus on disarmament questions.

(13) Not discussed.

(14) Not discussed.

(15) See *a* above.

Tab A

Policy Questions Proposed by Eaton

POINTS FOR POSSIBLE EXPLORATION WITH TOP POLICY MAKERS

1. If deGaulle and Adenauer, even after careful softening-up tactics, should oppose the Norstad Plan, do we consider it a dead issue? Are there other weapons of persuasion at our command? If not, are we prepared to press it against their combined opposition or against the opposition of Adenauer alone?

2. If the Soviets should indicate willingness to accept the Norstad proposal if linked to some measure of disarmament, do we have any latitude? Can we, for example, promise troop reductions within specified time period—say, one year—if inspection is working satisfactorily? Can we promise to accept under similar conditions (or accept) a Rapacki first stage (i.e., no nuclear arms to indigenous forces in Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).

3. What are the conditions under which we would be prepared to enter into commitment with the Soviets not to transfer nuclear weapons—to all other nations? to specified allies? to countries on Soviet bloc periphery? to Germany?

4. The same question with regard to IRBMs? Also, what are our present plans for IRBM installations in Europe?

5. Are we prepared to negotiate elimination of certain bases on Soviet periphery—for example, IRBM bases in Italy, air and naval bases in Turkey? If so, what should be our price?

6. Under what conditions would we agree to a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact? between U.S. and USSR?

7. Are there any commitments on the use of nuclear weapons which we would be prepared to negotiate with the Soviets? For example, upper KT limit on weapons in a limited war? Ban on use of nuclear weapons against population centers in a limited war? Ban on use of any but short-range missiles in a limited war?

8. Have we a price for U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe? Do we in fact want complete Soviet withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, bearing in mind the possibility of another Hungary and its implications for the West?

9. Are we prepared to enter into commitment not to traffic in arms? in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America?

10. Are we prepared to use elimination of strategic trade controls as a bargaining tool? If so, what is the range of prices?

11. Re a police force, do we favor one under UN auspices or separate from the UN, perhaps linked with Disarmament Control Organization, as at one time suggested by the British?

12. Should U.S. make some sort of well-publicized gesture on eve of talks to put Soviets on defensive, such as:

a. Announcement of unilateral lifting of closed travel areas in the U.S.?

b. Invitation to high-ranking Soviet military to “tour” selected U.S. defense installations to “see for themselves” that U.S. military posture is “strong,” but not “threatening to attack anyone?”

13. Are there any political implications of the Berlin and German issue which tie in with the work of the Ten Nation group? What posture should we take prior to May Summit Meeting?

14. What specific political solutions are required before we enter advanced stage of disarmament?

15. What positions should we take on the French position that they cannot accept our position on the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes unless their allies can supply them with fissionable material for weapons purposes?

535. Letter From Khrushchev to Eisenhower¹

March 3, 1960

Dear Mr. President:

I should like by way of the frank and friendly correspondence, which has been established between us and which has already acquitted itself in many instances, to exchange views with you on a question which in our opinion is of very great importance.

I could not but note your statements at the press conference on February 3 on the question of the possibility of the United States turning over to its allies secret information on nuclear weapons, nor could I fail to note the world reaction subsequent to those statements.

To be honest, at first I was hesitating as to whether I should make this matter the subject of my correspondence with you at this time. The final decision to address you with this letter was arrived at after I had convinced myself that your statements at the press conferences on February 3 and 17, as well as Secretary of State Herter's statement on February 8, were rather broadly interpreted in various countries, including these in the West, in a quite definite sense, i.e., as an expression of the intention of the United States to equip with American nuclear weapons, within the framework of NATO in particular, those of its allies who do not have such weapons.

The question touched upon by you is of such great importance that I believe it necessary even now to share with you certain considerations.

It is a well known fact that from the time when nuclear weapons were invented the secret of their production has been acquired by the USA, the USSR Great Britain, and now to a certain extent by France. Other states so far possess neither the secrets of production of nuclear weapons nor the weapons themselves. We are in agreement as to the necessity of freeing humanity from the frightful threat of a nuclear war and of working toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It is on this crucial problem that you and I reached complete mutual understanding during the memorable conversations at Camp David. It is for this very purpose that negotiations are being conducted by the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, and soon there will begin a discussion of general and complete disarmament in the Ten-Nation Committee.

¹ Source: U.S. plans to share nuclear weapons with NATO. No classification marking; Presidential Handling. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev-Eisenhower.

Of course, it is very important that none of the nuclear powers take any steps that could complicate the solution of the problem of complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

The question arises as to what consequences would result from increasing the number of states having access to nuclear weapons. What would the result be in such a case?

It is hardly necessary, Mr. President, to seek to prove to you, an outstanding military leader and statesman made rich in wisdom by life's experiences, that the cause of consolidating peace and eliminating the threat of a nuclear war would suffer serious loss as a result. It would enormously impede the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, which would of course provide for cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of the stock piles thereof. It is obvious that the greater the number of states possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons the more difficult it would be to take the measures necessary for the complete destruction of this weapon under effective control. Indeed, let us suppose that the allies of the USA—individually or within the framework of NATO—actually have a nuclear weapon placed at their disposal, and that the circle of nuclear powers in the West is thus expanded. In such a case there would arise an absolutely new situation, in which the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons would be considerably complicated. In such a case we would also have every justification to hand over this weapon to friendly countries that might turn to us with a corresponding request for purposes of ensuring their security and defense.

Let us look at another aspect of the problem. Let us suppose that the secret of the production of the nuclear weapons or the weapons themselves are handed over to the Federal Republic of Germany. Is it a secret that at the present time in the FRG there have again appeared many reckless people who cherish the hope of *revanche* for the Second World War? It is sufficient to recall only a recent statement by Mr. Adenauer to the effect that the German people are charged with a "special mission."

However Mr. Adenauer may have interpreted this "special mission," the fact must not be disregarded that if he were to have the nuclear weapon placed at his disposal he would be tempted to use it to fulfill this "mission." And can it be hoped that Mr. Adenauer's successors in the post of chancellor would be more peace-loving? With the present trend in the course of events in the FRG, the answer of course is no.

I consider it appropriate to point out that neither the Soviet Union nor the states allied with us experience any fear, of course, in connection with the belligerent statements of the German "revanchists." You realize that from the standpoint of our security we have no fear of the

German “revanchists,” even though they may be armed with nuclear weapons.

But it would be a great mistake if we, bearing a great responsibility for the fate of all humanity, should gamble on the readiness of our countries for any war with the most modern weapons. The Soviet Government considers it the main purpose of its policy to prevent the unleashing of any new world war, and to bring about the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and every kind of weapon in general. A widening of the circle of nuclear powers would create new obstacles on the road to disarmament and of course would immeasurably intensify the threat of humanity’s sliding into the abyss of general nuclear war.

However, I continue to believe, Mr. President, considering your statements that the course of events will run, not in the direction of increasing the number of states possessing nuclear weapons but in the direction of general and complete disarmament and, consequently, in the direction of eliminating the danger of nuclear war. Therefore, I hope that you will correctly understand the motives that have prompted me to appeal to you with this message.

For my part, I should like very much to have your views concerning the matters to which I have referred.

With sincere respect,

N. Khrushchev

536. Telegram 6676 to London¹

Washington, March 5, 1960, 3:11 p.m.

6676. EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR AND EATON.

Please deliver following to Selwyn Lloyd:

QTE March 5, 1960 Dear Selwyn:

I have just returned from South America and have had an opportunity of checking on the conversations which have taken place between Doug Dillon, Fred Eaton and Caccia here since I received the personal message from you which was delivered to me in Argentina.

¹ Source: Transmits letter for Lloyd from Herter on ten-nation disarmament talks. Secret; Niact. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

As you know, we feel that there is no great substantive matter of difference between us and are convinced that language satisfactory to both of us can be worked out between Ormsby-Gore and Eaton when they meet in Paris. From a purely practical point of view, I am sure you realize that, in the course of the negotiations, we feel that the items involved in Stages 1 and 2 should be agreed upon before we get involved in negotiations on the items in Stage 3, and certainly, again from a practical point of view, even though we should be successful in negotiating with respect to Stage 3, I am sure that you agree that the items in 1 and 2 should be implemented before we can implement those in 3. From reading your message I take it that you feel that this is essentially the line of all your thinking but that you do not wish to make any advance statement which would indicate that any phase of disarmament could not be discussed during the Geneva talks.

In this we of course agree since the tabling of our plan will inevitably involve discussion of the items in Stage 3. I realize that there is a narrow line between discussion and negotiation and this is the reason we continue to feel that our differences may be more of form than of substance. What we feel we must avoid at all cost is being drawn into negotiations on such items as banning the bomb before we have achieved agreement on items in Stages 1 and 2. We have considered this problem very carefully, and I must tell you in all candor that I can see no prospect of any change in our position on this matter. This, of course, does not rpt not involve waiting for the actual implementation of Stages 1 and 2 before commencing negotiations on Stage 3.

If when Eaton and Ormsby-Gore meet, there should still remain any differences in language, I should be most grateful if you would advise me when I could reach you by phone since I feel certain that we can work this matter out and feel very deeply that it is important for us to maintain a united front both with respect to our allies and when the talks begin in Geneva.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,
Chris UNQTE

FYI Copy has been delivered to Caccia here.

Herter

537. Note From Caccia to Herter¹

Washington, March 7, 1960

Dear Chris,

I have been asked to pass to you the attached personal message from the Foreign Secretary.

Yours sincerely

Harold Caccia

Attachment

Message From Lloyd to Herter

TEXT OF MESSAGE

Dear Chris,

Thank you for your letter of March 5. I am glad that you have got safely back to Washington. I hope that you are not too tired by what must have been a very arduous but well worth while journey.

I am glad that we have reached a compromise agreement on the language of the link between Stages 2 and 3. I am grateful to you and your colleagues for their willingness to try to meet our point of view. I do not think that our solution is ideal, but we too tried to find something that you could live with.

The problem in my mind has been one of presentation. Our preoccupation has been to prevent Mr. Khrushchev getting off with an undeserved halo as the man who is for complete disarmament. To start with, the Western plan must look good enough and far reaching enough, subject to the accepted reservations about effective control. If our plan does not look good enough, we shall have given Khrushchev a big propaganda advantage which he will particularly exploit at the Summit.

Ormsby-Gore is going this evening to Paris. I hope that Eaton and he will succeed in bringing the French along. It would be a great pity if they are out of step on disarmament. It will be another damaging blow to N.A.T.O.

With my best wishes,

Selwyn

¹ Source: Transmits letter from Lloyd to Herter: applauds compromise on nuclear testing talks position. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

538. Memorandum for the Record by Goodpaster¹

Washington, March 8, 1960

Mr. Herter met briefly with the President on February 28th. He reported to the President that Governor Potter, in the Canal Zone, had decided to fly American and Panamanian flags, crossed, on March first, and that he felt this was a helpful forward step.

Mr. Herter next said that he had received a long letter on disarmament from Selwyn Lloyd. The President read through this letter. He stated that he agrees with Lloyd on one point—that if we are to condition everything on elimination of nuclear weapons, we will never make any progress, because they could be hidden so easily as to make policing impossible. The President said he thought we should not take the position that we will not negotiate on “stage three” items until “stage two” items have been completely implemented. We can say, however, that we will not sign an agreement on stage three items until the earlier stages are completely in effect. Mr. Herter said this is exactly the problem with Defense. They do not want to discuss or negotiate on stage three items—for example, limitation on missiles, reduction in weapons and forces, etc.—until stage two is in effect. He thought it should be possible to find some kind of language that would accommodate our own and the British positions, on the basis of what the President said. The President said what he had in mind is that implementation should follow a certain order. Study of disarmament measures should desirably follow the same order, but it would be possible to start some of these studies earlier if there is a specific need—even while holding strictly to the sequence of implementation.

The President said he found it difficult to understand the thinking of Defense in this matter. I explained to him as did Secretary Herter that Defense is fearful that we will start talking about stage three items and then, because of the pressure of world opinion, be unwilling to adhere to our requirement that the implementation of these be delayed until after stage two is in effect.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Record of discussion between Eisenhower and Herter of a letter from Lloyd. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, State Department.

539. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 8, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Amb. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador

Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Ambassador Menshikov began by saying he had been instructed by Mr. Khrushchev to see the President and to hand over a personal message. The Ambassador then read from his own English translation the text of Mr. Khrushchev's letter dated March 3.

The President said he would have the message translated and would study it. He added that he would like to express the following preliminary thoughts which the Ambassador should transmit to Khrushchev. First, the President appreciated this personal message and Mr. Khrushchev's thought in sending it. Secondly, the President said he shared the uneasiness, if not dismay, if such a situation should arise as Mr. Khrushchev described in his message. But he would like to recall that at a time when the United States had a monopoly on atomic weapons it had tried in 1947 to give it to the United Nations. United States policy had never changed. Now we know, the President continued, that the Soviet Union has great nuclear power. We do not know what distribution the Soviet Union may have made of its nuclear power nor do we know how the members of the Warsaw Pact are armed. The President expressed readiness to study the message and to reply in due time. As he had repeatedly stated, he was ready to do anything to make a better, more peaceful world. Now we have four nations which dispose of nuclear weapons. It was easier to make them now and knowledge of how to do so was getting to be a common thing. We don't know when other nations may develop nuclear weapons.

The President expressed agreement that we must move rapidly on this problem and, as he had said at his Camp David talks with Chairman Khrushchev, the most important thing was agreement on reliable controlled disarmament. This was a very serious matter and while we agree on general principles, we must find the means to carry them out.

Ambassador Menshikov expressed the hope that progress would be made at the ten-nation disarmament committee level and at the forthcoming Summit.

¹ Source: Menshikov delivers Khrushchev's letter on nuclear arms for NATO. Secret; Presidential Handling. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/3-860.

The President replied he was ready for any practical forward step which would take the uneasiness out of the minds of mankind, that he would continue to strive for this goal.

Ambassador Menshikov asked what he might say to the correspondents who were waiting outside, to which the President observed that there was always this problem when he delivered a message in person to the White House. Ambassador Menshikov said it was the same at the State Department and suggested he might merely say that he had delivered a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev. Ambassador Menshikov said he was not instructed whether the letter was to be published.

The President in agreeing to Ambassador Menshikov's suggestion said that if the letter were not published he would merely reply to any press inquiries that he never revealed his personal correspondence with Chiefs of State without their concurrence. If the Soviet Government decided to publish the letter, the President requested prior notification.

NOTE: General Goodpaster informed Mr. Davis after Ambassador Menshikov departed that the President had instructed him to inform the Department that the contents of Mr. Khrushchev's message should be held closely on a need-to-know basis.

540. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 10, 1960, 8:35 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dillon
Mr. McCone
Major Eisenhower

Mr. McCone opened by informing the President that plans are going forward for Project Gnome, part of Operation Plowshare. This experiment would require a full year of preparation. Since the extensive construction work will require obtaining contractors and letting bids, an announcement will be necessary in the near future.

¹ Source: Operation Plowshare. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

The President said the only difficulty was that this almost serves notice to the world that we have given up obtaining an overall nuclear test ban agreement within a year. Mr. Dillon said that the principle of peaceful use of atomic energy has been agreed on with the Soviets.

The President said he had no objection, but that the announcement should include that we would welcome observers from the U.N. or from any member nation of the U.N. which has an interest in the project. He further desired that the idea that the principle has been approved between the U.S. and the Soviets be added to the announcement.

Mr. McCone said it would be useful to prod the Soviets on the test ban matter anyway. The Soviets have no intention of agreeing with any of our proposals at Geneva. Only yesterday they informed our negotiators in Geneva by direct telegraph from Moscow that they cannot fulfill their obligation to the IAEA on safeguarding nuclear reactors unless agreement on a nuclear test suspension has been reached. This linking of totally unrelated matters indicates they have no desire to make real progress.

The President said he wanted one more item added, which would be that final authorization for the actual detonation would be reserved for action by the President. He directed Mr. Dillon to inform the British Ambassador of our intention to go on with this project, but warned him not to afford the British a veto.

As a sidelight, Mr. McCone pointed out that the Canadians had a similar project in the Athabaska Tar Sands ready to go. They are holding up simply because they do not wish to be the first to fire a device. Mr. McCone pointed out the increased difficulties we are having in holding our laboratories together, stressing Livermore which has considerable interest in Plowshare.

The President, as another sidelight, said he wished that we could eliminate nuclear weapons entirely from the world. This is, of course, impossible, but many people think it can be done. Therefore, the only qualm he has on an operation such as this is that it might unnecessarily worry people who are scared enough anyway.

* * *

Finally, Mr. Dillon told the President that our disarmament plan has been presented to NATO by Mr. Eaton. It was well received and another meeting on this subject is scheduled for Saturday. Indications are that this can be made public on Monday.

John S.D. Eisenhower

541. Letter From Eisenhower to Khrushchev¹

Washington, March 12, 1960

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am grateful for your consideration in sending your letter of March third in which you share with me your views on matters which are indeed of great importance. As indicated in your letter, we were in full agreement at Camp David, as was mentioned in the communique covering those discussions, that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today and that the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem. To this I cannot fail to give my wholehearted and continued support.

In reply to the thoughts expressed in your letter, and in the same spirit of frank exchange of views I welcome this opportunity, as you requested, to set forth considerations which I think important.

First of all, while I do not wish to make extended comment on your remarks about the Federal Republic of Germany, I do consider that these reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of the post-war German state. An impartial appraisal would, I believe, show that the leaders of the Federal Republic, as well as the overwhelming sentiment of the population which elected these leaders to office, want peace as much as any of us and do not present an aggressive threat to any country. I can assure you from personal knowledge that this is the case, recognizing that, while memories of the past may justify caution, they should not blind us to the realities of the present.

Now, with regard to the basic questions raised in your letter, I should note that, as you yourself say, certain of the observations you make are based on interpretations arrived at in various parts of the world of the meaning of comments that Secretary Herter and I made in the course of press conferences during the month of February. If the interpretations of our comments to which you refer led you to believe that a change had taken place or was in progress in the policy of the United States as regards the transfer of nuclear weapons or information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons, they were in error. Neither Secretary Herter nor I had any intention of implying the existence of or plans for any such change; and upon re-reading carefully

¹ Source: No change in U.S. policy against transferring nuclear weapons to other countries. Confidential; Presidential Handling, 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower-Khrushchev.

the transcript of our remarks I do not feel that an interpretation in this sense would be justifiable.

Your letter therefore, based as it seems to be on misinterpretation of remarks which I have made, seems to reflect fundamental misunderstanding regarding the policy of the United States Government. At the risk of being repetitious I should like to review this policy for you.

It is our policy to avoid the widening of the circle of nuclear powers. This policy is implemented in the actions of the United States and is reflected in our basic laws, in particular the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended. The United States does not transfer nuclear weapons to the custody of its allies in time of peace and we do not (with the exception of the United Kingdom which is already a nuclear power) provide to our allies or to others information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Our policy has been public knowledge since its inception and any change would become immediately known. On the other hand, we do not know whether or not the USSR places nuclear weapons at the disposal of the members of the Warsaw Pact or others of its allies.

It must be recognized that states with a major industrial capability in the present world cannot be expected to be satisfied indefinitely with a situation in which nuclear weapons are uncontrolled and they themselves do not have nuclear weapons for their own defense. As for our allies in NATO, it must further be recognized that they have a legitimate desire to defend themselves with the most modern weapons available. This desire is easily understood when it is realized that they must provide for defense against forces which, as you yourself have made very clear on numerous occasions, already possess the most modern and destructive armaments. It is to help meet the legitimate need of our allies for their own defense that we have established the NATO atomic stockpile system. Under this system, custody of atomic warheads remains in the United States alone as provided by law and they can be used only in defense against aggression. The circle of nuclear powers is not widened thereby. The legitimate needs of our allies for modern weapons to be used in self-defense are satisfied, but in a manner which does not require them to produce such weapons themselves.

You and I must recognize, however, that the secrets of the production of nuclear weapons to which you refer cannot long remain hidden from many of the states in the modern world which have advanced scientific and industrial resources. If the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be prevented we cannot longer delay a start on the agreed international control of nuclear energy and a beginning on meaningful disarmament agreements covering both conventional and nuclear arms under verifiable conditions.

It is generally agreed that technical means are not now available for assuring the elimination of past and present stocks of nuclear weapons. This situation was officially recognized by the Soviet Government in its disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955 and reconfirmed in its declaration submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 18, 1959. I believe you also acknowledged it in a speech made at Moscow on May 24, 1958.

Nonetheless there are things which can be done now and I urge that we take the opportunities which are before us to agree to the measures which would bring to a halt immediately the possibility of the emergence of new nuclear powers.

What we can now do are the following three things:

1. We can, in the Geneva negotiations for discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, stop all nuclear weapons tests which can now be effectively controlled. That done, we could through joint research move, as quickly as additional control measures could be proven and agreed, to the cessation of all weapons tests. The response of your representative to the proposals of the United States representative on February eleventh for immediate agreement on the presently achievable steps has thus far been negative. But surely it is in the interests of our two countries and of the whole world to conclude now an agreement in all areas for which the problems of essential inspection have been resolved.

2. We can support, in the April meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the adoption of safeguards procedures which will ensure that the future expansion of nuclear power production does not itself become the source for fissionable material for production of nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are taking significant strides in the development of nuclear power and in the making available of this new energy resource for the benefit of other nations. Surely we have a common interest, as reflected in our adherence to the principles of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in seeing that the nuclear power reactors which are built in the future in many nations do not become the source of material for manufacture of weapons by new nuclear powers.

3. We can, in the disarmament negotiations beginning March fifteenth in Geneva, agree to stop the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons—thus stopping the accumulation of nuclear weapons stocks—as soon as effective inspection measures are agreed and operating. Simultaneously we could begin to transfer fissionable materials now in weapons stocks to peaceful purposes with a view to the eventual elimination of these weapons from national arsenals. This practical and important step is one which I have urged repeatedly since my letter of March 1956 to Premier Bulganin. The arguments which you

bring forward in your letter of March third seem to me to reinforce the cogent reasons for proceeding promptly with this significant measure.

I think we are agreed that the surest method of dealing with the situation which concerns you, as indeed it does me, is to make progress toward effective disarmament measures. I think you will agree that there is little prospect of achieving much in this field at the summit unless we can base ourselves on solid progress already achieved in the Geneva negotiations. I hope that you will instruct your representatives, as I have done mine, to make every effort to eliminate differences to the point where we will have something real to deal with at Paris in May.

I hope that this frank statement will clarify the policy and objectives of my Government and remove the misapprehensions of our purpose. Particularly I again assure you that my public statements, to which you refer, implied no change whatsoever in this nation's policies or their application. I appreciate your expression of the concerns which you feel. For my part, I express the hope that you will join with us in the negotiations to which I have referred, in undertaking now the concrete and effective measures which will make vast progress in dealing with the nuclear threat.

Sincerely,

542. Telegram Didel 32 to Geneva¹

Washington, March 16, 1960, 8:41 p.m.

Didel 32. Secretary has approved position paper on Chinese Communist problem and US disarmament policy. Paper being pouched. Summary follows:

I. Problem: General problem is to handle disarmament negotiations in such manner that Communists not permitted use negotiations for political or propaganda gains with respect ChiCom issue while avoiding commitment on meaningful disarmament program including effective inspection arrangements.

II. Anticipated Communist Position: Communist side may try inject ChiCom issue either by direct initiative or by exploiting any

¹ Source: Summary of approved position paper on Communist China and U.S. disarmament policy. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.1-GE/3-1660.

opportunities which free world proposals may offer. Communist objectives would be:

A) To use this controversial political issue to divert public attention from inadequacies of Communist disarmament position.

B) To reap political propaganda gains at free world expense without accepting disarmament obligations.

C) To confer prestige on ChiCom regime which Communists would exploit throughout Asia and Africa as well as in connection Chinese representation issue at next UNGA.

III. Manner in Which Issue Might Arise at Conference: Possibilities include:

A) Direct Communist Proposal: USSR may propose ChiComs be invited participate conference Geneva either as member Communist side or as observer or in some other manner. ChiComs for their part may send message demanding invitation to participate.

Participation by ChiComs in any manner whatsoever should be firmly rejected by free world side. Composition negotiating group has been agreed upon. ChiComs have no standing of any sort before group. Injection ChiCom issue would be political maneuver which could only be designed obstruct serious disarmament talks. Group should proceed at once with assigned task without interruptions by political moves.

B) Initial Force Level Ceilings: Any suggestion that force level ceilings are to be considered for ChiComs will almost inevitably lead to immediate Communist demand for ChiCom participation. In connection 2.5 million ceiling for US and USSR, and appropriate levels for certain other states, it has been agreed that Communist China should not be included but that QUOTE escape clause UNQUOTE might be required.

C) QUOTE Escape Clause UNQUOTE in Connection 2.5 Million Ceiling: In order minimize opportunity Communists use QUOTE escape clause UNQUOTE as basis for injecting ChiCom participation issue into discussions, escape clause should be phrased generalized language without specific mention ChiComs.

D) Second Stage Force Levels: If discussion this stage should be reached Communist side would be likely raise issue ChiCom participation. Phrasing of any proposals touching on this issue under stage two and timing their discussion are accordingly very significant matters.

E) World Disarmament Conference: Question of invitations to possible world disarmament conference of militarily significant powers or any studies relating to such conference would involve political issues which Communists might seek exploit. Handling of invitation issue or any study relating to conference is complex and politically delicate matter especially in forum such as Geneva talks. Separate paper dealing this matter will be prepared. As all studies contemplated first stage cannot be undertaken at once delegation should seek avoid getting into any discussion re world disarmament conference until substantial progress has been made with USSR on other aspects disarmament program.

IV. U.S. Position:

A) In view sensitivity of political problems involved, delegation should maintain close contact with Department on handling of any issues involving problem directly or indirectly. In particular delegation should consult Department on phrasing of any proposals bearing on this matter so that wording may be worked out by mutual agreement between Department and delegation.

B) Delegation should be guided by general principle that until there is evidence USSR is prepared accept meaningful commitments including effective control system, question of how Communist China will be brought into relationship with proposed arrangement should not be broached by US delegation. Discussion of best means handling ChiCom issue can be made later in light Soviet attitude as disclosed first stages negotiations. This issue should be decided by US Government during negotiations and after Soviet intentions re acceptance effective commitments including controls in their own territory have been clarified.

V. Discussion: Discussion section of position paper contains background information including following position given Department by Chinese Ambassador: QUOTE I realize that it would not make sense to leave the whole of the Chinese mainland out of any disarmament scheme, but at the present stage the question of disarmament is largely one of cold war. As such, we must face up to the danger of increasing Chinese Communist prestige and giving additional ammunition to those who are advocating the admission of Communist China to the UN and the recognition of it by the United States. In other words, we may not achieve any actual disarmament for some time to come, but we may find ourselves having lost another round of psychological warfare. UNQUOTE

Herter

543. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and Kistiakowsky¹

Washington, March 21, 1960

11:20—Telephoned Dr. Kistiakowsky 1) Secy said with regard to suggestions Dr. K had made on organization, Department had also

¹ Source: Disarmament organization; military planning; developments in test talks; moratorium on testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

prepared organizational set up in connection with disarmament which was a part of our presentation on the Hill on appropriations. Secy suggested Dr. K get in touch with Mr. Farley to see how the two might be dove-tailed, and Dr. K said he would call Mr. Farley. The Secy said he was still bothered as to whether the individual in charge of Dr. K's setup in the White House would be the fellow who was the top policy man or whether he would be an objective adviser to the President, which the Secy felt should be talked out a little more. Dr. K said he had hoped that by the fact that policy decisions would be made by the committee chaired by the Secretary of State, this would take care of it. Secy said, however, there was another section which stated that the White House man would be the principle policy formulator. Secy and Dr. K agreed that it was important that the various roles and functions be very clear right from the start. 2) Discussed unreliability of information being given Gates and, in turn, those responsible for policy formulation with regard to our missile programs, etc. Discussed Polaris and Navy's misrepresentation in order to concentrate on their submarine before people were distracted to the Polaris; discussed Air Force over-optimism on Sky Bolt. Dr. K said real trouble with our military planning is that the planners take the idealistic view of what they want and when instead of the realistic view of what they can have by when. 3) Secy referred to new Russian offer in Geneva and the fact that he had talked briefly to the President about it and additional fact that British will be very insistent on this. Secy said he had our legal people looking into what the President can and cannot do. Secy said, for instance, on a moratorium which wouldn't begin until ratification of the treaty which ratification is undoubtedly out of the question for this year, whether the President can commit himself to a moratorium which goes beyond his term of office?; what can be done by Executive action as opposed to a Treaty? Dr. K said he was worried about calling the principals meeting so quickly because both Gates and McCone will take a negative attitude. Secy said Gates is away and Douglas will be attending; that Douglas is pretty realistic on this. Secy said McCone had told him confidentially—Dr. K said McCone had also told him—that he feels there will be no more testing during this Administration, and Secy said whether McCone will be complete negative on a treaty he just didn't know. Secy said the British are inclined to feel real progress has been made and the Secy said he shared that feeling. Dr. K said he also felt progress had been made and that both he and Dr. Killian feel it would be very unfortunate if we reject this out of hand without countering with constructive suggestions of our own. Dr. K said we just have to accept the fact that there will be no more nuclear tests or else the whole cold war will get hotter. Dr. K said he had a feeling at the root of the difficulty is lack of understanding by our legislators and the electorate on what a monitoring system can do; we can't have a foolproof inspection

system. Secy said it was also a question of whether the Soviets will keep their word; whether they will cheat on a ban within the letter of the law or whether, with their current preoccupation with world opinion, they will respect the ban for fear of being caught cheating with its resulting effect on world opinion. Secy said as regards the meeting of principals tomorrow that the Secy felt we have to get this out on the table as soon as possible since we will have to go to the President on the unresolved factors. Dr. K said since this is largely a political rather than a technical decision now, that he will have to take a secondary role in the meeting. Dr. K said there was one item which would undoubtedly be tossed at the Secy tomorrow, which Dr. K thought Secy should be forewarned about. Dr. K said it had been thought with regard to small underground explosions that there was a sharp limit as to size—if the explosion was too big it would collapse and a signal would go out—but Dr. K said it now appears that if you make it too big you don't get the full effect but you still get a partial effect and, therefore, the risk of doing it clandestinely is very much reduced. Dr. K said he is sure this will be mentioned tomorrow by the people who will argue against going ahead.

2:12—General Goodpaster telephoned (see separate memo)

2:30—The President telephoned (see separate memo)

3:30—Returned Mr. Kendall's earlier call, but Mr. Kendall had seen Secy at the White House and taken care of whatever the matter was.

4:05—Mr. Kohler telephoned to say the Soviet Ambassador wants to see the President again. The Secretary said the answer was no. Mr. Kohler said we always have to balance this a little against Thompson getting in to see Khrushchev, but agreed the Soviets should tell us the subject matter and then we could decide. Secy said he would call Gen. Goodpaster about this.

544. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 21, 1960

SUBJECT

The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production

REFERENCES

A. NSC Action No. 1840-c

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject; "Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement", dated March 28, 1958

C. NSC Action No. 2161-b

The enclosed report on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, March 24, 1960.

Also enclosed for discussion by the Council in connection with the above-mentioned report are two memoranda containing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject. The request in paragraph 7 of the first of these memoranda ("U.S. Disarmament Policy", March 2, 1960) that the JCS be afforded an opportunity to comment on the study by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology prior to its referral to the NSC, has been complied with; and the second memorandum ("Study Entitled 'The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production'", March 18, 1960) contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

The enclosures, one of which contains RESTRICTED DATA, are being given a special limited distribution, and the contents should be subject to special security precautions, with access thereto limited to those individuals having a strict "need to know" in the performance of their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc:

The Secretary of the Treasury (MEMO ONLY)
The Director, Bureau of the Budget (MEMO ONLY)

¹ Source: Transmits March 14 report by Kistiakowsky on "The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production" and two JCS memoranda (attachments to print Document 249). Top Secret; Restricted Data; Limited Distribution. 50 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171.

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science & Technology

Enclosure

Report Prepared by Kistiakowsky

March 14, 1960

*The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored
Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production*

Scope, Limitations and Assumptions

1. The study is divided as follows: investigation of (a) the feasibility and monitoring requirements for a ballistic missile flight test ban or limitation, (b) the feasibility and monitoring requirements for a ballistic missile production ban or limitation, and (c) the national security implications of any such agreements. The relationships of the above questions to the operations of national space programs has also been considered under the assumption that space programs will be continued subject to inspection and some control.

2. There are a number of other interrelationships which merit serious study, but which it has not been possible to consider in this analysis. The conclusions to this study must be read with these limitations in mind. In particular, the study does not adequately consider:

2.1 The implications of abrogation of any of the possible agreements that might be reached;

2.2 The relationship of the arms control measures discussed here to others, including general disarmament;

2.3 The implications of inhibiting the attainment of nuclear delivery capabilities by nations, other than the U.S., U.K., and USSR;

2.4 The dissymmetries between the U.S. and the USSR in the problems of maintaining production and/or test facilities, and competence when limitations on their utilization are in force.

2.5 The detailed inspection team requirements and cost for monitoring a production ban;

2.6 Specific limitations and controls that might be imposed on space programs and the organization of a possible international authority to carry out space programs;

2.7 The implications of increased emphasis on other delivery systems that might flow from agreements limiting missile tests or production.

2.8 The violation of a production ban or limitation by the importation of long-range ballistic missiles from a non-signatory country.

On the basis of this study, and particularly in view of its limitations, it has not been possible to determine whether or not a test ban in

1963, or at any later date, would be to the net advantage or disadvantage of the U.S.

3. The conclusions that follow are based on the present NIE of Soviet stockpile growth and on U.S. missile program schedules as approved, or proposed for approval, that appear to be reasonably attainable if adequately supported. In the event of any agreement, it would be necessary to be certain that the applicable U.S. schedules were indeed met, if not actually accelerated, prior to the implementation of the agreements.

Summary of Conclusions

Missile Test Monitoring

4. Detection of ballistic missile flights with high confidence can be accomplished by means of radars that are currently in development. The siting of some radars within the Sino-Soviet Bloc and within the U.S. would be required. Such a detection system would probably take about two-and-a-half years to develop and install. About 15 radars would be needed to detect with certainty missiles from within the Bloc whose trajectory rose 75 n.m. or more above the surface of the earth. Of these, at least 4 or 5 would have to be located within the Bloc; the remainder could be located in friendly countries around the periphery. On normal ballistic flights, an apogee of 75 n.m. corresponds to a ground range of 300 n.m. However, it would be possible to fire missiles on non-optimal very flat trajectories out to perhaps 3,000 n.m. without their apogee exceeding the 75 n.m. limit. Radar monitoring could not detect static or tethered firings, nor assure detection of short-range firings of long-range ballistic missiles, or flights by aerodynamic vehicles. Therefore, such tests should not be excluded by any agreement unless there were some other detection means agreed to by which they could be monitored.

5. A world-wide high confidence system for detecting missiles, the apogee of which exceeds 75 n.m. is feasible, but would require a large number (about 100) of radars. It is possible, though by no means certain, that alternative less expensive flight detection systems could be operational by about 1963.

Relationship of a Missile Test Ban to Space Programs

6. For a test ban to be effective in limiting missile development, it would be necessary that space programs, both civilian and military, be abandoned, subjected to rigid inspection and some controls, or internationalized.

7. Short of abandoning space efforts altogether, some feed-through from space programs into possible missile development programs is inevitable. Though more detailed study is required, a cursory look

suggests that limitations or controls consistent with valid national space programs could slow, but would not stop, the effects of this feed-through. The inspection teams would, however, be in a position to assess the degree of danger represented by the applicability of space techniques to possible military developments.

8. Inspection would include advance disclosure of all space firings, right to inspect all space vehicles in advance of firing, together with their components and associated equipment, and access on the part of both sides to all results.

9. Internationalization of the space effort could reduce the effects of feed-through to a minimal level, and could also lower the risks associated with the possibility of technological surprise.

Implications of a Missile Flight Test Ban

10. A missile flight test ban would represent a considerable risk for the U.S. if implemented as early as January 1961. A test ban so dated as to preclude the confident operational development of the mobile Minuteman and the 1500 n.m. Polar's would be disadvantageous to the U.S. On the basis of the programs indicated in Figs. 1 *a* and 2 *a*, early 1963 would represent the earliest possible date for such a ban. With respect to other considerations and on the basis of present knowledge and expectations, there do not appear to be decisive reasons for believing that the risk to the U.S. (or the USSR) would be either greater or less if there were a missile test ban in 1963 than if there were no such ban.

11. Any test ban which is dependent on radar coverage for monitoring the Bloc should provide sufficient lead time so that construction of radar sites can begin two years before the effective date of the ban. Alternative monitoring systems may or may not involve comparable lead times.

Monitoring of a Missile Production Ban or Limitation

12. A missile production ban or limitation can be monitored if, and only if, the following conditions can be met.

12.1 The agreement guarantees a right to unrestricted and self-initiated access by the inspection teams to any point in any area of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

12.2 The inspection directorate has the right to valid aerial photography of the entire Bloc on a periodic basis.

A prior inventory of Bloc missile stockpiles and selected industrial facilities would probably be required for monitoring production, and in any case would be needed to insure that the stockpile is not greatly different than estimated in the NIE.

13. Given the foregoing conditions, if a quota were desired, a sufficiently large quota could probably be set on the permitted number of

inspections without seriously degrading the confidence of the monitoring system.² However, in the event of a production limitation or in the event of a continuing national space program, continuous inspection of certain key facilities, such as missile and space production installations, would be required.

14. The inspection teams would be concerned not only with the production of the missiles themselves, but also with the production of the support equipment necessary to give the missiles an operational status. Although it is not within the terms of reference of this study and has not been investigated here, it seems probable that inspection of launchers and launch sites would be of great use; it is possible that further study would reveal it to be as important, or perhaps more important, than inspection of missile production.

15. U.S. intelligence data could provide valuable support to the activities of inspection teams.

16. Despite inspection of the sort envisaged here, there will remain the possibility of a small flow of clandestinely produced missiles. The order of one or two missiles a month might represent a relatively low risk of detection, while five or more a month would probably represent a high-risk situation to the USSR.

Implications of a Missile Production Ban

17. An absolute ban on production would be dangerous to the U.S. if implemented as early as 1961. With delay, the danger would diminish. On the basis of the estimates in the tables, by January 1963 there might still be significant risk, but by January 1964 (or possibly earlier if U.S. production were accelerated), the risk should be small.³

Implications of a Limitation on Missile Production

18. If implemented as early as 1961, a limitation which permitted production of at least several times the estimated clandestine production capability could improve the U.S. position. This conclusion is contingent on the USSR not already having an overwhelming initial attack force which would make it necessary to accelerate presently-planned U.S. missile production. With the passage of time, the advantage of a limitation over an absolute ban would diminish in importance. In the event of an agreement to limit production, a continuation of flight testing would seem advantageous up until early 1963, in that continued testing would contribute to stability by permitting the attainment of

² The Department of Defense is opposed to agreements on quotas, on principle. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ The DOD representatives would prefer that this read “smaller” rather than “small.” [Footnote is in the original.]

hardening and mobility by both sides. After 1963, continued flight testing might be disadvantageous in that such testing would permit further improvements in the guidance accuracies of both sides (particularly that of the USSR).

INTRODUCTION

19. The purpose of the study is to determine the feasibility and the implications to U.S. national security of a monitored multilateral agreement to ban or delimit the flight testing and/or production of long-range ballistic missiles. The precise terms of reference of the study are set forth in Annex A.

20. The definition of long-range involves a certain arbitrariness, particularly since radar detection system requirements are more directly tied to missile apogee than to range, and since for a given apogee the variation in range may be considerable. A limit of about 75 n.m. on apogee would certainly exclude all full-range ICBM firings, and would also exclude firings in the IRBM range except on trajectories so flat as to impose constraints on design substantially more severe than are required for minimum energy trajectories in the same range. A 75 n.m. apogee would seem to be a reasonable limit, though it should be pointed out that a lower limit would be required if it were desired to preclude tests of all ballistic missiles in the ranges that might be important for launch from submarines or aircraft.

21. Questions of national military policy and posture affect the emphasis in the study. With the advent of the Soviet missile force, probably movable, or possibly mobile, and in any event sited in locations unknown to the U.S. (and at least some of which will probably remain unknown for some time), there is a basic dissymmetry in the U.S. and Soviet positions. Thus, even if U.S. policy would permit a first strike by us, it could not be expected to seriously impair Soviet missile strike capability. Consequently, the emphasis of the study has been on the preservation of a U.S. retaliatory capability in the event of a possible Soviet surprise attack.

22. This dissymmetry will, to a significant extent, be weakened by the eventual U.S. possession of a mobile missile force—first Polaris, later the mobile Minuteman, and possibly eventually the ALBM when airborne.

23. The conditions requisite to a satisfactory implementation of a production ban or limitation would presumably reduce this asymmetry, since these conditions involve unlimited inspection and access to valid air reconnaissance data.

24. While emphasis in the study has been on the preservation of a secure U.S. retaliatory capability, it has also seemed important to consider the problem of stability more generally. Even though the U.S. (or the USSR) might have a substantial retaliatory capability, the USSR (or perhaps less likely the U.S.) might make a pre-emptive strike in a

situation when war seemed very probable or inevitable in the hope of minimizing damage to itself. To the degree that such a course may seem desirable, the situation may be characterized as unstable. On the other hand, if the U.S. force posture were such that nearly all the U.S. force would survive a Soviet attack, and if nearly all the Soviet force could be expected to survive a U.S. attack, a situation of great stability would ensue, for there would then be little incentive for either side to strike first, even in the event of what it might regard as extreme provocation. Hardening of missiles can help bring about such a situation by increasing the exchange ratio, i.e., the number of missiles required in an attack to achieve some high probability of destroying one of an adversary's missiles. It is also important, of course, that the force sizes not be so disparate that an attacker may have the capability of overwhelming the opponent's force even though it is hardened. As the exchange ratio approaches unity with improving accuracy and reliability, or if the U.S. is unable to estimate Soviet force size with any confidence, mobility will be a preferable method of insuring stability.

25. There are certain key considerations which dominate and interpenetrate all discussions of the present problem. It is desirable to isolate these clearly at the very outset so that they can be kept explicitly in mind during the ensuing discussion. For convenience they are tabulated here:

25.1 There is a fundamental difficulty in monitoring a missile test ban in that there need be no residue or evidence at the site of a launching which will persist for a sufficient period of time so that an inspections team could verify a suspected firing by visiting the site. (This is particularly obvious in the case of missiles fired from submarines.) Disturbances in the atmosphere and ionosphere may persist long enough so that evidence of a firing may be adduced minutes or hours after the event; however, the techniques for doing this are still under development. For the present at least, because of the impossibility of verification after the fact, missile detection systems for monitoring a test ban must therefore be such that there is negligible probability that other events will be mistaken for missile tests. It is not necessary that the system be able to detect all missile tests. If it is able to detect a substantial fraction of possible tests, and if the conditions when detection will not be made are unpredictable by the other side, then it would seem reasonable to assume that any agreement would not be violated in the hope or expectation of avoiding detection.

25.2 By agreeing to stop missile flight tests, particularly if it is done within the next few years, there will be pressures exerted which will tend to prevent, or at least defer, the development of ballistic missiles by countries other than the U.S., USSR and UK. Clearly, this effect may be of very great importance. However, consideration of whether the net effect will be desirable or undesirable is beyond the scope of this study.

25.3 The problems of warning, decision making and reaction time for the U.S. are critical. In the near future it must be assumed that virtually all of the aircraft or missiles would be destroyed on any U.S. base against which a Soviet ICBM was delivered, provided the Soviets were able to achieve a high degree of surprise and simultaneity of attack.

The degree to which they can do this remains somewhat uncertain, but what evidence there is suggests that they can probably do reasonably well. Later, hardening will enhance the survival probability of many missiles. However, warning will continue to be very important. As BMEWS becomes operational (the first station late this year), about 15 minutes of warning will be available. Although BMEWS may be very helpful in providing warning for SAC aircraft, there may be serious problems in communications and decision-making that must be solved if use is to be made of such warning for launch of U.S. missiles. There is probably a very real question as to whether a decision to actually launch missiles would ever be made solely on the basis of BMEWS warning. The first BMEWS station will provide warning of ICBM attack against most, but not all, U.S. bases; however, it should be noted that even with all three BMEWS stations operational, there will still be a gap in warning of attack by missiles launched from submarines. Moreover, there are conceivable trajectories for Soviet ICBM's against which the BMEWS would not be effective. There is no provision for providing IRBM's and aircraft stationed on overseas bases that are around the periphery of the Bloc with BMEWS type of warning against ballistic missile attack, and even warning against aircraft attack may be questionable. In view of the Soviet 700 and 1100 n.m. ballistic missile and light bomber capabilities, and the softness of the IRBM's (and aircraft), they must for the most part be discounted completely as retaliatory weapons after surprise attack. They may, however, contribute to the complexity of a possible Soviet attack.

25.4 Considerations not only of production rates but of national missile stockpile levels are fundamental to the study. The analysis from which the conclusion of this study derives is based on the NIEs⁴ of Soviet development, production and deployment, and on U.S. schedules that have been approved or proposed for approval, and which are believed attainable. If, within the next three years, the Soviets should substantially accelerate production, or if there should be major slippages in U.S. programs, the U.S. position could be very adversely affected, and some of the conclusions of this study would require alteration. Figures 1 through 6 show the anticipated performances, characteristics, and operational capabilities on which the analysis is based. Figure 7 shows graphically the growth in effective ICBM's for both sides and the size Soviet force that would be required in order to have a 90% probability of producing at least a specified overpressure at each aim point in the U.S. Included as aim points are SAC operational air bases, ICBM sites, naval bases, and command and control installations. The assumptions are, for the most part, based on NIE 11-8-59 and are summarized on the figure.

25.5 Questions of attainable guidance accuracy turn out to be central to the discussion. Insofar as the dissymmetry discussed in 21 obtains, Soviet accuracy is far more important than U.S. accuracy, since their missile sites are not currently among our aim points, whereas our fixed missile sites undoubtedly figure prominently in theirs. Thus, the Soviet CEP emerges as probably the most sensitive parameter of the

⁴ NIE 11-5-59 Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, 3 Nov. 1959 (TOP SECRET); NIE 11-8-59 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964, 9 Feb. 1960 (TOP SECRET). [Footnote is in the original.]

study. This is basically because CEP is more or less directly translatable into missiles, via the notion of the “exchange ratio.” This ratio is the number of Soviet missiles required to destroy (at a certain level of confidence) a U.S. missile installation. Thus, each such installation can in a sense “claim” so many Soviet missiles. The exchange ratio for hardened sites is extremely sensitive to CEP, varying about as the square of this quantity. Consequently, a two to one improvement in Soviet CEP means approximately a four to one effective amplification in that part of the Soviet missile force earmarked for attack on our hard sites. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this parameter, variations from the NIE of Soviet CEP have explicitly been considered. In particular, an alternative set of Soviet CEP’s has been used for exploratory purposes, which corresponds to the accuracies believed, on the basis of U.S. R & D flights, to be attainable with radio-inertial guidance systems.


25.6 It has been necessary to consider carefully the destabilizing effects that a variety of measures might have on the balance that the agreements in question are intended to foster. Some of these measures are quite obvious, e.g., the effects of possible clandestine production under a ban. Others, no less important, are not quite so obvious, namely the effects of ASM measures and of possible active defense measures against ballistic missiles. The relevance of ASM to the efficacy of Polaris as a deterrent is clear. With respect to AICBM or AIRBM measures, the reasoning goes something like this. While cost effectiveness arguments may militate against AICBM defense when there are no constraints on missile production and when heavy decoying and a high degree of simultaneity of arrival are possible, ballistic missile defense may be much more attractive when these conditions cannot be met. Thus, in the event of a production ban or limitation, there would be added incentive for both sides to develop such defenses. Also, if a test ban were negotiated which would lead to heavy emphasis by the U.S. on Polaris (which has little decoy capacity and would not be capable of delivery of weapons with high simultaneity of arrival), then, the possibility that the USSR might develop—via crash and haywire—a modest but worrisome AIRBM capability would accordingly have to be taken into account. (The same applies in part to Minuteman, in that this missile will probably have a minimal decoying capability.)

26. The points discussed above are not the only ones that could be adduced, but they are the most essential ones and will probably suffice to clarify the discussion.

27. The spectrum of time over which the agreements might be implemented runs roughly from the present era into the 1964 period. Two dates have been singled out for detailed analysis: 1 January 1961 and 1 January 1963. It turns out that these dates enjoy a certain adventitious naturalness in that they represent key dates in the structure of the U.S. missile force (1961 operational Polaris capability and Atlas capability; 1963 hard and mobile Minuteman potentially).

28. Finally, the study group recognizes that the problem of the study is only a part of a much larger problem—that of armament control generally. It has not concerned itself directly with questions of the negotiability of any of the agreements considered.

Figure 1a
U.S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles Anticipated
Performance Growth



* (Yield in [text not declassified] distances in nautical miles) [Footnote is in the original.]

Figure 1b
U.S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles Anticipated Performance Growth

CY		1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
THOR	*Yield						
	CEP						
JUPITER	Range						
	Yield						
	CEP						
	Range						
ALBM (Unauthorized)	Yield						
	CEP						
PERSHING	Range						
	Yield						
	CEP						
	Range						
[text not declassified] [text not declassified]							

* (Yield in [text not declassified] distances in nautical miles) [Footnote is in the original.]

Figure 2a
U. S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles
Operational Capabilities




Figure 2b
U.S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles
Operational Capabilities




Figure 3a
U. S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles
Flight Test Program





Figure 3b
U. S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles
Flight Test Program

	CY	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
THOR	(Development Tests Complete)						
JUPITER	(Development Tests Complete)						
ALBM (Unauthorized) Cum, Flt. Tests (Incl. drop and carry)			12	23	45	80	1st Opnl. Sedn.
PERSHING Cum, Flt. Tests		6	12	24	39	53	67
[text not declassified]							


Figure 4
Estimated* Soviet Inventory and Deployment
(Figures are cumulative)



* NIE 11/8/59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964," 9 Feb 60 (TS). [Footnote is in the original.]

** [text not declassified]

Figure 5
Estimated* Soviet Development Testing Program
(Numbers in parentheses are cumulative)



*Estimated by CIA for the sole purpose of this study. [Footnote is in the original.]

**There is the firm evidence of flight testing these missiles from submarines. [Footnote is in the original.]

Figure 6
Estimated Soviet Missile Performance

	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63
[text not declassified]					

*Topical Discussion**I. Items relating to the feasibility of monitoring a long-range missile flight test ban.*

30. Ballistic missile flights originating within the Sino-Soviet Bloc could be detected with high confidence utilizing a system of radars, at least some of which must be deployed throughout the Bloc. The numbers (and to some degree the characteristics) of the radars required will depend on the minimum apogee and range against which the system is to be effective. Table I illustrates this.

a) Column a is the minimum apogee against which the system is to be effective.

b) Column b is the range of a missile on a minimum energy trajectory which will have the apogee given in column a.

c) Column c is what is believed to be a reasonable upper limit on range for the apogee given in column a. It should be noted that attainment of such extremely flat trajectories as implied in column c would require heavier nose cones to withstand the great heating and also probably some terminal guidance.

d) Column d is the number of radars required for world coverage against missiles with the apogees given in a and the range given in b.

e) Column e is the number of radars required for world coverage against missiles with the apogees given in a and the range given in c.

Table I

Apogee (nm)	Missile Range (nm)		Radars for World Coverage	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
100	400	10,000	125	70
75	300	3,000	170	115
50	200	1,000	250	240
30	120	200	415	415

From the table it can be seen that an apogee limitation of about 75 n.m. would exclude ICBM test firings. If it were desired to exclude IRBM's as well, a limit of slightly over 50 n.m. is indicated, though even with the 75 n.m. limit IRBM testing would have to be on far from minimum-energy trajectories. With a 75 n.m. limit, world coverage requirements are seen to be about 115 radars. Actually, of course many areas would not require coverage so that number of radars needed might be more like 100. Because of the great expense of a world wide radar system and in view of other possibilities discussed below, it might be desirable to use radar monitoring only for missile flights originating in the Bloc (and the U.S.). The numbers required are somewhat sensitive to location, i.e. whether it is necessary, and possible, to install radars in

countries around the periphery over which Soviet missile might be fired. If it is assumed that this is to be done, then about 15 radars would be required to detect firings of missiles the apogee of which exceeded 75 n.m. As many as 10 or 11 of these could be located in countries along the periphery of the Bloc. The rest would have to be sited within the Bloc. The system would probably take about two and a half years to install, and the initial cost would be of the order of 300 million dollars. A staff of 30 to 50 technicians (plus housekeeping) would be needed at each site. Mobility for the staff would not be a severe requirement.

31. With a radar detection system as described above, a substantial amount of missile development could continue since the radar system described above would not detect static, tethered and very short-range firings of long-range ballistic missiles, firings in which the missile is destroyed shortly after take-off, and any firings of aerodynamic missiles. Therefore, such tests should not be excluded by any agreement unless there were some other detection means agreed to by which they could be monitored. It is assumed that both sides would conduct such tests. If this were to prove not to be the case, there would be a serious dissymmetry which is not considered in this study.

32. Certain current developments—particularly acoustic and radio backscatter systems—offer the possibility, if used cooperatively, of a satisfactory and relatively inexpensive detection system—one that could even be deployed peripherally to the Bloc countries. It is not possible at the present time to specify the confidence level to be attached to such a mutually supporting system, either with respect to certainty of detection or with respect to immunity to false alarms.

33. In the event of a Soviet self-imposed moratorium on missile flight tests, these techniques—in conjunction with others now being used to monitor Soviet missile firings—might suffice at least for a while to keep track of Soviet activities. However, the present techniques are subject to circumvention if the Soviets take certain rather costly and time-consuming measures.

34. The testing of IRBM's and small ICBM's at sea is a possible operation. A world-wide radar system to detect such launchings would have an initial cost of the order of 2 billion dollars. Alternatively, cooperative use of acoustic and backscatter techniques might constitute a relatively inexpensive world-wide detection system which might be satisfactory for the detection of the inherently high-risk operation of launch by the Soviets (or others) on the open seas. Another alternative system to monitor tests at sea would involve the use of inspection teams to examine ships, shipyards, ports and coastline. The monitor teams would require rights of access and of aerial photography comparable with those delineated in Item IV, 50. as necessary for a production ban.

35. The MIDAS infra-red satellite system, which may be implemented in any event as a measure of early warning, has the potentialities of a world-wide flight detection system. It is not possible at present to determine whether such a system would by itself satisfy the requirements, nor to determine with certainty the date by which it could be operational.

36. Of the various detection systems discussed above, only the radar system would have any capability of distinguishing between a missile firing and a space flight. None would have any capability at all for determining whether a space flight was being used primarily to further missile development. Consequently, it would be necessary to establish in all the countries involved monitor teams having broad powers of inspection of space vehicles and payloads, both civil and military, including direct access to the firing site, the vehicle and its check-out equipment, to the internals of the payload components, and to the tracking and telemetry data.

II. Items relating to the effect of a space program on the effectiveness of a missile flight test ban.

37. In the event of a test ban, space experimentation could provide a "feed through" to the advantage of missile capability. Certain of this feed-through would be quite difficult to circumvent, for example:

- a) Increase missile reliability through continuing experience in the handling and firing of large rocket engines.
- b) Improvements in guidance accuracy.

Such improvements are by no means contingent on the existence of a space program, but they would certainly be accelerated by it.

38. A cursory examination suggests that limitations or controls on a national space program, such as would be at all consistent with the vigor and scientific validity of such a program, could slow, but would not stop, the effect of feed-through. The requirements for such controls, and the degree to which they would slow down feed-through, have not been studied in detail. It would be necessary to study in detail the question of whether new configurations (e.g., solid propellant boosters) or new sub-systems (e.g., all-inertial guidance) developed and tested in the course of space operations might find their way into the Soviet missile stockpile. Such developments would enjoy greatly reduced confidence in the presence of a test ban, but the lack of confidence would not necessarily constitute complete unacceptability.

39. The supervision of space effort (including military space programs, if they were to be continued) by an international authority could result in a minimal degree of feed-through into the military missile efforts. It would, in addition, greatly reduce the dangers inherent in the possibility of technological surprise.

III. *Items relating to the national security implications of a missile flight test ban.*

40. If a test ban were implemented in January 1961, the only ICBM that could be deployed in which the U.S. would have high confidence would be the soft, radio-inertial Atlas. An operational Polaris force, with 1200 n.m. missiles only, would be possible; confidence in it would be less than in the case of the soft Atlas. A hard all-inertial Atlas capability could be developed, but confidence in it would be even less than in Polaris. The operational deployment of the Titan would be precluded; this would probably imply a smaller (as well as qualitatively different) U.S. ICBM force for the period beginning in the latter half of 1961 than would be the case in the absence of a ban.

41. A January 1961 test ban would reduce but not stop the rate of improvement in accuracy of Soviet missiles. Insofar as the ability of these missiles to strike soft U.S. targets is concerned, Soviet accuracy will almost certainly be good enough by January 1961 so that any further improvements may be quite unimportant.

42. In summary, a test ban dated January 1961 would involve considerable risk for the U.S., since it could lead to a situation a few years hence wherein the U.S. would have an inadequate retaliatory capability. Soft missiles (and any aircraft caught on the ground) could be easily destroyed by a surprise Soviet strike-first. The Polaris force would not have certain desirable characteristics which further testing would provide, and in addition, confidence in the system would be lower than in the case of continued testing. Any aircraft that may be on air alert will find penetration of Soviet air defenses increasingly difficult with the passage of time. Finally, any hard ICBM capability which might be developed would be one in which there could be little confidence.

43. A test ban implemented in January 1963 would permit the operational deployment of the 100 psi all-inertial Atlas, Titan and Minuteman, of the mobile Minuteman and of the 1500 n.m. Polaris, assuming adherence to present schedules. A test ban implemented six months earlier would probably not preclude development of any of these systems, though confidence in the mobile Minuteman and the non-cryogenic all-inertial Titan would probably be significantly lowered.

44. A January 1963 test ban could not be counted on to preclude the development of a second-generation Soviet ICBM, possibly smaller and employing non-cryogenic fuel.

45. By January 1963, Soviet guidance will probably have improved substantially. A 1963 test ban would reduce, but not stop, the rate of improvement subsequently. It is possible that by January 1963 accuracies and reliabilities of Soviet missiles may already be good enough so

that the exchange ratio against 100 psi U.S. targets may be approaching dangerous levels.

46. In summary, a January 1963 test ban (would not appear to be particularly dangerous for the U.S., since it)⁵ would permit development of all U.S. missiles for which there are now firm programs, with the probable exception of the ALBM. At this time there do not appear to be any others in prospect that would offer the possibility of greatly improving our retaliatory posture. It would seem important that the test ban not be so early as to preclude development of the mobile Minuteman and the 1500 n.m. Polaris in view of the inevitable improvements in Soviet CEP's.

47. Technological, military or political developments as yet unforeseen could invalidate or modify these conclusions. There does not appear to be any basis for determining at the present time whether such developments will make a test ban less desirable or more so.

48. Certain possible developments do not alter the conclusions but are distinctly related to the problem. Thus, it seems unlikely that in the next few years, the USSR could develop ASW or ballistic missile defense capabilities which could seriously modify the deterrent effect of the Polaris missiles. However, in the farther future, the possible effects of such countermeasures might be important. In particular, the unilateral deployment of an AICBM defense could seriously alter the balance of force.

49. As a second example, a test ban, particularly an early test ban, could lead to a strong resurgence of interest in aerodynamic missiles, particularly very low altitude varieties. Thus a ban could create strong side effects whose ultimate consequences are difficult to predict, but which might be as serious as those which this ban sought to preclude.

IV. Items relating to the feasibility of a ban or limitation on missile production.

50. A qualifiedly⁶ effective system for delimiting Sino-Soviet production of missiles could be implemented if, and only if, the following conditions could be met:

50.1 The agreement guarantees a right to unrestricted and self-initiated access by the inspection teams to any point in any area of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

50.2 The inspection directorate has the right to valid aerial photography of the entire Bloc on a periodic basis.

⁵ The DOD representatives would prefer that words in parenthesis be deleted. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ The major qualification is treated in Item 55 below. [Footnote is in the original.]

A prior inventory of Bloc missile stockpiles and selected industrial facilities would probably be required for monitoring production, and in any case would be needed to insure that the stockpile is not greatly different than estimated in the NIE.

51. Given the conditions outlined above, a limitation on allowed rates of inspection could probably be set. However, existence of a space program or of limited missile production would make necessary continuous inspection of certain key facilities, such as missile and space installations.

52. The activity of the inspection teams would be concerned not only with the production of the missiles themselves, but also with the production of the support equipment necessary to give the missiles an operational status. Although it is not within the terms of reference of this study and has not been investigated here, it seems probable that inspection of launchers and launch sites would be of great use; it is possible that further study would reveal it to be as important, or perhaps more important, than inspection of missile production.

53. U.S. intelligence could support the work of the inspection teams by providing relevant information beyond that derived from the overt inspection.

54. A much more extensive study will be required to determine the proper organization and manpower requirements of the inspection teams and the intensity of level of inspection, including limitations on inspection frequency. A cursory first look indicates that for monitoring the Sino-Soviet Bloc, a minimum of 1000 qualified people, exclusive of logistic support, would have to be engaged in this activity.

55. Despite inspection of the sort envisaged here, there will remain the possibility of a small flow of illicitly produced missiles. A clandestine rate of one or two missiles per month might involve relatively low risk of detection, while five or more per month would probably represent a high-risk situation.

The risk of detection and exposure has to be related to the possible advantage to be gained by incurring the risk. In the event of a total ban on production, for example, the advantage to be gained might be very large compared with the probability of, and the likely consequences of, exposure. In the event of a reasonable limitation on production, the advantages might seem considerably less persuasive.

V. Items relating to the national security implications of a ban or limitation on ballistic missile production.

56. A production ban as early as January 1961 would leave the U.S. with a very few soft fixed missiles, two Polaris submarines, and a bomber force whose capability of penetration (particularly in a retaliatory role) will diminish in time as Soviet defenses continue to

be buttressed. The Soviet ICBM force relative to the number of U.S. aim points could be such that only sure warning and great speed of response on the part of the U.S. bomber force could offer any hope of survival of any significant U.S. retaliatory capability in the face of near-simultaneous surprise attack. In addition, the generally low levels of inventory on both sides would lead to a danger from small levels of clandestine production.

57. If implemented as early as 1961, a limitation which permitted production of at least several times the estimated clandestine production capability of the Bloc would lead to a situation a few years hence where the missile inventories of the two sides would be in a proportion such that neither side's force would be sufficient to destroy the bulk of the adversary's force. (This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that at the time of the ban the Soviet operational missile stockpile would not be so unexpectedly large as to make it necessary to accelerate presently-planned U.S. missile production). The allowed production rate should be made sufficiently high that an approximate parity would be achieved before the U.S. bomber force could be rendered ineffective by Soviet air defense.

58. The detailed tailoring of the negotiations would have to include consideration of the problems of some continued testing, replacement and disposal of obsolescent missiles, and manufacture of spare parts.

59. In the event of an early production limitation, both sides might wish to do limited testing in order to prevent diminution in confidence, to improve accuracy and to prove out modifications of the missile force—particularly improved mobility and hardening. Such modifications would probably, in the near future, increase exchange ratios—and hence promote stability of deterrence—faster than improvements in accuracy could diminish them. With a limitation production, continuation of testing would seem, therefore, to be advantageous to both sides. At some later date (possibly in early 1963) when both sides had sufficiently exploited mobility and hardness, the desirability of continued testing might be questionable. Further tests might result in reduced exchange ratios as improvements in guidance became more significant than further improvements in hardening. Moreover, a discontinuance of testing at that time might prevent or delay the attainment of missile capabilities by powers other than the U.S., U.K., and USSR. Whether or not this would be desirable is not considered in this study.

60. If current schedules are met, a January 1963 production ban would leave the U.S. with about 200 ICBM's and 9 Polaris submarines operational. Actually, additional missiles might be produced prior to 1963 and added to the operational inventory later as more bases and/or submarines were completed. If Soviet CEP's and force levels were about as estimated in the NIE, a very substantial fraction of the U.S. ICBM's would survive a Soviet first-strike. The Polaris force, plus even

a small residue of the ICBM and bomber force, would pose a very substantial threat to the USSR.

61. Thus, U.S. capabilities would seem sufficient so that the Soviets would not attack in the expectation of delivering a knockout blow with small damage to themselves. However, if they should, for any reason, arrive at the conclusion that war was inevitable or highly probable, there would be great incentive for them to deliver a pre-emptive strike since by doing so they could destroy a very large fraction of the U.S. force and so reduce damage to themselves very materially below what would be expected in the event that war should develop in such a way that the whole of the U.S. force could be used against them. The possible advantage to them of such a pre-emptive strike in the event of crisis or uncertainty would then be contributory to instability. This, coupled with uncertainties regarding Soviet future capabilities, would seem to make a 1963 production ban somewhat risky, though probably not out of the question.

62. With deferral of the ban until about January 1964, the U.S. Minuteman forces, both fixed and mobile, are scheduled to grow so substantially that a situation of more stable mutual deterrence should have been reached, since a pre-emptive Soviet strike could be expected to destroy a much smaller fraction of the total U.S. capability. Thus, on the basis of current estimates and schedules, there would appear to be little danger in a ban at that date.

63. By 1963 the stockpiles of both sides will be large enough so that the advantages of a production limitation over a ban would be far less significant than in 1961. The conclusions with respect to the desirability of a ban in 1963 or 1964 are then, for the most part, appropriate to a limitation in production as well. A limitation would, however, seem slightly preferable, in that it would minimize the desirability of possible clandestine production.

64. The arguments presented earlier with respect to a prohibition on testing when there is also a limitation on production seem applicable for 1963 or later.

65. In the event of a ban or a limitation on production, the development of an AICBM defense would probably receive increased emphasis on both sides. The unilateral development and deployment of such a capability by either nation could seriously modify the stability of an established mutual deterrence.

Annex A

Proposed Terms of Reference, NSC Study (per NSC Action 2161–b)

The purpose of this study is to determine the technical feasibility and national security implications of a monitored ban on flight testing and/or on production of long-range ballistic missiles.

The study shall consider the major problems and implications of a ban on the testing of long-range ballistic missiles with emphasis on the technical feasibility of monitoring an agreement. The study will evaluate the importance of the changes that have taken place since the NSC study of March 28, 1958, with particular reference to the evolving status of missile capabilities in the U.S. and USSR.

A similar study will be made of the technical problems and implications of an agreement to stop missile production.

The relationship between the two types of restriction shall be considered, to determine their interdependence and, where appropriate, the relationship of missile test and production bans to other closely related arms control measures will be considered.

The relationship between any missile test or production ban and outer space programs will be a part of the study.

This study could consider an assumed situation existing on January 1, 1961, and alternatively, January 1, 1963. The study will be completed between February 15 and March 1, 1960.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Gates

JCSM 74-60

Washington, March 2, 1960

SUBJECT

U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 24 February 1960, concerning a possible international agreement to ban or limit the testing, production, and the numbers and/or deployment of long-range missiles.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed disarmament measures and the accompanying question encompassed in your memorandum which stated:

“Cessation of all further flight testing of IRBMs and ICBMs and immediately upon the installation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. All further peaceful uses testing of rockets would be conducted only as part of an internationally agreed program. Upon the installation of appropriate inspection measures, agreed limitations would be imposed upon the numbers and the production and/or deployment of long-range missiles and of other long-range delivery systems such as aircraft and submarines. Subsequently agreed reductions would take place.

“Question. What would be the effect on the relative military posture of the United States and her Allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc including Communist China of the adoption of an international agreement along the lines of the above measure, effective in January 1962; 1963; 1965?”

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that these disarmament proposals entail critical implications for the future security of the United States. This is particularly so if considered for any of the proposed time periods whether with or without regard to other disarmament measures. Current U.S. long-range missile programs are far from complete. For example, the MINUTEMAN program, including research and development on missile components, is actually just well underway. Although hardened MINUTEMAN testing is programmed to be practically complete in 1963, the mobile configuration would still be in the testing stage. (All of this presupposes no slippage or detrimental test results along the way.) The current POLARIS research and development program is less than 40 per cent complete. Although plans indicate completion of development of the 1500 mile missile by 1962, development of the subsequent model (2500 miles) will not be possible if a cut-off date of 1963 is established. TITAN research and development flight test programs are just beginning (of the 98 R&D flights programmed, 7 have been accomplished). The various improvements in this program are dependent upon SUCCESSFUL test completion.

4. There are many serious technical difficulties in our missile program that can be overcome only by extensive R&D testing over the next three or four years, followed by actual military crew firings under field conditions. Examples of more serious problems are: the all inertial ICBM guidance systems have not been flight tested to date; the development of a reliable large grain, solid propellant is in its infancy; and non-cryogenic fueled ICBM's have not proceeded past the static engine test phase. To commit the United States to a missile flight test ban, as of the proposed dates, based upon anticipated major technical advances and their successful incorporation into our missile programs, could be dangerous to the security of the United States.

5. Failure to successfully complete the flight test phase of any of these systems, or major system components thereof, would not permit the United States to produce a reliable missile weapons system to match the estimated current and anticipated missile technical advances of the USSR. Of equal importance, when viewed in the light of unit operational readiness, training of combat crews would be reduced to “dry runs”. This, of course, would result in questionable confidence in the whole weapons system.

6. Consideration of the foregoing, plus an examination of the implications thereof leads to the following conclusions:

a. Any agreement to ban flight testing of IRBM's, effective prior to 1965, would be disadvantageous to the United States because of the impact upon our weapons systems development programs.

b. The lack of firm data on U.S. programs as well as those of the Soviet Bloc makes the period 1965 one of great uncertainty. The anticipated continuing accelerated advances in weapons technology dictates that judgments as to the relative posture of the Soviet Bloc and the Free World by 1965 cannot be more than questionable at this time.

c. Any consideration of production limitations must include consideration of relative effectiveness of existing inventories of operational missiles as of the cut-off date. Measures which both the Soviet Bloc and the Free World would take to accelerate their ballistic missile programs, PRIOR TO THE CUT-OFF DATE, cannot be determined, but such could materially change current inventory forecasts, to include types of missiles. Furthermore, judgments as to relative advantage accruing therefrom would be contingent, to large extent, on the degree to which either or both sides possess an effective active defense against such a missile posture. Therefore, any judgments as to the advantages or disadvantages which would accrue from a national commitment to cease or limit production as of a given future date must be approached with extreme caution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a decision relative to the date at which a production ban would be advantageous to the United States cannot be made at this time.

d. An examination of our strategic dependence upon extensive deployment of U.S. and Allied strike forces, as compared to the more monolithic character of the military posture of the Soviet Bloc, indicates that it would be to our national disadvantage to negotiate agreement which would limit deployment of long-range delivery systems.

e. With regard to agreements on reduction of the long-range delivery systems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that specific measures cannot be considered except as related to other disarmament measures.

7. Recommendation: Inasmuch as it is understood that the study being conducted under direction of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology encompasses, in addition to an investigation of the feasibility of an inspection system, an assessment of the implications of such proposals as are related to our national security, it is recommended that the foregoing be utilized by the Defense representatives in the development of this study. Furthermore, in view of the military implications involved, it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on this study prior to its referral to the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED
Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

Attachment

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Gates

Washington, March 18, 1960

SUBJECT

Study Entitled "The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production" (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 14 March 1960, which requested that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the subject study be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by 18 March 1960.

2. It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that when this study was requested by the National Security Council on 10 December 1959, it was contemplated that all major aspects of the problem of control of long range ballistic missiles would be considered and their implications fully assessed in order to establish a sound basis for a policy decision by the President. The terms of reference furnished to the study group were sufficiently comprehensive to permit accomplishment of this objective. However, the study report sets forth, in paragraph 2 thereof, seven interrelated areas of major concern which were not adequately considered.

3. These limitations of the study should be fully recognized in order to preclude a premature decision on this matter. In its over-all effect, the report is unduly optimistic with regard to the prospects for an early U.S. proposal for, or agreement to, a missile test or production limitation.

4. In view of its limitations, the study does not provide an adequate basis for the formulation of a broad policy with regard to the control of missiles. It does afford a sufficient basis, when construed in the light of the comments contained in the Appendix hereto, to conclude that the United States should not at this time propose any limitation on the testing or production of missiles to become effective at any foreseeable date in the future.

5. It is to be expected that proposals of this nature will be advanced by other nations in such a manner as to require their consideration by the United States. For this reason, it is recommended that the United States expeditiously complete a study of all major aspects of the problem in order to provide its negotiators with adequate policy guidance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

Thomas D. White

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Appendix

COMMENTS ON STUDY ENTITLED "THE FEASIBILITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A MONITORED AGREEMENT TO STOP OR LIMIT BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTING AND/OR PRODUCTION"

1. *Paragraphs 2, 10, 18 and 46* (pages 1, 4, 6 and 33). These paragraphs imply that a flight test ban beginning in early 1963 would contain no risk, or only slight risk, to the United States. The date 1963 is considered to be within the period where potential disadvantages of a test ban, with regard to possible slippages, unforeseeable technical/operational difficulties, and the desirability of sophisticating our programmed weapons system, can be identified. Moreover, the possibility that Soviet technical advances could provide them with a significant technical superiority prior to the effective date of a test ban should not be overlooked. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that uncertainty appears in the period 1965 and beyond.

2. *Paragraph 3* (page 2). With regard to the last sentence, it should be recognized that such certainty is a practical impossibility.

3. *Paragraphs 4 and 31* (pages 2 and 28). A radar monitoring system may not provide enough coverage to ensure detection of short-range missile firings or of ALL flights by aerodynamic missiles. However, it would be incorrect to imply that even a minimal system could not detect some of those flights within its radar envelope.

4. *Paragraph 6* (page 4). It should be recognized that consideration of the implications of these measures was beyond the scope of the study, and that, because of the indicated relationship, such implications must be considered before test or production limitations are proposed.

5. *Paragraph 8* (page 4). It is considered unnecessary for the limited purpose of the inspection system contemplated here, that ALL information be disclosed. However, it must be recognized that if this proposal were eventually implemented in conjunction with other disarmament proposals (such as measures to preclude surprise attack) there would be inevitable pressure for the complete disclosure of all information obtained through the use of space vehicles. This consideration should be given full weight in any initial decision as to whether the United States should propose or agree to, any restriction on testing or production of missiles.

6. *Paragraph 9* (page 4). The second conclusion of this paragraph (following after the comma in the second line) should not be interpreted as implying the internationalization of our space program would be to our advantage.

7. *Paragraph 10* (page 4). The indecisiveness of the last sentence (and of the last sentence of paragraph 2, page 1) supports the view that a determination cannot be made at this time that a missile test ban effective at any foreseeable date would be to our advantage.

8. *Paragraph 11* (page 4). The lead time indicated, and the emphasis on radar, are relevant only if credence is given to an effective date of 1963.

9. *Paragraph 12* (page 4). The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the conclusions of this paragraph. It should be noted, however, that the study fails to point out, in this paragraph, or elsewhere, the very significant problem involved in the determination of whether the United States would be willing to submit to such extensive inspection.

10. *Paragraph 13* (page 5).

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should not agree to a predetermined, fixed number of annual inspections (quota). Instead, the level of inspections should bear an appropriate relationship to scientific facts and detection capabilities. This principle would seem to require the right to inspect all declared production facilities and any suspected undeclared facilities. The level of inspection should, therefore, have an appropriate relationship to the number of declared facilities and to the numbers of undeclared facilities and suspected activities qualifying for inspection on the basis of agreed criteria.

b. The language of the first sentence indicates that in order not to seriously degrade the confidence of the monitoring system, a large quota would have to be set on the permitted number of inspections. The likelihood of obtaining USSR agreement to a "large quota" is completely negated by past experience.

c. The last sentence implies that continuous inspection of "certain key facilities" would be adequate in the event of a production limitation or a continuing national space program. Such limited inspection would disregard clandestine production.

11. *Paragraph 17* (page 6).

a. It is possible that the danger of a production ban would diminish with time, but, recognizing the limitations of this study, there is no justification for concluding that the risk will be small by January 1964. It is equally true that a production ban would become progressively less meaningful with time. The over-all assessment of risk vs gain should include comprehensive assessment of many facets, not considered in this study, before a conclusion as to "small risk" can be justified.

b. This paragraph mentions only acceleration of United States missile production. It would be extremely dangerous to assume that the Soviets would not also immediately accelerate their production in the event that an international proposal for limitation of production at some future date were to be presently taken under consideration.

12. *Paragraph 18* (page 6). Recognition should be given to the possibility of development, before 1963, of terminal guidance methods to improve missile accuracy. Tests to refine such terminal methods might

be continued, even after establishment of a test ban, by test launchings from aircraft remaining below the floor of the radar detection system.

13. *Paragraph 23* (page 8).

a. The meaning of this paragraph is not clear.

b. Paragraphs 13 and 23 appear to be inconsistent in the following respect: The latter contemplates unlimited ground and air inspection of a limited production ban; the former envisages a type of limited inspection both with regard to number of inspections (quota) and situs of inspections ("certain key facilities").

14. *Paragraph 25* (pages 9–14). Current U.S. long-range missile programs are far from complete. For example, the MINUTEMAN program, including research and development on missile components, is actually just well underway. Although hardened MINUTEMAN testing is programmed to be practically complete in 1963, the mobile configuration would still be in the testing stage. (All of this presupposes no slippage or detrimental test results along the way). The current POLARIS research and development program is less than 40 per cent complete. Although plans indicate completion of development of the 1500 mile missile by 1962, development of the subsequent model (2500 miles) will not be possible if a cut-off date of 1963 is established. TITAN research and development flight test programs are just beginning (of the 98 R&D flights programmed, 10 have been accomplished). The various improvements in this program are dependent upon SUCCESSFUL test completion.

There are many serious technical difficulties in our missile program that can be overcome only by extensive R&D testing over the next three or four years, followed by actual military crew firings under field conditions. Examples of more serious problems are: the all inertial ICBM guidance system have not been flight tested to date; the development of a reliable large grain, solid propellant is in its infancy; and non-cryogenic fueled ICBM's have not proceeded past the static engine test phase. To commit the United States to a missile flight test ban, as of the proposed dates, based upon anticipated major technical advances and their successful incorporation into our missile programs, could be dangerous to the security of the United States.

Failure to successfully complete the flight test phase of any of these systems, or major system components thereof, would not permit the United States to produce a reliable missile weapons system to match the estimated current and anticipated missile technical advances of the USSR. Of equal importance, when viewed in the light of unit operational readiness, training of combat crews would be reduced to "dry runs". This, of course, would result in questionable confidence in the whole weapons system.

15. *Paragraph 25.6* (page 13).

a. The first sentence implies that “the agreements in question”, i.e., proposed agreements on limitation of testing or production of missiles, are intended to foster “balance”. The achievement of a balance of power is not a purpose of, nor could it be achieved by, disarmament agreements except pursuant to proposals whereby the stronger side accepts greater limitations or reductions. This would be an unrealistic expectation.

b. In considering the last six lines of this paragraph (page 14), recognition should be given to current efforts leading toward development of decoy capability for both POLARIS and MINUTEMAN.

16. *Figures 1 thru 3* (pages 16–21). These figures relating to U.S.–U.K. missile data do not indicate their source and cannot be reconciled in detail.

17. *Figure 5* (page 24). Does not indicate source.

18. *Figure 7* (page 25). The data upon which “SOVIET REQUIREMENT” was plotted do not correspond to data for any of the cases discussed in Table A, Annex A, to NIE 11–8–59. It would be undesirable to have before the policy makers two estimates of Soviet missile requirements (this study and NIE 11–8–59) which differ considerably, without a very clear explanation of the reasons for the difference.

19. *Paragraph 30* (page 27). The conclusion that about 15 radars would suffice under the assumption stated fails to recognize the possibility of testing on the high seas.

20. *Paragraphs 62–63* (page 38). Any consideration of production limitations must include consideration of relative effectiveness of existing inventories of operational missiles as of the cut-off date. Measures which both the Soviet Bloc and the Free World would take to accelerate their ballistic missile programs, PRIOR TO THE CUT-OFF DATE, cannot be determined, but such could materially change current inventory forecasts, to include types of missiles. Furthermore, judgments as to relative advantage accruing therefrom would be contingent, to large extent, on the degree of which either or both sides possess an effective active defense against such a missile posture. Therefore, any judgments as to the advantages or disadvantages which would accrue from a national commitment to cease or limit production as of a given future date must be approached with extreme caution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a decision relative to the date at which a production ban would be advantageous to the United States cannot be made at this time.

545. Letter From Eaton to Herter¹

Geneva, March 22, 1960

Dear Chris:

We have finished a week here and are now on into the first day of the second week. It is very difficult to tell how the Soviets intend to proceed.

They seem quite relaxed. But, although there has been virtually no difficult language used as yet, they are trying very hard to establish the words "general and complete disarmament" as applicable to their own plan. In other words, the Soviets feel they have a patent on the expression and will permit no infringement.

So far as I am concerned, this is not particularly disturbing except as it is wasteful of time. However, it would be my guess that in these first days it is inevitable that time should be wasted in some way, and this is the least harmful I can think of.

The Soviets speak of the nuclear test talks each day, and I frankly believe that it is in this area that they are concentrating at the moment, permitting our own discussions to go in a rather desultory fashion. But, as I said earlier, it is really too early to guess.

Each day last week I made some comment solely for the purpose of establishing ourselves in the conference. I have now determined, at least for the moment, that I will not enter further into discussions while they remain in the upper atmosphere (where they have been all week) but save my fire until, hopefully, we get down to more mundane measures.

In this connection, while shaking hands with Zorin this morning, I told him that I hoped he would get in touch with me directly when he felt there was some specific matter for discussion which would advance the objective of our conference. He seemed quite grateful and uttered "khorosho, khorosho". After the day's meeting, at which he had talked for perhaps thirty minutes in not a destructive manner, I sent a private word along to him that I thought his statements had, in general, been helpful. I believe that this may be fruitful of some results later on when he believes the time is ripe to talk specific matters.

By the foregoing, however, I do not intend to indicate that we should sit by and wait for Russian moves as a general rule, but at this particular time I am convinced that this is the best tactic.

¹ Source: Report on first week of ten-nation conference on disarmament. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2260.

Also, I am of the impression that the Russians feel that the British are our Achilles heel. Zorin has sent word that he wishes to talk with Ormsby-Gore. It may be that he will wish to play us off against the British or vice-versa. Again, this is but a feeling and is based on no creditable evidence. But, I rather sense that the British are not too unhappy about the nuclear test talk as presented by the Russians on Saturday. Why should they be? If I am correct, the presentation reads very much like a play-back of a record cut in London.

In this connection I spoke to Michael Wright on Friday evening and told him that I had heard the Russians were coming in with the “threshold” accompanied by a moratorium. He said, “Yes, this could be very troublesome.” I replied that it certainly would be troublesome for us. I rather felt that he was a bit embarrassed by my comment. Therefore, I did not elaborate on it further.

In line with your suggestion, I broached the subject of recessing for the Summit in my talk with Dr. Protitch on the second day of the meeting. From the feeling in Washington, I gather there is talk of a Western Summit and some talk of a meeting in Istanbul. In light of all of this, I indicated that Dr. Protitch might want to suggest, on his own, that we recess the last Friday in April and sit down again shortly after the first of June. This would give us ample time to bring you up to date on what has transpired here, as well as time after the Summit to prepare the papers necessary to carry out any instructions which may emanate therefrom.

Dr. Protitch raised the question with the Russians, and they indicated that they thought recessing during the month of May would be consonant with their own plans. This is not agreed as yet since we want to be sure that it is agreeable to all of our colleagues and if possible avoid any chance of the onus for an early recess being placed upon us.

The foregoing about covers the report of the week.

I have two specific matters:

a. I think it would be well if I made an occasional report to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, i.e., Senator Fulbright and Senator Humphrey. I am enclosing a letter to each of them together with my first report.

The decision on whether to forward these communications rests entirely with you. However, I hope that if you decide that they should go forward that they do so promptly in order that they will be contemporary rather than historical documents. I will not expand on this as I hope the enclosures will be self-evident in this respect.

b. The other matter is the question of instructions from you. On the morning of the opening of our conference (when it was much too late

to have any discussions with our allies and only the briefest with our own staff), I received very specific instructions together with language to be included in remarks which I was to make on the opening day. These related to our relations with the United Nations. I could not follow these instructions without requesting a change in the Allied Paper which had been cleared in all five capitals and with NATO. Specifically, it was requested that a United Nations study be substituted for the Joint Study referred to in the Plan (which I may say had been in the Plan for weeks and reference to the U.N. included in the last days to cover point).

Further, this matter had been thrashed out and agreed between Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Dillon on the last day of my stay in Washington.

I was therefore, put in the embarrassing position of failing to follow your instructions or of causing a very real explosion among our allies.

I determined that I would endeavor to make the minimum changes in your suggested language (which being in quotation marks and in the context of the telegram I had to assume you had approved, word for word). I hope the result did not do violence too much to either your instructions or the agreement with our allies. I left it in such a way that we are free now to go back to our allies and change the earlier arrangement if that seems to be desirable.

I have set this forth at some length, as base on this experience, I hope that you will realize our predicament when matters of this kind arise in the future.

We begin preparations here after lunch with a meeting of our four allies for presentation to the full conference on the following morning at 10:30 A.M. Therefore, any communication which I receive after lunch I will not have time thoughtfully to consider, discuss with our staff and with our allies until the following day.

I recognize that there may well arise a critical or emergency situation which may require more immediate action.

I am enclosing copies of all this material which you may wish to send to Doug and Phil Farley and copies of letters to Senator Fulbright and Senator Humphrey which you may wish to send to Mr. Macomber.

Forgive the length of this letter but I felt that it would be helpful to give you some of the flavor of things here at this early date.

Kindest regards and gratitude for the help which I have received from you.

Sincerely,

Fredrick M. Eaton

546. Note From Caccia to Herter¹

Washington, March 22, 1960

Dear Chris,

The Foreign Secretary has asked me to send you the attached strictly personal message about nuclear tests.

When you have had time to consider it and the problems involved, he greatly hopes that you may give me a further opportunity of talking over this question with you before you send him any reply.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Caccia

Attachment

Message From Lloyd to Herter

TEXT OF MESSAGE

Dear Chris,

Harold Caccia has reported to me the conversation which he had with you on Sunday about the proposals put forward by the Russians at the Nuclear Tests Conference last Saturday. I understand that you will be giving further consideration to them in the course of this week, and I therefore hope you will not mind if I inflict upon you another letter setting out our attitude.

We regard these proposals as a most hopeful development. Of course we must go into the detail of them with great care and get precise clarification of what Tsarapkin really is proposing. He seems to have left some important points open for detailed negotiation. We must of course make sure that these points are settled in the way we want and I think it would be worth trying had to see whether this can be done.

I do not want now to rehearse at length all the arguments I put to you in my two messages of January 14 and 27. I hope you will look once again at those messages; but I would like in this one to set out as a series of headings the arguments I then used. These were:

¹ Source: Transmits letter to Herter from Lloyd on nuclear test conference. Secret; Personal. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

(i) that the Russians would only accept an agreement which would suspend all tests;

(ii) that if we now fail to reach an agreement the odium for this failure is likely to fall on the West;

(iii) that similarly if we fail and tests are resumed, and even if Russian tests were atmospheric while yours were underground, the main odium for this resumption of testing would likewise fall on the West;

(iv) that it is possible and indeed likely that from the military point of view the Russians stand to lose more than the West if tests are not resumed;

(v) that we have in any case had a completely uncontrolled moratorium on all tests since the negotiations began nearly seventeen months ago;

(vi) that even the best possible agreement would, as we have always realised, involve a virtually uncontrolled moratorium on all underground tests at least for a period of two or three years during the installation of the system; acceptance of the principle of the present Soviet proposal would in effect scarcely add to that period;

(vii) that if we fail to get an agreement then

(a) we lose the first opportunity of installing controls on Soviet territory and hence a vital precedent for future disarmament agreements;

(b) we gravely prejudice the prospects of progress in the Ten Power Disarmament Conference;

(c) we lose the best prospect now open to us of checking the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers.

There is also the important argument which I did not use in my two messages of January 14 and 27 but which I have used with you before. Supposing we fail to get an agreement, we shall be in a period in respect of which the Russians have announced that they will not be the first to resume tests. If, when it came to the point, the United States were to decide that it would not resume tests either, then we shall have thrown away all the advantages which an agreement might have brought us and shall have, in fact, an uncontrolled suspension.

But the most important argument of all is that at long last there may be a chance of making an agreement with the Soviet Union on fairly reasonable terms which would involve the setting up of a control system in the Soviet Union. If achieved in the way we want, it would be the first piece of controlled disarmament that the world has really ever seen and could change the outlook both for the Disarmament Conference and for the Summit.

I will not examine the technical considerations here; but I am convinced that, if a satisfactory moratorium proposal were accepted, we could by inspection exercise some real degree of deterrence against the possibility of Soviet violations below as well as above the proposed threshold.

I know that you will reflect carefully on these arguments and on all the remaining factors which suggest that agreement on the basis the

Russians have now proposed may be negotiable in a manner which would, on balance, be to the advantage of the West.

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

Selwyn

547. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, March 22, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations: Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
Under Secretary
Merchant
EUR—Mr. Kohler
SOV—Mr. Dubs
S/S-RO—Mr. Borg
S/AE—Mr. Farley
Mr. Spiers
Mr. Baker
Mr. Cotzlinger

Department of Defense
Under Secretary
Douglas
Mr. Irwin
General Loper
General Dabney
White House
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Keeny

Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. McCone
General Starbird
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Dulles
Dr. Scoville

Secretary Herter explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the nature of our reply to the Soviet counterproposal of March 19 in which they offer to conclude a treaty on the cessation of all tests except underground tests below a magnitude of 4.75, on condition that all parties agree at the same time not to test below that magnitude during a period of joint research. It is necessary to take legal and political factors into consideration. *The Secretary* has been informed by the legal adviser that the President cannot bind this country to a moratorium on testing going beyond his term of office, unless such a moratorium is approved by the Congress. Another legal point is that the Immigration

¹ Source: Discussion of reply to Soviet proposal on testing moratorium. Secret. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

law waiver which would allow Soviet scientists to come to the United States as participants in a joint research project also would not extend beyond the term of this Administration. A further legal consideration: Since there appears to be no chance for agreement on a treaty in time to allow ratification by the Senate at this session, the treaty, if submitted late in this session, will probably just be held over for consideration during the term of the next Administration or, perhaps, to the period next January when the new Congress will be in session, but the new President will not yet have been inaugurated. These are legal limitations to keep in mind. The political factor consists of the strong feeling of the U.K. that the Soviet counterproposal represents an important breakthrough in the negotiations; the U.K. wants favorable action on it—and soon. This is a political reality. *The Secretary* then discussed the counterproposal, in light of information presently available, which is not complete. It appears that the Soviets envision a moratorium of 4 to 5 years duration. It is not clear what is to happen after that time, if joint research work has not produced a detection system satisfactory for discovery of all tests. Only chemical explosives would be used in research work. There is nothing new as to inspection quotas; they are still to be politically determined, and to have no relation to the number of events discovered. The only change in the Soviet position seems to be the provision for joint research. Nevertheless, some consideration must be given to this tricky counterproposal. So much propaganda has been made with it already that even the U.S. public thinks it involved a big concession. The burden is on us to prove that it is a bad proposal and how it could be made better. So the possibilities as to future action on which we must decide are: 1) Rejection of a moratorium and a resumption of testing; 2) continuing negotiation; and 3) Establishing direct connection with the Ten Nation general disarmament talks. *The Secretary* referred to the Bell Laboratory report on unmanned seismic stations, due in three weeks, as an additional factor. Another factor, and a great worry, is that we are now in a de facto moratorium, but there is no benefit for the U.S. in such a moratorium since we can conduct no on-site inspections at all.

Mr. McCone strongly urged that the Soviet counterproposal be rejected. He advocated remaining firmly attached to the principle, enunciated at the meeting with the President on July 23, 1959, that we should not commit ourselves to end tests which cannot be controlled. This principle was reiterated at the December meeting in Augusta. The Bell Laboratory studios are important, but they will not make the detection problem appreciably easier. Also, joint research using chemical explosives does not have the same value as research using nuclear explosives. Mr. McCone emphasized the dangers of continuing the moratorium: If we remain exposed to a long period of nuclear test suspension, while the Soviets are not, we shall become a second

class nuclear power. At present, and if we accept the Soviet counter-proposal, the possibility exists that the Soviets will continue testing. Meanwhile, our own weapons development possibilities, which would be greatly increased by a modest testing program, are not being taken advantage of. Mr. McCone expressed great disappointment with the British attitude. He disagreed with the idea expressed by Ambassador Wadsworth that progress could be made in Geneva on organizational issues; there is only one issue at Geneva and that is: Controls. If we accept suspension without controls, the security of the United States is threatened.

Mr. Douglas said that Mr. McCone has well expressed the inclinations of the Department of Defense. A period of two to three years during which the Soviets may test, and we will not, involves a real risk. He suggested that a program of joint research be initiated, but without a commitment not to test.

Mr. Dulles answering a question by *Secretary Herter*, stated that there is a chance of obtaining some additional information about Soviet testing, by means other than scientific detection and subsequent inspection.

Dr. Kistiakowsky, answering a question by Secretary Herter, stated he is unable to estimate the likelihood of the Soviets being able to conduct so many clandestine tests during a period of moratorium of 4 to 5 years as to be dangerous to U.S. security.

Secretary Herter announced that he must leave to greet the Foreign Minister of Spain, but wished to reiterate that there are political questions of the first magnitude involved here. The international state of mind is one of opposition to nuclear tests. These advocating a special General Assembly session to consider the French tests are only five votes short. The votes needed to summon such a session will possibly be forthcoming after another French test.

Dr. Kistiakowsky praised the value of the Bell Laboratory test studies on unmanned seismic stations. Stationed at 200 to 300 mile intervals, these stations could undoubtedly detect and identify events of a strength far below the threshold. But the cost and complexity of the operation would be enormous. Thousands of stations would be required. This is a serious limiting factor. Perhaps it would be a useful compromise to install such unmanned stations near known salt domes. Perhaps also the treaty could provide that the stations would be movable at the discretion of the organization.

Mr. McCone reiterated opposition to a moratorium, pertaining to the fact that the President had announced from the beginning that a moratorium was dependent on significant progress on the disarmament issue. Perhaps it is time to transfer the nuclear test suspension negotiations to the Ten Nation general disarmament conference.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that such a move would result in the test suspension issue being fitted in with some 20 others on which the ten nations are just beginning deliberations. Alternatively, a special sub-committee would deal with test suspension. Both alternatives seem undesirable. In the meantime, the political and scientific problems of the moratorium would remain with us. It is quite likely that a General Assembly session will be devoted to the "evils" of testing, a factor to be considered when we consider resumption. On the other hand, if negotiations continue for two more years with a de facto moratorium, we would be better off with a treaty, containing a moratorium, which would allow us to inspect in the Soviet Union.

Mr. McCone expressed regret that it was not made sufficiently clear at the outset of these negotiations that we would not consider a treaty without complete controls, under any circumstances. What has happened should serve as a lesson to Ambassador Eaton. Even a General Assembly condemnation by a vote of 80 to 10 is preferable to abandonment of the key principle of controls. Answering a question by *Mr. Douglas*, he stated that AEC preparations for eventual resumption of underground testing will be completed by midsummer. We can then test within 45 to 60 days thereafter. Any delay in testing after that time involves a delay in improving the efficiency of our weapons.

Mr. Douglas said that a delay of eight to ten months would perhaps not make much difference.

Dr. Kistiakowsky, answering a question by *Mr. Merchant*, stated that a vigorous three year program, employing largely technical talent available in the United States, would result in major progress on the detection and identification program. But there is no guarantee that the whole problem will be solved by then.

Mr. McCone quoted *Dr. Romney* and *Mr. Northrup* as saying that 3 to 5 years would be required, barring a crash program. However, no one can be sure that the program will yield practical results. Though the "Cowboy" serious has not been fully evaluated, results already show that decoupling through underground testing in salt is practical and that a considerable reduction in signal can be obtained even by a system of decoupling which is partially, not completely, successful.

Mr. Dulles, answering a question of *Mr. Gordon Gray*, said there is no evidence to show that the Soviets are conducting tests.

Mr. Gray commented that the present situation will subject the Government to criticism by the press and the American people. In effect, there has been a moratorium for 17 months. If these negotiations are combined with the Ten Nation talks there is likely to be an additional de facto moratorium period. If the Government continues the moratorium while there is a feeling that testing is important, criticism

is sure to follow. Another angle to consider is that of the effect which a relaxation of the principle that adequate controls must safeguard a suspension of testing agreement will have on the general disarmament negotiations. Mr. Gray felt the group should prepare an agreed position, or alternate recommendations clearly stated, for submission to the President. He recommended that the group be consistent in its statements to the press.

Mr. Merchant, after answering a question of *Mr. Dulles* by stating that the Soviets appear to want all test suspension treaty issues, except the inspection quota, settled before the Summit, suggested that all press inquiries be referred to Secretary Herter. He expressed belief that the President's chief advisers should talk in definitive terms about our reply to the counterproposal only after the President has decided on it. Even though the proposal may be patently unacceptable and our answer may be clear, there should be no out-of-hand rejection.

Mr. McCone said that he would be unable to refuse to answer all questions of the press, since he has always been on record in opposing an agreement containing inadequate control provision, so his position on this proposal must be clear. As a basic matter of principle, we should reject it. He quoted Senator Andersen, in a speech of today, as favoring rejection. *Mr. Irwin* supported Mr. McCone.

Dr. Kistiakowsky commented that the Soviet proposal is unacceptable, for technical reasons. Assuming there will be only 20 stations in the Soviet Union, there is no hope of detecting all events, including decoupled explosion. For political considerations, however, a counterproposal should perhaps be evolved.

Mr. Dillon (*who entered the meeting at this point*) and *Mr. Merchant* said that the strong feelings of the U.K. on this proposal must be taken into consideration in the opinion of Secretary Herter. However, we could not let the U.K. determine our own course of action.

Mr. Dillon pointed out the advisability of arriving at a decision as soon as possible, so that a program may be submitted to the President. The U.K. is exerting pressure for favorable consideration of the Soviet proposal. We all believe that it is not a good proposal, but the decision we must make is as to desirability of a counterproposal. He suggested another meeting of the Principals for the next day, March 23.

548. Telegram 4663 From London¹

London, March 24, 1960, 4 p.m.

Sent Department 4663, repeated information Geneva 127.

Embtel 4581. Nuclear Test Negotiations.

While we presume Department has been receiving British views on Geneva nuclear test negotiations from both British delegation and UK Embassy Washington, we believe we would be remiss if we failed to emphasize apparent strength and breadth of British attitudes toward March 19 Soviet proposal.

Government and other informed British elements are undoubtedly aware of dangers of accepting disarmament limitations or obligations that do not involve adequate controls. At same time public and political pressures are such in Britain today that we judge it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for government to resume nuclear testing, even small underground explosions below threshold proposed by us at Geneva. It seems clear therefore not only that British Government is under heavy pressure to accept latest proposal for moratorium on tests below threshold, In order to gain over-all test agreement, but also that there will be very little understanding or support in this country for us if we refuse negotiate on this basis.

In last few days many indications of British attitudes on this matter have been given me and various members of Embassy staff. These have included comments from government ministers and officials, members of Parliament, etc.

Parliamentary attitudes appear quite uniform, extending across board through Conservatives, Liberals and Labour Parties. And press comments have been likewise uniform.

Whitney

¹ Source: U.K. views on Soviet proposal for test moratorium. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

549. Draft Paper with Eisenhower's Revisions¹

March 23, 1960

The United States should be prepared to accept the following three point program in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations:

(1) Conclusion of threshold treaty along lines proposed by the U.S. on February 11, with satisfactory settlement of the outstanding technical and political issues required for an effective control system, including the level or quota of inspections (to be applied both above and below the threshold), remaining aspects of the staffing and voting problems, composition of the Control Commission, arrangements for detonations for peaceful purposes, and the phased extension of the controls necessary to assure a world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

(2) Undertaking of a coordinated research program, to be commenced as soon as possible, for the purpose of progressively improving control methods for events below the threshold. Such a research program should explicitly make provision for the conduct of nuclear explosions (to be carried out under safeguards similar to those for detonations for peaceful purposes) necessary for improving and testing detection capabilities.

(3) Simultaneous unilateral declarations by the three powers at the time of signature of the treaty that they would refrain from conducting nuclear weapons tests explosions not prohibited by the treaty for an agreed period² dependent on (a) active pursuit of the agreed coordinated research program and (b) absence of any indication that the other countries are testing.

¹ Source: Outlines a U.S. position on nuclear test suspension. Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.

² The President would make it clear in the basic agreement that so far as he is concerned this period could not extend beyond January 20, 1961, and that subsequent determination would necessarily be by his successor. [Footnote is in the original.]

550. Telegram Deldi 39 From Geneva¹

Geneva, March 26, 1960, 1 p.m.

Deldi 39. Eyes Only Secretary. From Eaton. I should like to make the following points with respect to the forthcoming visit of Macmillan. The following are my impressions and not based upon any solid evidence. (1) The French delegation here quite apparently does not wish to reach any kind of agreement that can be blessed at the summit, the reasons being that the possible areas of agreement that they see are troop reductions, a test ban or, less likely, nuclear cut-off without substantial weapons destruction. They are opposed to all of these. They, therefore, are keeping things in the air to the extent that they can and avoiding any solid discussion. In my effort yesterday to pin the Russians down with a question on control in terms of manpower and conventional armaments, the French did everything they could to run away from it not because they did not agree on control but because they were fearful that conventional reductions might become an isolated measure that DeGaulle could not accept at the summit. (2) The British are rather on the other side of the fence and would appear to be eager to reach some agreement for blessing at the summit.

I asked Ormsby-Gore yesterday whether he knew if Macmillan planned to discuss with the President any particular point in the field of disarmament other than nuclear tests. He said he did not think there was any particular point but certainly discussion disarmament would very likely take place.

In our view, the British are playing a somewhat cagy game. They try hard not to antagonize the French but while with us in general at the same time they are not completely in our camp. This may be because of Ormsby-Gore's concern that by my taking a fairly firm position at this point on controls it will become increasingly difficult for any measure to reach a point where it is susceptible of having holy water sprinkled on it at the summit. I have impression from British here that they may be overly anxious for agreement on either some particular measure or on broad and fuzzy general principles to take to summit. (3) I believe we have far more chance of getting an eventual agreement which would be acceptable to us by not being too eager in the coming days than by appearing over-anxious with the Russians. I have taken a fairly firm line in all public gatherings but have on two occasions communicated to the Russians that any time they wish to talk about some specific measure I would like to talk to them.

¹ Source: Disarmament and the Macmillan visit. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2660.

The only result was a luncheon yesterday at which Zorin suggested that we accept the Khrushchev plan, failing that, we should agree on all the measures of disarmament, place them in stages, and in time sequence, adopting a goal which was their goal, not ours immediately. My only response to this was that if at any time he had any practical suggestions, he should let me know because I was only too glad to talk with him about them. I specifically asked them to give me any paper which they indicated they had in mind for submission to the summit. They ducked this.

(4) Most important I would hope that we would make abundantly clear to Macmillan that we are not prepared to have any agreement on any specific disarmament measure without first discussing the details of the inspection which would be permitted to verify the particular measure and pinning the Sovs down to agreement with respect to these inspection provisions.

(5) With respect to the summit, I believe it follows that the greatest care must be exercised against agreeing with the Russians in general terms that we will accept any measure which is subject to adequate verification because the Russians would seize on the substance of the agreement and walk away from the control.

From the impressions we now have, after two weeks here, I do not believe that any particular measures or set of general principles have reached a stage where it would be productive to seek agreement on them at the summit.

The foregoing does not repeat not in any way mean that between now and the summit discussions there may not develop here specific measures or general principles which might be introduced for endorsement and we will continue our efforts to see what can be developed. At this stage, however, we see nothing which we can presently suggest.

I do not think that forcing the pace here in the interest of securing something to agree at the summit would be useful for the longer range prospects of disarmament negotiations.

The foregoing comments on the summit, I submit in recognition that other factors of which I may not be aware may have an important bearing on strategy.

Villard

551. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 26, 1960, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Suspension

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Caccia
Lord Hood
The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Farley

The Secretary said that the United States had formulated its tentative views on the recent Soviet proposal at Geneva. He gave the U.K. Ambassador a paper summarizing these views, in anticipation of discussions with the Prime Minister the following week. He said that the substance of the paper had been transmitted to Ambassador Whitney to give to Selwyn Lloyd.

After looking through the paper (which was substantially the same as the position paper on "Nuclear Testing" for the Macmillan visit) the U.K. Ambassador said that he did not understand the relationship of the proposal for a moratorium "from one to two years" and the statement that the President could only commit himself until January 20, 1961, which would be less than one year. The Secretary explained the legal problem involved. Mr. Kohler remarked that the Soviets, to judge by a recent piece in *Tass*, were aware of this problem and were citing it as evidence of their willingness to meet us more than half way in their proposal.

The U.K. Ambassador asked what our conception was of a "coordinated research program". Mr. Farley said that we use the term "coordinated" rather than "joint" research to indicate that we wanted to go ahead actively with our national research without holding it up until agreement was reached. As a matter of fact, what emerged would be for the most part discussion of national research activities in this field, some sharing of tasks, and exchange and comparison of results. This would undoubtedly be most efficient. In addition it would probably be desirable to have some actual joint effort with scientists of the three countries working together on individual projects. The Secretary suggested that advantage should be taken of the presence of Sir William Penney to hold informal discussions with Dr. Kistiakowsky,

¹ Source: U.S. position on Soviet proposal for a test moratorium in advance of Macmillan visit. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

Mr. McCone and others on the United States side. This might be done Monday afternoon, March 28, if the schedule at Camp David did not demand the presence of the proper participants. Mr. Farley agreed to set up tentative arrangements for such a session.

The Secretary said that he thought there was not too much difference between the United States approach and the U.K. approach as reflected in the points which Lord Hood had transmitted to Mr. Farley a day or two earlier. The U.K. Ambassador agreed, but observed that the U.K. might feel that a more positive Anglo-American approach was desirable rather than the exploratory approach reflected in the U.S. paper. The Secretary observed that there were a number of important issues still to be resolved and we should not give away prematurely our readiness to agree to a moratorium and thus weaken our bargaining power on these other issues. The U.K. Ambassador said that if other questions arose when the U.K. group examined the U.S. paper, they might call Mr. Farley in the period before the meeting at the Embassy on Monday morning.

552. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 28, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Macmillan
Sir William Penney
Con O'Neill
Ambassador Caccia
Lord Hood
Mr. Wiggin

United States
Dept. of State
Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Farley

Dept. of Defense
Acting Secretary Douglas

Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman McCone

¹Source: Coordinating the U.S.–U.K. position in nuclear test talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

The *Prime Minister* expressed his appreciation of the tremendous and sincere effort which had gone into preparation of the United States paper which Mr. Herter had given the British Ambassador on March 26. There were manifold political, technical, and even spiritual matters which were involved in trying to find a common position which would respond to the expectations of the world. Having studied the U.S. paper he was aware that the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom were so close together that he could only express his estimate of the situation by addressing to himself the familiar wartime admonition: "is your journey really necessary?". He did think it was helpful to have a full understanding of the possibilities and the course of action which would be agreed. It might also make it easier for our highly competent negotiators to know that the people who are giving them instructions have gotten together and concerted their views.

The *Secretary* said that the United States side had examined the points transmitted to Mr. Farley by the British Ambassador and also felt for their part that there were no real differences.

The *Prime Minister* asked what the United States meant by referring to "coordinated research." *Sir William Penney* said that he could perhaps comment on this since he had already held some informal discussions on the previous day with U.S. technical people; there were to be further technical talks later in the day. The concept is that national research programs should be worked out and that the technical people from the three countries should keep in close touch while they are being carried out. It was not contemplated that a U.S.-U.K.-USSR directorate should be set up to develop and conduct a single program. He observed that this concept of exchange of views and information was a familiar one in international cooperation among scientists. He observed that one point which needed further discussion was the question of use of nuclear detonations in the research program. Such detonations would have a great advantage but raised political difficulties.

Mr. McCone said that the United States had looked into the latter question carefully and concluded that nuclear explosions were needed if anything meaningful was to be done. The *Prime Minister* asked whether this was because the waves from chemical and nuclear explosions are different. *Sir William* said that nuclear detonations were proposed in order to check that point. The *Secretary* commented that the United States wanted to be sure that definitive results were obtained in a research program. We do not want to get again in a position where we find that we have entered an agreement and then find that our technical facts are inadequate. *Mr. McCone* commented that *coordinated* rather than *joint* research was important if results were to be obtained in a one

to two year period. We could not hold up our own research while we were attempting to get agreement on a joint program.

The Prime Minister speculated that the Soviet Union will argue that the objective is to stop all tests rather than to find additional reasons for conducting nuclear explosions. *The Secretary* said that we would expect to conduct any nuclear detonations in accordance with procedures agreed on for nuclear detonations for application to peaceful purposes. It was important that our negotiators proceed to get agreement on the pertinent treaty article covering such procedures. *Sir William Penney* said that he thought from his discussions with Soviet representatives that the Soviets would be willing to agree to such procedures if they believe that weapons improvements will be barred. *Mr. McCone* said that there were several ways of accomplishing this. Examination of a nuclear device might be possible, at least by the Soviets, who presumably would not benefit as would potential Nth powers from study of the design of some of our weapons. However, it would be difficult to expose the design of some of our advanced reduced radiation devices to the Soviets, even though these are the devices which may be preferred for certain peaceful applications.

The Secretary said that for us the real justification of a moratorium on underground tests is the hope of progress in the research program. We must have simple and clear research objectives. The timing of commencement on the research program was a problem. We had to recognize that negotiations on the treaty might well be protracted for another six to twelve months on such issues as staffing and accession of other countries.

The Prime Minister said that, while there are many issues remaining, we should acknowledge that much of the past delay has been due to stalling on both sides. Given a common approach, we should be able to work through most of the remaining issues fairly quickly, although the inspection quota and perhaps one or two others will probably have to be resolved at the highest level. If the quota can be agreed at the Summit, he would anticipate signature of a treaty this summer. Ratification, of course, would depend on respective constitutional processes.

The Secretary said that he envisaged the possibility that we might need to have simultaneous unilateral declarations of a moratorium on testing before signature of the treaty. We now have no moratorium, as the President made clear last December 29, which puts us in an anomalous situation. If negotiation on the treaty is protracted, we might wish to seek agreement on the research program and agree to the research program and unilateral moratorium simultaneously with a clause

providing that the moratorium would end after a specified and brief period if the treaty is not signed.

Mr. McCone commented on the research work under way or planned by the United States. A station of the kind agreed to at Geneva is under construction in Oklahoma for completion in early fall. Also 20 smaller stations, without the full seismic array, are being built throughout the United States. By September or October we should be ready to make 5 kt detonations in granite and tuff, both nuclear and chemical, to test detection and decoupling. Tentative plans are under way for putting up five more stations in the United States and possibly Canada in 1960 and 1961. He commented that each experiment of course raises many new questions in addition to such answers as it gives to previous questions. Finally, about 15 unmanned stations are being built on a grid.

The Prime Minister said that apparently more thought needed to be given to the timing of the moratorium and research program. He had thought that we contemplated declaration of the moratorium and initiation of the research program simultaneously with signature of the treaty, as indicated in the U.S. paper. *Mr. O'Neill* said that the negotiating tactics might be quite different in the two approaches. He had thought that we wanted to hold out promise of the moratorium as an inducement to get favorable settlement of the remaining treaty issues. He saw that we could protect ourselves, and perhaps retain some bargaining power, by an escape clause in an agreement covering coordinated research and a moratorium, but doubted that this would be equally effective.

The Prime Minister said that there was a more fundamental negotiating problem. If this were a business negotiation we would simply continue negotiating out the remaining issues without saying much about the Soviet proposal and our position. Unfortunately our full position is in the press before we have finally agreed on it among ourselves and instructed our negotiators. He would like, if possible, to make a virtue out of this situation and thought perhaps this might be done by putting forward our position as an offer of a positive nature.

The Secretary said that he tended to favor an approach which focused on the remaining issues and threw back at the Soviets their statement that the remaining items are inconsequential. We should say that if these issues are indeed small, then here are solutions which are acceptable to us on which we can readily reach agreement. *Mr. Douglas* said that while he agreed with the approach to a coordinated

research program outlined earlier by Sir William Penney, he thought there was virtue in some cases to having Soviet scientists actually participating in some of the work so that they can see and evaluate for themselves the results achieved. This was generally agreed. In response to a question by Mr. Herter, *Sir William* said that the Soviets can undoubtedly contribute significantly to such a research program, though he was certain that they would need to develop plans and find money, seismometers and people just as he would. *Mr. McCone* said that the program he had outlined would cost the United States 18 to 20 million dollars a year which would have to be found. *Mr. Herter* said a further technical meeting was scheduled later in the day which could look further into these problems and report back to the principals the following day.

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any other major points which should be identified. *Mr. Douglas* said that he thought it important any agreed inspection quota apply both above and below the threshold. *Mr. O'Neill* said that he understood the Soviets were prepared to agree to this. *Mr. Farley* said that this was the position Tsarapkin had taken, but in the context of a moratorium which was a treaty obligation.

The Prime Minister and *the Secretary* returned to the question of what our public posture should be. *The Prime Minister* said that we would have to point out at the outset that, because of our ratification processes, the moratorium would have to be outside the treaty. As for timing, there were two possibilities—a moratorium declared simultaneous with signature of the treaty, or a moratorium declared immediately with a proviso that it would lapse if the treaty is not signed soon. *The Secretary* said that a related question was whether we put our position as a counter-proposal or as an acceptance of the Soviet proposal. After some further discussion he agreed with the Prime Minister that a third possibility would be to avoid either accepting or rejecting the Soviet proposal, but instead to proceed with a negotiation designed to marry the February 11 Western proposal with the Soviet March 19 position.

The meeting broke up at 11:30 a.m. with agreement that further discussion would have to be devoted to the tactical line and to the question of communique.

553. Paper¹

March 28, 1960

The Need for Nuclear Detonations in a Seismic Research Program

While it appears that educated guesses, based on the best relevant theoretical considerations, indicate that the difference between HE and nuclear explosions in terms of amplitude of seismic signal might be within the range of factors of 2–5, it is believed that a program of nuclear detonations is necessary, for the following reasons:

(1) At the present time there is no experimental data to connect the seismic signals from deep, contained HE and nuclear detonations.

(2) There is no generally accepted theory connecting seismic signals with the details of the source. Speculations as to the behavior of nuclear detonations, unsupported by actual evidence, should be tested. Data is needed on which to base conclusions, or better inferences, as to: spectrum of frequencies of shocks generated, effect of environment (gas & water content, etc.), and the state and behavior of the vaporized material.

(3) The effect of different media must be further known. To date deep underground nuclear detonations have only been conducted in Nevada tuff. Even with contained experiments with H.E. in this medium, extrapolation of effects to other media could be very misleading.

(4) The effect of different crustal environments between source and receiver can be important in determining the characteristics of signals received by a seismic station. Again, nuclear detonations are needed in other locations, as well as in other media, to obtain definite information on this.

(5) For proper evaluation of the capabilities of Geneva stations it is essential to have data at larger ranges. There are yield limitations on the use of HE, in that the volume of HE alone for 5 KT requires a spherical cavity of 60–75 feet diameter. Larger yields than 5 KT are highly desirable for the experimental program.

(6) There have been no nuclear “big hole” decoupled shots. The differences between HE and nuclear detonations should be further examined experimentally since there is expected to be a difference in the shock phenomenology occurring.

(7) It is important to keep in mind that if there is a now unknown characteristic of the seismic wave which would prove to be more useful

¹ Source: “The Need for Nuclear Detonations in a Seismic Research Program.” Confidential. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II.

for detection and identification than any now known, it can be discovered only by experiments with nuclear sources.

554. Talking Paper¹

undated

*TALKING PAPER ON THE SUBJECT OF A COORDINATED EFFORT
IN THE SEISMIC IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM*

I. General Principles

1. The program will involve a major research, development and test effort whose objectives would be:

- a. To secure maximum improvement in seismic detection and identification capabilities (for both the short and long term).
- b. To determine the capabilities and limitations of any system which may be adopted.

2. Although coordinated effort by the three parties is desirable, each party must conduct such program activities as it believes essential to the program. There should be early initial coordination among the parties, so that:

- a. Each may adjust its program to gain better over-all coverage, and to avoid undesirable duplication;
- b. Agreement can be reached on the observation of, and cooperation in, the activities of the others.

3. It is propose that:

- a. Each party will keep the others informed as to its planned research, development, and field test activities, including locations and times of tests and locations and types of seismic recording stations.
- b. Each party will facilitate to the extent reasonably practical, the installation on its own soil of instruments useful to the others' program.
- c. Each party will announce well in advance any additional, significant, man-made, seismic disturbance which may be useful to another's program.
- d. Each party will provide expeditiously to the others, any basic information, results of analysis, or findings which may be useful in furthering the program.

¹ Source: Coordinated effort in the seismic improvement program. Confidential. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II.

4. Test detonations including nuclear detonations (See Appendix "A") will be necessary to investigate seismic signals and system behavior, with firings both in coupled and decoupled emplacement, and in various geographic and geologic environments.

5. All parties will commit themselves, for any nuclear devices they may fire in connection with this program, to use only devices whose design is already proven and not to use the firings concerned to advance weapon design. To assist in assuring others of their fulfillment of this commitment, they will comply with the following provisions: allow the other parties to observe all features of device emplacement, instrumentation, and firings, except for the internal design of devices themselves; install only such minimum instrumentation as is necessary to assure safe firing and measuring of yield, and deposit immediately under general surveillance of the others the devices it will use for the purpose.

II. *United States Effort*

1. The United States is initiating an extensive program of research and development designed to further the possible methods of improvement described in the Berkner Panel Report and in the Report of Geneva Technical Working Group II for the improvement of the control system. This program includes the following:

a. Study of the seismicity of the earth by world-wide standardized seismic instruments, study of the generation and propagation of seismic waves of all types and frequencies from earthquakes and explosions in various media and geographical locations, investigate the frequency characteristics and directional spectrum of microseisms, investigate the transfer functions of typical crustal structures, conduct model studies of radiation around simulated faulting and explosive sources, investigate cross-correlation techniques for determining direction of first motion of P waves from earthquakes and explosions, investigate extensively crustal structure by refraction shooting, study inverse transforms for long period waves.

b. Study microseismic noise on the ocean bottom and in deep wells, develop improved long period detectors, develop digitalized recording techniques, study deep hole seismometers, design and test large arrays and other improved seismometers.

c. Design, construct and test a complete Geneva-type seismic station and include as appropriate improvements to such station. Develop detailed specifications for a world-wide system to control underground nuclear tests.

d. Conduct such nuclear and HE tests as are needed to obtain fundamental seismic data which are needed to develop more sophisticated techniques for detection and identification and to test performance of system components and the final Geneva system.

e. Investigate the feasibility and reliability of unmanned stations.

f. Determine the relationship between magnitude and equivalent yield of seismic events.

2. Initial U.S. field installations which can be ready by September 1, 1960, to further the research and development program described above will include one Geneva-type station, and twenty simpler stations at various locations in the U.S. (Each containing one three-component, one second period seismometer and one three-component, 25-second period seismometer and some containing 1–10 second seismometers and 2 to 2½ second seismometers).

3. As soon as the above are ready we would propose to fire at NTS three test explosions of equal yield (5 Kt), one nuclear in hard rock, one nuclear in tuff, and one HE in tuff. From these, very useful (though recognizably incomplete) information should result relative to: behavior of a single Geneva station; the contrast in behavior of HE and nuclear detonations in one rock; and behavior of equal nuclear detonations in two different rocks. These experiments will provide at an early date basic data essential to the planning and execution of the more complicated analytical studies described above. These studies hopefully could result in significant technological progress toward improvement of the system by providing knowledge of possible characteristic difference between signals from explosions and earthquakes.

4. The U.S. is considering the installation of five additional Geneva-type stations and some 10–15 of the simpler stations. These would come available progressively over the period 6–18 months from now. The U.S. would intend to operate continuously the Geneva stations and some of the simpler stations, to acquire information on background and on signals from natural events. This information is intended to improve our basic knowledge required for detecting and identifying seismic events, so as to make possible improved system capabilities.

5. The U.S. is also considering the installation of 15 unmanned seismic stations in a grid of 100–200 kilometers in a region of high earthquake activity to study the behavior of natural events and smaller HE shots.

6. In addition, when the network mentioned above has been installed, further high explosive and nuclear detonations will be required to confirm the more sophisticated techniques which should be available at that time and to obtain a test of the improved instrumentation and system response of the six Geneva stations, as well as to determine the effect of different locations and/or conditions of firing. An estimated 5 nuclear detonations, together with several large HE detonations, probably would be needed and timed to be fired at the end of the 18 month period referred to in paragraph 4 above. The earlier Plowshare experiment, GNOME, and any other Plowshare experiments should be beneficial in this regard.

III. Results Possibly To Be Achieved Through This Effort

It is certain that an 18–24 months program along the lines of that described, with the United Kingdom and Soviet programs, will give

a more definite indication of the capability of a Geneva-type system. It should provide us with much basic information on possible seismic detection and identification techniques and equipment not now known. This should enable the efforts at improvement to be directed in realistic and effective avenues. It should lead to useful developments which will improve the detection and identification capability of the Geneva or improved Geneva system. It, however, may show added difficulties or limitations not now recognized or properly evaluated. It is not now possible, therefore, to estimate whether the overall effect would be that of showing the system to be more reliable than now believed.

Appendix A

THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR DETONATIONS IN A SEISMIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

A limited number of nuclear detonations is considered an essential element of a vigorous seismic research program for the following reasons:

(1) There exists a substantial uncertainty as to the relative amplitude of seismic signals from nominally equivalent (e.g. 5 KT nuclear and 5000 ton HE) detonations.

(2) There exists a strong possibility that the frequency spectra of seismic signals from nuclear and HE explosions are different and there may be other differences as yet unknown.

(3) The decoupling of explosions by carrying them out in large cavities may be substantially different for HE and nuclear charges and lead to different signals.

A comparison of new HE shots with the already existing seismic data from the Rainier shot and other underground nuclear tests of the Hardtack II series would not meet the requirements of the research program because of the limited seismic instrumentation which was previously used.

An additional consideration is the very high cost of and substantial transportation and hazard problems that will be involved in carrying out HE shots involving thousands of tons which are considered essential to obtain strong signals in the second zone. For instance, a 5 KT shot would require placing underground 200,000 cases of TNT.

Thus, the use of HE explosions alone will inhibit the research program and will prevent the realization of full capabilities of the advanced seismic detection systems which could be developed if detailed information on seismic signals from nuclear explosions were obtained.

555. Supplementary Memorandum of Meeting¹

Washington, March 29, 1960, 3:30 p.m.

Supplementary Memorandum—Meeting of the President with Prime Minister Macmillan on March 29, 1960 at Camp David, 3:30 PM.

Secretary Herter brought in a draft of instructions to the US and UK delegations at the test suspension negotiations in Geneva. The President said he had looked at these and thought they were satisfactory.

Prime Minister Macmillan commented that he saw two reasons against trying to incorporate the provisions for a moratorium on testing below the threshold into the treaty. First, we have always said that we would not sign an agreement unless there were fully effective inspection. The second point is that the moratorium then would not go into effect until the treaty is ratified. This would mean that we would have to wait at least until next February, which is apparently the earliest time that a treaty could be expected to be ratified.

Mr. Herter raised the point as to whether there should be a moratorium on tests above the threshold while we await ratification. He said that it has always been generally assumed that there would be such a moratorium, and general agreement with this position was indicated.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Instructions for test ban negotiations. Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II. Drafted on April 20.

556. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

March 30, 1960, 2:45 p.m.

OTHER PRESENT

Dr. Kistiakowsky
General Persons
General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that Chairman McCone, Secretary Herter and Acting Secretary Douglas had asked him to assume the task of preparing a plan for the coordinated conduct of research in the seismic field in connection with nuclear testing. He said that, if the President approved, he would be agreeable to doing so. In response to a question by the President, he said his role would be one of preparing a plan, not conducting operations. On this basis the President approved his doing so.

Dr. Kistiakowsky next said that the concept of giving assurance against clandestine testing through technical monitoring is showing some signs of getting out of hand. The techniques become so elaborate and complex as to be impractical. He thought we must be careful of working ourselves into a position where we are proposing things that cannot practically be carried out. He suggested that an alternative approach might be to concentrate on the fact that the Soviet operate behind an iron curtain; perhaps our efforts should go into breaking that down, and obtaining information through that route.

Dr. Kistiakowsky mentioned that he and Dr. Killian had talked further with Secretary Herter on the subject of an organization within the Executive Branch for arms limitation activities. Mr. Herter agreed that a staff level organization within the State Department is not good enough. The President commented that one virtue of his First Secretary concept is that such an organization could be put directly under him.

Dr. Kistiakowsky next brought up for discussion the question of setting out a definite program for technical research relating to arms limitations. He asked the President what kind of time objectives the President thought should be established. He also asked if this work could be assigned high priority by the President. The President thought that study would show that the research effort would fall naturally into distinct steps. The essential point is to give it a high priority, and he approved the assignment of high priority to the project. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that Dr. York believes he can get together two-thirds of the money needed (in the order of \$20 million), but would need help on

¹Source: Research in seismic detection, radioactive strontium in wheat. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series. Drafted April 4.

getting the last \$10 million. The President thought that the planning phase of this activity should not cost very much, and that this might be supported out of his emergency fund. He asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to check with the Bureau of the Budget on the whole matter, however. He stated he would be willing to send up a supplemental to cover what is needed in this field, inasmuch as the need arises on the basis of new, more hopeful developments related to limitation of armaments.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that there has been discussion within his group and the AEC concerning the continuation of small hydrodynamic nuclear experiments. These do not of course constitute weapons tests. There was some thought that this should be discussed with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and that a standby statement should be prepared to explain what these are, in order to avoid any confusion of these with the question of weapons testing. The President expressed great worry about the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, because of its failures to safeguard the security of secret information given to it. He also had great doubts about making a statement to explain this matter. Dr. Kistiakowsky stressed that the statement was intended to be prepared for standby only, and that it would be worked out with all the interested agencies. The President agreed that this experimentation could go ahead. He offered no objection to the secret preparation of a standby statement. Dr. Kistiakowsky then suggested that there might be some reason for the President to discuss with Khrushchev what constitutes a weapons test. The President was very dubious about this.

The next subject raised by Dr. Kistiakowsky was a report on carcinogens in food, including specific reference to the cranberry problem last fall. He said it is an excellent report, which he plans to show to Secretary Flemming and Secretary Benson. The President agreed with his doing so and stated the Administration could then decide whether to release the report. Dr. Kistiakowsky then referred to a related problem of great seriousness which has developed. Analysis of wheat and wheat products shows, in some nine States, a high concentration of radioactive strontium, particularly in the bran. There seems to be no immediate hazard to health in this, but the concentrations are within the range that warrants concern. The information is not public as yet, but could be presented in a highly sensational fashion. The President asked about the source of this radioactive strontium, and commented that it really means there should be no more large fission explosions in the atmosphere. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that there are dangers in the situation of large-scale dislocation of the economy, extending over a number of major farming States. The President asked General Persons to give personal attention to shaping up action on this matter.

Dr. Kistiakowsky next reported briefly to the President as to what is done with radioactive wastes, in response to a question some time

ago by the President. Most is held in huge underground concrete tanks, but is kept for a few years until the radioactivity has greatly declined. The residues are then disposed of in rivers, deep wells, or at sea, in the latter case quite frequently in sealed containers. The President commented about the terrible consequences that have arisen out of the discovery of nuclear fission, endangering the whole future of civilization. He recalled a statement he had made in 1953—which had been greatly challenged, although he has continued to believe it—that if the world could be completely free of these weapons, the U.S. would be better off. It is because of these weapons that, for the first time in our history, we have reason to fear for the safety of our country.

The President reverted to the question of radioactivity in wheat, and asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to arrange to obtain the results of samples taken in Argentina and Australia.

Dr. Kistiakowsky concluded the meeting with a report on the DISCOVERER project. The design is good and the engineering is good. However, the management (Lockheed) is extremely poor and the Air Force is taking steps to try to tighten it and strengthen it. A great number of stupid mistakes have been made (for example, using foam rubber in one apparatus which, in a vacuum, swelled up to fill the entire instrument and preventing its functioning).

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

557. Letter From Herter to Gray¹

Washington, April 11, 1960

Dear Gordon:

I have your memorandum of April 7, 1960.

I am not sure that you are aware that last October the President wrote to me suggesting that permanent status be given to a unit of Government dealing with disarmament and that this be in the State Department, and that I responded in November concurring in the President's

¹ Source: Organization for disarmament. No classification marking, but responds to a Personal and Confidential memorandum from Gray (included). 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament-General.

judgment. Subsequently I have received from Dr. Kistiakowsky and others recommendations that the disarmament organization be established in the White House. I have given very extended and careful consideration to the merits of these proposals, but have concluded again that the permanent disarmament organization which the President had in mind should be established within the Department of State. In any event, I would consider the assignment of the disarmament responsibility to a subcommittee of the National Security Council as being inappropriate.

Last week Dr. Kistiakowsky and Dr. Killian were informed of this decision and they have promised to do their best to support it. With the assured cooperation of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the cooperation I expect to receive from the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, I am quite confident that the State Department organization arrangement will prove successful. Furthermore, I am convinced that it is important that this project be advanced without any further delay.

I expect to submit a progress report to the President on this matter shortly.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

Attachment

Memorandum From Gray to Herter and Gates

April 7, 1960

I have very informally and tentatively explored with the President a notion I have had with respect to continuing studies regarding reduction and control of armaments. It was largely prompted by the discussion following George Kistiakowsky's presentation at the Council meeting on March 24. You will recall that Secretary Rostow, Admiral Burke and Dr. Kistiakowsky all indicated the need for continuing studies, but the President did not make any specific decision regarding such studies.

Also, I am prompted by recalling that we have perhaps had a rather spotty and uneven record of studying the reduction and control of armaments problem and in preparing for international conferences which have been concerned with this matter. We have had big

projects like the [illegible in the original] project and smaller ones like the Coolidge project, and others generally on an ad hoc basis.

My thought is to establish a procedure which would, for example, provide for (a) continuing and integrated evaluations of the technical feasibility and implications for the national security of proposals for the reduction and control of armaments; and (b) a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter such evaluations.

In order to provide continuity within an established organizational structure which is directly responsible to the President, I think this procedure could best be accomplished by establishing a small subcommittee of the National Security Council. The subcommittee could consist of the Secretary of State (Chairman) and the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission participating when matters of concern to him were before the Committee. Advisors to the Committee might be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Provision would be made for a small staff, headed by a full time staff director, to be approved by the President. The staff could be composed, as the Committee might determine, both of representatives detailed from the interested departments and agencies and of individuals from outside of government, either on a part-time or a full-time basis.

This procedure should not disturb, but would instead [illegible in the original] and supplement, organizational arrangements which you would have in the State Department and in the Defense Department.

The President has asked me to explore this matter personally with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and I shall shortly be in touch with both of you. In the meantime, this is simply to acquaint you with the notion in general terms so that you may give the matter some thought before we meet to discuss it, and I suggest that this not be given any general distribution in your department. The President would of course not proceed except upon your recommendation.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

558. Statement Agreed to at a Meeting of Five Western Foreign Ministers¹

April 13, 1960

Tab C

The Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States reviewed and approved a report from their representatives in Geneva on the course of the disarmament negotiations now in progress within the 10-Nation Disarmament Conference in relation to the forthcoming meeting of the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government in Paris. They recalled the unanimous resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of November 20, 1959, which expressed the hope that measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

The Foreign Ministers consider that the approach reflected in the Western proposals represents the surest and most effective way of moving toward the ultimate goal of a secure, free and peaceful world in which there shall be disarmament under effective international control.

The Foreign Ministers expressed the hope that agreement would be reached as soon as possible in these negotiations on measures of disarmament to be attained by balanced, phased and safeguarded agreements which must be observed and verified by an appropriate international organization within the framework of the United Nations. At the same time they agreed that their representatives should give thorough consideration to any practical disarmament proposal which would preserve the security of all the nations concerned and which would pave the way for further progressive measures leading toward the ultimate objective. In this connection the Foreign Ministers are requesting their representatives in Geneva to continue their efforts to achieve the early identification and consideration of areas of possible agreement.

The Foreign Ministers noted that the negotiations will be pursued within the 10-Nation Disarmament Conference until April 29, at which time the formal sessions will be recessed until June 7. During this period of recess the representative of the Five Western Powers will review the course of the negotiations and advise the Foreign Ministers in preparation for the May meeting of the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government.

¹ Source: Tab C to print Document 252 re disarmament negotiations. Confidential. 1 p. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

559. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/50

Washington, April 14, 1960, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Problem of Nuclear Test Suspension

PARTICIPANTS

Howard C. Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada
Norman A. Robertson, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs
Arnold Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to U.S.
Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State
Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Delmar R. Carlson, BNA

Mr. Robertson inquired as to whether the United States was looking beyond an agreement suspending nuclear tests by the three powers and considering the question of accession to the agreement by other powers. The Secretary replied that much work, including considerable detailed preparations, had been done regarding this problem.

The Secretary explained that even if agreement were obtained among the three powers and by any others, a considerable number of problems of implementation would have to be solved. He pointed out that an enormous, expensive, and complicated system would be required for a worldwide inspection network. Such a system, he said, would require, according to the scientists, 180 stations with about 30 persons located at each station, together with very sophisticated equipment. He observed, however, that if the Soviets were to accept a comprehensive system of that sort, 20 of the stations were to be in the Soviet Union and therefore Soviet acceptance would be a great step forward.

Regarding accession, the Secretary emphasized that we would strongly desire other powers to adhere to any agreement and to share in the responsibility for the maintenance of the system. He mentioned that the agreement would provide for signatories to the agreement to leave the system after two years if they concluded that it was not working. Mr. Green inquired as to whether the matter of accession had been discussed with the Soviets. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and

¹ Source: Accession to nuclear test ban agreement, Chinese nuclear capability, commercial nuclear work in Europe. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

added that we had already drafted some of the articles necessary to cover accession in an agreement.

In answer to a question by Mr. Robertson regarding China, the Secretary confirmed that there had been rumors that China might explode a nuclear device, but that we had no confirmation of this. The Secretary also mentioned the reported possibility of commercial firms in West Germany and the Netherlands being able to produce nuclear materials. Such a development would be particularly worrying because it indicated a proliferation of the most deadly knowledge.

560. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 21, 1960, 1–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
Mr. Dwinell
Mr. Farley
Mr. Foster
General Gruenther
Mr. McCloy

1. *Disarmament Organization*

The Secretary said that a good deal of thought had been given in the Executive Branch, both in the White House and the State Department, to the question of organization for disarmament policy development and negotiations. He had discussed the question with the President and also with Mr. Gates, Mr. McCone, Dr. Kistiakowsky, and other interested officials. The arguments for centering disarmament efforts in the White House and in the Department of State had been carefully examined and compared. The President has now authorized an expanded and up-graded disarmament effort in the Department of State reporting

¹ Source: Coordinating center for U.S. disarmament efforts. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

directly to the Secretary. At the Secretary's request *Governor Dwinell* reviewed State Department plans for an expanded effort and the status of administrative actions to put these plans in motion.

There was extended discussion of the proper location of the coordinating center for U.S. disarmament efforts. *Mr. Foster* said that he applauded the decision to undertake such coordination and an expanded planning and studies activity. He had himself long supported such a move. Though he felt it should be in the White House, he recognized the arguments for locating the effort in the Department of State and was quite willing to see whether that solution could be made to work.

General Gruenther and *Mr. McCloy* also welcomed the move and emphasized the importance of obtaining an experienced individual of recognized stature to head the program. They also emphasized the importance of centralizing all State Department disarmament activities under such an individual. There was some discussion of possible candidates for such a position.

2. Geneva negotiations

The Secretary and *Mr. Farley* reviewed briefly the status of the Geneva ten-power disarmament negotiations and the nuclear test suspension negotiations and prospects for discussion of disarmament and nuclear testing at the Summit.

561. Memorandum of Discussion Between Eisenhower and McCone¹

Washington, April 22, 1960, 11:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT AT 11:15 AM, APRIL 22, 1960

I met with the President for fifteen minutes this morning and reviewed the content of my discussions with President de Gaulle as outlined in my cable to Secretary Herter; reviewed the details of my visits to the French production plants, laboratories, etc. and my discussions

¹ Source: McCone's visit to France; nuclear testing. Confidential; Eyes Only. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.

with the Commissariat and members of the foreign office as outlined in my memoranda to the files, dated April 18, 1960.

The President expressed himself as feeling our present laws are forcing other countries to develop a weapons capability; that we might stop this if we would develop a somewhat different approach to the plan of handing weapons in conjunction with other countries, but under appropriate controls. I agreed.

The President expressed himself as becoming increasingly alarmed over atmospheric testing, stating he felt our scientists and others had been overly optimistic in minimizing the dangers from fallout. I said I concurred and that, as I had told him many times in the past, I would not in my present position recommend a resumption of atmospheric tests.

I pointed out underground testing was another thing as there was no danger from fallout. He concurred.

I told the President that our monitoring stations had picked up the radioactivity resulting from the French tests.

John A. McCone

562. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 24, 1960, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Ten-Power Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

France

Mr. Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Pellen

United States

Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
Mr. Farley
Mr. McBride

Mr. Couve de Murville said that there was apparently disagreement among the Western delegations in Geneva regarding the nature of the counter proposal to be tabled before the April 29 recess. The United

¹ Source: Tactics for ten-power disarmament talks. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/4-2460.

States, generally supported by the U.K., Canada and Italy, wishes to table a paper combining a statement on principles and a call for specific initial disarmament measures. The French prefer to table simply a statement of principle. On tactical grounds, the French delegate believes the specific measures will be effectively attacked by the Soviets as not new, and as very limited, and as emphasizing control more than arms reduction. On grounds of substance, the French find great difficulty in the focus on the cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This measure is for the French, in effect, a renunciation of nuclear weapons, since they are just about to begin production. The proposed specific-measures papers, either in the U.S. version or in the longer version worked out in Geneva, added to French difficulties by presenting the cut-off as a first-stage rather than second-stage measure. The French also have difficulty with troop ceilings or reductions in the near future, though this problem is less serious. In view of the French nuclear situation, they must insist on measures of substantial reconversion of nuclear weapons in order to equalize the position of the present nuclear powers with theirs.

The Secretary recalled the great concern in the United States, especially in military circles, with any early time scale for elimination of the nuclear threat in view of technical inspection limitations and the Western reliance on the nuclear deterrent. *Couve* said that, of course, the French insisted on balanced nuclear and conventional reductions and maintenance of an adequate military posture.

Mr. Farley said that the U.S. was apprehensive of a separate Western principles statement which would shift the debate to Soviet ground and pose the issue as how one proceeds toward general and complete disarmament as matter of principle, rather than as what practical measures can be taken to make a beginning and to test Soviet professions of willingness to accept effective controls. *Couve* said that he saw the problem as one of public relations. The West must counter the recent Zorin statement on disarmament principles with something of the same scope and nature but with greater realism. *Mr. Farley* said that, in addition to the difficulty the U.S. had as a matter of pre-Summit tactics with engaging in a debate on principles, we believe that the principal impression given publicly by the proposed Western principles statement would be one of "realism". Public relations-wise, the Western document would appear cold and negative and delaying with its references to phasing, balance, and prior effective controls. The U.S. specific measures paper, while fully consistent with the Western five-power plan, was an effort to take out and high-light concrete steps which would emphasize once again the specific actions the West were willing to take. *Mr. Dillon* observed that the difference appeared to be that *Couve* considered the Western

measures “mouselike”, whereas the U.S. considered them to be concrete and to some extent publicly appealing.

Couve suggested that the U.S. paper might be tabled by the U.S. simply as a U.S. approach. *Mr. Farley* suggested that the principles statement, of which the text was now agreed among the five Western delegations, might be introduced in the same way, by one of the other Western delegations, as a counter to the Zorin statement.

The Secretary said that the steps might be done in sequence, with first the principles paper introduced and then, subsequently, the U.S. specific measures paper. This might best be done toward the end of the week, in order to leave the Soviets as little time as possible to tear the two papers into bits. *Couve* agreed generally but observed that the timing would have to be left to the delegations in order to take into account their problems of filling up the week. It was agreed that the principles paper might be introduced as a common five-power Western paper and that the U.S. paper would simply be supported by such other Western delegations as were able to, with any others remaining quiet.

The Secretary said that we had just learned Hammarskjöld wished, not only to attend a ten-power meeting next week, but also to exercise his “unquestioned right” to speak to the ten-nation meeting. *Couve* said that he understood this possibility had been discussed among the Geneva delegations, who did not welcome such an appearance. It was agreed however that, under the circumstances, it would be necessary to hear what the Secretary General had to say.

The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

563. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, May 5, 1960

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>AEC</i>	<i>DOD</i>
Under Secretary Dillon	Mr. McCone, Chairman	Secretary Gates
Mr. Sullivan—S/AE	Brig. Gen. Starbird	Mr. Knight
Mr. Spiers—S/AE	Dr. English	Mr. Lanier
Mr. Dubs—SOV		Gen. Betts—ARPA
Mr. Baker—S/AE	<i>White House</i>	Mr. Beyer—ARPA
Mr. Gotzlinger—S/AE	Dr. Kistiakowsky	Col. Brundage—USMC
Mr. Mau—S/S	Dr. Gray	Maj. Poulson—USAF
	Mr. Keeny	Mr. Northrup—AFTAC
<i>CIA</i>		Dr. Leonard
Mr. Dulles		Dr. Cmdr. Chandler
Dr. Scoville		

General Betts introduced members of his staff who would brief the group on present capabilities of detection of high altitude explosions, possibilities of circumventing such detection and possibilities of improvement in the capabilities of detection.

Dr. Leonard explained that detection in outer space can be effected by use of the open-photo multiplier-type x-ray, and neutron and gamma-ray techniques. Neutron and gamma-ray equipment is now ready for use, but the x-ray equipment, which in theory has much greater capabilities, will require extensive research and development work. Furthermore, x-ray techniques can be confounded by a violator's shielding of the weapon which he explodes. The vehicle requirements of a potential violator of course depends on the effectiveness of the detection system. If there is none, he is free to test a few hundred miles above the earth, using quite simple rockets. If there is a deterrent, he is forced to use multi-stage rockets. As the deterrent improves in effectiveness, the violator is forced farther into space, perhaps to tens of millions of miles.

¹ Source: ARPA briefing on detection of high-altitude explosions; inspection of underground events above the threshold. Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.

ARPA's approach to this problem, Dr. Leonard continued, was based on study of the capabilities and limitations of:

1. the Argus Detection System;
2. A Far Earth Satellite System; and
3. An Advanced Satellite System, containing advanced x-ray equipment.

The Argus System, based on the use of two satellites, could be operational within nine to twelve months at a cost of 100 million dollars. However, the U.S. now has the capability of launching a nuclear device for testing which would not be detected by the Argus. The Argus is effective for detection anywhere up to 15,000 miles, but it has lesser capacity for detecting devices exploded over the polar regions.

The Far Earth System would be composed of six satellites stationed at a distance of 60,000 miles from the earth. It requires no further research and development and can be made operational within 18 months, at a cost of about 200 million dollars. It would be capable of coverage extending to a few million miles, but its effectiveness would vary with the size of the nuclear device being tested. When the U.S. completes the Atlas-Centaur project, the resulting missile could serve as a test vehicle for testing without detection by the Far Earth System.

The Advanced System would be composed of a number of solar and earth satellites containing advanced x-ray, neutron and gamma-ray equipment. Four years of research and development would be necessary plus one additional year before the operational stage is reached. The cost of the System, including the first three or four years of operational capacity, would be 1.1 billion dollars. The capability of the Advanced System cannot be clearly defined; it may be confounded to some degree by shielding of the nuclear device and by unexpected radiation in space. It is a good guess that a determined violator could avoid even this System by going tens of millions of miles into space.

If the foregoing program were carried out, therefore, a violator would not be restricted at all in the first year; in the next six months, he would not be able to test within the earth's magnetic fields; thereafter, he would have to go out to a distance of a million miles or more until establishment of the advanced system, when he would need vehicles with a range of tens of millions of miles as well as shielding against x-ray detection. The total cost of all systems would be in excess of 1.3 billion dollars.

Major Poulson presented recommendations of the Department of Defense as follows: That the treaty agreement be limited to a controlled ban on tests within the sensible atmosphere (30–50 KM); that control posts be equipped in accordance with the recommendations of the 1958 experts; that a research and development program be instituted to develop increased high altitude detection capabilities and to define a high

altitude "threshold"; and that the Treaty can be progressively expanded, based on research and development program results. Defense recommends immediate initiation of a research and development program to expedite achievement of expanded coverage and definition of a high altitude "threshold", and consideration as to unilateral establishment of a satellite-based detection system at the earliest time, so as to deter a potential violator and provide at least limited intelligence as to any clandestine tests, in case a moratorium on high altitude testing is agreed to.

In answer to *Mr. Dillon's* question *Dr. Leonard* stated that a violator could be quite certain of testing with impunity if his vehicle reaches a height beyond the effective range of the detection system in use at the particular time. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* replied that the violator takes an automatic chance since he hardly can be absolutely certain that the vehicle will perform as planned. In answer to *Mr. Dulles*, question, *Dr. Kistiakowsky* stated that a violator could gain intelligence as to yield alone from a test ten million in space. *Mr. McCone* expressed belief that diagnostic instruments in the future could pick up more information.

A discussion as to cost of possible clandestine nuclear tests in space ensued. There was agreement that a test, sufficient to escape detection by the Argus System, would cost about 20 million dollars.

Dr. Leonard commented that ground based equipment at 180 stations, as planned by the 1958 Experts, would be capable of picking up a half megaton device detonated at a distance of 600,000 miles. *Mr. McCone* defined what he believed to be the question before the group: Whether to withdraw from an attempt to negotiate an agreement covering tests above the sensible atmosphere by citing the position expressed in the President's letter to Khrushchev in April 1959 that we will agree to suspend testing only in those environments where effective controls can be agreed.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the question not be decided before some evaluation of the alternative high altitude plan, which relies on inspection of orbital and sustained space flight missile launchings and radar detection. *Mr. McCone* commented that this alternative plan, which would appear comparatively simple to the public, should certainly be explored. However, we must keep in mind its effect on our missile testing program and on the ten nation general disarmament negotiations in Geneva. *Mr. Dillon* pointed out that we had presented this proposal already in the 10-Nation meeting.

It was agreed that a principals meeting be held, Tuesday, May 10, to further discuss our position on high altitude testing in view of the Defense presentation.

Proceeding to a discussion of the proposed agreement on a moratorium on underground testing below the threshold, *Mr. Dillon* commented that our position had been decided at Camp David as being one to two years. According to *Mr. Northrup*, AFTAC believes that the Berkner

Panel objectives for improvement in the capabilities of the detection system can be attained in three years. But there will be some significant progress within six to twelve months. *Mr. Dillon* compared the Soviet proposal of a moratorium lasting 4–5 years with the 1–2 year moratorium proposed by the US and UK. He pointed out that British at Camp David had indicated readiness to accept a three year term and said that we must be prepared for British support of three years as a practical compromise. *Mr. Gates* and *Mr. McCone* said they saw no reason for anything more than a unilateral declaration as to voluntary suspension of tests until such time as research programs on improved detection methods would show significant results. No definite time should be set. *Mr. McCone* thought some conclusive results would be obtained from three scheduled firings this year. *Mr. Gates* expressed belief that the program would take four to five years. He proposed that each of the participating nations make a unilateral declaration as to the length of time of the moratorium it will abide by. *Mr. McCone* distributed three Atomic Energy Commission papers concerning the proposed research program, “U.S. Position Relative to our Course of Action at the End of the Coordinated Research and Development Program” (TAB A), “Primary U.S. Position on Safeguards Concerning Use of Nuclear Explosions in the Seismic Improvement Program” (TAB B), and “Fallback U.S. Position” (TAB C). He urged that the United States clearly state its objectives in regard to the research program. There had been an unfortunate failure in the past in this regard. At the 1958 Experts meeting, we agreed that complete suspension of tests was feasible based upon 90% identification capability at the 5KT yield equivalent level. Secretary Dulles and Secretary Quarles, however, believed that the Soviets would not accept a sufficient number of on-site inspections, and that a threshold, under which tests under the threshold would be permitted, would result. This belief was not quite borne out, however. Therefore we should very clearly state that the purpose of the coordinated research program will be improvement of detection capabilities and a determination whether or not a threshold will continue to be necessary. Khrushchev and Tsarapkin seem to presuppose that a system having complete capability can be devised. We must make sure that the stated objectives of the research program take into account the possibility of a conclusion that a threshold will continue to be necessary. *Mr. Sullivan* asked for an estimate as to time necessary to make significant progress in detection of underground events. *Mr. Northrup* replied, 3 to 5 years. But some very important information can be developed this year and some more next year, at least to the extent of guidelines as to what will be eventually possible.

Mr. Knight raised the question of inspections below the threshold. *Mr. McCone* distributed an Atomic Energy Commission paper, “U.S. Position on the Quota” (TAB D). He stressed that the number below the threshold must be based on a political determination. The number of 50 has been suggested, because the total annual number of natural

events in the Soviet Union below 4.75 magnitude is estimate at 500. However, AEC would not hold to this number. *Dr. Scoville* raised the possibility of one interchangeable quota covering all events above and below the threshold. *Mr. Gates* expressed opposition to this approach since it would serve to negate our established principle against formal agreement in environments where there are no adequate safeguards. Until three years of research and development is completed, we will not know whether we can adequately detect events below the threshold. Therefore, there should be no connection between the agreement to ban tests above 4.75 and the unilateral voluntary moratorium on tests below. *Mr. Northrup* stressed the difficulty of exact determination of magnitude, and stated his belief that a degree of interchangeability would result from this. He expressed hope that the seismic system would not be assigned the task of determining exact magnitude. *Mr. McCone* advised that the quotas above and below the threshold be kept strictly separate in negotiation; in practice cases might arise where an event slightly below the threshold is inspected out of the quota for events above. *Mr. Dillon* commented that we should make it plain that the quota below the threshold is not tied to a technical determination. Otherwise, when a technical determination can finally be made, parties might argue against an adjustment. *Mr. Gates* suggested that we either require no inspections at all below the threshold or settle for a small token number that would be only part of the research program. *Mr. McCone* cited the Rand study to the effect that an increase of control posts in the Soviet Union from 21 to 30 and a relocation to more favorable sites could materially increase detection capabilities. He suggested that any US-UK compromise in regard to the quota for inspections above the threshold be accompanied by an agreement to effect the changes suggested by the study. He went on to stress the need for consideration of a temporary detection system which will quickly afford some capability after signing of a treaty. Such a system should permit immediate use of our inspection quota. *Mr. Dillon* asked for comments on the Peaceful Uses paper. (TAB B). *Mr. Gates* and *Mr. McCone* stated that they do not agree with any plan involving disclosure of devices. *Mr. McCone* expressed concern about the legal problem involved and about the problem of disclosure to Nth powers.

Mr. Gates returning to the subject of development of detection capabilities, commented that this program could afford opportunity for weapons development. Two underground tests and one high altitude test could result in an improvement of 6 to 1 in the effectiveness of the Minuteman. There would also be a significant reduction in the need for nuclear materials. *Mr. McCone* stressed the dramatic improvements in nuclear weaponry which both the Soviets and ourselves are capable of making by engaging in a relatively small number of tests. He promised to bring a chart to the meeting of May 10 to illustrate this point. There are estimates to the effect that the Soviets could ensure a

25 to 1 improvement in efficiency of their 50 megaton nuclear weapons by engaging in just two high altitude tests and one underground test. Smaller weapons are also capable of dramatic improvement in yield and flexibility with just a few underground tests.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

*U.S. POSITION RELATIVE TO OUR COURSE OF ACTION AT
THE END OF THE COORDINATED RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM*

1. The United States should insist that, as a result of a coordinated research and development program, it will determine: whether the Geneva system, improved as appears feasible, can provide a reliable monitoring arrangement for all underground testing; and if not the modifications that are practical to permit greater effectiveness, and, hence, a lowering of the threshold. In reaching its conclusions it will consider both normal firings and decoupled firings. Thereafter the United States would agree to revise the treaty to preclude all testing which can be adequately monitored by the control system incorporating such modifications as have been revealed necessary and are agreed. The United States would feel free to resume the conduct of tests which the monitoring system cannot effectively control.

2. Naturally, should either of the other two nuclear powers resume nuclear weapons testing during the period of the unilateral moratorium, the United States would feel it necessary to take similar action.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

*PRIMARY U.S. POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS CONCERNING USE
OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE SEISMIC
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM*

It is necessary to avoid a situation where the Soviets could use the seismic improvement program as a means of carrying out continuous weapon development, or a situation where our own intentions could be misunderstood. After weighing all courses, we believe the best way to meet this problem is for the U.S. and U.K. to propose at the earliest possible time that the three powers agree that any devices used by them for this program will be deposited as black boxes within an agreed very short

period of time, and that these, and only these, devices will be used for this program. Specifically we believe that the U.S.-U.K. proposal should call for agreement by the three powers on the following restrictions:

a. The parties to announce they will use only proven designs for the program;

b. The black boxes will be deposited by each party, within the shortest possible time (say by August 15) in storage within its own territory but under such surveillance by the others (or by an international group) as is required to prevent modification or substitution;

c. Observation of all aspects of the firing and its instrumentation, except the internals of the devices, will be permitted to the other parties;

d. No diagnostic instrumentation will be permitted at the zero point.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

U.S. FALLBACK POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS CONCERNING USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE SEISMIC IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

If the Soviets will not declare their agreement to conduct any nuclear portion of their program under the procedures outlined in the U.S. primary position (black box deposits, observation of firings, etc.), the U.S. and U.K. should announce that we intend to proceed with our programs and under the conditions stated. Simultaneously, the U.S.-U.K. should declare that, if the USSR later, either announces nuclear firings or if detonations are detected, we must assume that these are firings for weapon development, and we shall consider ourselves free to undertake such firings as we believe as we believe are necessary to avoid possible loss in relative nuclear position.

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

U.S. POSITION ON THE QUOTA

1. With regard to events of over 4.75 the United States should hold to the annual level of inspections already proposed, namely, 20% of all events located or 30% of all events unidentified by U.S. criteria, either of which is estimated to be about 20 inspections a year in the USSR. The treaty should make clear that both the initial and the periodically revised annual number of inspections are a *technical* determination and will bear an agreed relationship to scientific facts and the capability of the system.

2. The allowable number of inspections for events under the 4.75 quota must be a number politically taken. We believe that the United States should insist on approximately 50 if the Geneva network is that to be installed. Based on recent estimates this would approximate 10% of the annual number of natural events under 4.75 which occur annually in the USSR.

3. As a matter of principle if there is to be a lesser number of inspections accepted by the United States it should be only upon reaching an agreement that comparable improvement of the system initially called for is agreed by the Soviets. This gain could come through:

a. Increasing somewhat the number of stations above the 21 now contemplated by the US–UK for the USSR, and

b. Permitting the US–UK to make locations in the most favorable areas.

4. So that the system can be most effective even in the short term, we should insist also on the following:

a. The right of the US–UK to install as quickly as possible temporary stations in the USSR with the USSR having comparable rights for territory we control.

b. The US–UK to have the right to inspect any event detected by the temporary system until such time as the permanent system has such capability as to allow the permanent criteria to apply.

564. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, May 10, 1960

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list (Tab A)

Secretary Herter began with a discussion of the Atomic Energy Commission paper, as amended, on safeguards concerning use of nuclear explosions in the seismic improvement program, which had been

¹ Source: Detection of nuclear tests and missile launches, inspections. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

distributed at the Meeting of Principals of May 5 (Tab B). The "black box" principal is a controversial one, but there are arguments in favor of it, the Secretary said. It will assure that the research program is not used by the original parties as a means of carrying out weapons development. It will obviate the necessity of declassifying devices which might have served to increase the nuclear capability of other States. *Mr. McCone* pointed out that the devices which we might be free to declassify would be uneconomic ones requiring tremendous amounts of material. Furthermore, a coordinated program involving detonation of devices previously deposited in "black boxes" would get around legal problems. Under present law, for example, any nuclear device transported into the United States automatically becomes the property of the United States and receives a "restricted classification". These provisions of law would also be likely to preclude a possible exchange with the Soviets of devices contained in "black boxes", as requested by *Mr. Herter*. Transportation and handling within the United States of foreign devices of unknown design would also involve an unconscionable safety risk.

Mr. Herter requested suggestions on making the "black box" approach more acceptable to the Soviets. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* reported that Sir William Penney had told him about some ancient U.K. devices which perhaps might be declassified for use in the research program. He asked about any legal problems which import of such devices into the United States could cause. *Mr. McCone* replied that, under the law, the devices will become the property of the United States. He offered to initiate immediate consultation or to use of the U.S. devices between General Starbird, now in London, and the British. *Mr. Herter* expressed approval of this idea. It was agreed that the AEC position on safeguards be adopted.

Turning to the problem of high altitude detection, *Mr. Herter* briefly reviewed the report on capabilities which had been presented by ARPA at the May 5th Meeting of Principals. *Mr. Gates* commented that the report showed a violator would find it increasingly difficult to test, as successive components of the 1.3 billion dollar system are installed, but that he might, with sufficient expenditure, have the capability for doing so, even with all components in operation. He would be able to obtain valuable information on yield even from a distance of many millions of miles in space. *Mr. Herter* asked whether the Midas satellite would contain equipment useful for detection. *Mr. Gates* replied that that Midas could not be expected to do the work of ten or more satellites as envisioned in the ARPA report. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* referred to the Report of the High Altitude Experts of July 1959 which found that it is technically feasible by means of a system of optical detectors installed at ground control posts to detect a one-kiloton explosion up to 100,000 KM during the day, and 300,000 KM at night. Use of fluorescence, electromagnetic and radiation equipment installed in ground posts, supplemented by the Argus satellite,

would afford capability up to 100,000 KM. We have the knowledge to set up a system effective to 100,000 KM now. Above that, a more collaborate system would, of course, be needed. But the Department of Defense position that we cannot now provide a reliable system of control above the sensible atmosphere is to be questioned. *Mr. Dillon* commented that, in view of the ability of a ground-based system to detect events in the 50,000 to 100,000 mile range, we might be able to suggest a high altitude detection system effective to that range, combined with a plan for pre-launch inspection of orbital and sustained space flight missiles. Radar would be employed for detecting any clandestine launching. If a party has launched a missile above a prescribed altitude without having subjected it to inspection, it would be assumed that a weapons test has been conducted. *Mr. Herter* expressed concern that the Soviets would state that introduction of an alternate concept is a repudiation of the high altitude experts report. *Mr. Dillon* replied that the tremendous costs, which still would fail to produce a completely reliable system, constitute a good argument for seeking an alternative. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* reaffirmed that the full network of 180 control posts equipped in accordance the experts' agreement would give coverage up to 100,000 KM.

Dr. Northrup commented that, in connection with project Vela, he had received a time and cost estimate from United Electrodynamics Corporation for installation of the 22 control posts in the area of the Soviet Union. If there are 100 arrays at each station, the time estimate is five years; the estimated cost, one to five billion dollars. *The group* expressed astonishment at these estimates. *Mr. McCone* quoted *Dr. Bethe* as estimating the cost of 600 unmanned augmenting stations as only sixty million dollars. *Dr. Northrup* replied that no realistic estimate had yet been made as to cost of unmanned stations. He recommended a study of costs and of problems involved in installing element arrays at remote stations. The "housekeeping" costs after establishment of a control post are also a large factor. *Mr. Gates* suggested that the U.S. Delegation stress all those uncertainties and mention the need for a year of joint and unilateral research on the problems of time and cost of installations and on imperfections. He stressed the need for expert advice on costs. *Mr. Herter* agreed that research is badly needed.

Dr. Northrup replied that an engineering study of the proposed 22 stations in the USSR has laid the groundwork for a more careful estimate than the one he had cited. It would be possible to extrapolate the results to the 180 stations planned all over the world. *Mr. McCone* suggested that a paper be prepared for the President. *Gen. Roderhauser* stated that decision to have 30 arrays at each station rather than 100 would cause a revision in the cost estimates. An estimate as to savings and as to changes in capability resulting from such a decision could be given to the President. He stressed the expense of connecting up arrays. *Dr. Northrup* promised a more realistic estimate than "one to

five billion dollars" within two days. *Mr. Gates* commented that a more exact estimate as to time is just as necessary. *Dr. Northrup* described "five years" as a "thumb sketch" estimate. The problems of constructing, for example, air fields in the Arctic should not be underestimated. A better estimate will be ready soon. *Mr. McCone* raised the possibility of the organization's requiring a private communications system. *Dr. Northrup* commented that the cost of such a system has not been specifically estimated, but it was taken into consideration when the total estimate was made.

Returning to the specific subject of high altitude, *Mr. Gates* suggested we could talk about a goal: no further tests which might cause fall-out. That would be well within 100,000 KM. *General Potts* estimated the necessary distance at 15,000 KM. He pointed out a problem in connection with a high altitude threshold; the uncertainty in determination of distance of a missile firing. It would, for instance, be difficult to prove that a ban on tests up to 25,000 KM had or had not been violated by a missile which travelled to 24,000 or 26,000 KM. *Mr. McCone* recommended that, in view of so many uncertainties, main reliance must be placed on a system of pre-launch inspection of missiles. Even though there are problems in connection with Soviet inspection of our missiles on our territory, he could see no better way of dealing with the high altitude problem. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* and *Mr. McCone* assured *Mr. Herter* that it would be possible to inspect adequately a missile to determine whether it contains fissionable materials. *Mr. Irwin* pointed out the other problem: to detect a clandestine missile launching. *Mr. Sullivan* stated that technical discussion would probably have to follow a United States proposal of an alternate high altitude detection system. *Mr. Dillon* restated the two principal problems: (1) how to conduct a pre-launch inspection of missiles; and (2) how to ensure, by means of a Midas satellite or radar, or other means, that any clandestine launching is discovered. *Mr. Irwin* expressed the belief that the Midas satellite would be able to detect a missile launching anywhere in the world. Defense is now spending a considerable amount to attempt to assure the success of the Midas. *Mr. McCone* promised an immediate AEC study of the problem of pre-launch inspection. *Mr. Sullivan* urged that the alternate high altitude proposal be tabled as soon as possible, if it is to be offered. Since a departure from the experts report is involved, it is up to the United States to make the move. *The group* agreed that, pending completion of necessary studies, the United States position remains simply as stated in the threshold proposal of February 11, i.e., that all tests up to the greatest heights to which effective controls can now be agreed, should be banned.

Turning to the subject of quotas, *Mr. Herter* reviewed the paper presented by AEC at the Meeting of Principals of May 5. (Tab C) *Mr. McCone* proposed that we continue to insist on 20 or 21 annual inspections of

events above 4.75 magnitude, based on a technical determination. As for events below the threshold, there should be 50 inspections based on a political determination. The figure 50 just happens to be ten percent of estimated events. In view of the number of years which will elapse before a complete system is installed—perhaps 5½ years—there is a real problem involved in applying the quota during the interim period. Perhaps some seismic stations can quickly be set up; perhaps the AFTAC complex of stations can give notice of suspicious events. *Mr. Dillon* also stressed the importance of making it plain that the quota above the threshold and that below the threshold are based on entirely different considerations. *Mr. Herter* suggested no inspections take place below the threshold. If there are such, it might prejudice the cut-off on the moratorium after two years, since everyone will have become accustomed to the prescribed inspection arrangement as constituting adequate controls over events below the threshold. *Mr. McCone* expressed preference for having some inspections. At the end of two years of research, he said it will be possible to exercise better judgment as to whether it may be possible to control a comprehensive treaty or whether the threshold can be reduced to, say 4.25 or whether, in view of decoupling possibilities, the present threshold is the minimum which can effectively be controlled. *Mr. Irwin* asked whether seismologists ever expect to be able to identify a nuclear event positively. *Dr. Northrup* answered in the negative; the best that can be expected is a substantial reduction in unidentified events. At this time, it is also not possible to distinguish a nuclear explosion from a chemical explosion. *Mr. Irwin* advocated taking a firm position on what still remains to be done to improve the detection and identification system as far as feasible. We should agree to a moratorium of two years. At the end of that, a threshold should be set at a magnitude which is then considered subject to effective control. *Mr. McCone* agreed. He recalled that at the 1958 beginning of the negotiations we had agreed to a comprehensive test ban based on an expected report which only envisioned 90 percent identification capability at the 5 KT level. He had agreed to this only upon being persuaded that the Soviets would prefer a threshold to a comprehensive ban, when the great number of on-site inspections necessary to control the comprehensive ban would be revealed. But matters had turned out differently. *Mr. Herter* pointed out that the threshold now proposed is at the 20 KT level. It might be said that our attitude has stiffened, rather than wondered. *Mr. McCone* urged that we notify the U.K. and our delegation that the moratorium and concurrent research program are aimed at making a final choice as to a threshold. He stated his impression that the Soviets and the U.K. have a different concept, neither envisioning that there will be any further tests under any circumstances. He wanted it understood that, if there are no improvements in detection capabilities, the threshold will be 4.75. *Mr. Herter* expressed belief that everyone agrees to this. If research does

not lead to improvements within two years, the Government would certainly not submit to the Senate a treaty providing for a comprehensive ban. *Mr. McCone* asked whether Selwyn Lloyd understands our approach. *Mr. Irwin* stated the belief that Selwyn Lloyd understands, but does not agree. *Mr. Dillon* commented that the U.K. perhaps hopes to persuade us to its viewpoint. *Mr. Irwin* urged that, on remaining issues of substance, no more concessions be offered to the Soviets just for the sake of a successful conclusion to the negotiations. *Mr. Herter* remarked that our discussions with the U.K. have never departed from the principles expressed by this group.

Dr. Latter then briefed the group on the Rand study of possibilities for increasing the effectiveness of control posts in identifying seismic events. About 100 earthquakes above 4.75 magnitude occur annually in the Soviet Union, *Dr. Latter* said. All of them can be detected by the net of 21 control posts as now arranged to be established on the land territory of the Soviet Union. Through a study of the nature of the first motion and unofficially based upon identification of four clearly recorded first motions, the Geneva experts believed it possible to identify 48 earthquakes, leaving 60 which could be suspected of being nuclear events.

In the course of the Rand study, it was first of all discovered that the criteria of the Geneva experts could not be fully justified. Fuzzy signals, emanating from a distance of 2500 to 3500 KM, might result in identification of a nuclear explosion as an earthquake. It was then discovered that relocation of control posts, so as to supply some concentration in that 5 percent of the land area of the Soviet Union in which 80 to 90 percent of earthquakes occur, would not only remove the [illegible in the original] mentioned above but would substantially increase the effectiveness of the system in identifying earthquakes. If the number of control posts set by the experts—21—were to be redistributed so that it would not be likely to be necessary to consider data emanating from a distance of more than 1100 KM, all but 12 to 15 percent of earthquakes could be positively identified as such. It will be necessary to identify only two motions instead of four. Of course, such a redistribution might result in losses of detection capability for methods of detection other than the seismic. The Rand study also encompassed the probable effects of adding stations to the Geneva set. An addition of four stations, placed near seismic areas, would result in identification of all but 20 percent of detected earthquakes; an addition of nine stations would result in identification of all but 10 percent.

The Rand Study also encompassed earthquakes exceeding magnitude 4.4 (5 kilotons Rainier coupling). There are 220 of these annually in the Soviet Union, of which 150 would remain unidentified after application of present criteria. Relocation of 21 control posts would result in identification of all but 45 earthquakes. Addition of four control posts would result in identification of all but 75; addition of 9 stations, all

but 35. The principal earthquake areas in the Soviet Union are the Pumir Mountains, Kamchatska, Sakhalin and the Urals. *Dr. Latter* concluded that the principle of unrestricted location and relocation of control posts is a very important one.

In answer to *Mr. Herter's* question, *Dr. Latter* replied that it would be possible to determine the size of an event. He also explained that the study was based on the Nevada-type nuclear detonation in tuff. In his best judgment, an explosion in salt produces a signal reduced by a factor of two or three. *Mr. Herter* said, nevertheless, this study points to possibilities for tremendous advances in identification. *Mr. McCone* remarked that it points to possibilities for bargaining a reduction in onsite inspections against an increase and/or free relocation of control posts. *Dr. Northrup* commented that the proposed Rand system would also result in location of an event within a smaller area than the 50 to 200 square miles on which the Geneva experts based their recommendations.

Tab A

List of Participants

Participants of Meeting of Principals on Nuclear Test Negotiations on May 10, 1960

Department of State:

Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
S/AE—Mr. Farley, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Spiers, Mr. Baker, Mr. Gotzlinger
S/S—Mr. Lau
SOV—Mr. Dubs

White House:

Dr. Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gray, Mr. Sochler

AEC:

Mr. McCone, Dr. English

CIA:

Mr. Dulles, Dr. Scoville

DOD:

Secretary Gates
Mr. Irwin, Gen. Dabnoy, Gen. Potts, Gen. Roderhauser, Dr. Northrup, Mr. Ranier,
Col. Brundage, Dr. Latter, Dr. Karzac, Lcdr. Chandler

Tab B**Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission***Primary U.S. Position on Safeguards or Concerning Use of Nuclear Explosions in the Seismic Improvement Program*

It is necessary to avoid a situation where the Soviets could use the seismic improvement program as a means of carrying out continuous weapon development or a situation where our own intentions could be misunderstood. After weighing all courses, we believe the best way to meet this problem is for the U.S. and the U.K. to propose at the earliest possible time that the three powers agree that any devices used by them for this program will be deposited as "black boxes" within an agreed very short period of time, and that these and only these devices will be used for this program. Specifically, we believe that the U.S.-U.K. proposal should call for agreement by the three powers on the following restrictions:

- a. The parties to announce they will use only proven designs for the program;
- b. The "black boxes" will be deposited by each party, within the shortest possible time (say by August 15) in storage within its own territory but under such surveillance by the others (or by an international group) as is required to prevent modification or substitution;
- c. Observation of all aspects of the firing and its instrumentation, except the internals of the devices, will be permitted to the other parties; and
- d. No diagnostic instrumentation will be permitted at the zero point, except specified yield measurements.

Tab C**Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Agency***U.S. Position on the Quota*

1. With regard to events of over 4.75, the U.S. should hold to the annual level of inspections already proposed, namely 20 percent of all events located or 30 percent of all events unidentified by U.S. criteria, either of which is estimated to be about 20 inspections a year in the USSR. The Treaty should make clear that both the initial and the periodically revised annual number of interventions are a *technical* determination and will bear an agreed relationship to scientific facts and the capability of the system.

2. The allowable number of inspections for events under the 4.75 quota must be a number politically taken. We believe that the U.S.

should insist on approximately 50 if the Geneva network is that to be installed. Based on recent estimates, this would approximate 10 percent of the annual number of natural events under 4.75 which occur annually in the USSR.

3. As a matter of principle, if there is to be a lesser number of inspections accepted by the U.S., it should be only upon reaching an agreement that comparable improvement of the system initially called for is agreed by the Soviets. This gain could come through:

a. Increasing somewhat the number of stations above the 21 to 30 now contemplated by the U.S.–U.K. for the USSR; and

b. Permitting the U.S.–U.K. to make locations in the most favorable areas.

4. So that the system can be most effective, even in the short term, we should insist also on the following:

a. The right of the U.S.–U.K. to install, as quickly as possible, temporary stations in the USSR with the USSR having comparable rights for territory we control; and

b. The U.S.–U.K. to have the right to inspect, within the quota, any event detected by the temporary system until such time as the permanent system has such capability as to allow the permanent criteria to apply.

565. Memorandum for the Record by Kistiakowsky¹

June 6, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

As I shall be accompanying the President on his Far Eastern trip, I have prepared the following comments on several technical aspects of the Nuclear Weapons Test Cessation problem as guidance to Mr. Keeny of my office in the event that he attends a Principals meeting as an observer during my absence.

¹Source: Comments on technical aspects of nuclear weapons tests cessation. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

I. The Underground Detection Problem.

The Soviet delegates in Geneva have refused to agree with our plans to include decoupled explosions as well as small (below about 1 KT) tamped nuclear explosions in the seismic research program, claiming that these do not contribute to the improvement of the system and/or are a subterfuge aimed at the resumption of development of small tactical weapons.

While I strongly feel that we should continue with a seismic improvement program, if necessary on a unilateral basis, I have misgivings about proceeding on a unilateral basis with the present Vela program, particularly with safeguards based on the "black box" approach. My reasons for this misgiving are that the nuclear tests in the Vela program discussed in paragraphs (a) to (c) below are technically not all indispensable and could be modified to meet some of the Soviet criticisms without damaging seriously our program. Therefore, if we proceed on this program with "black box" safeguards, we may invite world-wide criticism that we are using a subterfuge in order to resume weapons tests. This possibility should certainly be taken into account before deciding to proceed with the present Vela program of nuclear explosions.

In considering this problem, it should be noted that the Ad Hoc Panel which reviewed the Vela program, presented by us at Geneva, was not instructed to reduce the number of nuclear explosions to the technically indispensable minimum and therefore accepted AEC-DOD plans for twelve nuclear explosions as contributing technically to the program. Several component issues are involved here, which I will consider separately below.

(a) Tamped explosions. The program to study the effect of environment and yield on tamped nuclear explosions includes shots of 1 KT and $\frac{1}{4}$ KT yield. I discussed the matter with three members of the above mentioned Ad Hoc Panel; they feel that these shots could be done chemically or even eliminated without seriously impairing the program, but emphasize that some other members of the panel might well take a different view. It is an issue on which no technical unanimity is likely to be achieved.

A special problem is presented by the earliest scheduled shot, "Lollipop," (5 KT) to be fired in September. It has come to my attention that the Department of Defense is constructing extensive underground installations in close proximity to the locus of this explosion for "weapons-effects tests," (i.e. to determine the effects on different types of construction for hardened missile sites). Whether this use of the seismic improvement program would be accepted by world opinion, I do not care to estimate, but am sure that the existence or intent of the installations could not be kept secret, especially if UN or USSR observers are present there.

(b) Decoupled explosions. In addition to one large (10 to 20 KT) partially decoupled explosion, the program includes 0.1 KT, 0.5 KT and 2.0 KT decoupled or partially decoupled explosions as well as a [illegible in the original] KT tamped calibration explosion. The principal reasons for the small yields chosen are that smaller underground holes can be used, reducing construction time and cost. However, the explosions are so small that they might yield only incomplete technical information relating to possible methods of detecting and identifying decoupled explosions. It should be emphasized that the Geneva system, even after substantial improvements and some expansion, cannot be expected to detect such small decoupled explosions. Therefore, unfriendly minds could denounce them as a program for developing techniques for evasion of monitoring. The panel members with whom I discussed the issue feel that, for instance, a single, fully decoupled 5 KT shot would be more instructive as far as possible improvements are concerned than the present program, but they emphasize that this will entail a significant delay and that such a modified program will probably be objected to by some members of the Panel. It is probable that the Panel would be unanimous in insisting from the technical point of view that, as a minimum, one or two decoupled shots of perhaps 5 KT be included in the program, as otherwise no information on means of detection of decoupled explosions will be forthcoming because chemical explosives cannot be used for *this* purpose.

(c) Safeguards for nuclear explosions present a serious problem because of the flat rejection of the "black box" plan by the Soviets. If our program is reoriented to include only explosions of a size of a few KT and larger, it should be possible, technically and I believe legally, to resort, if a compromise is sought, to one of the following schemes: (i) to use UK weapons which were developed prior to the US–UK bilateral agreement. These could be inspected by US and USSR on UK soil, then sealed into "black boxes" and imported into USA. (ii) to use devices based on the old US "gun type" design, which could be inspected by the USSR and UK after declassification. As this design requires a large amount of U-235 and is extremely inefficient, its declassification would be of only very limited value to any nation attempting to join "the club." The cost to us of these devices will be small compared to the total costs of the Vela program, although larger than in the case of implosion weapons. Whether the political problems involved in either of these proposals can be resolved, I do not know.

(d) The estimate of the cost of the monitoring system in the USSR was mentioned at the Joint Committee hearing and at the Principals meeting as \$1–5 billion. I have not been able to discover any foundation for this figure. The relevant report of United Electrodynamics to

AFTAC gives only the figure of \$75 to \$128 million for the installation of arrays of seismometers at 22 stations in the USSR. It does not include other costs, such as logistic support system, other equipment, housing and communications to the World Control Center at Vienna. I understand that United Electroynamics has recently unofficially estimated the total cost for USSR at \$750 million (which included allowance for nuclear testing of system). This figure is much in doubt and is much higher than the corresponding figure given in the estimate prepared by AFTAC.

II. The High Altitude Detection Problem.

As you may recall, the experts in Geneva agreed on the feasibility of monitoring high altitude weapons tests through a fantastically complex system, including ground-based instruments, low-altitude satellites, high-altitude satellites and solar satellites. The DOD briefing given to the Principals presented an especially pessimistic (and not wholly correct) assessment of some features of this plan. I understand that certain of the pessimistic conclusions on the time of availability of X-ray detection are now being modified as a result of a review by the OSD Ad Hoc Committee on High Altitude Detection. More significantly, however it now appears that the cost of a satellite high altitude detection system may be greatly reduced as a result of work by Lockheed Corporation. This idea makes use of the fact that fission fragments from explosions relatively close to the earth would be mechanically trapped in the upper atmosphere and would radiate gamma rays for an appreciable time. This would permit the substitution of four low-altitude (500 km) satellites for a larger number of high-altitude satellites. Satellites of this type with somewhat simplified X-ray equipment for deep space detection could probably be available in two or three years. When more sophisticated X-ray equipment becomes available, this system would have essentially the same capabilities as the high-altitude satellite system described by the DOD. The cost for this type system would be in the \$100 million class rather than in the \$1 billion class. A definitive analysis of this plan should be available by mid-June, but it looks most promising. I might add that low-altitude satellites were a part of the Geneva plan and the new scheme merely makes the rest of the plan unnecessary, unless one wants to go to the so-called "solar satellites" to monitor nuclear explosions behind the sun and to force a violator to more complicated shielding devices. My guess is that one could have a moratorium on such tests in deep space for quite a few years without fear of evasion, because of the great costs and difficulties of carrying out such weapons tests.

566. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 9, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list. (Page 13)

Secretary Herter suggested that the discussion be based on the memorandum, subject: “Course of Action in Nuclear Test Negotiations”, dated June 7, 1960 (TAB A). Particular attention might be paid to the problem of safeguarding nuclear explosions used in the research program to ensure against their use for weapons development, and to the problem of high altitude detection. He expressed regret at the fact that the Soviets have seen fit to disavow the statements of their scientists at the recent meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Groups by denying plans to take part in any coordinated research program for the purpose of verifying or revising the recommendations of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts. Since any declared moratorium is conditioned on agreement as to a coordinated research program, the moratorium concept is endangered.

Mr. Farley summarized Soviet objections to the United States-suggested co-ordinated research program as follows: Too large a number of nuclear tests, especially small yield tests; study of decoupling which is unnecessary and undesirable; lack of sufficient safeguards, such as internal inspection, for ensuring that devices are not being exploded for the purpose of weapons development.

Mr. Herter remarked that these objections are much like Soviet objections to our “Plowshare” program of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. He called on *Mr. McCone* to present results of his study as to legal means by which satisfactory safeguards for ensuring against weapons development might be offered.

Mr. McCone responded that the devising of a satisfactory plan presented considerable difficulties. While it is necessary to operate a sophisticated array of instruments in order to secure really useful weapons information, any explosion will give at least a “go-no go”

¹ Source: Safeguarding seismic research explosions, high altitude detection. Secret; Restricted Data. 13 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, RD-Test Ban Question.

result and might to that extent supply some information of value for weapons development. Therefore, he continued, the possibility of opening the devices for internal inspection has been considered. To do so, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, the AEC must declassify the needed devices. Such declassification might make the device available to countries other than the three nuclear powers, and would thus defeat one of the major purposes of a treaty; i.e., the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons information. The use of U.K. and Soviet devices has also been considered. But the AEC would find it most difficult, under this alternative, to fulfill its statutory responsibility for safety of atomic devices. *Mr. Herter* suggested that UK devices be examined internally in the UK and, then, in transport to the U.S. and thereafter, be handled as are our devices. *Mr. McCone* remarked that this would involve quite a cumbersome disassembling and reassembling procedure. Besides, it is doubtful whether the U.K. is in possession of devices which could be so used with a range of yields necessary for the research program.

Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that we declassify some old gun-type devices of our own; such devices as would not be likely to assist another country in achieving nuclear capability. *Mr. McCone* wondered whether such a device would supply the range of yields necessary for the research program. *Dr. English* stated that there might be old gun-type devices which could be specially altered for the purpose of giving the required yield, but that such alteration would be a difficult task. They could not be fabricated to yield less than one kiloton. *Mr. McCone* said that the Kistiakowsky suggestion could be considered. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* expressed his belief that use of old gun-type devices, though perhaps not as ideal for the research program as use of sophisticated small devices, might be adequate and would be easier to defend from the political standpoint, since there could hardly be suspicion of use for weapons development purposes. *Mr. Herter* asked whether the number and size of shots planned for the VELA program was a fixed determination from which there should be no departure. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* replied that the Panofsky Panel had been under no instructions to determine a minimum number and had, therefore, selected 12 as a desirable number for an adequate program. He quoted *Dr. Panofsky* as saying that the panel would not be unanimous as to a minimum number and minimum range of yield. *Mr. McCone* defined the objective of declassification: To make available old gun-type devices, developed so as to be of use for a sufficient number of shots (perhaps a few less than planned for VELA) and not likely to be of assistance to any powers seeking to develop a nuclear capability. He expressed doubt that any nation without considerable nuclear material resources would be able to make

use of the comparatively elaborate and extravagant device using large quantities of U-235 which could be developed. He agreed that the very small nuclear explosions were not essential, although omitting them would require some reorientation of the program. *Mr. Herter* stressed the importance of obtaining scientific advice within the shortest possible time as to the possibilities of effective use in the research program of declassifiable devices, and on the minimum number of nuclear tests necessary.

Mr. Northrup announced a meeting to take place next week of the Panofsky Panel. It is expected that the Latter brothers and other seismologists will also attend. They are to consider the best distribution of yields for nuclear devices to be used in the research program. This group can consider the question raised by the Principals. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* defined the question as: The number and yield of devices which need to be detonated in order to make worthwhile the research program on improvement of detection and identification methods. Part of the issue would be the essentiality of detonation of very small devices, and whether these could perhaps be replaced. He also suggested that everyone connected with the planning for Project VELA be included in the group. *Mr. Northrup* agreed and proposed also the addition of *Dr. Harold Brown*. He expressed confidence that an answer could be supplied within a week. *Mr. Herter* asked *Mr. McCone* whether he would be prepared to accept the guidelines and conclusions of the group of scientists. *Mr. McCone* indicated that he would accept, pointing out that he had accepted the recommendations as to Project VELA.

Mr. Northrup reported an inclination toward tests with a yield range from one kiloton to 50 kilotons, rather than yield ranges beginning at a fraction of a kiloton, as suggested by the United States at the meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group. However, he expressed belief that the need for experimental shots to determine the effectiveness of decoupling will be reinforced by the panel of scientists. *Mr. McCone* and *Mr. Irwin* reaffirmed the importance of including decoupling in the research program. The study of decoupling is still in the theoretical stage. *Mr. McCone* said that the negotiations would be at an impasse if the Soviets do not accept the need for this.

Mr. McCone promised to inform the panel of scientists as to the type of devices which can be made available for modification and declassification.

Mr. Farley remarked that the problem of dissemination of information to nth countries could be resolved by getting Congressional relief so that certain devices could be released for the program without being declassified and disseminated. He said that we would be

very vulnerable vis-a-vis the Congress if we throw the blame for our inability to use open devices on the limitations imposed by domestic law, without having first consulted with Congress. *Mr. McCone* stated that the suggestion was worth considering, and that he would discuss the matter with the Joint Committee. As to the use of open devices in peaceful uses projects, it might be possible for Project Gnome and for the Athabasca oil project, but not for the harbor and canal projects, since these require devices based on very advanced technology.

Mr. McCone suggested that we dismiss the idea of using U.K. or Soviet devices and, instead, attempt to satisfy Soviet objections by declassification or legal action. *Mr. Herter* expressed belief that, when a program of seismic improvement is being carried out earnestly and in good faith, the scientific group in charge might well decide that a number of detonations, additional to the minimum agreed number, might serve a useful purpose. Therefore, the program should be as flexible as possible, and it should be agreed on as soon as possible.

Mr. Farley referred to two other issues on which we hope to obtain agreement soon: the parties article and the quota provisions. The former is designed to ensure, as far as possible, the accession of Red China. The U.K. has promised comment on our proposed language for both articles. *Mr. Herter* recalled that, based on the report of the 1958 Conference of Experts, we have put forward a proposal calling for 20 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union for events of magnitude 4.75 or above. The Rand Report, summarized at the last meeting of principals on May 10, has however held out the hope of a reduction in unidentified events, based on redistribution and possible addition of control posts.

Mr. Northrup commented that the Rand Report should only be considered as offering an interesting direction for further research. It is merely a theoretical indication of progress which might be made in a research program. He quoted Dr. Richard Latter, who was principally responsible for it, as stating that no proposal to reduce the quota should be based on this report until a research program establishes the correctness of its conclusions. *Mr. McCone* advocated that the Rand Report not be considered in any way at this time as a basis for policy changes. *Mr. Herter* expressed disappointment that there had been briefings and much publicity about this report. *Mr. Farley* said he understood the Rand Report conclusions are no less certain than the conclusions on which we based the proposal for 20 inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union. *Mr. Irwin* replied that he understood the Rand Report to indicate there might be many more seismic events in the Soviet Union than the 100 estimate contained in it. *Mr. Northrup* reported an AFTAC study as determining there are about 120 annual seismic events. He pointed out that the efficiency of the system advocated in the Rand

Report would be lessened by the use of 30 element arrays instead of 100 element arrays. A study has indicated the impracticability of using 100 element arrays in the Soviet Union. *Mr. McCone* advocated that we not base policy on theory not yet supported by experience, and that we base our stand on previous determinations while insisting on a seismic improvement program, the results of which may lead to adjustment of the quota.

In reply to *Mr. Irwin's* question as to the status of the formula by which we arrive at our quota of 20, *Mr. Herter* replied that the number we adopt would bear a relationship to probable number of events even though the relationship might not be explicitly agreed. *Mr. Farley* said that we planned to write a specific number into the treaty, but that this would be subject to revision at the end of two years and periodically thereafter on the basis of recalculation of number of events and other factors.

Dr. Kistiakowsky advocated that the Rand Corporation be requested to supply an explanation as to the reliability of the conclusions in their report. His suggestion was supported by *Mr. Herter* and *Mr. Gates*. *Dr. Romney* suggested that an independent evaluation of the Rand Report be made by a capable group. *Mr. Herter* replied that he would prefer to have Rand's own evaluation first. *Mr. McCone* repeated that the Rand Report should not be considered in any way. He expressed regret that it had received so much publicity before the Joint Committee and in private conversations with the British. *Mr. Herter* stated what he believed to be the conclusion of the group: That we await an evaluation from Rand Corporation before giving any more consideration to possible use of the figures in the report as a basis for negotiations.

Mr. Herter recalled the cost estimate of one to five billion dollars for installation of 22 control posts in the Soviet Union, mentioned by *Mr. Northrup* at the May 10th meeting of principals. *Mr. Northrup* said that this estimate had been presented by United Electrodynamics Corporation at the Joint Committee hearings in April. The corporation has since made a brief restudy and now estimates that installation on the territory of the Soviet Union will cost 750 million dollars, and the entire 1958 Geneva system, exclusive of high altitude, up to 3½ billion dollars. The corporation is now undertaking a careful 90-day study and will present a final estimate in July or August. The AFTAC cost study of last year, which arrived at a figure of 1½ billion dollars for installation, is now believed to have been an underestimation. *Mr. Gates* stressed the necessity of securing careful cost estimates.

Mr. Herter, *Mr. Gates* and *Mr. McCone* agreed that the time has come to make a determination whether the Geneva negotiations are in range of agreement. Such a determination is inherent in the National Security Council directive, *Mr. McCone* said. It would be wrong to launch

a seismic improvement program, costing 75 to 100 million dollars, if its results were to be rejected or to have no practical use. He advocated that the principals meet again by the end of the month in order to decide on alternative courses proposed in Section III of the memorandum (TAB A) in light of the Soviet attitude.

Mr. Irwin reported that the study on possible alternatives to the high altitude system proposed by the Geneva experts has been completed but, pending review by a working group, it is not yet ready for the principals. Dr. Kistiakowsky remarked that, while the Rand Report may have been a bit too optimistic about improvements in the system, the report on high altitude delivered by the Department of Defense specialists, at the meeting of principals on May 5, may be too pessimistic. An ad hoc study group reporting to General Betts has concluded that a simplified x-ray system for use in satellites, having a capability up to 100 million kilometers, might be available much sooner than a system having capability up to 1 billion kilometers. Also, a preliminary study by Lockheed Corporation appears to indicate the feasibility of replacing satellites at 60,000 km as recommended by the Geneva experts with low altitude satellites (perhaps at 300 km) having a capability from 50 km out to distance of capability of the x-ray system. The significance of these developments are a substantial reduction of costs and saving in time, deriving from elimination of a sophisticated system of satellites in far space, and, possibly, elimination of ground-based equipment for detection of events occurring at high altitude. He suggested that the decision of the principals as to high altitude alternatives be delayed a week or so, in order that it may be based on consideration of all studies. Mr. Herter recommended that another meeting of principals be held within two weeks.

Mr. McCone recommended certain revisions to the memorandum concerning courses of action, and these were approved. Agreed revisions are contained in TAB B.

Tab A

Paper Prepared for Principals of Geneva Test Group Meeting

Course of Action in Nuclear Test Negotiations

The meeting of Principals Thursday at 10:15 AM will consider the course of action to be pursued in the nuclear test negotiations, considering specifically (a) the current status of negotiations, (b) US tactics in the period immediately ahead, and (c) the course of action to be followed pursuant to last week's NSC decision, namely that we should make clear these negotiations and the US moratorium cannot go on indefinitely without a decision, and that the US should determine at what time or at what stage it should seek to place a time limit on its duration.

I. Current status of negotiations.

A chronology of major developments in the negotiations during the past six months is attached. At present, the focal point of Conference discussion is an effort by the US and UK Delegations to seek clarification of the Soviet position on the coordinated research program. Although the Soviet Delegation has reaffirmed the May 3 declaration, accepting the idea of a strictly limited number of nuclear detonations for research purposes, their statement that they will not conduct the chemical explosions discussed by their scientists nor begin coordinated research until signing of the treaty leaves important ambiguities in their position which should be clarified to assist us in determining the prospects for any meaningful coordinated program. For example, we do not know whether the Soviet position is (a) that national research programs should begin now and their coordination begin when the treaty is signed; or (b) that coordinated research should begin now insofar as it involves Soviet observation of US tests and programs but should not involve US observation in the USSR until treaty signature. Moreover, we do not know whether they have cancelled the entire Soviet component of the research program or only the four or five chemical explosions in it.

II. Objectives and Tactics in negotiations during current month.

The following course of action is recommended as a basis for discussions at the meeting. It sets forth certain steps and objectives to be carried out during the month of June to lay the basis for decisive action, and suggests alternative courses that might be pursued at the end of the month.

In general, the objective during the current month should be to lay the basis both for governmental determination and public acceptance of a course of action that will achieve the purpose defined by the NSC decision to, in effect, place a time limit on the duration of the US test moratorium.

The following steps are recommended:

A. The U.S. Delegation should be instructed to stress that the US position as set forth in the White House announcement of March 29 and subsequently in the conference is that a moratorium on testing below an agreed treaty threshold is conditioned upon prior agreement on a coordinated research program. The U.S. Delegation should also stress the corollary of this position, namely that if no agreement can be reached at an early date on treaty and on a coordinated program of research, there can be no such moratorium.

B. The U.S. Delegation should press urgently for clarification of the Soviet position on the coordinated research program.

C. The US should seek to deprive the Soviets of any argument that Project VELA explosions might involve weapons development and to lay the basis in public opinion for the conduct of such explosions. Two alternative possibilities for accomplishing this purpose might be (a) if a fuller technical justification for the present US position on safeguards to demonstrate conclusively that it would not permit weapons development cannot be found, to find methods consistent with the Atomic Energy Act for constructing devices that might be opened to inspection or opening existing devices, and indicating willingness to have observation by qualified scientists on a world-wide basis, or (b) to state US willingness to employ UK devices which would be open to inspection by the three parties before their importation into the US. We understand from the AEC that there are various legal, practical and safety factors which would make the latter course extremely difficult.

D. The U.S. Delegation should seek to ascertain promptly whether the harder Soviet line regarding research has affected the prospects of early agreement on other issues before the conference. In this connection, we should press, in particular, for Soviet responses to the various proposals we have tabled prior to the summit, i.e., quota, staffing, criteria, definition of magnitudes, flight routes, observers and phasing. In order to increase pressure on the Soviets to be specific about the quota, the US might indicate that if the Soviets are unwilling to discuss quota apart from the question of duration of a moratorium, we are prepared to consider these questions simultaneously.

E. In order to assess and demonstrate decisively whether agreement within a reasonable length of time is possible, the US should seek to define and bring to public attention, as quickly as possible, the full range of remaining issues which would have to be resolved if agreement is to be achieved. Specifically, the questions of high altitude and parties should be brought to the fore by the tabling of US proposals. We should also, within the month, in order to complete the process of bringing the negotiations to a decisive focus, fill in all significant gaps in the Western position by tabling the quota article, the definition of nuclear detonations and the revision of Annex I.

III. Alternative courses of action at the end of June.

On the basis of the issues and Soviet attitudes defined by the foregoing tactics, the US should, at the end of the current month, decide upon one or more of the following steps which serve to define with varying degrees of exactness a time limit on the US moratorium.

A. In the absence of substantial agreement in the coordinated research program, the US should (a) announce specific dates for several shots in the VELA series, (b) indicate that we are still hopeful that agreement on safeguards and coordination can be reached before these

dates, but the conduct of the explosions will not be dependent upon such agreement, and (c) reaffirm the December 29 position on nuclear weapons tests. This US may also wish to announce one or more Plowshare shots at this time since these, like VELA shots, are unrelated to the moratorium.

B. Depending upon the Soviet attitude and prospects of agreement defined by the tactics outlined above, the US may also wish to announce at the same time or as a subsequent move the indefinite suspension of atmospheric tests on a unilateral basis and either (a) state that in the absence of substantial progress toward agreement, underground weapons tests will also begin at an early date or (b) announce specific weapons tests which would take place after the initial VELA and Plowshare shots.

Recommendations

1. That a decision be reached as to US tactics in the immediate future.
2. That an early meeting of Principals be set to consider the position to be taken on high altitude.
3. That a meeting be scheduled before the end of the month to review the status of negotiations and determine a further course of action.
4. That Defense be requested to expedite its assessment of the Rand report as a basis for determining its relationship to discussion of the quota.

Attachment

CHRONOLOGY OF NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION NEGOTIATIONS

December 18, 1959—Technical Working Group 2 concluded with agreement on possible improvements in the Geneva control system, but with disagreement on the capabilities of the control system, and on criteria for identification of underground seismic events.

December 29, 1959—Augusta statement by the President that United States will be free to resume nuclear weapons tests on expiration of its voluntary moratorium on December 31, but will not do so without advance announcement.

February 11, 1960—US proposal for:

(1) Threshold treaty which would end, upon signature, atmospheric and underwater tests, high altitude tests as far as effective controls are agreed, and underground tests above 4.75 seismic magnitude reading.

(2) Joint research and experimentation to improve detection of small underground tests and permit extension of the ban.

February 16, 1960—Soviet position on criteria for identification of underground events shifts almost to the US-UK position in Technical Working Group 2.

March 19, 1960—Soviets propose conclusion of a threshold treaty as proposed on February 11, but covering all outer space tests and with the joint research program accompanied by an obligation not to conduct underground weapons tests below the threshold.

March 29, 1960—Eisenhower-Macmillan Camp David communique declares negotiation on remaining issues leading to a threshold treaty should be speeded up and completed. As soon as a threshold treaty is signed and arrangements are made for a coordinated research program, a voluntary unilaterally declared moratorium could be instituted for an agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold.

April to mid May, 1960—US and UK introduce proposals on several major elements of a threshold treaty including staffing and extension of the control system; Soviet Union marks time.

May 3, 1960—Soviet Union agrees to proceed with working out a joint research program which would include a strictly limited number of joint underground nuclear explosions. Soviets agree that the moratorium should be unilaterally declared but propose a four to five year duration co-extensive with the program of joint research.

May 7, 1960—White House announces Project VELA expansion to a level of \$66 million for FY 61, including such nuclear explosions as are necessary.

May 11, 1960—Experts meet in Geneva to discuss the seismic research program. The Soviets describe a program of fairly extensive seismic research including a number of chemical explosions.

May 17, 1960—Scheduled Summit meeting does not occur.

May 30, 1960—Geneva Experts adjourn with Soviets opposing US plans for studies of decoupling and for a number of nuclear explosions, and expressing view that research program should begin only with signature of treaty.

June 2 and 3, 1960—Tsarapkin rejects US proposals for safeguards to insure that nuclear explosions do not advance weapons development. Disclaims research necessary except as US condition for moratorium; insists on four to five year moratorium duration. States research should be joint, with full Soviet examination of internals of nuclear devices used.

Tab B

Revisions to Memorandum at Tab A

*REVISIONS TO MEMORANDUM, "COURSE OF ACTION IN
NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS"*

1. In paragraph I, insert the following after the third sentence:

Their recent statements are particularly confusing in that they apparently renounce the statement of intentions made by the Soviet scientists in the Seismic Research Advisory Committee meetings.

2. In paragraph II, delete the third sentence.

3. In paragraph II, subparagraph A should read as follows:

A. The U.S. Delegation should be instructed to stress that the U.S. position, as set forth in the White House announcement of March 29, and subsequently in the Conference, is that a moratorium on testing below an agreed treaty threshold is conditioned upon: (a) prior agreement on a coordinated research program; and (b) prior satisfactory agreement on the other issues outstanding, such as on-site inspections, control commission, control post and inspection team staffing, voting matters and peaceful use detonations (also the issues of length of moratorium, schedule for installation of temporary and permanent stations and high altitude monitoring). The U.S. Delegation should also stress the corollary of this position; namely, that, if no agreement can be reached at an early date on all of these treaty issues and on a coordinated program of research, there can be no such moratorium.

4. In paragraph II, the following second sentence should be added to subparagraph B:

However, in so pressing, it should avoid as far as possible any implication that it is the U.S. which will gain by Soviet acceptance (and, hence, the U.S. would be expected to compromise on other essential issues).

5. In paragraph II, subparagraph C should be deleted and the following subparagraph C and D should be substituted:

C. The U.S. should seek to deprive the Soviets of any argument that Project VELA explosions might involve weapons development and to lay the basis in public opinion for the conduct of such explosions. Note: Due to the technical, legal, safety, and other problems involved, the alternate possibilities of using USSR or U.K. devices for Project VELA nuclear shots are deemed an unworkable solution. Other possible alternatives for accomplishing this purpose might be: (a) to develop and fabricate suitable U.S. gun-type designs, and in the necessary yields, which might be declassified; and (b) to secure necessary legislation or Congressional sanction to reveal to the U.K. and the USSR the internal design of the classified device presently planned for the VELA

program. (It should be noted that an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act or Congressional sanction to permit the U.S. to reveal the internal design of the classified device to the U.K. and the USSR would present serious difficulties with respect to certain U.S. Allies, particularly France.) The AEC believes that one of the above two alternatives may be possible and has agreed to further examine these two possibilities as a matter of urgency in order to determine if either is practical. Consequently, the AEC will promptly prepare a study which will outline the legal, technical and other considerations which would have to be resolved. The AEC position will be determined after such studies have been carried out and further considered.

D. The U.S. should emphasize publicly and in the Conference the facts that: (a) the proposed safeguards are adequate to give assurance to the Soviets that no significant weapon progress will be made. This is possible if the proposed U.S. safeguards are carried out by both sides or by an international team; and (b) under existing U.S. law, it is impossible to open our devices to the Soviets without declassifying them and, hence, making weapons information available to all countries.

6. In paragraph II, subparagraph D should be deleted and the following subparagraph E should be substituted:

E. The U.S. Delegation should seek to ascertain promptly whether the harder Soviet line regarding research has affected the prospects of early agreement on other issues before the Conference. In this connection, we should press immediately, in particular, for Soviet responses to the various proposals we have tabled prior to the Summit; i.e., quota (and the procedures under which its inspections can be used), staffing criteria, definition of magnitudes, flight routes, observers and phasing. In order to increase pressure on the Soviets to be specific about the quota, the U.S. might indicate that, if the Soviets are unwilling to discuss quota apart from the question of duration of a moratorium, we are prepared to consider these questions simultaneously, but it must be understood that agreement to a moratorium is dependent on a resolution of all other unresolved issues.

7. In paragraph II, old subparagraph E becomes now subparagraph F.

8. In paragraph III, subparagraph A, the words "and other outstanding issues" should be inserted after "coordinated research program" on the second line.

9. Add the following recommendations, numbered 5 and 6, to the section entitled "Recommendations":

5. U.S. Government spokesmen both here and abroad should make every effort to explain publicly the meaning and importance of the issues which must be resolved, and the necessity for prompt resolution.

6. That more attention be given to realistic cost estimates for installation and operation of the system, and that the U.S. Delegation in Geneva raise these matters in the negotiations when we are prepared to give our considered estimates.

Participants of Meeting of Principals on Nuclear Test Negotiations Held June 9, 1960

Department of State:

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Dillon

Mr. Smith—S/P

Mr. Dubs, SOV

S/AE—Mr. Farley, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Spiers, Mr. Baker, Mr. Goodby, Mr. Gotzlinger

Department of Defense:

Secretary Gates

Mr. Irwin

Gen. Loper

Gen. Fox

Gen. Denney

Mr. Northrup

Dr. Romney

White House:

Mr. Gray

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Keeney

CIA:

Mr. Dulles

Mr. Brent

AEC:

Mr. McCone

Dr. English

Col. Sherrill

567. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

JCSM–250–60

Washington, June 10, 1960

SUBJECT

Soviet Disarmament Proposal of 2 June 1960 (U)

1. Pursuant to the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 8 June 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Soviet disarmament proposal of 2 June 1960. If adopted, this proposal

¹ Source: Conveys JCS views on a June 2 Soviet disarmament proposal. Secret. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman's File.

would dismantle the U.S. nuclear capability, including the foreign base structure essential to our forward strategy, before any controlled reduction of Sino-Soviet conventional capability had been accomplished. Further, since control functions throughout the disarmament process would, under the Soviet proposal, be carried on essentially only at declared plants and sites with no inspection for clandestine activities, there would be no assurance that even the nuclear capability of the Soviets had been equally nullified.

2. Enough has been said by the West about the necessity for a balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control arrangement that the Soviets undoubtedly know this proposal is completely unacceptable to the West. Indeed, in his letter which transmitted the proposal, Mr. Khrushchev asserted that the West is "not ready to implement it". Though he cleverly attributed the proposal for immediate nuclear disarmament to French insistence on early restrictions on nuclear delivery systems, the Soviet proposal goes much further than anything which has been suggested by the French.

3. Thus, this proposal appears to constitute but another effort in furtherance of the Sino-Soviet objective to disrupt Free World alliances, disintegrate our collective defenses, and frustrate the United States forward strategy. There has never yet been any reason to regard apparent Soviet willingness to negotiate disarmament measures as other than diversionary tactics, and there is no basis for regarding the present proposal in any different light.

4. For the above reason and also because of its failure to remedy the shortcomings of past Soviet proposals in such areas as control, preliminary studies, phasing and post-disarmament peacekeeping, it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposal is completely unacceptable. In any examination of the Soviet proposal at the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference, we should adhere firmly to the principles, conditions and time-phasing set forth in the Western disarmament plan of 16 March 1960. In this connection, it is observed that Mr. Eaton, in his cable to the Secretary of State of 7 June 1960, anticipates heavy pressure from all four of our Allies to make substantial amendments to the Western plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have already rejected in JCSM-203-60, dated 12 May 1960, the French proposal for control of means of delivery for nuclear weapons. Without prejudging any other proposed modification of a specific Western proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard it as imperative that the United States insist strongly upon Allied unity in the future, remembering that it was an instance of disunity which provided the Soviets the opportunity for concealing the true purpose of their present proposal.

5. In addition, it is important that our governmental departments and agencies, and our negotiators, bear constantly in mind the

fundamental principle which underlies any disarmament measure as well as a dangerous tendency which constantly asserts itself to lead us astray from the principle. We rely upon armaments for national security. With disarmament, there must be a *quid pro quo*—an adequate substitute if our security is to remain unimpaired. The exchange must be simultaneous with no hiatus. Traditionally, we have regarded the substitute to be an adequate system of inspection and control to assure initial and continuing compliance, since good faith, alone, has been demonstrably proven inadequate. The tendency, which too often achieves headway, is toward the erosion, during the negotiating process, of the control system originally deemed necessary. This result is readily apparent in the nuclear test cessation negotiations, where, through the medium of the moratorium, the United States has, in effect, acceded to the Soviet demand for a cessation of nuclear testing without any assurance that the Soviets are not, themselves, testing. This undesirable precedent must not be permitted to influence the outcome of the Ten Nation negotiations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

568. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

JCSM-236-60

Washington, June 13, 1960

SUBJECT

Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in accordance with your memorandum, dated 26 January 1960. Cognizance has also been taken of recent events such as the THRESHOLD proposal, made by the United States during February, and subsequent related actions.

¹ Source: Conveys JCS views on test ban treaty. Secret. 7 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman's File.

2. Specific comments on the treaty itself, to include inspection and control aspects and the estimated installation and operating costs of the control system, are contained in the Appendix hereto.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views on 21 August 1959, in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, that an adequate military posture for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat. It is recognized that if an enforceable test ban agreement is concluded and implemented the United States will not achieve such a spectrum of weapons. However, a nuclear test ban treaty which would guarantee a cessation of testing by the Sino-Soviets as well as the United States could theoretically be to the relative U.S. military advantage. The present estimated preponderance of the U.S. stockpile relative to that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the current U.S. lead in sophistication of nuclear weapon systems are factors which, if taken in isolation, could justify U.S. acceptance of an enforceable test ban from a security standpoint. Unless a test ban treaty could guarantee a cessation of testing in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, with its resultant effect on Soviet weapons and stockpile development, further U.S. testing for sophistication of the components of various existing weapon systems as well as basic development of new weapons is deemed vital. The anti-missile missile is not the least of this latter category.

4. The recent trend of the Geneva test ban negotiations offers little [illegible in the original] for a treaty that would ensure a cessation of testing in the closed society of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. An inadequately safeguarded treaty, however, would be self-enforcing in the open societies of the West. The introduction of the U.S. THRESHOLD proposal with its attendant moratorium and inadequate detection, inspection and control system justifies reiteration and re-emphasis of the dangers of such an unsafeguarded agreement to the security of the United States.

5. The conclusion of a treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests without adequate safeguards would set a dangerous precedent for the Ten Nation negotiations, particularly in respect to the proposal for cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, phased reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles and eventual elimination of the use of nuclear weapons. For the past decade, the Soviets have pressed for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, consequently, there will be a tendency to equate a nuclear weapons test ban with a ban on their use. This point the Sino-Soviet Bloc would undoubtedly pursue to the maximum in an effort to offset our present nuclear advantage.

6. Acceptance of the presently proposed test ban treaty, the provisions of which do not provide for adequate safeguards, would establish a dangerous precedent for the Ten Nation negotiations and would

make it increasingly difficult to insist on adequate control for the above mentioned nuclear disarmament measures which have already been tabled. The historical U.S. position of insistence upon adequate safeguards (required by Basic National Security Policy) appears to be deteriorating rapidly in the interest of arriving at agreement. Although the decision to announce a unilateral moratorium below the THRESHOLD has already been made public, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a technical analysis and experimental verification of the effectiveness of the proposed control and inspection system should be made and the results evaluated before any moratorium is actually implemented. The fact that prominent and patriotic U.S. scientists insist that adequate inspection and control is impossible due to difficulties in the high altitude and underground environment is, in itself, good reason to require that such an analysis be made. The decision on a unilateral moratorium below the THRESHOLD was based primarily on political considerations which in no way removes technical difficulties involved in developing an effective control and inspection system in high altitude and underground environments.

7. As previously stated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it essential to the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent to periodically detonate weapons to test systems and techniques for the employment of nuclear weapons to ensure operational reliability, and to further sophisticate weapon systems. Unless a safeguarded treaty could ensure a cessation of testing by the closed society of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, these requirements must be fulfilled continuously in order to provide for the security of the United States. The most important matter of concern now, however, is the apparent movement of the United States away from a safeguarded treaty to one of "good faith" which has always been the Soviet approach. A prolonged moratorium without satisfactory development of a reliable control system achieves essentially the same results for the Soviets as an agreed and ratified treaty. Any test cessation agreement accepted on faith alone gives the Sino-Soviet Bloc, with its closed society, an advantage in altering the present military posture ratio. As such it would be militarily undesirable to the United States. The frustration of the U.N. truce team in Korea is an example of the danger of accepting the principle of agreement on good faith with the hope of working out the details of control during the implementation of an agreement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED TREATY FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS (U)

1. Comments on Basic Treaty Proposals.

a. Despite agreement reached thus far on the preamble, 17 articles and one annex to the treaty, the most significant issues are still unresolved. The parts agreed deal principally with broad statements of objectives and with procedural and administrative matters relating to implementation of the treaty. Moreover much of that which has been agreed is actually subject to terms and provisions of the treaty not yet agreed.

b. Obviously there is a fundamental difference between the U.S. and USSR positions to date. The United States insists upon the development of an adequate detection identification and control system first, with signing of the treaty to follow. The Soviets desire a treaty first with vague reference to later development of adequate controls. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the U.S. position in this matter reflects Basic National Security Policy of the United States.

c. U.S. efforts during February to break the negotiation stalemate by proposing the THRESHOLD² approach appear to have opened the door to deterioration of U.S. position of insistence upon adequate treaty safeguards. The moratorium below the THRESHOLD insisted upon by the Soviets and agreed upon by the United States, is a departure from adequate safeguards. However, more serious is the possibility of retreating further to include the moratorium as a part of the treaty itself and including below the "THRESHOLD" in the inspection quotas agreed upon.

2. Inspection and Control Aspects.

The technical aspects of the inspection and control system are contained in Annex I, Detection and Identification System (DIS). There are, however, important decision making and overall control type measures included in those treaty articles not yet agreed. Because of limited success in reaching agreement in both of these areas, the United States in February tabled the THRESHOLD proposal.³ This proposal presumes adequate capability now to detect nuclear explosions above seismic magnitudes of 4.75. Scientists are not in agreement that such detection is presently feasible. This was highlighted during

² Department of State message to American Consul, Geneva (NUSUP), circular 1002, dated 10 February 1960 (DA IN 283394). [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Department of State message to the American Consul, Geneva (NUSUP), circular 1002, dated 10 February 1960 (DA IN 283394). [Footnote is in the original.]

the conference of experts held during August 1958 and later during Technical Working Group Two meetings held during November and December of 1959. The final report of the latter group reflects that there are areas of disagreement regarding the interpretation of the new data from the HARDTACK experiments and regarding the question of de-coupling. More recently, Dr. Edward Teller's testimony before a congressional committee on 20 April 1960 indicated several different methods by which nuclear explosions can go undetected. He further testified that an adequate control system would not be feasible for at least a decade. Even Hans Bethe, a leading scientific advocate of a ban on tests, was in regretful agreement to the inadequacy of the Geneva detection system. These and other considerations indicate that technology has not yet provided a reliable system for detecting and identifying all types and magnitudes of nuclear detonations within the earth's atmosphere, much less in outer space. The detection inspection and control system as envisioned within the treaty should be critically and carefully re-examined formally by scientific experts, both nationally and internationally, to determine the adequacy of this system.

3. *Comments on Estimated Installation and Operating Costs of the Control System.*

a. The Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC) estimate on the cost of the control system recommended by the Geneva Conference of experts was examined and found to be a reasonable estimate of dollar expenditure for that system. However, the addition of an outer space satellite capability for detecting high altitude explosions and the requirements which would be imposed in developing a lower THRESHOLD would raise the system cost to an amount greatly in excess of the AFTAC estimate. For example, the cost figure arrived at by AFTAC to install the Geneva system and operate it for one year is \$1,643,545,756. If the number of control posts were increased by a factor of five, as has been suggested by some to insure acceptable reliability of even the Geneva system, this figure is raised to over \$8,000,000,000.

b. Consideration of the additional control posts as unmanned stations may be expected to reduce the costs of installations and operation. The reliability of such installations, however, is open to serious doubt. For example recorded data is of no value until analyzed and evaluated. Transmitting such data to manned stations would have to be automatic. Also, back-up equipment with "fail safe" automatic cut-in capability would have to be provided to assure no breakdown. Stations would have to be protected against sabotage, thievery and vandalism. All of these and other problems will be aggravated because of the remote siting of unmanned posts. Failure to adequately safeguard the equipment could result in a low confidence factor for the whole system. Because of the undetermined number of unmanned stations that would be acceptable, and other variables, cost

estimates cannot be made. It is believed, however, that savings in personnel and their attendant logistical support will not be in direct proportion to actual costs. The additional sophistication of the equipment, safeguarding the site, and base-to-site logistical support are expensive considerations.

c. Since a satellite detection capability is presently under study by ODDR & E, the cost of that system could not be considered at this time.

569. Letter From Lloyd to Herter¹

June 15, 1960

Dear Chris,

I am concerned at the way in which the negotiations in the Nuclear Tests Conference have been stagnating recently. The immediate reason is the Russian attitude towards seismic research. But while we must press them on this I think it is important, if we are to maintain the momentum of the Conference and our public position, that we should take what opportunities are open on other questions. When we had our useful discussion on June 1 during my visit to Washington, I understood that, despite what had happened in Paris, United States policy in these negotiations was to press ahead as fast as the changed circumstances allowed.

To make progress in the negotiations, we shall sooner or later have to tackle the major issues which we had hoped to solve during the Summit. These were the size of the quota, the composition of the Control Commission, and the length of the moratorium. Time is getting on, and I wonder if you are yet able to give me any indication as to how you propose we should handle these issues at Geneva. Unless we take some initiative soon, there seems to be a risk of a deadlock developing in which neither side will speak first. Indeed, Tsarapkin has just dropped a hint that he will not discuss the various texts we have tabled until the West has come out with some proposal on the length of the moratorium and the composition of the Control Commission. Now that the Conference discussions are a matter of public record it might be difficult

¹ Source: Status of U.S. positions at test ban negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

effectively to charge the Russians with deliberate procrastination so long as it is open to them to argue that we have held back on key issues.

I am sure that you have also been giving thought to the situation that has developed and will, as I am, be concerned with the need not only to keep the negotiations moving but to maintain a good public position vis-a-vis the Russians on the broad issues of the Conference. It would be very helpful to me to have an indication of how you think we ought now to proceed.

Yours ever,

Selwyn

570. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 17, 1960

SUBJECT

Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

State

Mr. Sullivan—S/AE

Mr. Spiers

UK Embassy

Lord Hood

Mr. Wiggin

Lord Hood called under instructions to present UK views on future Western activities in the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference. He reported that the Foreign Office feels that it will be increasingly difficult to hold to our present position in Geneva, that it is disadvantageous to the West to let the Soviet plan hold the field, and that it is not enough for us simply to probe and criticize while standing pat on our present position. The UK felt it was necessary to think up a new way of proceeding and suggests that we adopt the tactic of pressing the Soviets to discuss particular subjects in working groups. If the Soviets declined, we should then proceed to discuss these measures in plenary sessions. The particular items which the UK had in mind were: (1) the Irish resolution, which we are committed to discuss, (2) control of orbiting

¹ Source: Tactics for ten-nation disarmament conference. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/6-1760.

vehicles, (3) nuclear cut-off, (4) constitution, functions, and powers of the control organ, and (5) control over nuclear delivery systems. The UK felt that we should start with the items on which it would not be difficult to reach Five Power agreement.

Mr. Sullivan said that our own tentative approach was not greatly different from that which Lord Hood had outlined. We do not want to make a substantial departure from the present Western position but agree in principle to expanding or modifying the Western plan while staying within its present framework. He said that we had been considering tabling the terms of reference which are being coordinated among the five Western delegations and that this idea would have the same effect as that proposed by Lord Hood. He asked whether the British were thinking also of proposing studies of Third Stage measures such as elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems. *Mr. Wiggin* said that the British did not have the same hesitation about this as the US had previously demonstrated. Such discussion of the controls for these measures would conclusively demonstrate that they belonged in the Third Stage. Furthermore, the UK had never felt that there was implied in such study proposals a moral commitment to move directly to the implementation of the measures studied at the conclusion of the particular study. *Mr. Sullivan* said that we were reviewing these questions ourselves and did not rule out the possibility of our agreeing with this position. With respect to the delivery system problem with the French, our primary concern was over the French idea for prohibition against mating warheads and carriers in an earlier stage. This would have a dangerous and profound impact on our readiness of forces and thus on our entire deterrent posture.

Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Spiers reviewed the other points which we had been considering, emphasizing that they did not at this point represent firm US decisions, as follows: (1) exchange of military observers at agreed military bases as an initial confidence building measure; this function would in due course be taken by IDO. *Mr. Wiggin* observed that this would be characterized by the Soviets as control without disarmament. (2) a US-USSR surprise attack zone; we would not contemplate proposing a European zone at this time in view of the probable French reaction. (3) introduction of 1.7 million as the first level of reduction in Stage III of the Western plan; and (4) incorporation of reference to gradual elimination of military bases in Stage III of the Western plan. *Mr. Sullivan* said that we were not sure yet whether we would, if these ideas are accepted, wish to issue a revision of the Western plan or to table separate papers expanding on various parts of the Western plan. Two other ideas which are under consideration are to provide in the Western plan that transfer between stages would depend upon a Security Council decision that the prior stage had been implemented and

for which the concurring votes of the permanent members would be required. *Mr. Spiers* noted that this was a reversion to previous Western positions which had normally provided for such a role for the Security Council and which would protect the West against the unacceptable automatic movement from stage to stage provided for in the Soviet plan. A further idea was to expand our proposals on transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses by indicating a proposed specific amount for to be transferred. *Mr. Sullivan* pointed out that the timing on this entire matter was of great importance since it was necessary to move rapidly if the Western powers were to be effective. We hope to have our own views by Tuesday and to be in a position then to discuss them with our Allies.

Lord Hood asked whether we had anything we could say at this point about the nuclear test negotiations in the light of Selwyn Lloyd's letter to Mr. Herter. He assumed that it would be possible to arrange a meeting between Ambassador Caccia and Mr. Herter early next week. *Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Spiers* said that the main issue at the moment was the safeguards we would propose for the nuclear detonations in the seismic research program. Various alternative possibilities to the "black box" are now under review. *Mr. Wiggin* said that the Western powers would be in an impossible position vis-a-vis public opinion unless we could abandon the "black box" idea, since we were asking the Soviets to accept a type of control relying on good faith declarations and that this was a radical reversal of our own previous position in all disarmament talks. If we did not revise our position, we would be hoist our own petard. *Mr. Sullivan* said that we were keenly aware of these vulnerabilities and were quite confident we would find some way of proceeding with open devices. *Mr. Wiggin* inquired about our attitude on the composition of the Control Commission. *Mr. Spiers* said that while we were prepared to accept parity on the Control Commission we would continue to believe, as Mr. Herter had indicated to Mr. Lloyd in Paris, that we should not make this concession at this point before other potentially difficult issues such as high attitude treaty provisions had been identified so that all our bargaining leverage was not used up too quickly. He believed that we would soon be prepared to discuss the problem of the length of the moratorium if the Russians were prepared at the same time to be concrete on the size of the quota.

571. Letter From Caccia to Herter¹

Washington, June 22, 1960

Dear Chris,

Selwyn has asked me to send you the enclosed personal note about disarmament.

I think that it speaks for itself. But he has asked me particularly to say that the last thing he wants to do is to throw any monkey wrench into any works that may be in hand. Hence the very personal form of his letter.

At the same time he does feel strongly that we shall need to play this hand with great care as this is the area in which we and the Communist bloc still have business dealings, and unlike last year there will not be the same prospect of a Summit meeting as there was when the Assembly met in 1959. From long experience he knows, as you do, that it is not possible to set the stage for disarmament discussions at short notice. It is for this reason, amongst others, that he would value your views on how this problem should be handled with the object of our having a good position and the initiative when the Assembly meets.

I have an appointment to see you tomorrow and shall be most grateful if you can give me at least some preliminary reaction at that time.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Caccia

Enclosure

Message From Lloyd to Herter

TEXT OF MESSAGE

My dear Chris,

It seems to me that over the next nine months or so the struggle between East and West for world opinion may well be concentrated in the field of disarmament. This is the one area in which the free world and the Communist bloc are now seriously in contact and discussion,

¹ Source: Transmits a message from Lloyd to Herter on Western position in disarmament talks. Personal and Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.

and the way in which each side conducts itself will be watched with the closest attention all over the world and especially in the uncommitted countries. As you know, I have always argued that we need to conduct our disarmament discussions with two main objectives in mind. First, to achieve some concrete progress by the implementation of some specific measure or measures which would increase confidence and open the road to further progress. Nuclear tests come in this category. Secondly, to retain or win the support of world opinion for our standpoint on disarmament. This seems to me best done by demonstrating that we are absolutely genuine in our desire to bring about substantial and far-reaching disarmament, provided always we can assure ourselves with regard to our own security through a system of international control and verification together with the establishment of effective peace-keeping machinery. Under these conditions we at least are prepared to go to the end of the road. If the way seems blocked, it must be clearly seen to be because the Communists refuse to accept these reasonable and necessary conditions and not because of any reluctance of the part of the West.

I have always felt that this is the posture that we must constantly try to maintain and it is in this context that I wished to let you have my private thoughts on the present state of play in the disarmament discussions.

Since we last talked together, the Russians have come forward with their new proposals. They are for obvious reasons quite unacceptable. It was also perhaps fortunate that Mr. Khrushchev put up such a deplorable exhibition in the press conference at which he introduced them, so that it was widely interpreted as indicating that the Russians were not very serious about them. Nevertheless, the proposals do contain, for the most part in quite the wrong sequence, virtually every measure put forward in the Western Plan. In addition Zorin has been saying that he is fully prepared to consider any suggestions and amendments that the West cares to propose. This superficially flexible and reasonable approach is, I am afraid, bound to make an increasingly favorable impression and will gain them much undeserved support outside and in the United Nations. This impression will be reinforced if the West after three months of negotiations are unable to point to any move that they have made since tabling their plan in March. In these circumstances the Russians having by their new proposals gained the initiative, will succeed in exploiting it to our disadvantage. I regard this as a serious and major danger to the overall Western position at this stage in East-West relations.

How are we to prevent this? The alternatives seem to me to be the following:

(A) We stand by our existing plan and make no move; we restate its advantages and do our best to discredit the new Russian proposals.

This would be a rational course but I think our position would steadily deteriorate the longer the talks in Geneva continued and when we came to the United Nations we might find our position more vulnerable. We would be thoroughly on the defensive.

(B) We could try and refurbish the Western plan and submit it to the conference as a new Five-Power proposal. The trouble is that this might prove quite a lengthy proceeding and indeed once we re-opened the whole discussion between the five Western Powers, and presumably in NATO, it is by no means certain that we could reach unanimous agreement in time to be of any use. On the other hand, we might be able to do this in time for the Assembly.

(C) One or two of the Western partners might introduce another set of proposals perhaps in outline rather than in detailed form. This would, of course, be worked out with the full knowledge of your people, if in the end you preferred not to be one of the authors. It would be in such a form that you could give it a general welcome and promise it the most sympathetic consideration, but you would not be committed to it. I have in mind the same sort of procedure we adopted over the Anglo-French plans of 1954 and 1956 and over our plan at last year's Assembly. In each case you made sympathetic noises but were not committed. I think that the last exercise at the United Nations served as quite a useful counterweight to Mr. Khrushchev's much publicised plan put forward the following day.

Weighing up the alternatives I see some advantages in course C and I would very much like to hear how it strikes you. If you felt that it had some merits it would then be important to decide on the timing. Here there would seem to be two alternatives:—

(A) For us to work out the proposals as quickly as possible with a view to submitting them in the Ten-Power Committee in Geneva. The ideal target date might be about the middle of July on the assumption that the conference is likely to have to adjourn at the end of July in order that a report can be prepared for the Disarmament Commission and that all concerned can have some break before the General Assembly. The objective would be to regain the initiative from the Russians before the recess.

(B) To take a little more time to work out the new proposals with a view to introducing them in the United Nations forum in September. Again the objective would be to regain the initiative for the West before the United Nations began its debates on disarmament. At the same time a drawback to this alternative might be that we would appear to be leaving ourselves in a bad posture throughout the Geneva talks and it would almost certainly be necessary therefore to agree to take some smaller initiatives in the committee in order to indicate that the West was not entirely rigid and inflexible. I have in mind minor amendments to the Western plan and proposals for joint studies of those measures on which both sides agree.

I have been turning these matters over in my mind and in the absence of an opportunity to talk them over with you personally, I thought I should send you my private thoughts in strictest confidence. None of our partners knows anything of this. Please let me know frankly what you think of all this.

In the meantime, we are putting together some ideas for an initiative such as that suggested in paragraph 4(C) above.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Selwyn

572. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 23, 1960

SUBJECT

Disarmament and Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Dillon

Mr. Kohler—EUR

Mr. Sullivan—S/AE

Mr. Spiers—S/AE

U.K.

Ambassador Caccia

Lord Hood

Mr. Wiggin

The Secretary apologized for his delay in answering Selwyn Lloyd's letter on the nuclear tests negotiations and explained that we had been concentrating our attention on solving the "black box" problem in connection with the seismic research program. He said that we had drafted a joint congressional resolution which had now been approved within the Government and which is being put before the Congress. He read the operative paragraph of the draft resolution. *The Secretary* observed that this move, if successful, should eliminate the present sticking points with the Soviets. If the Russians insist on more than we are willing to provide, so long as we are able to let them inspect the inside of the device, we are disposed to reject such further demands. Of course if we could not go ahead with the coordinated program on this basis the question of a moratorium on underground tests would be out of the window since the two issues were connected in the Eisenhower-Macmillan communique of March 29. *Ambassador Caccia* said that the resolution seemed to him a very fair offer and that he could not

¹ Source: Positions in negotiations on disarmament and test ban. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

see any justification, speaking as a non-scientist, for giving the Soviets blue prints of the device, since we contemplated allowing full inspection of its internals. *Mr. Dillon* said there was to be a secret hearing at 10 o'clock June 24 on this subject before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. Preliminary soundings indicate that the resolution should go through without difficulty.

The Secretary said that with respect to moving ahead on other matters he was in general agreement with the points made in Selwyn Lloyd's letter. The only difference seemed to be on the question of tactics, with respect to making a concession on the composition of the control commission. We are fully prepared to accept parity but would not feel we should go ahead with this concession right now. We are prepared however to discuss the question of the length of the moratorium together with the quota number. The only issue on which our position is not yet in good shape is on the problem of high altitude controls. *Ambassador Caccia* said he would get these points to Mr. Lloyd right away and that he was sure there was no need for a formal reply to the letter.

Turning to the question of disarmament *the Secretary* said that we had also been thinking along the lines set out by Lloyd in his more recent message on the subject of general disarmament. He gave *Ambassador Caccia* the new U.S. revised Western Plan and referred to the paragraph providing for study of missile delivery systems, observing that this met the essence of the French position. *Ambassador Caccia* asked if we envisaged a series of subcommittees being established to deal with various aspects in the plan. *Mr. Dillon* said this was a possibility. *The Secretary* referred also to the paragraph in the proposal providing for a Security Council decision regarding transition from stage to stage, noting that this also met a French suggestion.

Mr. Dillon said it was our view that the revised plan would have a great deal of public opinion impact. *The Secretary* said there were not many changes in substance. He did wish to mention, on a confidential basis, that by the time the plan was presented, Mr. Eaton might be in a position to propose a substantial transfer of enriched uranium to peaceful uses after the cutoff.

The Secretary said that we are trying to make arrangements for Mr. Eaton to see Mr. Lloyd on Saturday morning (June 25) and to see Couve de Murville on Saturday afternoon (June 25). We hope it would be possible to have a meeting of the Five Western Disarmament Representatives in Paris on Sunday, June 26. If agreement is reached on the text it would be possible to give the plan to NAC on Tuesday, June 28. *Mr. Dillon* said that the plan has been forwarded to our Embassies in London, Paris, Rome and Ottawa with instructions that it be delivered to the Foreign Office the first thing tomorrow morning. *The Secretary* said that this plan

could be characterized as meeting many of the Soviet positions. Where Soviet language was acceptable, we had actually adopted it.

Mr. Kohler informed Ambassador Caccia of our recent discussions with the French, who gave us a copy of their own paper the day before yesterday. Ambassador Alphand had called today indicating his unhappiness that we were going ahead with a revised proposal without commenting on the specific French suggestions. We had advised the French that their suggestions were essentially tactical and were not inconsistent with the paper we had prepared. We had made a great attempt to meet their point of view and we are prepared to discuss their ideas further in Paris. *Mr. Dillon* said that the French proposal was based on the assumption that the U.S. would not be able to make a significant policy move at this point. Since this assumption had proved incorrect the framework in which the French ideas had been suggested was changed and subject to re-examination.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether we still considered the Norstad plan a possibility, particularly in connection with the General Assembly. *The Secretary* referred to the language in the US paper providing for establishment of an inspection zone “including the US and USSR” as preserving the possibility of a zone in Europe. *Mr. Dillon* said that this might create some difficulty in Paris. In that case we were prepared to take out the word “including”. He said he was certain that the eagle eyes of the French would pick up this point.

573. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 23, 1960

SUBJECT

Meeting of Principals on Disarmament and Nuclear Testing Conference

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by asking whether there were any comments on the latest draft of the “Program for General and

¹Source: Disarmament and nuclear test conferences. Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, '60.

Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control". *The Secretary* said he understood the paper had been fairly well staffed out. He felt there might be a problem with some of our Allies as to the provision for establishment of zones of inspection but felt this provision should be left in the paper; it might prove to be a good trading point.

Mr. Gray felt that the U.S. might be making a mistake in adopting certain Soviet phraseology for inclusion in the revised disarmament plan and mentioned, as an example, the phrase "security of citizens". He felt that we should be careful not to include in the new plan concepts which are alien to U.S. traditions.

Ambassador Eaton agreed that some language from the Soviet papers had been incorporated in the new draft where it was acceptable to us. He noted that the Soviets use the term "security forces" while the term "security of citizens" was U.S. phraseology. *Ambassador Eaton* felt that we should not be obdurate and refuse to accept any Soviet terminology, even when acceptable to us.

Secretary Gates stated that he had an opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the latest draft plan, the substance of which was that the plan was acceptable militarily. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also pointed out that the U.S. would be under pressure to modify the new plan and that the U.S. should stand firm with this plan. *Secretary Gates* added that Defense thought the sentence in the new plan referring to "blank number" of kilograms of fissionable material for the transfer from past production to peaceful uses should be deleted. At a later date, after Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the AEC had studied this matter further, a specific number could be transmitted to *Ambassador Eaton* for his use in explaining the plan. It was preferable, *Secretary Gates* commented, for *Ambassador Eaton* to specify the quantity of kilograms in a speech rather than to include this number in the plan itself. *Mr. Allen* said he felt it would be well to have a definite figure in the plan when it is presented in Geneva. *Secretary Gates* thought it would be possible to arrive at a definite figure by the middle of the following week, but he would prefer that the sentence not appear in the draft given to the Allies. The Principals agreed that the sentence in question would be deleted.

Chairman McCone mentioned that the term "fissionable materials" involved both uranium 235 and plutonium. The U.S. could transfer uranium, but because of the military needs for plutonium, we could not agree to transfer that material. He had, therefore, suggested to *Ambassador Eaton* that the term "weapons grade highly-enriched uranium" be used in the draft plan in place of the term "fissionable materials". *Chairman McCone* recalled that *Ambassador Eaton* had not wished to change the terminology which had been used for some time. *Ambassador Eaton* replied that, if a sentence referring to specific quantities of fissionable material to be transferred were, at a later date, inserted in

the draft plan the AEC wording might then be used. *Mr. Smith* suggested that it might be desirable to use the singular form of the term “fissionable materials” when referring to transfers but to make the term plural when referring to the cut-off, since the cut-off would include all fissionable materials. *Chairman McCone* thought this might be one way of handling the problem. *Secretary Gates* remarked that, if his suggestion were followed, the sentence regarding quantities to be transferred would not appear in the plan at all, but would appear in a speech to be made by Ambassador Eaton.

Secretary Herter stated that, while there might be difficulties with our Allies on the plan, a paper reflecting the lowest common denominator would not be worth having. He felt that the U.S. should move. *The Secretary* noted that a copy of the plan had been sent to the President, as a draft which was to be considered by the Principals. There had been no reaction as yet from the President. Pending that, *The Secretary* concluded that he understood the Principals were now in agreement on the text of the plan and that Ambassador Eaton could proceed to consultations with the Allies on the basis of the revised plan (TAB A).

Secretary Herter then turned to the question of a resolution to be presented to Congress requesting relief from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (TAB B). The resolution would permit the inspection of the interior of a nuclear device by representatives of the three original parties to the proposed treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. *Chairman McCone* reported that he had undertaken consultations with Congressional leaders and, while he could not guarantee favorable Congressional action, the reaction of the people he had consulted had been encouraging. He recommended that the draft resolution be sent at once to the President if the Principals agreed with the text.

Chairman McCone then stated that this resolution involved the question of the conduct of the negotiations on testing from this point on. He felt that, if the Soviets rejected an offer by the U.S. to open certain nuclear devices to inspection in connection with the seismic research program, it would clearly indicate that the Soviets were following a policy of placing one impediment after another in the path of negotiations. *Secretary Herter* agreed that, if Congress acted favorably on this resolution and the Soviets did not accept the proposal, it would seem virtually impossible to reach an understanding with them on a research program. *Chairman McCone* said he felt the U.S. should break off the negotiations on testing if the Soviets turned down this proposal. *The Secretary* remarked that certainly the justification we had given for a moratorium would break down if the Soviets refused to join with us in a coordinated research program to improve underground detection of nuclear tests.

Secretary Gates felt that the resolution also might create problems with our Allies, since information is withheld from them on the type

of device we propose to disclose to the Soviets. Furthermore, *Secretary Gates* said, if the precedent of disclosing the interior of a nuclear device were extended to the Plowshare program, the U.S. would be in difficulties for the reason that in the Plowshare program it is proposed to use very sophisticated types of nuclear weapons. He felt strongly that, if we agreed to open the "black boxes" to be used in the research program, and if the proposal is still not accepted by the Soviet Union, the U.S. should walk out of the test talks.

Chairman McCone felt that our position with respect to our NATO Allies could be defended. However, as regards opening up the "black boxes" the staffs of both the Defense Department and the AEC were quite worried, because of the possibility of opening nuclear devices in the Plowshare program. For example, the theory of the "Ditch-digger", a device which might be used to dig canals, would have to be tested in Nevada. This was such an advanced theory that the interior of this device could, perhaps, not even be exposed to the U.K. (*Chairman McCone* noted, in passing, that the Vice President had told *Secretary Gates* and himself on the preceding day that the Plowshare program should go forward without delay.)

Chairman McCone then stated that, with respect to the resolution, its provisions fell short of what *Tsarapkin* was requesting. *Tsarapkin* was insisting on the right to sample materials that went into the assembly of the nuclear devices and also wanted to have the blueprints, *Chairman McCone* felt this was a ridiculous request.

Secretary Gates reiterated that he felt we would be under pressure from our Allies after making this offer of opening a nuclear device for the Soviet Union. *Mr. Smith* felt that the French would not try to get information through the medium of the test talks, since they wanted to have nothing to do with the talks.

Chairman McCone asked whether the Principals were agreed that the negotiations on testing were finished if the Soviets did not accept the offer which the passage of the resolution by the Congress would make possible. *The Secretary* remarked we seemed pretty close to the end of the negotiations even now, and that we had no obligation at the present time not to test. *Mr. Smith* referred to the resolution and asked whether it was necessary to use the word "representatives", which implied many people would be looking into the nuclear devices. He felt the wording should be a "qualified representatives." This would strictly limit the number of people who would be participating in the exercise. After some discussion, it was agreed that the word "representatives" might be modified by the addition of the words "limited" or "qualified". *Chairman McCone* felt that the number of representatives could be controlled.

Chairman McCone added that he felt the conversations with Congress should be kept in the closest confidence. If the resolution were not

acceptable to Congress. This fact could be used against us by the Soviet Union. *Mr. Gray* agreed and thought everyone in the room should be cautioned to be very careful about discussing this matter.

The Secretary asked *Mr. Keeny* what progress had been made by the panel of scientists working on the problem of the minimum number of nuclear explosions to be conducted in the seismic research program. *Mr. Keeny* replied that there had been no agreement on what a minimum program of nuclear shots should be, due in part to the unclarity as to what was meant by the term “minimum” and due, also, to some technical problems. He thought it was significant that not too much disarmament had appeared with regard to the general program as it had previously been drawn up. Everyone had agreed that the decoupling phase of the program should be included, but there had not been agreement on the exact number of the shots to be conducted. *The Secretary* inquired whether the committee would be definitive as to the number of shots required. *Secretary Gates* answered that the exact number of explosions needed would not be definitely known until the program had gotten underway. *The Secretary* expressed the hope that the scientific community would reach unanimity on this problem.

Mr. Keeny said that the committee had not been certain whether the time required for the conducting of the seismic research program should be considered as 18–24 months or three years. With larger yield shots and a three-year period of research, fewer nuclear explosions would be required. *Mr. Keeny* and *General Starbird* pointed out that with larger shots, problems of a technical and engineering nature arose, such as the problem of larger excavations, which would prolong the period of research to three years.

Chairman McCone brought up another matter—that of Soviet insistence that the research program be agreed among the three parties in the negotiations. *Chairman McCone* felt an “agreed” program was nonsense; it should rather be carried out in a “coordinated” manner.

Secretary Gates asked if the record of this meeting of Principals would show that the Principals were agreed that if the Congress passed the resolution being presented to it, and if the Soviets did not accept the U.S. offer made possible by the passage of the resolution, the negotiations on discontinuance of nuclear tests would be broken off.

The Secretary repeated that the justification for a moratorium on nuclear testing would be lost if the seismic research program did not go forward; the final decision on such a step as a break-off of the negotiations would, of course, be up to the President.

Mr. Gray said that, if the program offered to the Soviets were rejected out of hand, the U.S. should then be in a position immediately to carry out the steps necessary to give us the type of posture we want globally. Since an outright rejection of the program by the Soviet Union was at least a possibility, we should make advance preparations as to

what steps we would take. *Mr. Dillon* said the most likely outcome was a fuzzy reply by the Soviets which would be neither outright rejection nor acceptance. In this case, the Principals would have to meet again to settle the problem.

Both *Secretary Gates* and *Chairman McCone* wanted it made clear as to what would happen if the Soviets did not accept the research program proposed to them by the U.S. *Chairman McCone* added that everyone he would be consulting in Congress would want to know whether the negotiations will be broken off, if Congress passed the resolution and the Soviets rejected the program. *The Secretary* replied that he would think they would be; he thought the President would think so too. An outright Soviet rejection would give us good grounds to break off negotiations.

PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING OF PRINCIPALS ON JUNE 23, 1960 AT 8:45 A.M.

Department of State:

Secretary Herter

Under Secretary Dillon

Assistant Secretary Kohler

Assistant Secretary Smith

Ambassador Eaton

S/S—Mr. Mau

SOV—Mr. Dubs

S/AE—Messrs. Sullivan, Spiers, Baker, Toon, Goodby

Department of Defense:

Secretary Gates

Under Secretary Douglas

Assistant Secretary Irwin

General Dabney

General Fox

Mr. Lanier

Atomic Energy Commission:

Chairman McCone

General Starbird

Dr. English

Central Intelligence Agency:

Deputy Director Cabell

Deputy Director Amory

White House:

Mr. Gray

Mr. Keeny

United States Information Agency:

Mr. Allen

574. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between Herter and Eaton¹

June 27, 1960

9:15 a.m.—Mr. Eaton telephoned to report on the break-up of the conference. Mr. Eaton said he had spoken to Zorin before the meeting and told him that Eaton would be prepared to table a new proposal within a very few days. Eaton said Zorin's response was that the discussions had been going badly. Eaton said the meeting then came to order with the Pole in the chair and the Pole recognized Zorin who read his statement. Eaton said Zorin's statement was then paralleled by one of the satellites and they walked out while everybody on our side insisted the conference go on. Eaton said the next chairman in alphabetical order was Ormsby-Gore who took the chair and said the conference was continuing. Eaton said he then made a statement, which will be coming over the open wires to us, and Eaton said he filed the plan exactly as it came out of Washington. Eaton said this was then followed by a statement on the part of all the other Western delegations endorsing the plan. Eaton said Moch then raised a point of order that this conference had been convened by the Four Foreign Ministers and that it could not be broken up by any one of them unilaterally. Eaton said the conference was then adjourned until tomorrow which will give us a chance to determine what should be done. Eaton said they can either convene in the morning and do something or they can announce termination or whatever is decided. Eaton said the Western delegates were meeting at 5:00 p.m. Geneva time (12:00 noon Washington time) and following that meeting Eaton said he would get a communication to the Secy on any suggestion by the Western delegates. The Secy said he was assuming the statement Eaton made was in order and Eaton said it was fine—one of the most classical statements ever made. Eaton said he had been asked to have a press conference but he didn't think he would. Eaton said they called the press into the conference after the Soviets walked out so they heard the Western statements, but Eaton said he thinks he will go very briefly on radio and TV. Eaton said the Soviets are in a very, very difficult position because the press knew we had a plan and were going to present it. Eaton said he told the press he had had a private talk with Zorin so they knew that he had told Zorin we were prepared to do this. Eaton said they had just heard about the President making a speech and they will have in Washington a text of what Eaton said for the President's possible use. Eaton asked if the President had received a letter from Khrushchev and the Secretary asked what

¹ Source: Breakup of ten-nation disarmament talks. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Calls.

letter he referred to. Eaton said Khrushchev has presumably written to each of the heads of the Western powers according to Zorin's statement and Mr. Eaton then read the rough translation of Zorin's remarks (copy attached). Mr. Eaton said the significant part was, of course, their taking this to the UN.

3:00 p.m.—Mr. Eaton telephoned from Geneva after having met with the other Four Western representatives. Mr. Eaton said the Soviets will not come back; that they will meet tomorrow and the conference will adjourn after tomorrow. The Secretary said he was then in a session discussing the question of going to the U.N. Disarmament Committee with a view to passing a resolution urging the Soviets to continue disarmament discussions. Eaton said this is good. Eaton said they were going to recommend the Secy consider making a statement calling an immediate meeting of the Security Council to ask that an emergency session of the General Assembly be called. The Secretary said they have a Disarmament Committee of 82 which would seem to us the better and more logical forum. Eaton said the Soviets have said they would go to a regular meeting of the GA and it might appear we were trying to avoid that by going to the Disarmament Committee. Eaton said by going directly to the GA this would indicate we could take a positive approach quickly by putting it before the U.N. Eaton said their alternative recommendation was to go to the Disarmament Committee but everyone there would favor calling a emergency session which can be done by seven members of the SC. Eaton said the only thing would be to be sure the emergency session would be limited to disarmament matters, but regardless of that, Eaton said it was the strong view of everyone with the possible exception of the French, that it would be good better to go before the GA to make clear we were going to the forum the world recognizes. Eaton said the suggestion on the part of all the Five delegations was that coordination of the Western position take place in Washington where the time difference problem is less. Eaton said he expressed the personal view the Secy might want to take a position and take it immediately to indicate we can take decisions without delay and the other delegations are fully conscious of this and would go along with the exception of wanting to be certain their Foreign Ministers are advised. Eaton said he would be available by phone at any time and was sending the Secy by most rapid communication a fuller text of what Eaton had said to the Secy.

575. Memorandum for the Files by McCone¹

Washington, June 28, 1960

During my discussion with the President on Monday, June 27, he stated:

- a. No moratorium on testing now exists (December 29, 1959, Augusta statement),
- b. Why shouldn't we proceed with unannounced tests.

In discussions with the Joint Committee on June 27, concerning the proposed "Joint Resolution" the following questions were raised:

- a. Can the seismic improvement program be carried on with older gun type devices (thereby eliminating the use of the Mark 7),
- b. Would gun type devices now in stockpile be used or would modifications be necessary and, if so, would these modifications be construed as "weapon developments."

With reference to the President's statements:

- a. Technically, no moratorium exists at the present time, for on December 29, 1959, he stated: "..... In the meantime, the voluntary moratorium on testing will expire on December 31. (1959)"

"Although we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear weapons testing, we shall not resume nuclear weapons tests without announcing our intention in advance....."

I agreed with the President that no moratorium existed based on the December 29 statement but, nevertheless, no testing had taken place and, furthermore, the Eisenhower-Macmillan declaration of March 29, offering to conduct a seismic improvement program extended the moratorium for a period during which a limited treaty would be negotiated and signed and a coordinated seismic program completed.

Therefore, for all practical purposes, a moratorium does exist by directive of the President.

- b. With reference to the conducting of nuclear tests for weapons development or seismic improvement in secrecy, my investigation indicates this is possible at the Nevada test site because of the vastness of the installation and the diverse activities taking place there. However, there is a very high probability that the activity would become known to the press and, through them, to the public because of the number of people involved and the familiarity on the part of the press with various activities such as safety precautions, unusual instrumentation, and laboratory technicians all of which is unique to a weapons test undertaking.

¹ Source: Record of McCone's conversation with Eisenhower on considerations for resumed testing. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Eyes Only. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.

Therefore, it can be concluded that one or two tests can be conducted without the fact becoming known, but a series (and a series would be required for meaningful results) would, in all probability, become known to the public.

The President's position caused me to review requirements for immediate tests. It is indicated that testing should be undertaken promptly on the Minute Man, Polaris and the first step on a small Queen weapon. These tests are justified on the basis of safety and dependability.

With regard to the points of the Joint Committee:

a. The seismic program outlined under project Vela calls for use of both the gun type weapons and the Mark 7. Seismologists and the AEC staff consider these as "proven designs", however, neither the Mark 7 nor the gun type devices *now in stockpile* will give the exact yields called for under project Vela. The yields are obtained by increasing or decreasing the special nuclear materials in the "proven devices".

If the program is restricted to existing devices in the stockpile on the theory that only such devices are acceptable as "proven", then project Vela must be modified considerably. *[text not declassified]*

It is debatable whether an increase or decrease of the special nuclear material in a proven device could or should be construed as a "weapon development."

b. If the program is restricted to gun type devices then project Vela, as now laid out, cannot be accomplished. For yields of *[text not declassified]* a modified program can be developed.

However, for yields above 25 KT and, more particularly for yields under 1 KT (of which 4 are indicated, ranging from *[text not declassified]*), we must extrapolate from knowledge gained from the present gun type devices for these particular yields are both above and below yields yet attained by us in devices of this type.

It is quite possible that actual yields so extrapolated would vary from the theoretical yields by as much as 30%, plus or minus, and it is also possible that yields of the lower range *[text not declassified]* might fail entirely. Such extrapolation might very readily be considered as the development of new and heretofore untried weapons as yield of the magnitude anticipated has not been produced heretofore.

[text not declassified] of the Mark 7 device. These devices would always be used because of the economy of the special nuclear material. However, it is important to note that under an arrangement of where the gun type device would be declassified (even on a limited basis), or the Soviets were permitted visual and manual inspection (as provided in the Joint Resolution), and as a result that completed the weapon development, for the reason mentioned above *we could not* explain that this is not the case because we had alternate devices which are better and more economical (Mark 7's in stockpile) and such information is classified as Top Secret, Restricted Data.

John A. McCone

576. Record of Telephone Conversations Between Herter and Lodge and Lyndon Johnson¹

June 28, 1960

6:10 p.m.

Lodge telephoned that the resolution in the Disarmament Commission requests the Russians to go back to the 10-nation group. Lodge said he didn't think this would get as many votes as a resolution to negotiate in the Disarmament Commission. The Secretary asked if he had reference to negotiating with a group of 82 and Lodge said that was what the Disarmament Commission was made up of and that he didn't think we had to be afraid of this at all. The Secretary said it was impossible to negotiate in such a large body and Lodge insisted that if it could be done with 10 it could be done with 82. Actually, he said, it would boil down to the Russians and us; that we could bring the British and French in for private talks. Lodge said this was all academic because they would refuse. He said he was afraid we wouldn't get a strong vote to go back to the 10-nation group. Lodge said he had suggested we go into the Disarmament Commission with the proposal on disarmament which he thinks would be best of all. The Secretary asked if he hadn't received what Eaton had tabled. Lodge said they had been told that this wasn't sufficiently far along. The Sec. said the draft letter to Hammarskjold would have our proposal as an attachment asking that it be circulated. He said that Eaton didn't have time to clear the proposal with our allies. Lodge said that the meeting would be on July 6; that would be time to clear it with our allies. The Secretary said it would still be in the process of clearance. Lodge said the best thing to do would be to start negotiating on disarmament in the Commission; the next best was to urge the Russians to come into the Commission. The worst thing would be to come back into the 10-nation group. The Secretary said to try to do it in the 82-nation was just as bad; that this was a terribly complicated and difficult thing. Lodge said he didn't think the fact that there were 82 added anything to the complexity of the situation. It meant that we, the Russians, the British and French would sit down in private. The Secretary mentioned wording it in such a way as to ask the Russians to return or in such form as the Disarmament Commission would select. Lodge said then all the neutrals would get in, i.e., Communist China. The Sec. said he wouldn't mind Communist China being in and Lodge said not in an election year. The Sec. said he could not see it being done in the 82-nation group. Lodge suggested the

¹ Source: Tactics for U.N. resolution on resuming disarmament talks; State Department appropriations bill. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

Secretary get in the disarmament experts and mull it over. Lodge said the point was to force the Russians to say yes or no to negotiations now. Lodge said he planned to meet with our allies tomorrow to sign the letter and the Sec. asked if they were ready to sign. Lodge said he didn't think they were. The Sec. said the British wanted time to think it over. Lodge asked the Secretary to think it over and to let him know.

6:43 p.m.

Telephoned Lyndon Johnson that he was worried about the State Department Appropriations Bill. The Secretary said that as Mr. Macomber had told him, we would do our best on the money going into the University. Sec said he hoped that as far as salaries and expenses were concerned the Senator would give us a good break. Senator Johnson said he would certainly be considerate. He realized the burden the Secretary carried and that he would try to be as understanding as if their positions were reversed. He said he would get on it in the morning. The Secretary expressed his appreciation.

577. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 30, 1960, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations (Meeting of Principals)

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State Dept.</i>	<i>DOD</i>	<i>AEC</i>	<i>White House</i>
The Secretary	Mr. Gates	Mr. McCone	Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Dillon	Mr. Irwin	Dr. English	Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Farley	Gen. Dabney	Col. Sherrill	Gen. Persons
	Mr. Lanier	Col. Anderson	Mr. Keeney
<i>CIA</i>			
Gen. Cabell			
Dr. Scoville			

Mr. Herter reviewed the Geneva discussions of a coordinated research program and the arrangements for use of nuclear devices in

¹ Source: Use of nuclear explosions in seismic research. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

seismic research. In view of the Soviet shift in position regarding seismic research and Soviet unwillingness to use nuclear devices of their own, the United States is faced with the problem whether to go ahead on its own. If we do go ahead, the “black box” approach permits suspicion that we are doing something of possible weapons advantage. To avoid this situation, Mr. McCone explored with Congressional leaders the possibility of a congressional resolution permitting us to open certain devices for U.K. and Soviet examination. The eventual congressional reaction was that this should only be done if there was a reciprocal opening of Soviet devices. AEC also explored declassification possibilities. General declassification was impractical since it would result in the information being made available to Nth countries. Limited declassification restricting dissemination of the information on the specific devices involved also appeared undesirable.

Mr. McCone said that limited declassification would be objectionable to the Joint Committee since it would establish a precedent whereby the Congress would lose control over restricted data. For example, the Executive Branch would be able to handle transmission of nuclear weapons or nuclear submarine information to selected allies by this procedure without having to submit an agreement for cooperation for Congressional review. *Mr. Gray* said that perhaps the Joint Committee wouldn’t like it, but limited declassification apparently was feasible under the law. *Mr. McCone* said that the congressional objections would be bipartisan and would probably lead to legislative action shutting off this course of action.

Mr. Herter said that we had to find an answer. As things now stand, the Geneva talks are likely to end not because of Soviet obduracy but because of United States unwillingness to remove a valid basis for suspicion of our nuclear explosions under the seismic research program.

Mr. McCone said that he thought a possibility would be for us to reemphasize the necessity for seismic research and use of nuclear explosions for this purpose, emphasize that we were going ahead with this program, and propose that we and the Soviets each put in 4 to 6 nuclear devices for use in the program and open them up for examination. Congress would buy this reciprocal approach in his judgment. The Soviets would probably turn such an offer down. We could then invite UN observers to check our use of “black boxes”. *Mr. Herter* asked if this meant we would go ahead with Vela even if the Geneva negotiations collapse. *Mr. McCone* said a modified version of Vela would be desirable. He thought that there would be a controlled underground test ban someday and we do not know enough now without further research to design the requisite controls. He did not dispute *Mr. Herter’s* belief that the “black box” approach was not persuasive enough to world opinion, though it would satisfy objective scientists like Nils Bohr.

Mr. Herter asked whether AEC had concluded firmly that Soviet devices could be brought into the United States and used in the research program. He recalled that such a proposal had been vigorously rejected on a previous occasion. *Mr. McCone* said that he needed to discuss the practical aspects with his laboratories and that this idea had come to him just on the preceding evening.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that continuing discussions among the U.S. technical people had developed a new list of nuclear explosions for Vela cutting out two shots below 1 kiloton. Of course, any initial list would be subject to review in the light of actual results from early shots.

Mr. Dillon said that another possible course would be for the President to take the initiative and offer the Soviets the opportunity to examine the U.S. nuclear devices used in Vela upon condition of Congressional approval. If accepted, the President could send this to Congress in August. The Presidential lead would somewhat protect the Congressmen from the political dangers they feared by shifting responsibility to him, and they would be hard put to refuse the President the authorization he asked. There was considerable discussion of the sensitivity of information on gun-type devices and its possible value to the Soviets or to the French.

Mr. Herter stressed the importance of proceeding without delay. *Mr. McCone* emphasized his view that the limited declassification approach would draw Congressional counter-action promptly in August and that we should avoid facing the Congress with a fait accompli if possible. He believed he could get an answer as to the technical and safety aspects of his reciprocal proposal by noon, July 1. *Mr. Gates* urged that any such conditional proposal be accompanied by the statement that the United States will go ahead on August 15 if the Soviets do not accept. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that such a statement, while it would bring the issue to a head, was not necessary on technical grounds since Vela could proceed for awhile using chemical explosions and the first nuclear test would not be ready much before October 1. *Mr. Dillon* pointed out that if Congress convenes August 8, then the August 15 deadline would be too close. *Mr. Gates* said that he believed the earliest possible date should be set and he did not see why, if a decision was made, we could not be ready to act August 15.

Mr. Gray asked whether, if we go ahead unilaterally, UN observers would accept an invitation to observe our "black box" detonations; he referred to past invitations to UN observers which showed their reluctance. *Mr. Dillon* said that probably they would not come, but the offer would be worth something as evidence of our good intentions.

Mr. Dillon said that when we came to make a decision we should face the fact that the requirements for reciprocal Soviet participation will not appear reasonable and the Soviets will simply reiterate that

they do not believe nuclear detonations are needed and will not contribute any. The simplest and most direct course would be opening U.S. devices for examination. *Mr. Herter* and *Mr. McCone* thought that these objections were at least partially met by past instances of Soviet admission of detection limitations and the need for research.

Mr. McCone said that, in a frank talk on the previous evening, Ambassador Caccia had told him that he thought the Soviets would shortly walk out of the Geneva negotiations, attempting to throw the blame on the U.S., and declaring that they would not conduct nuclear tests unless the United States held nuclear explosions (of any kind, including Vela or Plowshare) in which case they would consider themselves free to conduct whatever tests they felt necessary.

It was agreed that, while *Mr. McCone* was checking out the technical and safety problems of bringing Soviet devices into the United States, the staffs of the interested agencies would draft on a contingency basis instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth to put forward a proposal of the kind suggested by *Mr. McCone*.

578. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 30, 1960

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

U.K.—Sir Harold Caccia, The British Ambassador
The Viscount Hood, Minister, The British Embassy
Mr. Charles Wiggin, First Secretary, The British Embassy

U.S.—Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
James D. Swihart, OIC, U.K., Ireland and B.I Affairs

The Ambassador inquired as to our latest thinking about the Nuclear Testing Conference developments. The Secretary responded that we presently had under discussion some of the complicated legal aspects. He understood the Ambassador had recently had a conversation

¹ Source: Seismic testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

with Mr. McCone regarding some of the problems. At the moment, we were working on alternative proposals that would be more acceptable to the Congressional leaders concerned. He would probably have no objections if something along a reciprocal basis could be worked out. There would remain some technical questions, such as whether the Atomic Energy Commission could shoot off someone else's device. The Ambassador observed that even under our new thinking, we would have still the difficulty that the Soviets have gone on record that they are opposed to inspection. The Secretary remarked that if the Soviets were to turn us down, then the moratorium would be out the window. The Ambassador felt that it was a pity that our first proposals were not practical from a U.S. domestic political standpoint. The Secretary observed this was a question involving the inspection problem. Lord Hood asked whether it was correct to state that our new idea would mean the Soviets could inspect our explosions here and that we, theirs in the Soviet Union? The Secretary said that this was not correct. Under our proposal, we would all exchange a certain number of devices and then test each others. Lord Hood wondered whether this would not raise legal complications from our standpoint. The Secretary replied we are trying to see how we can get around these difficulties including the problems of how to declassify, which, in turn, might raise difficulties here and with our Allies. Lord Hood felt one of the hazards might be that the Soviets would not turn down our proposal completely. The Secretary said that our position would be to fall back on the 1958 scientific experts' report. He commented further that in putting forward any such proposals, we may have to state they are subject to subsequent legislative approval. The Ambassador remarked that in the event we decide to go down this road, he would like to warn his own people as soon as possible. The Secretary said that we should know where we're going by tomorrow and would let the British know as quickly as possible. The Ambassador inquired whether we had given any further thought about the Tsarapkin package. The Secretary said we have, but unless some of the other problems are settled the moratorium will be over. He remarked that the quota and the moratorium were two separate issues. The Ambassador agreed, but pointed out that during the moratorium period we could inspect. The Secretary said this was so in theory, but as a practical matter, the appropriate instrumentation may not be ready during the two-year moratorium period. The Ambassador summarized that it would appear we felt this problem should be taken step by step; i.e., inspection first, quota second, and finally, moratorium.

[text not declassified]

579. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, July 6, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list

Mr. Dillon expressed his appreciation to *Mr. McCone* for returning from California to be present at this meeting. The purpose of the discussion would be consideration of how we proceed regarding opening to inspection older-type nuclear devices to be detonated in connection with the research program. The proposal to open the devices for inspection on condition that an approximately equal number be made available by the U.S., the U.K. and the USSR, (as forwarded to the delegation in NUSUP 919) caused great consternation in the British Government. Lord Hood had told the Department that this alternative was unlikely to be accepted and represented a step backward from the move which Secretary Herter had mentioned to Ambassador Caccia (i.e., obtaining Congressional authority to open old devices to inspection, without condition of reciprocity), and that the “ultimatum” aspect might force the Soviets to break off the talks under conditions highly unfavorable to the Western powers. In view of the firm U.K. stand, it is likely that we will be on our own if we persist in the approach set out in NUSUP 919. *Secretary Gates* asked why the U.K. could accept the approach calling for “quid pro quo” on inspection of devices if they believe it to be unacceptable to the Soviets. *Mr. Dillon* replied that they believe such an approach would not be vulnerable, from a world public opinion standpoint, if not coupled with the statement of intention to go ahead on our own even though it were rejected. *Mr. Farley* commented that the U.K. desire for continuation of the negotiations is the key to their reactions.

Mr. Dillon expressed belief that a U.S. decision to go ahead with our own research program after a maximum effort by the U.S. to find an answer to the safeguards problem would have a good chance of acceptance by public opinion, but that otherwise we would be very vulnerable.

¹ Source: Opening nuclear weapons for seismic research program to inspection. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.

Mr. Gray reported that, in a telephone conversation, General Persons had expressed concern about our putting forward at Geneva, in the face of present Congressional views and without indication of Congressional support, any safeguards proposal which would require some Congressional authorization.

Mr. McCone reviewed the discussions which had taken place with members of Congress in regard to a joint resolution, prepared by the Department of State and the AEC, authorizing the revealing of a number of older-type devices in connection with the research program. During the week beginning June 20, he had talked to Senators Johnson and Anderson and Representatives Rayburn, McCormack, Holifield and Halleck, and had met with unanimously favorable response. He was advised that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy should report out the resolution. At a closed hearing on June 24, the Committee appeared prepared to endorse the resolution, on condition that the text would limit inspection to "visual and manual examination", and would contain a proviso that each of the other nations would accord similar rights of examination to devices it might use in the program. On the succeeding Monday, June 27, however, perhaps as a result of informal Congressional discussions over the weekend, the atmosphere had changed. It was obvious that the Committee would not approve the original resolution because of fear that political opponents of members running in the coming elections would charge them with having given away nuclear weapons information to the Soviets without any return. Thereupon we had developed our "pool" proposal. *Mr. McCone* had not, however, told these members of the plan to state that, in case of rejection by the Soviet Government, we would go ahead on our own. The Atomic Energy Commission also had reconsidered declassification of devices but arrived at a negative conclusion as before.

In light of this background information, *Mr. McCone* recommended that the delegation be instructed to advance the alternative proposal, calling for the pooling arrangement and omitting the language objectionable to the U.K. Government. He warned against advancing the original proposal, at this time since the Joint Committee opposed it. He quoted Senator Hickenlooper as still favoring the original resolution but as warning him against proceeding on it without support of the other committee members. If this proposal were advanced, and accepted by Soviets, we might be in serious trouble with the Committee, perhaps made vindictive by the political climate. *Mr. Dillon* commented that the progress in the negotiations which would ensue from finding an answer to the safeguards problem might spur popular demand for Congress to pass the needed resolution. He stated that the addition of the "ultimatum" represented a departure from the proposal the Joint Committee was considering and might affect the Joint Committee's

attitude towards it. *Secretary Gates* commented that the words “We would face strong compulsion to” hardly constituted an ultimatum.

After further discussion, *Mr. Dillon* agreed that the alternative proposal be advanced, as suggested by *Mr. McCone*. If it is turned down by the Soviets, the Administration might then be in a stronger position to go back to the Congress for authorization as required under the original proposal. *Secretary Gates* expressed concern at elimination of the language announcing our intentions to proceed unilaterally with the research program, including nuclear experiments, if the Soviets do not accept the alternative proposal. He called for a clear decision that there will be nuclear detonations for purposes of improving the underground detection system, during the term of this Administration, and recommended that this decision be clearly communicated to the other parties to this treaty. He urged that further long negotiation, under a *de facto* moratorium, be avoided. *Mr. Dillon* replied that such a communication should be connected to a plan which world opinion would consider to be good, such as an offer to open the devices which will be used. Attaching such a communication to the alternative proposal, with its compulsory “*quid pro quo*” features, would be likely to lead to the collapse of the talks under circumstances very unfavorable for us. *Secretary Gates* urged that the Principals recommend to the President that the nuclear aspects of the research program go forward, if the Soviets do not accept our proposal. *Mr. Dillon* said that the statement of our intention to go ahead with the testing program might be attached to our “fall-back position” offer. He re-emphasized his view that the U.K. would consider this a reasonable approach. *Secretary Gates* and *Mr. McCone* stated it appears that the U.K. basic objectives in these negotiations are different from ours. They even appear to be agreeable to a comprehensive treaty without adequate controls. *Secretary Gates* agreed that the caveat might be left out, as long as the Administration has a clear position on its own objective.

After a discussion, it was decided not to make an informal approach to the Joint Committee at this time as to either of the alternatives. *Secretary Gates* and *Mr. McCone* recommended that the proposal be advanced in Geneva as soon as possible, in order to avoid a Soviet walk-out accompanied by an announcement that “We’ll never test again.”

Mr. Dillon proposed that we first advance the alternative proposal now, devote our best efforts to obtaining its acceptance, and second, if this fails, go back to the Joint Committee in August with a request for a joint resolution enabling us to put forward the original proposal, together with a caveat about intention to go ahead on our own. *Mr. Sullivan* suggested that the House Foreign Affairs Committee also be consulted. *Mr. McCone* expressed belief that it would be preferable

to make the second move without seeking Congressional authority, because of the possibility that some of the members of the Committee might remain away from Washington and that those who come back might again refuse to give favorable consideration. *Mr. Dillon* suggested that the second move, if necessary, might be made before the August session begins. *Mr. McCone* conceded that there is an element of chance in the second move; but he urged that, in view of the danger of leaks to the press, we go ahead as rapidly as possible. He cautioned against expanding the inspection concept beyond the permissible limits set by the Joint Committee. He recalled that the Joint Committee had been unusually concerned about showing drawings or blueprints to the Soviets.

Mr. McCone expressed his understanding that, in the event the original proposal is eventually advanced, it will be accompanied by a caveat phrased as originally proposed by Secretary Gates. *Mr. Dillon* suggested that extensive thought be given to the domestic political implications before setting a nuclear detonation date for inclusion in the caveat. *Secretary Gates* said that the President and Vice President must certainly be consulted as to this question, but if they do not consider the move unwise, we should include a very strong statement. *Mr. Dillon* replied that consideration should even then be given to the form of presentation of the proposal. Inserting a date might give the Soviets the opportunity to break up the Conference with a big propaganda blast. *Mr. Kohler* agreed that inclusion of a date would ensure an adverse reaction.

Secretary Gates reiterated that there would be no question of considering that an ultimatum or a threat is involved here. We are merely trying to go ahead with explosions for research proposes, to improve the capabilities of the system. *Mr. Dillon* pointed out that there seemed to be some experimentation for military purposes involved. *Mr. McCone* denied this. The tunnel linings which had been constructed would have the purpose of providing information useful for civil defense. It has nothing to do with weapons development. *Mr. Dillon* pointed out that military application could be made of the results. *Secretary Gates* and *Mr. McCone* insisted that, at a time when the Soviets are firing rockets into the Pacific, no one should object to that. *Mr. Dillon* said that the problem was not so great if the results of all the experimentation were made generally available. *Secretary Gates* said this would be the case. *Mr. McCone* noted that the tunnel could simply be filled in if the problems this experiment would create were too great.

In answer to a question by *Mr. McCone*, *Mr. Farley* mentioned that Sir Michael Wright had suggested that, in order to make the pooling proposal more palatable to the Soviets, the pool might be used for both research devices and peaceful uses devices, so that the Soviets could

have a rationale for agreeing to contribute to it. *Mr. McCone* expressed opposition to this since some Plowshare devices are of such sophisticated design that they cannot even be shared with the U.K.

The Principals agreed to pass their recommendations to the President on July 7.

*PARTICIPANTS OF MEETING OF PRINCIPALS ON NUCLEAR TEST
NEGOTIATIONS HELD JULY 6, 1960*

Department of State:

Acting Secretary Dillon

EUR—Mr. Kohler

S/AE—Mr. Farley

S/AE—Messrs. Sullivan, Spiers, Gotzlinger

SOV—Mr. Dubs

Department of Defense:

Secretary Gates

Mr. Knight

General Fox

Mr. Lanier

White House:

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Lt. Col. Eisenhower

Mr. Gordon Gray

Mr. Keeney

AEC:

Chairman McCone

General Starbird

Dr. English

CIA:

Mr. Dulles

Dr. Scoville

580. Telegram 219 to London¹

Washington, July 9, 1960, 2:45 p.m.

219. Please deliver following message from President to Prime Minister. Advise date and time delivery.

QUOTE: July 9, 1960

Dear Harold:

I have been giving considerable thought to the handling of the nuclear detonations in the seismic research program. This program is essential if we are to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing of the kind you and I proposed on March 29, and if the moratorium which we are prepared to agree to is to provide us answers on the underground detection problem.

We have explored here, and with your people, various ways of dealing with the safeguards for these nuclear detonations. One possibility is a pool approach whereby devices of the U.K., the U.S., and the USSR would be used on a reciprocal basis. Another approach would be an offer by the United States to open its seismic research devices to inspection by representatives of the U.K. and the USSR. Either approach would, as you know, require Congressional authorization.

With respect to the first proposal it is probable that the Soviets will reject it inasmuch as they have already stated that they have no intention of using nuclear explosions in seismic research. In spite of this I feel it is important that we put the pool idea forward as a proposal. It will be another evidence of our desire to find a cooperative solution. A further reason that I believe it is desirable to put this forward is the strong feeling expressed by certain members of the Congress that a safeguards arrangement should be reciprocal. Having made this proposal, we would then be in a better position to obtain Congressional support for the second course of action. I have concluded that we should not put forward this proposal accompanied by any sort of warning of possible unilateral action in the event of Soviet rejection.

If the Soviets reject the pool proposal in spite of our best persuasion, we plan to offer to open devices used in the United States seismic research program for examination by the United Kingdom and the USSR. This proposal would also be put forward without a warning of possible unilateral action in event of Soviet rejection. Implementation of this proposal would of course be subject to Congressional action

¹ Source: Transmits letter to Macmillan from Eisenhower on opening nuclear weapons for seismic research to inspection. Secret; Presidential Handling. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/7-960.

which I could request in August if the Soviets show any likelihood of accepting.

However, should the Soviets reject this reasonable proposal or should they delay their response for an unreasonable period it would be our intention to announce that we are proceeding with the U.S. seismic research program and that we intend to invite United Nations or other international observation of these experiments. If this proposal does not satisfy the Soviets I doubt that there is anything we can devise which would, and under those circumstances I believe our action in going ahead would be widely understood and supported.

As for timing, it is our objective to put forward these proposals and be prepared in the event of Soviet rejection or undue delay to make the above mentioned announcement sometime during August.

To protect our negotiating position we are limiting knowledge of the second proposal and our future intentions to the smallest possible group.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQUOTE

Herter

581. Memorandum From Beckler to Goodpaster¹

Washington, July 14, 1960

SUBJECT

Plowshare Study Proposal

When the Science Advisory Committee met with the President on July 11th there was discussion of the Plowshare program, particularly with respect to the matter of radioactivity and its economic consequences. The Committee recommended that a critical study of the problem be undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences.

Attached is a general description of what is intended to be included in the proposed study. The description is based on a discussion with Dr.

¹ Source: Transmits description of Plowshare study proposal. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Dr. Kistiakowsky.

Kistiakowsky immediately prior to his departure for Europe, but he has not had an opportunity to see the final language.

D.Z. Beckler

Enclosure

Proposed Study

K-C-10334

July 14, 1960

*Proposed Study on
Radioactivity Associated with Project Plowshare*

It is proposed that, on behalf of the President, the Special Assistant for Science and Technology request the National Academy of Sciences/ National Research Council to undertake a classified study of the radioactivity associated with use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (Project Plowshare). The purpose of this study would be to provide a basis for government planning concerning Project Plowshare.

The study would be focused on the critical evaluations of the world-wide and local fallout and the ground contamination involved in specific applications of nuclear explosions proposed in Project Plowshare. The study would also make general estimates of the direct and indirect economic effects resulting from precautions against radioactivity contamination. In addition, the study would estimate the duration and magnitude of the research and development effort required to reduce the radioactive contamination involved in various applications.

The study would not attempt to evaluate either the overall comparative economic worth of the proposed applications of Project Plowshare or the psychological aspects of the problem resulting from either the favorable reaction to U.S. technological strength or the unfavorable reaction to fear of radioactivity contamination and the association of the project with nuclear weapons development.

The study would be completed by September 10, 1960 in a form suitable for a briefing for the President. (It must be recognized, however, that the late starting date and the problem of obtaining the services of competent people during August make this completion date uncertain.) The cost of conducting such a study is estimated at some \$25,000 to \$50,000.

582. Memorandum From Henderson (IO) to Merchant¹

Washington, July 19, 1960

SUBJECT

Background for Your Meeting with Lord Hood on Disarmament

The Acting Secretary and Ambassador Lodge, in a meeting with the President agreed in principle that we take steps to convene a meeting of the Disarmament Commission about the middle of August—preferably earlier rather than later. We had hoped to have a meeting of the Disarmament Commission shortly after the Soviet walkout from the 10-nation Committee on Disarmament meetings in Geneva which would have been limited to a call on the USSR to resume negotiations. We had not envisaged that the Commission would become involved in the details of the substance of disarmament, nor would it concern itself with the transfer of the disarmament negotiations to a forum other than the 10-nation group. The passage of time has changed the situation, and the limited kind of DC meeting we had in mind no longer appears profitable.

It has been our expectation and that of our allies that there would be at least one meeting of the Disarmament Commission before the next General Assembly. The primary issue among our allies is whether or not the meeting should be immediately before the Assembly convenes and *pro forma* in nature or whether it should be called earlier and a more substantive discussion of the issues be allowed to take place. On July 15 Mr. Wilcox called the British, Canadian, Italian and French representatives in and informed them that we now believe a meeting by mid-August of the Disarmament Commission was most desirable. We have now had responses to our proposal. The Canadians feel that the earlier a meeting of the DC is convened the better; the Italians are willing to go along with a mid-August meeting but do not appear to feel strongly about the date; the British feel that the disadvantages of a mid-August meeting outweigh the advantages and prefer a later meeting which, at one point, they described as possibly late August or early September; the French prefer to hold no meeting of the Disarmament Commission and are adamantly opposed to a meeting prior to September 15.

While there are advantages and disadvantages which are cited below for a mid-August meeting, we believe the advantages outweigh

¹ Source: Background briefing for Merchant's meeting with Hood on position on timing of a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.12/7-1960.

the disadvantages and that we should make further efforts to persuade the French and British to our point of view.

Briefly stated, the advantages of a meeting by mid-August are as follows:

1. By that time the Soviet Government may have responded to our note of July 2 concerning the Communist bloc walkout from the 10-nation meeting in Geneva and again made clear that they do not intend to resume negotiations in that forum in the near future.

2. There is an obligation to report to the Disarmament Commission on the 10-nation Conference and it is likely that some members of the Commission would resent what they might consider a deliberate effort to avoid meaningful discussion and action if the meeting is called just prior to convening the General Assembly. In addition, a late session of the Commission would interfere with the preparations which each delegation must make prior to convening the General Assembly session and might for this reason alone be resented.

3. Finally, fixing a precise and early date for convening the Disarmament Commission might place some pressure on the French to move toward agreement with us on a revised disarmament plan. Such agreement would, of course, give us a much stronger position in a substantive discussion in the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, a position much less possible of exploitation for divisive purposes by the USSR.

On the other hand, there are serious difficulties. The principal one is a possibility that agreement will not be reached on a revised disarmament plan and we will thus be susceptible to Soviet divisive efforts. In addition, the question of the usefulness of the 10-nation Committee probably will be challenged by the Soviet Union and its associates, and the difficult question of the composition of another group may be raised (we have raised the question of composition with our allies but we have not as yet received their views as to how to handle this issue should it be raised).

We are doubtful that the French or even the British can be persuaded of the advantages of a meeting of the Disarmament Commission by mid-August but in view of the agreement in principle on such a meeting between the Acting Secretary, Ambassador Lodge and the President, we believe we should make one more effort at your level before reconsidering this course of action. We had urged our allies to respond favorably to our proposal well before July 20 so that our request for a meeting of the Disarmament Commission could be made coincidental with the withdrawal of the bulk of our negotiating mission in Geneva which will begin on that date.

583. Letter From Herter to McCone¹

Washington, July 20, 1960

Dear John:

At the President's request, I am sending you herewith a copy of a presentation entitled "Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations" recently made to the President by his Science Advisory Committee.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

Enclosure

Presentation Prepared by the Science Advisory Board

Washington, July 12, 1960

Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

Mr. President, we are concerned over the possibility that the nuclear test ban negotiations will end in failure under circumstances which may cause a substantial portion of world opinion to place the blame for the failure on the United States. We would, therefore, like to discuss two technical problems which could endanger our position before world opinion if these negotiations fail. These problems are the use of nuclear explosions for seismic research (Project Vela) and for peaceful purposes (Project Plowshare).

There are many important unsettled issues in the Geneva negotiations. On some of these issues both sides have presented positions which are being actively debated; on other issues one side or the other has not yet taken a position (The United States for example has not presented a position on the length of moratorium or the high altitude coverage of the Treaty). *The technical issue concerning the use of nuclear explosions in the seismic research program to improve the control system is not in itself sufficiently critical that it should control the outcome of the negotiations.*

¹ Source: Conveys copy of presentation by the Science Advisory Board entitled "Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations." Confidential. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing.

We believe that the program for improving means of seismic detection of nuclear explosions which is now being pursued vigorously in this country is most desirable. Nevertheless, one must anticipate that the technical results of this *program will not change the nature of the political decision* which will have to be faced by the U.S. Government after a two year period. The technical basis for such decisions will, of course, be stronger. There will, however, *still be a threshold* yield of nuclear explosions, probably smaller than at present, below which it will not be possible to distinguish explosions from earthquakes. The United States will have to make a purely political *decision whether to accept the possibility of evasion of a test ban under this threshold, or whether to press for a more extensive control system, or whether to resume testing of small weapons.* In addition, *methods of concealment will still exist, and even more powerful ones may have been conceived.* The United States will still have to *weigh these factors against the risks and costs to a potential violator, against the net military significance of continued nuclear weapons progress, and especially against the broad significance of achieving a first step toward more important measures of arms control and toward opening up the USSR.*

A seismic research program using only conventional chemical explosives would contribute a great deal to seismic detection methods, but would fall far short of the objectives of the presently planned research program, particularly in the area of concealment by decoupling. Therefore, *we recommend that every effort be made to propose at Geneva a safeguarding procedure involving the open inspection of obsolete U.S. devices whose design is already known to the USSR.*

We believe that it is imperative that any nuclear explosions in the seismic research program be conducted solely for useful seismic experiments, so that our motives in conducting them cannot be subject to question. We are concerned, therefore, both by the possibility that such an early date will be picked for the first nuclear explosion that its scientific value will be drastically reduced and by present plans for the use of the so called LOLLIPOP site which has extensive and obvious military weapons effects tests built into tunnels in the immediate vicinity of the shot point.

Should attempts to arrive at a mutually agreed upon safeguarding procedure fail, we do not consider that the promise of the seismic research program toward clarifying the political issues is sufficient to warrant unilateral use of nuclear explosions. Under such circumstances, we recommend that the seismic research program be restricted at this time to chemical explosions. *We believe that should the U.S. resume unilateral nuclear explosions, it should be only for valid military reasons.* It would be unfortunate if weapons testing were resumed as a result of a program which itself was conceived to remove obstacles from the treaty to cease such tests.

The use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (Project Plowshare) presents a less immediate but more difficult problem than their use for seismic research. Although some exploratory work can be done in this field with both chemical explosives and obsolete nuclear devices, ultimate economic utilization of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses depends on the most advanced thermonuclear weapon design. The question of safeguarding procedures for these nuclear explosions will have to be faced both in drafting treaty provisions and in preparing for Plowshare nuclear explosions planned for next year. On the one hand, we cannot subject advanced devices to Soviet inspection in the foreseeable future; and, on the other hand, we cannot insist that the treaty be drawn to permit this project to proceed in an unrestricted fashion without creating an almost unlimited means of evading a ban on nuclear weapon development.

The Plowshare projects have several common features:

- (a) they aim to accomplish, at a hoped for large economic advantage, objectives most of which could be achieved by ordinary means.
- (b) they are long range, requiring further studies and test explosions before the actual tasks can be begun.
- (c) they involve many new safety considerations which affect the engineering and economics of the projects.

We have no doubt concerning the soundness of the basic underlying physical principles. On the other hand, *a realistic evaluation of the economic balance between nuclear and ordinary accomplishment of the projects has not been made.* Such an analysis cannot be made until the economic significance of the radioactivity controls required in Plowshare undertakings is understood. Even if technically radioactivity proves controllable, a serious public relations problem remains. There does not appear to be any economic or scientific reason why such a program should be pursued in haste. We are concerned, therefore, that the proponents of this project may be overly optimistic over its immediate prospects, and that this project could be oversold by them in much the same manner as were fusion reactors and aircraft nuclear propulsion. A critical review by an unbiased competent group is essential before decision to push this program is taken.

While a soundly prosecuted Plowshare program might be of value to U.S. prestige, we are concerned with the probable adverse public reaction to potential radiation exposures, however small, and also with the inevitably widespread doubt concerning U.S. motives. We note in this connection that Mr. Vishinsky in November 1949, when announcing the first successful Russian nuclear tests to the United Nations, explained the explosions as having been carried out for just such peaceful economic purposes as are envisaged under the Plowshare program.

Under these circumstances, the United States may have difficulty justifying to world opinion, or to our own people, either unilateral initiation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes or insistence on treaty provisions which would appear to permit nuclear weapon development, if these courses of action were to result in the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations and (or) in the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.

We conclude reluctantly that an effectively controlled nuclear weapons test ban will necessarily involve some restrictions to an optimum program of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, unless such a program can be conducted openly.

584. Letter From Wadsworth to Herter¹

Geneva, July 21, 1960

Dear Chris:

Many thanks for your nice letter of July 16. You are quite right that things have picked up considerably, but our information from Washington is that there are still a few important things which are stalled.

I agree with you that if things looked as though we were close to agreement in early August, the Conference should probably keep driving ahead. However, given the existing rigid position of the Soviet Union on all matters over the last several weeks, I am sure that this will not happen.

Cabot and I have had some conversation on the subject of your second paragraph, and Doug Dillon and I also skirted around the subject delicately while he was here. Although I would, of course, like to carry this negotiation to a successful conclusion for all kinds of reasons, I still think that I would prefer to come back to New York in the event that Cabot goes on the ticket. This, of itself, is a question of necessary timing, which I wish we could discuss quietly together. Perhaps after the Convention we can work out some kind of an arrangement of

¹ Source: Exchange of three letters on state of negotiations and possibility that Wadsworth will replace Lodge. Personal and Confidential. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Letters-1960.

communication between you and Cabot, on the one hand, and Geneva on the other.

As to personal and health considerations, there is no doubt but that, if I have to come back to New York, we will have to have a very definite rest period before plunging into preparations for the General Assembly. This might mean that mid-August could turn out to be a little late for departure from Geneva.

Thanks again for your warm understanding—I appreciate it more than I can say.

Sincerely yours,

James J. Wadsworth

Attachment

Letter From Herter to Wadsworth

Washington, July 16, 1960

Dear Jerry:

It seems for some reason that our personal correspondence by mail becomes outdated by the rapidity with which events are moving. When you wrote me on July 1, you were obviously very discouraged as to the turn the negotiations had taken, but I gather from recent wires that things have picked up considerably. However, I have the feeling that we are not out of the woods as yet.

I do hope that the negotiations will be recessed in the middle of August, unless it looks as though you were very close to completing an agreement. A new factor has entered the picture insofar as you yourself are concerned in that Cabot Lodge may very possibly be nominated for Vice President on the Republican ticket, in which case we might well feel that you should take over in New York with the beginning of the September session. I will, of course, be in very close touch with you on this just as soon as our information is a little clearer.

In the meanwhile, take care of yourself and feel free to keep on sending me your own personal views.

Best to you both,

As always,

Christian A. Herter

Attachment**Letter From Wadsworth to Herter**

Geneva, July 1, 1960

Dear Chris:

Thanks so much for your nice letter of June 28. In one way, it makes me feel much better; in another way, quite apprehensive. I am wondering if people other than yourself who are struggling with this question realize what the inevitable steps will be if we cannot come up with a reasonable safeguard provision for these Project Vela explosions. Perhaps they don't care, but I would be surprised if this is the case.

One thing is sure: If we fail to come up with reasonable safeguards, and if we fail to come up with positions on the various other things like moratorium, composition of the Control Commission, etc., we will not have the same kind of finale as the Disarmament talks.

On the contrary, it will be the United States which will be in the position of not being able to defend itself before public opinion. I agree with the British that the major saving factor in the ten-nation debacle was the fact that Fred Eaton had a piece of paper ready to put on the table. If we don't put all of our pieces of paper on the table, we will not have that advantage. In addition to this, I am quite sure that public opinion would side with the Russians in their insistence that adequate safeguards be placed around research explosions in order to demonstrate that we are not seeking weapons development material.

This is a frightful dilemma, and I don't envy you people who have to make the decision. If it comes to a "finale" for this Conference, you have (1) no Conference, (2) no coordinated research program, (3) no moratorium, (4) no treaty, (5) no control, and (6) the \$64,000 question as to resuming tests. If tests are resumed, even for research, you face the inevitability of world-wide development of weapons. You have the Soviet declaration that they would test in all elements, thus leading to more public outcry which will be blamed on us because we were the first to test. What would this sequence of events do to us in the United Nations and the Western Alliance? Against this is the national security argument.

As I indicated above, I know you are thoroughly aware of all of these things, but I am just wondering if the other people who might oppose executive declassification fully realize where this would inevitably lead.

In the meantime I will be awaiting more cheerful news with as much patience as I can muster.

Harty joins me in best to you and Mac.

Sincerely yours,

James J. Wadsworth

585. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Eisenhower and Herter¹

July 21, 1960, 5:30 p.m.

5:30—the President telephoned from Newport with regard to his proposed press statement on disarmament. *The President* said he was bothered about this failure to have the British and French go along. THE SECRETARY said we have been working on it very hard for the last ten days. THE PRESIDENT said what he was getting at was if we go ahead and if we don't get their support, then what? THE SECRETARY what happens is that Lodge files the letter requesting the meeting with the SYG and the SYG then has to poll the entire membership of the UN and has to get 42 members supporting the call of the Disarmament Commission, and the Secy said he thinks when it is actually put on the table the British will go along but they won't go along to co-sponsor the call for the meeting at this time. THE PRESIDENT said the Secretary better send a message to the British and French to the general effect we are very sorry they couldn't co-sponsor but we felt it was necessary to put it on and see what the majority of the UN would feel. THE PRESIDENT said what worries him is if we get something of vital importance and we have ignored the British and French view on this—The President said as he understood it the difference was just a matter of timing—then when we want something that is really important, they say to the hell with us. THE SECRETARY said we have had at least four separate sessions with them on this; that the Canadians are keen and so are the Italians; but rather than split the Five Western Powers in the sponsorship of this, we felt it was better the U.S. call for the meeting since we could not have the co-sponsorship of all the other Four. THE PRESIDENT said if the Secretary feels this is important he will approve it, but said he thinks the Secretary should say to the British and French that we thought it was necessary to go ahead because of “special considerations” but we are sorry they couldn't see their way clear to cosponsor. THE PRESIDENT said he takes it, however, they are not opposed, except to the question of timing. THE SECRETARY said he has a feeling when the chips are down they may go along. THE PRESIDENT said he had doubts they would, and said we haven't many good friends in the world and when we slap them in the face it is bad, so the President said he would be careful to explain it. THE PRESIDENT said he would not spell out the “special considerations” but they

¹ Source: U.S. request to UN Secretary-General to convene the Disarmament Commission. No classification marking. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.

could guess them. THE PRESIDENT said he would tell Jim Hagerty to put this statement out in half an hour to give the Secy time to send cables to the British and French.

586. Letter From Eaton to Herter¹

Geneva, July 25, 1960

Dear Chris:

I have submitted separately for the record a classified report on the Geneva disarmament talks but since it runs to some 14 pages, I want to sum up here more briefly comments and recommendations on what strike me as the essential points emerging from the Conference.

1. It's clear that we never got down to the stage of concrete and business-like negotiations on disarmament with the Soviet side. From our own point of view, the Conference was more a matter of continuing, backstage negotiation with our Allies, particularly France, on how far the United States was willing to alter its basic disarmament position to counter Soviet initiatives in this field.

2. We made an honest effort to find some genuine negotiating ground with the Soviets. However, the Soviet break on June 27 confirmed what had become obvious almost from the start, namely—that the Soviets came to Geneva with an all-or-nothing program they knew could not be negotiated with the West. At no time in Geneva was there any indication that the Soviets were prepared to discuss any disarmament matters which had a possible chance of acceptability to us. They knew this, and therefore at no time did they contemplate a serious negotiation.

3. I am not prepared to speculate at length about the conditions under which the Soviets might have been willing to talk seriously in Geneva, or whether they came here in March with the primary intention of using the Conference for Communist propaganda and political warfare against the West. Regardless of their intentions, however, every statement and act in and out of the Conference appeared designed for propaganda and to win world opinion. I am not at all sure they succeeded in this, particularly in view of the poor timing of their break.

¹ Source: Sums up ten-nation disarmament conference. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12-GE/7-2560.

Nothing short of major substantive concessions from us of a character damaging to Free World security would have been likely to change the Soviets' basic propaganda approach to the Conference.

4. Fruitful discussion of disarmament with the Soviets will only take place in bilateral talks. There must be fullest consultation with our Allies giving consideration to their views, their national interests and aspirations, but the decision must rest with us. Use might be made of NAC to facilitate this process. While bilateral negotiation will be politically difficult now, it will become far more difficult and perhaps impossible as time goes on.

5. One of the biggest problems facing us on the Allied side is how to resolve our basic differences with the French on disarmament, which ran through the whole Conference. The French position on early control and elimination of delivery vehicles is intended primarily as pressure on us. It counters our proposal to stop fissionable production before the French have really started, and serves notice that we should not expect to retain the bulk of our nuclear weapons and delivery means while the bulk of our nuclear weapons and delivery means while the French have none. By appealing to world opinion as a plausible avenue to disarmament, the French delivery vehicle proposal is intended to soften the difficult position in which the French would find themselves if they should refuse to go along with any agreement we might make with the Soviets in the nuclear field. It is probable that the only way out of our difficulty with the French would be to assure them that we will find a way to support their efforts to become a nuclear power. Failing this, French acquiescence to a common Western Plan will be obtained, if at all, only by the prospect of the tabling by the other four powers of a common paper before some public session, as in the UN.

6. A related major problem concerns the position and tactics we should adopt to handle the disarmament issue during the next phase in the UN. I feel strongly that, if any paper is to be tabled in the UN, we should seek flexibility by tabling a US Plan which the NATO governments would welcome and generally endorse without being committed—either our June 27 plan or better yet its modified version, US/WP/09 (Rev. 5). This would give us a better opportunity to move into possible bilateral discussions in the future than if we were committed to either a Five-Power or Four-Power Plan from which we could not vary without the consent of our partners. My guess is that the British, Canadians, and Italians would prefer our tabling a plan unilaterally to isolating the French publicly. Furthermore, if we should do this, the French might not feel impelled to air their differences with us publicly by tabling their own markedly different proposals.

7. As far as the Soviets are concerned, we can expect them to make renewed efforts to get UN approval of their approach to general and complete disarmament in order to set the framework for any new round of negotiations. They will probably seek to enlarge the composition of the Ten-Nation Committee perhaps by the inclusion of Communist China and India. The outcome of maneuvering in the UN during the next few months will be important, and we certainly must do our best to forestall Soviet moves which could have crippling effects on the future Western negotiating position.

8. If serious negotiation is to be undertaken in the future, it is important that the US not state a public position in detail until after the negotiations have commenced and it becomes apparent that the Communists are prepared for serious talk. The public position we will constantly be called upon to declare must be in general terms, sufficiently specific to be serious but sufficiently flexible and consonant with our basic security needs to permit detailed negotiation when such becomes feasible. Although this is difficult, the latest US proposal, in good measure, meets the requirement.

9. In view of Soviet disarmament initiatives designed for wide mass appeal, there may understandably arise pressures for US response in kind. The US should never design a disarmament proposal or plan with an eye to propaganda. Once the elements of the plan are determined, however, it should be put in clear and forceful language to enhance its public appeal. In the long run we will be best served before world opinion by straightforward espousal of reasonable and practical measures which we ourselves are fully prepared to carry out. Any US proposal must be consonant with US security. This does not mean that US security may not well require important controls, reductions and perhaps eventual elimination of national armaments and forces, but the proposal must require that the first measures to be taken shall be reasonably verified before we are committed to further obligations which, if not honored by other states, would endanger our security.

10. In formulating a disarmament position, there is a natural tendency to focus on our present security and political posture. This is understandable, since we can not predict with assurance what the future will hold. However, we can be sure that during the several years time it would take to work out and put into effect any substantial disarmament measures, there will be important changes in the present situation. For example, our weapons systems may call for a quite different deployment from that of today. It may not be necessary to maintain substantial forces on the European continent or elsewhere abroad. Furthermore, as their own situation changes, our Allies may not welcome our presence to the extent they do today. I do not mean to suggest that

this will necessarily be the case, but such considerations should be taken into account in designing the future disarmament proposals.

Sincerely,

Frederick M. Eaton

587. Official Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament¹

Geneva, March 15–June 28, 1960

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO
THE CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT

I. BACKGROUND

The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament held 48 sessions in Geneva between March 15, 1960 and June 28, 1960. The committee recessed between April 29 and June 7.

The committee originated as a result of an initiative of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and USSR. The Foreign Ministers of these countries, in a communique of September 7, 1959, declared that:

“As was announced on August 5, 1959, prior to the closing of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussed possibilities by which further negotiations on the question of disarmament could be most effectively advanced. Agreement has now been reached among the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to set up a committee to consider disarmament matters. Understanding has also been reached that the participants in the disarmament committee will be the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, and Rumania, subject to the agreement of all the named states.

“The United Nations Charter recognizes that disarmament matters are of world-wide interest and concern. Accordingly ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures rests with the United Nations.

¹ Source: No classification marking. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12–GE/7–2660.

The setting up of the disarmament committee in no way diminishes or encroaches upon the United Nations' responsibilities in this field. In setting up the committee the special responsibility resting on the great powers to find a basis for agreement is taken into account.

"The four governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces under effective international control as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations. Furthermore, it is the hope of the four governments that the results achieved in these deliberations will provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations.

"It is the intention of the four governments that United Nations Disarmament Commission will be kept appropriately informed of the progress of the deliberations of the committee. For this purpose the four governments have agreed that the committee will present reports on its work to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and through it to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. As a first step in this direction, they have requested the Secretary General, in accordance with Resolution 1252-D (XIII), to convene the Disarmament Commission during September 1959 if feasible, in order that the members may be fully informed of the nature and purpose of the disarmament committee.

"The four governments will consult with the United Nations Secretary General with respect to providing appropriate facilities to the newly established committee. They expect that the committee will begin its work early in 1960 in Geneva."

The General Assembly on November 20, 1959, adopted Resolution 1378 (XIV), in which it called upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The same resolution requested the Secretary General to make available to the ten-nation committee for thorough consideration the U.K. declaration of September 17, 1959, the Soviet declaration of September 18, 1959 and other proposals or suggestions made, as well as the records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the First Committee at which the question of general and complete disarmament was discussed. The General Assembly also expressed the hope in this Resolution that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

II. THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. *Before the Recess of April 29*

At the opening session of the conference on March 15th the Soviet bloc renewed its support of the plan presented by Chairman Khrushchev to the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 1959.

The plan called for complete and general disarmament to be carried out, within a four-year period, in three stages. Stage one proposed significant reductions in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces. The second stage called for the complete disbandment of all remaining armed forces and the elimination of all foreign military bases. The final stage proposed the total elimination and/or destruction of all means of waging war, including abolition of all military institutions, courses and organizations.

The Allied plan was formally submitted at the second session of the Conference. As an ultimate goal the preamble of the plan looked toward a secure, free and peaceful world disarmed under effective international control where disputes would be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. To attain this objective the plan proposed three stages. The first and second stages detailed specific measures of disarmament which, in the first instance, would serve to stabilize the existing military environment. These two stages set forth basic measures to: guard against surprise attack or accidental war; halt future production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; reduce existing nuclear weapons stockpiles; bring about beginning balanced reductions in conventional arms and armed forces and initiate steps toward assuring the peaceful use of outer space. The third or final stage outlined far-reaching measures of disarmament. These aimed at the elimination of armaments to levels required only for internal security purposes and the build-up of an international enforcement system backed by universally accepted rules of law.

During the first three weeks of the negotiations each side probed the position of the other side.

The Soviet bloc, in asking the Allied powers to elaborate on their program, argued that the Allied plan did not provide for the total elimination of all means of warfare and did not embody concrete measures which, within a fixed time period, would lead to general and complete disarmament. They claimed that it was not responsive to Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Allies, in turn, noted that the Soviet bloc, while having stated its willingness to embark upon a program of complete and general disarmament, omitted any reference to specific measures by which this objective could be reached; its plan had unrealistic time limits and avoided control measures in the early stages. In particular, the Allies cited the fact that it detailed no specific measures which would lead to the first essential requirement—that of halting the arms race and securing a generally stable military situation.

Midway through the conference's first round, it became apparent that neither side was prepared materially to change its basic position.

At this juncture, the Soviet bloc took a new tack. On April 11, the Soviet representative tabled, ostensibly to find a way out of the apparent stalemate, a document entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament". This stated that general and complete disarmament should: include the disbanding of all armaments and armed forces; be achieved in a sequence of three stages within four years; be implemented under international control; result in states having only internal security forces of an agreed size; and not be interrupted by any condition not covered in the treaty. In addition, a so-called "concrete measure" was proposed. To back up an agreement on principles by a deed, the bloc suggested that states possessing nuclear weapons should "solemnly declare" that they would not be the first to use them.

The Soviet bloc's "General principles" document was a step backward rather than a step forward. It was nothing more than a rephrased version of objectives contained in the Khrushchev plan. As to the proposed measure of renouncing first use of nuclear weapons, the West's view was that uncontrolled paper proclamations of intent which in no way would assure world stability or security were unacceptable.

At this point, the conference seemed to be stymied. In an effort to break the apparent deadlock, the Allies, on April 26, presented to the conference a "statement on conditions" for disarmament. It was hoped that such a statement would overcome the intransigence on the Communist side and permit negotiations to proceed on specific measures.

The statement declared that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfill the following conditions: disarmament must be carried out in stages and as rapidly as possible, but with no fixed timetable; nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced in the interest of equal security for all countries; disarmament measures must be effectively controlled to ensure full compliance; and disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control. The statement concluded that the final goal of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to levels required only for internal security and the fulfillment of obligations under the U.N. Charter.

While the Communist countries did not specifically reject the Western paper, their reaction offered no encouragement to the Allied hope that the conference could turn toward a discussion of specific measures.

The conference recessed on April 29 in anticipation of the meeting of Heads of Government.

At the last session the Soviet bloc reiterated its determination to seek, as the first prerequisite of the conference, agreement on general principles for complete and total disarmament.

For its part, the West made it quite clear that unless and until the Soviet bloc was prepared to negotiate and agree on a number of specific disarmament measures, the conference's prospects for success were dim.

The Allies had hoped that through general probing this first round would indicate possible areas of common interest for negotiation. This unfortunately was not the case.

B. After the Conference Reconvened on June 7

Upon the resumption of the conference on June 7, the Soviet Delegation submitted the paper, Basic Clauses of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which had been transmitted by the Soviet Union to the Western governments on June 2, as well as to some 80 odd additional nations, and which revised the earlier Soviet proposals of September 18, 1959. The Soviet Delegation maintained that these new proposals represented an attempt to meet some of the views expressed by the Western Delegation prior to the recess.

The Soviet Delegation was told that the Western Delegations and their governments would carefully study the Soviet proposals in the hope that they might represent a serious desire to negotiate.

The work of the conference thereafter consisted primarily of two endeavors, first a renewed effort by the Western Delegations to have the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations discuss the concrete measures of disarmament as set forth in the Western proposals of March 16, and secondly attempts by the Western delegations to obtain clarifications regarding the new Soviet paper, in order to facilitate study of these proposals by Western governments.

Our efforts to get the Soviet delegation to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament that would enable the world to make a start toward the goal of general and complete disarmament were unsuccessful. In spite of the fact that we invited the Soviet Delegation to choose any one of the measures in the March 16 paper as a basis for initial discussion, the Soviet Delegation persisted in refusing to discuss these proposals or the inspection requirements for each. The excuse used was to charge that the March 16 proposals were essentially proposals for control without significant measures of disarmament.

The Western effort to obtain clarification of the Soviet proposals of June 2 was made by a series of questions which were put to the Soviet Delegation. Only some of these questions were answered during the course of the discussions and the answers were unsatisfactory. The questions on control which were submitted by the French Delegation were answered evasively. The Soviet and other Eastern European delegations spent most of their time making propaganda speeches charging that the Western delegations were avoiding substantive responses to the new Soviet proposals and were displaying a negative and inflexible attitude.

In spite of the evasiveness of many Soviet answers to questions, it became clear that the new Soviet paper was primarily a change in format from the earlier September 18 proposals, and that most of the unrealistic and unacceptable concepts of that earlier document remained. Various changes which the Soviet Delegation maintained had been made in the September 18 paper in order to meet Western views proved in fact to be illusory or tied to impossible conditions.

Thus, for example, the Soviet Delegation maintained that moving a proposal for elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles from the last to the first stage of a disarmament program was in response to views expressed by the French Delegation, whereas in fact the Soviet proposal would have required the free world to commit itself as a first step to destroy within a matter of months its essential means of collective self-defense.

Similarly, the discussions showed that Soviet indication of a possible willingness to abandon its previous insistence on a four-year time table for complete disarmament was merely the abandonment of this particular figure but not of the impractical principle upon which it is based, that a fixed time table for the entire complex disarmament process must be agreed on before any steps can be taken to halt the arms race. As a corollary position the Soviet Union continued to insist that a time table for complex and radical disarmament measures be agreed to without the benefit of any joint studies to determine the problems or even feasibility of implementing each measure.

With regard to the critical question of control and inspection, there appeared to be little change in the Soviet position even though the Soviet paper of June 2 devoted more space to the subject than did the Soviet paper of September 18. The discussions showed that the Soviet Delegation was unwilling to accept even in principle that international inspectors would have the right to determine if clandestine installations existed in excess of agreed amounts; the Soviet position would limit the inspectors merely to counting these particular installations or forces that a government declared it was eliminating.

Finally, the responses made by the Soviet Delegation to some of the questions put to it made it apparent that a fundamental difference between positions remained. The position expressed by the Soviet Delegation was that the whole range of general and complete disarmament must be negotiated in detail in the Ten Nation Conference and then submitted to a world conference where all the nations of the world would have to approve a complex world-wide treaty before any actual measures to halt the arms race could be instituted. This approach would, of course, foredoom the world to endless discussion and no action could be taken to get the disarmament program started while negotiations were continuing on later stages.

The U.S. Delegation indicated to the Soviet Delegation the general nature of our concerns about the above indicated Soviet positions. The U.S. Delegation had also indicated in earlier meetings those elements of the June 2 paper which appeared to represent some slight movement toward a more rational approach to disarmament, such as the Soviet recognition, at least in principle, of the need to develop improved peace-keeping arrangements within the United Nations to assure the security of nations as national forces are progressively reduced, and the apparent recognition of the need to study at an early stage the arrangements necessary for the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons.

Notwithstanding the serious and fundamental faults in the Soviet paper which the discussions in the conference had revealed, and despite the fact that the Soviet Delegation had refused to discuss the allied proposals of March 16, the U.S. Representative returned to Washington for consultations during the week of June 19. The Soviet Representative, Mr. Zorin, was informed by the U.S. Representative that he was returning to Washington to discuss the various views that had been presented during the discussions since the recess. During these Washington consultations a revised U.S. proposal was prepared. This new paper was based on the same sound basic principle of that of the Western proposals of March 16, namely, that we should proceed with earlier measures of disarmament and then discuss the details of later and more difficult stages of general and complete disarmament. The new U.S. paper did, however, clarify and amplify certain of the proposals put forth in the Western delegations on March 16 and it contained modifications which reflected views expressed by our allies and certain of those expressed by the Soviet Union. Thus, its purpose was to provide a fresh basis for advancing the negotiations.

The U.S. Representative informed Mr. Zorin before the meeting of June 27 that discussions in Washington had been fruitful and that the U.S. Delegation would table a new paper within the next few days, following consultations with allied delegations.

In the light of these facts, the subsequent action of the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations during the meeting of June 27 in withdrawing from the conference clearly demonstrated that their governments were not interested in serious negotiations but rather were concerned only with propaganda.

The action of the Polish Representative who was acting as Chairman of the meeting was unprecedented in the annals of international conferences. The Polish Representative refused to permit Western representatives who had been inscribed to speak the opportunity to make statements, recognizing only communist representatives. He then attempted the illegal procedure of declaring the meeting and conference ended. His departure from the room required the United Kingdom

Representative to take the chair for the remainder of the meeting. The U.S. Delegation, in view of the actions by the communist delegations, tabled the new U.S. paper (TNCD/7). It was not possible, of course, to present the paper as a Five Power document, since none of the Allied delegations had had time fully to consult with their governments.

The Conference held one subsequent meeting on June 28 in order to give the communist delegations an opportunity to reconsider their arbitrary withdrawal. The communist delegations, however, did not attend the June 28 meeting. The Conference adopted the following communique at the end of the meeting:

"The forty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 28 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The Conference requested the United Nations Secretariat to forward all records of the Conference to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and, through it, to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

"The Conference decided that the verbatim record of the forty-eighth meeting should be made public as soon as possible.

"The Conference adjourned at 11:10 AM."

The United States Delegation, together with the delegations of Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom remained on in Geneva in order to be available in the event the governments of the communist delegations reconsidered their actions and decided to resume negotiations. The failure of the communist governments to return their delegations to the Ten Nation Conference, however, created a situation in which further useful work by the Conference was impossible.

The United States Delegation expresses its regret that the communist governments have, by their actions, prevented successful negotiations on disarmament. The importance to the world of the task of halting the arms race and of achieved balanced and staged disarmament remains unchanged by recent communist actions in the Conference.

It is important that the United States continue its efforts to seek safeguarded disarmament agreements that will reduce the danger of war and permit the devotion of a greater portion of man's creative capacity to the construction of a better world for all peoples. It remains, however, for the communist governments, and particularly the Soviet Union, to decide that they are more interested in serious practical negotiation than in propaganda before this hope can be realized.

III. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

A. Secretariat

As a result of consultations with the Secretary General of the United Nations, all facilities and services for the conference were

provided by the United Nations Secretariat under the direction of Dr. Draga N. Protitch, who was present as the personal representative of the Secretary General.

B. Rules of Procedure

Prior to the first private meeting of the conference, agreement was reached on the following document (TNCD/INF. 1):

“Agreement on Procedural Arrangements

Agreement has been reached by the representatives of the ten Nations on the following matters. Modifications may be made by agreement of the ten Nations.

1. Nature of Meetings

All meetings will be private, except when agreed otherwise by the ten Nations.

2. Time of Meetings

There will normally be one meeting per day at 10:30 AM Mondays through Fridays. If experience proves that this time creates difficulties for any Delegation the matter may be raised again for further discussion.

3. Publicity and Communique

Publicity by or on behalf of the conference will be limited to the communique following each meeting. The draft communique will be prepared by the Chairman of the day and approved by the ten Nations. It will normally refer to the chairmanship of the meeting, any new documents tabled, agreements reached and the time of the next meeting. Delegations reserve the right to brief the press as regards their own positions.

4. Languages and Records

The languages of the conference will be English, French and Russian and there will be simultaneous interpretation into each of these languages. The right is reserved for delegations to request consecutive interpretation, but wherever possible advance notice of the request should be given to the Secretariat. Verbatim records will be furnished in the three languages.

5. Seating and Chairmanship

Delegations will be seated in English alphabetical order and chair will be taken in rotation by the ten Delegations in English alphabetical order.”

C. Agenda of the Conference

No formal agenda was proposed or agreed upon. In addition to the documents transmitted to the committee by General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV), the committee had before it the following documents tabled during its deliberations:

Message of greetings from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. (TNCD/1 of 15 March 1960)

A message by President Eisenhower to Ambassador Eaton for the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. (TNCD/2 of 15 March 1960)

A Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on 16 March 1960. (TNCD/3 of 16 March 1960)

Proposal by the Delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Czechoslovakia, submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 April 1960 (TNCD/4 of 8 April 1960)

Proposal by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 26 April 1960. (TNCD/5 of 26 April 1960)

Proposals by the Soviet Government submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 7 June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev. 1 of 8 June 1960)

Program for General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control submitted by the delegation of the United States of America to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 27 June 1960 (TNCD/7 of 27 June 1960)

IV. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE

United States Delegation:

Ambassador Fredrick M. Eaton, Chairman, U.S. Representative
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Minister, Deputy U.S. Representative

ADVISERS

Mr. Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State

Mr. N. Spencer Barnes, Department of State

Mr. Jeremy Blanchet, Department of State

Rear Admiral Paul D. Dudley, U.S.N. Senior Military Advisor,
Department of Defense

Mr. F. Richards Ford, III, Department of Defense

Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley, Department of State

Mr. Robert E. Matteson, Department of State

Mr. Alan G. Mencher, Department of State

Captain Willard deL. Michael, U.S.N., Department of Defense

Mr. D. F. Musser, Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. John M. Stuart, Jr., Public Affairs Officer, American Consulate
General, Geneva
Mr. Robert G. Sturgill, Department of State
Lt. Colonel Harry E. Taber, U.S. Army, Department of Defense
Mr. Malcolm Toon, Department of State
Mr. Henry S. Villard, Minister, U.S. Representative at the European
Office of the United Nations
Mr. Lawrence D. Weiler, Department of State
Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, U.S.A.F., Department of Defense

SECRETARY OF THE DELEGATION

Mr. Virgil L. Moore, U.S. Resident Delegation and Consulate General, Geneva

V. OTHER DELEGATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE

1. Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria... (4 members)
2. Delegation of Canada... (5 members)
3. Delegation of the Czechoslovak Republic... (11 members)
4. Delegation of France... (19 members)
5. Delegation of Italy... (10 members)
6. Delegation of Polish People's Republic... (8 members)
7. Delegation of Rumanian People's Republic... (9 members)
8. Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics...
(17 members)
9. Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland... (20 members)

588. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, August 2, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

See attached list

The Secretary opened the meeting by reading Under Secretary Dillon's memorandum of conversation of the last meeting of the Principals with the President on July 7.

Chairman McCone stated that, as agreed at the July 6 meeting, AEC had consulted members of the Joint Committee to inform them of the alternative fallback position which was under consideration and to informally ascertain their views. Mr. Dwight Ink, who handles legislative liaison, had consulted five or six key members of the Joint Committee during a recent trip on which he had accompanied them. Without exception they opposed the fallback position violently. Mr. Ink's appraisal was that if the fallback position was presented to Congress through normal channels, there would not be a single vote for the proposal on either side of the aisle in either House. If the President should use the device of securing prior endorsement by both presidential candidates and by the leadership of both political parties, the chances of passage would still not be greater than 50-50. Chairman McCone said that he recognized that our job is to reach sound policy decisions and seek to influence Congress rather than to second-guess them. He realized also there was danger in basing an appraisal upon Congressional reaction to a hypothetical question rather than one actually before them for decision. Nevertheless, he thought Congressional reaction was a legitimate factor to consider in policy decisions and wanted to emphasize the negative effect upon that reaction which the Soviet proposal of 3 inspections had produced. There was much feeling that such a ridiculous proposal in the face of the scientific facts was an indication of lack of seriousness about the negotiations as a whole. *Under Secretary Douglas* commented that the question of 3 inspections is not directly related to the main question of safeguards.

¹ Source: Instructions to U.S. delegation to test ban negotiations. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.

The Secretary, in reviewing other action that had been taken pursuant to the July 7 decision, recalled that the President had informed Prime Minister Macmillan of the course of action we had then contemplated, including the fallback position. There had been no official response from the Soviets to the proposal which was advanced in the conference on July 12. Tsarapkin had made a strong speech outside the conference condemning the proposal and using stock propaganda phrases, but he had not yet stated an official position. Meanwhile, he had put forth a proposal for 3 inspections to be applied above and below the threshold. He has pressed us for a declaration on a length of the moratorium. He may be seeking tactically to link the quota and moratorium questions. The Secretary recalled that the initial moratorium proposal of March 29 had been linked not to the quota but to two preconditions, namely, the conclusion of threshold treaty and agreement upon a coordinated research program. The Secretary was not sure that his view was fully shared by Under Secretary Dillon, but he personally considered that the original preconditions should be met before a moratorium would get us off on a tangent, and he did not see why we should agree on a moratorium before agreeing on the action to be taken by way of research during the moratorium. Both the U.S. and UK Delegations in Geneva had proposed that we get our positions on the table in the near future. The Secretary indicated that he had questions about this procedure. He would be reluctant to go to Congress on the fallback position until the Soviets had responded to our proposal, but he agreed that we could not let the Soviets delay a response indefinitely.

There was one aspect of the research program which he would like to see clarified, mainly that of the LOLLIPOP event. The Secretary read the letter of July 22 from Secretary Gates and raised the question of how urgent and important the proposed effects tests were considered to be. *General Loper* said that we had never had tests of underground pressures generated by close-in bursts. In building silos for underground missiles, in particular, we had to rely on extrapolation in the absence of such data. LOLLIPOP would be the first and perhaps the only shot we would conduct in granite, so we wanted to use it for this purpose. *The Secretary* asked whether we would be conducting the VELA program today except for the hope of achieving a test agreement through such a program. *Chairman McCone* said that we would, even if the negotiations break down, seek improvement of our knowledge of detection capabilities, although probably by using different devices in a somewhat different series of explosions. Even if there were no negotiations in progress, we would at least instrument our Plowshare and weapons tests to give us seismic data as well. *Under Secretary Douglas*, addressing himself to the Secretary's question as to the urgency of the tunnel lining tests, said it would be hard to maintain such tests are urgent to a matter of weeks or months. Our construction program for hardened bases is

already far down the road. It is true, however, that it is proceeding on the basis of limited experience. *The Secretary* observed that this then is not a controlling factor on the speed of moving ahead. *Under Secretary Douglas* said such information would be reassuring, but we have proceeded so far without any great question as to this aspect of the problem. *General Loper* said the designs for basic construction would not be affected, but the tunnel tests would give us better estimates as to their vulnerability. The same would be true of our evaluation of the effects of various weapons on Soviet bases in relation to differing with varying CEP's. *The Secretary* asked whether we would make all the information derived from such tests public. *Under Secretary Douglas* said yes. *Chairman McCone* said that Secretary Gates, in the meeting of July 7, had affirmed this, stating that all the information was of a fundamental scientific nature useful for both military and civil defense purposes. *The Secretary* asked how much information this would give the Russians. *General Loper* said it was hard to hold this kind of information classified, as Civil Defense people need this information badly, for example, in evaluating the use of subway tunnels for emergency transportation or shelter areas. *Under Secretary Douglas* said that since the LOLLIPOP event would be in granite, results would not be directly applicable to any missile site construction that is contemplated. *General Loper* said it would, however, add to our general knowledge of the question.

The Secretary said there was the immediate question of instructions to send Ambassador Wadsworth. In this connection, he failed to see the reason for making a recess proposal now. *Under Secretary Dillon* said it was simply a matter of the three delegations being exhausted. *Mr. Farley* said that our delegation had been instructed not to agree to either the beginning or the duration of a recess. The consensus was that it would probably be for about a month. *Chairman McCone* recalled that the March 29 announcement regarding our willingness to have a moratorium had been based on two preconditions and agreement had not been reached on either. It hardly seemed appropriate to recall the delegation or to agree to a recess under these circumstances. *The Secretary* said the principal unresolved issues include moratorium, quota and composition of the Control Commission. He felt the quota and the Control Commissions questions should be resolved first, but he would have no objection to putting in a statement that we intended a moratorium of a year or eighteen months, provided it was made clear that the matter would not be discussed further unless agreement had been reached on other matters. We should also send instructions that there should be no recess until the Soviets had responded to our safeguards proposal, and we in turn had had an opportunity to respond with our counter-proposal. We should send instructions that the moratorium question should not be negotiated while these matters were outstanding.

Chairman McCone referred to the telegram reporting on Narayanan's conversation with Tsarapkin and noted that in the process Narayanan had, in effect, revealed our fallback position. He read the telegram to the group and noted that if we advanced the fallback position, we might find ourselves confronted by a situation that would give us problems on the Hill. *The Secretary* said it made no sense to conduct these experiments for seismic improvement if the negotiations had blown up. The Soviets say that they would be free to test anywhere. Accordingly, we should not confine ourselves to seismic improvement shots if the negotiations end. *Under Secretary Dillon* said the first question was what we would tell Wadsworth. We should press for a reply before granting any recess. We should decide what to do if the Soviets come back with an answer along the lines of the Narayanan telegram. Presumably, we should go to the fallback, but we cannot go to Congress unless either the Soviets have accepted our July 12 proposal, which is impossible, or we are able to tell Congress of our fallback position and that we need this authority in order to conduct an essential program and that we will fire the first shot at a specified time. There was not a chance of the Soviets accepting our fallback proposal before an August recess. *Chairman McCone* said this amounted to saying that the whole matter must go over to the next Administration. *Under Secretary Dillon* said we must either do that or be prepared to announce, we are going to make a shot. He considered it best, from the standpoint of dealing with the Soviets, to state a fallback position and set a date on which the program would begin, but this might not prove feasible since the President did not seem very keen about issuing such an ultimatum. The alternative is to let things drag on until after the elections. *The Secretary* said we should put the alternatives to the President. If we are to break the negotiations at our own initiative, we must issue an ultimatum and announce a date for the first shot. He had no enthusiasm for talking about the moratorium until this matter was settled. *Chairman McCone* said the quota of 3 against all the scientific background we have presented is so ridiculous as to raise the question of whether the Soviets have any sincerity at all. *The Secretary* said that the present self-imposed moratorium, of course, is in the Soviets' interest, and accordingly is in their interest to drag out the talks. *Under Secretary Dillon* said we should recall that if we break off this time of the year, we get a debate in the General Assembly and possibly a resolution asking us not to proceed with the nuclear detonations. *Under Secretary Douglas* asked whether anybody had thought of our taking our own initiative in the UN with a resolution banning atmospheric tests. *Under Secretary Dillon* said he didn't think that would work. The resolution would promptly be amended to include all tests. Testing is an emotional rather than a rational issue on which the UN would be marshalled against us. If we decide to act against UN sentiment, we should take action first and let the UN deplore it rather

than announcing action, being confronted by a UN resolution and then acting in defiance of it.

The Secretary said he was planning to instruct Wadsworth that there should be no reference to the moratorium until the safeguards issue was settled. *Under Secretary Douglas* said he would approve such an instruction. *Under Secretary Dillon* asked what we would do when the Soviet answer comes. Should we decide now or have another meeting. It was generally agreed that we should decide later. *Chairman McCone* recalled, returning to the question of instructing Ambassador Wadsworth, that the March 29 moratorium proposal had two conditions: agreement upon a threshold treaty and upon a coordinated research program. We should not agree to a recess until these matters are agreed, but we should indicate that we would sit for only so long. We might state that the moratorium would go with a two year program to be announced as beginning on a given date. *Under Secretary Dillon* said he was not sure whether all of this would be satisfactory from a domestic standpoint. He welcomed *Chairman McCone's* idea, however, that we should not tie the ultimatum to one shot but to the VELA program as a whole, since this would be a better public relations posture. *The Secretary* said we should draft immediate instructions to Wadsworth that no recess should be agreed until the safeguards matter was cleared up; then in a separate paper we should put the alternative courses of action regarding safeguards to the President. *Chairman McCone* agreed we should not recess until the research question is resolved. The VELA program is being undertaken in the light of our hopes for agreement. If there is no such hope, we should change our plans and employ different devices in order to get maximum benefit from the shots.

Turning to the question of high altitude controls, *The Secretary* thought the alternatives were whether to lay a proposal on the table for a complete control ban or for the threshold in outer space. He did not wish to pursue a technical briefing on a proposed control system, however, unless he could be assured the recommendations were scientifically sound and generally agreed. *Under Secretary Dillon* said he wondered whether we need take a position on outer space at all in Geneva, since technical certainty is not possible in this rapidly evolving field. Any position we take now could only embarrass us three years hence. Tabling a position would just put a new question before the conference which could open months of debate. The chances for getting an agreement on the underground aspects of control were so slim that we need not open the outer space question. *The Secretary* added that the outer space component would add hundreds of millions of dollars to the cost of the system. *Chairman McCone* said that in the high altitude area we would again be taking very inconclusive scientific evidence as a basis for national policy and repeating the mistake of 1958 if we

reached a decision now. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said that from a political standpoint Under Secretary Dillon's comment seemed entirely reasonable. From a strictly scientific standpoint, the uncertainties of the underground situation were much greater than the uncertainties of a high altitude detection system. We know very little about the transmission of the signals through the complex structures of the earth, but we know a great deal about the transmission of such signals through empty space and about the instruments for recording them. As regards high altitude, there are only two uncertainties: first, that of background radiation and secondly, those of engineering the detection satellites now under construction in which we had a reasonable degree of confidence. There is a much more solid basis for confidence in the high altitude components of the system than in the underground. *The Secretary* asked what is the danger of the Soviets getting valuable information from tests at millions of kilometers as compared to the danger of their getting such information by testing below the threshold or by underground concealment. *Under Secretary Douglas* said that for our part we have no interest in tests at such great distances. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* said such a test would give information as to whether a device actually went off, but other diagnostics would be much more difficult in outer space than underground. *The Secretary* asked if the high altitude question isn't something better left to the Control Commission in view of present technical uncertainties. *Chairman McCone* said there is a good technical reason for deferring decisions on it since it would require at least two years of development to know much about it. *The Secretary* commented that he was still attached to the pre-launch inspection approach. *Mr. Irwin* noted there were serious technical difficulties in this approach as well. *Dr. Kistiakowsky* observed that some of these difficulties related to our reluctance to permit close inspection of vehicles to be launched. He said there was still another alternative: that we could speak of a threshold in outer space not as a ceiling in terms of altitude but in terms of signal strength which was the way we had defined the underground threshold. Detection capabilities of the system recommended by the experts a year ago would be a megaton at at least a hundred million miles and a kiloton at shorter distances. *The Secretary* raised the question of what language could be used in the treaty to describe these various alternatives. *Mr. Irwin* said we could devise language for either of the three alternatives: 1) an altitude ceiling, 2) a threshold in terms of signal strength, or 3) a complete ban in which we would accept whatever uncertainties are involved. There was general agreement that the question should not be decided at the present time, that an immediate instruction should be sent to Geneva regarding the recess and silence as to the duration of the moratorium along lines already discussed, and that a further paper

should be drafted for Presidential consideration of alternative courses of action on the safeguards problem.

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
S/AE—Mr. Farley
 Mr. Sullivan
 Mr. Spiers
 Mr. Baker
SOV—Mr. Dubs

Department of Defense
Under Secretary Douglas
General Loper
General Fox
General Dabney
Mr. Irwin
Captain Foster
Dr. Romney—AFTAC
Mr. Beyer—ARPA
Colonel Brundage
Major Poulson
Dr. Leonard
Mr. Gise
Mr. Grady Frank

Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman McCone
Dr. English

Central Intelligence Agency
Director Dulles
Mr. Brent
Dr. Scoville

White House
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Keeny

589. Letter From McCone to Goodpaster¹

Washington, August 2, 1960

Dear Andy:

Attached please find a statement prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of "USSR Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium". This statement was prepared as a result of this statutory committee's discussion of the subject at their meeting in Washington on July 26–28, 1960.

¹ Source: Transmits statement by the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on "U.S.S.R. Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium." No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AEC, Vol. II.

The reports of the several briefings mentioned in the statement, including Dr. Bethe's memorandum, will be made available to you should you desire to have copies of them.

For your information, I am also furnishing a copy of the GAC statement to the following: Secretary Herter, Secretary Gates, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Kistiakowsky, and Mr. Gray.

Sincerely yours,

John A. McCone

Attachment

Statement Prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the AEC

Washington, July 29, 1960

**USSR CAPABILITY IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
DURING THE TEST MORATORIUM**

The Committee continued to examine the problem presented at its May meeting on USSR Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium. Representatives of the Division of Military Application, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the Livermore Laboratory, and the Central Intelligence Agency presented excellent briefings on the numerous aspects of the general problem. At the request of the Committee, Dr. H. A. Bethe provided a memorandum entitled "Estimate of USSR and USA Capabilities of Weapons Development". The Committee greatly appreciates Dr. Bethe's efforts in the preparation of this carefully considered statement. As a result of these briefings, Dr. Bethe's memorandum, and accompanying discussions, the Committee submits the following comments.

The General Advisory Committee is convinced that it is technically possible for the USSR to conduct, without serious risk of detection, significant weapons tests under the current test moratorium. We are fearful that under these circumstances the USSR may be able to surpass the United States in nuclear weapons performance. The Commission should recognize that continuation of the current situation increases the risk that the United States advantage will be overcome. We must take vigorous action to break the current deadlock either by securing a test-ban agreement with adequate inspection safeguards or by resuming testing under such conditions as not to contaminate the biosphere.

590. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of the Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, August 11, 1960

SUBJECT

Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

See list on page 6

The Secretary stated that the purpose of the meeting is consideration of the proposed course of action, and certain alternatives presented therein (*Attached*). In connection therewith, it would be advisable to discuss the Congressional aspects of our fallback position on safeguards. The Secretary expressed particular concern about the fact that the House of Representatives is expected to be in session only two weeks. In order that restrictions against opening devices for inspection may be lifted, both Houses would have to act on a joint resolution.

In answer to the Secretary's question, *Mr. McCone* explained the mechanics of committee procedure in connection with such a resolution. In view of the jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy over matters involving restricted data, it may be expected that a new resolution, just as the resolution of last month, would be assigned by the leadership to the Joint Committee. *Secretary Gates* commented that at best the Committee will decide to take no action on a new Administration request. *The Secretary* said, his information indicates that favorable action can be expected only after a major effort. *Mr. McCone* recommended that, before proposing the fallback position as outlined in the course of action, we should work it out with Congress, consulting both the Joint Committee and the House Foreign Relations Committee. Informal contacts with Congress have resulted in an appraisal of a 50% chance that desired action may be obtained, provided there is vigorous Administration support. It is difficult to predict, however, how Congress would act when the time comes. *Secretary Gates* commented that the White House is now most reluctant to approach Congress on any new matter since, it is believed, Congress will be most likely to take no action, and thus embarrass the Administration. He expressed belief that this attitude will be reflected in the decision on the course of action. *The Secretary* asked about possible alternatives. *Mr. McCone* responded that the Commissioners of the AEC, who have responsibility under law, have voted against declassification.

¹ Source: Discussion of resumption of testing. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

The Secretary inquired as to the possibility of limited declassification. He recalled the President's reluctance to submit matters to the Joint Committee, and wondered if Executive declassification, followed by reclassification, would provide a feasible answer. *Mr. McCone* asked that limited declassification, under executive order of the President, would extend only to the end of the President's term.

Mr. McCone stated that, in giving second thought to the matter, he has serious reservations about advancing the fallback position in Geneva. He expressed belief that the President and the Vice President, who are very much concerned about making possible the Plowshare peaceful user program, will hesitate to advance a position which will greatly endanger that program. Plowshare devices are too sophisticated to be opened; a demand to open them may follow from our fallback position on research devices. He also expressed anxiety about increasing obstacles to progress in the Russian position. He recalled an informal conversation of June 23 between Tsarapkin and Wadsworth in which the former adamantly opposed the commencement of a research program before the treaty is signed. He also criticized the Soviet proposal calling for three annual inspections, and the remark allegedly made to a New York Times reporter that this proposal is not negotiable. He doubted Soviet sincerity in seeking agreement. *The Secretary* recalled that, at the Camp David discussions, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan envisaged that the start of the research program would not be long delayed, and that the moratorium would be in at the same time as the research program. *Mr. Farley* explained that, while the Soviets may not participate in a research program by conducting programs of their own before signing of a treaty, they do not object to our carrying on such a program earlier as long as they are consulted about it and permitted to join in it.

The Secretary stated that a decision to withdraw from the plan to advance the fallback position would have to be communicated to the British Government right away since we are committed to it. Of course, the President must make the final decision. *The Secretary* agreed that, in view of the Congressional situation, an approach to them on the fallback position now appears impractical. It is clear, he said, that a political decision must now be made on the future of these talks, which have dragged on endlessly. He expressed support for the setting of a deadline, after which the United States seismic research program would get underway. We should not subject ourselves to a protracted delay while the Russians consider any safeguards proposal we may make.

The Secretary asked whether Congressional reaction would be more favorable if our proposal included a requirement that the Russians open any alleged large high explosive detonations to our inspection to ascertain that nuclear devices are not used. *Mr. McCone* replied that such inspection would give us needed assurance that explosions up to 50 KT which are announced or which we detect and cannot identify are

not nuclear explosions. This would certainly serve as a reassurance to Congress. However, the two principal elements of concern to Congress are: 1) the unilateral character of our commitment to open devices, giving the appearance that we are giving in to Soviet demands; and 2) the effect on our allies of such a move. The French, for example, are not permitted to inspect devices in the NATO stockpile, which are like the devices to be opened for inspection to the Russians. Rep. McConmack especially may be expected to express concern over this.

Secretary Gates remarked that it was time to say that we are now going ahead with the UK on a seismic research program. *Mr. McCone* suggested that, if there is no prospect of an agreement emerging from the research program proposal, we should go ahead with a program of underground shots providing information of use for seismic research, but also for Plowshare and for weapons purposes. A change in devices making possible the accomplishment of these added purposes would be practicable.

The Secretary raised the problems involved in withdrawing from our commitment to Macmillan to advance the fallback position, in devising an effective way of presenting a cut-off date, and in conducting explosions so as to minimize difficulties in the United Nations. *Mr. Allen* commented that our public posture would be better if the UK joined us in testing after any break. *Mr. Farley* commented the UK would probably show understanding for the US need to test, but would not join us unless the Soviets resume testing.

Secretary Gates remarked that, if we cannot find an adroit way to get out of this situation, any program would in effect be delayed till next year. *The Secretary* referred to the possibility that the President may simply decide there will be no nuclear explosions while he is in office. He referred the participants to the alternative approach at Geneva and in Congress mentioned in Para 3 of the proposed Course of Action, and commented that this approach might keep the matter out of the political arena. He suggested laying out the alternatives clearly for the President. He should decide on the date on which the research program will get underway.

Responding to the Secretary's question, *Mr. McCone* said that AEC would be ready for a detonation on October 1 which will produce significant, but not optimum, results. A delay to November 15 would not be a good idea since intense technical preparations at the test site would have to be made during the week of the election, which might be seized upon as the cause for various demonstrations by those opposing the shot, and because a shot scheduled for a post-election date might produce another "voice" seeking to be heard on this matter. He responded to *Mr. Gray's* question by stating that three explosions are planned up to the end of the year, but it is not sure that all will actually take place within that time period. *Gen. Starbird* expressed belief that at least two explosions can be made ready. *Mr. Gray* commented

that the President has made clear that he alone will be responsible for decisions till January 20 next. If he believes that significant results could be accomplished, he may well feel differently about permitting these shots. *Secretary Gates* remarked that the technical people believe a better job can be done in November, except for the political factor. *Mr. McCone* agreed, but pointed out that there has never been a shot for which the scientists did not want more time.

Mr. McCone described the first device scheduled for explosion. [text not declassified] Its location is at the bottom of a well, 950 feet deep and 36 inches in diameter. A tunnel has been dug from a location 1000 feet away from the device to a location 250 feet away, with numerous branch tunnels. All tunnels contained lining and instrumentation to test the shock resistance of the lining material. Total cost of the installation is four to five million dollars. The results to be obtained will be useful for design of hardened bases, for civil defense shelters, and for the mining industry. When the information is published, it will prove very valuable even to the Soviets. We should take the position that this installation has nothing to do with weapons development. Nor will there be any fallout. *Mr. Allen* commented that results would be made available to the Soviets whether they attend the explosion or not. *Mr. McCone* said that he would supply to the President full particulars regarding the planned explosion.

Secretary Gates, recalling the President's statement of July 7, expressed belief that the President would select the alternative proposal in Para 3 of the proposed Course of Action. *Mr. McCone* replied that the statement as to a date contained in the proposal hardly qualifies as an ultimatum in the sense that the President found objectionable.

Mr. Allen asked about the time required for the final preparations for the shot. *Gen. Starbird* replied that scientists must be summoned 30 days before the expected date, and practice radio countdowns begin two weeks before. *Mr. Allen* commented that a short lead time is of advantage since it minimized the problem of possible [illegible in the original] and demonstrations against the planned explosion. *The Secretary* said that the recent Presidential statement assuring that there would be no tests that would contaminate the atmosphere during his Presidency would be helpful.

The Secretary remarked that the issues seem to be clearly drawn for Presidential determination in the Course of Action paper. *Mr. McCone* suggested the alternative of pressing the pooling proposal once more. He referred again to Soviet adamance on a number of issues, and wondered whether we should not be equally adamant and press for resolution of other issues on our terms. He pointed out that, at the end of the two year research program, we still face a two or three year period of installation. *Mr. Farley* remarked that the only way to be adamant is to make plausible a threat to resume testing. If we actually resume nuclear detonations for

research proposes, we lend plausibility to such a threat. *Secretary Gates* expressed the suspicion that the Soviets may be testing nuclear weapons. It does not seem plausible that they are developing Polaris warheads without such tests, he said. *Mr. Dulles* remarked that we have no indications that such tests are going on.

Mr. McCone suggested that the Course of Action paper be changed by transferring to paragraph 2(a) the provision, now contained in 2(b), that our detonations will proceed on schedule and that prompt Soviet reply will be necessary if they are to leave themselves enough time to arrange for observation.

It was agreed that the Course of Action would be presented for consideration at the meeting of the National Security Council, Friday morning, August 12.

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
The Secretary
S/AE—Mr. Farley
Mr. Spiers
Mr. Baker
Mr. Gotzlinger
SOV—Mr. McSweeney

Department of Defense
Secretary Gates
General Dabney
General Loper
General Betts
Captain Foster

Control Intelligence Agency
Director Dulles
Mr. Brent

White House
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Keeny

USIA
Director Allen

Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman McCone
General Starbird
Dr. English

Attachment

Paper Prepared for the Principals of the Geneva Test Group

COURSE OF ACTION

1. Adopt a planning date of *November 15* (October 1)² for the first nuclear detonation in the seismic research program.

2. Authorize Wadsworth to state that, on studying the Soviet response to the pool proposals, the United States has decided, subject to Congressional authorization, to open its devices for U.K.-Soviet examination and thus end the debate regarding arrangements for the necessary nuclear detonations. The U.S. seismic research program of about

² Defense and AEC alternative to underlined words. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined words are printed here in italics.]

two years substantially as outlined by our scientists in May at Geneva, is scheduled to get under way on *November 15* (October 1)³.

(a) In so stating he would attach the condition that the Soviet Union agree that any devices employed for seismic research on its own territory will be opened on a reciprocal basis. He would also *recall our previous proposal* (attach the further condition)³ that any alleged large high explosive detonations for either industrial or seismic research purposes be opened to U.K. and U.S. observers to ascertain that nuclear devices are not used. He would also state that the devices would be open for visual and manual observation by the U.K. and USSR, that U.K. and Soviet scientists can be present when the device is detonated, *that U.K. and Soviet seismic instrumentation as necessary and agreed can be installed* (that Soviet and U.K. scientists can observe all U.S. instruments)³, and that all data obtained will be made available to the U.K. and Soviets; this forthcoming approach if well publicized should make it difficult for the Soviets to make major issues of the details of these arrangements, on which they have insisted on prior agreement;

(b) Wadsworth will make clear that our detonations will proceed on schedule and that prompt Soviet reply will be necessary if they are to leave themselves enough time to arrange for their observation and installation of necessary and agreed seismic instrumentation that they may propose.

(c) Wadsworth will continue to press for resolution of outstanding issues as called for in the March 29 Eisenhower-Macmillan communique, including an adequate quota of on-site inspections, the composition of the control commission, control post staffing, voting matters, and arrangements for the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes. In this connection the U.S. would continue to make it emphatically clear that the Soviet offer of 3 inspections is totally inadequate and unacceptable, and should restate its position that the level of inspections must bear an appropriate relationship to the number of unidentified events and to the capabilities of the system.

(d) Provided the coordinated research program goes ahead as scheduled on *November 15* (October 1) and remaining issues are solved and a treaty signed, the U.S. would agree to a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold from date of signature of the treaty for the remaining portion of the two-year research program we have outlined.

3. A joint resolution would be submitted to Congress during the August session, preferably after receipt of evidence of intent on the part of the Soviets to reach agreement, but if necessary before receiving a Soviet reply.

If statement of a specific date in 2 above has an undesirable appearance of ultimatum, which the President on July 7 wished to avoid, Wadsworth might modify his approach slightly by saying simply that we were proceeding with our preparations urgently without mentioning a specific date until a Soviet reaction was received; but we would advise

³ Defense and AEC alternative to underlined words. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined words are printed here in italics.]

Congress privately that we were determined to go ahead regardless of the Soviet answer and were making our preparations accordingly.

Upon Presidential approval of the above course of action, Congressional consultations should be undertaken promptly and should include Congressional leadership and Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees in addition to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. (After Congressional consultations, and only if they indicate that favorable Congressional action on the fallback proposal is probable,)⁴ it would also be necessary immediately to send a letter to Prime Minister Macmillan, who expressed reservations regarding any unilateral U.S. action and will have to be persuaded of the necessity for such a decisive course of action. If necessary because of serious objections from the Congress of Macmillan, the above course of action would be reconsidered with the President.

⁴ Defense and AEC proposed addition. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined words are printed here in italics.]

591. Position Paper Used by Herter at 455th NSC Meeting¹

August 12, 1960

PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

1. Adopt a planning date of _____ for the first nuclear detonation in the seismic research program.

2. Authorize the U.S. Representative to state that, on studying the Soviet response to our pool proposal, the United States has decided, subject to Congressional authorization, to open its devices for U.K.-Soviet examination and thus end the debate regarding arrangements for the necessary nuclear detonations. The U.S. seismic research program of about two years substantially as outlined by our scientists in May at Geneva, is scheduled to get under way on _____.

(a) We would attach the condition that the Soviet Union agree that any devices employed for seismic research on its own territory will be

¹ Source: Proposed course of action in test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Papers, Disaster File, Disarmament.

opened on a reciprocal basis. We would also state that the devices would be open for visual and manual observation by the U.K. and USSR, that U.K. and Soviet scientists can be present when the device is detonated, that U.K. and Soviet seismic instrumentation as necessary and agreed can be installed (we will make clear that our detonations will proceed on schedule and that prompt Soviet reply will be necessary if they are to leave themselves enough time to arrange for their observation and installation of agreed instrumentation), and that all data obtained will be made available to the U.K. and Soviets. This forthcoming approach, if well publicized, should make it difficult for the Soviets to make major issues of the details of these arrangements, on which they have insisted on prior agreement;

(b) We will continue to press for resolution of outstanding issues as called for in the March 29 Eisenhower-Macmillan communique, including an adequate quota of on-site inspections, the composition of the control commission, control post staffing, voting matters, and arrangements for the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes. In this connection the U.S. would continue to make it emphatically clear that the Soviet offer of 3 inspections is totally inadequate and unacceptable, and should restate its position that the level of inspections must bear an appropriate relationship to the number of unidentified events and to the capabilities of the system.

(c) Provided the coordinated research program goes ahead as scheduled on _____ and remaining issues are solved and a treaty signed, the U.S. would agree to a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold from date of signature of the treaty for the remaining portion of the two-year research program we have outlined.

3. A joint resolution would be submitted to Congress during the August session, preferably after receipt of evidence of intent on the part of the Soviets to reach agreement, but if necessary before receiving a Soviet reply.

(If statement of a specific date in 2 above has an undesirable appearance of ultimatum, which the President on July 7 wished to avoid, our approach might be modified slightly by saying simply that we are proceeding with our preparations urgently without mentioning a specific date until a Soviet reaction was received; but we would advise Congress privately that we were determined to go ahead regardless of the Soviet answer and were making our preparations accordingly.)

Upon Presidential decision as to a course of action, there should be prompt Congressional consultations as appropriate and communication with Prime Minister Macmillan, who was advised of our intention of going to a fallback position but expressed reservations regarding any unilateral U.S. action to commence nuclear detonations.

592. Memorandum From Farley to Dillon¹

Washington, August 12, 1960

SUBJECT

Recent Developments in the Negotiations for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Testing

Safeguards in Connection with Seismic Research Program

On August 2, the Soviet delegation declared that the United States proposal on inspection of the interior of nuclear devices opens up the possibility of working out a mutually acceptable formulation of safeguards provisions, but rejected the concept of tripartite pooling of devices. The Soviets reiterated their proposal of June 15, calling for examination of internal and external construction and of drawings of devices used in any research explosions carried out by the U.S. or the U.K. (*Tab A*)

On August 11, the Principals gave consideration to a Course of Action paper dealing with authorization to advance the fallback position, and recommended its submission, in revised form, to the National Security Council on the following day. (*Tabs B and C*)

The matter was discussed with the President at a meeting of the National Security Council on August 12.

Package Proposal on Organizational Matters

We instructed our delegation to explore informally with the other delegations a possible package settlement of organizational issues. In the context of such a package, the United States would be prepared to accept a Control Commission based on parity between the West and the Soviet bloc, consisting of four representatives from each of these, and three representatives of uncommitted states. Except as now otherwise specified in the treaty, the Commission would decide all organization matters by majority vote. Chiefs of control posts, and personnel of inspection teams in the territories of original parties would be selected by the Administrator from nationals of the other side. Chiefs of control posts, and personnel of inspection teams in the territories of other parties would be selected from members of the staff able to function

¹ Source: Update on test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8-1260.

with full objectivity in the state concerned. Observers on special aircraft flights would not be nationals of any country in whose territory the event under investigation may have occurred and, where such an event may have occurred on territory of an original party, the observers would be nationals of the other side. In accordance with the general parity concept, the budget would be set by equal contributions from the Soviet Union on one hand, and the United States and United Kingdom on the other. The United States would be prepared to agree to requirement for adoption of the budget as a whole, by unanimous agreement of the three original parties.

After obtaining U.K. concurrence, Ambassador Wadsworth presented the package proposal at an informal meeting of August 10. In the course of discussion, Mr. Tsarapkin expressed the personal opinion that a 4–4–3 Control Commission is reasonable, but saw some difficulty in the provisions on staffing and budget contributions.

Sir Michael Wright has pressed our Delegation strongly to table the package proposal, in order to complete the formal introduction of the western position. He has also urged consideration of a fallback position concerning inspection teams, observers and deputies. We have instructed our Delegation not to accede to the British request since tabling is expected to make it easier for Tsarapkin to pick and choose parts of the package he will accept and parts he will reject.

Moratorium on Testing Below the Threshold

Since the Camp David announcement of United States and United Kingdom willingness to institute a voluntary moratorium of agreed length on tests below the threshold, provided that a treaty is signed and a coordinated research program arranged, the Soviet delegation has, at ten plenary meetings and a number of informal meetings, pressed the Western delegations to state the moratorium duration they envisage. Ambassador Wadsworth has urged that he be authorized to state an initial position, citing tactical advantages which would be derived therefrom. We have instructed the Ambassador to withhold such a proposal at this time on the ground that it might enable the Soviets to divert the focus of discussion from the research program and remaining treaty issues.

On August 10, Sir Michael Wright pressed our delegation strongly on the desirability of tabling a proposal, in order to complete the formal introduction of the western position.

Annex I, "Detection and Identification System"

The U.S. Delegation has tabled a revised draft of Annex I, containing a description of components, operations and criteria to be employed in detecting and identifying events which could be suspected of being

nuclear explosions, and an installation schedule. We are awaiting Soviet response.

The revised draft does not include provisions for the installation of a high altitude detection system. At a meeting of Principals of May 2, it was decided to make no decision at this time as to the alternative proposals on such a system, viz., a complete test ban in outer space based on controls recommended by the Experts' Conference of 1958; a treaty ban up to 50 KM, with or without a moratorium on tests above that altitude.

On August 11, after criticizing the United States' installation schedule for "not preserving the equality of the sides in each stage of installation", the Soviets presented their own text, differing principally in that it sets 15 control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union, instead of 21, as contained in the U.S.-U.K. version, and in that it seeks to establish a number of control posts in such southern hemisphere locations as Australia and Oceanic Islands in the first phase of installation, rather than in later phases. This phase would be extended from three years, as proposed by the U.S.-U.K., to four.

Parties Article

On July 26, the United States delegation tabled a revised draft article on parties to the treaty containing provisions for adherence or accession of other states or authorities. (*Tab D*) In their response of August 4, the Soviets objected (1) to the use of the term "states or authorities", and expressed strong preference for the term "states"; (2) to the distinction between states invited to join by the Commission, and those whose accession the Commission finds to contribute to the achievement of the purposes of the treaty; and (3) to the necessity for Commission action on accession of parties. They charged that these provisions are unprecedented in treaty usage and would discriminate against certain parties.

Recess

The U.K. delegation has informally urged a recess, and the Soviet delegation has indicated approval. At a meeting of Principals of August 2, it was decided that the United States should not agree to a recess until the matter of safeguards in connection with the research program is cleared up. Following a meeting of the National Security Council on August 12, the delegation was instructed to seek to arrange for a recess of 3 to 4 weeks beginning soonest.

Quota of On-Site Inspections

On July 26, the Soviet delegation presented a proposal calling for a quota of up to three annual inspections on the territory of each original party, for events above or below the threshold. (*Tab E*) Ambassador

Wadsworth responded that the Soviet figure falls short of meeting the minimum requirements for effective deterrence.

TABS

TAB A: SUPNU 1262

TAB B: Memorandum for General Goodpaster, and Proposed Course of Action, August 11, 1960

TAB C: Uncleared Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of Principals, August 11, 1960

TAB D: Draft Article on Parties to the Treaty (GEN/DNT/102)

TAB E: SUPNU 1250

593. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, August 15, 1960

OTHERS PRESENT

Chairman McCone, General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone noted that he would be leaving for the discussions with Macmillan and the British on test suspension negotiations later the same day. Mr. McCone said that checks that had been made with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy made it clear that a shift to our “fall-back position” regarding Soviet inspection of nuclear devices used in our seismic experimentation program would cause a great deal of trouble in the Congress. The President said he understood from Macmillan’s latest letter that he would like to see us go to our fall-back position.

Mr. McCone said that the Soviets evidently knew about our fall-back position at the time we put forward our proposal regarding reciprocal inspection arrangements. He didn’t know who had passed this information to them, but noted that it must have been our negotiators in Geneva, or the British, who had been informed about it. In any case, they turned down the reciprocal system and demanded what amounted to unilateral concession by the United States.

The President told Mr. McCone that he thought he and Under Secretary Merchant should simply tell the British that we have so many

¹ Source: Preparation for McCone’s discussions with Macmillan. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series. Drafted on August 19.

political problems in regard to this matter during the next 2½ months that he did not feel it is possible to prepare the way for the proposal now. He did not, however, want to be in the position of breaking up the negotiations. He commented that this would be a shock to world opinion, adding that world opinion can be held quite strong along lines to which people are accustomed, but can become unstable and "shattered" under the shock of surprise, as for example the U-2 affair. The President added that he did not want Macmillan to think that we are playing fast and loose with him in having mentioned a fall-back position in July and then not putting it forward now.

Mr. McCone recalled that the check made with the Congress indicated that they would not clear the fall-back position. The President thought that after the election, an incoming President might have a good chance to get something like this through. He added that he considers the Atomic Energy Act unconstitutional in the powers it accords to the JCAE. He thought perhaps he would put forward the proposal and let Congress turn it down—and added that he might conceivably, in those circumstances, go ahead and do what he proposed and defy Congress to take action against him.

Mr. McCone said there is one point he intends to stress to Macmillan and that is that there is a tremendous difference between the United States and the USSR at Geneva, and that any talk of having narrowed these differences to something quite small is entirely erroneous. The President commented that he would be glad to take any treaty reducing military weapons if there is a proper quid pro quo and if adequate inspection to verify performance is provided. Mr. McCone recalled that the Soviets have offered three inspections a year and that practically speaking this is equivalent to none at all. He said Dr. Killian has held that a number in the order of seventy-five is a minimum.

Mr. McCone next commented that he had agreed that Ambassador Lodge, in making his speech on disarmament, should suggest that we and the Russians each put 30,000 kgs. of U-235 into escrow under inspection. He referred to planning a few years ago on the subject of atomic weapons and noted that our annual production today is many times what was estimated to be the total requirement just a few years ago.

The President asked that Mr. McCone extend his personal regards to Prime Minister Macmillan when he saw him.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

594. Memorandum From Dillon to Eisenhower¹

Washington, August 22, 1960

SUBJECT

Disarmament Reorganization within the Department of State

You will recall that last fall you initiated steps to strengthen the organization of the U.S. Government for dealing with disarmament matters. You decided that it was logical to place the responsibility for leadership of this new effort in the Department of State. On April 22, Secretary Herter reported to you orally that we would move ahead with the establishment of a focal point for disarmament activities, in a new organization reporting directly to him but with relative autonomy and staffed in part with personnel from other agencies. Since then, with the assistance of the White House Staff, we have been actively seeking an outstanding public figure to head the organization. In the meanwhile we have been proceeding with our plans.

On or about September 1, the Department of State plans to establish formally a United States Disarmament Administration. In addition to an intensified program of study and research, the new administration will be responsible for formulating policies with respect to the limitation and control, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and will progressively assume responsibility for the direction and support of international negotiations in this field. A more complete statement of the functions of the Administration is enclosed.

Secretary Herter has kept the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and your Scientific Advisor informed of these developments and he is confident of their understanding and support. Nevertheless, given the importance of this move and realizing your great interest in the subject, Secretary Herter thinks it would be most helpful if you could express your views on the new project in a letter to him and to these key officials. I am enclosing suggested letters for your possible use.

It might also be useful for our international relations if you or the White House were to make a public announcement in connection with the establishment of this organization. The exact form of the announcement would, of course, be reviewed in the light of circumstances existing

¹ Source: Establishment of U.S. Disarmament Administration within the Department of State. No classification marking. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/8–2260.

at the time of its release. It could take the form of (or include) release of the letter which you would send to Secretary Herter.

With the establishment of the United States Disarmament Administration and at the time Mr. James J. Wadsworth enters on duty as United States Representative to the United Nations, it would be appropriate to terminate his designation as United States Representative on Disarmament. The designation was made by letter from Secretary Dulles with your approval on February 27, 1956. With your approval, Secretary Herter will take the appropriate formal steps, in the next few weeks. You may at that time wish to express appreciation of Mr. Wadsworth's significant services in his former capacities.

/S/ Douglas Dillon
Acting Secretary

Enclosure 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Functions of the New United States Disarmament Administration

The mission of the Administration will be to assist the Secretary of State in leading and coordinating the effort of the United States government in formulating, negotiating and implementing policies in the field of control and limitation, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds, including agreements to safeguard against surprise attack and to lessen the danger of war by miscalculation. This mission, which will be carried out with the cooperation of the other interested parts of the government and with the assistance, where necessary, of experts and consultants under contract will include, *inter alia*, the following functions in the arms control field:

A. Development, review, analysis, evaluation and coordination of plans, policies and programs, and research in connection therewith, where necessary;

B. Coordination, and where appropriate, commissioning or assisting in the conduct of research and development activities in such matters as systems of limitation, inspection and control;

C. Formulation and coordination of U.S. positions for use in negotiation at international conferences, including analysis of the proposals of other countries; preparation of instructions to delegations, taking account of established procedures and responsibilities for U.S. participation in the U.N; provision, where appropriate, of members of U.S. delegations; and maintenance of contact with representatives of foreign governments;

D. Stimulation, coordination with and, where appropriate, financial support of such U.S. activity as is carried on by non-governmental agencies;

E. Planning, cooperation with, and assistance in public information programs designed to keep foreign and domestic public opinion accurately informed of U.S. policies;

F. Planning and coordination of U.S. participation in such arrangements for monitoring and inspection as may be required under international agreements to which the United States may be a party.

Enclosure 2

Suggested Letter from the President to the Secretary

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have read and approved your memorandum concerning the steps you are taking, pursuant to plans I initiated last fall, to create a United States Disarmament Administration to strengthen leadership and coordination of the manifold activities of the United States government in the field of arms limitation and control.

I agree that this Administration should be staffed with personnel drawn from other agencies and from outside government as well as from the Department of State, thus assuring the blending of skills essential to the highly complex work in which it will be engaged. I expect that, as in the past, you will continue to coordinate the participation of the other agencies in this program.

In addition to coordinating or conducting an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating policies with respect to disarmament, including the limitation and control, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and for direction and support of international negotiations on these subjects.

The Disarmament Administration will permit the United States to marshal the best available political, technical and scientific skills in a continuing campaign to discover practical means for easing the burden of armaments, lessening the dangers of war by miscalculation, and winning a just and durable peace.

I am requesting the heads of all other interested agencies to give you full and continued support in developing an effective organization and in building a strong and imaginative policy.

My own devotion to this endeavor is deep and abiding. The well-being and safety of our country and of the world may be significantly advanced by your efforts. I shall support you in every way I can.

I am sending letters related to this one to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of CIA, and to my Special Assistant for Science and Technology.

Enclosure 3

Suggested Letter From Eisenhower to Multiple Recipients

Suggested Letter from the President to:

The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Pursuant to the plans which I initiated last fall, the Secretary of State has established the United States Disarmament Administration to strengthen leadership and coordination of the manifold activities of the United States Government in the field of arms limitation and control.

This Administration will be responsible to the Secretary of State and will be staffed with personnel drawn from other agencies and from outside government as well as from the Department of State, thus assuring the blending of skills essential to the highly complex work in which it will be engaged.

In addition to coordinating or conducting an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating policies with respect to disarmament, including the limitation and control, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and for direction and support of international negotiations on these subjects. As in the past, the Secretary of State will continue to coordinate definition of these policies with you as appropriate to your responsibilities.

The Disarmament Administration will permit the United States to marshal the best available political, technical and scientific skills in a continuing campaign to discover practical means for easing the burden of armaments, lessening the dangers of war by miscalculation, and winning a just and durable peace.

I am confident that your agency will give full and continued support to the Secretary of State in developing an effective organization and in building a strong and imaginative policy.

My own devotion to this endeavor is deep and abiding. The well being and safety of our country and of the world may be significantly advanced by its efforts. I shall support it in every way I can.

I am sending letters related to this one to the Secretary of State and to other agencies and Departments with responsibilities in the field of arms control.

595. Memorandum From Farley to Herter¹

Washington, August 27, 1960

SUBJECT

Developments in Connection with the Negotiations for the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapons Testing, August 12–27, 1960

Recess

At a meeting in London of Chairman McCone and Under Secretary Merchant with Minister of State Ormsby-Gore and Sir Roger Makins, it was agreed that a recess of approximately four weeks' duration would be desirable, and the delegations were instructed to approach the Soviets on this basis. It was further agreed that, during the recess, there would be U.S.–U.K. coordination to develop tactics for the post-recess period and that this should take place in good time to permit review of positions by the principals of both sides (TAB A and TAB B).

The Soviets readily acceded to our informal proposal, and the conference was recessed from August 22 to September 27, after the Western delegations put on record a restatement of major differences and stressed the need for a more flexible Soviet attitude.

In the past week, there have been two meetings of the interdepartmental working group for the purpose of outlining positions for a report to the principals and coordination with the U.K. Mr. Charles Stelle and Mr. David Popper are expected to arrive on August 28 and September 7, respectively, for the purpose of taking part in interdepartmental consultations and consultations with British political and technical people beginning September 7.

Nuclear Detonations in Connection with Seismic Research Program

At the London meeting, the British readily accepted our explanation as to our inability to proceed with the fallback position. They expressed the opinion, however, that any proposal short of unilateral disclosure of devices would not be acceptable to the Soviets, that no marked progress can be made in the negotiations without putting forward a new position on safeguards, and that we could not go ahead unilaterally with seismic research shots without causing a breakoff in the conference. They feel that, aside from safeguards, the question of decoupling shots is the only serious outstanding issue on the research

¹ Source: Update on test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2760.

program, and it is an issue on which the Soviets will not be in a strong position.

The British tried unsuccessfully to obtain assurances that we do not intend to schedule a nuclear shot until the next administration. We pointed out that the basic position remains as stated by the President on December 29, 1959, but that we have no intention of announcing a test during the recess or immediately afterwards. (TAB A and TAB B)

The President replied to the Prime Minister on August 26, pointing out the impossibility of obtaining congressional approval now for the fallback position and expressing the intention to consult further on the safeguards problem. (TAB C)

Moratorium on Testing Below the Threshold

At the meeting of August 12, the Soviets repeated that the duration issue is the most important before the conference and put forward once more a proposal of four to five years. Responding generally, the U.K. delegate called for a moratorium sufficiently long to allow research to show results and to allow discussion of these results.

In the London discussions, it was agreed that it would be desirable to put forward our position on duration of a moratorium after the recess, along the lines that it should be no longer than the time required for the research program (2 years) plus a few months (3-6) to assess results. (TAB A and TAB B)

Package Proposal on Organizational Matters

Although plenary discussion failed to reveal any Soviet movement on staffing issues, Soviet deputy representative Usachev, in a dinner conversation, expressed conviction that "a deal was possible" on the package proposal which had been informally presented by Ambassador Wadsworth on August 9. He interpreted Moscow's rapid agreement to recess as a sign that quick and serious consideration is to be given the package.

Annex I, Detection and Identification System

Further informal technical discussion has taken place on reconciliation of the Soviet and the Western approach on phasing of installation of the system. The Soviet counter proposal of August 11 had revealed substantial agreement with our concept, but had suggested a rearrangement of the installation schedule in the southern hemisphere and 15 control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union instead of 21. Provision is made for formation of inspection groups only after entry into operation of Phase I control posts.

Soviet deputy representative Usachev told Mr. Popper that discussion could be based on the current U.S. draft of the Annex, rather than

on the old Soviet version, and that there is general similarity of views on phasing. He implied that there are relatively few serious obstacles in connection with the Annex.

Quota of On-Site Inspections

At numerous pre-recess plenary meetings, debate has continued on the approach as to inspection of the two sides, the Western delegations stressing the paramount importance of technical considerations in determining a quota and the Soviets defending their politically based offer of three annual inspections, applicable to events above or below the threshold. The Soviets attempted to prove that a technically based quota would result in five times as many inspections on the territory of the United States as in the Soviet Union. They proposed that auxiliary aids be included in the treaty, so as to reduce drastically the number of unidentified events.

In the London discussions, Mr. Ormsby-Gore agreed that we should be “stern” on the inspection quota. He expressed belief that the Soviets would compromise on a figure, but not above ten. He wondered whether it would be feasible to carry out more than ten annual inspections. (TAB B)

AFTAC has prepared an estimate, showing average seismic activity in the U.S. to be one to one and a half times as great as in the Soviet Union and slightly more than that in territory under jurisdiction of Great Britain.

Parties Article

Usachev stated informally that the Soviets are adamant in their insistence on automatic accession of nth parties and on use of the term “states” in place of “states or authorities” in identifying parties in the text of the article.

High Altitude Detection

General, but inconclusive, discussion took place at the London meetings. The interdepartmental working group agreed that a briefing be arranged for the British on or about September 9.

Budget Contribution Shares

The concept of West-Soviet parity of budget contributions is contained in our organizational package. The U.K. has informally presented to us its views on ratio of contributions between it and the United States and on the share to be borne by nth countries. The British could accept a 12:38 ratio, as compared with the United States, and proposed that ultimately 25% of the total costs of the organization should be borne by countries other than the original three. We had previously expressed

our opinion that such countries could not be expected to bear more than 10% of annual operating costs.

As Tab D to this memorandum there is also attached a report of an informal US-UK Delegation Meeting in Geneva, August 22, 1960.

596. Report of Working Group to Committee of Principals¹

August 31, 1960

Report of Working Group to Committee of Principals on Preparations for Resumption of Nuclear Test Negotiations

The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests will resume on September 27 in Geneva. Preparations on both political and technical aspects of the negotiations are under way and staff level consultations with the U.K. have been arranged in Washington beginning September 7. A report will be made to the Principals on these preparations and consultations during the week of September 12.

We expect to propose the following general approach in discussions with the U.K.:

1. Pending further consultations and decisions regarding the dates and arrangements under which the U.S. will conduct its first nuclear detonation in connection with project Vela we should reaffirm our readiness to proceed on the basis of the safeguards proposal advanced July 12 and reaffirm the White House statements of December 29 and May 7 regarding nuclear explosions. We should likewise press for Soviet acceptance and lay the groundwork by full explanations in the conference for public understanding of the necessity for the program of seismic research we have proposed.

2. Pursuant to the recent discussions in London we will take the position at an early appropriate time after resumption of negotiations that the moratorium referred to in the Eisenhower-Macmillan communique of March 29 be effective upon treaty signature for the remaining portion of the two year seismic research program (which will begin

¹ Source: Preparations for resumption of nuclear test negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing.

when announced by the U.S.) plus a period of three to six months to review results of the program.

3. We will upon resumption press for a resolution of the complex of technical issues relating to the number of inspections, the number and location of control posts, the treaty article on on-site inspection, the phasing of installation of control posts and Annex I on the Detection and Identification System. Preparations are under way on key issues in this field which are listed as *TAB A*. An AFTAC review of the technical aspects of these issues is attached as *TAB B*.

4. We will seek U.K. agreement to press in informal negotiations outside the conference the package of organizational issues as authorized NUSUP 968 (*TAB C*) to determine the price the Soviets would be willing to pay for a 4–4–3 parity arrangement in the Control Commission. In consultations with the U.K. during the recess we will stress that we consider it of the utmost importance that there be no deviation from present Western staffing positions on chief of posts and staffing of inspection teams and observers on special aircraft flights during these informal negotiations.

5. We hope to reach agreement with the U.K. during the forthcoming consultations on a definition of nuclear detonations.

6. We will during the recess begin exploration with the U.K. of the technical aspects of the high altitude question without prejudging the position the U.S. will finally take with respect to it.

7. If the general approach outlined above is followed upon resumption of negotiations it will be necessary to strengthen the technical side of the U.S. and U.K. delegations during the period immediately following resumption.

597. Letter From Herter to Gray¹

Washington, September 14, 1960

Dear Gordon:

I was most happy to receive your comments of September 13 on the suggested letter from the President and the statement of functions

¹ Source: Approves Gray's proposed amendments to statement of functions for the new U.S. Disarmament Administration. No classification marking. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, State Department.

of the new U.S. Disarmament Administration. I am in general agreement with your suggestions and have asked that appropriate changes be made in the two documents in the light of such comments as we receive from the agencies concerned.

With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

Attachment

Letter From Gray to Herter

Washington, September 13, 1960

Dear Chris:

I inclose a rather hastily prepared set of comments with respect to the suggested letter from the President and the statement of functions of the new U.S. Disarmament Administration which you sent to me with your letter of September 9. I submit these for whatever they may be worth to you.

With warm regards, I am,
Sincerely,

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant to the President

September 13, 1960

The two documents seem to raise two major questions:

First, does the President really intend to delegate to the Secretary of State and the U.S. Disarmament Administration the making of ultimate policy decisions? It would appear desirable to make it clear that the President reserves to himself policy decisions.

Second, do the documents as written provide for essential *meaningful* Department of Defense participation. The same question might be raised about AEC participation.

(A revision of the last sentence of paragraph 3 in the suggested letter from the President might substantially meet the problem of the first question and be helpful with respect to the problem involved in the second question. This sentence could read as follows: “As in the past the Secretary of State will continue to coordinate definition of these policies with you as appropriate to your responsibilities before obtaining Presidential approval.”)

My other comments are:

1. As to the suggested letter, in the first paragraph should not the word “safeguarded” be inserted before “arms limitation and control”?

In the fourth paragraph should there not be some reference to *military* skills? The word “technical” may include people familiar with military technology, but does this not ignore the strategic military considerations?

2. As to the statement of functions:

Should not the necessity of Presidential approval be somewhere referred to in the first paragraph?

In the second sentence of the first paragraph should not the last line read: “inter alia, assisting the Secretary of State in the following functions in the arms control field.”

Finally, would it not be desirable to involve the Director of the U.S. Information Agency in some way in this enterprise?

Enclosure

Letter From Herter to Gray

Washington, September 9, 1960

Dear Gordon:

As you know, the Department of State has today issued a press release announcing the establishment of the United States Disarmament Administration.

To help launch this new organization, it has been proposed that the President set forth its purpose in a letter to the heads of agencies who are most closely associated with the United States Government’s disarmament activities. A copy of this proposed letter is attached.

I am also enclosing a statement of the functions of the United States Disarmament Administration on which I would appreciate your comments. The functional statement will be incorporated in appropriate Department of State announcements and will, undoubtedly, be used in Congressional presentations.

I think it would be desirable if the Presidential letter could be issued and subsequent Department of State announcements on the new Administration be made within the next two or three days. I would, therefore, appreciate your urgent consideration of the attachments.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

Attachment 1

Suggested Letter From Eisenhower to Multiple Recipients

SUGGESTED LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO:

The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Pursuant to the plans which I initiated last fall, the Secretary of State has established the United States Disarmament Administration to strengthen leadership and coordination of the manifold activities of the United States Government in the field of arms limitation and control.

This Administration will be responsible to the Secretary of State and will be staffed with personnel drawn from other agencies and from outside Government as well as from the Department of State, thus assuring the blending of skills essential to the highly complex work in which it will be engaged.

In addition to coordinating or conducting an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating policies with respect to disarmament, including the limitation and control, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and for direction and support of international negotiations on these subjects. As in the past, the Secretary of State will continue to coordinate definition of these policies with you as appropriate to your responsibilities.

The Disarmament Administration will permit the United States to marshal the best available political, technical and scientific skills in a continuing campaign to discover practical means for easing the burden of armaments, lessening the dangers of war by miscalculation, and winning a just and durable peace.

I am confident that your agency will give full and continued support to the Secretary of State in developing an effective organization and in building a strong and imaginative policy.

My own devotion to this endeavor is deep and abiding. The well being and safety of our country and of the world may be significantly advanced by its efforts. I shall support it in every way I can.

I am sending letters related to this one to the Secretary of State and to other agencies and Departments with responsibilities in the field of arms control.

Attachment 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Functions of the New United States Disarmament Administration

The mission of the Administration will be to assist the Secretary of State in leading and coordinating the effort of the United States government in formulating, negotiating and implementing policies in the field of control and limitation, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds, including agreements to safeguard against surprise attack and to lessen the danger of war by miscalculation. This mission, which will be carried out with the cooperation of the other interested parts of the government and with the assistance, where necessary, of experts and consultants under contract will include, *inter alia*, the following functions in the arms control field:

A. Development, review, analysis, evaluation and coordination of plans, policies and programs, and research in connection therewith, where necessary;

B. Coordination, and where appropriate, commissioning or assisting in the conduct of research and development activities in such matters as systems of limitation, inspection and control;

C. Formulation and coordination of U.S. positions for use in negotiation in international conferences, including analysis of the proposals of other countries; preparation of instruction to delegations, taking account of established procedures and responsibilities for U.S. participation in the U.N.; provision, where appropriate, of members of U.S. delegations; and maintenance of contact with representatives of foreign governments;

D. Stimulation, coordination with and, where appropriate, financial support of such U.S. activity as is carried on by non-governmental agencies;

E. Planning, cooperation with, and assistance in public information programs designed to keep foreign and domestic public opinion accurately informed of U.S. policies;

F. Planning and coordination of U.S. participation in such arrangements for monitoring and inspection as may be required under international agreements to which the United States may be a party.

598. Memorandum From Twining to Eisenhower¹

Washington, September 15, 1960

SUBJECT

Arms Control Proposals and Your Speech at the United Nations, 22 September 1960

1. I have reviewed an early draft by the State Department Staff of a speech which you might make to the United Nations General Assembly and consider that certain basic aspects of the approach proposed in the arms control area would have serious implications relative to the security of the United States. The draft I saw probably will be revised. However, I feel that the following comments, which are addressed to the early draft, should be considered in formulating the arms control section of the speech you plan to make:

a. I question the view reflected in the speech that in a time of increasing tensions, as at present, the United States should feel compelled to increase the attractiveness to the Soviets of U.S. disarmament proposals by offering the Soviets one-sided military advantages. To do so, would be dangerously misleading to people throughout the world. The Soviets could only interpret this approach as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States and a sign of U.S. uncertainty about fulfilling its world-wide commitments.

b. I don't mean to imply that we should refuse to entertain new ideas, but it does seem clear that in the arms control field we can't expect to out-match the Soviets in offering fancy gimmicks for their propaganda appeal. Our interests surely lie in sticking to a responsible arms control program based on sound principles and realistic regard for the facts of international life.

c. Rather than the arms control approach taken in the draft speech, I believe that the United States should make clear that the unrenounced and frequently repeated Communist objective of world domination is the prime reason for the present level and deployment of U.S. armed forces and armaments.

d. With respect to arms control proposals, I believe that the United States should reiterate its interest in and willingness to negotiate international arms control agreements, and should demonstrate that the Soviets have consistently sabotaged all efforts in this direction through their repeated threats against and attacks on other peoples, their continued use of negotiations strictly as propaganda exercises and their refusal to negotiate in the 1960 Geneva disarmament conference, highlighted by their walk-out from that conference. In this connection, far greater stress than is now given in the draft should be placed on the Soviet penchant for secrecy as an obstacle to arms controls.

¹ Source: Views on a draft speech on disarmament. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. The United States should then restate—not renounce, as the draft speech implies—its 27 June 1960 disarmament proposals and invite participation in renewed negotiations on these proposals. As you no doubt recall, these proposals received your approval shortly before they were tabled in Geneva. To discard the 27 June 1960 proposals, as would be the case if we were to come forward now with what, in effect are new proposals, would—in addition to being a sign of great weakness—play into Soviet propaganda charges used to justify the Communist walk-out at Geneva in June 1960.

f. The arms control proposals in the draft speech are contrary to U.S. Basic National Security Policy in that they do not provide for balanced and phased disarmament. For example, the arms control proposals contained in the draft advocate the reduction of nuclear military capabilities without requiring substantial conventional disarmament, thus potentially impairing U.S. nuclear capabilities while leaving Sino-Soviet conventional capabilities unimpaired. The following are additional examples of proposals contained in the draft considered undesirable:

(1) One proposal asks the United Nations to “call on nations to engage in no military activities” on celestial bodies. This would be an uncontrolled ban, probably binding on the United States, but not on the USSR. A major principle of U.S. policy is that disarmament measures must be controllable and controls must be operative; this proposal is contrary to this principle and could establish a dangerous precedent. Also, this proposal could and probably would lead to additional U.N. resolutions such as ban the bomb, liquidate overseas bases, and eliminate means for delivering nuclear weapons.

(2) Another proposal asks that an “urgent study be initiated” in connection with control of nuclear delivery systems. This proposal, presented out of the context of the 27 June U.S. program, unduly emphasizes this aspect of the program in keeping with the Soviet desire to place the control of nuclear delivery means in Stage One.

(3) The proposals concerning nuclear weapons, aside from being undesirable because they are not tied to conventional disarmament, invite the ninety-odd nuclear have-nots, who have no capability and no responsibility for preserving the security of the Free World, to negotiate and pass resolutions on arms controls for U.S. nuclear weapons. In addition, the proposal to close nuclear production plants one-by-one is undesirable because it is offered without requiring verification to assure that new plants are not being established on the territory of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) The United States cannot agree to terminate “nuclear” production, as is proposed in the speech. This would encompass tritium without which many of our existing or remaining nuclear weapons would quickly become ineffective. For this reason, the U.S. proposals have only suggested termination of the production of “fissionable” materials.

(5) The speech deals inadequately with Soviet aggression over international waters and with the problem of obtaining the release of the RB-47 crewmen; also, it hands the initiative in this matter to the Soviets. The major points to be stressed are that a continuation of Soviet aggressive acts over international waters is a bar to peaceful negotiations; that

the continued illegal imprisonment of the RB-47 crewmen is a constant reminder of the fact of Soviet aggression; and that the RB-47 crewmen must be released immediately to afford any hope that Soviet brigandage over international waters will be stopped and, therefore, any hope that negotiations might be fruitful.

(6) The section on arms control fails to specify that nuclear and non-nuclear arms controls must be balanced and that "general disarmament" must be under effective international control.

2. I believe that specific arms control measures listed in the draft speech, should be redrafted to conform to the U.S. proposals of 27 June 1960, which are the latest arms control proposals which have been fully coordinated within the Government and approved by the President. The arms control proposals contained in the draft speech have not been so coordinated. They represent a drastic departure from the concept of balanced and phased arms control measures at all times under effective international verification and inspection, as reflected in the 27 June proposals, and would have serious security implications.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur fully in the views expressed above.

N.F. Twining

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

599. Memorandum From Parsons (FE) to Merchant¹

Washington, September 20, 1960

SUBJECT

Possible addition of Communist China to 10-Nation Disarmament Commission

My reactions from the strictly Far East viewpoint to a *U.S.* proposal to add the Federal Republic of Germany and Communist China to the 10 nation Disarmament Group are as follows:

1. It has long been the United States position that Communist China must indeed be included in any effective disarmament scheme but that until it is determined that the U.S.S.R. will agree to such a scheme rather than merely making propaganda, it would be premature

¹ Source: Possible addition of Communist China to Ten-Nation Disarmament Commission. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1772.

to bring in the Chinese Communists whose interest it is to exploit disarmament only to expose the imperialists, i.e. propaganda. We think our present stance is still sound and serviceable.

2. This position has the merit of minimizing pressures upon us as regards United Nations representation. If we think it important here and now to bring the Chinese Communists into the disarmament negotiations, we would be urged to concede that their presence in the United Nations would be important too. We could justify a seeming inconsistency in this regard if we could say we had evidence of a favorable Chinese Communist position on disarmament but our evidence is just to the contrary.

3. If Mr. Khrushchev for reasons related to his dispute with the Chinese Communists makes a big pitch to get them into the United Nations, I do not think we could one day go all out to oppose this and then turn around and propose adding them to the 10 nation group. The sophisticated nations might understand but they are in the minority.

4. If Chinese Representation problem goes routinely, point 2 applies less obviously but nonetheless importantly, I think.

5. In so far as the exacerbation of Soviet-Chinese Communist relations is concerned, I could argue for throwing the monkey wrench either way. On balance I feel that they are more likely to stick together if they are at the same table than if one is sulking in outermost Peiping. Also, if they are at the same table, the Russians will no longer feel a partial responsibility and will tell us to deal directly with the Chinese Communists.

6. In the Far East any apparent change of United States attitude toward the Chinese Communists arouses apprehension. Indeed, even the invitation to Khrushchev to come here a year ago caused consternation. The Thai are already jittery and critical as you know because we have been allegedly less anti-Communist and firm in Laos than we should have been. The Vietnamese and others in some degree share this concern.

7. I am afraid that this proposal would appear to many as a gimmick, none too sincere, at the expense of a substantive policy to which we have long consistently adhered. If some one else were to propose this, some of my misgivings would be removed but I would still suspect that we would be opening one or more boxes of Pandora with no clear sight ahead as to how to put the contents back under the lid or lids. There is little doubt that if present the Chinese would aggressively seek to blackmail the "imperialists" and try to divide them. We would be dealing across the table with two arch-obstructionists instead of one.

8. Incidentally, Chou-en-lai has said he would not take part in any disarmament conference involving countries, which have not recognized Communist China.

9. Finally, I am told the Department is putting the final touches on a Disarmament paper which rejects the idea of bringing the Chinese Communists into the group.

Copies to:

IO—Mr. Wilcox
S/AE—Mr. Farley
CA—Mr. Martin

600. Memorandum From Farley to Herter¹

Washington, September 23, 1960

SUBJECT

Today's Soviet Disarmament Proposals

I have compared the Soviet proposals on disarmament introduced today in the General Assembly with the proposals of June 2.

The only change of any significance is the shift of the proposal for reduction of U.S. and Soviet armed forces to 1.7 million, from para. 2 of the second stage to para. 2 of the first stage. Corresponding paragraphs concerning the duties of inspectors and other control measures have been shifted from para. 3 of the second stage to the end of para. 8 of the first stage.

The present sub-paragraphs III (f) and (g) have been moved up from their former locations in para. 3 of the second stage and para. 8 of the first stage respectively.

Other changes are even more trivial. They consist of:

(a) modifying the lead-in language to refer to the governments of states "participating in negotiations on disarmament" rather than "members of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament set up in 1959".

¹Source: Analysis of new Soviet disarmament proposals. No classification marking. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1772.

(b) Deleting the underlined words in the following phrase from sub-paragraph III (d): “each party to the Treaty will undertake to give the *inspectors and* inspection teams timely and unrestricted access within its territory.

(c) Adding the word “scientific” to “peaceful purposes” everytime the launching of rockets is referred to.

cc—

Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Smith
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Berding
Mr. Wilcox
Ambassador Wadsworth

601. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, October 2, 1960

OTHERS PRESENT

Prime Ministers Menzies and Macmillan; Ambassador Beale, Lord Home,
Mr. de Zulueta, Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

The President, after greeting Prime Minister Menzies, said he could not understand why the rest of the world had not reacted with shock and resentment to the resolution by the five neutral nations calling upon Khrushchev and himself to meet. He was especially surprised at Nehru joining in this, since Nehru certainly understands the Communist tactics. However, Nehru had said that his mind was confused regarding the situation that has developed. The President said he does not have much use for the others (Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito and Sukarno).

Mr. Menzies said that it is an old trick of Nehru's to sit silent, not giving his views on matters up for discussion, in order to embarrass the

¹ Source: Resolution of five neutrals calling for a U.S.-Soviet summit. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

other man. He recalled that Sukarno had objected to a summit meeting of four people, noting that he was now joining in proposing a summit meeting of two people.

The President said that he has been working hard on a reply to the five neutral leaders. The key point is that the problems are not problems of the United States and the USSR alone, but affect the whole of humankind. Mr. Menzies noted that in Cabinet meetings, when he has a problem it seems impossible to solve, a good technique is to refer it to a committee. He thinks the action of the neutral leaders is of this character—If Hammarskjold, as well as the Western nations, were going to be kicked around in the UN, then he thought those doing the kicking should be allowed to go ahead and break up the UN, since there would be no point in pretending that we have anything of value in those circumstances. The President concluded by saying that there is one Khrushchev recommendation he favored and that is to get the United Nations out of New York City. Having the United Nations there imposes a great burden on a free country, with a free press that people like Khrushchev and Castro can exploit for their own purposes.

Lord Home brought up one additional point—Khrushchev wants to add five “Neutrals” to the Disarmament Committee which now consists of ten members. He said his thought was to say that the Soviets may propose the addition of five, but we would like to add five also. Lord Home said it would be very difficult and undesirable to vote against the addition of Mexico, the UAR and one or two of the other nations proposed by the Soviets. Mr. Herter pointed out that the twenty-member committee would be getting quite unwieldy and discussion brought out that it is not desirable to approach this problem on a two-party basis.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

602. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel MC/110

New York, October 7, 1960, 1:10 p.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, October 3–7, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Max V. Krebs

United Kingdom
Lord Alexander Home
Mr. I. A. Samuel (Private Secretary)

SUBJECT

Disarmament

The Secretary opened the conversation by asking Lord Home how Prime Minister Macmillan's second conversation with Khrushchev had gone. The Foreign Secretary said almost the entire conversation had been devoted to disarmament with Khrushchev adding a new element in suggesting a special session of the General Assembly in February or March 1961 to take up only disarmament. Macmillan countered that he thought some progress could be made in Committee I during the General Assembly. He made no commitment regarding Khrushchev's suggestion. Lord Home went on to say that Khrushchev is expected to speak tomorrow when the Assembly discusses adoption of the agenda, and may advance his line regarding disarmament at that time.

Lord Home said that British tactic will be to refuse to be drawn into any general discussion of disarmament in the plenary. He questioned how long Boland would allow Khrushchev to go on with any statement on disarmament noting that the vote in the Committee on referral of disarmament to Committee had been better than a two-thirds majority. The Secretary said that in several of his talks with representatives of smaller nations he found them all in agreement with the idea of taking up disarmament in Committee first. As far as he was concerned Lord Home said he planned to leave on the morning of the 8th and would come back to New York only if the General Assembly got involved in the disarmament item and then only for a few days. He did indicate he might return to take part if the item came under serious consideration in Committee I.

¹ Source: Disarmament at the United Nations. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

Continuing, Lord Home said Macmillan had tried to get Khrushchev into discussion of controls and inspection, but that Khrushchev had shied away. The Foreign Secretary said that in a talk with Moch yesterday he had raised the question of DeGaulle's proposals on control of means of delivery. Moch had said there had been a misunderstanding of French intentions in this regard and that they had intended only inspection of the means of delivery in the first stage.

In reply to Lord Home's question the Secretary said the only other item which had been under consideration by the U.S. for possible advancement into the first stage was the matter of nuclear missiles. The Secretary added, however, that we had run into difficulty since this would involve submarines and other naval vessels as well as any aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

603. Letter From Eisenhower to Kistiakowsky¹

Washington, October 25, 1960

Dear Dr. Kistiakowsky:

Pursuant to plans which I approved last fall, the Secretary of State has established the United States Disarmament Administration to strengthen leadership and coordination of the manifold activities of the United States Government in the field of safeguarded disarmament and arms control.

This Administration will be responsible to the Secretary of State and will be staffed with personnel from the interested U.S. Government departments and agencies, together with personnel recruited from outside Government where appropriate, thus assuring the blending of skills essential to the highly complex work in which it will be engaged.

In addition to coordinating or conducting an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating recommendations for policies and basic positions for consideration within the U.S. Government with respect to effective disarmament and arms control, and for direction and support of international negotiations on these subjects. As in the past, the Secretary of

¹ Source: U.S. Disarmament Administration. No classification marking. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the President's Science Advisory Committee, U.S. Disarmament Administration.

State will continue to coordinate these policies with you as appropriate to your responsibilities.

The Disarmament Administration will permit the United States to marshal the best available skills applicable to the field in a continuing campaign to develop practical means for attaining effective disarmament and arms control agreements, for easing the burden of armaments, for lessening the dangers of surprise attack, or of war by accident or miscalculation, and for promoting a just and durable peace.

I am confident that your agency will give full and continued support to the Secretary of State in developing an effective organization and in building a sound and imaginative disarmament and arms control policy.

My own devotion to this endeavor is deep and abiding. The well-being and safety of our country and of the world may be significantly advanced by its efforts. I shall support it in every way I can.

I am sending letters related to this one to the Secretary of State and to other agencies and departments with responsibilities in the field of arms control.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Attachment

FUNCTIONS OF THE U.S. DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION

The mission of the Administration will be to assist the Secretary of State in formulating disarmament and arms control policies and basic positions consistent with national security for consideration within the U.S. Government, and in negotiating international agreements in this field. This mission, which will be carried out in cooperation with the other interested parts of the government, and with the assistance, where necessary, of experts and consultants under contract, will include assisting the Secretary of State in the following functions:

A. Development, review, analysis, evaluation and coordination of plans, studies, policies and programs, and research in connection therewith;

B. Maintenance of up-to-date information on all studies and research and development activities which are being carried on, both inside and outside the government, in support of the United States governmental effort in the disarmament and arms control field; development of a long-term cooperative program for such studies and activities; and undertaking or commissioning such studies or activities as may be appropriate in the light of the long-term program;

C. Formulation and coordination of policies for the guidance of U.S. delegations to international negotiations;

D. Maintenance of contact on disarmament, arms control and related matters with the representatives of foreign governments;

E. Planning for, cooperation with, and assistance in public information programs designed to keep foreign and domestic public opinion accurately informed of U.S. policies;

F. Development in cooperation with the other interested U.S. agencies of plans for U.S. participation in such arrangements for control and inspection as may be required under international disarmament and arms control agreements.

604. Memorandum From Herter to Persons¹

Washington, November 16, 1960

Dear Jerry:

You may recall my telling you that we should reach a decision soon with regard to the continuation of the Nuclear Test Suspension discussions in Geneva. On the basis both of Soviet statements and the current slow pace of their responses in Geneva it seems unlikely that they will be prepared to make any substantial negotiating moves or to seek seriously any resolution of remaining differences until they know whether a new administration is prepared to offer them a better deal on the outstanding issues. If a satisfactory resolution of remaining issues is not now likely, it would not seem to be in the U.S. interest to make concessions or offer compromises at a time when instead of enabling us to determine whether agreement is possible they might serve only to reduce our bargaining position for the final effort to reach agreement. Just as the prospects of agreement seem slight at present, so also do the prospects of breaking off negotiations or proceeding with nuclear research explosions in December on terms favorable to the West. In this connection it would be particularly difficult at this time to secure the assent of Congressional leaders to the fallback position on opening nuclear devices (without which the U.K. would not support us in initiating nuclear research shots).

¹ Source: Proposes recess in test ban negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series.

In light of these factors it would seem advisable to seek a recess in the negotiations in the latter part of this month and to propose that negotiations reconvene in February. Since a firm reconvening date would be set we foresee no likelihood that a recess would have any serious repercussions in the UN. Prior to a recess we should maintain essentially our present positions with such elaborations and developments on relatively minor aspects as can be handled through the normal day to day instructions.

Before consultation with the British and the Soviets on this matter, I think it would be well to advise Clark Clifford of what we propose to do. My guess would be that he would approve.

Christian A. Herter

605. Memorandum From Persons to Clifford¹

November 18, 1960

Memorandum of Information for Mr. Clark Clifford Furnished to me by the Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Nuclear Test Suspension Discussions in Geneva

You may recall my telling you that we should reach a decision soon with regard to the continuation of the Nuclear Test Suspension discussions in Geneva. On the basis both of Soviet statements and the current slow pace of their responses in Geneva it seems unlikely that they will be prepared to make any substantial negotiating moves or to seek seriously any resolution of remaining differences until they know whether a new administration is prepared to offer them a better deal on the outstanding issues. If a satisfactory resolution of remaining issues is not now likely, it would not seem to be in the U.S. interest to make concessions or offer compromises at a time when instead of enabling us to determine whether agreement is possible they might serve only to reduce our bargaining position for the final effort to reach agreement. Just as the prospects of agreement seem slight at present, so also do

¹ Source: Conveys Herter's memorandum on recess in test ban negotiations. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series.

the prospects of breaking off negotiations or proceeding with nuclear research explosions in December on terms favorable to the West.

In light of these factors it would seem advisable to seek a recess in the negotiations in the latter part of this month and to propose that negotiations reconvene in February. Since a firm reconvening date would be set, we foresee no likelihood that a recess would have any serious repercussions in the UN. Prior to a recess we should maintain essentially our present positions with such elaborations and developments on relatively minor aspects as can be handled through the normal day to day instructions.

Before consultation with the British and the Soviets on this matter, I think it would be well to advise Clark Clifford of what we propose to do.

The above information is the type that I would think would be given to Senator Kennedy's State Department designee, but I am passing it on to you pending the naming of this official.

Wilton B. Persons

606. Letter From Gray to Herter¹

Washington, November 30, 1960

Dear Chris:

In a letter to you dated November 19, 1960, copies of which were sent to each of the Principals, the Secretary of Defense recommended that United States policy on Arms Control be set forth in a single NSC document.

I heartily endorse the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense which, as I understand it, proposes only the codification in a single document of existing policy on arms control.

At present, United States policy on Arms Control is recorded in two NSC policy documents. It is set forth, but only in the very broadest terms, in a single paragraph of Basic National Secretary Policy (Paragraph 52, NSC 5906/1). It is also set forth in NSC 112, which was

¹ Source: Endorses Gates' proposal for single NSC document on U.S. arms control policy. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Records of the Office of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Arms Control.

approved on July 19, 1951 and which still remains unrescinded on the NSC records.

On July 22, 1960, I raised in the NSC Planning Board the question as to whether there should not be an up-to-date policy statement on the control of armaments. At that time the State Department representative stated that the Department would consider the possibility of developing a draft statement of current policy on the subject. I am advised that the State Department has not as yet undertaken to prepare such a policy statement.

Because paragraph 52 of NSC 5906/1 is cast in such general terms and because NSC 112 is over nine years old, I strongly urge the preparation of an up-to-date policy codification on arms control, suitable for submission to the National Security Council and approval by President Eisenhower.

I should suppose that the Committee of Principals would recommend such a paper and that the Interdepartmental Working Group for Disarmament would be the logical body to prepare a draft for this purpose.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Enclosure

Note From Gray to Lay

Washington, November 25, 1960

Mr. Lay:

I agree with Mr. Gates that there should be a single document setting forth the U.S. Arms Control Policy. You will recall that we had such a codification project on the books many months ago.

I think we should give every possible impetus to this.

Gordon Gray

Enclosure**Letter From Gates to Herter**

Washington, November 19, 1960

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on several occasions have pointed out the need for a formally approved comprehensive United States policy on Disarmament and Arms Control and for an official current statement of the United States position in order to provide definitive guidance (a) for the formulation of future United States proposals and (b) for our representatives in international negotiation and discussion on this subject. Current United States Basic Policy on Arms Controls, set forth in Paragraph 52—NSC 5906/1, is stated in very broad terms, and, while adequate for general guidance, requires clarification in the interests of common interpretation and understanding among the various governmental individuals and working groups concerned with the subject of disarmament.

With the foregoing in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to submit their views regarding the principles which should govern U.S. arms control policy and regarding specific measures which the United States might propose which would be in consonance with that policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have now submitted their recommendations. Except for minor modifications, principally in format, these recommendations are contained in the inclosure hereto and its annex, which I have reviewed and consider to be suitable for adoption. The position recommended (annex to the inclosure hereto) takes into consideration and is consistent with the Program submitted by the United States to the Ten-Nation Committee on June 27, 1960. The policy recommended (inclosure hereto) is comprehensive, and in my view, soundly based.

I believe it to be desirable that the arms control policy be set forth in a single NSC document to which the current U.S. arms control position should be appended. As in the case of other NSC documents, they should be kept current as revisions may occur from time to time. In the view of the possibility of an early resumption of international arms control negotiations, I believe it particularly important to establish an approved comprehensive U.S. arms control policy and the current U.S. position quite soon. Accordingly, I suggest that the proposed policy and United States position be referred to the Interdepartmental Working Group for Disarmament for review, with instructions to submit their final report to the Principals not later than November 10, 1960, with the

view of early approval by the President. Such final action would serve the dual purpose of formally recording U.S. arms control policy, which should govern the formulation of United States proposals now and in the future, and of setting forth the current U.S. position on an international disarmament program.

A copy of this letter is being transmitted to each of the Principals.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas S. Gates

607. Memorandum From Gray to Herter and Gates¹

Washington, December 14, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

I am directed by the President to request that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense prepare a codification of U.S. Policy on Arms Control in a single document which would become a part of the National Security Council record.

If I or any members of the NSC staff can be of any assistance I trust you will let me know.

Gordon Gray

Special Assistant to the President

¹ Source: Directs preparation of a codification of U.S. arms control policy in a single document. No classification marking (Top Secret enclosure). 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Arms Control.

Attachment

Letter From Haskins to Gray

November 29, 1960

Mr. Gray:

Attached is a proposed draft letter to the Secretary of State, seconding the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense for a codification of U.S. policy on arms control in a single NSC document.

I am afraid that I share Bob Amory's estimate as to the unlikelihood that such a document can be prepared by January 20, let alone by December 10.

The JCS draft enclosed with the letter from the Secretary of Defense seems scarcely a recapitulation of agreed existing policy. It states, for example:

"The U.S. negotiations effort must ensure that in the post-arms control agreement era the U.S. will be able to maintain at any stage an adequate response to the entire spectrum of the remaining Sino-Soviet Bloc threat; namely, an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an evident, flexible capability for military operations short of general nuclear war."

If you do wish to give every possible impetus to achieving a codification during this Administration, I suggest that you ask the President to raise the matter in the presence of Secretaries Herter and Gates and request them to produce an agreed codification for adoption in the NSC by a day certain.

Charles A. Haskins

608. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, December 16, 1960

SUBJECT

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

REFERENCE

NSC 5725/1

The enclosed Report by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State on the implementation of NSC 5725/1, for the period July 1, 1959 through October 15, 1960, is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Progress Report by the Atomic Energy Commission

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PROGRESS REPORT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE STATE OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSC 5725/1—PEACEFUL USES
OF ATOMIC ENERGY—FOR THE PERIOD OF JULY 1, 1959
THROUGH OCTOBER 15, 1960

1. This report summarizes major developments and problem areas for the period of July 1, 1959, through October 15, 1960, in the programs implementing NSC 5725/1, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", dated December 13, 1957.

¹ Source: Transmits report on implementation of NSC 5725/1, "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Confidential. 23 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5725.

2. During the reporting period, the United States maintained its leadership in fostering peaceful uses of atomic energy and assisting the programs of other countries and international organizations in this field. This leadership was demonstrated convincingly at the Third and Fourth General Conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in September 1959 and 1960.

3. At the 1959 Conference, the United States recommended a balanced expansion of Agency activities, much of which has been incorporated in IAEA programs, particularly in technical assistance to lesser developed countries.

4. In 1960, despite the continued opposition from important neutral and Soviet Bloc countries, progress was made toward a major U.S. objective, that of the Agency fulfilling its statutory responsibility of establishing and administering an international system of safeguards to assure against diversion to military purposes of materials and facilities supplied by or through the Agency or placed under its jurisdiction. (See "International Agency", paragraphs 21-32, and "Safeguards", paragraphs 11-19.)

5. In nuclear power development abroad, technical problems and general education in delivered prices of fossil fuels caused stretchouts and modifications in most major programs. The U.S. domestic program has been unaffected as fossil fuel costs have been and remain relatively stable.

6. It has been recognized that competitive power will be difficult to attain in the United States. There is confidence, however, that the short-term goals of the U.S. 10-year program ending in 1968 will be achieved and that the diversity and magnitude of the U.S. reactor development effort will provide continued leadership in this area. (See "U.S. Power Development", paragraphs 50-60.)

7. In 1960, U.S. cooperation was extended to three countries not previously associated with the Atoms for Peace program. These were Indonesia (research Agreement for Cooperation effected) and Finland and Yugoslavia, assistance to the latter two being made possible by the U.S.-IAEA agreement. (See paragraph 26.) Also, financing of work in this country in direct support of the Canadian heavy water moderated power reactor development was a significant expansion of cooperation with our Canadian ally. (See paragraph 54.)

8. Other events include the successful organization, in October 1959, along lines proposed by the United States, of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) and orderly development of its program without opposition at the second IANEC meeting in Brazil in July 1960 (Cuba not represented); increasing requests from countries and international organizations for U.S. experts and consultants (48 supplied in the reporting period); and success of the comprehensive Atoms for Peace exhibits in India and the United Arab Republic.

9. The U.S.S.R. so far has confined its own Atoms for Peace program primarily to the Soviet Bloc countries. Some aid has been given to Iraq (exchange of missions), Yugoslavia (a research reactor), Indonesia (offer of reactor and technicians) and the United Arab Republic (training and a research reactor). The Franco-Soviet agreement signed April 2, 1960 is limited largely to exchanges of scientists somewhat along the same lines of the US-USSR program.

10. There always is the possibility that the Soviet Union may add more substantial aid in the nuclear field to its current economic and technological offensive against the Free World. There are reports that the U.S.S.R. will offer to supply on attractive credit terms and with "no strings attached" (e.g., safeguards) a large power reactor to India which is in the market for such a facility.

SAFEGUARDS

11. After long consideration, the IAEA Board of Governors in April 1960 approved provisionally and referred to the Fourth General Conference, a proposed system of Agency administered safeguards. The proposed policies and procedures are acceptable to the United States and were strongly endorsed by U.S. representatives in the Board and at the September 1960 Conference.

12. During the Conference debate, at our request, eight nations went on record as favoring consultation with the United States with a view of transferring to Agency administration the safeguards provisions of their present bilateral agreements with the United States. Negotiations to accomplish such a transfer will be undertaken with the countries involved.

13. It is recognized that the Agency system, if implemented by the IAEA Board at its January 1961 meeting, is only a first step toward the goal of a comprehensive internationally administered control system that would be applicable to all types of materials and facilities where there is the possibility of diversion for military purposes. The proposed controls would apply only to reactors of up to 100 megawatts thermal power and are not applicable to facilities such as chemical processing plants or large power reactors.

14. In recognition of the evolutionary nature of the Agency system, the 15-power resolution, initiated by the United States and adopted by the Conference, provides that the Board of Governors shall report to the Sixth Conference in 1962 on the results of experience gained, as well as technological developments so that operation of Agency safeguards may be reviewed and evaluated.

15. To provide a field laboratory for the Agency procedures and to demonstrate that international inspection is not an unwarranted infringement on national sovereignty, the United States at the Fourth

Conference unilaterally offered to place under IAEA inspection two research, one experimental power, and one small power reactor—all representative of the types of facilities that would be covered under the proposed Agency system. The U.S. offer was well received and a project agreement is being worked out to put it into effect.

16. At the 1960 Conference, India and the Soviet Bloc continued their strong opposition to the proposed system. A large majority of members, however, rejected a five-power resolution initiated by India which would have had the effect of emasculating the proposed system and delaying its installation. Instead, by a better than two-to-one vote, the Conference adopted the 15-power resolution which returned the safeguards document to the Board for implementation and instructed the Board to take into account the views expressed during the debate.

17. It is anticipated, however, that the Soviet Bloc, India and other neutral states will continue their opposition to proposed safeguards system during the January 1961 Board discussions and, even if passed, may not join in its application.

18. (The President was informed on October 31, 1960 of rights and sanctions available to the United States to recover reactor fuel furnished by this country in event a recipient nation failed to comply with provisions of the Agreement for Cooperation under which the material was made available.)

19. U.S. preparation for the January 1961 Board meeting will be directed toward obtaining maximum support for the proposed Agency system and for a common position among other supplier nations to apply comparable safeguards to their bilateral transactions. Should these objectives fail to be achieved, the United States must re-assess its safeguards position, taking into account both actual developments and the requirements of national security.

20. As of this date, under bilateral agreements, U.S. safeguards are applicable to 62 facilities in 23 countries. Inspections are continuing on normal schedules without incident. Materials being controlled, as of September 30, 1960 amount to more than 20, 000 kilograms of uranium fuel and 365 tons of heavy water.

21. Meanwhile, Euratom has activated its safeguards operation and inspections by three-man teams of different nationalities are proceeding. No objections have been encountered either to the inspections or the nationality of the personnel. A master inventory of materials and facilities subject to Euratom controls is being prepared.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

22. Despite statutory and financial handicaps, the Atomic Energy Agency in the past 15 months has made significant progress in

competence and in scope of its technical programs. U.S. support of the Agency was expanded. Noteworthy was the U.S. effort to encourage our bilateral partners to look to the Agency for its future Atoms for Peace assistance. To this end, four bilateral agreements were allowed to expire: Chile, Colombia, Lebanon and Pakistan.

23. Six other bilaterals expiring in 1960 or 1961 (Argentina, Brazil, Republic of China, Greece, Israel, and Portugal) were extended for only two years with a view to encouraging these countries to seek future assistance from the Agency. The same was true for a three-year extension of the U.S. agreement with the Philippines.

24. The United States continued to be the largest financial contributor to the Agency. During calendar year 1960, the United States will provide not less than half of the voluntary budget and 32.43 per cent of the assessed budget. (See paragraph 28). Other monetary support includes \$192,000 worth of equipment as gifts in kind to certain member nations under the IAEA technical assistance program and \$700,000 for cost-free fellowships.

25. Under a master contract negotiated with the Agency, the United States, during the reporting period, placed 12 research contracts for work costing \$134,000 to be performed in other IAEA Member States.

26. These actions do not mean that the bilateral system of agreements is to be abandoned. The United States has adopted the policy of encouraging an increasing number of its bilateral partners to seek special nuclear materials and other assistance through the Agency. For those countries with which we have substantial joint programs, or in cases where political considerations dictate a preference, however, the bilateral agreement probably will continue to be the instrument of choice.

27. The US–IAEA Agreement for Cooperation, which went into force August 7, 1959, made it possible for the United States to use the Agency to provide reactors and fuel to Agency members whether or not such members had a bilateral agreement with the United States. Under this agreement, Finland and Yugoslavia will obtain, through the IAEA, research reactors and fuel of U.S. manufacture. In this connection, the United States awarded a \$200,000 grant to Yugoslavia towards the purchase of its reactor and an additional \$150,000 commitment for purchase of U.S. equipment.

28. Accepting the U.S. offer made at the 1959 IAEA General Conference, Agency scientists in 1960 began visits to some unclassified U.S. small nuclear power plant projects. At the 1960 IAEA meeting, the U.S. offer was extended to include additional projects in the small and medium-sized reactor field. Arrangements are being made to place Agency visits on a periodic basis. The IAEA technical staff is not large enough to permit long-term work assignments to these projects.

29. Other assistance included the offer to donate up to \$50,000 worth of nuclear fuel for the Agency-sponsored Finnish reactor project; participation of 35 U.S. scientists and engineers in many fields as consultants to countries requesting them through the IAEA or as members of Agency expert panels; and continuation of the program of making a minimum of 80 cost-free fellowships for training in the United States available through the Agency program.

30. Future financing of the Agency is one of the major problems confronting the United States in its continuing effort to make the Agency a more effective instrument in dealing with international matters such as health and safety, including waste disposal; safeguards; information dissemination; etc., and for channeling U.S. nuclear energy assistance to underdeveloped nations.

31. The present system of two budgets, one termed "administrative" and supported by assessments and the other, designated "operational", funded by voluntary contributions is inadequate and cumbersome. Voluntary contributions have not been as large as expected to the detriment of those Agency activities dependent on this source of funds. As of October 1, 1960 it did not appear that payments of other members will exceed \$500,000 (the goal was \$1,500,000 to which the United States contributed \$500,000). This means that none of the \$250,000 pledged additionally by the United States on a matching basis for contributions in excess of \$1,000,000 will be used. Although pledges of voluntary contributions have increased in the past two years, the Agency faces a difficult problem in obtaining adequate support on a regular basis from those Members able to pay more.

32. The present detailed statutory supervision of Agency operations by the Board of Governors impedes efficient administration of Agency programs and often results in undue delays in obtaining non-policy decisions and approvals. The United States will examine the desirability of changes in the Agency Statute, revision of which will be considered at the Fifth and Sixth General Conferences in 1961 and 1962, that would contribute to solving these problems.

33. A continuing problem at IAEA General Conference is injection of political and propaganda issues, principally by the Soviet Bloc, into general debate and committee discussions. This is resented particularly by some of the scientist-delegates from other member states but no practical solution appears at hand.

34. The term of former Representative Sterling W. Cole as Director General expires in 1961. The Board of Governors will appoint the Director General for the 1962-1966 term in time for approval at the Fifth General Conference in September 1961. Although no political commitments, direct or implied, were made when Mr. Cole was chosen, the

fact that he was from the “West” may lead to claims that he should be succeeded by a Soviet-oriented person. The United States contemplates seeking support among non-Soviet Bloc Members for a mutually agreed upon candidate for the Director General post.

EURATOM AND ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION (OEEC)

35. The deepening impact of economic factors that have produced a lessened urgency for nuclear power (see paragraphs 5–6) resulted in a setback in the joint US-Euratom effort to encourage European utilities to build large-scale nuclear plants in Western Europe. In the first round of invitations for plants to be constructed by the end of 1963, only one final proposal qualified for benefits of the joint program.

36. This was the 150,000 KWe project in Southern Italy for the Italian Societa Electronucleare Nazionale (SENN). Construction is proceeding and a U.S. manufacturer will supply the boiling-water-type reactor. With agreement of all parties involved and no objection from the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, this project—already initiated under bilateral arrangements—was placed under the Euratom program.

37. Invitation for two plants, to be completed by December 1965, is to be issued shortly by Euratom, with indications that the 150,000 KW(e) project of the Baden-Wurtemberg consortium in West Germany (AKS) and the 210,000 KW(e) joint Franco-Belgian proposal (SENA) may be submitted.

38. Euratom remains of the belief that, over the long term, nuclear power will be important in Europe. Its recent study forecast that, by 1980, the Community would require, in addition to expanded conventional output, some 40,000,000 KW installed nuclear capacity. This same study put nuclear power by 1970 at 9,600,000 KW. The 1956 “Target for Euratom” envisaged 15,000,000 KW by 1968.

39. The joint US-Euratom research and development program was cut back to limit proposals generally to work on the boiling water system. This policy will be reviewed after evaluation of proposals received for the 1965 reactors. To date, 45 projects totaling \$7,800,000 have been approved by the Joint US-Euratom Research and Development Board. The United States will finance \$2,200,000 of this work and Euratom the remaining \$5,600,000.

40. An Additional Agreement for Cooperation with Euratom came into force July 25, 1960 which covers transfer of highly enriched fuel and U-233 contained in fuel for use in research and development projects not connected with the joint program. A perfecting amendment to

the Euratom Cooperation Act to permit implementing this Additional Agreement will be submitted to the next Congress.

41. Euratom acquired, through lease, the excellent Ispra Center in Italy which will become its major research facility. The Community also made substantial progress in the use of national laboratories in Member States for research projects. Agreements are in force or being negotiated for joint or Community work at laboratories in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.

42. There have been important developments in the area of public liability. Signed and awaiting ratification is an OEEC convention setting up to \$15,000,000 of private protection as the maximum for each nuclear accident with a proviso that no state would require less than \$5,000,000. Euratom staff is developing a supplement to the OEEC convention which would permit its members, unilaterally, to add government indemnity to raise the maximum liability to between \$50,000,000 and \$80,000,000 with the possibility that, jointly, the Euratom countries might take action to bring the total available for public claims to approximately \$120,000,000.

43. There remain some problems which affect the U.S.-Euratom joint program. Among these are the recent Euratom request to lease enriched fuel inventories for the joint power reactor projects instead of purchasing them on the deferred payment plan; Euratom encouragement of the West Berlin project, BEWAG, which poses technical and political problems for the United States; and recurring friction between French and Euratom executives.

44. (The International Atomic Energy Agency continued its work on drafting public liability conventions which would have world-wide application to land based facilities and nuclear-powered ships.)

45. Euratom also has Agreement for Cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada. The former has not resulted in any joint projects to date and discussions have tended to range over long-range programs. Canada and Euratom have established a joint board to administer a five-year \$10,000,000 research and development effort on the heavy-water moderated reactor system.

46. United States expanded its cooperation with the OEEC and the latter's European Nuclear Energy Agency, through an agreement for exchange of data on experimental high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor (DRAGON in England; the Philadelphia Electric-General Dynamics project in this country); consultative assistance to Eurochemic (the semi-governmental share-holding company now building a chemical reprocessing plant at Mol, Belgium); and to the OEEC experimental reactor project at Halden, Norway.

*INTER-AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COMMISSION (IANEC)
AND PUERTO RICO NUCLEAR CENTER*

47. The new Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) is composed of representatives of the governments of the Organization of American States. Its statute, adopted in April 1959, sets up IANEC as a coordinating and consultative body in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

48. Several problems emerged from the two IANEC meetings and its symposium on industrial applications of nuclear energy, all held during the reporting period. Coordination of effort in training, education, and research remains the paramount need. The United States, at both IANEC meetings, committed itself to increased financial support on a bilateral basis to national centers and specialized research and training facilities when a comprehensive plan for practical development has been completed and given IANEC approval.

49. The acute lack of facilities for gathering and interchanging technical information in Latin-American countries also was demonstrated at the symposium. The United States supported resolutions adopted at the second IANEC meeting urging development of a coordinated training program and recommending revision of O.A.S. fellowship, technical assistance and other applicable programs to promote greater use of these programs in the nuclear science field.

50. The Puerto Rico Nuclear Center was strengthened during the reporting period with the completion of a small training reactor and the dedication of a large research reactor and related laboratory facilities in August 1960, and the appointment, effective July 1, 1960, of Dr. John Bugher, former Director of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, as Center Director. Dr. Bugher's appointment fills the need for putting an outstanding Scientific Administrator at the head of the Center.

51. Current objectives are effective recruitment of students from Latin America, establishment of strong research programs and achieving closer relationship with the University of Puerto Rico in planning Center and University programs. Approximately 20 Latin-American students were enrolled at the Center in the 1959 academic year.

52. With respect to the concept of a cooperative Center to serve Asian countries: There has been no revival of interest in the countries which were consulted several years ago.

U.S. NUCLEAR POWER AND PLOWSHARE PROGRAMS

53. One objective of the U.S. 10-year power program has been changed by the economic factors previously noted (see paragraphs 35–39). The hope that within five years U.S. assistance and progress in our program would bring competitive nuclear power to high cost areas in

friendly countries, especially in Europe, does not appear likely to be realized.

54. The U.S. effort is moving ahead. The 180,000 KW(e) Dresden plant near Chicago is in operation and attracting an increasing number of foreign visitors. The Yankee 110,000 KW(e) project in Massachusetts has gone critical. Plants in operation or under construction will raise the total U.S. installed nuclear capacity above the 1,000,000 KW(e) mark by 1964. See Appendix "A", page 20. If other planned plants materialize, the total by 1966 would be about 1,500,000 KW(e).

55. During the past year, active negotiations were begun for at least three additional large-scale nuclear plants: the proposed 300,000 to 360,000 KW(e) plants for Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas and Electric Companies and studies looking toward a 350,000 to 500,000 KW(e) project in New York State for which seven utilities are organizing a special company.

56. The first phase of a long range AEC study, completed in Fiscal Year 1960, indicates that the pressurized and boiling water and the organic moderated reactor systems, with reasonable success in programmed development effort, will meet the near-term goal of competitive power with large scale reactors in high cost U.S. areas by 1963. Also for the first time, leading reactor manufacturers are offering to build plants in the 300,000 KW range on a fixed price scale.

57. For the long range goal of competitive power in low cost areas and with smaller plants, the United States is programming substantial research and development on several advanced reactor systems. It is estimated that at least \$2 billion will be required for the U.S. Government sponsored nuclear power program in the 1960's. The bulk of the developmental work such as design, construction and operation of reactor experiments, and prototypes and general engineering will be funded by the Government. Privately financed projects are expected to add substantially to the total expenditures.

58. In addition to the U.S. work with Euratom and OEEC (See paragraphs 31-36, 41) a cooperative program entered into with Canada is expected to make substantial contributions to heavy water moderated reactor technology. Under this program, the United States will spend in this country up to \$5,000,000 over a five-year period for research and development supporting the Canadian program in this field.

59. Civilian applications are assuming more importance in efforts directed at nuclear rocket propulsion (ROVER program) and at developing small, light-weight auxiliary nuclear power and heat sources (SNAP program). Last August, work heretofore carried out separately by the AEC and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was consolidated in a joint Nuclear Propulsion Office.

60. Although an experimental ROVER graphite reactor tested in July 1960 ran for five minutes at about a 90,000 kilowatt power level, an effort to develop reactors of high power, higher gas temperatures and lower weight is being pursued. The goal is to achieve three to four times more power and thrust which would increase payload capabilities.

61. Progress was made in the two approaches to small nuclear auxiliary power sources—one using heat from isotope decay and the other based on small, compact reactors. Both have been successfully demonstrated. An experimental power package for a remote weather station was completed in Fiscal Year 1960. The U.S. Coast Guard has established a requirement for unattended power sources for several types of navigational aids.

62. In the nuclear ship program, the N.S. SAVANNAH is nearing completion and sea trials are scheduled for the spring of 1961. It will use a pressurized water reactor. Longer range development of other reactor systems is being carried out but it is not considered likely that nuclear merchant ship operation will be economic in the near future.

63. Negotiations are proceeding with the United Kingdom for permission for the NS SAVANNAH to call at Southampton and Tilbury (near London) and talks have been held with other European countries. Agreement has been reached with the British except for terms of third party liability.

64. In Europe interest in nuclear ship propulsion continues high despite the present lack of economic incentive. Recently, 11 shipyards in Germany were asked by the consortium of government and private industry at Hamburg, known as GKSS, to bid on design and construction of West Germany's first nuclear ship—to be a 10,000 horsepower "floating laboratory" powered by a 30,000 KW organic moderated reactor. Besides other German projects, mostly in the planning stage, studies are being pursued in Italy, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries.

65. Start of nuclear detonation experiments for peaceful uses (Project Plowshare) awaits decision related to negotiations on nuclear weapon tests ban. In the reporting period, cratering experiments with chemical high explosives have continued. Also, based on a technical study, the Panama Canal Company reported on April 29, 1960, that if certain preliminary experimentation should be successful, nuclear explosions could be used to build a new sea-level trans-Isthmian canal. The report urged that these experiments be conducted.

ACTIVITIES UNDER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

66. Activities carried on under bilateral agreements continued to expand. The most notable was the increase in transfer of reactor fuel. Most of the 339 kilograms of contained U-235 (total uranium 10,998 kg)

were shipped to other countries in the form of fuel elements manufactured in the United States. The total for this reporting period compares with 486 Kg of U-235 (total uranium 9,134 Kg) for all previous shipments.

67. This increase reflects the dominant position the United States has had in the sale of research and training reactors abroad since most of this fuel was for U.S. manufactured facilities. Foreign sales are dropping both in the United States and the United Kingdom, as other countries acquire the ability to design and construct reactors and as current needs are satisfied.

68. No large-scale power reactors were sold either by the United States or the United Kingdom in the reporting period. Plans of the Franco-Belgian and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kernkraftwerke Stuttgart (AKS) groups, however, are based on U.S. designed reactors. On October 10, 1960, India invited international bidding on a 300,000 KW(e) nuclear plant for the Bombay area. Brazil has announced that invitations for 200,000 KW(e) between Rio and Sao Paulo will be issued in 1961.

69. Reflecting the adverse economic climate for nuclear power, the only group to take advantage of the special deferred fuel payment plan offered for reactors that could be completed by 1964 was the Societa Elettro-nucleare Italiana (SELNI), a corporation 85 per cent privately owned, with the majority held in Edisonvolta. Its 165,000 KW(e) plant, using a U.S. reactor, is to be located in the Ligurian region and will serve the Milan industrial complex.

70. Changes in civilian bilateral agreements not previously noted include the coming into force of one for power with Venezuela (signed October 8, 1958) and two for research with Indonesia and Austria, the last-named being an updating of an earlier agreement. Amendments expanding the scope of cooperation were effected with Canada, New Zealand, and Thailand. The total agreements in force now stand at 41 with 39 countries, plus those with Euratom and IAEA.

71. The Canadian amendment clarified patent arrangements, provided for sale lease or loan of special nuclear materials and heavy water and extended the duration of the Agreement for Cooperation.

TRAINING

72. Training of foreign nationals in Commission and other U.S. institutions continued to increase. During the Fiscal Year 1960, more than 1,100 persons from 52 countries participated in formal courses (260) or received on-the-job training at Commission facilities (900 estimated). Guidance on opportunities and financial assistance available in private industry and U.S. colleges and universities was given to several hundred others.

73. The training program is kept flexible to meet changing needs. The first class at the school at Argonne National Laboratory, renamed, in 1960, the International Institute of Nuclear Science and Engineering, entered on much more advanced courses of study. Basic work now available elsewhere was dropped in the curriculum revision.

74. The first courses, primarily for foreign students, in various phases of reactor technology and operation were completed in this reporting period at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the nuclear ship project, and the Shippingport nuclear power plant.

75. Education-and-training continued to be an important and popular phase of the Atoms for Peace program, particularly in view of the increased efforts in technical assistance through IAEA research and equipment grants for use by foreign nationals in their own countries. Facilities for basic training are improving in quality and expanding in number in the more advanced nations. The AEC program will be altered as necessary to meet changing conditions.

EXHIBITS AND CONFERENCES

76. The Commission continued, on a selected basis, to support financially international conferences and symposia. Fourteen such meetings received support between February and October, 1960.

77. Subject to approval of the United Nations General Assembly, a Third International Conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy is scheduled tentatively for 1962 or 1963. The United States has taken the position that the International Atomic Energy Agency should have a major role in this next conference.

78. Major nuclear energy exhibits in New Delhi, India, and Cairo, United Arab Republic were most successful. A total of 2,800,000 viewed the U.S. exhibit at the New Delhi World Agricultural Fair between December 11, 1959, and February 29, 1960. Eleven seminars were held there for scientists and students. An operating reactor produced a number of isotopes some of which were used in experiments performed at the exhibit. Other major exhibits planned for the remainder of 1960 will be held in Pakistan and Argentina. During 1961, major displays are scheduled for Lebanon, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela.

79. The United States continued to support the objectives and work of the United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation.

REACTOR AND EQUIPMENT GRANTS

80. In December 1959, the United States terminated the AEC research reactor grant program, effective June 30, 1960. Except for several applications received just before the deadline which are being evaluated, future requests will compete with other aid proposals from the specific country

involved and, if granted, be funded by country program appropriations rather than from the Atoms for Peace budget.

81. In the reporting period, grants were committed for Turkey, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia, bringing the total to 22, of which 6 have been paid following completion of the reactor projects (see paragraph 26, Yugoslavia).

82. In general, the research reactor grant effort has been a successful phase of the Atoms for Peace program. This is attested in several ways: One has been concrete results in terms of research and development activities that are beginning to accumulate as these "grants" reactors continue successful operation. Another has been the stimulation that these projects provided for nuclear research and training in the recipient countries. In most cases, the total amount invested in facilities exceeded by many times the \$350,000 grant.

83. One of the more successful "grant" reactors is the Munich, Germany project which is doing important work in irradiation of elements and materials, experiments with neutron beams and reactor experiments. An Israeli team spent several months at Munich, learning how to operate and use the swimming pool reactor, the type that Israel has just completed with U.S. grant assistance. (The U.S. company that built the Israeli reactor has reported that this project has been the most successful of any of its many overseas installations.)

84. Some grant projects have encountered delays which can be charged to some extent to lack in the recipient country of proper organization for design, specification and construction and unrealistic and overly optimistic time schedules. The United States, where appropriate, is endeavoring to assist in remedying such situations. In one case (Japan) much of the delay of over a year appears to have been due to the U.S. manufacturers.

85. In some countries, there will be a problem of using these new reactors fully. The United States recommended to the IAEA that this factor be taken into account in its technical aid program.

86. Assistance in procurement of equipment is assuming added importance because of its value to lesser developed countries. U.S. grants are used to meet urgent needs ranging from integrated packages of laboratory equipment, including hot cells, to simple teaching tools needed in a radioisotopes course. These grants now are being handled in three ways: Direct by the AEC; through ICA country programs; and by U.S. grants in kind made through the IAEA. State and AEC are re-examining the methods of funding equipment grants.

87. In fiscal year 1960, the totals for all three categories of equipment grants were \$1,183,000 for 19 grants to 13 countries.

AEC PARTICIPATION IN US–USSR EXCHANGES

88. A Memorandum of Cooperation was signed in November 1959 by Chairman McCone of the USAEC and Professor V.S. Emelyanov, his counterpart in the Soviet Union. This understanding is incorporated as a formal addendum to the US–USSR 1960–61 Scientific, Technical and Cultural Exchange Agreement.

89. A modest program of exchanges of visits of US and USSR nuclear scientists under the Memorandum has made satisfactory progress and is being continued. In the reporting period, there have been reciprocal visits in the fields of high energy physics and controlled thermonuclear research. An exchange of visits in the area of radioactive waste disposal is expected to take place shortly as a result of further McCone-Emelyanov talks in Vienna in September, 1960.

90. Reports of these visits, as well as technical reports developed as a result of the discussions, are being made available to the IAEA. AEC is withholding direct exchange of its technical reports with the Soviet Union until the latter begins to fulfill its reciprocal obligations in this respect.

91. Professor Emelyanov has been urging discussion of possibilities of joint US–USSR projects, especially in waste disposal and high energy physics. The United States has responded cautiously because it is felt that such developments, particularly in high energy physics, should proceed on a broader international base.

92. At a meeting in New York City on September 16, U.S. and U.S.S.R. physicists agreed on the desirability of a particle accelerator in the energy region above 300 Bev. The U.S. group (private physicists not representing the Government) recommended that other countries and areas be encouraged to participate in the studies. This possibility is under consideration. The understanding calls for channeling any joint projects, to the extent that it is possible, through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

CONCLUSIONS

93. The six years of operation of the Atoms for Peace program has contributed to U.S. foreign policy with a relatively modest expenditure. The program brought to millions of people all over the world the realization of the potential of nuclear energy for peaceful applications.

94. Our effort to share with other nations the fruits of our progress in this field and our willingness to assist others has identified the United States as the world leader in seeking to encourage the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The historic United Nations conferences in Geneva in 1955 and 1958, initiated by the United States, contributed greatly to this image.

95. The program has resulted in thousands of person-to-person exchanges between U.S. nationals and those of most of the nations of the world. There have been more than 4,700 visitors from other countries to U.S. government and private nuclear laboratories, plants, and research centers. Some 2,500 foreign nationals have received training in nuclear science and technology in the United States.

96. One of the principal objectives of the program has been achieved. The International Atomic Energy Agency began operations in October 1957 and has grown slowly but steadily in competence and prestige. It has been recognized by other international organizations as having a leading role and competence in the nuclear field.

97. The Agency has, in less than two calendar years of full operation (staffing and organization predominated the first year), achieved noteworthy success in developing its fellowship program (about 1,000 awards made). Its publications are recognized internationally, particularly its manuals in the health and safety field. It has developed the ability to program and carry out large technical conferences and its smaller panels of experts have made significant contributions in the field of public liability and adoption of pertinent international standards.

98. The IAEA has made substantial progress toward implementing one of its most important statutory functions, that of establishing and administering an international system of safeguards to assure against diversion to military purposes of material designated for civilian use. If the safeguards proposal now before the IAEA Board for implementation is adopted and supplier and recipient nations do not bypass the Agency, administration of an international system of controls in the civilian area may assist in working out a practical contribution to new efforts to reach with the Soviet Union an agreement on a safeguarded formula for nuclear arms control.

99. One major goal has not been attained, that of the Agency becoming the chief custodian and broker of source and fissionable materials. Two factors are largely responsible: One is that the basic raw material, uranium ore, a scarce item in 1953, is now a surplus commodity on the world market. The other is that economic civilian uses for large quantities of uranium, particularly in nuclear plants, have not developed as fast as had been anticipated.

100. The basic objectives of U.S. policy in the Atoms for Peace effort, set forth in NSC 5725/1, continue applicable to programs implementing that policy. Consideration should be given to updating some of the background material. Some of the specific guidelines should be studied with a view to revision as necessary to reflect changing conditions such as the lessened urgency for nuclear power, development of multilateral agencies, and the emergency of new and underdeveloped countries which are becoming full-voting members of the United Nations, the IAEA, and other international organizations.

Appendix A

CENTRAL STATION AND EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN OPERATION, UNDER CONSTRUCTION
OR CONTRACTED FOR IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF OCTOBER 19, 1960

Name and/or Owner	Location	Principal Nuclear Contractor	Type	Net Power kw(e)	Startup
<u>Operable:</u>					
Shippingport Atomic Power Station (AEC and Dequesne Light Co.)	Shippingport, Pa.	Westinghouse Electric Co.	Pressurized Water	60,000	[illegible in the original]
Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Commonwealth Edison Co.)	Morris, Ill.	General Electric Company	Boiling Water	100,000	[illegible in the original]
Yankee Atomic Electric Co.	Rowe, Mass.	Westinghouse Electric Co.	Pressurized Water	110,000	[illegible in the original]
Experimental Boiling EBWR Water Reactor	Argonne, Ill.	Argonne National Laboratory, operated by the University of Chicago	Boiling Water	4,500	[illegible in the original]

Name and/or Owner	Location	Principal Nuclear Contractor	Type	Net Power kw(e)	Startup
Vallecitos Boiling VBWR Water Reactor, (General Electric Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company)	Pleasanton, Calif.	General Electric Company	Boiling Water	5,000	[illegible in the original]
Sodium Reactor Experiment SRE (AEC and Southern California Edison Co.)	Santa Susana, Calif.	Atomics International, a Division of North American Aviation, Inc.	Sodium graphite	6,000	1957
<u>Being Built:</u>					
Consolidated Edison Co. Thorium Reactor	Indian Point, N.Y.	The Babcock & Wilcox Co.	Pressurized water	255,000	1961
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant (Power Reactor Development Co.)	Lagoona Beach, Mich.	Owner	Fast breeder	94,000	[illegible in the original]
Hallam Nuclear Power Facility, Sheldon Station (AEC and Consumers Public Power District)	Hallam, Nebr.	Atomics International, a Division of Forth American Aviation, Inc.	Sodium graphite	75,000	1962

Name and/or Owner	Location	Principal Nuclear Contractor	Type	Net Power kw(e)	Startup
Northern States Power Co. Pathfinder Plant	Sioux Falls, S. Dak.	Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.	Boiling water nuclear superheat	60,000	[illegible in the original]
Rural Cooperative Power Association and AEC	Elk River, Minn.	Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.	Boiling water	22,000	[illegible in the original]
City of Piqua and AEC	Piqua, Ohio	Atomics International, a Division of North American Aviation, Inc.	Organic cooled and moderated	11,400	1961
Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor (Carolinas-Virginia Nuclear Power Associates, Inc.	Parr, S.C.	Westinghouse Electric Co.	Pressure tube, heavy water	16,950	1962
Boiling Reactor Nuclear Superheat Project (AEC and Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority)	Punta Higuera, Puerto Rico	General Nuclear Engineering Corp., a Subsidiary of Combustion Engineering, Inc.	Boiling water, international nuclear superheat	16,300	1962
Experimental Breeder FBR-2 Reactor No. 2	NRTS, Idaho	Argonne National Laboratory, operated by the University of Chicago	Fast breeder	16,500	[illegible in the original]

Name and/or Owner	Location	Principal Nuclear Contractor	Type	Net Power kw(e)	Startup
Boiling Reactor BORAM-5 Experiment No. 5	NRTS, Idaho	Argonne National Laboratory, operated by the University of Chicago	Boiling water	2650	[illegible in the original]
Saxton Nuclear Experimental Reactor Project (Privately Owned)	Saxton, Pa.	Westinghouse Electric Co.	Pressurized water	3250	1961
Experimental Gas Cooled EGCR Reactor (AEC and Tennessee Valley Authority)	Oak Ridge, Tenn.	Kaiser Engineers, a Division of Henry J. Kaiser Co.—ACF Industries, Inc.	Gas cooled, graphite moderated	32,900	1961
Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit No. 3 (Pacific Gas and Electric Co.)	Humboldt Bay, Calif.	General Electric Company	Boiling water	48,500	[illegible in the original]
Consumers Power Company	Big Rock Point, Michigan	General Electric Company	Boiling water	50,000	1962
<u>Contracted For:</u>					
High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (Philadelphia Electric Co.)	Peach Bottom, Pa.	General Atomic Division, General Dynamics Corp.	Gas cooled, graphite moderated	40,000	1963

